

HISTORY
OF
THE MAHRATTAS

BY
JAMES GRANT DUFF

AIN IN THE 1ST REGIMENT OF BOMBAY NATIVES
LATE POLITICAL RESIDENT AT SATARA.

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GOVERNOR, &c., &c., OF BOMBAY.

IN TESTIMONY OF RESPECT AND GRATITUDE, OF ESTEEM FOR HIS
PRIVATE, AND OF ADMIRATION FOR HIS PUBLIC, CHARACTER,

This Work is Inscribed,

BY HIS MOST OBEDIENT,

HUMBLE SERVANT,

THE AUTHOR.

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PREFACE.

THE want of a complete history of the rise, progress, and decline of our immediate predecessors in conquest, the Mahrattas, has been long felt by all persons conversant with the affairs of India; insomuch that, it is very generally acknowledged, we cannot fully understand the means by which our own vast empire in that quarter was acquired until this desideratum be supplied.

The difficulty of obtaining the requisite materials has hitherto deterred most of our countrymen from venturing on a subject where the indefatigable Orme has left his Fragments as a monument of his research, accompanied by an attestation of the labour which they cost him. The subsequent attempt of Mr. Scott Waring proved not only the difficulties of which Mr. Orme's experience had warned us, but that, at a period comparatively recent, those who had the best opportunities of collecting information respecting the Mahrattas were still very deficient in a knowledge of their history. Circumstances placed me in situations which at once removed many of the obstacles which those gentlemen encountered, and threw materials within my reach which had been previously inaccessible: nevertheless the labour and the expense requisite for completing this volume can only be appreciated by those who assisted me in the design, or who have been engaged in similar pursuits in India.

On the subversion of the government of the Peishwas, the most important of their state papers, and of their public and secret correspondence, were made over to me by Mr. Elphinstone, when he was acting under the orders of the Marquis of Hastings as sole commissioner for the settlement of the conquered territory in the Deccan. Captain Henry Dundas Robertson, collector and magistrate of Poona, with Mr. Elphinstone's sanction, allowed confidential agents employed by me to have access to the mass of papers which were found in the apartments of the Peishwa's palaces. The Mahratta revenue state accounts were examined and extracted for me by the Lieute-

nant John Macleod, when first assistant to Mr. Chaplin, who succeeded Mr. Elphinstone as commissioner for the conquered territory. The records of the Satara government were under my own immediate charge, and many original papers of historical importance, the existence of which was unknown to the Peishwas, were confided to me by the Raja. Mr. Elphinstone, when governor of Bombay, gave me free access to the records of that government; I had read the whole, both public and secret, up to 1795, and had extracted what formed many large volumes of matter relative to my subject, when Mr. Warden, the chief secretary, who had from the first afforded every facility to my progress, lent me a compilation from the records, made by himself, which shortened my subsequent labours, and afforded materials amply sufficient, as far as regarded English history, for the years that remained. Mr. Romer, political agent at Surat, not only read, and at his own expense extracted, the whole of the records of the old Surat factory, but also sent me an important manuscript history in the Persian language, which, when referred to as an authority, is acknowledged in its proper place. The viceroy of Goa most liberally furnished me with extracts from the records of the Portuguese government; and the Court of Directors allowed me to have partial access to those in the East India House for some particulars from the Bengal correspondence, and for authenticating a variety of facts, originally obtained from Mahratta authorities, but of which there is no trace in the secretary's office at Bombay. The gentlemen of the India House were on every occasion most obliging: the very old records under Dr. Wilkins, which I could not have read without great trouble, were made perfectly easy by the intelligence and kindness of Mr. Armstrong, one of the gentlemen in the office of Mr. Platt.

In regard to native authorities, besides the important papers already mentioned, records of temples and private repositories were searched at my request; family legends, imperial and royal deeds, public and private correspondence, and state papers in possession of the descendants of men once high in authority; law suits and law decisions; and manuscripts of every description in Persian and Mahratta, which had any reference to my subject, were procured from all quarters, cost what they might. Upwards of one hundred of these manuscripts, some of them histories at least as voluminous as my whole work, were translated purposely for it. My intimate personal acquaintance with many of the Mahratta chiefs, and with several of the great Bramin families in the country, some of

the members of which were actors in the events which I have attempted to record, afforded advantages which few Europeans could have enjoyed, especially as a great deal of the information was obtained during the last revolution in Maharashtra, when numerous old papers, which at any other period would not have been so readily produced, were brought forward for the purpose of substantiating just claims, or setting up unfounded pretensions. Latterly, however, I have to acknowledge many instances of disinterested liberality both from Bramins and Mahrattas, who of their own accord presented me with many valuable documents, and frequently communicated their opinions with much kindness and candour.

Next to Mr. Elphinstone, to whom I am indebted, not only for the situation which procured me most of these advantages, but for an encouragement without which I might never have ventured to prosecute this work, I am chiefly obliged to my friends, Captain Henry Adams, revenue surveyor to the Raja of Satara, and Mr. William Richard Morris, of the Bombay Civil Service, then acting as my first assistant. These gentlemen translated many hundreds of deeds and letters, numerous treaties, several voluminous histories; and, for years together, were ever ready, at all hours after the transaction of public business, to give up their time in furtherance of my object.

A great part of this work was written in India; and as the chapters were prepared, I submitted them to all those gentlemen on the spot, who, from their situations or pursuits, seemed most likely to be able to corroborate facts or to correct errors. It would be too long a list, nor can it be expected that I should enumerate all those who were so kind as to read portions of the manuscript, both in India and in England; but my thanks are due to Mr. William Erskine, of Edinburgh; to Lieutenant-Colonels Shuldhham and Vans Kennedy, of Bombay; to Sir James Mackintosh; to Mr. Mill; to Mr. Jenkins; to Lieutenant-Colonel Briggs; and to Lieutenant John MacLeod, whose premature fate in being cut off by a fever at Bushire, where he had been appointed political resident, may be justly regarded as a loss to his country.

I have thus endeavoured to express my acknowledgments to all who favoured me with their advice or opinion, or who, in the slightest degree, assisted or contributed to this volume: my particular obligations are commonly repeated in notes, where each subject is mentioned; but if I have omitted, in any one instance, to express what is justly due either to European or to native, I can only say the omission is not intentional and proceeds

from no desire to appropriate to myself one iota of merit to which another can fairly lay claim.

I am very sensible that I appear before the public under great disadvantages, as indeed every one must do who, having quitted school at sixteen, has been constantly occupied nearly nine-tenths of the next twenty-one years of his life in the most active duties of the civil or military services of India ; for, however well such a life may fit us for acquiring some kinds of information, it is in other respects ill-calculated for preparing us for the task of historians ; yet, unless some of the members of our service undertake such works, whence are the materials for the future historian to be derived, or how is England to become acquainted with India ? Whilst I solicit indulgence, however, to such defects as arise from this cause, it is also due to myself to apprise the reader that, independent of want of skill in the author, there are difficulties incidental to the present subject, besides harsh names and intricate details, with which even a proficient in the art of writing must have been embarrassed. The rise of the Mahrattas was chiefly attributable to the confusion of other states, and it was generally an object of their policy to render everything as intricate as possible, and to destroy records of rightful possession. As their armies overran the country, their history becomes blended with that of every other state in India, and may seem to partake of the disorder which they spread. As the only method, therefore, of preserving regularity, I have sometimes been obliged, when the confusion becomes extreme, rather to observe the chronological series of events than to follow out the connection of the subjects—a mode which will appear in some parts, especially of the first sixteen chapters, to partake more of the form of annals than I could have wished ; but persons who are better judges of composition than I pretend to be, found, upon examination, that the remedy might have obliged me either to generalize too much, or, what would have been still worse, to amplify unnecessarily. I have also afforded some explanations for the benefit of European readers which those of India may deem superfluous ; and, on the other hand, I have mentioned some names and circumstances which, I am certain, will hereafter prove useful to persons in the Mahratta country, but which others may think might have been advantageously omitted.

There being differences of opinion as to whether the writer of history should always draw his own conclusions or leave the reader to reflect for himself, I may expect censure or approbation according to the taste of parties. I have never spared my

sentiments when it became my duty to offer them; but I have certainly rather endeavoured to supply facts than to obtrude my own commentaries; and though I am well aware that, to gain confidence with the one-half of the world, one has only to assume it, I trust that I shall not have the less credit with the other for frankly acknowledging a distrust in myself.

It will also be apparent that, though I have spared no pains to verify my facts, I have seldom thought it necessary to contradict previous misstatements; for so many inaccuracies have been published on many points of Mahratta history, that it seemed far better simply to refer to my authorities, where strong and undeniable, than to enter on a field of endless controversy. At the same time I have endeavoured to give every opinion its due consideration; and wherever it seemed of importance to state conflicting sentiments, I have not failed to lay them candidly before the reader, that he might rather exercise his own judgment than trust implicitly to mine. Still, however, in such a work many errors must exist: of these, I can only say I shall feel obliged to any person who, after due consideration and inquiry, will have the goodness, publicly or privately, to point them out.

In regard to orthography, where Indian names have already become familiar to the English reader, I have seldom altered their usual spelling, however unlike the manner in which they are pronounced by the natives;* but in other instances I have, with some exceptions, nearly followed the system of Dr. Gilchrist: thus—

A	as in	Hall.	N	as in	Not.
B, Bh		Bud, Abhor.	O, Oo			Hole, Cool.
C, Ch		Cart, Church.	P, Ph			Put, Loophole.
D, Dh		Dad, Adhere.	Q			Liquor.
E, Ee		There, Been.	R			Ram.
F		Fill.	S, Sh			Sin, Sheen.
G, Gh		Gun, Doghole.	T, Th			Tent, Nuthook.
H		How.	U			But.
I		Sin.	V			Vend.
J		Judge.	W			Were.
K, Kh		King, Milkhouse.	Y			Youth.
L		Lamb.	Z			Zany.
M		Man.						

N. B.—*Ac*, *ou*, and *ow* are all to be sounded like *ou* in *house*.

LONDON, May 30, 1826.

* The instances which immediately occur to me, where I have deviated from this rule, are *outar*, an incarnation, for what is more generally written *avatar*; *wakeel* for *sakeel*; *Bhonslay*, the *n* sounded like the French *n* in *son*, for *Bhosla* or *Bounsello*; and *Toongbuddra* for *Tumboodra*. *Toongbuddra* is correctly written, because I have occasion to mention the *Toong* distinct from the *Buddra*, and my ear had become so accustomed to the other words that I wrote them. I was in the daily habit of hearing them pronounced, without being able to avoid doing so.

PREFACE TO PRESENT EDITION.

IN bringing before the public a new and cheaper edition, in one volume, of "Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas," nothing need be said to enhance the acknowledged high reputation of the work as a history done at first hand, and written by the author direct from the materials it embodies.

All persons familiar with modern Indian history have expressed their appreciation of the book ; and, amongst readers of this class, who are also acquainted with Western India and the Mahrattas, testimony is complete as to the remarkable fidelity with which the persevering and studious Bombay Captain of Infantry compiled his narrative, and described the characteristics of the people.

It is hoped that the work being now presented in one volume and at a much lower price than any previous edition, will secure for it a far wider circle of readers than it ever before obtained.

The personal interest which in the Bombay Presidency is connected with the authorship of the "History of the Mahrattas," will be renewed on perusal of the chief portion of a letter from the author, written in his retirement, in reply to a note, urging the publication of a new edition, from his friend Mr. E. H. Goldsmid, the eminent Bombay Civilian, to whom was largely due the development of the Revenue Survey system, and whose acquaintance with the Deccan, its people, and their usages, was most intimate. We are indebted for the use of this letter in the present instance to Mr. James Taylor, Honorary Secretary to the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, whose "Note on Grant Duff's History," comprising the extract we now give, appears in No. XXVIII. of the Society's Transactions, now passing through the press. It will be

seen that no liberty has been taken with the letter, which is presented, just as found, in its plain, easy, epistolary style :—

Extract from a letter from J. Grant Duff, Esq. (Author of the History of the Mahrattas), to E. H. Goldsmid, Esq., Bombay Civil Service.

Dated Eden by Banff, January 30th, 1846.

As to a Second Edition, about ten years ago, in consequence of repeated suggestions on the subject—for I had individually no pleasure in recurring to it—I wrote to the publishers, Longman and Co. ; but their reply was not so encouraging as to induce me to begin re-casting many ill-written passages, which I sometimes thought of, but had always some more immediate object of interest or business.

I am aware that it cannot be purchased, even of booksellers ; but even if the publishers now wished it, I should be much more inclined—though I could not now be bothered re-writing it—to publish a second edition, on testimonials such as yours than from any other consideration whatever.

I think your suggestion very good ; what you propose would make it more portable and better fitted to the one [? object] I had in view.

Your interest in the work, and in case you should ever become an Indian author, leads me to tell you something of its origin and progress.

It ought, and perhaps would, have been undertaken by Mr. Elphinstone had he not so soon been removed from the Deccan to Bombay. I began to collect materials at his (Mr. E.'s) and Sir Thomas Munro's suggestion, lest we should lose the only chance of recovering the records of a very extraordinary power, the history of which was only known in a very superficial manner. As I went on collecting, I was obliged to unite the fragments in order to ascertain what was wanted, and I soon found myself obliged to employ agents, not merely within the confines of Maharashtra, but all over India.

I wrote the greater part of the work when otherwise working 12 and 14 hours daily without intermission (and of what sort you know), whilst some of the gentlemen with me, who had their full share of public business, particularly Mr. W. R. Morris, still in the service, most zealously assisted in translating the mass of materials which were selected from a still larger mass, read over without discovering a single fact on which we could depend. To account for some apparently very careless passages, I must tell you that I was subject to very severe headaches, which at last became very agonizing, returning every fifth day, and lasting from six to sixteen hours at a time, requiring me to work with wet cloths girt about my head, and I always could do best and most as the fit went off—so that I very often was induced to write on, upon these occasions, requiring no sleep until next night.

I was, as might have been expected, driven home ; but it was some time before I had health or inclination to get through the task I had undertaken. At last I sent the MS. to the late Mr. Murray. It was read and approved of by the person to whom he submitted it. I waited upon the potentate of Albemarle Street, who told me he would publish the work if I would alter the title. I said—“ It was a history of the Mahrattas, and only of the Mahrattas.”—“ Who knows anything about the Mahrattas ?” “ That's the reason,” said I, “ the book has been written—no one does know much about them.” “ Well,” replied Murray, “ and who cares to know ?

"If you call it the Downfall of the Moghuls, and the rise of the English, " or something of that kind, it may do, but a *History of the Mahrattas*— "that will never sell!" I was not in the least discouraged, although I too well knew that what Mr. Murray said was true—and amongst other drawbacks, although India is now beginning to excite a little more interest in England, no one can write or speak of India as of Europe—the feeling which cheers and impels the writer or the orator by an indescribable . . . sympathy is wanting, and hence the tiresome task which the narration of events purely Indian imposes. Of course I do not mean such narratives as Orms's *Carnatic*, which is more exciting than it could have been made by the fancy of Dr. Foe. I got the MS. laid before Sir James Mackintosh, who most kindly—without stopping to finish it—walked from Cadogan place to Paternoster Row (before the days of omnibuses), and at his recommendation Longman and Co. immediately wrote to me offering to publish it. It went through the Press in six weeks, and many errors corrected by me escaped the vigilance of the compositor—the reason was, the MS. was *too distinctly* copied; had it been in such an abominably indistinct hand as mine, one of their best men would have been selected, but, because distinct, I got one of the less experienced.

The late Mr. Rees was the partner with whom I chiefly communicated. No publisher in London at that time understood the business so thoroughly. When calculating the sale, I was surprised when he put down a very small proportion for India. The reason he said was—"people in India "don't buy—they read, but borrow—and it would be long before the "Mahratta History would be bought as an *outfit* book." Murray was so far quite right—people require to know something before they desire to know more.

The publishers took the risk. The book cost me upwards of £2,000 before it went to press. The Court of Directors took 40 copies—which they would have done equally had it been a *Mahratta Vocabulary*—and, as a general rule, is liberal; but, although I collected all those materials, certainly valuable to Government, and gave them an original and most valuable map, they never even acknowledged the receipt of the latter. They never enquired, and I certainly never stated, that I lost upwards of £1,700 by what I had done—and indeed, excepting a very few, I do not suppose any Director or aspirant of that period even opened the *Mahratta History* after they became Directors—a matter of no consequence, excepting as discouraging to such servants of the Company as may engage in extraordinary labour, and whom most certainly it is their province at least . . . in order to stimulate others in a like course.

It is not unusual to send copies of new books to the principal Reviews, and even to make interest to ensure a favorable notice—but I begged Mr. Rees in this case to do nothing of the kind, as time, and time only, could prove whether the matter was correct—and that must be tried by Indian authority hereafter. I had in the first instance the favorable opinion of the best authorities of the period as regarded my facts; and the praise even of a favorable critique was therefore but a mere puff—of use principally to the booksellers. Mr. Rees, however, quite agreed with me.

These details, if not useful, may be amusing to you . . .

* Illegible in original.

HISTORY OF THE MAHRATTAS.

PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS

RESPECTING THE GEOGRAPHY, CHIEF FEATURES, CLIMATE, PEOPLE, RELIGION,
LEARNING, EARLY HISTORY, AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE MAHRATTA
COUNTRY.

ACCORDING to Hindoo geographers, the Deccan, or country south of the Nerbuddah and Mahanuddee rivers, consists of a considerable number of parts; but there are five principal divisions, named Drawed, Carnatic, Andur, or Telingana, Gondwaneh,* and Maharashtra. All well-informed Hindoos talk familiarly of these divisions, but they disagree materially as to their extent. Colonel Wilks, in the absence of more direct evidence, has adopted the best practical rule of ascertaining their boundaries, by tracing them according to the space over which each particular language is now spoken.

The portion termed Drawed extends from Cape Comorin to the north of Madras: in this tract the Tamul† is the vernacular tongue. The ancient Carnatic is comprehended in the great table-land between Malabar and the coast now known by the name of Coromandel: the Ghauts, or chain of hills on both sides, form its boundary to the east and west; but it extends in an angle between Telingana and Maharashtra, as far north as the Manjera river, from which point it forms the western boundary of the former and the south-eastern boundary of the latter. Telingana, commencing southwards about Pulicat, or the northern extremity of Drawed, extends to Sicacole in Orissa, which last, together with Gondwaneh, occupies the space between Telingana and the Mahanuddee. The fifth division, which forms the western boundary of Gondwaneh and Telingana, it will be necessary to define with more precision.

Maharashtra is the native country of the people whose history it is now proposed to trace. Different limits are assigned to this great portion of the Deccan. According to the *Tutwa*, one of the books of the *Jotush Shaster*, or Hindoo Astronomy, Maharashtra extends no farther than the Chandore range of hills, where Kolwun, Buglana, and Candeish are repre-

* The mountainous tract called Gondwaneh is inhabited by a savage race of people, who, as they are not Hindoos, are supposed never to have been conquered.

† Malabar, Toolava, and Gohurasht, three divisions of the Malabar coast, though not expressly comprised in the limits of Drawed and Carnatic, are, from the similarity of their languages, considered as attached to these divisions respectively, viz., Malabar or Kerala to Drawed, and Toolava and Gohurasht to Carnatic.

sented as its northern boundary, and all beyond those countries is indiscriminately termed *Vendhiadree*.

The tract between Chandore and Eroor Manjera, on the Kistna, is certainly the most decidedly Mahratta, and in it there is the least variation in the language; but following the rule adverted to, in its more extended sense, Maharashtra is that space which is bounded on the north by the Sautpoora mountains,* and extends from Naundode on the west, along those mountains, to the Wyne Gunga, east of Nagpoor. The western bank of that river forms a part of the eastern boundary until it falls into the Wurda. From the junction of these rivers it may be traced up the east bank of the Wurda to Manikdroog, and thence westward to Mahoor. From this last place a waving line may be extended to Goa, whilst on the west it is bounded by the ocean.

The Mahratta language prevails throughout this great tract of country; but in a space so extensive, there are, of course, various dialects of it, with a mixture of other tongues towards the verge of the boundaries; and there is a small space about Surat, Baroach, and Rajpeeplee where the Guzerattee is spoken, but which may be excluded by an imaginary line drawn from Danaun to the middle of the Naundode district, or western point of the Sautpoora range, whence this definition of Maharashtra commences. The whole tract comprehends a surface of upwards of 102,000 square miles, and its present population, estimated principally from the returns of the collectors in the territory lately conquered by the British government, is about six millions, or at the average rate of 59 souls to the square mile.

Maharashtra, from its still retaining a distinct language, from its giving name to a class of Bramins, and the general appellation of Mahrattas to its inhabitants, was perhaps at some very distant period under one raja, or Hindoo prince. There is, however, no direct evidence to support this conjecture; nor is there any ancient history in the country, excepting the fabulous legends called Poorans, which relate to the actions of gods and men, and which, though probably founded on historical truth, are yet so involved in mythological obscurity, that no research is ever likely to reconcile them with real events.†

* The Sautpoora is properly, I am informed by Major Tod, the range adjoining the Vendhia mountains to the south, but the Mahrattas term the whole *Sautpoora*.

† One of these Poorans, which recounts the exploits of Pureshrum in his war with the Kshittrees, mentions that at the close of it, having extirpated the Kshittrees and oppressive rajas, and conferred the conquered territory on the Bramins, they did not choose that he should reside amongst them, which induced Pureshrum to repair to the western coast of the Deccan, and to petition the sea for a place of residence. This request, however, was not willingly acceded to: but Pureshrum bent his bow and let fly an arrow from the top of the great western mountains, at which the ocean was intimidated, and, receding before it to the point at which it fell, left dry the extensive tract of country now known by the name of the Concan and Malabar coast. In this space different languages are spoken, and Hindoo geographers divide it into seven parts—viz., 1, Kerala; 2, Toolava; 3, Gohnrasht; 4, Concan or Kumpun; 5, Kurrar; 6, Wurur; and 7, Burbur. These are supposed to extend from the Paniany river to Mount Dilly, Dureea Bhadurghur, Sewdasheogurh or Cape Ramas, Deogurh, Bencote, Bassein, and the Taptee river respectively. The three first, as mentioned in a preceding note, are attached to Drawed and Carnatic; the four last are now, by the natives, indiscriminately included in the lower Concan, or Concan below the Ghauts. When the Concan simply is mentioned in this work, it is to be understood, as it is generally considered by Europeans, to extend from the sea to the line at which the Ghauts run into the lower country. When Concan-Ghaut-Mahta is specified, it is applicable to a particular tract of mountainous country hereafter described.

The Concan is that part of Maharashtra which lies between the Ghauts* and the sea, and extends along the coast, from Sewdasheogurh to the Taptee. Although so far below the great chain of mountains stretching along parallel with the western coast of India, it must not be considered a flat country; on the contrary, the Concan is in most parts remarkably rugged and broken, interspersed with huge mountains and thick jungles, intersected by rivers and numberless rivulets, rocky and clear until they descend on the level, where they are affected by the tide, when they are very deep and muddy. The roads are generally stony footpaths, and become more inaccessible as they approach the Syhadree mountains, which, except in places rendered more practicable by the British government, can only be ascended by narrow paths and defiles, sometimes so precipitous that a led horse can with difficulty keep his footing. When ascending, and on gaining the summit of any of these passes, especially to the southward of Poona, the scenery which everywhere presents itself is of the grandest kind. Some idea of it may be formed by imagining mountains succeeding mountains, 3,000 or 4,000 feet high, covered with trees, except in places where the huge, black, barren rocks are so solid as to prevent the hardiest shrub from finding root in their clefts. The verdure about the Ghauts to the southward of Poona is perpetual; but during the rainy season, especially towards the latter part of it, when the torrents are pouring from the sides of the mountains, the effect is greatly heightened by the extreme luxuriance of vegetation; whilst gleams of sunshine, reflected from the breaking masses of clouds, give a thousand evanescent tints to every hill they light upon. Tempests and thunderstorms, both at the commencement and close of the south-west monsoon, are very frequent, and in that region these awful phenomena of nature are, in a tenfold degree, tremendous and sublime.

Notwithstanding the roughness of feature which characterizes the Concan, it is in many parts remarkably fertile. Its breadth, from the sea to the summit of the Syhadree range, is of unequal extent, varying from 25 to 50 miles. The top or table-land, which is in many places very extensive, forms part of what the natives call Concan-Ghaut-Mahta, or Concan on the top, to distinguish it from Thul-Concan, or Concan below the Ghauts. The highest part of the ridge is that which immediately faces the Concan, and the summit is generally from 1,000 to 2,000 feet above the table-land. The breadth of the Concan-Ghaut-Mahta is about 20 or 25 miles, and comprehends all the mountainous tract on the upper or eastern side, including the vallies that lie between the smaller branches of hills. The Mahrattas, in short, reckon the Concan-Ghaut-Mahta from the point at which these branches terminate in the plain on the eastern side, to the summit of the ridge facing the Concan.

The Concan-Ghaut-Mahta, from Joonere to Kolapoor, is divided into the Mawuls, the Khoras, and the Mooras: these are names used by the natives, both for parts of the table-land and the valleys. The whole tract is populous, and the valleys are now well cultivated. The inhabitants are

* *Ghaut* literally means a break, but in the common acceptation it signifies a pass over any range of hills, and is thus applied to designate the hills themselves. When Ghauts are mentioned in this or any Indian history, the reader must bear in mind what Ghauts, or rather what particular range of hills, are alluded to; the Ghauts however, especially on the Bombay side, are the distinguishing appellation of that immense chain of hills which extends along the whole western coast of India, and is now more correctly termed the Syhadree (corruptly Shyadree) mountains. Ghaut also is sometimes applied to a ford, or the landing-place on the bank of a river—a sense in which we shall never have occasion to use it.

remarkable for their simple, inoffensive demeanour, but they are hardy and patient, and, as the well-known Mawulees of Sivajee, we shall find them led on to active and daring enterprise. North of Joonere these valleys are not so well cultivated, and the inhabitants are for the most part Bheels and Koolees—predatory tribes, who, in their wildest state, subsist by hunting and plundering. The Mawuls, Khoras, and indeed the whole of the Ghaut-Mahta, is infested by wild beasts, particularly the royal tiger, which is here found very fierce and destructive.

In the Ghauts, and along the hills alluded to, both above and below the great range, the summits are frequently crowned, or girded towards the top, by large massy basaltic rocks. These, with little aid from art, are capable of being formed into fortresses, which, independent of the extreme difficulty of approach, often seem in themselves impregnable. In many of them there are springs of the finest water, and in all a supply can be secured in tanks, or reservoirs, during the periodical rains from May to October. Throughout that period of the year it is scarcely possible for troops to act in the Ghaut-Mahta; as, superadded to the steep, rugged, rocky hills, and the deep, winding dells, covered, like the mountains, by high trees, or tangled with low impervious brushwood, there is almost perpetual rain; most of the rivulets are then frequently swollen into impassable torrents, and there is a chilling damp in the forests, exceedingly insalubrious to persons not inured to its influence; in short, in a military point of view, there is probably no stronger country in the world.

The Ghaut-Mahta is succeeded by the open country, or Desh, which generally becomes more and more level to the eastward; but there are four great ranges of hills, running west and east, extending far beyond the ordinary branches of the Syhadree mountains. In succession to the Sautpoora or northern boundary of Maharashtra, there are the great chain, commonly called the Chandore range, extending from Rhoura to the heart of Berar; the Ahmednugur hills from Joonere to Bheer; the range immediately to the southward of Poona; and the Mahdeo hills to the north of Satara.*

The general aspect of Maharashtra is hilly, the vallies are well watered, and the climate is perhaps the most salubrious in India; but in regard to cultivation, soil, and products, it is inferior to most other parts of that fertile region.

The principal rivers are the Nerbuddah, the Taptee, the Godavery, the Beema, and the Kistna. For some distance along the banks of these rivers the soil is in general excellent, and the crops raised cannot be exceeded in plenty and luxuriance. The banks of the Godavery, or Gunga as it is termed by the Mahrattas, the Beema, and its tributary streams, the Neera and the Maun, are all celebrated for their breed of horses,† particularly the two last, which, though small, are accounted the best and the hardiest that are reared in the Deccan.

The mass of the population in the country thus briefly described are Hindoos, who, by the ordinances of their sacred writings, are divided into

* I have had no opportunity of ascertaining, but the Chandore hills are probably the highest above the level of the sea: there is a very perceptible fall in the country from Chandore to the Taptee, and from the Mahdeo hills to the Warna and Kistna.

† These are distinguished by the name of the place where they have been reared—Gung-thuree, Bheem-thuree, Neer-thuree, and Maun Desh. *Thures* means the dale or *strath* in the neighbourhood of a river, and the appellations here mentioned are used by the Mahrattas in speaking of these countries, in preference to any other name by which sub-divisions of the country were marked by Mahomedans. Berar is likewise celebrated for the hardiness, but not for the beauty, of its horses.

the four well-known castes of Bramin, Kahittree, Weysh, and Shooder; but all these classes, though nominally preserved, are degenerated, extinct, or greatly sub-divided.

The Bramins* are the priesthood, whose lives ought to be spent in worshipping and contemplating the Divinity, and teaching, by precept and example, what is proper to be observed by the rest of mankind, to enable them to gain the favour of the gods, and to attain a more exalted state in their transmigration. They ought to have no interference in worldly concerns; but they have long been the principal officers, civil and military, in all Hindoo states. Those Bramins who strictly follow the tenets of their faith, and devote their lives to the study of what Hindoos conceive the divine ordinances, are held in great esteem; but otherwise, in the Mahratta country, there is no veneration for the Bramin character.

Independent of the two Mahratta divisions of Concanist,† or those who belong to the country below the Ghauts, and Deshist, or those of the territory above, there are in the Mahratta country eight classes‡ of Bramins, who differ from each other in some of their usages, and present to those accustomed to observe them, perceptible differences both of character and appearance.

The second of the four grand classes of Hindoos is termed Kshittree,

* There are in India two general divisions of Bramins, termed the *Punch Gour* and the *Punch Drawed*; these two are sub-divided into five each: the *Punch Gour* belong to, what has been termed by Rennell, Hindoostan proper, or the country north of the Nerbuddah, and the other five to Guzerat and the country south of that river, and the Vindhia or (as they have been already noticed by the more familiar Mahratta name of) the Sautpoora mountains. Those south of the Nerbuddah are the *Maharashi*, the *Andur* or *Teling*, the *Drawed*, and the *Carnatic*. The *Goojars* are of Guzerat.

Besides the great divisions of *Mahdeo Bhugt* and *Vishnoo Bhugt*, or the respective followers of Mahdeo and Vishnoo, there are a great number of sub-divisions in all these five classes of Bramins, whose appellations correspond with four of the great divisions of the ancient definition of the Deccan already given; they also derive distinctions from any of the four Vedas in which they may be primarily instructed.

† The Peishwas, who attained sovereign authority in the Mahratta nation, were of this class Concanists, from this circumstance, and the power which it naturally threw into their hands, pretend to some superiority in caste; but these pretensions are not well founded. They are termed *Chitpawun*, which, amongst other significations, means "a dead body raised." Their origin, according to what is mentioned in a Sanscrit work entitled *The Syhadren Kind*, was 14 dead bodies of different castes that had been drowned in the sea, whence they were transported by Vishnoo in his outar of Pureshrum, after he had forced the sea to give up the Concan, or *Pureshrum Kaheter*, and re-animated to people his new country. From these 14 families sprang the Concanese Bramins, who are now distinguished by 60 surnames. The Deshist Bramins, although they have surnames, prefer the distinction of their father's name, or the place of their residence, to their surname, which they will seldom mention.

The Concanist Bramins, before the elevation of Ballajee Vishwanath, commonly called the first, though in fact the fifth, Peishwa, were not employed as clerks and men of business, but as *harkaras* and spies. They carefully suppress or destroy all copies of the *Syhadren Kind*, where their origin is mentioned, and a respectable Bramin of Wasee was a few years ago, disgraced by Bajee Rao for having a copy of it. The Concanists say that the word *chitpawun* was originally *chitpohle*, literally signifying "bearing the heart," made use of in their addresses to their patron Pureshrum for not attending to their petitions; this expression, however, being considered undutiful or improper, was changed to *chitpawun*, "pure-hearted," which they interpret "a sinner pardoned."

Of all the Bramins with whom I am acquainted, the Concanists are the most sensible and intelligent.

‡ Their names, arranged according to their degree, are—1, Kurrara; 2, Yajurwedee, or Mahadinjen; 3, Kannoo; 4, Deorookay; 5, Kirwunt; 6, Shenwee; 7, Tirgoal; and 8, Suwassey.

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or the military body. The pure Kshittrees are considered extinct ; but the Rajpoots,* who assume their appellation and their privileges, are the least degenerate of their descendants.

The third grand class is the Weysh,† or the mercantile community.

The last of the four grand classes is the Shooder : they are properly the cultivators, and, as such, are known in the Mahratta country by the name of *Koonbee*.

But, besides these four grand divisions, there are a vast number of Hindoos, the intermixed progeny of the four classes and of each other. They are not, however, what the European reader might fancy as outcastes : they have a community of their own, and ranks, professions, and employments peculiar to themselves, of which there are an infinite number. All trades and artizans are of this irregular offspring, and classed, in Maharashtra, under the general appellation of *Shunkerjatee*.‡

From all castes and classes there are devotees, who, renouncing the world, assume a religious character, which is generally put on in order to attain a larger share of what they pretend to give up ; but some have been exemplary in their conduct, and, by the tenor of their lives, as well as their penance and observances, are supposed to have been animated by hopes paramount to all bodily suffering, and to have looked for no earthly reward ; that in them even vanity was subdued, and that they were

* Rajapootras, or literally the children of rajas. They are the offspring of Kshittree rajas with women of other castes, and are said to have existed since about the year 2000 of the Kalhee Yoog.

† The real Weysh is also said to be extinct ; the Wanees, or Banians, occupy their place ; but of a long list of the classes of Banians, there is not one of the sub-divisions that is real Weysh. The class termed *Komtee*, which is most common in Telingana, is the least degenerate. The other Banians in the Mahratta country are the *Lingait*, *Goojur*, and *Jain*. The Lingait, although their Banians reckon themselves Weysh, are, like the Jain, a distinct sect ; they are divided into three classes, termed *Silwunt*, *Punchum*, and *Tirulee* ; their Goo Roos, or priests, are termed *Jungum* ; they derive their appellation from wearing the Ling, an obscene symbol of both Mahdeo and Vishnoo. They will not eat what has been cooked by a Bramin, and they differ in their religious tenets, denying the doctrine of metempsychosis ; they are also deficient in some domestic observances rigidly practised by other Hindoos. The Goojur get their name rather from their country than their caste, being originally from Guzerat. There are also Bramins who are Goojurs. The Jains are not so common in Maharashtra as in the country south of the Kistna. A good account of this remarkable sect has been given by Colonel Mackenzie in the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. ix.

‡ Independent of other Hindoo observances, all classes of the Shunkerjatee have a sort of moral and religious government amongst themselves ; they have heads or chiefs, now termed *Muqudum*, *Chowdree*, &c., &c., whose power seems to be the result of supposed suffrage, rather than of any regular election. There is no one *Muqudum* who has any very general authority in the Mahratta country ; but all classes are subject to the same sort of rules ; they are frequently strict in enforcing both spiritual and temporal observances. An infringement of what is customary is liable to a general inquiry in the community, every member of which may be readily roused to a jealous defence of what is considered either privilege or propriety. The lower castes of the Shunkerjatee are not less particular than the others ; and hence it is that, in native regiments, the European officers often complain of having no trouble with affairs of caste except among low-caste men. For the origin of the Shunkerjatee, to those who may be desirous of acquiring minute information, reference may be made to Mr. Colebrook's writings on the subject, in the *Asiatic Researches*, vol. v. The most remarkable thing in the classification of the Shunkerjatee is, that the offspring of the Shooder with a woman of the Bramin class is the lowest of all. The term *Shunkerjatee*, in the Mahratta country, is applied to the mixed classes, which in many other parts of India, and in Sanscrit manuscripts, are styled *Wurn Shunkur* : this term is in use in Maharashtra, but is applied to any sort of employment in which a person may be engaged unbecoming his caste. A Bramin's child by a slave girl is termed *Sindey*.

superior to that greatest of all seductions, the praise of their fellow-men. A person of such a character is termed a Sadhoo : he may be of any caste or persuasion ; for a Hindoo admits that there may be pure devotion in any religion, sex, or caste. Of the Sadhoos, or saints, that have been famous in Maharashtra, Kubheer^{*} was a Mahomedan ; Tookaram, a Banian ; Kanhoo Patra, a woman born of the dancing tribe ; and Choka Mela was a Mhar or Dher.

Bramin devotees are of three sorts—Brimhacharee,† Wan Prist, and Sunneashee.

Banians, though there are many devotees from this class of people, are not so apt to become so as the other castes.

The Rajpoots, however, and all classes of Shooders,‡ may become Gosaeens and Byragees.§ When a Bramin assumes either of these characters, he forfeits all claim to caste as a Bramin. Yet Gosaeen is a familiar name for the followers and disciples of the famous Mahapooroosh|| and Brimhacharee, Ramdass Swamy, the spiritual director of Sivajee ; and it is likewise an appellation of those Bramins who are professional story-tellers, or reciters of Kuthas, generally known as Hurdass¶ Gosaeen ; but in these cases it is a mere nominal distinction.

The Gosaeens,** properly so called, are followers of Mahdeo. The Byragees generally maintain the supremacy of Vishnoo.

* Kubheer lived a Mahomedan, but, when dead, the Hindoos claimed him as a Sadhoo.

† Though this be a name for those devotees who are rigid students for 12 years, all Bramin boys are termed *Brimhacharee* from the time of their admission into their caste, that is, from the period at which the ceremony of the *Moony* is performed until the consummation of their marriage, when they become *Grehush*, or householders. The ceremony of the *Moony* is performed in all Hindoo families of the higher castes, of which the males may be entitled to use the *Janwa*, or distinguishing thread worn next the skin. This takes place when the boy is five or six years old, and the occasion is celebrated with more or less pomp, according to the wealth or poverty of the parents. The ceremony is performed by the household priest, who is called Gooroo, or Oopadheea, and, in itself, is merely fastening a piece of cloth about the child's middle, and tying the *Janwa* diagonally across the body over the right shoulder ; whilst the *Guyetri*, a mystical Sanscrit verse, is pronounced by the child's father, which all Bramins know, but none ought to disclose. Previous to this the child is not a Bramin, or accountable for omissions or infringements in eating, bathing, &c., &c.

‡ The Gaolees, or milkmen, hold the highest rank amongst the Shooders ; some say by descent, others by their being born in employment about that most sacred animal the cow. Nawees, or barbers, from being frequently in contact with Bramins, likewise acquire a reflected superiority, but they are properly of the Shunkerjatee.

§ Hindoo devotees, who subsist on charity, are often indiscriminately termed *Fuqeers* by Europeans, though the term is applicable to Mahomedan beggars only.

|| An explanation of this word will appear hereafter.

¶ *Dass* means servant : *Hurree* is a name of Vishnoo—*Hurdass*, the servant of Vishnoo.

** Their founder was Shunkeracharya ; there are ten divisions of them, with some shades of difference in their observances ; the ten are—1. *Gurree* ; 2. *Poorree* ; 3. *Bhar-tee* ; 4. *Bun* ; 5. *Arun* ; 6. *Surusutee* ; 7. *Teert* ; 8. *Ashrin* ; 9. *Sagur* ; and 10. *Purwutt*.

To become a Gosaeen, such castes as wear the *Kurgoota*, or string round the loins, destroy it, and substitute a piece of cloth, if any covering be deemed necessary ; and the person generally attaches himself to some one of the fraternity, as desirous of becoming a *chela*, or disciple. The novice may proceed thus far and still retract ; the irretrievable step, by which he becomes a Gosaeen for ever, is in the ceremony called *Home*, which, in this case, must be gone through in the most solemn manner. It is performed by taking an earthen vessel, one cubit square, termed *stundeel* ; this is to be filled with pure unmixed mould, over which powders of various colours are to be strewn ; upon this a fire is kindled, and over the whole ghee or milk

The Gosaeens are a much more numerous body in the Mahratta country than the Byragees; their dress, when they wear clothes, is invariably dyed orange—a colour emblematical of Mahdeo. The Gosaeens, for the most part, have deviated from the rules of their order in a manner universally stigmatized by Hindoos. They engage in trade; they enlist as soldiers; some of them marry, and many of them have concubines. Gosaeens, who go without clothing, acquire superior character; but those of greatest sanctity are the Gosaeens who never shave, or cut their hair or nails, or who have vowed to keep their heads or limbs in a particular position. The penances by extremes of heat and cold, and the voluntary tortures which some of them undergo, are often greater than one might suppose the human frame could endure.

Men who survive such exposure, and voluntarily submit to such bodily suffering, are, it may easily be conceived, very formidable when they take up arms. Gosaeens and Byragees have frequently waged a religious war, and some of the divisions of Gosaeens have had desperate battles with each other. Under a weak or unsettled government, the Gosaeens and Byragees have both been guilty of dreadful outrages on the persons and properties of the inoffensive part of the community; but the former are more notorious in this respect than the latter. They used to travel in armed parties, and, under pretence of seeking charity, levied contributions on the country. Where unsuccessfully resisted, they frequently plundered, murdered, and committed the most brutal enormities.

The reader will now understand, from what has been said of the most conspicuous classes of the inhabitants in Maharashtra, that the name Mahratta is applicable in some degree to all of them, when spoken of in contradistinction to men of other countries; but amongst themselves a Mahratta Bramin will carefully distinguish himself from a Mahratta. That term, though extended to the Koonbees, or cultivators, is, in strictness, confined to the military families of the country, many of whom claim a doubtful but not improbable descent from the Rajpoots.

The women in the Mahratta country are well treated; they are the helpmates, but by no means the slaves, of their husbands; nor are they in the degraded state in which some travellers have described the condition of the women in other parts of India, and in which the ordinances of the Shasters would place them. There is one custom generally observed among them, which is, that the wives of all the chiefs and military men, who pretend to Rajpoot descent, are as strictly veiled as the Mahomedan ladies of rank, and as much disgrace attaches to their being seen, particularly by persons not Hindoos. This observance they probably adopted, in the first instance, from the Deccanee Mussulmans or the Moghuls, but they say it is handed down as a usage of the branch of Rajpoots from whom they are descended. Mahratta ladies of this description, on the death of their husbands, frequently immolate themselves with the corpse; but in cases where they either have helpless infants or important family affairs requiring their care, they are rarely permitted to

is poured for a certain number of times, during which *munturs*, or mystical verses, are repeated, and vows solemnly made, of poverty, celibacy, and perpetual pilgrimage to the different holy places throughout India. Ghee is butter clarified by boiling. Milk is always used by a Bramin in performing the *Homa*, on this, as well as on other more common occasions of daily occurrence. The disciples of a Gosaeen are obtained in three ways—voluntary followers, slaves purchased, and children obtained from parents who had vowed to make them Gosaeens previous to their birth.

do so. Should they for the latter reason choose to survive, their veil is in a great degree removed, as they are obliged to appear where business demands their presence, in company with men, in an assembly, or even in battle.

With regard to religion, the principal feature in that of all Hindoos is their belief in the transmigration of the soul; and without attempting to reconcile, much less to defend, the ridiculous inconsistencies of their wild mythology, or to account for the differences that exist, in what may be now stated, from that which prevails in other parts of India, a brief summary of the religious creed of the Mahrattas will here be useful, especially to the reader in England :—They believe that the great Divine Spirit pervades the universe; that the soul of every human being is a part of that great Spirit, and, when perfectly purified, is re-united to it. This is the ultimate reward of the good, whilst the punishment of the wicked consists in being re-born in a state proportionally distant from that re-union. The soul which animates the body of a Bramin is nearest to this state of beatitude, provided he shall duly fulfil the ordinances of his faith; but if he do not, his soul shall be detained in *nurrak*, or hell, until sufficient torture, in expiation of sins, has been inflicted, when it will be sent to re-animate some other living shape upon the earth. The souls of all mankind must, therefore, pass through the human form of a Bramin as their last probation, unless that perfect goodness can be attained which they describe in the character of a Sadhoo, in which case immediate admittance is gained to eternal happiness.

The Mahrattas suppose that the divine nature, in itself, cannot be the agent; yet from this divine nature, or great spirit, known by the name of Brimh, emanated Prakritee, or nature, and Brahma the creator, Vishnoo the preserver, and Siva or Mahdeo the destroyer: the respective wives of these three are Sawitree, Luximee, and Parbuttee.

Brahma created all things: he created human beings, and was himself incarnate; he is the father of the *Deos*, or good spirits; and likewise of the *Dyts*, or evil spirits. Indra is the chief of the former, and Bullee of the latter. The agents of preservation and destruction, together with their wives, have likewise become incarnate, and assumed a multitude of forms on the earth, in order to fulfil the ends of their being. These incarnations are called their *outars*; the different names of these, together with a number of emanations, produce a host of deities, amounting, say the Bramins, exclusive of Brahma, Vishnoo, and Mahdeo, to three hundred and thirty millions.

There is but one temple dedicated to Brahma in India, which is at Pooohkur, near Ajimere. Vishnoo, Mahdeo, and their wives are worshipped under the names of their various outars, in numerous temples, where their images are preserved. There are a multitude of incarnations from all of them; but there are eleven principal outars of Mahdeo, and ten of Vishnoo: those of Mahdeo were chiefly for the purpose of assisting Indra in his wars with the Dyts: those of Vishnoo are the most celebrated; but as they are well known, it may be sufficient to remark that his wars for the destruction of evil genii and oppressive rajas, and the shapes he assumed for the preservation of the world on various occasions, are recorded in the Poorans or sacred histories, forming the subject of their great popular poems, the Ramayun, the Mahabharut, and the Bhagwut. These poems have in later times been imitated in Mahratta, and have afforded a never-failing fund of amusement in supplying ideas and allusions for all Kuthas, a sort of recitative, intermixed with music and

song ; in which tales, achievements, acts, and penances of the gods are related, anecdotes and allusions to passing occurrences often wittily introduced, and good moral lessons frequently conveyed. The Kuthas* are a popular amusement in Maharashtra with all ranks and castes.

There is no religion in which there are a greater number of sectaries than that of the Hindoos. The two great divisions are those who acknowledge the supremacy of Vishnoo, and those who assert the superiority or equality of Mahdeo ;† the latter has long been the prevailing creed throughout Maharashtra.

Most individuals have some deity, which they reckon especially propitious to themselves : this deity is termed Aradh ; but every family has invariably a tutelary god, who is styled their Kool Swamy.‡ All the gods are worshipped, more particularly at certain times, for instance, Gunputtee, the son of Mahdeo, on commencing anything ; and the name of Ram (an outar of Vishnoo) is pronounced in the hour of death ; but the Aradh and Kool Swamy are inwardly implored on ordinary occasions, when suing for strength to perform what is good or to resist what is evil ; to obtain health, happiness, or any worthy object. Such Bramins as can be termed religious instructors, are either Oopadheeas or Gooroos ; the distinction in these is, that the Oopadheea is commonly the hereditary domestic teacher in a family, and the Gooroo is the chosen instructor and intercessor of an individual. Many persons, especially men of consequence, choose some celebrated devotee for their spiritual guide, whose sanctity is supposed to be such that, by his intercession with the deity, objects will be granted which would be denied to the less worthy individual. Such a mediator, though he may not attain the character of a Sadhoo, is superior to other Gooroos, and acquires the appellation of *Mahapooroosh*.§ It is remarkable that the *Mahapooroosh* of the Mahrattas is sometimes a Mahomedan.

All natives of India, even the most intelligent of them, are extremely superstitious, and place great reliance on astrology, omens, prodigies, and prophesies ; and nothing of magic, witchcraft, or supernatural agency is too gross for the credulity of the multitude.

All Mahratta learning, except simple reading, writing, and arithmetic, is confined to those Bramins|| who study the Sanscrit language, in which only their sacred writings are composed. The principal of these are the

* Divested of the religious character of which they partake, Kuthas more nearly resemble Mr. Matthews's entertainments of the present day than anything to which I can compare them in England.

† Mahdeo, it may be here observed, does not destroy indiscriminately, and is not the depriver of life ; that occupation belongs to the goddess *Mruttyoo* ; and as soon as the soul departs, it is carried to be judged by *Yem Dhurm*, who is the son of *Soorya* (the sun), an outar of Vishnoo. I have not met with Mahdeo as the renovator : and if that idea be taken from any similarity in character with the heathen deity Jupiter genitor, as alluded to by Sir William Jones, it is a fanciful notion, to say the least.

‡ Byhroo, Joteba, Kundoba, and Parbuttee, under her name of Dewee-Bhowanee, are generally the Kool Swamy and Aradh of the Mahratta soldiery. In villages, temples to Byhroo, Luximee, and Gunputtee are the most common.

§ The *Mahapooroosh* is frequently referred to as an oracle, and, on predicting falsely, is often blamed by the disappointed individual, who declares him responsible for the unfortunate issue of the affair. On the other hand, when the *Mahapooroosh* is not so well rewarded as he might expect, he sometimes (though this is rare) threatens to withdraw his protection from a person so unmindful and so unworthy.

|| Bramins learned in the Shasters have the title of Shastree ; in the Vedas, Waudeek ; in both Shasters and Vedas, Pundit—titles which much resemble those of the learned Rabbis in the Jewish synagogue.

four Bhedas, or Vedas; the six Shasters; and the Poorans,* or sacred histories, of which there are 18 principal; but upon these there are an infinite number of explanations and commentaries.

A small proportion only of the Mahratta Bramins understand Sanscrit; and there is no great proficiency, even in Hindoo literature, to be found among them at the present day.

Much injudicious praise has been lavished on the learning and virtue of the Hindoos, and in exposing these panegyrics, their character has become the theme of still more injudicious censure. Both extremes are unjust; and surely it would be better that the unfavourable side of the picture should not be viewed by any person whose fortunes may lead him to the shores of India as a servant of the public. If our young countrymen proceed to their destination unbiassed by prejudice, study the language, and cultivate the acquaintance of the natives, they will, after long intercourse, have many kind recollections and feelings towards them. They may often be disgusted with corruption, meanness, and every debasing passion which observation and general intercourse with mankind in all parts of the world will too frequently discover; but they will soon perceive that many of these vices have originated in a corrupt, oppressive government, and the demoralizing effects of an absurd superstition; that they really possess many virtues and great qualities; and that much of what is amiable, in every relation of life, may be found amongst the natives of India.

We now proceed, however, to notice the first records of events which have as yet been discovered relative to that portion of the people of whom our subject more particularly treats.

Like the early history of every country, that of Maharashtra is involved in much obscurity; yet there are traces of two or three great revolutions previous to the Mahomedan conquest. Popular legend tells us that the people called *Gurasee*, who are a low caste, and the best performers amongst the rude musicians of the country, are the aborigines of Maharashtra: and this is supported by the authority of the Poorans, in which it is stated that the tract between the Cavery and the Godavery was termed *Dhundkarinya*, or the forest, and that when Rawun held universal sway, he bestowed it upon the *wajintree*, or musicians. But the first authentic account we have of any sovereignty in the country is that of which Tagara was the metropolis. This city was frequented by Egyptian merchants 250 years before Christ; and the author of the Periplus of the Erythrean sea, who wrote about the middle of the second century, particularly mentions it as a place of great resort, and well known to the Greeks as the emporium for the supply of their merchandise.

Its name is well known to learned Hindoos, but its exact position has not been ascertained;† though it was probably situated on the bank of the Godavery, a little to the north-east of the modern town of Bheer. It was under the government of a Rajpoot prince, whose authority appears to have been very extensive, and acknowledged by several other rajas, as he is styled the chief of the chiefs of Tagara.‡

* The Poorans were written by Veas, an inspired Bramin, one of the seven immortal human beings. Walmeek, the author of the Ramayun, was, according to Mahratta legend, a Koolee, whose place of residence is pointed out near the Neera Bridge, at a village called Veerwalla, not far from Jejoory, and contiguous to the Poorundhur range.

† In the *Transactions of the Bombay Literary Society*, vol. iii., my reasons for this supposition are published.

‡ Mentioned in old grants of land, engraved on copper-plates.

It is probable that the power of the rajas of Tagara originated by conquest from the northward ; but the next revolution of which we have any trace appears to have been occasioned by an insurrection in the country, headed by a man of an inferior caste, named Shalivahan,* whose accession to power forms an epoch, commencing in the year 77-78 of the Christian era.

Shalivahan, it is supposed, removed the seat of government to Pruteshan, which is the Paithana mentioned in the Periplus, and the modern town of Mungy Pyetun, situated on the banks of the Godavery. What follows in regard to this prince is extracted from the fabulous legends of the country.

Shalivahan† annexed the territory of a raja, who reigned at Asseer, to his own dominions ; this raja was descended from Sissoday, a Rajpoot raja of the solar race ; his ancestor having emigrated from Koshul Desh, the modern Oude, and founded a state on the south side of the Nerbuddah, which, at the period of its conquest by Shalivahan, had existed 1,680 years. Shalivahan put the whole of the members of this family to death, excepting one woman, who, having escaped with her infant son, found shelter and subsistence in a miraculous manner amongst the Sautpoora mountains ; this son afterwards became the founder of the family of the rana of Cheitore. From the ranas of Cheitore sprang the ranas of Oudepoor, universally admitted to be the oldest family in Hindoostan ; and from them, according to the legend quoted, it is pretended that the founder of the Mahratta nation, as hitherto known to us, drew his lineage. The legend proceeds to state that Shalivahan long waged war with Vikramajeet, the prince of Malwa ; but they at last concluded a treaty by which the Nerbuddah become the boundary of Shalivahan to the north, and of Vikramajeet to the south. The commencement of the reign of each was to form an epoch for future calculation in their respective countries ; that of Vikramajeet commences 57 years before the birth of our Saviour, and is still prevalent to the northward of the Nerbuddah ; whilst that of Shalivahan, already noticed, continues in the Deccan. In the Mahratta manuscripts these epochs have been rather inconsistently adduced as a proof of such a treaty betwixt Vikramajeet and Shalivahan ; because as there is a difference of 133 years, the eras themselves refute the story ; unless we suppose that Vikramajeet had prior claims to sovereignty, and that the era was reckoned from the time of some of his forefathers.

There were, probably, several other revolutions in Maharashtra ; but nothing is known as to the cause, or period, of a subsequent removal of the capital from Paithana to Deogurh, the modern Doulutabad. Some manuscripts deduce a succession of rajas from Shalivahan to Jadow Ramdeo Rao, who was the reigning prince at the time of the first appearance of the Mahomedans in that quarter, in the end of the thirteenth century. At that period, and as far back as there is any authentic record,

* He is said by some to have been a Koonbee, or cultivator, and by others to have been the son of a *Kommar*, or potter. The legends of the country call him an outar of Mahdeo. His mother, says the same authority, was the virgin daughter of a Bramin, who, becoming pregnant by a snake of a sacred kind, was in consequence supposed to be disgraced, and was driven from her father's threshold ; but she was received into the house of a potter, by whom she was protected.

† There are various legends respecting Shalivahan in different parts of India ; this is what is current in Maharashtra, and it is not of importance to inquire whether thus or that fable be the more probable.

the Mahratta country seems to have been divided into many small states more or less independent.

Ferishta mentions the opposition which Alp Khan, the soobehdar, or governor, of Guzerat, experienced from a raja named Kirren, when co-operating with Mullik Kafoor in the second expedition into the Deccan. The raja of Gondwaneh is noticed; and the raja of Buglana is frequently mentioned by that author. By a grant of land, engraved on a copper-plate, and found at Tannah near Bombay,* it appears that there was a raja reigning in or near the island of Salsette, A.D. 1018, who claimed descent from the rajas of Tagara. A copper-plate of a similar description, found at Satara,† proves that in A. D. 1192 there was a raja at Panalla who possessed considerable territory.‡ By the legends of the country he is said to have reigned over the whole of the tract extending from the Mahdew range of hills, north of Satara, to the Hurnkassée river, south of Kolapoor, and including all the southern tract of the Concan as far as Sewdasheogurh.

This raja likewise claimed descent from the rajas of Tagara. His country, according to tradition, was reduced by a raja named Singin, also said to have been a Rajpoot prince. The place of his standing encampment, during the time his troops were reducing the country of the raja of Panalla, is still shown close to Mahsoorna in the neighbourhood of Poosa-saoly, south of Satara. Raja Singin died before he had firmly established himself, and the territory of Bhoje, raja of Panalla, fell into the hands of Mahratta polygars.§ The Concan-Ghaut-Mahta, from the neighbourhood of Poona to the Warna, belong to a family named Sirkay, whose descendants assumed the title of raja, and to this day rank amongst the highest of the Mahratta nobility.||

It is probable that future research in the Deccan may add considerably to this list, and establish further proofs in support of an opinion now pretty general among Europeans, that India, at a period long antecedent to the Mahomedan conquest, was divided into many small states.

The most beneficial result of such research would be the probable discovery of the various modes of revenue management, and the origin of many institutions now found in the country. Some partial explanation of these points must here be given, because a previous acquaintance with them is essentially necessary to the reader, in order to understand the state of the country at different periods, and to comprehend the mode in which the modern Mahrattas gradually and insidiously found pretexts for encroaching upon the corrupt and indolent Mahomedans.

In Maharashtra, and indeed throughout all the country of the Hindoos, next to their singular arrangement into castes, the most striking feature in their polity is the division of the whole country into villages, each of which forms a distinct community.

* First volume of *Asiatic Researches*, page 357.

† *Transactions of the Bombay Literary Society*, vol. iii.

‡ He is said to have built the following 15 forts—viz., 1, Pawangurh; 2, Panalla; 3, Bhodurgurh; 4, Bowra; 5, Kelneh (or Vishalgurh); 6, Samaugurh; 7, Rangna; 8, Wussuntgurh; 9, Satara; 10, Chundun; 11, Wundun; 12, Naudgeeree; 13, Kelinja; 14, Pandogurh; and 15, Wyratgurh. They are still known by these names, excepting, I believe, Bhodurgurh.

§ Polygar in the Mahratta country means one who has become independent, who refuses to pay revenue, and levies contributions from all those from whom he can enforce them.

|| Mahratta MSS. and tradition.

A Hindoo village in the Deccan is termed *gaom* : when not a market-town, it is called *mouza* ; and when it enjoys that distinction, it is styled *kusba*. Every village is a small state in miniature, and all the land in the country, with the exception of inaccessible mountains, or places wholly unfrequented, is attached to some one village. The boundaries of its lands are defined, and encroachments carefully resisted ; the arable land is divided into fields ; each field has a name, which, together with the name of the owner or occupant, is registered. The inhabitants are principally cultivators, and are now either Meerasdars^a or Ooprees.† These names serve to distinguish the tenure by which they hold their lands. The Oopree is a mere tenant-at-will, but the Meerasdar is a hereditary occupant, whom the government cannot displace as long as he pays the assessment on his field. With various privileges and distinctions in his village, of minor consequence, the Meerasdar has the important power of selling or transferring his right of occupancy at pleasure. To render this right saleable, of course, infers a low rate of assessment, and much discussion as to his being the proprietor of the soil has, in consequence, arisen in different parts of British India. It is a current opinion in the Mahratta country that all the lands were originally of this description.

Besides the cultivators and the regular establishment, there are other castes and trades in proportion to the size of each village. The complete establishment consists of a *Patell*, *Koolkurnee*, and *Chogula*, with 24 persons, called the *Baruh Balowtay* and *Baruh Alowtay*.‡ These 24 persons

* Meerasdar.—This is a Mahomedan appellation, though in more general use than Thulkuree, which is the Mahratta word for the same sort of tenure.

† Oopree literally signifies a stranger, and is here applied to the mere renter in opposition to the hereditary occupant.

‡ The following are the 12 Balowtay and 12 Alowtay, according to the general, but not universal, opinion of the Mahrattas :—First, *Balowtay*.—The head of the 12 Balowtay is the carpenter ; second, the blacksmith ; third, the shoemaker and carrier ; fourth, the Mhar or Dher. This is a person of the very lowest order of Shunkerjatee, except the Mang ; but on the village establishment his duties are very important. The Mhar acts as scout, as guide, frequently as watchman ; he cleans travellers' horses, and is obliged, if required, to carry the travellers' baggage ; he is a principal guardian of the village boundaries, and in Maharashtra the Mhars are a very active, useful, and intelligent race of people. Fifth, the Mang makes all leather ropes, thongs, whips, &c., used by the cultivators ; he frequently acts as watchman ; he is by profession a thief and executioner ; he readily hires himself as an assassin, and when he commits a robbery, he also frequently murders. The Mangs are not so intelligent as the Mhars : both the one and the other eat the carcases of cattle that have died of disease, and are exceedingly filthy in many respects. Sixth, the potter ; seventh, the barber ; eighth, the washerman ; ninth, the *goorow*, who is a Shoeder employed to wash ornament, and attend the idol in the village temple, and, on occasions of feasting, to prepare the *patrowlee*, or leaves, which the Hindoos substitute for plates. They are also trumpeters by profession, and in this capacity are much employed in Mahratta armies. Tenth, the *joshes*, or astrologer, is a Bramin who calculates nativities, foretells lucky and unlucky days, &c. Eleventh, the bhat or bard ; twelfth, the moolana, so called by the Mahrattas, is the moola, or Mahomedan priest ; and it is very strange how he is found ingrafted on the Balowtay establishment of a Hindoo village ; if on the Alowtay, which some say he ought to be, it would have been less unaccountable, especially if we admit, as is frequently done, that the institution of the Alowtay must have been at a period long after that of the Balowtay ; but this seems little more than mere conjecture. The moolana has charge of the mosques and burial-places of Mahomedan saints, and manages the affairs of enam, or freehold lands attached to them. He performs the ceremony at Mahomedan marriages, and ought to be competent to all the duties of a moola ; but he is very often found where there is no Mahomedan family except his own, and is known to the Mahratta population as the person who kills their sheep and goats when offered as a sacrifice at temples, or in their fields, to propitiate the deities presiding over the different

are of various trades and professions, necessary as artisans and public servants, or desirable on account of religious observances and common amusements. Very few villages are complete, and in a great part of the Concan the Khotes, or ancient farmers of the village revenue, have long become hereditary, and superseded the name and office of the chief village magistrate; but in the upper country every village has its Patell and Koolkurnee, and each of the larger villages has its bard and astrologer, as well as its carpenter, blacksmith, barber, and watchman. The smaller have only one or two of the most useful artisans.

The Patell is the head managing authority, his immediate assistant is the Chougula, and both of them are generally of the Shooder caste.*

The principal person next to the Patell is the Koolkurnee, the clerk, or registrar, who is now generally a Bramin.†

stulls, or great divisions of the village lands. The moolana, likewise, kills the sheep for the *katik*, who, although frequently mistaken for the butcher, is, in fact, the person who cleans and exposes the meat for sale. The moolana is entitled to two pice (small copper coin) and the heart of every animal he kills for the *katik*. Some of the Mahrattas are unmindful of the ceremony, but in general they profess not to eat flesh unless the *neyt* has been pronounced by the moolana, or some Mussulman capable of repeating what renders the flesh of any animal *hullal*, or lawful to be eaten. To account for this extraordinary adoption of Mahomedan observance puzzles the Hindoos. The moolana has the same kind of allowances as the other Balowtay. Second, the *Alowtay* are: first, the Sonar, or goldsmith; he is assayer of coins, as well as the maker of gold and silver ornaments for the richer inhabitants; second, the Jungum, or *gooroo* of the Lingait sect; third, the tailor; fourth, the Kolee, or water-carrier; fifth, the Tural, or Yeskur, is a Mhar; but the Alowtay rights, which constitute the Tural's emoluments, are distinct from the Balowtay of the Mhars. It is the duty of the Tural to remain in the village, and never to quit its boundary. He is at the constant call of the Patell, but his particular duty is to attend strangers, and take care of all travellers from the moment of their entering the village; of which, if walled, the Tural is porter. He furnishes all necessary information as well as supplies to strangers, and is often extremely useful to them. His duties are very numerous. Sixth, the gardener; seventh, the Dowree Gosawee, a religious personage who beats the *dour*, a species of small tambourin; eighth, the Gurse, or piper. The Gursees, as already noticed, are said to be descended from the aborigines of Dhund Kairinaya, the forest, or country between the sources of the Beema and Cavery. Ninth, the Ramoosee or Bheel. These, although their office is the same when employed on the village establishment, are different castes of people, but they resemble each other in many of their habits; both are professed thieves. The Ramoosees belong more particularly to Maharashtra. The Bheels, in the Mahratta country, are only found in Candeish, and along the Syhadree range north of Joonere. In villages they generally hold the office of watchman, and when a country is settled, they become useful auxiliaries in the police; but under a weak government, or when anarchy prevails, they quit their habitations and become thieves and robbers. The Ramoosees use the sword and matchlock: the Bheels more commonly the bow and arrow; the latter are less domesticated than the former. Bheels abound to the north of the Nerbuddah, and over the greater part of Guzerat. When employed on the village establishment, they are, in that province, called *Burtinneas*. Tenth, the Telee, or oil-seller; eleventh, the Tambowlee, or pawn-lender; twelfth, the Gonedulsee, or beater of the *tambhut*, a double kettle-drum.

* This is an argument against those Mahratta Patells who claim a Rajpoot descent; but it is by no means conclusive, as there are proofs of their having, in many instances, purchased the office from the tribe called *Kassar*. The Patellship, owing to the Hindoo law of inheritance, and the Patell's right of selling a portion, or *tugseemu* of his *wutun*, is frequently divided and sub-divided into two, four, or more shares amongst different families; and all the members of one of these families, the head of which holds any such share, call themselves Patell. In the same way the members of a Koolkurnee's family style themselves Koolkurnee, and so on of all other hereditary offices. The Patell, who holds the chief managing authority, is styled *Mugudum*.

† This has not always been the case; many of the Koolkurnees were Purbhoos, *Sonars* (goldsmiths), and *Simpees* (tailors). The Bramins excuse themselves for having entered upon worldly occupations by the plea of necessity. "Mankind," say they,

The Patell is assisted by the rest of the establishment in managing the affairs of the village ; and the whole are paid by lands, grain, or money, apportioned in shares to each individual by the regulations of the community.

The Patell superintends the cultivation, manages the police, and frequently provides for the amusement, as well as the protection, of the village. When disputes arise, which cannot be settled by the friendly interference of neighbours, the complaint is carried to the Patell, who advises, admonishes, and frequently induces the parties to compromise the matter ; but, if it seems necessary, the Patell assembles some of the inhabitants best acquainted with the circumstances, to whom the case is, in due form, submitted for arbitration : this is called a *Punchayet*, which commonly consists of five members. Such is the simple outline of the civil government of a village. In criminal cases, though instances are found where a Patell has exercised great power under the Mahratta government, he is not, by the acknowledged custom of the country, vested with the authority of fine or imprisonment, or the power of inflicting corporal punishment ; when crimes of such a nature occur, it is the duty of the Patell to report the case to his superior, or to apprehend and forward the culprit to higher authority.

The name Patell, though not a Mahomedan word, is supposed by the Mahratta Bramins to have been introduced by the Mahomedans. The ancient Hindoo appellation was *Gaora*, and that of the managing Patell or Muqudum, *Gramadikaree*. The Koolkurnee was termed *Gramlekuk*. A principal part of the duty of the Patell and Koolkurnee is to superintend the arrangement and collection of the revenue. It is the business of the Koolkurnee to keep all public accounts which are made up annually. In his general account the whole of the land is first stated ; then the commons, roads, the site of the village, and all waste-land incapable of cultivation, are deducted. The arable land is next shown, and alienations of every description specified. The remainder is the land on which the government assessment is levied. This ought to be laid on with reference to the produce. By the ordinances of the Shasters, one-sixth of the crop is the lawful share payable by the ryot, or cultivator, to the raja. But this usage of remote antiquity has been long unknown in practice ; and different rates and modes of collection have been fixed, or enacted by succeeding rulers, as wisdom and good policy suggested, or as rapacity and necessity may have urged.

The great source of revenue in every village of the Mahratta country is the land rent ; but there are two other heads of collection ; the one may be termed the extra revenue, and the other the customs. Under the first of these all taxes are comprehended, which, being added to the amount of the land assessment, the total is called the *jummabundee*. The extra revenue, although made up of a variety of petty items, is neither heavy nor important. The customs are of a more intricate nature. The villages, as already observed, are commonly either termed Mouzas or Kusbas ; one very large village may constitute a Kusba without any dependent villages ; but, in general, from five to twenty-five villages are subordinate to one Kusba ; and on this are regulated the complicated inland imposts which exist under native governments, and which are probably founded on ancient Hindoo institutions.*

"had become so corrupt, that charity to Bramins was not duly attended to, and hunger compelled them to adopt some means of obtaining food."

* Every Kusba has some usage in levying customs peculiar to itself; import and export, which, in England, refer to the kingdom, apply in India, where these duties

Independent of various allowances in kind, the Patells, Koolkurnees, and Chowgulas hold about one-twenty-fifth of the village land rent-free. It is a conjecture of the more intelligent natives of the country, that, in ancient times, these officers, superintended by the superior government agents, collected the assessment in kind. The whole of the intermediate agents that may have existed between the Patell and the raja are not precisely ascertained; but, at present, over several villages, forming a small district, there are always two hereditary officers—the one called *Deshmookh*, *Dessae*, or *Zumeendar*; and the other *Deshpandya*, *Deshlekuk*; and *Qanoongo*. Both these officers now occasionally assume the title of Zumeendar, but the appellations *Deshmookh* and *Deshpandya* are in more general use in the Mahratta country; and their duties under the Mahomedan governments were nearly similar in their districts to those of the Patell and Koolkurnee in their villages. The *Deshmookhs* and *Patells*, with few exceptions, are Mahrattas, as the *Deshpandyas* and *Koolkurnees* are Bramins. Though the services of the *Deshmookhs* and *Deshpandyas* are in general dispensed with, they continue to be paid by a portion of land in different parts of their district, which may be estimated at about one-twentieth of the arable soil, and a twentieth of the government revenue, or five per cent. separately collected by them, and calculated agreeably to the revenue actually realized. But this is stated merely to give a general idea of their allowances, which are exceedingly variable; and they have many rights of shares and exactions which it is unnecessary to enumerate. The *Deshpandya* has about half the allowances of the *Deshmookh* in land, in kind, and in money.

There are many conjectures as to the origin of *Deshmookhs*^o and *Deshpandyas*. They were, probably, a universal institution of the Hindoo states, as ancient as village establishments, or divisions into castes; and the *Deshadikaree* and *Deshlekuk* may possibly have been the chief managers in the district for the time being, as the *Gramadikaree* and *Chamlekuk* were in the village.† That there were *Deshadikarees* is proved by the *Widnya-*

exist, to import and export to and from the Kusba or villages within its range. Thus, there are peculiar rates for the inhabitants of the Kusba, for the inhabitants of Mouzas dependent on the Kusba, and for persons coming from a distance, or from within the range of an adjoining Kusba. In cities, or large towns, where there are several markets, each separate division, where such market is held, is called *Pete*, and is regulated in a manner nearly similar. Transit duties are of two sorts—one collected within the range of the Kusba, and the other a general transit through the country. The general transit is a ready-money payment, and was commonly, at least by the Mahomedans, reserved by government; but the right of collecting within the range of the Kusba is portioned in an intricate manner, and most of the permanent agents of government have some right to share in the customs, which by them are collected in kind. Many persons have pensions upon the customs; a right of levying a small share from certain articles, or exacting something from every one exposing their merchandise on a particular spot. These descend as hereditary, and with the divisibility common to all Hindoo property.

Trade in the Mahratta country, as far as authentic record exists, has always been a secondary object with the government.

* The Mahomedans, who, like other etymologists, are sometimes very ingenious at the expense of correctness, derive this appellation from words of their own language; *Dus*, signifying ten, and *mookh*, the fist—hence, say they, *Deshmookh*, the *tenth handful*, which brings the signification to accord with the supposed original allowance of those hereditary officers. *Desh* (or, in Hindoostanee, *Des*) signifies a country, *mookh* the mouth, and *Mookhya* a chief; the Mahrattas say the derivation is not from *Mookhya*, a chief, but from *Desh* and *Mookh* the mouth, or spokesman of a district. Many Englishmen have adopted the Mahomedan derivation.

† Though the probability is that the *Deshadikars* were, like most Hindoo institutions, hereditary, there are some circumstances for and against this supposition, which, as the question relates to my subject, as the origin of every thing regarding the rights

nishnur Shaster,* in which it is expressly stated that the appeal from the

of the people of India should be of importance, and as what I mention may be followed up by inquiries more satisfactory, I shall here submit these circumstances to the reader's judgment:—*Adikar* is a Sanscrit word signifying the first or chief in employment, whether as applied to the prime minister of the state, to one deputed by him, or by the prince; it likewise signifies a right, possession, privilege, or inheritance; it is never, however, that I have found, used synonymously with *Writtee*, which is the Hindoo appellation of what is now more generally expressed in the Mahratta country by the name of *Wutun*. *Adikaree* signifies a possessor, an heir, one who possesses some right or privilege; it is also frequently used as the name of any agent of government superintending revenue affairs. The name itself, therefore, is in favor of the supposition that the *Deshadikars* did exist as permanent hereditary officers; and that the *Deshadikaree*, like the *Gramadikaree*, was the principal superintendent amongst the body of relations for the time being.

The reasons, however, for doubting this conclusion, and for supposing the *Deshadikars* distinct from, and superior to, the *Deshmookhs*, are not unworthy of consideration. At the present day the Mahrattas generally preserve all the Mahomedan forms of address in their letters and official papers, unless they can revert to the ancient Hindoo words and forms with facility. On the occasion of granting *enam*, or rent-free lands, of any village, wholly or in part, there are four separate *sunnuds*, or deeds of gift, made out—1st, one to the grantee, always conferring the grant on him and his heirs for ever; 2nd, one to the *Muqudum*, or managing *Patell* in the village; 3rd, one to the *Deshmookhs* and *Deshpandvas*; and 4th, one to the *Deshadikarees*. The three first are addressed to the parties simply; but to the fourth the address is "*Rajeeree Deshadikaree wo Lekuk wurtuman bawee*"—to the *Deshadikarees* and writers *now* and *hereafter*. The terms used for *wurtuman bawee* in the Mahomedan grants are *hal wo istugbal*, and these are seldom found substituted by the Mahrattas for the Sanscrit. Those who are inclined to defend the antiquity of the *Deshmookhs'* rights say this address is merely applicable to the present agents, who are collectors for the government, and occupy the place which was held by the chief or managing *Deshmookh*; whilst others adduce it as an instance of there having been no permanent hereditary officer between the *Patell* and the sovereign, and this opinion they support by some plausible conjectures. The *Deshmookhs* and *Deshpandvas*, as now found, were, in the opinion of these last, an institution of the Mahomedans, when they first revolted in the Deccan, and adopted as an inducement for the Mahratta Naiks and Polygars to join their standard against the emperor; that they promised all such officers, and all *Deshadikarees*, certain powers and immunities in their *native district*; and hence the general introduction of the term *wutun*, an Arabic word signifying *one's native country*. To support this opinion, there is one curious circumstance:—In the oldest firmans of the Mahomedan princes of the Deccan, in the preamble to which the petition of the grantee is frequently inserted, all the claims to *Deshmookhs'* *wutun* are made, either in consequence of former firmans, granted for services performed to the *Beder king* (the name by which the princes of the Bahminee dynasty are designated in Maharashtra), or, if the petitions be addressed to those kings, the application is made in consequence of claims to which the petitioner considers he has an equal right with other persons on whom *wutun* has been conferred agreeably to the king's promise, should he succeed in establishing his independence, or, in the words of the petition, on his mounting the throne. I am inclined to suppose, from several specimens I have examined, that these firmans were forgeries, founded on an incorrect but popular Mahomedan opinion, and intended to impose upon the kings of Bejapoor, or rather the agents of that state. Their preservation in the hands of those holding the office is a proof that they gained their end. The *Deshmookhs*, however, are certainly of much greater antiquity than has been supposed by some men of great research, in other matters connected with revenue. Mr. Grant, for one, in his *Political Analysis*, fixes the date of the original institution in A. D. 1582, during the reign of Akber.

One surmise in support of the antiquity of *Deshmookhs* and *Dessaees* is that of the Ceylon *Dessaivas*. I do not offer it as a conjecture of their having originated in that island; but any Bramin in Maharashtra can tell that Himadh Punt, the famous physician who cured Bibeshun, the brother of Rawun, introduced the art of writing the *Morh* character, and several other hints useful to his countrymen, from the *Rakshus*, or Demons of Lunka.

* This is one of the books of the Dhurm Shaster, and is considered of great antiquity; the author was the celebrated Roshee Yadnewulkya.

Punchayet, assembled by order of the Gramadikaree, was to the Deshadikaree; but there is as yet no proof of the Deshadikarees having been a permanent and hereditary officer, with lands and immunities such as the Desmookhs had under the Mahomedan princes of the Deccan.

The institution of Deshmookh, however, on that footing, if not prior to the rise of the Bahminee dynasty, is at least coeval with it in Maharashtra; but as a Hindoo state succeeded that of the Mahomedans, the Deshmookhs never had the assurance to attempt to impose upon their own nation, by pretending to rights such as were so precipitately granted to the same class of people by the British government in Bengal under the permanent revenue settlement, which is aptly named the zumeendaree system, to distinguish it from all other schemes or systems ever known in India.

But whatever may have been the origin of these officers, the confirming or withholding of their rights, as far back as we have any authentic trace, has always been a strong political instrument in the hands of every prevailing power in Maharashtra; whether that power sprang from internal insurrection or foreign conquest, and whether the Deshadikars were mere agents or hereditary officers of Hindoo institution, there is no doubt that, previous to the Mahomedan conquest, they had in many instances obtained more or less power, with that gradual advance to independence which is conveyed in the appellations of naik,* polygar, and raja, assumed by them according to circumstances.

This brief account of the establishments and institutions will, it is hoped, prove useful to the reader, and his attention is now solicited to one short definition of some importance. All property, or shares of hereditary right in land, or in the district and village establishments, termed under the ancient Hindoo governments *Writtee*,† is now best known throughout the Mahratta country by the name of *wutun*;‡ and the holder of any such enjoys, what is considered very respectable, the appellation of *wutundar*.

These preliminary explanations being afforded, we shall proceed to the period when the Mahomedans first invaded the Deccan. From that time the Mahrattas were quite lost sight of, and so little attention was paid to them that, in the seventeenth century, when they started up from their native hills and plains, they were, to other nations, a new and almost unknown race of people. The object of this work is to endeavour to afford some information respecting the condition of the Mahrattas under the Mahomedan dynasties, and to trace, more clearly than has yet been done, the rise, progress, decline, and fall of our predecessors in conquest in India, whose power, it will be perceived, was gradually gaining strength before it found a head in the far-famed adventurer, Sivajee Bhonslay.

* Naik means master. Naik was a common title of the Mahratta chiefs in the service of the Mahomedans.

† Writtee is a Sanscrit word signifying livelihood.

‡ Wutun is an Arabic word, which means one's native country, as explained in a former note.

CHAP. I.

Conquest of the Deccan by the Mahomedans.—They cross the Nerbuddah and penetrate to Deogurh.—Establish their sovereignty.—Deogurh becomes the capital of the Mahomedan empire in India, and its name changed to Doulutabad.—An insurrection lays the foundation of an independent kingdom in the Deccan.—The Bahminee dynasty.—Its duration.—Condition of the Mahrattas during its existence.—Few insurrections of the Mahrattas against their Mahomedan rulers.—The dreadful famine, Doorga Dewee.—Districts depopulated.—Hill forts in possession of polygars and robbers.—An expedition sent to restore order.—Dadoo Nursoo Kallay—his revenue arrangements.—A second and a third expedition.—Treacherous massacre of the Mohomedan army by a Mahratta raja.—Concan reduced A. D. 1469.—Decline of the Bahminee dynasty, and immediate causes which led to it.

THE conquests of the Mahomedans in India were preceded by plundering incursions. They first passed the Attock* in the end of the tenth century, and 300 years afterwards, 8,000 horse, headed by Alla-ud-deen Khiljee, crossed the Nerbuddah, traversed Candeish, and suddenly appeared before Deogurh.

The reigning prince, a Mahratta, named Ramdeo Rao Jadow, after a slight attempt to defend the town, retired into the fort, and negotiated a treaty with Alla-ud-deen, by which the raja agreed to pay the invaders a considerable ransom, on condition of their retiring from his country. The terms were concluded, and the Mahomedans about to fulfil the condition, when the son of the raja, who had collected an army, advanced upon Deogurh. Without regard to the existing treaty, and contrary to the express injunctions of his father, he sent an insolent message to Alla-ud-deen, which brought on an immediate action, and, although at first doubtful, the result was a complete defeat to the Hindoos.

After this event the raja had to pay dear for the treachery of his son. The demands of the exasperated conquerors were exorbitant; and the treasures of the kingdom, together with the cession of Elichpoor and its dependencies, was the price at which they agreed to abide by the former stipulation.

The riches and the fame thus acquired by Alla-ud-deen paved the way to his usurpation of the throne of Delhi. During his reign three great armies were sent into the Deccan under his favourite Mullik Kafoor, by which Telingana was overrun, the greater part of Maharashtra conquered, and the whole country plundered from the Nerbuddah to Cape Comorin.

The disorders, however, which broke out in different parts of the imperial territories during the latter years of the reign of Alla-ud-deen, and the internal intrigues and commotions which prevailed in the court of Delhi for some years after his death, gave the natives of the Deccan an

* The Mahomedans crossed the Lower Sindo before they penetrated by the Attock.

opportunity of re-establishing the Hindoo sovereignty, and of regaining possession of every part, except the fortress of Deogurh, which continued to hold out until the emperor Mubarik advanced with a great army to its relief, on which Hirpal Deo, and the other rajas who assisted in the siege, hastily retired. But Hirpal Deo was pursued, taken, and inhumanly flayed alive by order of the emperor.

In the reign of the emperor Tughluk, a second insurrection in the Deccan was quelled by his son Yoonas, who carried his arms into the heart of Telingana, and finally reduced its capital, A. D. 1323.

The conquest of Telingana and the capture of Warangole drove many of the chief inhabitants from their home: two of them, about twelve years after the conquest of their country, founded the city of Beejanugur, on the banks of the Toongbuddra, which soon became the head of the most powerful state south of the Nerbuddah.*

Yoonas, after the successful termination of the war, returned in triumph to Delhi, where, in the year 1325, he succeeded his father, and ascended the throne under the name of Mohummud Tughluk Shah.

This prince was the most accomplished scholar of his age; but as a ruler he was cruel, rash, and speculative. Two years after he had ascended the throne, the Moghuls advanced in great force to the gates of Delhi, whence their retreat was purchased at an enormous expense. The spoils of the Carnatic and the sack of Dhoor Summooder† were not sufficient, in Mohummud's estimation, to repair this loss. He adopted many absurd measures for replenishing his treasury at the expense of public confidence and public credit. He planned an expedition into China, and lost an army in the attempt. He issued a copper coin at a nominal value equivalent to silver, without any security for the payment of such tokens; and he adopted the ruinous and cruel scheme of removing the whole population of Delhi to Deogurh, to which latter he gave the name of Doulutabad. This removal was enforced, and an imperial edict rendered Delhi desolate, distracted the minds of the people, and shook the empire to its centre.

Disturbances broke out in various parts of the kingdom, and the emperor had scarcely quelled one insurrection, when accounts of revolt in an opposite quarter were brought to him. An invasion of the Afghans, and a subsequent insurrection of some northern tribes, kept the imperial army employed at a distance from the new capital; and the deposed raja of Warangole, aided by some troops of the Carnatic, waged a successful war against the Mahomedan invaders.

The emperor was preparing a large army with the design of completely subjugating the Deccan, when a rebellion broke out, which laid the foundation of the independent Mahomedan dynasties south of the Nerbuddah. This rebellion originated in the flight of some refractory nobles from Guzerat, who had participated in a revolt that had just been quelled by the emperor; and, in dread of punishment, they sought refuge with Kutullugh Khan, the governor of Doulutabad, by whom they had been received in hopes that time or circumstances might induce the

* Wilks' Historical Sketches.

† Said by some to have been the capital of Bulal Deo, raja of the Carnatic; and by others to have been the principal sea-port of his dominions, and situated in Toolava (Canara), but that its site and harbour are unknown, owing to the ebbing of the sea.

emperor to overlook their misconduct. For affording this protection the governor fell under the displeasure of Mohummud ; he was removed from his government, and orders were sent to collect the fugitive nobles, to promise them pardon, and to conduct them to the imperial presence.

They proceeded, under the most solemn assurances of forgiveness, towards Guzerat, where the royal camp then was, but, on approaching the confines of that province, some circumstances occurred which led them to suspect that treachery was intended ; upon which they rose on their

guard, killed the officer sent in charge of them, and, A. D. 1344. erecting the standard of rebellion, marched back towards Doulutabad.

They were joined by several Hindoo chiefs, disgusted with the tyranny of the emperor ; and by the time they had reached Doulutabad, their numbers were so formidable that the garrison were encouraged to declare for the insurgents, which they did by confining their governor and delivering up the fortress.

It was now necessary to elect a head, and as there had been yet no individual sufficiently conspicuous for personal ability, their choice, in the meantime, rested on a commander of a thousand horse, named Ismael ; and in this election they were probably influenced by the hope that Mullik Moogh, the brother of Ismael, who commanded the imperial army in Malwa, would be drawn over to their party. The new king assumed the name of Nasir-ud-deen.

The emperor Mohummud, on hearing of this formidable rebellion, marched from Guzerat with a large army ; and, on arriving near Doulutabad, he found the rebel forces drawn up to engage him ; a severe action took place, and, although indecisive, the imperial army remained masters of the field of battle.

The insurgents not having obtained a first advantage, held a consultation, when it was resolved that Nasir-ud-deen should defend the fortress of Doulutabad, whilst the other chiefs, retiring to different districts, prosecuted a desultory warfare.

Amongst the rebel chiefs particularly distinguished for bravery and conduct, was Zuffir Khan, who, from a very humble origin, had risen to high command, and was destined to be the founder of a race of kings.

The emperor, on discovering the plans of the insurgents, immediately invested Doulutabad, and detached a force under Ummad-ool-Moolk Tebreezee to pursue Zuffir Khan. The garrison was reduced to extremity, when information was received that another insurrection had broken out at Delhi, which obliged the emperor to proceed thither, leaving the siege to be carried on by his officers. The Deccanees, encouraged by his departure, collected from all quarters to annoy the army before Doulutabad, which so alarmed the officers that they hastily raised the siege, and retreated to the Nerbuddah, closely pursued, and constantly harassed, by the Deccan cavalry.

Zuffir Khan, who was apprized of this turn in the affairs of his party, being at the head of 20,000 horse, now advanced towards Ummad-ool-Moolk Tebreezee, who, instead of continuing the pursuit, took post with his large army at Beder. This gave Zuffir Khan a great political advantage, which he judiciously improved, by merely showing that he was at the head of a party already capable of facing the imperial army, until he had induced the raja of Telingana to detach 15,000 horse to his assistance, and had obtained a reinforcement of 5,000 men from Doulutabad. He then attacked the imperialists ; and after an obstinate and bloody battle, in

which Ummad-eel-Moolk was slain, victory declared in-favour of Zuffir Khan. Detachments were immediately sent to occupy the country, whilst the main body marched in triumph towards Doulutabad. Nasir-ud-deen came out to meet Zuffir Khan; and observing the greater weight and ascendancy already acquired by his successful general, he prudently assembled the nobles, and requesting their permission to resign his crown, recommended their electing Zuffir Khan to the government of the kingdom—a proposition which was at once applauded and acceded to.

Zuffir Khan was said to have been originally the slave of a Bramin, an inhabitant of Delhi, named Kangoh,* who, having discovered his merits, gave him liberty, and assisted, as well as foretold, his subsequent fortune. On being raised to empire, Zuffir Khan did not forget his protector; the Bramin was appointed to the charge of the treasury, and had the honor of giving the appellation of Bahminee to a dynasty of Patan kings. Zuffir

A. D. 1347. Khan was recognized as sovereign in the year 1347, and assumed the title of Sultan Alla-ud-deen Hoossein Kangoh Bahminee. We have seen that this revolution was aided by the native princes of the Deccan, and from several circumstances in the conduct of the war, particularly the desultory plan adopted by the insurgents, which always requires the aid of the native inhabitants of any country, there is strong presumption of their having contributed more to its success than the Mussulman historian was aware of, or perhaps was willing to allow. There are many recorded proofs of the new Sultan's prudence; but his wisdom is most conspicuous in the conciliatory measures he adopted for obtaining the entire possession of the districts which had been before subject to the Mahomedans, binding all classes of his new subjects to his interests, and gaining the friendship and support of the raja of Warungole, in whom the Mahomedans had previously found a watchful and implacable enemy.

The death of the emperor of Delhi, Mohummud Tughluk Shah, relieved the new Sultan from all apprehensions in that quarter. He very early employed the minds of the warlike and turbulent people over whom he ruled, by directing their attention to conquests in the Carnatic; and the subsequent rivalry with the rajas of Beejanugur probably preserved the kingdom of his successors from internal decay, for a much longer period than if they had been able to extend their conquests rapidly, or if their seditious armies had been left to the enjoyment of a mischievous repose.†

The Bahminee dynasty‡ may be said to have existed upwards of a century and a half; during that period we may learn something of the condition of the Mah rattas from Mahomedan history; and a few circum-

* The story altogether, as detailed by Ferishta, bears the marks of tradition—an observation of no consequence in this place; but it may be remarked that all Bramins now in the Deccan, holding the office of Qanoongo, which is similar to that of Deshpandya, are invariably called Kangoh in the corrupt dialect of Maharashtra, and that even in Persian this corruption is found, spelt both with the kaf and qaf.

† The foregoing short abstract of Mahomedan history is almost entirely from Ferishta. Ferishta continues our best authority up to the beginning of the seventeenth century; but wherever I may adopt other authorities, I shall never intentionally omit mentioning them, as well in acknowledgment as in proof.

‡ The names of the successors of Sultan Alla-ud-deen, with the dates of their reign, according to Ferishta, are as follow:—

1st Sultan having died in 1357, was succeeded by his son.
2nd Sultan, Mohummud Shah Bahminee, died in 1374, and was succeeded by his son.
3rd Sultan, Mujahid Shah Bahminee, was assassinated in 1377 by his uncle and successor.

stances may be gleaned from the legends (or *Bukers*), which are found in possession of most of the descendants of the old Mahratta families.

It has already been stated that the country, at the period of the Mahomedan conquest, appears to have been divided into many small principalities, more or less independent. It is probable that most of those polygars, whose country lay in the accessible parts, were induced either to join or to submit to the head of the new state in 1347, which is the date assigned* to the accession of Sultan Alla-ud-deen.

4th Sultan, Daood Shah Bahminee, only reigned about one month, when he was assassinated at the instigation of Koopurwur Agah, and was succeeded by

5th Sultan, Mahmood Shah Bahminee, a younger son of the first Sultan, died in 1396, and was succeeded by his son.

6th Sultan, Ghazee-ud-deen Shah Bahminee, who reigned one month and twenty days, when he was assassinated by Lallcheen, a Turkish slave, and was succeeded by his brother.

7th Sultan, Shumse-ud-deen Shah Bahminee, was dethroned after a reign of less than six months, and was succeeded by the son of Daood Shah Bahminee.

8th Sultan, Firoze (Rozi Ufzoon) Shah Bahminee, died in 1422, and was succeeded by his brother.

9th Sultan, Ahmed Shah Wullee Bahminee, died in 1434, and was succeeded by his son.

10th Sultan, Alla-ud-deen (II.) Shah Bahminee, died in 1457, and was succeeded by his son.

11th Sultan, Humaioon Shah Bahminee, commonly called Zalim, or the tyrant, who died the victim of passion and cruelty in 1460, and was succeeded by his son.

12th Sultan, Nizam Shah Bahminee, died in 1462, and was succeeded by his brother.

13th Sultan, Mohammud Shah Bahminee, who died in 1482, and was succeeded by his son.

14th Sultan, Mahmood Shah Bahminee, who died in 1518, and his son,

15th Sultan, Ahmed Shah Bahminee, was his nominal successor, who died two years afterwards, or in 1520, and to fill his place,

16th Sultan, Alla-ud-deen (III.) was set up as successor, but was afterwards strictly confined in 1526, when Kulleem Oolla Bahminee was the last on whom the title was conferred, and with him ended the Bahminee dynasty.

* There are at present four eras used in the Mahratta country besides the Christian—viz., 1, the *Shalivahan*; 2, the *Soorsun*, or Arabic year; 3, the *Fusslee* year; and 4, the *Raj-Abishik*, or from the date of Sivajee's ascending the throne.

The Hindoo day and night contain 60 *ghutkas*, commencing from the time of the morning when objects at hand are discernible; therefore, the name of the day by this method will not always be the same as with us: for our Sunday morning at 1, 2, or 3 A. M. would be the latter part of their Saturday.

The *Mirg*, or cultivator's year, always commences in the beginning of our month of June, corresponding with the end of the Hindoo month *Weyshak*, or beginning of *Jeshth*. Although the Hindoo year is lunar, it is adjusted to the solar time by the intervention of the *Adheek Muheenu*, or intercalary month, being one month counted twice over in every fourth year; and again further corrected by throwing out one month from one year in every three cycles of 60 years each, or 180 years. The month thrown out is termed *Kshy-mas*, or the deficient month.

By calculation, it appears that the *Soorsun* (generally written *Shuhoorsun* by the Mussulmans) was introduced on the *Mirg*, in Heejree 745, which corresponds with A. D. 1344-45, and hence it would appear that it must have originated with Mohammud Tughluk Shah. It was much more like his character than that of the Emperor Akber to introduce so useless an innovation; but it was in the reign of Akber that the *Fusslee* era commenced to the north of the Nerbuddah, and it was introduced into the Deccan by his grandson, Shah Jehan, in the year of the Heejree 1047, or A. D. 1637-38. The *Soorsun* and *Fusslee* eras are merely solar years, setting out with the date of the year of the Heejree when they commenced, but without making allowance in future reckoning for the difference between the solar and lunar years, by which means they differ rather more than three years every century. Both the *Soorsun* and *Fusslee* are called *Mirg*, or the husbandman's year, from their commencing at the season when the fields begin to be sown.

The new Sultan was obliged from his situation to conciliate the people of the country, and he either bestowed hereditary lands and immunities on the leading men, or confirmed them in those they already enjoyed as Deshmookhs and Deshpandyas. He likewise appears to have conferred some subordinate military rank on a few of the chiefs,* and to have appropriated lands in jagheer for the maintenance of small bodies of horse : but such lands seem to have always been within the jurisdiction of some greater Mahomedan jagheerdar, himself subordinate to the governor of a great province. By such means did the Sultan bind the natives of the country to his interest. He had obtained possession of almost the whole of Maharashtra, except the Concan-Ghaut-Mahta from the Poorundhur range of hills to the Hurnkassee river, which, together with the coast from Dabul to Cape Ramas, was not entirely conquered by the Mahomedans for upwards of a century after the establishment of the Deccan monarchy. There were very few insurrections occasioned by the natives of the country against their Mahomedan rulers : the first took place during the reign of Sultan Mohummud Shah, about the year

A. D. 1866. 1366, or after his return from his first expedition to the Carnatic.

The insurrection alluded to was headed by one of his own officers, named Bahram Khan Muzenderanee. The circumstances which gave rise to it were the report of the Sultan's death, and the absence of the troops from Doulutabad upon the Carnatic expedition. Bahram Khan was incited to this rebellion by a Mahratta chief, named Jadow,† who was probably a relation or a descendant of the ancient rajas, as he is termed chief of the Naiks, and the Jadows are still Deshmookhs in that part of the country. The insurgents were joined by the raja of Buglana, whilst other chiefs in Berar, with true Mahratta policy, secretly sent reinforcements of troops. Bahram Khan seized on all the collections he could obtain, and the greater part of the district, which from the time of Kafoor appears to have got the name of Maharashtra,‡ fell into his hands.

Mohummud Shah sent remonstrances, and, from a personal regard for Bahram Khan, offered him the most favourable terms ; but as he was under Mahratta influence, he did not comply with the Sultan's offers. The insurgents marched to Pyetun, where they collected a great crowd of needy adventurers, such as appear to have at all times swarmed in the Deccan.

The advanced force which composed the bulk of the Sultan's army, was commanded by Musnud Ali Khan Mohummud, a veteran officer, who, not choosing to engage hastily, halted at Sewgaom, a few miles from Pyetun. When encamped there, Bahram Khan made an attempt to surprise him ; but on finding Musnud Ali on his guard, he injudiciously returned to his own lines, thus showing the enemy his weakness, and leaving his own troops to suppose that their chief was doubtful of the result of an

* Hurnak Pohl and Kam Raje Ghatkay had small munsabs of from 200 to 300 horse ; there were others, but their names are not known.—Mahratta MSS.

† In Scott's Translation it is Geodeo. In some copies of Ferishta it is Govind deo ; but Ferishta says the chief of the Naiks was a descendant of the raja of Deogurh. Ram deo Rao Jadow was the raja of Deogurh, according to all Hindoo MSS, and it is not improbable that this chief's name may have been Govind deo Jadow.

‡ This name has given rise to conjectures ; it was probably some small tract about where Dhoolia now is, in Candeish, in the possession of some Mahratta polygar. It is not such a misnomer as Europeans have been guilty of in calling Toolava, Canara, though both names are to be accounted for in a similar manner.—See *Wilks*, vol. i.

equal engagement. The consequence was, of course, fatal. Musnud Ali immediately prepared to attack him, and sent intelligence to the Sultan, who was hunting among the hills in rear of the army, that he was about to engage the rebels. The Sultan immediately galloped forward, and joined his troops just as the battle was about to commence. The news of his arrival quelled the insurrection. The raja of Buglana instantly fled, and the others followed; Bahram Khan and Jadov first sought refuge in Doulutabad, and afterwards in Guzerat, beyond the pursuit of their enemies. This was the only insurrection of any consequence in Maharashtra up to the period when the Bahminee dynasty began to decline, when some of the garrisons, composed of Mahrattas, took an opportunity of throwing off their allegiance.*

In 1396, the dreadful famine, distinguished from all others by the name of the *Doorga Dewee*, commenced in Maharashtra.

A. D. 1896. lasted, according to Hindoo legends, for 12 years. At the end of that time the periodical rains returned: but whole districts were entirely depopulated, and a very scanty revenue was obtained from the territory between the Godavery and Kistna for upwards of 30 years afterwards. The hill forts and strong places, previously conquered by the Mahomedans, had fallen into the hands of polygars and robbers; and the returning cultivators were driven from their villages.†

A. D. 1429. sent in the year 1429, in the reign of Sultan Ahmed Shah Wullee Bahminee, to extirpate the banditti, to give security to the people, and to restore order in the country. This expedition was commanded by Mullik-ool-Tijar, who was accompanied by the hereditary Deshmookhs of the districts, wherever they remained, and an experienced Bramin named Dadoo Nursoo Kallay. Their first operations were against some Ramoosees in Kuttao Des, and a body of banditti that infested‡ the Mahdew hills. The army next marched towards Waee, reduced several forts, and even descended into the Concan;§ but Mullik-ool-Tijar appears on this occasion to have crossed the Ghauts without penetrating into the fastnesses of the mountains on either side. On his return to Beder, Dadoo Nursay, and a Turkish eunuch of the court, were left to arrange the country and recal the inhabitants.¶ As the former boundaries of villages were forgotten, Dadoo Nursay, in fixing new limits, extended them very much, and threw two or three villages into one. Lands were given to all who would cultivate them: for the first year no rent was required; and for the second a *tobra*|| full of grain for each *beega*|| was all that was demanded. But the result of this expedition was a mere temporary relief from the heavy contributions which the banditti of the Ghaut-Mahta were in the habit of exacting; and it soon appeared

* Ferishta.

† Mahratta MSS., and a firman in possession of one of the Waee Deshmookhs.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ From Kallay's surname, which sounds like Kala (black), these two are said to have been called the black and white eunuchs—Kala Khojeh and Gora Khojeh. European Turks early found their way to the Mahomedan court in the Deccan.

|| A tobra is a leather bag used to feed horses, by putting in the grain, and tying it on the mouth by a thong which passes over the horse's head like a head-stall, and is fastened by putting it through a running noose on one side of the tobra. It is a part of the accoutrements of every Mahratta horseman.

¶ A Beega, according to the present measurement, approaches to within 1-15th of an acre; under some of the Mahomedan states it was much smaller.

that there could be no effectual security afforded to the villages until the whole of the hill forts should be reduced.*

A second expedition was sent in 1436, under Dilawur Khan; but little having been effected by him, a third was prepared under A. D. 1486. the command of Mullik-ool-Tijar, in the reign of Sultan Alla-ud-deen (II.) Bahminee, and during the administration of Meamun Oolla Deccanee, who formed a plan of reducing not only the hill forts in the Syhadree range, but likewise the unsubdued part of the Concan to the southward of Dabul.

Mullik-ool-Tijar, having undertaken the conduct of the war, marched at the head of a choice body of troops, the flower of the Deccan army. This officer began on a systematic plan of conquering and regulating the country to be subdued. He established his head-quarters at Chakun,† and raised a fort near the city of Joonere. Thence he sent out detachments, at different times, into the Concan, and reduced several rajas to subjection. At length he moved in person to that part of the country, and laid siege to a fort, the raja of which was obliged to deliver himself up with all his family.

This raja's surname was Sirkay; and he was, without doubt, a descendant of that polygar who obtained possession of the range of country about the source of the Kistna, after the raja of Panalla was conquered in the beginning of the thirteenth century, by the raja Singin.

Mullik-ool-Tijar insisted on the raja's renouncing his own faith, and embracing the tenets of the Koran. The enraged but subtle raja, with the true policy of a Mahratta when he intends deadly vengeance, humbly represented that there existed between him and the raja of Singur,‡ a fort in the territory of Kondan,§ a family competition and rivalry, and that they were near relations; that should he embrace the Mahomedan faith, and the raja of Kondan remain in power without the loss of his caste, he should become obnoxious to his subjects, and that his rival would excite rebellion and triumph over him. He, therefore, proposed that Kondan should first be taken and bestowed on himself, or one of his relations, when he promised not only to embrace the faith of Islam, but to remit an annual tribute to the Sultan, and assist in controlling all those rajas that might hereafter fail in their allegiance.

This proposal was blindly acceded to. The troops marched were drawn into an ambuscade, treacherously beset in the night, and nearly 7,000

A. D. 1453. Mahomedans, together with their general, when buried in sleep, were inhumanly massacred by the Mahrattas. The remainder of the Sultan's army retreated; the Sirkay family regained

* Mahratta MSS.

† Chakun is a small fort 18 miles north from Poona. It is nearly square, with towers at the angles and centres of the faces; it has a good ditch about 30 feet wide and 15 deep, but wet on the north side only; the walls are high, the parapet and rampart narrow, and the towers confined. There is but one entrance into the body of the place through five or six gateways; and there is a mud outwork which also has a ditch. I mention it particularly on account of its reputed antiquity; for although it probably is the fort built by Mullik-ool-Tijar, according to concurring Hindoo legends it was constructed by an Abyssinian polygar, A. D. 1295. As to how he got there, they do not pretend to account.

‡ Probably the fort of Singurh, eight miles south of Poona. It was called Kondaneh by the Mahomedans, but afterwards by Sivajee changed to Singurh. In Scott's Translation it is written Kelneh. Kelneh is the modern Vishalgurh, and certainly lies in a situation much more resembling the description of the country, as given by Ferishta, than Singurh.

possession of their country, and for a period of nearly 16 years no further attempt was made to follow up the plan of Meamun Oolla Deccanee.

It is not known at what period Goa came into the possession of the rajas of Beejanugur; but it was taken from them A. D. 1469, when Khajeh Jehan Gawan, in the reign of Mohummud Shah, undertook an expedition which terminated in the capture of Goa, and the complete subjugation of the whole of that strong country which is included in the south-west corner of Maharashtra.

The tract so reduced remained but a very short time under the reigns of the Bahminee dynasty. The structure that had been founded and reared by Alla-ud-deen continued to be built up by his successors; but the pile soon became too lofty to sustain its own weight without a broader basis; and the great addition of territory to the eastward, which was acquired by the victories of Mohummud Shah over the raja of Orissa, brought on a crisis which could only terminate in reform or revolution.

The date of the extinction of the dynasty is 1526; but long before that period, there were in fact five separate states under Mahomedan kings in the Deccan: —1, Edil Shahee, or Beejanugur; 2, Kootub Shahee, Golcondah, or Hyderabad; 3, Ummad Shahee, or Berar; 4, Nizam Shahee, or Ahmednugur; and 5, Bureed Shahee, or Ahmedabad Beder. Of these five independent states, which sprang from the dismemberment of the first Mahomedan kingdom, only three existed at the period when the Mahratta people began to emerge from subjugation, and to be conspicuous as actors in the affairs of India.

The history of these Mahomedan kingdoms, as far as regards the detail of events, is already accessible to the public^o up to the commencement of the seventeenth century; but the immediate cause of the downfall of the Bahminee dynasty, and a brief notice of the origin and progress of the states alluded to, are connected with our subject, and must be introduced as conducive to perspicuity.

At the period of the first Sultan's death in 1357, the dominion of the Mahomedans in the Deccan extended over almost the whole of Maharashtra: a small portion of Telingana, together with Raichore and Moodgul in the Carnatic, were also in their possession. When Mohummud Shah Bahminee succeeded to the throne, one of his first arrangements was to divide his country into four parts, which he termed Turufs; and to each he appointed a governor, who was styled Turufdar.

In the course of 130 years, the territory had been greatly increased by conquests from the neighbouring rajas of Beejanugur, Telingana, the Concan polygars, the raja of Orissa, and others,—the governments of all, except Beejanugur, having been almost entirely subverted; but the original four divisions, subject to the defects attendant on old establishments never revised, had been so greatly enlarged, that the governors became too powerful to be either controlled or superintended. Under such circumstances the application of a remedy is very difficult. About

the year 1478 an attempt was made by Khajeh Jehan A. D. 1478. Gawan, the able minister of Mohummud Shah, to divide the authority, and to preserve a due insight into the affairs of each province. His plan will be best understood by showing the original divisions of the kingdom, and the new sub-divisions which he projected. The names of the governors appointed to each are added; and this abstract is recommended to the particular attention of the reader.

* Scott's Translation of Ferishta.

*Old Divisions.**New Divisions.*

1st. *Kulbarga*—of which, as of all the rest, two governments were formed :—

- | | | |
|------|---------------------|---|
| 1st. | Beejapoor | —with many districts as far as the Beema, and including Raichore and Moodgul. To this Khajeh Jehan Gawan was himself appointed. |
| 2nd. | Ahsunabad | —which included Kulbarga and Suggur, Nuldroog and Sholapoor, and was placed in charge of the Abyssinian eunuch, Dustoor Deenar. |
| 2nd. | <i>Doulutabad</i> . | —3rd. Doulutabad—of which Eusoof Adil Khan Sawee was appointed governor. |
| 4th. | Joonere | —with the Concan, and the districts as far south as Goa and Belgaom were conferred on Fukhir-ool-Moolk. |
| 3rd. | <i>Telingana</i> . | —5th. Rajamundree—Mausulipatam, Pilkondah, Oureah, and other places were held in the name of Nizam-ool-Moolk Byherree. |
| | | 6th. Warungole—was given in charge to Azim Khan. |
| 4th. | <i>Berar</i> . | —7th. Gawel—was placed under Futih Oolla Emmad-ool-Moolk. |
| | | 8th. Mahoor.—Under the Abyssinian, Khodawund Khan. |

In order to preserve an insight into the affairs of these governments, the revenues of several places, in each of the eight divisions, were reserved for the Sultan's private expenses, and particular collectors appointed to manage them.

Had these measures been steadily superintended for any length of time, a due ascendancy in the head of the state might long have been preserved; but Khajeh Jehan's influence could not withstand the malice of his enemies, by whom a conspiracy was formed against his life; he was falsely accused by them, and rashly and wrongfully put to death by order of Mohummud Shah.

The evils against which his measures were calculated to provide were hastened by this event. The chiefs, who had been the enemies of Khajeh Jehan, only remained with the Sultan in hopes of enlarging their own power by the ruin of those who were the friends of the late minister. Nizam-ool-Moolk Byherree was the person supposed to have laid the plan for the destruction of Khajeh Jehan. The origin and the career of Nizam-ool-Moolk are remarkable: he was the son of a Bramin Koolkurnee of the town of Pathree,* and accompanied his father to the Carnatic during the prevalence of a famine at their native place. When residing in that country, the Bramin boy was taken prisoner by the Mahomedan troops, in one of the expeditions of Ahmed Shah Wullee Bahminee, and brought as a slave to that Sultan, by whom he was made a Mussulman, and named Mullik Hoosein. In the reign of Mohummud Shah, he was raised to the rank of Huzaree, or commander of 1,000 horse, and by degrees attained high situations, till at length, by the recommendation of Khajeh Jehan, he was, with the title of Nizam-ool-Moolk, appointed to the government of Telingana, a portion of which was assigned to him in jagheer. Nizam-ool-Moolk got his son, Mullik Ahmed, appointed his deputy in the provinces; whilst he himself remained with the Sultan, plotting the foul deed by which he cut off the benefactor that had raised

* Situated in the district of the same name, north of the Godavery.—*Ferishta*, *Mahratta MSS.*, and *Huqueet-i-Hindoostan*, a modern compendium by Luximon Narain, of Hyderabad.

him, and deprived the country which he served of a man deservedly respected. But although his ambition was thus temporarily gratified, a worse fate was reserved for himself; he was, in the end, treacherously murdered by a wretch whom he had rescued from misery and elevated to power.

After the death of Khajeh Jehan, the principal governors paid no respect to the authority of Mohummud Shah; and although some of them preserved a show of obedience, they gradually assumed independence.

Hence arose those kingdoms in the Deccan, the subjugation of which for a very long period employed the descendants of Timour, and during the struggle the Mahomedans, whilst exhausting themselves, were gradually exciting that turbulent predatory spirit, which, though for ages smothered, was inherent in the Hindoo natives of Maharashtra;—in this manner the contention of their conquerors stirred those latent embers, till, like the parched grass, kindled amid the forests of the Syhadree mountains, they burst forth in spreading flame, and men afar off wondered at the conflagration.

CHAP. II.

Five independent States arise from the dismembered monarchy, which afterwards form the three kingdoms of Ahmednugur, Beejapoor, and Golcondah.—The term Deccan as now used.—Review of events during the sixteenth century.—Forts garrisoned by Mahrattas.—Portuguese appear on the Malabar coast—on the shores of Maharashtra—they take Goa.—The king of Ahmednugur appoints a Bramin his Peishwa, or prime minister.—The king of Beejapoor likewise shows a preference for the natives of Maharashtra.—Cavalry.—Sillidars and Bargeers.—Portuguese ravage the coast, and levy contributions.—Battle of Telikotta.—Beejanugur state subverted.—The kings of Beejapoor and Ahmednugur attack the Portuguese without success.—Maharashtra, A. D. 1573, possessed, with some exceptions, by Beejapoor and Ahmednugur.—Extent of the kingdoms of Beejapoor, Ahmednugur, and Golcondah.—Internal administration.—The Mahrattas under these states frequently opposed to each other.—The principal Mahratta families under Beejapoor and Ahmednugur—some account of each family, particularly that of Bhonslay.—The Moghul invasions, for the purpose of subjugating the Deccan states, had great influence on the rise of the Mahrattas.—State of the Deccan when the Emperor Akber projected its conquest—at his death, A. D. 1605, in possession of a part of the territory of Nizam Shah.—Mullik Umber—his regency.—Lookhjee Jadow Rao.—Death of Mullik Umber and of Ibrahim Adil Shah.—Shahjee Bhonslay.—Mahrattas fast rising into consequence.—Accession of Mohummud Adil Shah.—Futih Khan succeeds his father.—Mullik Umber is confined by Mortiza Nizam Shah.—Murder of Lookhjee Jadow Rao.—Death of the Emperor Jehangeer, and accession of his son, Shah Jehan.—Khan Jehan Lodi, his rebellion and death.—Shahjee Bhonslay enters the Moghul service.—Alliance betwixt Mortiza Nizam Shah and the king of Beejapoor.—Army of Beejapoor defeated by the Moghuls.—Futih Khan murders Mortiza Nizam Shah—negotiates with the emperor—obtains some districts previously promised to Shahjee.—Shahjee in disgust joins the army of Beejapoor.—Futih Khan treacherously breaks with the Moghuls.—Siege and surrender of Doulutabad.—Moghuls repulsed before Purinda, and compelled to retreat to Burhanpoor.—Shahjee's regency.—Shah Jehan's policy.—War with Beejapoor—peace concluded—terms.—Shahjee maintains a desultory warfare—is at last compelled to yield, and enter the service of Beejapoor.—End of the Byheree dynasty.

By the distribution of the governments under the administration of Khajeh Jehan Gawan, Eusoof Adil Khan Sawee was, as
 A. D. 1478. we have mentioned in the foregoing chapter, appointed to Doulutabad; but upon the death of that minister, who had been his patron and intimate friend, Adil Khan was removed to the government of Beejapoor, where several circumstances combined

to strengthen his power ; till, in the year 1489, he assumed the ensigns of royalty. Such was the origin of the kings of Beejapoor, well known by their Deccan appellation of the Edil Shahee dynasty.*

The first prince of Ahmednugur, the founder of the Nizam Shahee or Byheree† dynasty, was Mullik Ahmed, the son of that Nizam-ool-Moolk Byheree stigmatized as the principal instigator in the murder of Khajeh Jehan Gawan.

Nizam-ool-Moolk having succeeded to the office of the deceased minister, and having, by the will of Mohummud Shah, become prime minister to his son, Sultan Mahmood, obtained Bheer and other districts in addition to his former extensive jagheer ; and Mullik Ahmed, who had been his father's deputy in the lately-acquired territory of Rajamundree and Oureah, being recalled thence, was sent to the northward, and appears to have held a general charge of the territory comprehended in the districts of Doulutabad and Joonere by the arrangements of 1478.

When his father, Nizam-ool-Moolk, was murdered, Mullik Ahmed rebelled ; and, having assumed independence, defied all the efforts of Mahmood Shah Bahminee to reduce him.

Kootub-ool-Moolk, Turufdar of Telingana, to which government he was appointed in the year 1495, styled himself Sultan, and mounted the throne of Golcondah in 1512 under the title of Kootub Shah.

The founder of the Berar state was Futih Oolla Ummad-ool-Moolk, governor of that province. The Ummad Shahee dynasty lasted till 1574, when Berar was conquered and annexed to the territory of Ahmednugur by Mortiza Nizam Shah I.

The Bureed Shahee dynasty lasted a still shorter period than the Ummad Shahee. The sovereignty was founded by Umeer Bureed, whose influence was obtained by his control over the king's person ; the territory he possessed never extended beyond Beder, Kulburga, and a few of the adjoining districts ; the greater part was afterwards annexed to Beejapoor.

The three states, therefore, more immediately connected with our subject, are those of Beejapoor, Ahmednugur, and Golcondah.‡

* The Moghuls never acknowledged their title to Shah (that is, king) ; and, therefore, in all Moghul writings, the sovereigns of Beejapoor are only mentioned by the name of Adil Khan.

† One of the situations by which Nizam-ool-Moolk ascended to power was that of having charge of the royal falconry ; the Byheree being a species of hawk much used in the Deccan, he obtained the name of Byheree from that circumstance.

‡ A list of the princes of each dynasty, with the dates of their reign up to the end of the sixteenth century, is as follows :—

Beejapoor, or Edil Shahee.	Ahmednugur Nizam Shahee, or Byheree Dynasty.	Golcondah, or Kootub Shahee.
1st. Sultan Eusoof Adil Shah, assumed independence in 1489. Died in 1510.	1st. Mullik Ahmed, under the title of Ahmed Nizam-ool-Moolk Byheree, assumed independence about 1487, and died in 1508.	1st. Sultan Kootub-ool-Moolk assumed independence in 1512, and was assassinated in 1551.
2nd. Sultan Ismael Adil	2nd. Sultan Boorahan Ni	2nd. Sultan Jumsheed suc-

But before proceeding further, it is fit to apprise the reader that the term Deccan, as at present used by all classes, is different from the ancient Hindoo signification, which, we have seen, included the whole tract of the five grand divisions of the Indian peninsula. Europeans have adopted the Mahomedan definition; and the modern Deccan comprises most of Telingana, part of Gondwanah, and that large portion of Maharashtra which is above the western range of Ghauts, and which extends from the Nerbuddah to the Kistna.

We shall now take a brief review of events during the sixteenth century, and of the state of the country and its inhabitants during that period.

On the appointment of Mullik Ahmed to his government of Doulutabad and Joonere, in the year 1485, he found the Mahrattas,

A. D. 1485. who garrisoned the hill forts, in a state of revolt; and was obliged to besiege and take the whole of the forts about Poona, including Kondaneh* and Loghur, and also many in the Concan, as far as Dhunda Rajepoor, which was about the southern extremity of the Ahmednugur territory.

The pretence set up by the Mahrattas for refusing to surrender the forts was the minority of Mahmood Shah; but they were, perhaps, induced to hold out at the instigation of some of the factions which then agitated the court of Beder.

Beejapoor, or Edil Shahee.	Ahmednugur Nizam Shahee, or Byherree Dynasty.	Golcondah, or Kootub Shahee.
Shah succeeded his father, and died in 1554.	zam Shah succeeded his father, and died in 1553.	ceeded his father, and after a short reign of seven months was succeeded by his brother.
3rd. Sultan Mulloo Adil Shah succeeded his father, and was deposed in 1555.	3rd. Sultan Hoossein Nizam Shah succeeded his father, and died in 1565.	3rd. Sultan Ibrahim Kootub Shah, who died in the year 1581.
4th. Sultan Ibrahim Adil Shah succeeded his brother, and died in 1557.	4th. Sultan Mortiza Nizam Shah succeeded his father, and was put to death in 1587 by his son and successor.	4th. Sultan Mohummud Koollee Kootub Shah succeeded his father, and was succeeded by his brother.
5th. Sultan Ali Adil Shah succeeded his father, and was murdered in 1580.	5th. Sultan Meeran Hoossein Nizam Shah, who was, after a reign of two months, put to death, 1587.	5th. Sultan Abdoollah Kootub Shah.
6th. Sultan Ibrahim Adil Shah succeeded his father.	6th. Sultan Ismael Nizam Shah, the cousin of Meeran Hoossein, was raised to the throne, but deposed by his father. 7th. Sultan Boorahan Nizam Shah (II.), who died in 1594.	

* Or Singurb, as already noticed.

Early in the sixteenth century a new power appeared, which took some share in the events which followed. The Portuguese, under the celebrated

A. D. 1498. Vasco de Gama, had made their appearance in May 1498 at the town of Calicut in Karala, or Malabar. In 1507, in an engagement fought at Choule^o by Lorenzo, the son of Francisco de Almeyda, against the fleet of the Soldan of Egypt, the Portuguese cannon were first heard on the shores of Maharashtra. Choule then belonged to Ahmednugur, and the country of Mullik Nizam-ool-Moolk Byheree seems to have been the only one to which the ravages of Portuguese piracy did not extend. They maintained a friendly intercourse, for a good many years, with the king of Ahmednugur.

On the 30th December 1508, the Portuguese fleet entered the river of Dabul, and the viceroy, Francisco de Almeyda, who commanded in person, having landed his men, took, plundered, and burnt the town. But the first territory of which the Portuguese obtained possession in Maharashtra was the important island on which stands the city of Goa, and which belonged to the territory of Beejapoor.

The attack on Goa was suggested to Alphonzo de Albuquerque by the Hindoo pirate Timmojee, a native of Toolava.† Goa was surprised, and surrendered on the 27th February 1510,^o but was retaken, a few months afterwards, by Eusoof Adil Shah in person.‡ It was, however, again attacked in the fair season, and finally conquered by Albuquerque on the 25th November 1510,^o since which time it

A. D. 1510. has remained in possession of the Portuguese.

About the year 1529, it is particularly deserving of notice that Boorahan Nizam Shah bestowed the office of *Peishwa*, or prime minister, on a Bramin, whose name, according to Ferishta, was Kawerseen; and from that period the Hindoos acquired great influence in the Nizam Shahee government. Ibrahim Adil Shah, upon his accession to the throne of Beejapoor, in 1555, likewise showed a great preference for the natives of Maharashtra, both as men of business and as soldiers. He discontinued keeping the accounts in Persian, for which he substituted Mahratta, though deeds of importance were written in both languages.§ This regulation, of course, tended to increase the power and consequence of Mahratta Bramins. Ibrahim Adil Shah likewise disbanded most of the foreign troops, and displaced many of the foreign nobility. He entertained 30,000 Deccan cavalry, and introduced the practice of enlisting *Bargeers*,‡ men who are supplied with a horse by the state or by individuals, instead of *Sillidars*, who provide a horse at their own expense.¶

In 1532 the Portuguese made a descent upon the coast, burnt the whole of the towns from Chicklee-Tarapoor to Bassein, destroyed some fortifications newly erected there, and levied contributions from Tannah and Bombay. Two years afterwards they took Damaun, and obliged Sultan Buhadur, of Guzerat, then hard pressed by the Emperor Humaioon, to cede Bassein in perpetuity, to grant permission to build a fort at Diu, and to invest them with the right of levying duties on the trade with the Red Sea, for which they promised to assist him against the Moghuls.^o

* De Faria.

† Ferishta.

‡ A Sillidar is much more respectable than a Bargeer; he is considered in the Mahratta country a sort of gentleman cavalier.

† Commonly termed by Europeans, Canara.

§ Old deeds:

Their operations in Guzerat, and in other quarters, occupied the attention

A. D. 1548. of the Portuguese for some years; but, in 1548, they committed great havoc on the coast of the Beejapoor dominions, having destroyed, with fire and sword, the whole of the towns from the neighbourhood of Goa to Bancoote.* They were invited to become parties in a plan for deposing Ibrahim Adil Shah, and placing upon the throne his brother Abdoollah, who was then residing at Goa under their protection; but the attempt was abandoned.†

The decisive battle at Telikotta,‡ or, as it is termed in Mahratta manuscripts, *Rakshitta Gundee*, which subverted the Beejanugur state, was

A. D. 1564. fought by the confederate Mahomedan powers of the Deccan against the Hindoo army of the Carnatic in the year 1564. Jealousy among the allied Sultans prevented the kingdom of Canara from being totally annihilated. The brother of Ram Raja was allowed to retain a considerable sovereignty; but the government never recovered itself, and the Deshmookhs, or zumeendars, took advantage of its weakness to establish their own independence.§

In 1571 there was a combined attack made upon the Portuguese by the

A. D. 1571. Beejapoor and Ahmednugur kings. Ali Adil Shah besieged Goa, and sustained a very mortifying repulse;|| but the defence of Choule, which was besieged by Mortiza Nizam Shah, and was defended by Luis Ferara de Andrada, reflected particular credit on the Portuguese, and, as is generally the case where a native army is defeated, the Mahomedans attributed their want of success to treachery.*

Ferishta says the officers of Nizam Shah were corrupted, principally by presents of wine. Both monarchs desisted from their attacks in August of the same year, when Ali Adil Shah's arms were turned against some of the rajas in the Carnatic, and in reducing them he was more successful.

In 1573 Maharashtra was subject to the kings of Beejapoor and Ahmed-

A. D. 1573. nugur, with the exceptions of a part of Candeish, which was held as an independent principality by the Sultan of Burhanpoor; the northern Concan, belonging to Guzerat; and the possessions of the Portuguese. The power of Beejanugur had been for ever humbled; and Berar and Beder were annexed to the dominions of their more powerful neighbours.

The three great Mahomedan states which divided the Deccan at this period may be here briefly and generally defined.

Beejapoor extended from the Neera to the Toongbuddra. The district of Adonee, and probably¶ Nundheal, south of that river, were in its possession. The coast from Bancoote to Cape Ramas, with the exception already adverted to, formed its western side; and on the east, the boundaries of its districts, Raichore, Eedgeer, Mulkair, and Beder, divided it from the kingdom of Golcondah; Akulkote, Nuldroog, and Kallian became frontier provinces, and, like Sholapoor, situated between Ahmed-

* De Faria.

† Ferishta.

‡ I follow the usual designation of that battle; but it was probably fought at some village opposite to Telikotta, across the Kistna, and consequently 16 miles south of the modern Telikotta.

§ Ferishta.—Wilks.

|| De Faria, Cæsar Frederick.

¶ I say probably, for the same reason that Colonel Wilks does, namely, that although included as one of the Moghul divisions of the soobeh of Beejapoor, there is no positive evidence of its having been either taken or ceded to Beejapoor. Adonee was taken in 1567.

nugur and Beejapoor, were sometimes overrun by the troops of the one and sometimes of the other.

Ahmednugur extended over the greater part of Berar, and the whole of what was afterwards comprehended in the soobeh of Aurangabad. Galna, and some other districts in Candeish, and the district of Kalianee, in the Concan, or from Bancoote to Bassein, were likewise subject to this state.

The kingdom of Golcondah extended from the territory of Beejapoor and Ahmednugur east as far as the opposite coast; but a part of the territory about Rajamundree, which had been originally conquered from the raja of Orissa, continued to be governed by one of that raja's descendants, by whom tribute having been withheld, Ibrahim Kootub Shah was employed in establishing due authority in that quarter, and in settling his lately-acquired districts in the Carnatic, whilst the Sultans of Ahmednugur and Beejapoor were acting against the Portuguese, or extending their respective possessions in Berar and the Carnatic.

Under these governments the country was divided into *sirkars*, though not, perhaps, so regularly as by the subsequent arrangements of the Moghuls. The next division to a sirkar was known by the various and synonymous names of *pergunna*, *kuryat*, *summut*, *mahal*, and *talooka*, and also by the Hindoo appellations *pramti* and *desh*. Khora, Moora, and Mawul have been already described as lands comprehended in the Concan-Ghaut-Mahta, and such parts, from having been generally intrusted to Hindoo management, continued to be known by their ancient appellations.

The revenues under all the Mahomedan states seem generally to have been farmed out in small portions, in some parts of the country by single villages. Where they were not farmed, the management appears to have been generally intrusted to Hindoo agency.* To collect the revenues so farmed, there were *aumils*, or agents on the part of government, who regulated the police and settled civil suits; these last, in disputes relating to hereditary office or landed property, were decided by Punchayet.† In matters which regarded mere money transactions, it is probable that the aumils frequently gave decisions themselves. Under the Beejapoor state there was an aumildar who superintended the affairs of a considerable division, and to whom all other aumildars were subordinate. This officer was termed *mokassadar*;‡ and it is conjectured that he had some percentage upon the revenues, but the amount is unknown. There are instances of Mokassadars having held their situations for upwards of 20 years, and been succeeded by their sons,§ but this was entirely

* This is stated on the authority of many papers in possession of Deshpandyas, local inquiry amongst intelligent natives, and numerous circumstances throughout the country, as well as written documents in support of what the Deshpandyas adduce.

† Under the Beejapoor state, in cases of hereditary property where the government was a party, there were about fifteen persons assembled on the Punchayet. By some old writings I have seen, two-thirds of these appear to have been Mahomedans and one-third Hindoos. With regard to the Ahmednugur state, I have not had the same opportunities of gaining information; but that claims to hereditary property were settled by Punchayet, the old papers in every district will prove.

‡ The origin of this name, as here used, is probably to be found in the Arabic word *moqata*, signifying the place of collecting the customs or revenue. The subsequent application of the word Mokassa by the Mahrattas, though perhaps taken from this source, is, like several of their revenue terms, more arbitrary than derivative.

§ There is one instance where the situation remained in the same family for three generations. Mokrib Khan, Mokassadar of Kuttao, Kurar, &c., was succeeded by his son and grandson.—(Old written documents preserved by the Deshpandya's family, who managed his affairs.)

optional with the Sultan. Some were removed in one year, and the Mokassadar was not always a Mahomedan. There was frequently, but not always, an authority superior to the Mokassadar, called a Soobeh : he did not reside constantly in the districts, and took no share in the revenue management, although deeds and formal writings of importance were made out in his name.

The condition of the Mahrattas in the early part of those dynasties continued much the same as it had been under the Bahminee kings. The hill forts seem generally to have been garrisoned by Mahrattas :^{*} they were sometimes in the immediate pay of government, and sometimes in charge of the jagheerdars and district Deshmookhs : a few places of great strength were always reserved by the king, by whom the Killidars, or governors, were appointed ; but to this we shall again more particularly revert. A certain rank depending on the number of a body of horse under an individual's command, and which rank is termed by Mahomedans munsib, was frequently conferred on Mahratta chiefs,† and military jagheers, or lands given for the purpose of maintaining a body of troops, were granted for their support. The quota of troops so furnished was very small in proportion to the size of the jagheer. Phultun Desh, for which, in the time of the Mahratta Peishwas, 350 horse were required, only furnished 50 to the Beejapoor government, at a very late period of that dynasty ; but the Mahratta chiefs could procure horse at a short notice, and they were entertained or discharged at pleasure—a great convenience to a wasteful court and an improvident government. Titles were conferred upon many of the Mahrattas, but under the Deccan dynasties such titles were generally ancient Hindoo appellations. Raja, Naik, and Rao were the most common, and, though bestowed by their Mahomedan conquerors, the distinction was always exceedingly gratifying to the Mahrattas, especially as they invariably obtained with the title the means of supporting their new rank.

The Mahrattas are occasionally mentioned in Ferishta's history of the Edil Shahce kings, under the name of *Bergee*, by which they are scarcely known to Europeans. *Bergee*, or *Burgay*, was more frequently applied by the Mahomedans to the Naiks of the Carnatic ; many natives of which, who cannot speak their own language, call themselves Mahrattas ; but all the troops of the Mahratta munsibdars were called *Bergee* ; and in many parts of India they are still known by that name : it was used like the term *Barukh Bhasee*‡ of later date, as a contemptuous appellation, and perhaps originated with the foreign cavalry, when disbanded, to make room for Deccanees in the army of Beejapoor. They were always found particularly

* This may be gleaned from various parts of Ferishta ; and, by old papers in the possession of some of the Deshmookhs, it appears they were frequently intrusted with the care of the king's forts.

† The munsibs of the Deccan states exactly corresponded with the number of horse from which they took their rank. In the Moghul service, munsibdars of 10,000 might only hold command of half that number of horse. The munsibs of Mahomedans rarely, if ever, exceeded 10,000, even under the Moghul government, but Mahrattas in the service of the emperor had much higher munsibs ; in one instance, a Mahratta chief, as will be hereafter observed, had a munsib of 24,000 conferred on him.

‡ Where anything is disorganized, in the hands of many, or in a state of confusion, the Mahrattas use this phrase. Europeans, in designating any one body of horse by this appellation, misunderstand both its point and its meaning. The Bramins invariably apply it to Mahratta affairs, of which they have not the sole management.

serviceable in stopping roads and intercepting supplies, in hanging on the rear of a flying enemy, and in plundering and devastating a country.

In the year 1578 Ferishta mentions that excesses were committed by

A. D. 1578. some of the Bergee chiefs in their jagheers in the Carnatic; and a considerable force was detached for the purpose of suppressing them; but, after a year of constant skirmishing, the officer sent against them stated the impossibility of making any impression on the Bergee horse; and the Sultan, Ali Adil Shah, with that treachery for which the Deccan has always been notorious, formed a scheme for drawing them into his power, and putting their chiefs to death. His instrument for this detestable purpose was a Bramin, named Vasoojee Punt, who succeeded in betraying most of them.

The Bergees, however, afterwards attended the standard of the Sultan's successor; and in the reign of Ibrahim Adil Shah we find them actively engaged in their usual mode of warfare against the army of Nizam Shah.

The Mahrattas were naturally much more numerous in the armies of Beejapoor and Ahmednugur, as these kingdoms extended over almost the whole of Maharashtra, but some of them served in the army of Golcondah. Neither national sentiment, nor unity of language and religion, prevented their fighting against each other. Not only did Mahratta subjects of these governments stand in array opposed to each other, but the most active enmity was frequently evinced between members of the same family. They fought with rancour wherever individual dispute or hereditary feuds existed; and that spirit of rivalry in families, which was fomented by the kings of the Bahminee dynasty,* was one means of keeping the Mahrattas poised against each other in the dynasties which succeeded them.

Some of the principal Mahratta chiefs, under the Beejapoor state, were—1st, Chunder Rao Moray; 2nd, Rao Naik Nimbalkur, called also Phultun Rao; 3rd, Joojhar Rao Ghatgay; 4th, Rao Manay; 5th, Ghorepuray; 6th, Duffay, 7th, Sawunt Buhadur, Deshmookh of Waree, &c.

Those under Ahmednugur were—1st, Rao Jadow; 2nd, Raja Bhonslay; and many others of less note.

In regard to the chiefs under Beejapoor, a person named Moray, originally a naik in the Carnatic, was appointed in the reign of Eusoof Adil Shah to the command of a body of 12,000 Hindoo infantry, sent for the purpose of reducing that strong tract which is situated between the Neera and the Warna rivers. In this enterprize Moray was successful; he dispossessed the descendants of the Raja Sirkay, and completely suppressed the depredations of their abettors; the principal of whom were families named Goozur, Mamoolkur, Mohitey, and Mahareek. Moray, for this service, was dignified with the title of Chunder Rao; and his son Yeswunt Rao, having distinguished himself in a battle fought near Purinda with the troops of Boorahan Nizam Shah, in which he captured a green flag, was confirmed in succession to his father as raja of Jowlee, and had permission to use the standard he had won. Their posterity ruled in the same tract of country for seven generations; and by their mild and useful administration, that inhospitable region became extremely populous. All the successors of the first Moray assumed the title of Chunder Rao. The invariable submission manifested by this raja probably induced the government to exact little more than a nominal tribute from districts producing so little, and which had always been in disorder under Mahomedan management.

* Papers respecting hereditary disputes in Mahratta families, Ghatgay's Buker, &c.

Another principal chief, under the Beejapoor government, was the **Naik** of Phultun, whose title was Rao Naik Nimbalkur, or Phultun Rao. The original name of this family is said to have been Powar; the name **Nimbalkur** is derived from the village of Nimbalik, now called Nimluk, where his ancestor resided. The origin of his Deshmookhee claims on **Phultun** Desh is unknown: the family is considered one of the most ancient in Maharashtra. Nimbalkur was made Surdeshmookh of Phultun, before the middle of the seventeenth century, by the king of Beejapoor, as appears by original sunnuds of that date. The Deshmookh of Phultun is said to have become a polygar, and to have withheld the revenues of the district repeatedly; but the exact periods are not ascertained.

Wungojee Naik, however, better known by the name of **Juggal**, who lived in the early part of the seventeenth century, was notorious for his restless and predatory habits. The sister of Juggal was the **grandmother** of the famous Sivajee. Nimbalkur never exchanged his **ancient** title of **naik** for that of **raja**.

Joojhar Rao, Deshmookh of Mullaoree, was chief of a powerful family of Ghatgays; their native country is Kuttao Desh, and is separated from that of the Nimbalkurs by the Mahdeo range of hills. The Ghatgays were Deshmookhs and Surdeshmookhs of the pergunna of Maun, and their chief had a munsab under the Bahminee dynasty; they did not obtain the title of Surdeshmookh till the year 1626, when it was given to **Nagojee** Ghatgay as an unconditional favour by Ibrahim Adil Shah, together with the title of Joojhar Rao. The amount of revenue payable to a Surdeshmookh† is not mentioned in any of the deeds of the Edil Shahee **king**s. The great ancestor of the family, Kam Raje Ghatgay, had a small munsab under the Bahminee dynasty. From that period till the present day the Ghatgays have been notorious for their family feuds. They held enam and jagheer lands under the Beejapoor state, and served that government with a body of horse. Their jagheer was immediately subject to the control of the Mokassadar.

The head of the Manay family was Deshmookh of **Muswar** adjoining the district of the Ghatgays. The Manays were distinguished Sillidars under the Beejapoor government, but nearly as notorious for their revengeful character as the Sirkays.

The Ghorepurays were originally named Bhonslay, and their ancestor acquired the present surname, according to their family legend, during the Bahminee dynasty, from having been the first to scale a fort in the Concan, which was deemed impregnable, by fastening a cord round the body of a *ghorepur*, or guana. They were Deshmookhs under the Beejapoor government, and divided into two distinct families—the one of Kapsee, near the Warna river, the other of Moodhole, near the Gutpurba.‡ The Ghorepurays appear to have signalized themselves at a very early period. The

* Naikwaree, which is now used to denominate a particular officer, a sort of hereditary land measurer on the village establishment, was formerly a title of respect, like the present *jee*, or as we would say the Mahratta officers in charge of forts under the Beejapoor government are frequently termed **Naikwaree** in Persian MSS. and deeds.

† Aurungzebe allowed the old Surdeshmookhs 2 per cent., as appears by sunnuds of his time.

‡ The Kapseeur and Moodholeur were known under the Beejapoor government, the former by the *nowkus*, the latter by the *saibus* Ghorepurays—a distinction which both families keep up, but for which they can give no satisfactory reason. The first Ghorepuray that joined Sivajee was one of the former. The head of the latter is the Patell of a village near Satara.

title of Umeer-ool-Oomrah was conferred on one of the members of the Kapsee family by the Beejapoor kings.

The Duflays were Deshmookhs of the pergunna of Jhutt, not far from Beejapoor; their original name was Chowan, and they acquired the surname of Duflay from their village of Duflapoor, of which they were hereditary Patells. They held a munsab, but no title, from the Beejapoor kings.

The Sawunts were hereditary Deshmookhs of Waree, near Goa, and acquired the title of Buhadur from the kings of Beejapoor, during some of the wars against the Portuguese. Their original name was Bhonslay, and their chief is frequently, to this day, styled the Bhonslay. It is remarkable of their territory that the ancient appellation of the family is preserved in our modern maps.* They were distinguished as commanders of infantry, a service best adapted to the country which they inhabited.

The principal Mahratta chief in the service of the Ahmednugur state was Jadow Rao, Deshmookh of Sindkheir, supposed with much probability to have been a descendant of the raja of Deogurh. No Mahratta family was so powerful as the Jadows. Lookhjee Jadow Rao, in the end of the sixteenth century, held a jagheer, under the Nizam Shahee government, for the support of 10,000 horse.

There was, likewise, a respectable Mahratta family, surnamed Bhonslay, particularly connected with the history contained in the following pages, which first rose into notice under the Ahmednugur government. They are said to have held several Patellships; but their principal residence was at the village of Verole,† near Doulutabad. Babjee Bhonslay had two sons, the elder named Mallojee, and the younger Wittojee. Mallojee was early married to Deepa Bye, the sister of Wungojee, or Jugpal Rao

A. D. 1577. Naik Nimbalkur, Deshmookh of Phultun. At the age of 25, in the year 1577, by the interest of Lookhjee Jadow Rao, he was entertained in the service of Mortiza Nizam Shah, with a small party of horse, of which he was the proprietor. He had no children for many years, which is considered a great misfortune amongst Hindoos. He was a rigid votary of the deity Mahdeo, and the goddess Dewee Bhowanee, of Tooljapoor, was the Kool Swamy of his family; but both deities had been invoked in vain to grant an heir. A celebrated Mahomedan saint or peer, named Shah Shureef, residing at Ahmednugur, was engaged to offer up prayers to this desirable end; and Mallojee's wife having shortly after given birth

A. D. 1594. to a son, in gratitude to the peer's supposed benediction, the child was named after him, Shah, with the Mahratta adjunct of respect, *jee*; and in the ensuing year, a second son was in like manner named Shureefjee. Shahjee was born in 1594.

Mallojee Bhonslay was an active Sillidar, and had acquitted himself so well in various duties intrusted to him, that he began to attain distinction. He had by some means made an addition to his small body of horse, and was always much noticed by his first patron, Jadow Rao. His elder son Shahjee was a remarkably fine boy; and on the occasion of the celebration

A. D. 1599. of the Hoollee festival in the year 1599, when Shahjee was five years old, he accompanied his father to the village of Jadow Rao. It is usual for all castes of Hindoos to

visit the ancient name of the country is Koodhal Desh, a sub-division of Gohurasht. The village close to the celebrated caves of Ellora, and from which they

meet on that occasion, at the residence of some principal person, on the fifth day of the festival; and when there is any footing of intimacy, the children often accompany their fathers to the place of assembly. Shahjee, on this occasion, was noticed by Jadow Rao, who good-naturedly called the boy towards him, and seated him beside his daughter named Jeejee, a pretty child of three or four years old. The children began to play together, when Jadow Rao, in the joy of his heart, thoughtlessly asked his daughter—"Well, girl, wilt thou take this boy as thy husband?" and, turning round to the company, observed in the same strain, "They are a fine pair." The children, at this time, happening to throw some of the red colour at each other, which is a common amusement on this festival, the circumstance occasioned a great

A. D. 1599. deal of laughter in the assembly. This mirth, however, was disturbed by Mallojee Bhonslay's rising up and saying—"Take notice, friends, Jadow has this day become a contracting party with me in marriage"—to which some of those present assented; but Jadow seemed astonished, and was mute.

Affecting to treat what had passed as a mere joke, Jadow Rao next day asked Mallojee to a dinner, but he declined the invitation, unless Jadow would formally recognize Shahjee as his son-in-law. This Jadow Rao peremptorily refused; and his wife, being a proud woman of high spirit, was very indignant at his having, even in jest, matched her daughter with such a person as the son of Mallojee Bhonslay. Mallojee appears, however, to have been crafty and persevering, little scrupulous about the means employed, so that his end could be attained. He retired to his village, where it is pretended that the goddess Bhowanee, having appeared to him, discovered a large treasure; at all events he and his brother Wittoojee became possessed of money in some secret manner, which in that troubled period of the Nizam Shahee government, during the first years of the seventeenth century, was probably by robbery. Their confidant, as to the fact of possessing the money, was a soucar or banker of Chumargoondée, named Seshao Naik Poonday, in whose hands the cash was deposited. But, according to Mahratta legend, the discovery of this treasure was merely a means which the goddess afforded to effect what she had, on first appearing, declared to Mallojee; namely, that "there shall be one of thy family who shall become a king: he shall be endowed with the qualities and attributes of Sambh;* he shall re-establish and preserve justice in Maharashtra, and remove all that molest Bramins and violate the temples of the gods; his reign shall form an epoch, and his posterity shall mount the throne for 27 generations."

Mallojee employed his fortune in the purchase of horses, and in the popular works of digging tanks, building wells, and endowing various temples; but he was not diverted from his favourite scheme of being connected with the family of Jadow Rao. Jugpal Naik Nimbalkur of Phultun, the brother of Deepa Bye, Mallojee's wife, warmly interested himself to promote the proposed marriage of his nephew. Wealth too, at a falling court like that of Ahmednugur, could procure anything; and as Jadow Rao's objection was now confined merely to Mallojee's rank, this was soon obviated by his being raised to the command of 5,000 horse with the title of Mallojee Raja Bhonslay. The forts of Sewnerree and Chakun, with their dependent districts, were likewise placed in his charge; and the pergunnas of Poona and Sopra made over to him in

* A name of Mahdeo.

jagheer. Thus every obstacle being removed, Jadow Rao had no longer an

A. D. 1604. excuse for not performing what he was urged to by his sovereign. The marriage of Shahjee to Jeejee Bye was celebrated with great pomp, and was honoured by the presence of the Sultan.*

The Moghul invasions for the purpose of reducing the kingdoms of Ahmednugur, Beejapoor, and Golcondah had a great influence on the rise of the Mahrattas. The revolutions which took place in Hindoostan, and which placed the descendants of Timour on the imperial throne, gave the princes of the Bahminee dynasty an opportunity of firmly establishing their power; and had the Moghul emperors been in a condition to attempt the conquest of the Deccan, whilst the united kingdom existed, it probably would have been the means of preserving two rival Mahomedan empires in India for a much longer period than either of them endured. When the great but ambitious

A. D. 1590. Akber projected the subversion of the Deccan monarchies, they were not only in a state of warfare with each other, but internal dissensions paralyzed their individual efforts. The kingdom of Ahmednugur in particular was a prey to disorder, occasioned by the contests of two parties: the one headed by a Hindoo,† the other by Abyssinian nobles.‡ The Hindoo faction, though they soon repented of the measure, were the first to invite the interference of the

A. D. 1605. Moghuls; and the Emperor Akber, at his death in 1605, was not only in possession of Candeish, which he had wrested from the independent Mahomedan princes who had long governed it, but of a portion of the territory belonging to Nizam Shah, comprehending a great part of Berar, and the fort of Ahmednugur,§ with some districts in its immediate vicinity. Ahmednugur fell to the Moghuls during the minority of Buhadur Nizam Shah, whom they sent into perpetual confinement in Gwalior. But the Nizam Shahee state, though its capital was reduced, and its lawful prince imprisoned, was still far from being subdued. The Abyssinian faction, headed by a man of uncommon genius, named Mullik Umber, attained the chief control; set up a new king, by the title of Mortiza Nizam Shah II., hoisted the Byheree standard on the impregnable rock of Doulutabad, and soon became equally formidable and respectable.

Of the origin of Mullik Umber there are various traditions; the most consistent of them is, that he was, in his youth, a personal adherent of Chungeze Khan,|| the too loyal¶ minister of Mortiza Nizam Shah I., and

* The above account of the ancient Mahratta families is from MSS., old deeds, and records in the possession of their descendants.

† Of this Hindoo, whom Ferishta calls Mean Rajoo, I have obtained no satisfactory account, nor is any mention made of him in any Mahratta MSS. that I have ever seen.

‡ Several of the Nizam Shahee kings had Abyssinian wives, and the nobles alluded to are said to have been chiefly the connections of these wives.

§ It sustained two memorable sieges before it was finally taken; and its first defence, maintained by Chaund Beebee, the widow of Ali Adil Shah of Beejapoor, was perfectly heroic. The Chaund Beebee, who was assassinated during the second siege, still lives in Deccan story and Deccan song, a heroine unrivalled. The celebrated lady, the historian Khafee Khan calls the daughter of Boorahan Nizam Shah; but this is a mistake; she was the daughter of Hoossein Nizam Shah, and given in marriage, with the fort of Sholapoor as her portion, to Ali Adil Shah in 1564, for the purpose of binding the alliance then formed against the raja of the Carnatic. Some years after her husband's death she returned to Ahmednugur.

|| Mahratta MSS.

¶ Aware of the contents of the cup, he swallowed the poison tendered by his ungrateful sovereign.—Ferishta.

from his able patron it is probable he acquired some of that knowledge by which he, in a short time, regulated the country, improved the revenue, and, on the threatened frontier of the Deccan, became, for upwards of 20 years, its bulwark of protection from foreign conquest. The accession of Jehangeer, and the rebellion of his son Sultan Khosrou, afforded Mullik UMBER some respite from Moghul invasion; he had leisure to commence his revenue arrangements, to establish his authority in those parts of the Ahmednugur territory not occupied by the imperial troops, and to make his regency respected at home and abroad. The Sultans of Beejapoor and Golcondah, unfortunately for the stability of their own kingdoms, did not view the rise of Mullik UMBER favourably. Ibrahim Adil Shah bore him a personal enmity, and both kings were likely to disapprove of a usurpation which might, from such an example, be speedily followed in their own courts.

Mullik UMBER founded the city of Khirkee,* near Doulutabad, where he established his capital, and built several splendid palaces. He repeatedly defeated the Moghul armies, and for a time recovered the fort of Ahmednugur and the districts in Berar. Though almost constantly engaged in war, this great man found leisure to cultivate the arts of peace, and to forward those arrangements in finance which have left his name, in every village of his country, far more venerated as a ruler than renowned as a general. He abolished revenue farming, and committed the management to Bramin agents under Mahomedan superintendence; he restored such parts of the village establishment as had fallen into decay; and he revived a mode of assessing the fields, by collecting a moderate proportion of the actual produce in kind, which, after the experience of several seasons, was commuted for a payment in money settled annually according to the cultivation.† By such means his districts soon became thriving and populous; and, although his expenditure was great, his finances were abundant.

But Mullik UMBER was not always prosperous; he frequently experienced severe reverses, and about the year 1621, some of the principal Mahrattas in his service were induced to quit his standard and go over to the Moghuls. The most important defection was that of Lookhjee Jadow Rao, Deshmookh of Sindkheir, whom we have already mentioned as a principal Mahratta chief under the Nizam Shahee government. The manner in which the Moghuls received and rewarded him, is, in itself, a proof of the great power and consequence which the Mahrattas had by that time attained. A munsub of 24,000, with 15,000 horse, was conferred upon him, and such of his relations as accompanied him were all raised to high rank.

But the rebellion of the Prince Shah Jehan again called off the attention of the imperial troops, and Mullik UMBER, before his death, which happened in the beginning of 1626, once more triumphed in the Deccan. Ibrahim Adil Shah of Beejapoor did not survive Mullik UMBER above a year. The memory of both is still pre-

* Frequently written Gurka by Mahomedan authors. Its name of Khirkee was afterwards, as we shall see, changed to Aurungabad.

† This account of Mullik UMBER's famous revenue arrangements is principally upon the authority of Mahratta MSS., where it is stated that his assessment was two-fifths of the produce of government lands. Tradition says his money commutation was about one-third.

served with much respect in the legends of the countries where they ruled. The mausoleum of the latter still stands, the most perfect and the most beautiful of the many buildings which remain among the ruins of Beejapoor, to attest its former grandeur and the magnificence of its nobles and kings.

During the wars of Mullik Uंबर, the Mahrattas in his service were frequently conspicuous. Shahjee Bhonslay, who had succeeded his father Mallojee in the jagheer, particularly distinguished himself in a great battle with the Moghuls, fought in the year 1620, near the northern boundary of the Ahmednugur territory, in which, although Mullik Uंबर was defeated, no share of the blame was attached to the Mahrattas. In the account of the battle, Lookhjee Jadow Rao is mentioned as well as Shahjee, and one of the naiks* of Phultun was killed on the same occasion.

Up to this period, since the first conquest of the country, we find little trace of the Hindoo natives of Maharashtra in Mahomedan history; †

* This is supposed by the present Jan Rao Naik Nimbalkur to have been his ancestor Juggal, who was killed about this period. Though the Naiks of Phultun held their jagheer from the Beejapoor government, this circumstance affords no satisfactory evidence of Ibrahim Adil Shah's having assisted Mullik Uंबर, or that there was a general confederacy against the Moghuls. From the character of Juggal, who, according to the family legends, was always present where there was hunting or fighting, he may have joined without the authority of his government.

† Ferishta's history, which is deservedly considered our best authority, ends about the beginning of the seventeenth century. From that period, for the ensuing 40 years, or up to the final dismemberment of the kingdom of Ahmednugur, I have adopted the work of Khafee Khan as the most consistent and authentic source, respecting that obscure period of Deccan history. Khafee Khan was the assumed name of the author; his real name was Mohummud Hashem Khan. He was the son of Kbwajeh Meer, also an historian, and an officer of high rank in the service of Morad Bukhsh; but after that prince's confinement and death, he came into the employment of Aurungzebe. Mohummud Hashem Khan was brought up in Aurungzebe's service, and was employed by him both in political and military situations. His history has been frequently referred to, and large extracts from it have appeared in various works, particularly in the Seyr Mutuakhereen, but no English translation of the history has been published. Dow's third volume would have been much more valuable, had he adopted Khafee Khan as his only authority. The history was written after Aurungzebe's death; the great blank in the Moghul history, which occurs from the tenth year of that emperor's reign, is very indifferently supplied, but after the twenty-third year of the reign, the account is full, and is frequently supported by other authorities, or rather, at that period, serves to corroborate them.

During repeated visits to the ancient city of Beejapoor, which was comprehended in a tract of territory for some time under my superintendence, I endeavoured to collect from the descendants of the persons in charge of the once splendid endowments of its mosques and mausoleums, all the manuscripts, deeds, and papers in their possession. The following is a list of those which bore the smallest reference to my subject :—

1st.—Original memoranda of a history of Beejapoor, partly arranged by Abdool Hoossein Qazee, who died a few years before the city was finally captured; the papers, said to be in his own hand-writing, are in possession of a Peerzadah, styled Sahib Huzrut, son-in-law of Abdoolah Sahib, a very venerable and sensible old man, the most respectable person now in Beejapoor. He is full of legendary information, and on seeing and conversing with him, in the midst of lofty domes and falling palaces, one fancies himself in company with the last of the inhabitants of that wonderful place.

2nd.—A history of Beejapoor, by Meer Ibrahim, son of Meer Hoossein Lohr. This work, which the Deccan Mahomedans frequently quote without understanding it, is nothing more than a collection of names and dates, expressing the dates in letters, and something of the characters of each individual whose death is thus recorded.

3rd.—A history of Ali Adil Shah II., written by Noor Ullah, the son of Syud Ali Mohummud Hoosseinee Qadree, in which there is some very useful information amongst a great deal of rubbish.

their leaders and their nation are almost nameless, but we shall now see them fast rising into consequence, and it therefore becomes necessary to enter a little more fully into the detail of events which immediately preceded the rise of Sivajee.

Ibrahim Adil Shah, whose death we have just mentioned, was the

A. D. 1626. second of that name who had filled the throne of Beejapoor. He left to his son Mohunsmud Adil Shah, who succeeded him in the fifteenth or sixteenth year of his age, a large treasury, a country still flourishing, and an army, the strength of which appears exaggerated* when stated at 80,000 horse, with upwards of 200,000 infantry in pay, including his garrisons.

Mullik UMBER left two sons, Futih Khan and Chungeze Khan: he was succeeded as regent of the Nizam Shahee kingdom by his eldest son, Futih Khan. The new regent prosecuted the war against the Moghuls, but being entirely destitute of his father's abilities, he would have been worsted, had not the Moghul general, Khan Jehan Lodi, granted him an armistice on very favourable terms.

Sultan Mortiza Nizam Shah II., on attaining man's estate, was naturally

A. D. 1629. desirous of circumscribing the power of the regent, and the violent and inconsistent conduct of Futih Khan rendered this object a matter of easy accomplishment; otherwise it could never have been effected by this prince, who was vindictive, versatile, and totally unfit for the difficult conjuncture in which he had the misfortune to be placed. Assisted by an officer named Tukurrib Khan, he succeeded in throwing Futih Khan into confinement; on which

A. D. 1630. event the Mahratta chief, Lookhjee Jadow Rao, immediately offered to return to his allegiance.

But Mortiza Nizam Shah had conceived mortal offence at his desertion, and only pretended to listen to his overtures until he had allured him to a conference within the fort of Doulatabad, where he treacherously murdered him with several of his relations. His widow, a person whom we have already had occasion to notice, on hearing what had happened, fled with the troops of her husband to Sindkheir, whence, accompanied by her brother-in-law, Jugdeo Rao Jadow, she repaired to the imperial camp, where, by her intercession, Jugdeo Rao was confirmed in the jagheer, and obtained the rank of 5,000 horse; ever after which the Jadowes of Sindkheir faithfully adhered to the Moghuls.

The Emperor Jehangeer died in 1627, and, in the following year, was succeeded by his son Shah Jehan.

A. D. 1628. The new emperor bore a personal enmity to Khan Jehan Lodi, then governor of the Moghul conquests in the Deccan. He removed him from his government to that of Malwa, and invited him to court. Though at first received with much courtesy, he afterwards suspected

4th.—The Ali Namu, an historical poem of the reign of Ali Adil Shah II. It is written by Nusserut, the only poet of Beejapoor, excepting Hashimee, who translated Yusooef and Zuleikha into Hindoostanee verse. The works of Nusserut are the Ali Namu and Goolshun-i-eshq; a copy of the former was found in Tippoo's library at Seringapatam, and is not uncommon.

5th.—A history of Beejapoor, written by Synd Moideen Peerzaduh, suggested by numerous inquiries put to him by English officers, who have been much in the habit of visiting Beejapoor since the last Mahratta war. It was finished in January 1821: and although great pains have been taken, the author's dates, by confusing the Soorsun and Heejree eras, are frequently much misplaced. His industry, however, is very commendable.

* Beejapoor MSS.

treachery, fled into the Deccan, and sought refuge on the confines of Buglana, within the territory of Nizam Shah. A force was immediately sent in pursuit of him; but the zumeendars or Deshmookhs of the country, rose in his defence, repulsed the Moghul troops, and could not be induced, by promises or threats, to give him up. Shah Jehan was so ex-

A. D. 1629. tremely jealous of Khan Jehan Lodi, that he deemed his submission of vital importance to the stability of his throne. He advanced towards the Deccan with a great army, threatening with destruction all who should afford protection to Lodi, or espouse his cause. Having had considerable experience in the desultory mode of warfare peculiar to the Deccan, he separated his army into three divisions, which he placed under the respective command of Azim Khan, Iradut Khan, and Shaisteh Khan. The division of Azim Khan penetrated by the western route, and he, being a very active officer, soon compelled Khan Jehan Lodi to fly to the southward.

Shahjee Bhonslay was one of the supporters of Lodi; but on his flight, Shahjee, probably fearing the loss of his jagheer, followed the example of his mother-in-law, the widow of Lookhjee Jadow Rao, and made a tender of his services to the Moghul emperor through Azim Khan; promising, on

A. D. 1629. condition of receiving a safe conduct and a letter of pardon, to repair to the imperial presence. The indulgence being granted, he came to court, accompanied by his immediate dependants and a body of 2,000 horse. Having paid his respects to Shah Jehan, he was promoted to the rank of 6,000 with 5,000 horse; many of his dependants were also raised to munsubs, and Shahjee was not only confirmed in his jagheer, but received a grant for some other districts, the names of which nowhere appear, but Ahmednugur was probably* one of them. Shahjee's cousin, Kellojee Bhonslay, the son of Wittoojee, went over to the imperial service about the same time, and received a munsub.†

Khan Jehan Lodi, on being driven from the western quarter of the Nizam Shahee territory, repaired to Beejapoor, and endeavoured to rouse Mohummud Adil Shah to combine, with Mortiza Nizam Shah, in repelling Moghul encroachment. His arguments had no immediate effect, and he was compelled to return to Doulutabad.

During the season of 1629-30 no rain fell in the Deccan, and a famine,

A. D. 1630. accompanied by pestilence, ensued; but on its being ascertained that Khan Jehan had returned, notwithstanding the obstacles which disease and the difficulty of procuring subsistence presented, Azim Khan marched towards Doulutabad. His army was opposed by that of Nizam Shah, which had taken up a strong position for the purpose, but was driven from it after a resolute defence.

This defeat, and the wretched state of the country, induced Khan Jehan to adopt the desperate resolution of endeavouring to make his way to the Afghans in Cabul. He set out, but was soon closely and perseveringly followed by the imperial troops: a party at last overtook him, when turning on his numerous pursuers, at the head of a few faithful adherents, he fell covered with wounds; but nobly fought on to his last breath, in a man-

* I say probably Ahmednugur, because Shahjee had no hereditary claim to the Deshmookhee of Ahmednugur, and it will hereafter appear that his son Sivajee set up such a pretension.

† Original firman, from Shah Jehan to Kellojee Bhonslay, found in possession of a Mahratta, who headed a petty insurrection near Vishalgurh in 1820. Kellojee Bhonslay was put to death by Aurungzebe; the time and circumstances are not ascertained. —Mahratta MSS.

ner which obtained for him the admiration of the most obdurate of his enemies.

Azim Khan, in the meantime, pursued the advantages which his victory opened to him; he took possession of the districts, displaced the agents of the Nizam Shahee jagheerdars and munsuddars, and bestowed divisions of the country on his own adherents. Marching southward from Doulutabad, he reduced several places, and surprised the strong fort of Dharoor near Bheer. The troops of Nizam Shah appear to have been commanded by two officers—Bahlole Khan, an Afghan adherent of Lodi, and Mukrib Khan, who maintained a desultory warfare, and, though constantly put to flight, remained unsubdued.

Mortiza Nizam Shah found that disorder and ruin threatened him on all sides; but had neither discernment to discover the defects of his administration, nor talents to apply a remedy.

A. D. 1631. Losing confidence in his minister, he turned his attention to his prisoner, Futih Khan, released him from confinement, and restored him to power. Tukurrib Khan, disgusted by this proceeding, and dreading the consequence to himself, went over to Azim Khan, and got the rank of 6,000 horse in the imperial service. His defection at this period was useful to the Moghuls, as they were threatened with a new enemy in the person of Sultan Mohammud Adil Shah.

It appears that a secret partition treaty had been entered into betwixt Ibrahim Adil Shah and the Moghul emperor, at some period of the war with Mullik Umer, the conditions of which were, that the Beejapoor government, if it afforded active co-operation in reducing the Nizam Shahee territory, should receive the districts in the Concan belonging to that state, also the fort of Sholapoor, with five forts on the eastern side, communicating with the Adil Shahee districts near Beder, of which Dharoor was one. But Mohammud Adil Shah, though he appears to have recognized the agreement in the first instance, never entered heartily into the views of the Moghuls: he would gladly have seized for himself a portion of the Nizam Shahee territory, but he did not consider it politic to share it with such a formidable power. On the present occasion he had engaged in a secret negotiation with Mortiza Nizam Shah, but sent forward an army under his general, Rendoollah Khan, giving out that they were auxiliaries proceeding to join the Moghuls. On arriving in the neighbourhood of Azim Khan's army, Rendoollah Khan sent to request that the fort of Dharoor might be delivered up to the troops of Adil Shah, according to the treaty. Azim Khan reasonably objected that, as they had not assisted in its reduction, nor as yet fulfilled their part of the conditions, he could not comply with the demand; but, as there was still ample opportunity for proving their good faith, the present application might be a future consideration with the emperor. Meanwhile Mortiza Nizam Shah having agreed to restore Sholapoor to the king of Beejapoor, an alliance was concluded between them, which had for its object mutual defence against the Moghuls.

Occasion of quarrel, however, arose between the armies of Azim Khan and Rendoollah Khan, before the plans of the confederates were matured, and a battle was fought in which the army of Beejapoor was defeated.

The two states in alliance might still have recovered what they had lost; but Mortiza Nizam Shah, having put himself in the power of the ruffian whom he had injured, was about this time thrown into prison and strangled by order of Futih Khan; by whom, also, the whole of the nobility, attached to the unfortunate prince, were put to death.

To excuse these acts of revenge and violence, Futih Khan sent a petition to Shah Jehan, representing that he had thus acted on purpose to testify his regard for the imperial service, and that he had raised the son of the deceased to the vacant throne until the emperor's pleasure should be known.

Shah Jehan, in reply, affected to believe this representation; and although he considered the remaining districts of the kingdom almost subdued, and about to be annexed to the empire, yet, as it would have been difficult to obtain possession of many of the forts by force, he pretended to grant them to the orphan, on condition of his sending the best elephants, and the most valuable of the jewels belonging to the Nizam Shahee family, to the imperial court. Great honours were, at the same time, conferred on Futih Khan; considerable districts were promised to him in jagheer, and, amongst others, some of those formerly granted to Shahjee Bhonslay.

Upon the breaking out of hostilities with Beejapoor, large reinforcements were poured into the Deccan; and Asif Khan as chief-in-command, passing through the Nizam Shahee territory, thus unexpectedly detached from the alliance, invaded the territory of Mohummud Adil Shah, laid it waste, and besieged his capital. But supplies having been cut off, and the operations artfully protracted, Asif Khan was obliged to desist; and after plundering and destroying the country as far west as Merich, he returned with his army. Mohabet Khan, who had been appointed governor of the Moghul territory in the Deccan when Khan Jehan Lodi was removed to Malwa, now took upon himself the conduct of the war. It was intended to prosecute the reduction of the Beejapoor territory, but circumstances changed the scene of action.

Futih Khan at first showed some reluctance to part with the elephants and jewels demanded of him, but compliance being enforced
 A. D. 1632. he was confirmed as regent, and allowed to retain the promised districts. Shahjee Bhonslay, disgusted by this treatment, made overtures to the Beejapoor government, through Morar Punt, an able Bramin, and a principal minister of Mohummud Adil Shah.

A projected enterprise against Doulutabad formed a part of Shahjee's proposals to Morar Punt: and he so strongly represented the unprepared state of the garrison, the general defection of the nobility, and the readiness with which all who had suffered in the late commotions would join against both Futih Khan and the Moghuls, that the king consented.

Futih Khan, on hearing of the march of the Beejapoor army, reinforced by Shahjee, sensible of the general hatred towards himself throughout the country, proposed to place himself under the protection of the Moghul general, Mohabet Khan, and to give up the fort. Mohabet Khan, much pleased with an offer so advantageous, marched, as soon as possible, towards Doulutabad. The army of Beejapoor, however, arrived first, and, to prevent communication with the fort, threw themselves between it and the Moghuls. A battle, of course, ensued; the ground was obstinately contested by the Beejapoor army, and Shahjee creditably supported the leading part he bore in the cause: but they were finally driven back, and forced to encamp 16 miles on the opposite side of Doulutabad.

The Beejapoor chiefs, who, like all the Deccanees, were adepts at intrigue and negotiation where force was ineffectual, sent messages to Futih Khan, representing how much he should sacrifice by surrendering the fortress; and that if he would agree to remunerate Shahjee, and not deliver up Doulutabad to the emperor, they would support him and

maintain the former alliance. The proposal being acceded to, both in conjunction, without any previous declaration, opened a fire on the Moghuls, which so enraged Mohabet Khan that he determined on regularly investing the place, and punishing this unparalleled breach of faith on the part of Futih Khan. Having a fine army, with many experienced officers, he formed a part of it into three divisions—one to oppose the Beejapoor army, another to cover the supplies of his own camp, and the third to prevent any provisions or stores from being thrown into the fort. Each was to support the other as necessary; whilst the main body, under his own superintendence, was destined for active operations against the fortress.

The attack was maintained with vigour and perseverance, and was met by an equally vigorous defence; but the garrison, being A. D. Feb. 1633. indifferently provisioned, were obliged to capitulate after an eventful siege of 58 days. Futih Khan was divested of all power, and became a pensioner of the Moghul government.* The child whom he had set up was placed in perpetual confinement in Gwalior, being the second prince of this house immured in that fortress.

Shahjee was one of the best partizans on the side of the Beejapoor army, and it became an object to check his activity by any means. Whilst the siege of Doulutabad was in progress, Mhaldar Khan, the Nizam Shahee governor of the fort of Trimbuck, offered his services to the emperor, through Mohabet Khan; by whom he was told that, if he would seize Shahjee's wife and family, then residing near Byzapoor, he might have a still better opportunity of proving his zeal for the cause he had embraced, and of doing a very acceptable piece of service. The Killidar accordingly made the attempt, and succeeded in taking the wife of Shahjee, together with a great deal of property. The object, however, was not answered, from circumstances hereafter explained; and some of the relations having become security, obtained Jeejee Bye's release, and conveyed her to the fort of Kondanch.†

After the fall of Doulutabad, Mohabet Khan left Khan Dowran to protect that neighbourhood, and marched in pursuit of the Beejapoor troops. They retired before him, but maintained their usual desultory mode of warfare, and several sharp skirmishes took place, in one of which Nagojee,‡ a Mahratta officer of distinction, was killed: some overtures for peace were made by Morar Punt, probably with a view of throwing the Moghul general off his guard; for, when Mohabet Khan had advanced a considerable distance into the Beejapoor territory, a large detachment set off secretly, and by forced marches endeavoured to surprise Doulutabad, but the attempt was unsuccessful. Towards the end of the year Mohabet Khan was superseded by the appointment of Sultan Shuja, the emperor's second son, to the government of the Deccan. Mohabet Khan remained as his director in the management of affairs; but still he was only second-in-command, and the war, from that time, did not prosper under this administration. Both Mohabet Khan and Sultan Shuja were recalled in the ensuing year, in consequence of their having

A. D. 1634. failed to reduce the fortress of Purinda; where they were not only repulsed, but, after raising the siege, were compelled to retreat to Burhanpoor.

* He afterwards became mad, and died from the effects of an old wound in the head.

† Beejapoor MSS. Khafee Khan mentions that the daughter of Shahjee was captured on this occasion, but I cannot find that he had a daughter.

‡ Supposed to be Nagojee Ghatgay Joojhar Rao, who was killed in a battle with the Moghuls.—(Buker of the Ghatgay family.)

In the meantime Shahjee, after the surrender of Doulutabad, the removal of Futih Khan, and the confinement of the young prince, aspired to the regency, and accordingly proclaimed another prince as the lawful heir of Nizam Shah. By the assistance of some Bramins, he commenced regulating the country, got possession of most of the forts, occupied the districts in the name of the new king, and collected troops from all quarters. The whole of that part of the Concan which had belonged to the kingdom of Ahmednugur, and the districts as far east as Ahmednugur, extending from the Neera river on the south, to the Chandore range on the north, with the exception of a few of the garrisoned places, were for a time overrun by Shahjee.*

A small detachment from the army was at first considered sufficient for his suppression; but his party continued to gain strength, and on the defeat of the Moghuls at Purinda, he extended his power in the manner we have mentioned.

After the removal of Prince Shuja, Aurungzebe, the emperor's third son, being very young, and Shah Jehan considering the conquests in the Deccan too extensive to be placed under any one officer not of the royal family, resolved, as a temporary measure, to separate them into two governments. To those districts of Candeish which had been long in possession of the Moghuls, Galna was added; together with that part of Berar, termed Berar Payeen Ghaut, which lies to the north, below the range of hills. These constituted one of the new governments, and the lately-acquired districts in the Nizam Shahee territory formed the other. Khan Dowran and Khan Zuman were appointed to the charge of them, and directed to co-operate in the settlement of the western districts, and in the reduction of Shahjee. This last, however, was an operation of difficulty. Shahjee had collected a large army, was intimately connected with Morar Punt and Rendoollah Khan, and supported by the Sultan, their master.

The emperor was exasperated at the opposition made, in a country which he had considered as subdued on the capture of Doulutabad, and being highly incensed against Mohummud Adil Shah, he prepared a great army, with the determination of bringing affairs in the Ahmednugur territory to a speedy settlement, even if it should involve the reduction of the other kingdoms in the Deccan, to which Shah Jehan, in his deliberate judgment, was always averse. Whether this moderation proceeded from policy or a sense of justice, it is difficult to determine; but his hostilities against both Beejapoor and Golcondah were always commenced in the spirit of personal anger. On the present occasion he sent an ambassador to Beejapoor, directing him to demand the restitution of the forts lately belonging to the Nizam Shahee state, of which the Sultan of Beejapoor had obtained possession: their guns and military stores were likewise to be delivered up, particularly the large cannon called Mullik-i-Mydan,† which had been conveyed from Purinda to Beejapoor.

* There is evidence of these facts in Mahratta MSS. as well as in Khafee Khan. This is no doubt the regency of Shahjee which we find mentioned in all the Mahratta MSS. as having taken place during a minority in the family of Nizam Shah.

† "The sovereign of the plain." The natives of Beejapoor insist on calling it moolk-i-mydan, which, they say, signifies "the lion of the plain." This gun, of which the muzzle is four feet eight inches in diameter, and the calibre two feet four inches, was cast at Ahmednugur, A. D. 1549, by a native of Constantinople, named Hoessein Khan. Aurungzebe put an inscription upon it to commemorate the conquest of Beejapoor in 1685, which has led to the mistake of supposing it to have been

But, above all, the envoy was directed to insist upon the Sultan's renouncing Shahjee, and affording no countenance or protection to him, or to those persons by whom disturbances were excited. To induce a compliance with these demands, a promise of the fort and district of Sholapoor, together with the whole of the Nizam Shahee Concan, and a vaunting threat of annihilation in case of refusal, were at once held out. Both proved ineffectual; and Shah Jehan, according to his usual practice of dividing his attacks, broke his army, of which 48,000 were select cavalry, into four divisions—two to act against Shahjee, and two against Mohummud Adil Shah. Of the two former, one under Shaisteh Khan and Aliverdy Khan was destined to besiege Shahjee's forts about Chandore, Sungumner, and Nassuck; and another, consisting of 20,000 horse, under Khan Zuman, was to drive him from the field, to pursue him, to take possession of his strongholds in the Concan, and to expel him from every quarter of the Nizam Shahee territory. Of the two latter, one under Khan Dowran was originally ordered to take up a position near Nandere, owing to suspicions entertained of Sultan Abdoollah Kootub Shah of Golcondah; but on these doubts being removed, and his paying the arrears of tribute for which the emperor's envoy was then settling, and which he did before the campaign opened, Khan Dowran's division became available both for the capture of the forts to

A. D. 1635. the eastward, and for hostilities in the heart of the Beejapoor dominions. The other detachment, which at first composed the reserve under Syud Khan Jehan, was also destined for Beejapoor.

A part of the besieging division of Shaisteh Khan, under Aliverdy Khan, speedily reduced 25 of the forts about Chandore and Nassuck, which, though places of strength, made little resistance.* Shaisteh Khan himself proceeded towards the borders of the Beejapoor dominions, where he reduced Nuldroog, and occupied the districts between Sholapoor and Beder; but the forts of Trimbuck, Sewner, and Kondaneh above the Ghauts, with many in the Concan, were still in possession of Shahjee's adherents.

Shahjee maintained a desultory warfare against Khan Zuman for a considerable time, but was driven from the territory about Ahmednugur, Chumargoond, and Baramuttee successively, and pursued across the Neera into the Beejapoor territory, towards Merich and Kolapoor. Assisted by the Edil Shahee troops, he there continued to harass by his attacks, or elude by his vigilance, the army in pursuit of him; and Khan Zuman was therefore directed to give over a fruitless pursuit, and lay waste the country about Kolapoor, Merich, and Raebagh. He accordingly took and destroyed the towns, carried off the inhabitants prison-

cast at that time. It is alike curious from its dimensions and its history; the Bombay government in 1823 was particularly desirous of sending it to the king of England, and an engineer was sent to examine it for the purpose; but the present state of the roads renders the difficulty of transporting such a huge mass of metal to the coast almost insuperable.

* Khafee Khan mentions the capture of the son and family of Shahjee in one of these forts, of which I can find no confirmation, and consider it a mistake connected with the report of the former capture of Jeejee Bye. The same author mentions Sivaajee's escape to a fort in the sea on this occasion; and this also may allude to the former circumstance. Jeejee Bye, after her first capture, seems to have been principally at Kondaneh, Sewner, and perhaps, from the year 1633 to 1636, occasionally at Maholy in the Concan.

ers, and continued every species of depredation, until an armistice was concluded with Beejapoor, when he again resumed the pursuit of Shahjee.

Khan Dowran marched from Candeish towards Beejapoor in the direction of Beder and Kulburga, surprised and took several forts, plundering the mercantile towns, and spreading ruin wherever he appeared. He was attacked by some divisions of the Beejapoor army in their usual manner, but they did not prevent his advance. When he approached Beejapoor, Mohummud Adil Shah adopted the resolution of emptying the reservoirs of water beyond the walls of the fort, and collected or destroyed the whole of the grain and forage within a circuit of 20 miles.* Khan Dowran, therefore, did not attack the capital, but continued his plan of plundering and devastating the country. The division of Syud Khan Jehan adopted the same system, and the march of the Moghuls was everywhere marked by flames and desolation.

The Beejapoor troops, however, frequently acted with great vigour. Syud Khan Jehan was repeatedly attacked by Rendoolah Khan with success, and forced, at last, to effect a junction with the division of Khan Dowran.

But the ruin spread throughout the country compelled Mohummud Adil Shah to sue for peace; and a treaty was concluded on A. D. 1636. terms more favorable than he had reason to expect. Though an enumeration of all the articles be unnecessary, the general terms of this pacification, and the partition of the Nizam Shahee territory, deserve the reader's particular attention, being intimately connected with the rise of Sivajee.

It was settled that the forts of Purinda and Sholapoor, with their dependent districts, should be given up to Mohummud Adil Shah. He was, likewise, to retain undisturbed possession of the districts of Nuldroog, Kallianee, and Beder, east of Sholapoor; and the huge piece of ordnance pertaining to Purinda was thus left on the works of Beejapoor, where it remains to this day. The province of Kallianee, in the Concan, which extended the Beejapoor possessions on the coast, as far north as the Bassein river, was also ceded; and the whole of the country lying between the Beema and the Neera, which had formerly belonged to the kingdom of Ahmednugur, as far north as Chakun, was now annexed to Beejapoor. The principal condition attached to this cession was the payment of an annual tribute of 20 lakhs of pagodas. By an article of the treaty, the emperor promises to pardon Shahjee and his adherents, if he will deliver up the forts in his possession, together with all his artillery and warlike stores; but in case of non-compliance, he is to be expelled from the territory of Beejapoor, and declared the common enemy of both states.

Shahjee, as soon as the Beejapoor government began to treat, retired towards the Concan; and as he at first evaded the surrender of his forts, Khan Zuman continued to prosecute the war against him. But in the

A. D. 1637. course of a few months, Trimbuck, Sewnerree, and most of his forts in the Concan being reduced, Shahjee solicited a pardon, and petitioned for admission into the emperor's service.

* The neighbourhood of the capital of Beejapoor is very sterile on three sides, but four miles to the south of the city there is a rich, deep, black soil, which in good seasons produces very extraordinary crops. The soil extends several miles on each side of the small river Dhone, the water of which is strongly impregnated with salt. The Mahrattas have a very expressive rhyme in regard to this small tract:—

Should the crop on Dhone grow, who can eat it?
Should it fail, who can eat it?

In reply to this application he was told that he might retire into the service of Mohummud Adil Shah, which he accordingly did, and Kondaneh* was probably surrendered by Shahjee to Beejapoor.

The young prince, whom, in imitation of Mullik Umber and Futih Khan, Shahjee had set up, was taken by Khan Zuman in one of the forts, and sent off to be confined with the others in the state prison at Gwalior.

This event completed the subjugation of the Ahmednugur state, and finally ended the Byheree dynasty.

* Kondaneh came into Shahjee's possession by his being at the head of the government. Kondaneh and Poorundhur were two of those forts which, under the Mahomedan governments, were reserved by the king, and not intrusted to the care of jagheerdars.

Before quitting this chapter, I have to acknowledge my obligations to Captain Alexander Gordon, first assistant to the Resident at Nagpoor, and Mr. William Erskine, late of Bombay: the former has translated Khafee Khan to the end of the reign of Jehangeer, and the latter has translated all such parts of the reign of Shah Jehan from the same author, as bear reference to Deccan history. Both these gentlemen allowed me the free use of their labours, and thus far materially shortened mine.

I have had access to two or three copies of the original of Khafee Khan; the best is in the library of Moonshee Mohummud Huneef, late of the Poona residency.

CHAP. III.

FROM A. D. 1637 TO A. D. 1648.

Shahjee's progress after entering the service of Beejapoor—marries a second wife.—Two sons by his first wife, Sumbhajee and Sivajee; and one son by his second wife, Venkajee.—Shahjee departs for the Carnatic, and sends his first wife and his son Sivajee to reside on his jagheer at Poona, under the care of Dadajee Konedeo.—Political views of the courts of Beejapoor and Golcondah.—The Moghuls introduce a new revenue system, and the Fusslee era into the Deccan.—Revenue system of Dadajee Konedeo.—The Mawuls—improvement of the condition of their inhabitants.—Sivajee's education, disposition, and early pursuits.—His three first adherents—obtain possession of the fort of Torna—manner of justifying the proceeding—builds Rajgurh.—Dadajee Konedeo's death.—The Kilidars of Chakun and Kondaneh gained over by Sivajee—makes himself master of Sopa and the fortress of Poorundhur.

WHEN Shahjee was finally driven to seek refuge under the Beejapoor government, his resources and abilities being known to A. D. 1637. Morar Punt, and all who had served with him, he was readily received and confirmed in possession of Poona in Sopa,* two of the districts belonging to his family jagheer, which, by the late treaty, had been ceded to Beejapoor.

* From this period I have recourse principally to Mahratta manuscripts. Those to which I shall have immediate occasion to refer are as follow :—

1. A Life of Sivajee, procured from the late raja of Kolapoor, written by Kistnajee Anund Subhasud. There are several copies of this work; one is in possession of Mr. Hale, the judge and magistrate of the Southern Concan, to which I had access. I returned the original copy to the raja of Kolapoor, and lodged a copy of it with the Literary Society of Bombay.

2. Lives of the Rajas, and History of the Mahratta Empire, from the earliest period to the present time: compiled by Mulhar Ram Rao Chitnees from original memoranda, and originals, or copies of many authentic papers, written or transcribed by his ancestors, who were all persons highly distinguished at the courts of Raigurh, Ginjee, and Satara. Mulhar Ram Rao's Life of Sivajee is very voluminous; but I do not think he has made a good use of the valuable letters and records in his possession. Sivajee's instructions to officers and departments are very complete and satisfactory. Some of the original copies of these instructions are in the hand-writing of Balajee Aujee, and I have had them authenticated from another quarter, as will be mentioned. I lodged a copy of Mulhar Ram Rao's work with the Literary Society of Bombay.

3. A Life of Sivajee, procured from the descendant of Chunder Rao Moray, raja of Jowlee.

4. A Life of Sivajee, partly translated into English by Thomas Coats, Esq., late superintending surgeon of the Poona auxiliary force.

5. A Life of Sivajee, partly translated, in the hand-writing of the late Sir Barry Close. Received from the Hon. M. Elphinstone.

6. A Life of Sivajee, obtained from the Koolkurnee of Kolhar, near Beejapoor.

7. A History of the Mahrattas, including an account of the kings of Beejapoor, by the Deshpandya of Kuttao Desh.

When reverting to Moghul history, Khafee Khan continues my principal authority.

Morar Punt was employed, at this period, in the settlement of the newly-acquired districts between the Neera and Beema, in which he appears to have been principally assisted by Shahjee. During their intercourse Morar Punt had additional proofs of his talents and genius; in consequence of which he loaded him with encomium and favour, and, on their return to court, strongly recommended him to the king.

An expedition being then projected against the Carnatic, Shahjee was nominated second-in-command under his friend Rendoolah Khan, and was at the same time promised a jagheer in that quarter, consisting of the districts of Kolhar, Bangalore, Ouscotta, Balapoor, and Sera, which were afterwards made over to him; and, probably with a view of securing him by an interest in different parts of the kingdom, Mohummud Adil Shah conferred on him a royal grant for the Deshmookhee of 22 villages, in the district of Kurar,* the right to which had by some means devolved on government.

Shahjee's political connection with his relations, the Jadows, Deshmookhs of Sindkheir, which had never been intimate, was entirely dissolved from the time of his quitting the imperial service; and Jugdeo Rao Jadow, his wife's uncle, acted on the side of the Moghuls during the war carried on against him. Domestic affairs have great influence on the public conduct of Mahrattas, and there may have been private reasons for Jugdeo Rao's animosity. Shahjee, in the year 1630, married into another family, named Mohitey, which was resented by Jeejee Bye,† his first wife, and she retired to some of her own relations, with whom she appears to have been residing when taken in 1633.

By this lady, the daughter of Lookhjee Jadow Rao, Shahjee had two sons: the elder was named Sumbhaje, and the younger Sivajee. The elder was his father's favourite, and accompanied him from early infancy; but the younger remained with his mother. Sivajee was born in the fort of Sewneree,‡ in the month of May 1627; and during the turbulent period in which his childhood was passed, he had frequently escaped, by his mother's vigilance, from falling into the hands of their Mahomedan enemies. It is not known where he was concealed when his mother was made prisoner; but it is probable her release was obtained on the plea of her husband's neglect, and the disgrace, which many of the relations, both Jadows and Bhonslays, in the Moghul service, would conceive attached to themselves until they had procured her enlargement.

To the disagreement that arose between Sivajee's parents, in consequence of the new connection formed by Shahjee, and the troubled state of the country, we may ascribe the circumstance of Sivajee's not having seen his father for a period of seven years, or from the year 1630 to 1636 inclusive. When Shahjee went with Morar Punt to Beejapoor, Jeejee Bye accompanied him, but only remained until the celebration of Sivajee's marriage to Suhjee Bye, the daughter of Nimbalkur; after which event Shahjee set out upon the Carnatic expedition, and Sivajee, with his mother, was sent to reside at Poona.

By Tooka Bye Mohitey, his second wife, Shahjee had one son, Venkajee; he had, likewise, an illegitimate son by a dancing-girl whom he named Suntajee.

* Kurar is situated 30 miles south of Satara.

† Bye adjoined to a woman's name designates her being a lady.

‡ It is situated about 50 miles north of Poona. The town is called Joonere, the fort Sewneree.

All Mahratta officers of consequence invariably retain a number of Bramins in their service, as writers and men of business.* Shahjee had a vast number of this description, some of whom had followed his fortunes, and contributed to his success at a more prosperous period; and others, who had been displaced by the Moghuls on occupying the country, now naturally adhered to him, in hopes of finding employment and subsistence. Among all these, his most confidential men were Naroo Punt Hunwuntay and Dadajee Konedeo; the former he appointed to the management of his districts in the Carnatic, and the latter had charge of his family and jagheer at Poona.

Dadajee was an able revenue officer, and under his superintendence the cultivation was soon improved, and the population increased. Further scope for his talents was afforded by the acquisition of the districts of Indapoor and Baramuttee; which, together with several of those mountain valleys near Poona, known by the name of Mawuls, were added to Shahjee's jagheer, in consequence of his eminent services in the Carnatic, and intrusted to the management of Dadajee Konedeo.†

An ambition of extending their boundaries in the Carnatic became prevalent, both at Golcondah and Beejapoor. These states were at peace, but they vied with each other in pursuing aggrandisement, by the easy conquests which the dissensions of the petty rajas in the south afforded; without reflecting on their own precarious situation, or seeking, in a league of common defence against the Moghuls, that security which rivalry or jealousy had already so much undermined. A step towards

A. D. 1641. union was, however, made by the marriage of the king of Beejapoor to the daughter of Kootub Shah in 1641.

Mohummud Adil Shah was personally not a warlike prince. He seldom quitted the neighbourhood of Beejapoor, and his armies were intrusted to his generals. He improved his capital by the construction of an aqueduct, still in existence, and ornamented it with several magnificent buildings.‡

The Emperor Shah Jehan, after the peace of 1636, endeavoured to arrange and improve the lately-conquered territory. The two governments in the Deccan were united, and the prince Aurungzebe was appointed viceroy; but at this time he only remained a very short period, and nothing of note was achieved, excepting the conquest of Buglana, a great part of which was afterwards relinquished.

The grand innovation occasioned by the Moghul conquests in Maharash-

* These Bramins, when occupied by ordinary duties, are termed carcoons, or clerks; but when sent on public business, on the part of any great man, they are, in common with all envoys, styled Wukeels. This remark applies to Bramin writers in the service of an individual, and to subordinate clerks. Bramins at the head of offices, or employed in particular departments of the state, are designated according to the name of the office or situation they hold. Every Mahratta owner of land, money, or even of two or three horses, has his carcoon, who ostensibly attends to all his orders in the most respectful manner; but the carcoon has generally the whole property at his disposal. He contrives to lend his master money at usurious interest, and soon runs him in debt to himself; and the poor Mahratta is thus completely in the Bramin's power. But each frequently becomes necessary to the other, and many Bramin carcoons in Mahratta families, on very trying occasions, have shown the most devoted attachment and fidelity to the person and interests of their masters.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ Beejapoor MSS. I have enumerated those manuscripts in the preceding chapter.

tra, under Shah Jehan, was the introduction of the revenue system of Todur Mull, whose name must be familiar to the generality of oriental readers as an eminent Hindoo statesman, who, by his financial arrangements, and his regulations in the mint department, during the reign of Akber, had acquired a character of no inconsiderable celebrity.

In acting on Todur Mull's plan, the lands were, in the first instance, assessed with reference to their fertility, in a proportion varying from one-half to one-seventh of the gross produce, according to the expenses of culture, or to the description of the article cultivated. The government share was then commuted for a money payment; and in time, when a measurement, classification, and registry had taken place, the regulated assessment was fixed at a fourth of the whole produce of each field throughout the year,* and thus became the permanent rent of the land. Such was the method now introduced by Shah Jehan in the districts north of the Beema, under the superintendence of Moorshed Koolee Khan, an able officer who was employed for nearly 20 years in its completion.

The system is known by the name of *Tunkha*, an appellation derived from the name of the silver coin in which Todur Mull collected the revenues, in lieu of the *Tukha*, a copper coin previously used in revenue accounts throughout the empire.† It was likewise at this period (or 1637-38) that the Fusslee year was introduced into the Mahratta country.

Dadajee Konedee, whose districts adjoined those of the Moghuls, continued the system of Mullik UMBER. He levied a proportion of the actual produce of each cultivated field, fixing the proportion every year, or, when not collected in kind, he substituted a money payment. This plan differed from the permanent land assessment, as it was not only variable according to the state of the crops, but the rate was probably higher in particular instances. It appears, however, to have been suited to the state of the country, as the districts flourished; and great praise is invariably bestowed on his management. The mountain valleys, or Mawuls, were inhabited by a hardy, poor race of people, whose industry, exerted at all seasons, scarcely procured them subsistence. In the early part of Dadajee's administration they were in more than usual distress; though armed to defend themselves against wild beasts, they were destitute of clothing; and the few miserable huts of which their villages were composed, were insufficient to protect them from the inclemency of the weather. Dadajee endeavoured to ameliorate the condition of the Mawulees. For several years no rent was demanded for their lands: a number of them were entertained in his service as peons to assist in collecting the revenue, for which they received a trifling sum as pay, and some very coarse grain as subsistence.

The family of Shahjee continued to live under the care of Dadajee. Their residence was fixed at Poona, where Dadajee built a large house for Jeejee Bye's accommodation, and gave the son of his master such an education as was proper for a person of his birth. Mahrattas seldom can write or read; they consider all such learning the business of a carcoon, and, if not degrading, at least undignified. Sivajee could never write his name, but he was a good archer and marksman, skilled in the use of the spear, and of the various swords and daggers common in the

* Mr. Grant's Pol. Analysis.

† Khafee Khan. I give this definition as the historian has recorded it; I have no reason to doubt its correctness, but I have not found it in any other authority. Village revenue accounts in the Deccan are to this day not unfrequently stated in *Tukhas* by the Koolkarnees.

Deccan. His countrymen have always been celebrated for horsemanship ; and in this accomplishment Sivajee excelled. By the care of his guardian, he was fully instructed in all the ceremonies and observances enjoined by the rules of his caste ; and such parts of the sacred histories as are generally known were explained to him. The fabulous exploits detailed in the Mahabharut, the Ramayun, and the Bhagwut were the delight of Sivajee's youth ; and such was his partiality for Kuthas,* that many years after he became famous in the country, he incurred great danger in his anxiety to be present during an entertainment of that description.

The religious and natural feelings of a Hindoo were strongly implanted in Sivajee, and he early imbibed a rooted hatred to the Mahomedans. These feelings in part supplied the want of a more exalted patriotism ; but although they may have tended to stimulate his own love of enterprise, he did not employ them to animate others, until success had taught him to plan new schemes, and to apply such powerful and natural auxiliaries in their execution.

His first designs were formed merely with a view to personal advantage. From about his sixteenth year he began to associate with persons of lawless habits, and to talk of becoming an independent polygar. These circumstances, on being made known to his guardian, produced remonstrances, and Sivajee was obliged to be more cautious in his conversation ; he was, however, frequently absent in the Concan for several days ; and Dadajee Konedeo endeavoured to wean him from such excursions by showing him more attention at home, and confiding much of the affairs of the jagheer to his superintendence.

There were several carcoons under Dadajee, intimate companions of Sivajee, who afterwards became his agents and advisers. As he was intrusted with a larger share of power, he used to pay and receive visits among the respectable Mahrattas in the neighbourhood of Poona ; and he obtained general good-will in that part of the country by an obliging and conciliatory deportment ; but, even at this time, it was whispered that Shahjee's son was a sharer in the profits of some extensive gang robberies committed in the Concan.

Sivajee was always partial to the Mawulees ; he observed that, although clownish and stupid in appearance, they were active and intelligent in anything to which they had been accustomed, and remarkably faithful in situations of trust. He was attentive to those in Dadajee's service ; they accompanied him on his excursions, and in hunting ; and he became extremely popular, not only with them but with the whole of their countrymen in the Mawuls. In his visits to these valleys, and to different parts of the Ghaut-Mahta and Concan, he grew familiar with the paths and defiles of that wild tract where he afterwards established himself. He had marked the condition of the adjoining strongholds, and began to devise schemes for getting one of them into his possession.

The hill forts under all the Mahomedan governments were, generally, much neglected. Some of the best had, as already mentioned, a Killidar appointed by the king, or some of his ministers, and when war was expected, a portion of the garrison was composed of good troops. At other times less care seemed necessary, and the generality of the forts were intrusted to the mokassadars, aumildars, jagheerdars, or deshmookhs of the districts in which they were situated.

* See page 10 for explanation of this word.

The reason given for their being seldom garrisoned by Mahomedans was their insalubrity, particularly during the rains; and as they had always been reduced with extraordinary facility, they were not estimated in proportion to their real importance. At the period at which we have arrived, the Beejapoor government, being at peace with the Moghuls, and engaged in plundering or reducing the Carnatic, had removed all their best troops to that part of the country. There was no hill fort in Shahjee's jagheer committed to the care of Dadajee Konedeo. The strong fort of Kondaneh* had a Mahomedan Killidar: and Poorundhur was under charge of a Bramin appointed by Morar Punt. Shahjee's family were on terms of intimacy with both Killidars, particularly Neelkunt Rao of Poorundhur, who was originally under the Nizam Shahee government, and had adhered to Shahjee.

In the Mawuls were three persons with whom Sivajee constantly associated; their names were Yessjee Kunk, Tannajee Maloosray, and Bajee Phasalkur. The last was Deshmookh of Moosay Khora; the other two had also some hereditary rights among their native hills. These three were the first known adherents and military followers of Sivajee. Assisted by them, he held communication with the Killidar of Torna, a hill fort exceedingly difficult of access, 20 miles south-west of Poona, at the source of the Neera river; and by means, the particulars of which are not known, induced him to give over the place.

A. D. 1646. This event happened in the year 1646.† As soon as they had got possession, Sivajee, who pretended that he was acting for the advantage of government, sent wukeels to Beejapoor to represent what he had done, and the many benefits likely to result to the king from having a faithful servant in that sequestered part of the country, the value of which had never been ascertained, owing to the farming of districts to deshmookhs whose interest lay in concealing their resources. As a proof of this statement, he offered a much larger rent than had been paid during the ten years which that tract had been in possession of Beejapoor. The answers to these applications were put off from day to day, which suited Sivajee's purpose, as his object was merely to gain time. His representations were seconded by bribes to the courtiers, as usual on such occasions, and for several years little notice was taken of him.‡

Whilst the wukeels were thus amusing the government at Beejapoor, Sivajee was collecting Mawulees, and strengthening and repairing Torna. When digging up some ruins in that fort,§ he accidentally discovered a large quantity of gold, which had been buried at some remote period—a piece of good fortune attributed to a miracle worked in his favour by the goddess Bhowanee, which afforded great support and encouragement in prosecuting his plans. Arms and ammunition were purchased; and he resolved on employing the money thus bestowed in building another fort.

A. D. 1647. For this purpose he pitched on the mountain of Mhorbudh, three miles south-east of Torna, and used astonishing exertion in fortifying it. When finished, he gave it the name of Rajgurh.

During its progress reports of what was going forward from time to time reached Beejapoor; the work was forbidden, and letters were despatched to Shahjee in the Carnatic, calling upon him to account for these

* Now Singurh.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ Khafee Khan, Beejapoor MSS., and some evidence in Mahratta MSS.

§ Mahratta MSS. Sivajee called it Pruchundgurh. I have retained the ancient name by which it is still known.

proceedings. Shahjee replied that his son had not consulted him ; but as he himself and all his family were devoted servants of the king's government, Sivajee, without doubt, had been acting for the improvement or security of the jagheer. Shahjee, at the same time, wrote to Dadajee Konedee and his son, censuring the proceedings of the latter, desiring an explanation, and calling upon him to desist. Dadajee Konedee, with the deepest interest in his welfare, urged every argument to induce Sivajee to abandon his designs ; he represented the probable ruin and the certain risk he incurred by such daring and unjustifiable conduct. He likewise set forth the great prospects which his father's name and respectability presented, in a faithful adherence to the government of Beejapoor. Sivajee answered by fair words ; but the old man saw that his purpose was unshaken. Infirm by age, worn out by disease, and now a prey to anxiety for the fate of his master's house, Dadajee did not long survive. But just before his death he sent for Sivajee, when, so far from dissuading him in his accustomed manner, he advised him to prosecute his plans of independence ; to protect Brahmins, kine, and cultivators ; to preserve the temples of the Hindoos from violation ; and to follow the fortune which lay before him. After this, having recommended his family to his young master's care, he expired.

The dying injunctions of Dadajee Konedee served to confirm Sivajee in his designs, and gave them a sanction in the eyes of the subordinate officers of the jagheer, which must have tended materially to raise his character, and perhaps, in some degree, to elavate his motives of action.

He took charge of the jagheer in his father's name ; but very shortly after, on the arrival of messengers from Shahjee to Dadajee Konedee, requiring the payment of some arrears of revenue, Sivajee sent them back with news of his guardian's death ; and on this, and several subsequent occasions, evaded all payments, till at last he informed his father that the expenses of that poor country had so much increased, that he must depend on his more extensive and fertile possessions in the Carnatic.

There were two officers in the jagheer whom it was of much consequence to gain or to remove, as neither of them, in the first instance, acceded to the views of Sivajee : the one, Phirungajee Nursalla, in charge of the fort of Chakun ; the other, Bajee Mohitey, the brother of Tooka Bye, Shahjee's second wife, manager of the district of Sopa.

Sivajee's emissaries succeeded in corrupting Phirungajee, who tendered his services to their master, and was confirmed in the command of Chakun. He likewise received charge of the revenue management of the adjoining villages, on condition that he should maintain the system of Dadajee Konedee.

But a more important acquisition than any hitherto made was obtained by the possession of Kondaneh. It was given up by the Mahomedan Killidar for a large bribe, and Sivajee changed or restored its name to Singurh, or the lion's den,* by which appellation it is still known.

Bajee Mohitey had 300 good horses : he occupied Sopa : and though he sent civil answers to all messages, he refused to pay the revenue, or listen to any overtures unauthorised by Shahjee. Sivajee concealing his approach, surrounded Sopa with a party of Mawulees in the middle of the night, surprised Bajee Mohitey and his whole party, took them

* The literal signification would be lion's fort, but the lion's den was the meaning intended by the name which Sivajee gave to Kondaneh : so say the Mahrattas, and it is proved by Sivajee's own words as we shall find recorded.

prisoners, and sent Mohitey, together with all who did not choose to enter his service, to join his father in the Carnatic.

The revenue officers of Baramuttee and Indapoor, whilst nothing interrupted the usual routine of affairs, appear to have realized the collections, and paid them over at Poona for some time after Dadajee Konedeo's death, without disputing the authority of Shahjee's son; but these districts, as well as the purgunna of Sopa, were at a distance from the hills, and too much exposed to be always maintained by Sivajee.

The demise of the Killidar of the fort of Poorundhur happened about the same time as that of Dadajee Konedeo. He left three sons, the eldest of whom, without confirmation from Beejapoor, assumed command of the garrison. The two younger sons claimed an equal right to command jointly with their brother, and to share in the profits of some fields and pasture-lands attached to the fort. They wished Sivajee to assist in arbitrating their differences: and he took a lively interest in their affairs, secretly supporting the younger brothers.

Whilst these disputes were pending, Sivajee, at a fit time, giving out that he was on his route towards Sopa, encamped under Poorundhur, and was, as he had hoped, invited into the fort with a few attendants. When the eldest of the three had retired to rest, Sivajee, in conversation with the other two, represented that the best expedient for inducing their brother to submit to a fair arbitration was to make him prisoner, to which the young men eagerly acceded. Sivajee, on pretence of granting them means of completely overawing every attempt at resistance, despatched a messenger to his troops below, and long before morning had a band of Mawulees in possession of the upper and lower forts, the eldest brother a prisoner, and the two younger, with the whole garrison, completely in his power. Sivajee attempted to excuse this treachery by avowing his designs of independence; and, although he removed the whole from Poorundhur, he had the address to reconcile them by grants of enam villages, and to persuade all the brothers to enter his service, in which they afterwards attained some distinction.

All these acquisitions were made without stir or bloodshed; the government districts were not molested. Mohummud Adil Shah was building palaces and mausoleums, or intent on acquisitions in the Carnatic; and the irregularities in the jagheer of Shahjee, if fully known, were not deemed of magnitude, whilst the jagheerdar himself was in the power of the king.

Thus did Sivajee obtain possession of the tract between Chakun and the Neera: and the manner in which he established himself, watching and crouching like the wily tiger of his own mountain valleys, until he had stolen into a situation from whence he could at once spring on his prey, accounts both for the difficulty found in tracing his early rise, and the astonishing rapidity with which he extended his power, when his progress had attracted notice, and longer concealment was impossible.

CHAP. IV.

FROM A. D. 1648 TO A. D. 1657.

Local authorities under the Beejapoor government in the immediate neighbourhood of Sivajee.—The Sawunts of Waree.—The Seedee of Jinjeera.—A daring robbery.—Forts taken by surprise.—The province of Kallian reduced.—Shahjee seized.—Sivajee applies to Shah Jehan for his enlargement.—An attempt to seize Sivajee frustrated.—Shahjee released,—returns to the Carnatic ;—his eldest son Sumbhajee killed.—Progress of Sivajee.—Murder of the raja of Jowlee, and conquest of his country.—Rohira escaladed.—Pertabgurh built.—Shamraje Punt, the first Mahratta Peishwa.—Sivajee's views on the Moghul districts.—History of the Moghuls in the Deccan since 1636.—Meer Joomleh.—Moghuls attack Golcondah,—make war on Beejapoor.—Shah Jehan's illness,—his four sons,—all aspire to the crown.—Aurangzebe's character and progress ;—usurps the throne.

THE details contained in the foregoing chapters have probably enabled the reader to form a sufficiently clear idea of the state of the Deccan so far as relates to the different great powers which divided it ; but, for the sake of perspicuity in what follows, it is necessary to offer a few remarks respecting the various local authorities under the Beejapoor government in the immediate neighbourhood of the tract occupied by Sivajee.

The south bank of the Neera, as far east as Seerwul, and as far south as the range of hills north of the Kistna, was A. D. 1648. farmed by the hereditary Deshmookh of Hurdus Mawul, named Bandal ; and the fort of Rohira was committed to his care. Having early entertained a jealousy of Sivajee, he kept up a strong garrison, and carefully watched the country adjoining Poorundhur. The Deshmookh was a Mahratta, but the Deshpandya was a Purbhoo (or Purvoo), a tribe of the Shunkerjatee, to whom Sivajee was always partial.

Waree was the station of a Mokassadar of government who had charge of Pandoogurh, Kummulgurh, and several other forts in that neighbourhood.

Chunder Rao Moray, raja of Jowlee, was in possession of the Ghaut-Mahta from the Kistna to the Warna.

The Kolapoor district, with the strong fort of Panalla, was under a Mahomedan officer appointed by government.

The ancient possessions of the Beejapoor state in the Concan were held in jagheer, or farmed to the hereditary deshmookhs, with the exception of the sea-ports of Dabul, Anjenweel, Ratnaguiry, and Rajapoor, which, with their dependent districts, were held by government officers. The principal hereditary chiefs were the Sawunts of Waree ; they were deshmookhs and jagheerdars of the strong tract adjoining the Portuguese territory at Goa, and their harbours were the resort of pirates, early known by the name of Koolees. Next in consequence to the Sawunts were

the Dulweys of Sringarpoor, who, from occupying an unfrequented tract, were, like the raja of Jowlee, nearly independent.

The province of Kallianee, formerly belonging to the kings of Ahmednugur, and ceded to Beejapoor by the treaty of 1636, was principally confided to two authorities; the northern part of it, extending from Bheemree (or Bhewndy) to Nagotna (or Nagathanna), was under a respectable Mahomedan officer appointed by the king, and stationed at the town of Kallian Bheemree. He had an extensive charge, comprehending several strong forts both above and below the Ghauts; but these forts, from the causes we have endeavoured to explain, were much neglected. The southern part of the province was held in jagheer by an Abyssinian;* the condition of his tenure, as far as can be ascertained, was the maintenance of a marine for the protection of the trade, and conveying pilgrims to the Red Sea. His possessions were not considered hereditary, but were conferred on the most deserving Abyssinian officer of the fleet, and the chief so selected was styled Wuzeer. The crews of his vessels were in part composed of his countrymen; and a small African colony was thus formed in the Concan. The great maritime depôt was the harbour of Dhunda Rajepoor, in the middle of which stands the small fortified island of Jinjeera.† In the vulgar language of the Deccan, all natives of Africa are termed Seedeess. The name of the principal Abyssinian at this time was Futih Khan, commonly styled the Seedee,‡ an appellation assumed by the chief and his successors, by which they have been best known to Europeans. The Seedee had charge of several forts, amongst which were Tala, Gossala, and Rairee; they were all intrusted to the care of Mahrattas.§

Thus much being premised, we return to Sivajee, who was secretly, but actively, employed in very extensive plans, in prosecution of which he was himself busy in collecting and arming Mawulees, whilst some of his Bramins were detached into the Concan to gain intelligence and forward his views in that quarter.

Having heard that a large treasure was forwarded to court by Moolana Ahmed, governor of Kallian, Sivajee put himself at the head of 300 horse, taken at Sopa, now mounted with Bargeers on whom he could depend, and, accompanied by a party of Mawulees, he attacked and dispersed the escort, divided the treasure amongst the horsemen, and conveyed it with all expedition to Rajgurrh. This daring robbery completely unmasked his designs; but the news had scarcely reached the capital before it was known that Sivajee had surprised and taken the forts of Kangooree, Toong, Tikona, Bhoorup, Koaree, Loghur, and Rajmachee.|| Tala,

* It is not exactly known at what period the power of his predecessors commenced; but Hubush Khan and Seedee Uंबर were Abyssinian admirals of the Nizam Shahee fleet during the time of Mullik Uंबर; and an Abyssinian officer, named Seedee Bulbul, was at that time in command of Rairee.—Beejapoor MSS.

† Jinjeera, the name by which the place is known in the Deccan, is the Mahratta corruption of the Arabic word *Jazeera*, an island.

‡ Seedee, when assumed by Africans themselves, has an honorable import, being a modification of the Arabic word *syud*, a lord; but, in the common acceptation, it is rather an appellation of reproach than of distinction.

§ Khafee Khan, Orme, and a loose traditionary Persian MS. procured from the collector and magistrate of the Southern Concan.

|| The manner of surprising these forts is not satisfactorily explained; but a traditionary account of one of Sivajee's exploits suggested a like attempt by a body of insurgents in the Concan-Ghaut-Mahta, who took up arms against the Peishwa's government, in modern times, during the administration of Trimbukjee Dainglia. It was usual for the villagers, in the vicinity of the hill-forts, to contribute a quantity

Gossala, and the strong hill of Rairee were given up to his emissaries : several rich towns were plundered in the Concan, and the booty with great regularity conveyed by the Mawulees to Rajgurh.

But this was not the extent of his designs, or of his success. Abajee Sonedeo, one of the Bramins educated by Dadajee Konedeo, who had already distinguished himself as much by his boldness as by his address, pushed on to Kallian, surprised the governor, took him prisoner, and procured the surrender of all the forts in that quarter.

As soon as Sivajee received this joyful intelligence, which exceeded his expectations, he hastened to Kallian, and bestowing the highest encomium on Abajee Sonedeo, appointed him soobehdar, or governor, of the country comprised in this important acquisition. No time was lost in commencing revenue arrangements. Ancient institutions were revived wherever a trace of them could be found ; and all endowments to temples, or assignments to Bramins, were carefully restored or maintained. As the Seedee was a formidable neighbour, Sivajee, to secure the hold already obtained on his jagheer, gave orders for building two forts—Beerwaree, near Gossala, and Lingannah, near Rairee.

Moolana Ahmed, made prisoner by Abajee Sonedeo, was treated by Sivajee with the utmost respect, and, being honourably dismissed, he returned to court. The news of his capture, and the surrender of the forts, had arrived before him, and although permitted to pay his respects to the king, he was not reinstated in any place of trust or emolument.

Sivajee's rebellion, in consequence of the report of Moolana Ahmed, began to create general anxiety at Beejapoor ; but Mohummud Adil Shah, impressed with an idea of its being secretly incited by Shahjee, took no active measures to suppress it by force. The power of Shahjee in the Carnatic, which had greatly increased by his being left as provincial governor, on the return of Rendoollah Khan to court, may have tended to occasion such a suspicion, strengthened also by the circumstance of its having begun in his jagheer, and spread over a province where his power had so lately been suppressed.*

The king, therefore, sent private orders to Bajee Ghorepuray of Moodhole, then serving in the same part of the country with Shahjee, to seize and confine him. This object Ghorepuray effected by treachery : he invited Shahjee to an entertainment, and made him prisoner.

On being brought to court, Shahjee was urged to suppress his son's rebellion, for which purpose freedom of correspondence was allowed between them.

Shahjee persisted in declaring that he was unconnected with his son, that Sivajee was as much in rebellion against him as against the king's government, and recommended his being reduced to obedience by force of arms. Nothing he urged could convince Mohummud Adil Shah of his innocence ; and, being enraged at his supposed contumacy, he ordered

of leaves and grass for the purpose of thatching the houses in the fort—a practice said to have prevailed from before the time of Sivajee. The insurgents having corrupted one or two persons of the garrison, a party of them, each loaded with a bundle of grass, having his arms concealed below it, appeared at the gate in the dress of villagers, to deposit, as they pretended, the annual supply ; and admittance being thus gained, they surprised the garrison, and possessed themselves of the place. The fort was Prucheetgurh, and the circumstance will be alluded to in its proper place ; it is only mentioned here as a stratagem, the original merit of which is ascribed to Sivajee.

* Mahratta MSS., Khafee Khan, Beejapoor MSS., and tradition.

Shahjee to be confined in a stone dungeon, the door of which was built up, except a small opening; and he was told that, if within a certain period his son did not submit, the aperture should be for ever closed.

Sivajee, when he heard of the imprisonment and danger which threatened his father, is said to have entertained thoughts of submitting; but if he ever seriously intended to adopt such a plan, it was overruled by the opinion of his wife, Suhjee Bye, who represented that he had a better chance of effecting Shahjee's liberty by maintaining his present power than by trusting to the mercy of a government notoriously treacherous.*

The alternative which Sivajee adopted develops a principal feature of his early policy. He had hitherto carefully refrained from molesting the subjects or territory of the emperor, probably from an opinion of the great power of the Moghuls, and from a design he appears to have contemplated, of throwing himself on the imperial protection in case of being pushed to extremity by the government of Beejapoor.

He accordingly, at this time, entered into correspondence with Shah Jehan for the purpose of procuring his father's enlargement. The proposals made by Sivajee are not known, but the emperor agreed to forgive the former misconduct of Shahjee, to admit him into imperial service, and to give Sivajee a munsib of 5,000 horse.†

It is probable that the emperor's influence, and the friendship of Morar Punt,‡ were the means of saving Shahjee from a cruel death. He was released from his dungeon on giving security; but he was kept a prisoner at large in Beejapoor for four years.¶

Sivajee, whose immediate object was effected by his father's reprieve, artfully contrived to keep his proposal of entering the Moghul service in an unsettled state, by preferring a claim on the part of his father, or himself, to the deshmookh's dues in the Joonere and Ahmednugur districts, to which he pretended they had an hereditary right. Sivajee's agent, who went to Agra with this ostensible purpose, did not, as was probably foreseen, succeed in obtaining a promise of the deshmookhee; but he brought back a letter from Shah Jehan, promising that the claim should be taken into consideration upon Sivajee's arrival at court.§

During the four years Shahjee was detained at Beejapoor, Sivajee, apprehensive perhaps for his father's safety, committed few aggressions, and the king was, probably, deterred from sending a force against him, lest it should induce Sivajee to give up the country to the Moghuls, which the emperor had sufficient excuse for receiving on account of arrears of tribute. In this interval a feeble attempt was made to seize Sivajee's person. It was undertaken by a Hindoo named Bajee Shamraje. Sivajee frequently resided at the town of Mhar in the Concan; and the party of Shamraje, passing through the territory of Chunder Rao Moray, lurked about the Phar Ghaut until an opportunity should offer; but Sivajee anticipated the surprise, attacked

* Mahratta MSS.

† Original letters of the Emperor Shah Jehan to Sivajee.

‡ Colonel Wilks says Rendoollah Khan. His name in Mahratta MSS. is certainly always mentioned with Morar Punt's, but Rendoollah Khan died in 1648, as appears on his tomb. He had a son or relation who had the same title, but he never attained sufficient rank or influence to have obtained Shahjee's release.

§ Original letter from Shah Jehan. The original letters from Shah Jehan and Aurungzebe to Sivajee are in the possession of the raja of Satara. Copies of them are lodged with the Literary Society of Bombay.

the party near the bottom of the Ghaut, and drove them in great panic to seek safety in the jungles.*

Shahjee had, in vain, endeavoured by every means to obtain permission to return to his jagheer in the Carnatic, when, at last, the great disturbances which became prevalent in that quarter induced the king to listen to recommendations in his favour. Previously, however, to granting his complete enlargement, Shahjee was bound down by solemn engagements to refrain from molesting the jagheerdar of Moodhole; and in order to induce both parties to bury what had passed in oblivion, Mohummud Adil Shah made them exchange their hereditary rights and enams as deshmookhas, Shahjee giving those he had received in the districts of Kurar, and Bajee Ghorepuray what he possessed in the Carnatic.†

This agreement, however, was not acted upon; and the first use Shahjee made of his liberty was to write to Sivajee—"If you are my son, punish Bajee Ghorepuray of Moodhole"—an emphatic injunction to vengeance which Sivajee, at a fit time, carried into terrible execution.

On his return to the Carnatic, Shahjee found that the accounts of the disturbed state of the country were not exaggerated; every petty chief endeavoured to strengthen himself and weaken his neighbour by plunder and exaction. His own jagheer had been subject to depredations; and he sent his eldest son Sumbhajee to punish one of these aggressions on the part of the Killidar of Kanikgeeree. On this service Sumbhajee was killed, and his detachment defeated. Shahjee afterwards took Kanikgeeree by assault, and avenged his death; but the loss of Sumbhajee was a source of much affliction; and the event was followed by the demise of his principal agent in the Carnatic, Naroo Punt Hunwuntay, a Bramin educated in the school of Mullik Umber, who had served Shahjee for many years. His place was fortunately well supplied by his son, Rugonath Narain, a person of considerable talent, whom we shall have occasion to notice at a future period. Disturbances became more and more prevalent in the Carnatic, and quite diverted the attention of the Beejapoor government from Sivajee; but no sooner was his father released, than he began to devise new schemes for possessing himself of the whole Ghaut-Mahta and the remainder of the Concan.

He had, in vain, attempted to induce the raja of Jowlee to unite with him against the Beejapoor government; Chunder Rao, although he carried on no war against Sivajee, and received all his messengers with civility, refused to join in rebellion against the king. The permission granted to Shamraje's party to pass through his country, and the aid which he was said to have given him, afforded Sivajee excuse for hostility; but the raja was too powerful to be openly attacked with any certain prospect of success; he had a strong body of infantry, of nearly the same description as Sivajee's Mawulees; his two sons, his brother, and his minister, Himmuto Rao, were all esteemed good soldiers; nor did there appear any means by which Sivajee could create a division among them.

Under these circumstances, Sivajee, who had held his troops in a state of preparation for some time, sent two agents, a Bramin and a Mahratta, the former named Ragoo Bullal, the latter Sumbhajee Cowajee, for the

* Mahratta MSS.

† Copy of the original instrument, and Mahratta MSS.

purpose of gaining correct intelligence of the situation and strength of the principal places, but ostensibly with a design of contracting a marriage between Sivajee and the daughter of Chunder Rao.

Ragoo Bullal, with his companion, proceeded to Jowlee, attended by 25 Mawulees. They were courteously received, and had several interviews with Chunder Rao, the particulars of which are not mentioned; but Ragoo Bullal, seeing the raja totally off his guard, formed the detestable plan of assassinating him and his brother, to which Sumbhajee Cowajee readily acceded. He wrote to Sivajee, communicating his intention, which was approved, and, in order to support it, troops were secretly sent up the Ghauts, whilst Sivajee, pretending to be otherwise engaged, proceeded from Rajgurrh to Poorundhur. From the latter place he made a night-march to Mahabylisur, at the source of the Kistna, where he joined his troops assembled in the neighbouring jungles. Ragoo Bullal, on finding that the preparations were completed, took an opportunity of demanding a private conference with the raja and his brother, when he stabbed the former to the heart, and the latter was despatched by Sumbhajee Cowajee. Their attendants being previously ready, the assassins instantly fled, and, darting into the thick jungles, which everywhere surrounded the place, they soon met Sivajee, who, according to appointment, was advancing to their support.

Before the consternation caused by this atrocious deed had subsided, Jowlee was attacked on all sides; but the troops, headed by the raja's sons and Himmur Rao, notwithstanding the surprise, made a brave resistance until Himmur Rao fell, and the sons were made prisoners.

Sivajee lost no time in securing the possessions of the late Chunder Rao, which was effected in a very short period. The capture of the strong fort of Wassota,* and the submission of Sewtur Khora completed the conquest of Jowlee. The sons of Chunder Rao, who remained prisoners, were subsequently condemned to death for maintaining a secret correspondence with the Beejapoor government; but the date of their execution has not been satisfactorily ascertained. Sivajee followed up this conquest by surprising Rohira, which he escalated in the night at the head of his Mawulees; Bandal, the Deshmookh, who was in the fort at the time, stood to his arms on the first moment of alarm; and although greatly outnumbered, his men did not submit until he was killed. At the head of them was Bajee Purvoe, the Deshpandya; Sivajee treated him with generosity, received him with great kindness, and confirmed him in all his hereditary possessions. He had relations with Sivajee, and afterwards agreed to follow the fortunes of his conqueror; the command of a considerable body of infantry was conferred upon him; and he maintained his character for bravery and fidelity to the last.

To secure access to his possessions on the banks of the Neera and Quyna, and to strengthen the defences of the Phar Ghaut, Sivajee A. D. 1656. pitched upon a high rock, near the source of the Kistna, on which he resolved to erect another fort. The execution of the design was intrusted to a Deshist Bramin, named Moro Trimmul Pingley, who had been appointed a short time before to command the fort of Poorundhur. This man, when very young, accompanied his father, then in the service of Shahjee, to the Carnatic, whence he returned to the Mahratta country about the year 1653, and shortly after joined Sivajee. The able manner in which he executed everything intrusted to him soon gained

* Sivajee called it Wujrgurrh, a name which it has not retained.

him the confidence of his master, and the erection of Purtabgurrh, the name given to the new fort, confirmed the favorable opinion entertained of him.

The principal minister of Sivajee at this period was a Bramin, named Shamraje Punt, whom he now dignified with the title of Peishwa ; and, as is common amongst Mahrattas with persons filling such a high civil station, he likewise held a considerable military command.

Hitherto Sivajee had confined his usurpations and ravages to the

A. D. 1657. Beejapoor territory ; but become more daring by impunity, and invited by circumstances, he ventured to depart from his original policy, and to extend his depredations to the imperial districts. To explain the motives which actuated him, we must revert to the proceedings of the Moghuls.

Since the peace of 1636, they had held undisturbed possession of their

A. D. 1636. conquest in the Deccan, and had been laudably employed in improving these acquisitions.

The Prince Aurungzebe, after an expedition against Kandahar, was appointed viceroy of the Deccan for the second time, in the

A. D. 1650. year 1650, and for several years abated nothing of the active measures which had been adopted for fixing equitable assessments, and affording protection to travellers and merchants. He established the seat of government at Mullik Umber's town of Khirkee, which, after his own name, he called Aurungabad.* But, however capable of civil government, Aurungzebe was early

habituated to the interest which is generally excited in the human mind by having once acted as a leader in war ; and in the A. D. 1655. year 1655, he readily seized an opportunity of fomenting dissensions at the neighbouring court of Golcondah, with the hope of involving the emperor in the dispute. At this period the prime minister of Kootub Shah was the celebrated Meer Joomleh ; he had attained that situation by his ability and his wealth ; but he had considerable influence, and was held in very general esteem at every Mahomedan court in Asia. He was originally a diamond merchant, and his occupation brought him acquainted with princes and their countries. His talents, his riches, and the extent of his dealings, had made him familiarly known at the imperial court, long before he rose to be vizier at Golcondah.

His son, Mohummud Amin, was dissolute, but he possessed his father's confidence. This youth, having been guilty of some disrespect to the person or authority of Abdoollah Kootub Shah, the latter thought fit to punish him. This treatment being resented by Meer Joomleh, altercation arose between him and the king, which at length led to a formal petition, on the part of the former, for the emperor's protection. The application being warmly seconded by Aurungzebe, laid the foundation of that friendship between him and Meer Joomleh which greatly contributed to Aurungzebe's elevation.

Shah Jehan espoused the cause of Meer Joomleh as ardently as Aurungzebe could have desired, and addressed an imperious letter to Kootub Shah on the subject. The king, exasperated by this interference, threw Mohummud Amin into prison, and sequestered his father's property. Such a proceeding, exaggerated by the colouring which Aurungzebe gave to it, could not fail to rouse the anger of Shah Jehan, and he immediately

* Futih Khan had before changed the name to Futihnugur, which it did not retain.—Beejapoor MSS.

determined on enforcing compliance with the orders he had sent in favour of Meer Joomleh. A choleric despot is prompt in his commands : Aurungzebe was ordered to prepare his army, to demand the release of Mohummud Amin, and satisfaction to Meer Joomleh. In case of refusal, he was directed to invade the territory of Golcondah.

As the king would not acknowledge the emperor's right of interference, Aurungzebe, on his rejecting the mandate, without any declaration of war, sent forward his eldest son, Sultan Mohummud, with a considerable force, on pretence of passing Hyderabad, on the route to Bengal, whither, it was given out, he was proceeding to espouse his cousin, the daughter of Sultan Shuja. Aurungzebe followed with the main army.

Abdoollah Kootub Shah did not discover the artifice until the young prince appeared as an enemy at his gates, when he solicited succour from his neighbours and made concessions to the Moghuls in the same breath. The citadel was attacked, and the town of Hyderabad plundered of great riches ; the advancing succours were intercepted, and the king reduced to the greatest distress.

Shah Jehan, the first ebullition of his anger being subsided, began to repent of his hasty orders. Fresh instructions were despatched to Aurungzebe, desiring him to accept of reasonable concessions from Abdoollah Kootub Shah, and not to proceed to extremities ; but Aurungzebe would not relinquish the advantage which his successful surprise had established, until he had extorted the most humiliating submission.

The king of Golcondah had, in the first instance, on the prince's arrival, released Mohummud Amin, and restored his father's property. He was now compelled to give his daughter in marriage to Sultan Mohummud, and to pay up all arrears of tribute, fixed by Aurungzebe at the annual sum of one crore of rupees ; but Shah Jehan, in confirming these proceedings, remitted twenty lakhs of the amount.

Meer Joomleh and Aurungzebe concurred in their ideas of the facility

A. D. 1656. and expediency of reducing the kingdoms of Beejapoor and Golcondah into provinces of the Moghul empire, and of spreading their conquests over the whole peninsula ; but Aurungzebe pretended to be actuated more by the hope of propagating the Mahomedan faith in that region of idolatry than swayed by a desire of possessing its resources. Meer Joomleh having been invited to the imperial court, was shortly after raised to the rank of vizier, and took every opportunity of urging the fitness of a plan in which both he and Aurungzebe probably calculated their own future advantage. A very short period had elapsed when an event occurred which drew the emperor partially to accede to their schemes of conquest, and induced him to authorise a war. This was the death of Mohummud Adil Shah, who, after a lingering illness, expired at Beejapoor, 4th November 1656.*

The deceased king, although his tribute was not paid with regularity, had, since the peace of 1636, cultivated a good understanding with Shah Jehan, whom he courted through the influence of his eldest and favourite son, Dara Shekoh. This proceeding, in consequence of a secret jealousy between the brothers, drew upon Beejapoor, independent of its being an object of his ambition, the personal enmity of Aurungzebe.

Mohummud Adil Shah was succeeded by his son, Sultan Ali Adil Shah II., who, immediately after his father's death, mounted the throne of

* Beejapoor MSS.

Beejapoor in the nineteenth year of his age. The resources of his kingdom were still considerable ; he had a large treasury, a fertile country, and his army, had it been properly concentrated, was powerful. The troops, however, were greatly divided, and large bodies of them were then employed in reducing the refractory zumeendars in the Carnatic.*

As the throne was filled without complimentary reference, or the observance of any homage to which the emperor pretended a right of claim, agreeably, as he maintained, to an admission on the part of Mohummud Adil Shah, it was given out by the Moghuls that Ali Adil Shah was not the son of the late king, and that the emperor must nominate a successor. The same circumstance is noticed in the works of contemporary European travellers,† but probably obtained from Moghul reports of that period, as nothing of the kind is alluded to in any of the Beejapoor writings, or in Mahratta manuscripts. This war, on the part of the Moghuls, appears to have been more completely destitute of apology than is commonly found even in the unprincipled transactions of Asiatic governments.

Meer Joomleh, by the emperor's express appointment, and for a cause hereafter explained, was at the head of the army destined for the reduction of Beejapoor, in which Aurungzebe was only second-in-command. But Aurungzebe and Meer Joomleh had a secret understanding ; the authority of the latter was nominal, that of the former supreme.

On the unexpected approach of the Moghuls, hasty preparations were made by the court of Beejapoor ; but no army could be assembled sufficient to cope with them in the field. Strong garrisons were therefore thrown into the frontier places expected to be invested, whilst, in order to succour them with such horse as were in readiness, Khan Mohummud, the principal general, and several Mahomedan officers of note, took the field with all expedition. Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, Bajee Ghorepuray, Nimbalkur, and other Mahratta jagheerders promptly joined him with their troops.*

Aurungzebe was prepared to advance by the month of March 1657, and proceeded towards the frontier of the Beejapoor territory by the eastern route. The fort of Kallian was reduced almost immediately, and Beder, the garrison on which most dependence was placed, fell to the Moghuls in one day, owing, it is said, to an accidental explosion of the principal magazine. Aurungzebe† was greatly elated by this unexpected success ; and his progress was expedited by every possible exertion. Kulburga was carried by assault, and no time was lost in prosecuting his march. The attack of the horse, who now began to annoy him, presented greater obstacles than any he had yet experienced ; but he succeeded in corrupting Khan Mohummud, the prime minister and general of Beejapoor, who shamefully neglected every opportunity by which he might have impeded the march of the Moghuls.*

Some of the officers continued to exert themselves until they had suffered by an entire want of support, when the road was left open for

* Beejapoor MSS.

† Tavernier. Bernier. It is perhaps the same vulgar story which Fryer relates regarding the son of Ali Adil Shah, and probably equally unfounded.—See Fryer, p. 169.

‡ In a letter to Sivajee he thus announces it—"The fort of Beder, which is accounted impregnable, and which is the key to the conquest of the Deccan and Carnatic, has been captured by me in one day, both fort and town, which was scarcely to have been expected without one year's fighting."—Original letter from Aurungzebe to Sivajee.

- Aurungzebe, by whom the capital was invested before the inhabitants had leisure to make their usual preparations of destroying the water, and bringing the forage from the neighbourhood within the gates.

The siege was pressed with great vigour, and the king sued for peace in the most humble manner, offering to pay down one crore of rupees, and to make any sacrifice demanded; but Aurungzebe was aiming at nothing short of the complete reduction of the place, when an event occurred which suddenly obliged him to change his resolution. This circumstance was the supposed mortal illness of the emperor, news of which at this important moment reached Aurungzebe, having been privately despatched by his sister, Roshunara Begum.

Shah Jehan had four sons—Dara Shekoh, then with his father at Agra; Sultan Shuja, viceroy of Bengal; Aurungzebe, employed as we have seen; and Sultan Moraud, governor of Guzerat. As all the sons aspired to the crown, each of them now assembled an army to assert his pretensions. Dara Shekoh, as soon as his father's life was in danger, assumed the entire powers of the state; but he had previously been vested with great authority. To his influence was ascribed the order which obliged Aurungzebe to desist from the siege of Golcondah, and also the appointment of Meer Joomleh over his brother to the command of the army, at this time employed against Beejapoor. He was jealous of all his brothers, but he dreaded Aurungzebe. His apprehensions were well founded; the ambitious character of that prince, masked under the veil of moderation and religious zeal, was an over-match for the open and brave, but imprudent and rash, disposition of Dara. The latter openly professed the liberal tenets which the court of Agra had derived from Akber, but which ill-accorded with the religious feelings of most of the Mahomedans in the imperial service. Aurungzebe perceived and took advantage of this circumstance, carrying his observances of the forms enjoined by the Koran to rigid austerity, and having, or pretending to have, nothing so much at heart as the interests of religion, and the propagation of the faith of Islam. One of the first acts of Dara was to issue an order recalling Meer Joomleh and all the principal officers serving in the Deccan—a measure to which he may have been in some degree induced by partiality towards Beejapoor, as well as by hatred to his rival brother. Aurungzebe, by the advice of Meer Joomleh, immediately resolved on counteracting this order by marching to the Moghul capital. His first step was to accept the overtures of Ali Adil Shah, from whom he obtained a considerable supply of ready money, and concluded a treaty, by which he relinquished the advantages he had gained, and in a few days was on his march towards the Nerbuddah. As the family of Meer Joomleh were at Agra, in the power of Dara, the former suffered himself to be confined by Aurungzebe in the fort of Doulutabad, where Aurungzebe also lodged his own younger children and the ladies of his family. His second son, Sultan Mauzum, was left in charge of the government of Aurungabad. Aurungzebe's first care was to deceive his brother, Moraud Bukhsh, into a belief of his having no design upon the crown for himself; that such views were wholly inconsistent with the religious seclusion he had long meditated; that self-defence against the enemy, their brother Dara, obliged him to take up arms; and that he would join to assist in placing Moraud Bukhsh on the throne. Accordingly, their forces having united, they defeated the imperial armies in two pitched battles. Dara became a fugitive; and although he afterwards assembled an army, he was again defeated, and at last betrayed into the

hands of Aurungzebe, by whose orders he was put to death. Shah Jehan, contrary to expectation, recovered from his illness, and during the advance of his sons, sent repeated orders commanding them to return to their governments ; but to these mandates they paid no attention, as they pretended to consider them forgeries by Dara. As soon as Aurungzebe had his father in his power, he imprisoned Morad Bukhsh, gained over his army, deposed the emperor, and mounted the throne in the year 1658.* Having sent for Meer Joomleh from the A. D. 1658. Deccan, they marched against his brother Shuja, discomfited his army, and forced him to fly to Arracan, where he was murdered, and Aurungzebe was thus left undisputed master of the empire.

* There is a good deal of confusion in the dates of the reign of Aurungzebe, owing to its commencement having been frequently reckoned from 1659. Khafee Khan is, in consequence, sometimes thrown out one or two years. Aurungzebe appears to have begun by reckoning his reign from the date of his victory over Dara, to have subsequently ascended the throne in the following year, and then changed the date, which he again altered by reverting to the former date at some later and unknown period.

CHAP. V.

FROM A. D. 1657 TO A. D. 1662.

Sivajee enters into a correspondence with Aurungzebe—commits hostilities on the Moghuls by plundering Joonere and Ahmednugur—augments his cavalry.—Political artifice of Sivajee and of Aurungzebe.—Sivajee entertains a body of Patans.—Factions at Beejapoor.—Khan Mohummud, the prime minister, put to death.—Shamraje Punt defeated by the Seedee.—Moro Trimmul Pingley appointed Peishwa.—Treaty with the Sawunts,—which they break.—Expedition against Sivajee.—Afzool Khan, the Beejapoor general, seduced to a conference and murdered.—Sivajee gets possession of Panalla—defeats Roostum Zuman—plunders to the gates of Beejapoor—levies a contribution from Rajapoor—takes Dabul.—Another expedition against him under Seedee Johur—besieged in Panalla—escapes from the fort,—gallant conduct of his rear guard—heroic death of Bajee Purvoe.—Ali Adil Shah takes the field—reduces the country lately overrun by Sivajee—and retakes Panalla.—Sivajee takes Rajapoor—conquers Sringarpoor—and reduces Dhunda Rajapoor—kills Ghorepuray, and burns Moodhole.—Conquest of Waree.—Truce with Beejapoor.—Shahjee visits Sivajee.—Raighur.—Sivajee's territory and army.—The Moghuls.

AT the time when Aurungzebe was on the point of commencing the war against Beejapoor, Sivajee, professing himself a servant of the emperor, entered into a correspondence with that prince, who readily listened to his overtures, assented to his keeping what he had wrested from Beejapoor, and, with the alleged right of the emperor to dispose of that kingdom, consented to a proposal from Sivajee of taking possession of Dabul and its dependencies* on the sea-coast.

Aurungzebe was particularly desirous of having an interview with Sivajee, for the purpose of explaining how essentially their interests were allied, and the vast advantages the latter might expect to reap by uniting with him.† But Sivajee, although he professed obedience, and humbly demeaned himself towards Aurungzebe, no sooner saw the army at a distance, and ready to engage in what he hoped would prove a long struggle, than he resolved on seizing this opportunity of augmenting his resources by plunder, and increasing his cavalry. Of the latter, he at this time had but a small number, and, partly from want of confidence in his countrymen, as well as want of funds, he did not at first attempt to raise them in the usual footing of Sillidars.‡

The first act of hostility which Sivajee committed against the Moghuls was, May 1657, when he one night surprised and plundered the town of Joonere, carrying off three lakhs of pagodas in specie, 200 horses,

* Original letter from Aurungzebe to Sivajee.

† Original letter from Aurungzebe to Sivajee.—Mahratta MSS.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

some valuable clothes, and other articles. This booty he escorted as far as Poona, where he gave it in charge to a party prepared for the purpose, who conveyed it to Rajgurh. Sivajee himself marched by unfrequented roads to Ahmednugur, in hopes of surprising the Pettah : but in this attempt he was only partially successful ; he was attacked whilst his men were plundering ; but he had secured 700 horses and four elephants, with which he got clear off, although several of his party were killed by a detachment from the fort, which had, on the first alarm, been sent out to protect the town.

On Sivajee's return to Poona, he used great exertions to increase his cavalry ; he purchased horses in all quarters, and mounted them with Bargeers of his own : he now also commenced entertaining Mahratta Sillidars. Mankojee Dutonday, an old officer, who had served with his father, had commanded his small body of horse for several years, with the title of Surnobut : but, at his death, Sivajee appointed as his successor Netajee Palkur, an enterprising officer, who had considerable influence with the Sillidars in various parts of the country, but a man naturally cruel and unprincipled.

The unexpected success of the Moghuls, and the danger which threatened Beejapoor, alarmed Sivajee. He made every preparation to augment his army, but he wrote to Aurungzebe in the most humble strain, begging forgiveness for what had passed, and promising to continue steadfast in his allegiance for the future. Rugonath Punt, one of his confidential wukeels, was despatched to reiterate these assurances.

The news from Agra, the peace with Beejapoor, and the march of Aurungzebe to the northward, altered the face of affairs. Sivajee sent another ambassador, Kistnajee Bhaskur, professing, as before, his extreme regret for what had happened ; mentioning his having prepared a body of horse, offering to assist Aurungzebe in the present exigency, and to protect the imperial territories during his absence ; but he at the same time revived his pretensions to certain hereditary claims within the Moghul districts, and pointed out the deshmoockhee, and some part of the family jagheer, as a fit recompense for serving with his troops. The ambassador was likewise instructed to represent how much many parts of the Concan were mismanaged by Adil Khan, and the great advantage of transferring the whole to Sivajee.

Aurungzebe was in no condition to resent such arrogant demands ; but conceiving that security to the imperial territory would be best consulted by encouraging Sivajee's aggressions on the Beejapoor government, and by amusing him with hopes of obtaining what he claimed in the Moghul districts, he wrote to him, artfully acknowledging in the same letter the communications made by Rugonath Punt and Kistnajee Bhaskur, condescending to pardon his crimes, assenting to his taking possession of the Concan, and desiring that Sona Pundit (Abajee Sonedeo) might be sent to discuss his hereditary claims ; that when the terms were concluded, Sivajee should send 500 horse to join his army, and be prepared with the rest of his troops to maintain order and tranquillity in the imperial districts.*

It is not probable that either party was deceived, as no further agreement was concluded. Sivajee, however, prepared his troops for the

* Mahratta MSS., and original letter from Aurungzebe written immediately after the battle with Jeswunt Sing and Kassim Khan, which happened, not near the Nerbuddah, as Colonel Dow seems to conclude, but within 12 miles of Oojein.

purpose of reducing the Concan, and occupied several neglected strongholds on the sea coast, where he afterwards collected boats for purposes of piracy. He acquired a considerable accession to his force by being joined by 700 Patan infantry, whom the Beejapoor government discharged immediately after the departure of Aurungzebe. Sivajee hesitated in entertaining these Mahomedans; but his scruples were overruled by the judicious arguments of Gomajee Naik, an old retainer of his maternal grandfather, Jadow Rao, who had been the faithful adherent of Jeejee Bye during the many dangers of her eventful life. Sivajee from this time admitted a portion of Mahomedans into his service, and the advice of Gomajee afterwards proved of infinite importance to the success of the Mahrattas. The body of Patans were placed under a Bramin commander, Ragoo Bullal, the murderer of Chunder Rao Moray.*

The government of Beejapoor was distracted and weakened by a treacherous, factious nobility, and Ali Adil Shah's youth was ill-calculated to control them. As soon as Aurungzebe retired, when they might have sent an army to crush Sivajee's formidable rebellion, their time was occupied in plotting the ruin of each other. Khan Mohummud, the prime minister, who had betrayed the cause of his king, was justly condemned, but, instead of being tried in any regular manner, he was invited to court under promise of protection, attacked by a band of assassins at the gate of the city, torn down from the elephant on which he sat, and put to death in the most barbarous manner.

Khan Mohummud was originally an Abyssinian slave, named Rehan, given by Ibrahim Adil Shah to his son Mohummud, whose minister he afterwards became. The young king did not, as is usual on such occasions, sequester his estate; it was bestowed on his son, Khowaus Khan, but the execution of his father rankled in the bosom of the son, who was always suspicious of the king, and necessity alone reconciled them to each other.†

Sivajee, in pursuance of his plan for reducing the Concan, sent a large force under the Peishwa, Shamraje Punt, to invade the possessions of the Seedee. But Shamraje Punt was unfit for such an undertaking; Futih

A. D. 1659. Khan was prepared, anticipated the attack, and defeated the Peishwa's army with great slaughter.

This reverse was the first which Sivajee had experienced, and he was proportionally disappointed; but every exertion was used to repair the disaster. He sent a fresh body of troops to join the fugitives; Rugonath Punt was directed to assume command of the whole: Shamraje Punt was recalled, disgraced, and removed from the office of Peishwa, which was now bestowed on Moro Trimmul Pingley. Previously to the defeat of Shamraje Punt, the Sawunts (deshmookhs and jagheerders of Waree), on learning the great preparations of Sivajee, and supineness of their own government, sent a wukeel for the purpose of negotiating a treaty, to which Sivajee readily assented, and it was settled that one-half the revenue should belong to Sivajee, and be collected by his agents, whilst the other half, exclusive of their deshmookhee rights, which were also yielded to them, should remain to the Sawunts. For these concessions they became bound to keep up garrisons in the forts, and a body of 3,000 infantry, liable to be called upon for service at the shortest notice.‡ But they soon repented of this alliance; although they did not act against

* Mahratta MSS. † Beejapoor MSS. ‡ Copy of the original treaty.

Sivajee in the ensuing season, they did not abide by the terms of their agreement, and shortly after resumed their allegiance to Beejapoor.

The Seedee maintained his ground against Rugonath Punt, and both parties retired on the setting in of the monsoon. During the rains a great army was prepared under the joint command of the Peishwa and Netajee Palkur; but, as the season continued unusually severe, the Seedee's possessions remained unmolested; and in the meantime Sivajee was threatened by a more formidable enemy, to whom all his attention was directed.

The Beejapoor government had at last become sensible of the necessity of making an active effort to subdue him, and for this purpose an army was assembled, consisting of 5,000 horse and 7,000 choice infantry, a good train of artillery, or what was considered as such, besides a large supply of rockets, a number of swivels mounted on camels, and abundance of stores. Afzool Khan, an officer of high rank, volunteered to command the expedition, and at his public audience of leave, in the vaunting manner particularly common to Mahomedan natives of the Deccan, pompously declared that he should bring back the insignificant rebel and cast him in chains under the footstool of the throne.

To avoid impediments which present themselves on the straight route from Beejapoor, and the heavy rains which seldom subside in the neighbourhood of the hills till the end of September, the army proceeded to Punderpoor, and thence marched towards Waee.

Sivajee, on its approach, took up his residence in Pertabgurh, and sent the most humble messages to Afzool Khan. He pretended to have no thought of opposing so great a personage, and seemed only anxious to make his peace with the Beejapoor government, through the Khan's mediation; he affected the utmost sorrow for his conduct, which he could hardly persuade himself would be forgiven by the king, even if the Khan should receive him under the shadow of his protection; but he would surrender the whole of his country to the Khan, were it possible to assure himself of his favour.

Afzool Khan had all the vanity of a Mahomedan noble; he had also a thorough contempt for his enemy; but having formerly been in charge of the Waee district, as soobehdar of the province, he was aware of the exceeding difficulty he should experience on his advance through the wild country which he must penetrate.

With such considerations, and mollified by Sivajee's submission, Afzool Khan, in answer to repeated applications, despatched a Bramin in his own service, named Puntajee Gopinat, with suitable attendants, to Pertabgurh. On his arrival at Phar, a village below the fort, Sivajee came down to meet him. The Bramin stated that the Khan (his master) and Shahjee were intimate friends, that the Khan bore no enmity towards his son, but, on the contrary, would prove his desire to assist him by interceding for pardon, and even endeavouring to get him confirmed as jagheerदार in part of the territory he had usurped. Sivajee acknowledged his obligation, although his reply at this public meeting was not couched in the same humble strain he had used in his messages. He said that if he could obtain a part of the country in jagheer, it would be all he could expect; that he was the king's servant, and that he had been of considerable use to his government in reducing several polygars, whose territory would now come under the royal authority. This was the substance of what passed at their first interview.

Sivajee provided accommodations for the envoy and his suite, but assigned a place for the Bramin at some distance from the rest. In the middle of the night Sivajee secretly introduced himself to Puntajee Gopinat. He addressed him as a Bramin, his superior. He represented that "all he had done was for the sake of Hindoos and the Hindoo faith; that he was called on by Bhowanee herself to protect Bramins and kine, to punish the violators of their temples and their gods, and to resist the enemies of their religion; that it became him, as a Bramin, to assist in what was already declared by the deity; and that here, amongst his caste and countrymen, he should hereafter live in comfort and affluence." Sivajee seconded his arguments with presents, and a solemn promise of bestowing the village of Hewra, in enam, on him and his posterity for ever. No Bramin could resist such an appeal, seconded by such temptation; the envoy swore fidelity to Sivajee, declared he was his for ever, and called on the goddess to punish him if he swerved from any task he might impose. They accordingly consulted on the fittest means for averting the present danger. The Bramin, fully acquainted with Afzool Khan's character, suggested the practicability of seducing him to a conference, and Sivajee at once determined on his scheme. He sent for a confidential Bramin already mentioned, Kistnajee Bhaskur, informed him of what had just passed, and of the resolution which he had in consequence adopted. After fully consulting on the subject, they separated as secretly as they had met.

Some interviews and discussions having taken place, merely for the purpose of masking their design, Kistnajee Bhaskur, as Sivajee's wukeel, was despatched with Puntajee Gopinat to the camp of Afzool Khan. The latter represented Sivajee as in great alarm; but if his fears could be overcome by the personal assurances of the Khan, he was convinced that he might easily be prevailed upon to give himself up. With a blind confidence Afzool Khan trusted himself to Puntajee's guidance. An interview was agreed upon, and the Beejapoor troops, with great labour, moved to Jowlee. Sivajee prepared a place for the meeting, below the fort of Pertabgurrh; he cut down the jungle, and cleared a road for the Khan's approach; but every other avenue to the place was carefully closed. He ordered up Moro Punt and Netajee Palkur from the Concan, with many thousands of the Mawulee infantry. He communicated his whole plan to these two, and to Tannajee Maloosray. Netajee was stationed in the thickets a little to the east of the fort, where it was expected that a part of the Khan's retinue would advance, and Moro Trimmul, with the old and tried men, was sent to conceal himself in the neighbourhood of the main body of the Beejapoor troops, which remained, as had been agreed upon, in the neighbourhood of Jowlee. The preconcerted signal for Netajee was the blast of a collerie horn, and the distant attack by Moro Trimmul was to commence on hearing the fire of five guns from Pertabgurrh, which were also to announce Sivajee's safety.

Fifteen hundred of Afzool Khan's troops accompanied him to within a few hundred yards of Pertabgurrh, where, for fear of alarming Sivajee, they were, at Puntajee Gopinat's suggestion, desired to halt. Afzool Khan, dressed in a thin muslin garment, armed only with his sword, and attended, as had been agreed, by a single armed follower, advanced in his palanquin to an open bungalow prepared for the occasion.

Sivajee had made preparations for his purpose, not as if conscious that he meditated a criminal and treacherous deed, but as if resolved on some

meritorious though desperate action. Having performed his ablutions with much earnestness, he laid his head at his mother's feet, and besought her blessing. He then arose, put on a steel chain cap and chain armour under his turban and cotton gown, concealed a crooked dagger, or *beechna*,* in his right sleeve, and on the fingers of his left hand he fixed a *wagnuck*,† a treacherous weapon well known among Mahrattas. Thus accoutred, he slowly descended from the fort. The Khan had arrived at the place of meeting before him, and was expressing his impatience at the delay, when Sivajee was seen advancing, apparently unarmed, and, like the Khan, attended by only one armed follower, his tried friend Tannajee Maloosray. Sivajee, in view of Afzool Khan, frequently stopped, which was represented as the effects of alarm, a supposition more likely to be admitted from his diminutive size. Under pretence of assuring Sivajee, the armed attendant, by the contrivance of the Bramin, stood at a few paces distance. Afzool Khan made no objection to Sivajee's follower, although he carried two swords in his waistband, a circumstance which might pass unnoticed, being common amongst Mahrattas; he advanced two or three paces to meet Sivajee; they were introduced, and in the midst of the customary embrace, the treacherous Mahratta struck the *wagnuck* into the bowels of Afzool Khan, who quickly disengaged himself, clapped his hand on his sword, exclaiming treachery and murder, but Sivajee instantly followed up the blow with his dagger. The Khan had drawn his sword and made a cut at Sivajee, but the concealed armour was proof against the blow; the whole was the work of a moment, and Sivajee was wresting the weapon from the hand of his victim before their attendants could run towards them. Syud Bundoo, the follower of the Khan, whose name deserves to be recorded, refused his life on condition of surrender, and against two such swordsmen as Sivajee and his companion, maintained an unequal combat for some time before he fell. The bearers had lifted the Khan into his palanquin during the scuffle, but by the time it was over, Khundoo Malley and some other followers of Sivajee had come up, when they cut off the head of the dying man, and carried it to Pertabgurh. The signals agreed on were now made; the Mawulees rushed from their concealment and beset the nearest part of the Beejapoor troops on all sides, few of whom had time to mount their horses or stand to their arms. Netajee Palkur gave no quarter; but orders were sent to Moro Punt to spare all who submitted; and Sivajee's humanity to his prisoners was conspicuous on this as well as on most occasions.‡ Many of those that had attempted to escape were brought in for several days afterwards in a state of great wretchedness, from wandering in wilds where they found it impossible to extricate themselves. Their reception and treatment induced many of the Mahratta prisoners to enter Sivajee's service. The most distinguished Mahratta taken was Joojhar Rao Ghatgay, whose father had been the intimate friend of Shahjee; but Sivajee could not induce him to depart from his allegiance to Beejapoor; he was therefore permitted, at his own request, to return, after he had been honorably dismissed with valuable

* The Beechna, or scorpion, is aptly named in its resemblance to that reptile.

† The Wagnuck, or tiger's claws, is a small steel instrument, made to fit on the fore and little finger. It has three crooked blades, which are easily concealed in a half-closed hand.

‡ The occasions where Sivajee was ever known to exercise cruelty to prisoners were those where he supposed them to be obstinately concealing wealth, which he was determined to extort.

presents. The son and family of Afzool Khan were taken by Khundoojee Kakray, one of Sivajee's officers; but on being offered a large bribe, he agreed to guide them to a place of safety, and led them by unfrequented paths across the mountains, and along the banks of the Quyna, until he safely lodged them in Kurar. The circumstances, however, became known to Sivajee, and Kakray was in consequence condemned to lose his head—a sentence which was promptly executed.

This success among a people who cared little for the means by which it was attained, greatly raised the reputation of Sivajee; and the immediate fruits of it were 4,000 horses, several elephants, a number of camels, a considerable treasure, and the whole train of equipment which had been sent against him.

Such of his troops as were wounded, he, on this occasion, distinguished by honorary presents of bracelets, necklaces, chains of gold and silver, and clothes. These were presented with much ceremony, and served to stimulate future exertion amongst his soldiers, as well as to give greater effect to the fame of his exploit. It is worthy of remark that the sword of Afzool Khan is still a valued trophy in the armoury of Sivajee's descendant. Puntajee Gopinat received the promised grant in reward for his treachery, and was afterwards promoted to considerable rank in the service.*

Sivajee prepared his troops as if to attack the Seedee, who, on the approach of Afzool Khan, had laid siege to Tala and Gossala; but on the report of his discomfiture, and the destruction of the Beejapoor army, he hastily retired. Sivajee, although he pretended to meditate an attack on him with his whole force, was engaged in an intrigue with the officer in charge of Panalla, from whom he had received overtures for surrendering that important place.† The terms having been agreed on, and their future operations determined, Sivajee could scarcely assure himself of its not being some stratagem contrived by the Beejapoor government, in order to draw him into their power. To guard against this, as well as to neglect nothing for securing a place of such importance, Sivajee sent forward Annajee Dutto, one of his most confidential Bramins, with a strong body of Mawulees, whilst he himself secretly drew together a large force, both of horse and foot, to act as the occasion might require.

Annajee Dutto was successful; both Panalla and Powangurh were surrendered, and Sivajee followed up this acquisition by surprising the fort of Wussuntgurh, levying contributions along the banks of the Kistna, and leaving a *thanna*,‡ or garrison with a revenue collector, in the

* Mahratta and Persian MSS., and English Records. The English Records, referred to during the seventeenth century, are principally in the East India House, London.

† The name of the person who gave up Panalla is nowhere mentioned. One Beejapoor MS. states that Sivajee took it by stratagem; another, that a Hindoo in charge surrendered it, which so far corresponds with the Mahratta account. Panalla was one of those forts to which the king generally appointed the Killidar, but it was situated within the jagheer of Roostum Zuman, one of the Beejapoor generals, whom we shall have occasion to mention in our progress. The jagheer of Roostum Zuman comprehended Merich and Kolapoor above the Ghauts, and Carwar and Rajapoor in the Concan. There is reason to suppose that Roostum Zuman was bribed by Sivajee at a very early period; the English merchants of the factories of Rajapoor and Carwar repeatedly accuse him of being in league with Sivajee, and of sharing in the plunder of some towns in his own jagheer.

‡ *Thanna* literally signifies a garrison, but it also means, more especially in Deccan history, the military post at which the inferior revenue officers are stationed to protect the country, aid the police, and collect the revenue, whether the station be a fort

Gurhee* of Buttees Serala. On his arrival at Panalla, his first object was to send off troops to reduce the neighbouring forts both above and below the Syhadree range, which, in general, submitted without resistance; but Bangna and Kelneh were taken by assault, and the latter got the name of Vishalgurh, which it still retains.

Roostum Zuman, an officer of Beejapoor, stationed at Merich, was directed to march, when too late, for the protection of the Kolapoor district: he had only 3,000 horse with a small body of infantry, with which he was permitted to advance to the neighbourhood of Panalla, when Sivajee in person attacked him with his cavalry, routed his party with great slaughter, and pursued him across the Kistna.† Thence, having written to Annajee Dutto to assemble all the spare infantry at Vishalgurh, Sivajee continued his route, plundered many of the villages as far as the neighbourhood of Beejapoor, levied contributions from most of the market towns, spread terror over the whole country, and retired with such celerity as to evade even an attempt at pursuit.

On joining his troops at Vishalgurh, he marched straight to Rajapoor on the coast, where he appeared a few hours after the A. D. 1660. Jan. news of his being in the neighbourhood of the capital had been received. He levied a contribution from Rajapoor, possessed himself of Dabul and its dependencies, acquired considerable booty, and safely conveyed it to Rajgurh.

The destruction of Afzool Khan and his army, the capture of Panalla, the defeat of Roostum Zuman, and, above all, the appearance of Sivajee at the gates of the capital, created such an alarm at Beejapoor that even faction amongst the nobles was in some measure allayed; but, as it was difficult to assign the precedence to any one in particular, it was suggested that the king in person should take the field against him. This proposition, however, was over-ruled, and a fit commander appeared in an Abyssinian officer, Seedee Johur, then commanding at Kurnoul, who had particularly distinguished himself on various services in the Carnatic.

Although he did not then rank among the nobility, his appointment excited less jealousy than if he had been one of either party; but he did not long escape their envy. His army was twice as large as that lately commanded by Afzool Khan; and Fazil Mohumud Khan, the son of Afzool Khan, who was anxious to avenge his father's murder, volunteered to accompany him. It was determined to open the campaign by the siege of Panalla; but before the march of the troops, Seedee Johur was dignified with the title of Sulabut Khan.‡ Futih Khan,

or an open village. The cultivators consider him their master who is in possession of the *thanna*; for this reason *garrison* does not convey the full meaning of *thanna*, and I have therefore been sometimes obliged to use it in preference to the English word.

* Gurhee means a small, or sometimes a weak, fort. Buttees Serala is called a Gurhee, although it is a mud fort, extensive, but of no strength.

† Mahratta MSS. A letter from the English factory at Rajapoor states that Roostum Zuman sent on a small party of his troops, under the son of Afzool Khan, and betrayed them into the hands of Sivajee; but the intelligence then obtained by the factors, all of which they wrote off just as it was received, cannot be relied on; indeed they frequently add that reports are so contradictory, they know not what to believe. Their letters, however, are very important for fixing dates; and in corroborating facts admitted by native authorities, they are invaluable.

‡ I have retained his name of Seedee Johur; but in all Beejapoor writings his name is henceforth changed to Sulabut Khan. The supposition of his being at all connected with the Seedeas of Jinjeera is a mistake into which it would be very easy to account for Mr. Orme's having fallen.

the Seedee, was prepared to attack Sivajee's possessions in the Concan, on the advance of Seedee Johur ; and the Deshmookhs of Waree, whose fears prompted them to act vigorously, were directed to co-operate for the same purpose.

Sivajee, on the other hand, made arrangements for defending the Concan. Rugonath Punt was opposed to Futih Khan ; Abajee Sonedeo protected the fort and districts of Kallian Bheemree ; and Bajee Rao Phasalkur, the surnobut or commander-in-chief of the infantry, maintained the war against the Sawunts of Waree. In the upper country, Moro Punt was charged with the care of Poorundhur, Singurh, Pertabgurh, and the adjoining country. Sivajee esteeming Panalla a place of greater strength than it really was, imprudently resolved to defend it in person. He made no attempt to dispute the approach of the Beejapoor army ;

but as soon as they encamped in the neighbourhood of the fort, Netajee Palkur, with the horse, began to ravage the surrounding country, to cut off their supplies, to avoid encountering their cavalry, but to harass them by night attacks, in which he was supported by the garrison. Parties of Mawulees under cover of the ravines approached the camp, sprung on the besiegers sword in hand, where they found them unprepared, or threw rockets when they were discovered.

In this manner they did great mischief, and, with little loss on their part, killed numbers of the Beejapoor troops. Seedee Johur ordered that no quarter should be given to men who practised such warfare. He personally headed the attacks, drove in the whole of the outposts, closely invested the place, and for several months, in the worst season of the year, persevered in vigorous efforts to reduce it.

The war was likewise actively prosecuted in the Concan. The Seedee, by means of his fleet, having made several successful descents on different parts of the coast, had gained some advantages over his opponent, Rugonath Punt ; and Bajee Rao Phasalkur, one of Sivajee's earliest followers, fought a drawn battle with Kye Sawunt of Waree, in which both commanders were slain.

The siege of Panalla had lasted four months ; the place was still tenable, but every avenue was vigilantly guarded, and Sivajee saw the fault he had committed in allowing himself to be shut up in a manner which effectually obstructed all communication, and prevented his either knowing or directing affairs in other parts of the country. To extricate himself from this dilemma required address and boldness.

The besiegers were in high hopes, and exceedingly alert. Sivajee first endeavoured to throw them off their guard. He began his scheme by proposals for surrendering ; negotiations were commenced, and Sivajee, who well knew that he could trust Seedee Johur* on receiving his promise not to molest him, came down, slightly attended, to one of the batteries, where he was met by Seedee Johur, and soon made him believe that he intended to submit. All firing ceased, and everything was adjusted, except a few trifling points artfully reserved by Sivajee till next morning ; and in the meantime, as the evening closed, he was permitted to return to the fort, which the whole army, now lulled into security, considered as if in their possession.

But in the darkness of night, Sivajee, with a chosen band of Mawulees,

* The Seedees, in general, have in the present day a high character among the Mahrattas for fidelity to their promise.

descended the hill, passed the unsuspecting guards, and was on full march towards Rangna before his flight was suspected. When discovered, Fazil Mohummud Khan, and Seedee Uzeez, the son of Seedee Johur, pursued him with the cavalry, followed by infantry. They did not overtake him till the morning was far advanced, and he was entering a ghaut within six miles of Rangna. To cover his retreat, Sivajee stationed a party of Mawulees in the pass, and confided the command to his former enemy, Bajee Purvoo, Deshpandya of Hurdus Mawul, desiring him to maintain the post until a signal of five guns announced the arrival of the main body at the fort. The Deshpandya was worthy of the honourable trust: the cavalry, in attempting to advance, were driven back: and on the arrival of the infantry, two successive assaults with fresh troops were gallantly repulsed. About noon a third party of infantry, headed by the son of Afzool Khan, advanced in a most determined manner. Their attack was desperate, and the brave defenders, after the loss of half their numbers, amongst whom was the gallant Deshpandya, were at last obliged to retreat, but not without effecting their object. Bajee Purvoo heard the signal guns before he fell, and died expressing his satisfaction. The Mawulees proved their regard for him, as well as their own steadiness, by bearing off his body in the face of their numerous pursuers.

Fazil Khan advanced and halted at Rangna: but Seedee Johur's plans were completely disconcerted. He hesitated whether to proceed to Rangna or to continue the siege of Panalla. Ali Adil Shah, disappointed in his hopes and impetuous in his disposition, was easily induced to believe that Seedee Johur had been bribed by Sivajee. The king accused him of this, and Seedee Johur, equally disposed to anger, and now in a state of irritation, denied the charge in terms which were construed into disrespect and

Jan. 1661. disloyalty. Ali Adil Shah took the field in person, and marched to Kurar. All the district authorities in the neighbourhood, some of whom had submitted to Sivajee, attended in the royal camp for the purpose of tendering their adherence. Seedee Johur apologized to the king; but dreading the malice of the courtiers, excused himself from coming to camp, and withdrew towards Kurnoul, the place of his government and jagheer.

The king again invested Panalla, of which, as well as of Pawungurh, he obtained possession. The whole of the forts in the neighbourhood taken by Sivajee during the former year, excepting Rangna and Vishalgurh, likewise submitted. The setting in of the monsoon induced the king to withdraw from the neighbourhood of the Syhadree range, and encamp at Chimulgay, on the banks of the Kistna.

Sivajee in the meantime, although he made no attempt to oppose the king's army, did not remain inactive. In the beginning of the year he again appeared before Rajapoor, which he took and plundered. On this occasion the English sustained some loss, and several of their factors were seized and confined in a hill fort for two years, on an accusation, never substantiated, of having assisted Seedee Johur with mortars and shells at the siege of Panalla.* On the reduction of Rajapoor, Sivajee attacked the possessions of the Mahratta polygar Dulwey. Sringarpoor, his capital, was surprised and taken; but Dulwey continued to resist, until he was

* Mahratta MSS., Beejapoor MSS., and English Records. The unfortunate Englishmen were not finally released without paying a ransom. There appears to have been some reason for Sivajee's suspicion, though the fact was never fully ascertained.

killed in an action where Sivajee in person commanded against him. Neither this conquest nor that of Jowlee were viewed throughout the country with the same favour as his successes against the Mahomedans ; and although the present advantage was not acquired by any atrocious deed, such as disgraced several of Sivajee's successes, yet some of the most respectable Hindoos of Sringerpoor preferred emigrating to the territory of the Seedee, to residing under the government of the conqueror. It required all Sivajee's address to persuade them to return, and he only effected it by gaining over a family named Soorway, the members of which had been principal managers under Dulwey. Sivajee, to obliterate this odium, and to make amends for his past conduct, assumed a greater regard for the forms enjoined by the Hindoo faith, to which he was probably induced as much from superstition as from policy. Precluded, by the situation of the celebrated temple of Dewee Bhowanee at Tooljapoor, from paying his devotions there, he this year, during the rains, dedicated a temple to that deity with great solemnity in the fort of Pertabgurh. His religious observances from this period became exceedingly rigid ; he chose the celebrated Ramdass Swamy as his Mahapooroosh, or spiritual guide, and aspired to a high character for sanctity.

But the devotions in which he was engaged did not impede the activity of his troops. During the rains his whole strength was directed against Futih Khan ; and although his operations were much obstructed by the weather, he drove back the troops of the Seedee, and had captured Dhunda Rajepoor before the season was sufficiently open to enable the Beejapoor government, or the Deshmookhs of Waree, to relieve the place. He opened batteries against Jinjeera ; but a want of guns, and of men who could use them with effect, prevented his making any impression on the works ; and he was soon called away to oppose an expected attack from Beejapoor.*

During Ali Adil Shah's stay at Chimulgay, he sent several persons to Seedee Johur, assuring him of a favourable reception. He was at last prevailed upon to pay his respects at the royal camp, where he was received with every mark of civility and distinction ; but as Ali Adil Shah was much under the influence of Ibrahim Khan, his personal enemy, Seedee Johur doubted the king's sincerity, and embraced the earliest opportunity of returning to his jagheer. There were at this time several petty rebellions in the northern part of the Carnatic, and as the king's first intention was to prosecute the war against Sivajee, Seedee Johur was commissioned to suppress them ; but as he showed no readiness to comply, it was supposed he secretly aided the insurgents, and that he was even connected with Sivajee.

In consequence of this state of affairs, the king's advisers were divided in opinion whether to direct their principal efforts to the prosecution of the war against Sivajee, or to re-establish order in the Carnatic. During their indecision the Deshmookhs of Waree sent proposals for reducing Sivajee, provided they were properly supported. It was therefore determined that the king should march into the Carnatic, whilst Bahlol Khan and Bajee Ghorepuray of Moodhole were directed to prepare an army to co-operate with the Sawunts against Sivajee. The king marched, and the troops destined for the latter service were assembling, when Bajee Ghorepuray, for some purpose of preparation, proceeded to his jagheer. Sivajee, who had early intelligence of all that took place, and who had returned

* Mahratta MSS.

to Vishalgurh, no sooner heard of Ghorepuray's being at Mall Moodhole, entirely off his guard, than he chose this moment for anticipating the attack, and avenging his father's wrongs. He made a rapid march across the country, surprised and killed Ghorepuray with most of his relations and followers, plundered Moodhole, left it in flames, and returned to Vishalgurh with the greatest expedition.

Khowsaus Khan was appointed to re-place Ghorepuray as second-in-command to Bahlole Khan; and the army had advanced as far as the passes into the Concan, when they were recalled to reinforce the army in the Carnatic.

The king found it necessary to reduce Raichore and Toorgul; both

A. D. 1662. places made an obstinate resistance, and Ali Adil Shah evinced great personal bravery in the attacks.

Seedee Johur at first did not act decidedly as a rebel; but as he foresaw the danger of putting himself again in the power of a sovereign who suspected him, he at last determined openly to oppose the king. He chose an opportunity of attacking the troops of Joojhar Rao Ghatgay and the Naik of Phultun, when they were separated from the rest of the king's camp by the Toongbuddra river. They were at first thrown into confusion, and fell back on the camp in great disorder, but on being reinforced by Bahlole Khan, and on recovering from their panic, they retrieved their discomfiture by following up and routing the troops that had attacked them. Seedee Johur maintained the war a very short time, owing to the treachery of his followers, by whom he was put to death in order to secure their own pardon. The king extended forgiveness to his son; and some time after, by the advice of his minister Abdool Mohummud, who succeeded Ibrahim Khan,* Seedee Uzeez was received into favour. But the suppression of this rebellion did not re-establish order; the refractory were numerous, and the war was long protracted. After two whole years spent in different parts of the Carnatic, the campaign was ended by enforcing tribute from the Soonda Raja; and Ali Adil Shah returned to Beejapoor, having only partially accomplished his object.†

The employment of the whole force in the Carnatic proved in many respects of the utmost consequence to Sivajee. He had, on the whole, lost considerably by the campaign of the former season; but he soon recovered more than an equivalent. As soon as Bahlole Khan and Khowsaus Khan were recalled, Sivajee attacked the Deshmookhs of Waree, who, thus imprudently left to their fate, scarcely offered resistance: their territory was speedily occupied, and the Sawunts, accompanied by Ram Dulwey, a near relation of the late polygar of Sringarpoor, fled to Goa for protection, where they were at first received; but the Portuguese, very different from those of their nation, who so greatly distinguished themselves a century before, were intimidated by the threats of Sivajee, and forced the fugitives to quit the place.

The Sawunts, abandoned by their government, and driven from Goa, threw themselves on the clemency of Sivajee, by whom their deshmookhee rights were restored, and they afterwards became faithful servants. Ram Dulwey likewise joined Sivajee; and although his relations were sometimes troublesome, Sivajee might reckon the resources of the southern part of the Concan, and the services of some good infantry and officers, at his disposal.

* Ibrahim Khan accompanied the king's mother to Mecca—the usual resort of displaced Mahomedan ministers, as Benares is of Bramins under similar circumstances.

† Beejapoor MSS. The campaign of Ali Adil Shah in the Carnatic is celebrated by Nusserut in his *Ali Namu*, already mentioned.

Sivajee, however, kept his own garrisons in the territory of the Sawunts,* and drew their infantry to distant quarters. He likewise built Rairee and Sindeedroog, or Malwan, and having seen the advantage which the Seede derived from his fleet, he used great exertions to fit out a marine. He rebuilt or strengthened Kolabah, repaired Severndroog and Viziadroog,† and prepared vessels at all these places. His principal depôt was the harbour of Kolabah, 20 miles south of Bombay. He gave the command of his fleet to two persons, named Dureea Sagur and Mynak Bundaree, and soon began to commit acts of piracy. The Portuguese, in order to prevent the ravages of the Mahratta fleet, sent an ambassador to Sivajee, who readily promised to refrain from molesting them, on condition of being supplied with some guns and warlike stores, to which they consented; and the demand, as might have been expected, was very frequently renewed.‡

After the Sawunts were reduced, the minister of Ali Adil Shah, Abdool Mohommud, entered into a secret compact with Sivajee.§ The particulars of this agreement, or the means by which it was brought about, are totally unknown; but it is not improbable that it may have been effected through the intervention of Shahjee. It is certain that about this period, Shahjee, who had been delighted with the exploit of his son against the treacherous Ghorepuray, came from the Carnatic, accompanied by his other son, Venkajee, and visited Sivajee, with the consent and approbation of his own government. Sivajee treated his father with the greatest distinction, and, on hearing of his approach, according to Mahratta notions of profound respect, went several miles to meet him, dismounted from his horse, and saluted him with the obeisance due by a servant to his sovereign; insisted on walking by the side of his father's palanquin, and would not sit in his presence until repeatedly commanded. After some weeks spent in conviviality, and visiting various parts of Sivajee's territory, Shahjee, highly gratified, returned to Beejapoor, the bearer of presents from Sivajee to the king;‡ and, what strengthens the supposition of Shahjee's having been the mediator, hostilities from that time were suspended between Sivajee and Beejapoor during the life of Shahjee; nor, when they were renewed, was Sivajee the aggressor.

It is an opinion of some of the Mahrattas that it was by Shahjee's advice that Sivajee changed his principal residence from Rajgurh to Rairee. It is certain that he at this time changed the name of the latter to Raigurh; and Abajee Sonedeo was instructed to commence erecting a complete set of public buildings within the fort, with accommodation for the different officers and departments of his immediate government—a work which was not completed for several years: considerable labour was also, for some time, used in strengthening the natural defences of the mountain, for the purpose of rendering it impregnable.

Sivajee now possessed the whole of the continent of the Concan, from Kallian to Goa, a length of coast about four degrees of latitude; and the Concan-Ghaut-Mahta, from the Beema to the Warna, a distance of about 160 English miles. His territory at its greatest breadth, or between Sopa and Jinjeera, did not exceed 100 English miles. He had an army proportionally much larger than the size of his territory: but when we consider the predatory means he took for supporting it, the number, when stated at 50,000 foot and 7,000 horse, is probably not exaggerated. His power was formidable, and the truce with Beejapoor gave him an opportunity of directing it against the Moghuls.

* The territory generally is now called Sawunt-Waree.

† Or Gheriah.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ Beejapoor MSS.

CHAP. VI.

FROM A. D. 1662 TO A. D. 1667.

Sivajee attacks the Moghul possessions.—Shaisteh Khan is sent against him, —occupies Poona, besieges and takes Chakun.—Raja Jeswunt Sing, of Joudpoor, sent to reinforce Shaisteh Khan.—Netajee Palkur is surprised and wounded, but escapes.—Sivajee performs an adventurous exploit.—Shaisteh Khan is recalled.—Sultan Mauzum is appointed to the Deccan, with Jeswunt Sing as second-in-command.—Sivajee plunders Surat.—Death of Shahjee.—Sivajee assumes the title of raja, and strikes coins in his own name,—his fleet makes prize of some Moghul ships bound to the Red Sea, and plunders the pilgrims proceeding to Mecca ; —plunders Ahmednugur ; —makes a descent on the coast, and plunders Barcelore.—Raja Jey Sing and Dilere Khan come against him unexpectedly.—Aurangzebe's views and policy in regard to the Deccan.—Progress of Jey Sing.—Sivajee in alarm and perplexity.—Siege and defence of Poorundhur.—Sivajee's submission.—Remarkable convention of Poorundhur.—War with Beejapoor.—Sivajee and Venkajee opposed to each other.—Sivajee repairs to Delhi,—is placed in confinement by Aurungzebe,—effects his escape, and returns to the Deccan.—Jey Sing's progress,—is obliged to raise the siege of Beejapoor, and retreat,—is superseded by Sultan Mauzum, and dies on his return towards Delhi.

SINCE the departure of Aurungzebe, Sivajee had been so much occupied in the war with Beejapoor, that he was not only unable to take advantage of the events passing in Hindoostan, but in May 1661, when the Moghuls possessed themselves of Kallian Bheemree, Sivajee was not in a condition to resent the aggression. He now, however, prepared a large force—the infantry under Moro Punt, and the horse headed by Netajee Palkur. The former during the rains possessed himself of several strongholds north of Joonere, but there is no satisfactory account of the particulars. Netajee Palkur, as soon as the state of the roads permitted, ravaged the Moghul districts without mercy ; he was ordered to plunder the villages and levy contributions from the towns ; but he even exceeded these orders, swept the country to the environs of Aurangabad, spread terror in all directions, and by moving rapidly from one direction to another, returned safe and unopposed to Poona.

Shaisteh Khan,* who with the title of Umeer-ool-Oomrah had been appointed to succeed the prince Sultan Mauzum, as viceroy of the Deccan, was ordered by the emperor to punish this daring incursion, to carry the war into Sivajee's territory, and to reduce his forts.

* Maternal uncle of Aurungzebe, and nephew of the celebrated Noor Mhal, whose name is probably more generally known at present from Mr. Moore's *Lalla Rookh* than from the history of India. The fact of our being indebted to Noor Jehan's mother for the discovery of utter of roses, is gravely recorded by the historian Khafee Khan.

Shaisteh Khan accordingly marched from Aurungabad with a great force, and pursuing the high road by Ahmednugur and Pairgaom, turned from the latter place westward towards Poona. On his route he sent a detachment to take possession of Sopra, and pitched on Jadow Rao, Deshmookh of Sindkheir, Sivajee's relation, to occupy the districts.* Sivajee, on the approach of the Moghul army, left Bājgurh, and made Singurh his principal residence. Shaisteh Khan took Poona, and sent out strong detachments to occupy the Katruje Ghaut and the village of Sewapoor. Parties were also detached to reconnoitre the forts; and as Chakun lay between him and Joonere, which was inconvenient, and as he expected that so small a place would surrender on the first summons, he moved against it with the main body of his army; but Phirungajee Nursalla, who had remained in command of Chakun since the year 1646, refused to surrender, and made an excellent defence. Chakun held out against the Moghul army for nearly two months. At last, on the fifty-sixth day of the siege, a mine having been sprung under the north-east bastion, a very large practicable breach was made, and many of the garrison were killed by the explosion. The Moghuls being prepared for the assault, rushed forward, but were met by the remains of the garrison, headed by their gallant havildar, in the breach, which was so well defended that the assailants could make no impression. The besieged maintained their post till night-fall, when the attack ceased, and in the morning Phirungajee Nursalla capitulated. Shaisteh Khan, in admiration of his conduct, treated him with great respect, and made him considerable offers if he would enter the imperial service, but Nursalla did not disgrace the fame he had acquired by accepting them; Shaisteh Khan dismissed him with honour, and he rejoined Sivajee, by whom he was commended and rewarded.

The Moghuls, by their own account, lost 900 in killed and wounded before Chakun, which, considering the length and obstinate nature of the defence, does not appear a great number; but Shaisteh Khan became

A. D. 1663. impressed with an idea of the insurmountable difficulty of reducing the hill forts Aurungzebe, on the contrary, considered their reduction a matter of easy accomplishment; and long after this period continued to entertain the greatest contempt for the Mahrattas as enemies. Raja Jeswunt Sing, the Rajpoot prince of Joudpoor, was however ordered to join the Khan with a large reinforcement. The fair season was far advanced before his arrival, and the whole army lay inactive in the neighbourhood of Poona, whilst Netajee Palkur again appeared about Ahmednugur and Aurungabad, burning and plundering the districts.†

A party was immediately detached to intercept him, and on this occasion succeeded in surprising and killing several of his men. They afterwards continued the pursuit; Netajee was himself wounded, and it was supposed he would have been taken, had not the Beejapoor general, Roostum Zuman, favoured his escape.‡

Shaisteh Khan, in the mean time, had taken up his abode in the town of Poona, and had fixed his residence in the house built by Dadajee Konedoo.§ From Sivajee's being in the neighbourhood, of whose character for stratagem he was well aware, the Khan took many of those precautions which frequently invite what they are intended to prevent. No armed

* Khafee Khan.

† Mahratta MSS. and English Records.

‡ Mahratta MSS., Khafee Khan.

§ Mahratta MSS.

Mahratta was permitted to enter Poona without a passport, and no Mahratta horsemen were entertained excepting under such chiefs* of their own as held their lands from the emperor.

Sivajee, watchful of all that passed, resolved to surprise the Khan, and sent two Bramins to make such arrangements as were necessary to gain admission. When his preparations were complete, Sivajee left Singurh one evening in the month of April,† a little after sunset, at the head of a considerable body of infantry, whom he posted in small parties along the road, but Yessjee Kunk, Tannajee Moloosray, and 25 Mawulees were all that entered.‡ His emissaries§ had gained a Mahratta foot-soldier in the Khan's service, who, on pretence of celebrating a marriage, obtained permission to beat through the town with the noisy instruments used on such occasions, and also for some of his companions, who always carry their arms, to join in the procession. Poona being an open town, Sivajee with his party, favoured by the contrivance of his emissaries, easily slipped undiscovers into the crowd, and joined in the moving assemblage.

When all was quiet, Sivajee and his companions, familiar with every avenue and every accessible part of the Khan's residence, proceeded with a few pick-axes to the cook-room, above which there was a window slightly built up. Through this place they soon made themselves a passage, but not without alarming some of the women of the Khan's family, who immediately ran and awoke their master. Shaisteh Khan was hurrying out, and in the act of lowering himself from a window, when he received a blow on the hand which cut off one of his fingers. He was fortunate in escaping without further injury, as his son Abdool Futih Khan and most of the guard at his house were killed.

Sivajee and his men retired before it was possible to intercept them, and gradually collected their parties on their route to Singurh. When they got to the distance of three or four miles, they lighted torches, previously prepared, to occasion deception as to their numbers, and to express their defiance and derision. In this manner they ascended to the fort in view of the Moghul camp, from which they might be distinctly seen.

No action of Sivajee's is now talked of with greater exultation among his countrymen than this exploit; to complete the triumph, a body of Moghuls came galloping towards Singurh next morning, and were permitted to approach close to the fort, which they did in a vaunting manner, beating their kettle-drums and brandishing their swords, when the guns opening upon them, they retired in the greatest confusion. Kurtojee Goozur, who commanded a party of Sivajee's horse, left in the neighbourhood by Netajee Palkur, took this opportunity of falling upon them, which he did so unexpectedly as to complete their flight and disgrace † This is the first time we find the Moghul cavalry pursued by the Mahrattas. Kartoojee Goozur, encouraged by his success, cut off several small parties, and obliged the Moghuls to strengthen their outposts.

Trifling reverses contributed to dishearten Shaisteh Khan in his present state of grief and mortification. Instead of acting with the spirit that became an officer, he accused Jeswunt Sing of neglect, complained of the

* Khafee Khan.

† Mahratta MSS., and letter from the English factors, then prisoners at large in Rajapoor, dated 12th April 1662.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ The means his emissaries took to obtain him admission is omitted in the Mahratta MSS., but Khafee Khan's account bears every mark of probability. It is also confirmed by Catrou.

state of his army, and wrote to the emperor stating suspicions of Jeswunt Sing's having been bribed by Sivajee. Aurungzebe was preparing for a journey to Kashmeer when news of the Khan's disaster, and the want of union between him and Jeswunt Sing, reached Delhi. He at first recalled both the principal officers, and appointed Sultan Mauzum viceroy of the Deccan ; but he afterwards conferred the government of Bengal on Shaiسته Khan, and directed Jeswunt Sing to remain as second-in-command under the prince.

Jeswunt Sing made a feeble attempt to invest Singurh, but he did not prosecute the siege. Strong detachments were left at Chakun^o and Joonere, whilst the main body of the army retired to Aurungabad.

Sivajee, who always spread false reports of his intentions, assembled an army in the neighbourhood of Kallian, and another near Dhunda Rajepoor, and gave out that he meant to attack the Portuguese at Bassein and Choule, or make a grand effort to reduce the Seedee. But his real design was on Surat, at that time one of the richest cities in India, and Byherjee Naik, a famous spy in his service, was already on the spot making such preparatory observations as were necessary. On pretence of paying his respects at a temple near Nassuck, and of visiting the forts lately taken by Moro Trimmul, Sivajee proceeded to the northward ; but when supposed to be engaged in devotions, he made a rapid march with 4,000 horse towards Surat, which he surprised, and having systematically plundered it for six days of great riches,

he leisurely conveyed his booty unmolested to Raigurh, which, being now completed, became the future seat of his government. The plunder of Surat was great, and it would have been more considerable had the English and Dutch factories fallen into his power, but they stood on the defensive, and the English in particular behaved so manfully, that they not only saved their own property, but a part of that of the citizens : Sir George Oxenden was then chief or governor at Surat.†

On Sivajee's return he heard of the death of his father, which happened by an accidental fall from his horse, when hunting,‡ in January 1664, at the village of Buswuputtum, on the banks of the Toongbuddra, near Bednore, where he had joined the Beejapoor army to assist in reducing some refractory zumeendars.

Shahjee possessed at his death, not only the districts originally conferred upon him in jagheer by the Beejapoor government, but the fort of

* It was about this time, when the army had retired, that Sivajee, having gone to hear a Kutha by Tookaram, in the town of Poona, narrowly escaped being made prisoner by the garrison of Chakun. The Mahratta MSS. particularly mention the miraculous interference of the god Pandoorang, by whom he was saved.

† The sack of Surat on this occasion is most minutely described in the Records of the English factory, now in the East India House. In consequence of their generous defence of the property of others, Aurungzebe granted to the English a perpetual exemption from a portion of the customs exacted from the traders of other nations at Surat. During the time the Mahrattas were plundering the town, Sivajee remained outside. A person named Smith, an Englishman, was taken prisoner and carried before Sivajee, whom he represented as seated in a tent, ordering heads and hands to be chopped off, in cases where persons were supposed to be concealing their wealth.

The walls of Surat, up to this period, were of mud. They were now ordered to be built of brick. Thevenot, who was at Surat in the early part of 1666, mentions that they were then in progress.

‡ Some Mahrattas, very old men, join in all sorts of hunting ; the present Jan Rao Naik Nimbalkur must be nearly as old as Shahjee was, and is still a keen sportsman.

Arnee, Porto Novo,* and the territory of Tanjore.† He continued in obedience to Ali Adil Shah, who seems to have allowed him to retain his new acquisitions unquestioned.

Some days were spent by Sivajee in the observance of the usual obsequies, which he performed at Singurh, where he remained for some time, and afterwards came to Raigurh. He spent some months revising and arranging the departments and affairs of his government, assisted by his principal officers; and on this occasion, first assumed the title of raja, and struck coins in his own name.

Netajee Palkur regularly returned at the commencement of the rains, and was almost invariably successful. Sivajee's fleet had also succeeded in making considerable captures. Amongst others, they took some Moghul ships bound to Mocha, and exacted ransoms from all the rich pilgrims proceeding to the shrine of their prophet. In the month of August, Sivajee in person surprised and plundered the Pettah of Ahmednugur, and carried his depredations to the vicinity of Aurungabad. During his absence the Beejapoor army, stationed at Panalla under the command of two generals, broke the truce, made a vigorous effort for the recovery of the Concan, and had retaken several places, when Sivajee, who, as the English records of the period observe, seemed to be everywhere

and prepared for every emergency, appeared in the field October. at the head of a large force, with which he gave them

battle, and defeated them with great slaughter.‡ Vingorla, the inhabitants of which seem to have risen on his garrison, Sivajee burnt to the ground, and hastened back to Singurh to watch the motions of the Moghuls, from whom he apprehended an attack, as they had sent a strong

reinforcement to a camp formed at Joonere. But having A. D. 1665. discovered that they did not intend to act on the offensive, he sent off a part of his horse to plunder in the Beejapoor territory, south of the Kistna, and immediately devised a new enterprize. Preparatory to its execution he caused it to be believed that he had a design of

surprising the Moghul camp. Whilst this report was February. current, he secretly drew together a large fleet,§ suddenly set off for the coast, embarked from Malwan, made a descent on the rich town of Barcelore, about 130 miles below Goa, and sailed back as far as Gocurn with 4,000 men, before it was fully ascertained that he had quitted his capital. There, having dismissed the greater part of his fleet, he paid his devotions at a temple in the neighbourhood, and afterwards, having divided his troops into parties, scoured the whole country, and acquired immense booty from several of the rich mercantile towns in that neighbourhood; Carwar stood on the defensive, and Sivajee had only time

* The English Records mention the capture of Porto Novo by Shahjee in July 1661.

† All the Mahratta MSS. state the conquest to have been made by Shahjee. No Mahrattas or Bramins, conversant with their own history, seem to think otherwise; the doubt seems to have arisen in the neighbourhood of Tanjore, and it was natural to have done so, owing to the apprehension which the Tanjore raja must have entertained of being called to account for half his revenue; proofs, however, of what is stated will ultimately appear.

‡ The English factors at Carwar and Rajapoor mention that 6,000 of the Beejapoor troops were killed.

§ According to a letter from the Carwar factory, this fleet consisted of 85 frigates and 3 great ships. By the frigates are probably meant the small vessels with one mast, from 30 to 150 tons burthen, common on the Malabar coast; and by the great ships, three-masted vessels.

to exact a contribution ;* after which, having despatched his troops by land, he hastily re-embarked on his return to Raigurh.†

On this voyage Sivajee was detained longer than he expected, a strong gale drove him down the coast, and the north-west winds prevented his return for many days. This delay was one of several circumstances by which his tutelary goddess is said to have shown her displeasure at this expedition,—the only naval enterprize on which he in person embarked.

But a more serious cause of uneasiness than the inconveniences of adverse winds and sea-sickness awaited the return of Sivajee ; which was no less than the approach of a very formidable army under two officers of note—Mirza Raja Jey Sing, a Rajpoot prince, and Dilere Khan, an Afghan.

On first view it appears extraordinary that Aurungzebe, after what had occurred, did not prosecute the war against Sivajee with greater vigour ; but his own insecurity, the apprehensions of a usurper, especially during his father's life-time, and the natural distrust of a jealous disposition, sufficiently account for the delay, independent of discussions with the court of Persia, his ultimate views of subjugating the whole Deccan at once, and the contempt he entertained for "the mountain rat," as it is said‡ he affected to style Sivajee.

The assumption of the title of raja, the privilege of coining, the numerous aggressions committed, or even the plunder of Surat, did not call forth the resentment of Aurungzebe so forcibly as robbing the holy pilgrims proceeding to Mecca ; and the religious zeal which he professed demanded an exertion of his power to punish the author of outrages as sacrilegious to his faith as insulting to his empire.

Mirza Raja Jey Sing and Dilere Khan had both, in the first instance, declared for the cause of Dara, but were subsequently won over by Aurungzebe, to whom they performed essential services. The emperor never placed entire confidence in Jey Sing, and he was suspicious of Dilere Khan owing to his former conduct, to the bold daring character of the man, and to his great influence with his countrymen, of whom there were a great number in the imperial service. On the distant employment to which they were about to proceed, among a people and in a country familiar to Aurungzebe, but where they were strangers, their services and that of their adherents could be safely used in reducing Sivajee, and exacting arrears of tribute from Beejapoor. As that government became more and more indigent, this demand was always an excuse for hostilities. In the present instance it afforded convenient occupation for two men whom Aurungzebe doubted, and weakened a kingdom intended to be annexed to the empire. Aurungzebe, although he must have been aware that Jey Sing's means were inadequate, gave him a commission to conquer Beejapoor after Sivajee should be subdued. He had not sufficient confidence in any one to trust him with a sufficient force, and his policy, from the time he became emperor, seems to have been to shake the Deccan states so effectually that he could overturn them when it suited his purpose.

When this army marched, Ram Sing, the son of Raja Jey Sing, was directed to reside at the emperor's court, on pretence of doing his father

* The English factory paid 112*l.* sterling of this contribution.

† *Mahratta MSS.*, and *English Records*. The former mention that Sivajee on this expedition acquired vast plunder at Hussnoor, the latter say at Barcelore. The *Mahrattas* say that Hussnoor (with the situation of which I am unacquainted) is a town in Bardez, in the Goa territory.

‡ Fryer.

honour, but in reality as a hostage for his conduct. It was so contrived that Jey Sing's approach was not known to Sivajee when he embarked on his maritime expedition. The force crossed the Nerbuddah about the month of February. Jeswunt Sing and Sultan Mauzurh were recalled, but Jey Sing took an opportunity of paying his respects to the prince at Aurungabad, and then marched on to Poona. He arrived there early in April, and no time was lost in commencing operations. He invested Poorundhur; and leaving Dilere Khan to prosecute the siege, he himself blockaded Singurh, and pushed on his advanced parties as far as Rajgurh.

Sivajee had just returned from the coast on Jey Sing's arrival, and hastened to Raigurh, where he for the first time called a consultation of all his principal people. Netajee Palkur, though it was a part of his duty to watch the motions of the enemy, was at a great distance with the main body of the cavalry, and Sivajee, although he probably then found it impolitic to displace him, never forgave the neglect.* Kartoojee Goozur had further opportunities of proving his activity; but it was rather in eluding pursuit than in any particular success; he however cut off several parties of foragers, and brought in constant intelligence.

The great reputation of Raja Jey Sing,† the strength of his army, and the unexpected vigour of his attack, combined to create an unusual alarm and perplexity in Sivajee, which were perceptible in the consultations at Raigurh, and spread themselves amongst his chief officers. This indecision, according to the opinion of his countrymen anxious to deify him, was in consequence of a communication from the goddess Bhowanee, by whom Sivajee was warned in a dream that he could not prevail against this Hindoo prince; and as Sivajee was not, as far as can be ascertained, materially reduced in any way, it is probable that superstition was one of the principal causes which influenced his conduct at this crisis.

But the irresolution of the council at Raigurh did not affect the spirit of the garrison at Poorundhur. Bajee Purvoe,‡ a deshbandya of Mhar, was havildar of the fort, which was strongly garrisoned by Mawulees and Hetkurees. The deshbandya maintained his post with bravery and ability. He disputed every point of the approaches, but his outposts being driven in, Dilere Khan commenced mining a rock under one of the towers of the lower fort. The garrison made frequent sallies, and repeatedly drove off the miners, but they were at last firmly lodged under cover. After repeated failures they succeeded in shattering the rock and defences, so as to enable them to attempt an assault.§ They had gained the lower fort, but whilst the garrison was retiring to the upper, the assailants, careless or insensible of the danger to which they exposed themselves, dispersed to plunder the houses; when the Hetkuree marksmen, from above, opened a fire so destructive, that many of the assailants

* Catrou, from Manouchi's MS., says Netajee was bribed by Jey Sing, which, although not mentioned in the Mahratta MSS., is more than probable.

† He was styled, from the name of his capital, raja of Ambhere, now better known by that of Jeypoor or Jeynuggur. He was probably grandfather to the celebrated astronomer Jey Sing, who succeeded to the principality in 1693.

‡ He was no relation of the gallant Purvoe of the same name who covered Sivajee's retreat from Panalla.

§ The highest point of the mountain of Poorundhur is upwards of 1,700 feet from the plain immediately below; there are two forts, an upper and lower, situated from 300 to 400 feet below the summit; the works, like most of the hill forts in that part of the country, are of perpendicular rock, and frequently weakened, rather than strengthened, by curtains and bastions of masonry, by which the natural defences are generally surmounted.

sought shelter in every corner, and others ran outside to get under cover of the rock. At this moment the Mawulees, headed by their commander, sallied out, attacked the Moghuls sword in hand, killed all that opposed them, and drove them down the hill in view of Dilere Khan, who was seated on his elephant near the bottom, observing the progress of the assault. Seeing the flight of his men, he bent his bow, called to a body of Patans about him to advance, and, rallying the fugitives, pushed forward his elephant; but the garrison, like all Mahrattas daring in success, closed with his men, and even the hardy Afghans began to recoil from the swords of the Mawulees, when Dilere Khan, having marked the conspicuous conduct of their leader, with his own hand pierced him with an arrow and killed him on the spot. The whole of the garrison accompanying him instantly fled, nor stopped until they reached the upper fort. The Moghuls again took possession of the lower fort, but the fire from above obliged them to relinquish it. After this failure Dilere Khan, considering the northern face impregnable, determined on attempting to escalate Wujrgurh,* a small detached fort, situated on the north-east angle of Poorundhur, which commands a great part of its works. The attempt succeeded, and guns were brought up to breach the upper fort, but the rains had set in, and greatly retarded operations. The Moghul artillery was extremely bad, and, although they continued firing for weeks, little impression was made on the defences. The garrison, however, became dispirited, and sent notice that they could hold out no longer. They would have evacuated the fort, but Sivajee particularly desired them to maintain the defence until he should send them an intimation to retire.

Sivajee from the first had commenced negotiating and sending messages to Jey Sing, from whom he received assurances of favour: but the latter, who understood the character of his adversary, did not relax in his efforts or preparations, and Sivajee now seriously reverted to his early plan of entering the Moghul service, and relinquishing a part of his acquisitions.

With this view he sent Rugonath Punt, Nya Shastree, to Jey Sing, who listened, answered, and agreed to some of Sivajee's proposals; but he put no trust in his sincerity, until the Bramin (Rugonath Punt) convinced him that Sivajee did not intend deception. Jey Sing then desired him to assure Sivajee, on the honour of a Rajpoot, that he might rely, not only on pardon, but on favour and protection from the emperor. Whilst this negotiation was pending, Sivajee moved from Raigurh to Pertabgurh, and afterwards to Jowlee; for what purpose is unknown, but probably in order to conceal his real design from his own troops. With a slender retinue,

July. Sivajee, in the month of July, crossed the mountains, and proceeded straight to Jey Sing's camp, where he announced himself as Sivajee Raja. Jey Sing sent a person to conduct him to his presence, and, on his approach, advanced from his tent, met, and embraced him. He seated him on his right hand, treated him with great respect and kindness, and repeated the assurances sent by Rugonath Punt. After some conversation in the humblest strain on the part of Sivajee, he was permitted to retire to tents adjoining those of Jey Sing. Next day Sivajee went to visit Dilere Khan, who was still before Poorundhur, and now exceedingly mortified at his not being made privy to the negotiation. He threatened to persevere in reducing Poorundhur, and putting every man to the sword; this, however, was but a threat, and he was soothed and gratified by Sivajee's presenting the keys of the gate with his own hand, and telling

* Or Rooder Mahal, according to the Mahrattas.

him that all his forts and country were his, that he merely sought pardon, that experience had convinced him of the folly of resisting such soldiers as Aurungzebe could boast of, and that he now only hoped to be enrolled among the servants of the empire.

An armistice immediately took place as soon as Sivajee came into camp, and, after several conferences, the following were the terms of agreement entered into, subject to the approval of the emperor, but the whole under the guarantee of Jey Sing, without which Sivajee would not have trusted his person in a Moghul army. As a preliminary article, Sivajee relinquished whatever forts or territory he had taken from the Moghuls. Of 32 forts taken or built by him, in the territory which had belonged to the Nizam Shahee government, he gave up 20 to Jey Sing, amongst which were Poorundhur and Singurh. The whole of the districts dependent on those forts were ceded at the same time.

The territory belonging to the remaining 12 forts,* estimated at one lakh of pagodas of annual revenue, and all the rest of his acquisitions were to form his jagheer, dependent on the emperor. His son Sumbhajee, then in his eighth year, was to receive a munsob of 5,000 horse; but, the most remarkable part of this agreement was Sivajee's proposal of being allowed certain assignments on Beejapoor, probably in lieu of his pretended hereditary claims in the Nizam Shahee territory, and as some recompense for what he had ceded to the emperor.

These assignments were estimated at five lakhs of pagodas, being a fourth and a tenth of the revenue, termed by him the *chouth* and *surdeshmookhee*, of certain districts above the Ghauts; the charge of collecting which he took upon himself. So eager was Sivajee to obtain the imperial authority for this arrangement, that he offered, on condition of its being granted, to pay a peshkush of 40 lakhs of pagodas by instalments of three lakhs annually, and to maintain an additional body of troops.†

Aurungzebe, in a long letter to Sivajee, distinctly confirms the substance of what is recorded by the Mahrattas to have taken place at the convention of Poorundhur, enumerates the 12 forts, and promises a munsob of 5,000 horse to Sivajee's son. Aurungzebe's letter does not specify *chouth* and *surdeshmookhee*; indeed, it is probable he did not comprehend their meaning or insidious tendency, but as he also had sinister views in his plan of undermining the government of Beejapoor, he agrees to Sivajee's proposal, on condition of his accompanying Raja Jey Sing with his troops, exerting himself in the conquest of that state, and paying the first instalment of the promised peshkush.‡

According to his agreement, Sivajee, with a body of 2,000 horse and 8,000 infantry,§ co-operated with Jey Sing. The combined army marched about the month of November, and their first operations were directed against Bujajee Naik Nimbalkur, the relation of Sivajee and a jagheerदार of Beejapoor. Phultun was reduced, and the fort of Tattora escalated by Sivajee's Mawulees. All the fortified places were taken possession of in their route.

* The twelve remaining forts were—1, Rajgurh; 2, Torna; *3, Rairee (Raigurh); 4, Linganah; 5, Mhargurh; 6, Ballagurh; 7, Gossala; 8, Eeswaree; 9, Palee; 10, Bhoorup; 11, Koaree; and 12, Oodedroog.

† This proposal on the part of Sivajee was sent to the emperor according to custom in the form of a petition; and, at the suggestion of Jey Sing, Sivajee intimated his intention of visiting the emperor, by stating, in the most courtly strain, his desire to kiss the royal threshold.

‡ Original letter.

§ Khafee Khan.

Ali Adil Shah had prepared his troops, but endeavoured to prevent the invasion by promises of settling the demands of the Moghuls; Jey Sing, however, continued his advance, and met with little opposition until near Mungulwehra, where the Beejapoor horse first made their appearance, and acted with great activity and vigour. Abdool Mohummud, the prime minister, was the chief commander of the Beejapoor troops; the principal officers were Abdool Khureem Bahlole Khan, Khowaus Khan, Seedee Uzeez (son of Seedee Johur), and Venkajee Raja Bhonslay, the half-brother of Sivajee.

The Mahratta horse in the service of Beejapoor fought with uncommon spirit on this service. Venkajee Raja, and Ruttajee Manay, Deshmookh of Muswar, were the most conspicuous.*

On the side of the Moghuls, Sivajee and Netajee Palkur distinguished themselves, particularly on an occasion where they had the rear-guard.† They were also detached against several places of strength, which were reduced by Sivajee's infantry. Aurungzebe, in consequence of these services, wrote Sivajee a letter, extolling his conduct, and sent him an honorary present as a mark of his regard;‡ in a subsequent letter he invited him to court, promised to confer on him great rank and honours, and to permit him to return to the Deccan.§ Intercourse had established mutual confidence between Sivajee and Jey Sing; by the advice and on the assurance of the latter, Sivajee resolved to visit Delhi, and despatched Rugonath Punt for the ostensible purpose of announcing his approach, but principally to gain some intelligence respecting characters and affairs at the imperial court.§ Sivajee ordered all his principal officers to meet him at Raigurh; but whilst they were assembling, he visited the whole of his forts, gave the strictest injunctions to each of the officers in charge, and returned to the meeting at the capital.

He there invested Moro Trimmul Pingley, Abajee Sonedeo, and Annajee Dutto with full authority during his absence, and enjoined all persons to respect and obey their orders as if issued by himself. The territory was now greatly circumscribed; in the Concan it extended from Choule to the neighbourhood of Ponda, and in the Ghaut-Mahta from the Neera river to Rangna.

Sivajee, accompanied by his eldest son, Sumbhajee, set out for Delhi in the beginning of March 1666, attended by 500 choice horse and 1,000 Mawulees. On his arrival in the neighbourhood of Delhi, Ram Sing, the son of Raja Jey Sing, and another officer of inferior rank, were the only persons sent by Aurungzebe to meet him.

This marked slight did not pass unobserved; but Sivajee forbore noticing it till, on being admitted to an audience, and condescending to present a nuzzur,|| the place assigned to him was only amongst those who held the rank of 5,000. He could no longer suppress resentment at this indignity, and he expressed, in the hearing of those near him, who repeated

* Beejapoor MSS., confirmed by grants of land to Ruttajee Manay in consequence. The deeds are in possession of the family at Muswar.

† Khafee Khan.

‡ Original letter.

§ The account of the proceedings for 1665 is partly from Khafee Khan, but principally on the authority of Mahratta MSS.

|| Nuzur signifies a present; an offering made by an inferior to a superior in token of fealty, submission, congratulation, &c. There are a vast number of ceremonies and observances attendant both on the mode of presenting and of receiving nuzurs. Under the name of an offering, it is frequently a heavy exaction, imposed on appointment to office, or succession to rank and property.

his words to the emperor, the indignation he felt at such treatment. In consequence of this language, when the audience was ended, and Sivajee had retired to the dwelling assigned to him, it was intimated that the emperor for the future declined seeing him at court. Sivajee was justly alarmed at this communication, and after some delay, in order to ascertain the real intentions of Aurungzebe, he sent Rugonath Punt with a petition setting forth the reasons which had induced him to visit Delhi, the promises and invitation of the emperor, the services he had rendered, the conditions to which Aurungzebe had subscribed, the readiness of Sivajee to fulfil his part of the agreement, and his assurance of affording every assistance to the imperial troops in reducing the Edil Shahee or Kootub Shahee states. If, however, the emperor did not choose to avail himself of his services, he only asked permission to return to his jagheer, as the air and water of Hindoostan were prejudicial to his own health, as well as to that of the other natives of the Deccan by whom he was accompanied. Aurungzebe's answer was evasive; and he shortly after directed the Kotwal of the city to place a guard over Sivajee's house, to watch his person carefully, and never to allow him to quit his residence without a party responsible for his safe custody. Sivajee remonstrated, and complained particularly of the hardship of detaining his people. Aurungzebe readily granted passports for their return to the Deccan, and now, probably, considered Sivajee completely in his power. But it is the characteristic of cunning to overreach itself, and, in the safe-conduct afforded to his friends, Sivajee exulted in the greater facility it afforded of effecting his own escape. Ram Sing was privy to his design, and, on account of the pledge given by his father, connived at it.* The confinement of Sivajee was not so rigid as to prevent his paying visits. He frequently went to different nobles of the court, sent them presents, and endeavoured to interest them in his favour. In this manner an intimacy sufficient for Sivajee's purpose having taken place, he feigned sickness, sent for physicians, took medicines, and was soon reported very ill. Pretending to have partially recovered, he gave great charities to Bramins and presents to physicians. He made up several long baskets, which were daily sent from his apartments filled with sweetmeats, to the houses of different great men his acquaintances, or to be distributed amongst fugeers at mosques. When the practice had continued for some time, he one evening put Sumbhajee into one basket, got into another himself, and was thus conveyed by his domestics beyond the guards, to an obscure place where he could get out unseen. He proceeded to the suburbs of Delhi, where he had a horse prepared, mounted, with Sumbhajee behind him, and reached Muttra next day, where several of his Bramins, and his faithful friend Tannajee Maloosray, were watching the result of his scheme. Everything was prepared, Sumbhajee was consigned to the care of a Bramin family, natives of Poona Desh, and distantly connected with Moro Trimmul Pingley.† Sumbhajee remained in their charge several months, and was afterwards conveyed by them to the Deccan.

Sivajee's escape was not known until a late hour on the following day, owing to the precaution of making one of his domestics pretend indisposition, and lie down on his bed, so that, before the alarm spread, pursuit was fruitless. His party as well as himself escaped, in the disguise of

* This is distinctly asserted in the Chitnees's MS.

† One MS. by Kistnajee Anund Subhasud says Moro Punt's sister was married to one of the sons.

Gosseens ; they visited several places of religious resort ; but the route by which they returned to the Deccan is not satisfactorily ascertained. Sivajee did not throw off his disguise until his arrival at Raigurh, which he reached in December 1666, after an absence of nine months.*

In the meantime affairs in the Deccan assumed an aspect more favourable to his views than he had anticipated. Jey Sing had laid siege to Beejapoor, but on his advance, and during his operations, he was incessantly harassed by the Deccan horse. His supplies were cut off ; little rain had fallen during the preceding season, and there was much sickness and great scarcity of water in his camp.

The king of Golcondah, encouraged by the slow progress of the Moghuls, sent a detachment under Nek Nam Khan, one of his generals, to the assistance of Beejapoor. Aurungzebe's envoy at the court of Kcotub Shah remonstrated, and threatened in consequence ; but no assistance was sent to Jey Sing, and the latter became sensible that the sacrifice both of his own character, and of the lives of his brave Rajpoots, was, at the least, a matter of indifference to the emperor. Under these circumstances he determined to retreat to Aurungabad. This was not effected without loss, but was not attended with those disastrous consequences which had repeatedly occurred on similar occasions. Jey Sing had not the means of supporting many of the garrisons in the forts surrendered by Sivajee, or captured by his aid. He therefore placed strong garrisons in Logurh, Singurh, and Poorundhur, and also in Maholy and Kurnalla in the Concan.† A few men were left in such of the others as had still a supply of provisions ; and of the remainder he directed the gates to be burned, and such part of the

A. D. 1667. defences to be destroyed as could be hastily thrown down.‡ The opportunity of re-occupying them was not neglected. Moro Punt repaired them, replaced the garrisons, drove out the Moghul parties, and Sivajee's safe arrival in the Concan was announced by the re-capture of a great portion of the province of Kallian. His escape from Delhi was a great mortification to Aurungzebe, although he pretended that he meant to have dismissed him in an honourable manner ; he accused Ram Sing of having assisted in his flight, and forbade him the court. Jey Sing, on pretence of his discomfiture, was superseded in the government of the Deccan by Sultan Mauzum, and Jeswunt Sing was directed to accompany the prince. Jey Sing, on being relieved, was ordered to court, but his death, which happened on the road, deprived Aurungzebe of one of his best officers. It was the bane of that emperor's reign that all those whose services might have best contributed to his prosperity were mistrusted by him. Dilere Khan remained some time in the Deccan, and he was only removed for a short time to Malwa ; he was no favourite with the prince, and he was detested by Jeswunt Sing ; his presence in their neighbourhood, therefore, suited the jealous temper of Aurungzebe.

The emperor pretended an intention of again invading Beejapoor, but the northern part of his dominions required his presence. Pride prevented him from subjecting his son to disgrace, and jealousy would never permit him to entrust an army, sufficiently large for conquest, under any deputy.

* The account of Sivajee's visit and imprisonment, and of his escape from Delhi, is on the authority of Mahratta MSS., Scott's Deccan, and Khafee Khan. His escape was known in the Deccan long before he reached it. The English factors at Carwar, in a letter dated September 29th, 1666, observe—"If it be true that Sivajee hath escaped, Aurungzebe will quickly hear of him to his sorrow."

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ Khafee Khan.

CHAP. VII.

FROM A. D. 1667 TO A. D. 1669.

Sultan Mauzum and Jeswunt Sing—their characters.—Sivajee through them obtains various favours from the emperor.—The reported intention of Sultan Mauzum to rebel against his father doubted.—Peace concluded between Beejapoor and the Moghuls.—The states of Beejapoor and Golcondah agree to pay Sivajee an annual tribute.—Unsuccessful attempts of Sivajee against Goa and Jinjeera.—Rumours respecting Sivajee whilst he is revising and improving his civil and military arrangements—his remarkable institutions—the formation, discipline, and interior economy of his troops—his forts—financial and judicial regulations—chief offices and persons through whom his government was administered.

THE re-appointment of Sultan Mauzum as viceroy of the Deccan, A. D. 1667. accompanied by Jeswunt Sing, was very agreeable to Sivajee; with the latter he had become personally acquainted at Delhi. Jeswunt Sing was generally considered of a respectable character, but known to be tainted, in a high degree, with the vice of avarice, so common to Rajpoots. He was also a staunch Hindoo,* suspected by Aurungzebe, whom he first opposed, and afterwards joined during his rebellion. Sultan Mohummud Mauzum was, in many respects, a prince of an excellent disposition: he was brave, generous, and confiding; but with the defects which some of these qualities, unrestrained, may engender, he was fond of pleasure, lavish, easily persuaded, and much swayed by Jeswunt Sing.

Sivajee did not deceive himself in supposing that gold might effect much with persons of this character; and he accordingly used it with no sparing hand. The ostensible intercourse between Sivajee and Sultan Mauzum commenced by a petition from the former, imploring the prince to intercede for him, assuring him of his sincerity, and of his intention to adhere for the future to the emperor, although his services had been slighted. Representations were, in due form, made to court: and it being at all events then convenient for Aurungzebe to accede to them, Sultan Mauzum obtained for Sivajee the title† of raja, a confirmation of the munsab for Sumbhajee, and a jagheer in Berar.‡ To the charge of this new and distant acquisition, which was given in preference to admitting any claim on Joonere or Ahmednugur, a Bramin, named Raojee Somnath, was despatched with a fit establishment, and with the old Beejapoor title of mokassadar,§ thus applied, for the first time, to a Mahratta collector. Sumbhajee, with a body of horse, was sent to join the prince at Aurungabad; but, owing to his extreme youth, he was permitted to return to his father,|| and Kartojee Goozur, dignified by Siva-

* His well-known letter to Aurungzebe concerning the *jizeea*, or poll-tax, on all persons not professing Mahomedanism, is preserved by the raja of Kolapoor as the production of Sivajee.

† Original letter.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ Mahratta MSS. and paper.

|| Scott's Deccan, and Mahratta MSS.

jee with the title of Pertab Rao, and with the rank of surnobut of the horse,* was left in command of the contingent. The districts of Poona, Chakun, and Sopa were also restored to Sivajee, but the commanding forts of Singurh and Poorundhur were retained.†

There is no way in which we can account for the emperor's acquiescing in all these favours to Sivajee, unless with a view of again alluring him into his power, as is asserted in the Mahratta manuscripts; but there is no evidence of Sultan Mauzum's having been, from the first, privy to that design, or any satisfactory proof of his lending himself to his father in a feigned rebellion, for the triple purpose of entrapping Sivajee, ascertaining the disaffected nobles in the empire, and rendering himself an object of suspicion and distrust to all who would venture their lives in his cause.

Of such refinement in intrigue it is, on first view, very possible to conceive Aurungzebe capable; but further considered, danger, folly, and baseness in the parties are too conspicuous to admit the probability without the clearest proof.

About the middle of this year a treaty was concluded at Agra betwixt Aurungzebe and Ali Adil Shah; the terms on the part of the Beejapoor court were negotiated by Shah Abdool Hoossein Kamana, who gave up, as the price of peace, the fort of Sholapoor, and territory yielding 180,000 pagodas of annual revenue. No other particulars are ascertained; but in consequence, as is supposed, of this treaty, Sivajee, lest the Moghuls should interfere, had an interview with Jeswunt Sing and the prince, in order to purchase their connivance to his designs on Beejapoor and Golcondah.‡ He was about to levy his chouth and surdeshmookhee from the former, when Abdool Mohummud, the prime minister, purchased exemption, by agreeing to pay him an annual sum of three lakhs of rupees.§ This compact, like the others entered into with that minister by Sivajee, was kept secret at Beejapoor,† where the Mahomedans had still pride enough to feel the degrading submission of paying tribute to Hindoos, although a factious nobility and a wasteful court deprived the minister of means to assert the dignity of the kingdom.

Some agreement of a similar nature was entered into by Kootub Shah,|| and the amount stipulated at five lakhs of rupees.

Whilst such was the state of his political relations in the Deccan, Sivajee turned his attention to acquiring complete possession of the Concan. Goa and Jinjeera were his first objects; but a plot he had formed for the surprise of the Portuguese settlement was discovered and frustrated,‡ and his utmost efforts were in vain exerted to possess himself of the impregnable Jinjeera. The Seedee, however, was hard pressed; he solicited assistance from the English at Bombay; and the factors were so little conscious of the importance of their own island, that they suggested to their supreme council at Surat the many advantages of Jinjeera over

* Mahratta MSS. Netajee Palkur, the predecessor of Kartojee Goozur, was, according to Khattee Khan, made prisoner by Jey Sing, and sent to Delhi by the emperor's orders, where he became a Mahomedan, obtained a munsub, and the title of Mohummud Koollee, but afterwards returned to Sivajee. This is not mentioned by the Mahrattas, although it may have been so. Among Mahrattas, he never could have been respected, obeyed, or noticed as a renegade.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ English Records, and Mahratta MSS.

§ Mahratta MSS., and Scott's Deccan.

|| Scott's Deccan.

Bombay as a settlement ;* but their injudicious recommendation appears to have been treated with the neglect it merited.

The years 1668 and 1669 were those of greatest leisure in Sivajee's life.

A. D. 1669. Some of his contemporaries, speculating on future events, supposed, from his apparent inactivity, that he would soon sink into insignificance;† but he employed this interval in revising and completing the internal arrangements of his government ; with which, and his various institutions, we shall now endeavour to make the reader acquainted. They will be found well worthy of attention, not only in themselves, but as a key to elucidate the forms of government afterwards adopted by every Mahratta state. Sivajee's regulations were gradually formed and enlarged, but, after a certain period, underwent no change by the extension of his territory, until he assumed the ensigns of royalty. Even then the alterations directed were rather in matters of form than innovations on established rules. The plans of Mahratta encroachment, which were afterwards pursued so successfully by his nation, may be traced from a very early period ; and nothing is more remarkable in regard to Sivajee than the foresight with which some of his schemes were laid, and the fitness of his arrangements for the genius of his countrymen.

The foundation of his power was his infantry ; his occupation of the forts gave him a hold on the country, and a place of deposit for his plunder. His cavalry, as far as we have proceeded, had not yet spread the terror of the Mahratta name where the existence of such a people was unknown ; but we shall at once state, as briefly as the subject will admit, the rules of formation and discipline for his troops, the interior economy of his infantry and cavalry, the regulations for his forts, his revenue and judicial arrangements, and the chief officers through which his government was administered.

Sivajee's infantry was raised in the Ghaut-Malita and Concan ; those of the former tract were called Mawulees, those of the latter Hetkurees. These men brought their own arms, and were only furnished with ammunition by government. Their dress, though not uniform, was generally a pair of short drawers coming half-way down the thigh, a strong narrow band of considerable length tightly girt about the loins, a turban, and sometimes a cotton frock. Most of them wore a cloth round their waist, which likewise answered the purposes of a shawl.

Their common arms consisted of a sword, shield, and matchlock. Some of the Hetkurees, especially the infantry of Sawunt-Waree, used a species of firelock, the invention of the lock for the flint having been early received from the Portuguese. Every tenth man, instead of fire-arms, carried a bow and arrows, which were useful in night attacks and surprises, when the fire-arms were kept in reserve or prohibited. The Hetkurees excelled as marksmen ; but they could seldom be brought to desperate attacks, sword in hand, for which the Mawulees of Sivajee became celebrated. Both of them possessed an extraordinary facility of climbing, and could mount a precipice or scale a rock with ease, where men of other countries must have run great risk of being dashed to pieces.

Every 10 men had an officer called a *naik*, and every 50 a *havildar*. The officer over 100 was termed *joomladar*, and the commander of 1,000 was styled *ek-hazaree*. There were also officers of 5,000, between whom

* English Records. Letter from the factors at Bombay.

† Correspondence of the English factories.

and the surnobut, or chief commander, there was no intermediate gradation.

The cavalry were of the two kinds already described, Bargeers and Sillidars,* only Sivajee's Bargeers were generally mounted on horses, the property of the state. A body of this description is termed *pagah*, or household troops, and Sivajee always placed more dependence on them than on the Sillidars, or any horse furnished on contract by individuals; with both the one and the other of the latter description, he had a proportion of his *pagah* intermixed, to overawe the disobedient, and to perfect his system of intelligence, which abroad and at home penetrated into a knowledge of the most private circumstances, prevented embezzlement, and frustrated treachery.

The Mahratta horsemen are commonly dressed in a pair of tight breeches covering the knee, a turban which many of them fasten by passing a fold of it under the chin, a frock of quilted cotton, and a cloth round the waist, with which they generally gird on their swords in preference to securing them with their belts.† The horseman is armed with a sword and shield; a proportion in each body carry matchlocks, but the great national weapon is the spear, in the use of which, and the management of their horses, they evince both grace and dexterity.‡ The spearmen have generally a sword, and sometimes a shield; but the latter is unwieldy, and only carried in case the spear should be broken.§

Over every 25 horsemen Sivajee had a havildar. To 125 there was a joomladar; and to every five joomlas, or 625, he had a soobehdar. Every soobeh had an accountant and auditor of accounts, appointed by Sivajee, who were liable to be changed, and were invariably Bramins or Purvoes. To the command of every ten Soobebs, or 6,250 horse, which were only rated at 5,000, there was a commander styled *punch-huzaree*,

* The Sillidars, and all horsemen who did not belong to the *Pagah*, were obliged to furnish their own ammunition; there were particular rules, and the most careful system of economy, laid down by Sivajee for subsisting his *Pagah*.

† For ornament many of them wear very heavy gold and silver rings, and large ear-rings, which go round the back of the ear; thick necklaces of silver, and sometimes of gold, curiously wrought, are also much worn. All natives of India wear mustachios, and the Mahrattas, when they wish to describe a person as *extraordinarily* fierce-looking, mention his turban tied beneath his chin, and mustachios *almost as thick as their arm*.

‡ The trained spearmen may always be known among Mahrattas by their riding very long, the ball of the toe touching the stirrup; some of the matchlockmen, and most of the Bramins, ride very short and ungracefully.

§ With respect to the horse's appointments, the bridle consists of a single head-stall of cotton-rope, or leader, with a small but very severe flexible bit. There is a second head-stall over that of the bridle, to which is fixed a thong, or cotton band, tightly fastened to the girths, and this forms a strong standing martingale. The Mahratta saddle is composed of two pieces, or sides, of very thick felt, strongly sewed and tied together with thongs or cotton rope, leaving a small space between the sides, so as to prevent pressure on the horse's backbone: attached to this is a crupper, made of cotton rope, frequently covered with a piece of coloured silk or broadcloth. When the saddle is put on, the horseman lays over it his blanket, sometimes a carpet, and any spare clothes he may have. Two cotton bags, or pouches, tied together by a string and thrown over the front part of the saddle, carries either provision or plunder; when all these are adjusted, the horseman mounts; and the last thing is to seize his spear, which is stuck by the horse's head in the ground. On the left side and hind part of the saddle is suspended the tobra, or feeding bag already described, in which the pegs for picketing the horse, and his head and heel ropes, are carried. The horses in India are tied by ropes fastened to two tent pegs, one on each side, and also by ropes extended behind, which secure their heels.

with whom were also stationed a *muzzimdar*, or Bramin auditor of accounts, and a Purvoo register and accountant, who was called *ameen*. These were government agents; but, besides these, every officer, from the joomladar upwards, had one or more carcoons, paid by himself, as well as others in the pay of government.

There was no officer superior to the commander of 5,000, except the surnobut, or chief commander. There was one surnobut for the cavalry and one for the infantry.

Every joomla, soobeh, and punch-huzar had an establishment of news-writers and avowed spies, besides the secret intelligencers. Sivajee's head spy was a Mahratta, named Byherjee Naik, to whom, some of the Bramins readily admit, he owed many of the discoveries imputed to the goddess Bhowanee.

The Mahrattas, and probably all natives of India, are in a peculiar manner roused from indolence and apathy when charged in any degree with responsibility, either in what regards their own conduct or that of another person. Sivajee, at the commencement of his career, personally inspected every man who offered himself, and obtained security from some persons already in his service for the fidelity and good conduct of those with whom he was not acquainted. This system of security must soon have made almost every man answerable for some of his comrades; and although it could have been, in most instances, but a mere form, owing to the facility with which the responsibility could be evaded, it was always a part of Sivajee's instructions to his officers.

The Mawulees sometimes enlisted merely on condition of getting a subsistence in grain; but the regular pay of the infantry was from one to three pagodas* a month; that of the Bargeers was from two to five; and that of a Sillidar from six to twelve pagodas monthly.† All plunder, as well as prize, was the property of government. It was brought at stated times to Sivajee's durbar, or place of public audience, and individuals formally displayed and delivered their captures. They always received some small compensation in proportion; they were praised, distinguished, and promoted according to their success: and to *plunder the enemy* is to this day used by the Mahrattas to express a victory, of which it is, in their estimation, the only real proof.

The horse, especially at an advanced period of Sivajee's history, were subsisted during the fair season in the enemy's country; during the rains they were generally allowed to rest, and were cantoned in different situations near *kooruns*, or pasture-lands, under the protection of some fort, where the grass of the preceding season was stacked, and grain prepared by the time they returned. For this purpose persons were appointed, to whom rent-free lands were hereditarily assigned. The system was thus preserved when many of Sivajee's institutions were neglected, and it proved of much consequence to the cause of his countrymen.

The ancient Hindoo festival of the Dussera was observed by Sivajee with great pomp. It falls at the end of the monsoon, and was particularly convenient for a general muster and review of his troops previous to their taking the field. At this time each horse was examined, and an inventory and valuation of each soldier's effects were taken, in order to be

* A Beejapoor pagoda was valued at from three to four rupees.

† The pay of a joomladar in the infantry was seven pagodas; in the cavalry, 20. A soobehdar of cavalry had 50 pagodas and a palanquin. The pay of a punch-huzaree was 200 pagodas a month, besides an allowance for a palanquin and *afstabgeer*.

compared with what he brought back, or eventually to be made good. If a horseman's effects were unavoidably lost, his horse killed, maimed, or destroyed in the government service, they were on due proof replaced; but all plunder or articles discovered, of which a satisfactory account could not be given, were carried to the credit of government, either by confiscating the article or deducting the amount from the soldier's arrears. It was at the option of the captors to retain almost any article, if fairly brought forward, valued, and paid for.

The accounts were closed annually, and balances due by government were either paid in ready money, or by bills on the collectors of revenue in favour of the officers, but never by separate orders on villages.

The only exceptions to plunder made by Sivajee were in favour of cows, cultivators, and women; these were never to be molested, nor were any but rich Mahomedans, or Hindoos in their service, who could pay a ransom, to be made prisoners. No soldier in the service of Sivajee was permitted to carry any female follower with him in the field on pain of death.

His system of intelligence was the greatest check on every abuse, as well as embezzlement; and his punishments were rigorous. Officers and men who had distinguished themselves, who were wounded, or who had suffered in any way, were always gratified by promotion, honour, or compensation. Sivajee did not approve of the jagheer system; he confirmed many, but, with the exception of the establishment for his forts, he seldom, if ever, bestowed new military jagheers, and gave away very few as personal assignments. Enam lands were granted by him as well in reward of merit as in conformity with the tenets of his faith; a gift of land, especially to Bramins, being of all charities the most acceptable to the divinity.

Sivajee's discipline, which required prompt obedience to superiors in every situation, was particularly strict in his forts. The chief person, or killidar, in the command of a fortress, was termed *havildar*;^{*} and under him there was one or more surnobuts. In large forts, such as Poorundhur, Raigurh, and Panalla, there was a surnobut to each face. Every fort had a head clerk, and a commissary of grain and stores; the former, a Bramin, was termed *subnees*; the latter was commonly of the Purvoo caste and was called *karkanees*. Orders in respect to ingress and egress, rounds, watches and patrols, care of water, grain, stores, and ammunition, were most minute; and the officer of each department was furnished with distinct rules for his guidance, from which no deviation was permitted. A rigid economy characterized all Sivajee's instructions regarding expenditure.

The garrison was sometimes partly composed of the common infantry; but, independent of them, each fort had a separate and complete establishment. It consisted of Bramins, Mahrattas, Ramoosees, Mhars, and Mangs; the whole were termed *Gurhkurees*. They were maintained by permanent assignments of rent-free lands in the neighbourhood of each fort, which, with the care of the fort, descended hereditarily. The Ramoosees, Mhars, and Mangs were employed on the outpost duty; they brought intelligence, watched all the paths, misled enquiries, or cut off an enemy's stragglers. This establishment, whilst new and vigorous, was admirably

* I am inclined to think that all commanders of forts, under the Mahomedan governments not appointed by the king, were termed *havildars*, and that the term *killidar*, now in universal use, was originally the distinguishing appellation of those governors of fortresses who were specially appointed by a royal commission.

suited to Sivajee's purpose, as well as to the genius of the people. The Gurhkurees in their own language described the fort as the mother that fed them ; and, amongst other advantages, no plan could be better devised for providing for old or meritorious soldiers.

Sivajee's revenue arrangements were founded on those of Dadajee Kondeo. The assessments were made on the actual state of the crop, the proportionate division of which is stated to have been three-fifths to the ryot and two-fifths to government. As soon as he got permanent possession of any territory, every species of military contribution was stopped, all farming of revenue ceased, and the collections were made by agents appointed by himself.

Every two or three villages were superintended by a carcoon, under the *turufdar* or *talookdar*, who had charge of a small district, and was either a Bramin or Purvoo. A Mahratta *havildar** was stationed with each of them. Over a considerable tract there was a *soobehdar* or *mamlitdar*, who had charge of one or more forts, in which his collections, both of grain and money, were secured.

Sivajee never permitted the *deshmookhs* and *deshpandyas* to interfere in the management of the country, nor did he allow them to collect their dues until they had been ascertained, when an order was annually given for the amount.

The Patells, Khotas, and Koolkurnees were strictly superintended ; and Sivajee's government, though popular with the common cultivators, would have been quite the reverse with the village and district officers, of whom Sivajee was always jealous, had it not been for the resource which all had by entering his military service.

The method which the Bramin ministers of the Mahratta government afterwards adopted, of paying the military and civil servants by permanent assignments on portions of the revenue of villages, is said to have been early proposed to Sivajee ; who objected to it, not only from fear of immediate oppression to the ryot, but from apprehending that it would ultimately cause such a division of authority as must weaken his government, and encourage the village and district authorities to resist it, as they frequently did that of Beejapoor. With the same view he destroyed all village walls, and allowed no fortification in his territory which was not occupied by his troops.

Religious establishments were carefully preserved, and temples, for which no provision existed, had some adequate assignment granted to them ; but the Bramins in charge were obliged to account for the expenditure. Sivajee never sequestrated any allowance fixed by the Mahomedan government for the support of tombs, mosques, or places of commemoration in honour of saints.

The revenue regulations of Sivajee were simple, and, in some respects, judicious ; but during his life it is impossible they could have been attended with such improvements, and increase of population, as are ascribed to them by his countrymen. His districts were frequently exposed to great ravages ; and he never had sufficient leisure to complete his arrangements by that preserving superintendence which alone can perfect such institutions. The Mahomedan writers, and one contemporary English traveller,† describe his country as in the worst possible state ; and the former

* Both those authorities were civil, not military, as the names might lead some of my readers to suppose.

† Fryer.

only mention him as a depredator and destroyer ; but those districts taken by him from Beejapoor, which had been under the management of farmers or direct agents of government, probably experienced great benefit by the change.

The judicial system of Sivajee in civil cases was that of punchayet, which had invariably obtained in the country. Disputes of his soldiers were settled by their officers ; but he extracted his criminal law from the Shasters ; and the former rulers, professing the tenets of the Koran, had naturally introduced innovations, which long custom sanctioned and perpetuated. This accounts for the differences that may be still found between Hindoo law and Mahratta usage.

To assist in the conduct of his government, Sivajee established eight principal offices, the names of which, and the persons holding them at this period, were as follow :—

- 1st. Peishwa, head manager or prime minister. This office, we have already mentioned, was held by Moro Punt,* or Moreishwur Trimmul Pingley.
- 2nd. Muzzimdar,† general superintendent of finance and auditor general of accounts. His civil duties were consequently very important, and his establishment necessarily extensive. Abajee Sonedeo, soobehdar of the province of Kallianee, was muzzimdar.
- 3rd. Soornees, general record-keeper, superintendent of the department of correspondence, examiner of all letters ; all deeds and grants were first entered on his books, and the attestation of his examination and entry was necessary to their validity ; this office was held by Annajee Dutto.
- 4th. Wankanees. The duty of this officer was to keep the private journal, records, and letters. He was a superintendent of the household troops and establishment : the office was held by Duttajee Punt.
- 5th. The Surnobut. There were two surnobuts—one commanding the cavalry, Pertab Rao Goozur, and another the infantry, Yessjee Kunk.
- 6th. Dubeer, or minister for foreign affairs, and in charge of all business and messengers from other states. This office belonged to Somnath Punt.
- 7th. Nyadeish, or superintendent of judicial affairs. This department was managed by Neerajee Rowjee and Gomajee Naik.
- 8th. Nya Shastree, expounder of Hindoo law and the Shasters ; all matters of religion, of criminal law, and of science, especially what regarded judicial astrology, belonged to this office ; to which Seimbha Oopadheea, and afterwards Rugonath Punt,‡ was appointed.

* Moro Punt was his familiar name, or that which would be used in conversation—a custom common among Mahrattas, but which often makes it difficult to recognize, in their writings or letters, the names of people with whose history or persons we may be well acquainted. The very next name is an instance and illustration of this remark ; Neeloo Punt Sonedeo was the real name of Abajee Sonedeo ; but the familiar appellation of Abajee, given to him in boyhood, is that by which he is generally known, though his real name frequently occurs in the Mahratta MSS.

† This word, already used, is a corruption of the Persian *muzmoonadar* ; but the correct expression would scarcely be understood by the Mahrattas. Muzzimdar is now in fact a Mahratta word. Instances of the kind occur repeatedly where I have preferred using the word generally known in the Mahratta country. Although I may offend the ear of Persian scholars by such a practice, any one who has much to do with Mahrattas will, I think, find it more useful, and in the Mahratta history it is surely more correct.

‡ This Rugonath Punt Nya Shastree was one of Sivajee's earliest and most confidential adherents ; he was frequently employed as his envoy, but must not be confounded with Rugonath Punt Hunwuntay.

The officers at the head of these civil situations, except the Nyadeish and Nya Shastree, held military commands, and frequently had not leisure to superintend their duties. All, therefore, had deputies, called *karbarees*, to assist them, who frequently had power to annex the seal or mark of their principals on public documents ; when so empowered, they were styled *mootaliqs*, and each department, and every district establishment, had eight subordinate officers, under whom there were an adequate number of assistants. These officers were—

- 1st. The *Karbaree*, *Mootaliq*, or *dewan*.
- 2nd. The *Muzzimdar*, or auditor and accountant.
- 3rd. The *Furnees* or *Furnuwees*, deputy auditor and accountant.
- 4th. The *Subnees*, or clerk, sometimes styled *dufturdar*.
- 5th. The *Karkanees*, or commissary.
- 6th. The *Chitnees*, or clerk of correspondence.
- 7th. The *Jamdar*, or treasurer in charge of all valuables except cash.
- 8th. *Potnees*, or cash-keeper.

Attached to himself, Sivajee had a treasurer, a *Chitnees*, and *Furnees*, besides a *Farianees*, or Persian secretary. His *Chitnees* was a *Purvoe*, named *Ballajee Aujee*, whose acuteness and intelligence are recorded by the English government at Bombay on an occasion of his being sent there on business.

Bal Kishen Punt Hunwuntay, a near relation of the head manager of Shahjee, was Sivajee's *Furnees* ; and it is remarkable, as it bespeaks a connection maintained, that his treasurer was the grandson of Seshao Naik Poonday, of Chumargoondee, the person with whom Mallojee Bhonslay's money was deposited before the marriage of Shahjee.*

* This account of Sivajee's institutions is as brief an extract as I could make from original papers now in possession of the raja of Satara, or his *Chitnees*, the hereditary descendent of Ballajee Aujee. I have also obtained considerable information from a mass of records belonging to Surwultum Baboo Rao, the present Punt Amat.

CHAP. VIII.

FROM A. D. 1670 TO A. D. 1676.

The tranquillity of the Deccan is interrupted.—Interesting and daring enterprize.—Singurh escalated, and Tannajee Maloosray slain—several forts taken.—Jinjeera on the point of being delivered up to Sivajee—prevented by a revolution.—The Seedeas enter the Moghul service.—Sivajee plunders Surat—is intercepted on his return—stratagem for saving his booty—attacks the Moghul troops, and defeats them.—Naval operations.—Candeish plundered, and the chouth imposed.—Oundha, Putta, and Salheir taken.—Causes of the inactivity of the Moghuls.—Jeswunt Sing is relieved by Mohabet Khan—feeble operations against the forts.—Satheir besieged,—relieved.—The Mahrattas obtain a great victory.—Sivajee at war with the Portuguese—attempts to surprise a small fort on Salsette.—English alarmed—press their long-pending claims on Sivajee.—Khan Jekan Buhadur appointed viceroy of the Moghul possessions—his defensive system disapproved by Dilere Khan, who had been successful against Chakun.—Sivajee visits Golcondah—his coast suffers by a descent from the fleets of Surat and Jinjeera.—Death of Ali Adil Shah.—Khowaus Khan appointed regent at Beejapoor.—Sivajee retakes Panalla—plunders Hooblee.—English apply to him for indemnification.—Sivajee prosecutes the war against Beejapoor—conciliates the Moghul viceroy—takes Purlee, Satara, and several forts in its neighbourhood.—Pertab Rao attacks the Beejapoor army on its march—grants an armistice, which is disapproved by Sivajee.—Pertab Rao, without Sivajee's permission, makes a distant excursion.—Abdool Khureem, whilst Sivajee is engaged in the siege of Ponda, makes an effort to recover Panalla.—Pertab Rao arrives—receives a message from Sivajee—attacks the Beejapoor army, and is defeated and killed.—Victory snatched from the Mahomedans by the valour and conduct of Hussajee Mohitey.—Suntajee Ghorepuray and Dhunnajee Jadav are distinguished.—Hussajee Mohitey appointed Senaputtee, with the title of Humbeer Rao.—Death of Abajee Sonedeo.—Siege of Ponda raised.—Sivajee is enthroned, and assumes the titles and insignia of royalty.—Treaty with the English—tribute from the Portuguese.—Oundha and Putta re-taken.—Incursion of Humbeer Rao.—Ponda taken.—Murder of Khowaus Khan.—Sivajee builds a line of forts from Tattora to Panalla—is confined by illness at Satara—projects a most important expedition.

THE apparent inactivity of Sivajee, and the peace between the Beejapoor state and the Moghuls, gave hopes of a tranquillity long unknown in the Deccan. Sivajee, it was supposed, satisfied with what he had already acquired, or sensible of his inability to cope with the imperial armies, would now abstain from depredation, and endeavour to secure the favour of the Moghul viceroy by presents, such as were customary from those who were not altogether independent of his authority. It was, indeed, well known that both Sultan Mauzum and

Jeswunt Sing were in the habit of receiving large sums of money from Sivajee; and the report became at last so general, that Aurungzebe, desirous probably of dissolving their connection, if he could not succeed in again drawing Sivajee into his power, sent a peremptory order, threatening his son with severe displeasure if he did not apprehend Sivajee, Pertab Rao Goozur, and several of the principal officers. Before the public order arrived, Sultan Mauzum, apprized of its approach, privately warned Pertab Rao Goozur, who, accompanied by Sivajee's envoy, Neerajee Ramjee, fled with the horse the same night, and safely reached Poona, although pursued by a detachment sent after them by Sultan Mauzum, to save appearances with the emperor.

The temporizing measures for a time adopted by Aurungzebe, having thus assumed a character decidedly hostile, Sivajee soon displayed his wonted energy; and those who had prognosticated his future insignificance, or his fall, were this year astonished by a career of enterprizes, exceeding, if possible, all he had yet done. His first object was to endeavour to get possession of the important fortresses of Singurh and Poorundhur, which completely obstructed his communication with Poona and Chakun, and were strongly garrisoned by Rajpoots. Singurh, Sivajee justly considered one of the strongest forts in the country; and as the commandant, Ooday Bawn, was a very celebrated soldier, and had a choice body of men, it was supposed impregnable. This fancied security of the garrison, however, had rendered them negligent; and Sivajee laid a plan for surprising the place. Tannajee Maloosray, whom he consulted on the occasion, offered to take it, on condition of being permitted to have his younger brother along with him, and to choose 1,000 Mawulees for the purpose. None of the Mawulee attacks are given so consistently and distinctly in different Mahratta manuscripts as the account of this interesting and daring enterprize.

Singurh is situated on the eastern side of the great Syhadree range, near the point at which the Poorundhur hills branch off into the Deccan: with these hills it only communicates on the east and west by very high narrow ridges, while on the south and north it presents a huge rugged mountain, with an ascent of half a mile, in many parts nearly perpendicular. After arriving at this height, there is an immense craggy precipice of black rock, upwards of 40 feet high, and similar to that which has, in the first instance, been described as a common feature in the mountains of the Concan and Ghaut-Mahta; surmounting the whole there is a strong stone wall with towers. The fort is of a triangular shape, its interior upwards of two miles in circumference, and the exterior presents on all sides the stupendous barrier already mentioned; so that, except by the gates, entrance seems impossible. From the summit, when the atmosphere is clear, is seen to the east the narrow and beautiful valley of the Neera; to the north a great plain, in the forefront of which, Poona, where Sivajee passed his youth, is a conspicuous object; and though, at the period we have arrived, only a small town, it was destined to become the capital of the vast empire he was founding. To the south and west appear boundless masses of rolling mountains, lost in the blue clouds, or mingled by distance with the sky. In that quarter lies Raigurh; from which place, directed by Tannajee Maloosray, the thousand Mawulees, prepared for the attempt on Singurh, set out by different paths, known only to themselves, which led them to unite near the fortress, according to the words of the Mahratta manuscript, "on the ninth night of the dark half of the moon, in the month Magh" (February). Tannajee

divided his men; one-half remained at a little distance, with orders to advance if necessary, and the other half lodged themselves undiscovered at the foot of the rock. Choosing a part most difficult of access, as being the least liable to discovery, one of their number mounted the rock, and made fast a ladder of ropes, by which they ascended, one by one, and lay down as they gained the inside. Scarce 300 had entered the fort, when something occasioned an alarm among the garrison that attracted their attention to the quarter by which the Mawulees were ascending. A man advanced to ascertain what was the matter. A deadly arrow from a bowman silently answered his enquiries; but a noise of voices and a running to arms induced Tannajee to push forward in hopes of still surprising them. The bowmen plied their arrows in the direction of the voices; till a blaze of blue lights, and a number of torches kindled by the garrison, showed the Rajpoots armed or arming, and discovered their assailants. A desperate conflict ensued; the Mawulees, though thus prematurely discovered, and opposed by very superior numbers, were gaining ground, until Tannajee Maloosray fell. They then lost confidence, and were running to the place where they had escaladed, but by that time the reserve, led by Tannajee's brother, Sooryajee, had entered. On learning what had happened, Sooryajee rallied the fugitives, asked "who amongst them would leave their father's remains to be tossed into a pit by Mhars,"* told them the ropes were destroyed, and now was their time to prove themselves Sivajee's Mawulees. This address, their loss of Tannajee, the arrival of their companions, and the presence of a leader, made them turn with a resolution which nothing could withstand. "Hur, Hur, Mahdeo,"† their usual cry on desperate onsets, resounded as they closed, and they soon found themselves in possession of the fort. Their total loss was estimated at one-third their number, or upwards of 300 killed or disabled. In the morning 500 gallant Rajpoots, together with their commander, were found dead or wounded; a few had concealed themselves, and submitted; but several hundreds had chosen the desperate alternative of venturing over the rock, and many were dashed to pieces in the attempt.

The preconcerted signal of success was setting on fire a thatched house in the fort, a joyful intimation to Sivajee: but when he heard that Tannajee Maloosray was killed, he was deeply concerned, and afterwards, on being congratulated, mournfully replied, in allusion to the name he had given the fort, "The den is taken but the lion is slain; we have gained a fort, but, alas! I have lost Tannajee Maloosray!"

Sivajee, though he seldom bestowed pecuniary gifts on the Mawulees, on this occasion gave every private soldier a silver bracelet, or bangle, and proportionate rewards to the officers. Sooryajee was appointed to the

March. command of the fort, and afterwards assisted in taking Poorundhur, which was escaladed one month after the capture of Singurh, and fell with little resistance.

The fort of Maholy in the Concan was not such an easy conquest as

* The Mahrattas who fall in battle are carried off by their companions when it is possible to do so. To leave a commander's body to indiscriminate burial, without the funeral rites, is considered base in the highest degree. "Father" is an epithet much used by the soldiery of India, both as a term of respect, as appears in the text, and as a cheering encouragement. The "chulo, mera bap," "come on, my father," so often heard from officers of British sepoy's in action, is precisely the "come on, my boys," and "allons mes enfans" of the English and French.

† Names of Vishnoo and Mahdeo.

Poorundhur. Moro Punt was repulsed with the reported loss* of 1,000 men; but the siege was continued with spirit, and the garrison, in hopes of being relieved from Joonere, made a resolute defence, beat off a second assault, and held out for two months; but at the end of that time the fort surrendered. Kurnalla was likewise besieged and taken,† and the whole province of Kallian recovered by the end of June.‡ Loghur was also surprised and taken; but an attempt on Sewnerree failed.§ Sivajee in person superintended the siege of Jinjeera. Every year since 1661 he had erected batteries against it, and he now put forth his whole strength in hopes of reducing it before the fair season. Nor was force the only means employed; promises of every kind were resorted to, and Futih Khan, though he at first indignantly rejected every inducement, at last began to entertain thoughts of accepting Sivajee's protection, and surrendering. There were, however, three Abyssinians under him, who had rendered themselves particularly obnoxious to Sivajee; they were also bigoted Mussulmans, detested the Mahratta name, and being alarmed for their own safety, in case Futih Khan should submit, they determined to prevent such a measure at all hazards. To this end they formed a conspiracy among their countrymen, and, having obtained their suffrage, Futih Khan was placed in confinement, and, greatly to Sivajee's disappointment, they continued the defence of the place. They afterwards applied to the Moghul governor of Surat, offering, if duly supported, to hold their jagheer and the Beejapoor fleet under the imperial authority. The names of these three Abyssinians were Seedee Sumbhole, Seedee Yakoot, and Seedee Khyroo. The two last gave up their pretensions in favour of Seedee Sumbhole. Their proposals were accepted by the governor of Surat, and the terms confirmed by Aurungzebe, who changed the title of the principal Seedee from Wuzer to Yakoot Khan.||

The rains had scarcely subsided when Sivajee appeared at the gates of Surat at the head of 15,000 men. It so happened that the governor of Surat had died suddenly during the preceding month; and a considerable garrison which had been before thrown into the town, in consequence of a report of Sivajee's intention to plunder it, were, by accident or design, withdrawn by Jeswunt Sing or the prince. In this unprotected state, with only a few hundred men in the castle, the city was leisurely pillaged for three days. The English, as on a former occasion, defended themselves successfully, under the direction of Mr. Streingham Masters, one of their factors, and killed many of the Mahrattas. The Dutch factory being in a retired quarter was not molested; but the French purchased an ignominious neutrality, by permitting Sivajee's troops to pass through their factory to attack an unfortunate Tartar prince, ¶ who was on his return from a pilgrimage to

* English Records, Bombay to Surat, March 21st, 1670.

† The Mahratta MSS. afford no particulars of the manner in which the approaches were carried on in these sieges. The Bombay Records, in mentioning the siege of Kurnalla, say—"They advance by throwing up breastworks of earth and boards which they carry before them."

‡ Mahratta MSS., English Records.

§ Mahratta MSS., and Scott's Deccan.

|| This account of the revolution at Jinjeera is on the authority of Khafee Khan, but I am not certain of the exact date of the transfer of the fleet to the Moghuls. Their previous dependence on Beejapoor had long been nominal.

¶ The English factors call him "the late king of Kascar, deposed by his own son." Sivajee, say they, found in his quarters a vast treasure in gold, silver, and plate, a gold bed, and other rich furniture.

Mecca, and whose property became part of Sivajee's boasted spoils on this occasion.

After the third day, Sivajee, in consequence of intelligence from Burhanpoor, suddenly withdrew his army; and having left a letter for the inhabitants, demanding a tribute of 12 lakhs of rupees a year, as the price of exemption from future pillage, he returned towards his own territory by the great road of Salheir. He had passed Kunchin Munchin, near Chandore, when he was closely pursued by a detachment of 5,000 cavalry, under Daood Khan, a Moghul officer, whose approach occasioned no alarm; but Sivajee soon perceived that a larger body had got between him and the great pass near Nassuck, by which he intended to re-enter the Concan. He therefore broke his army into four or five divisions in order to distract the enemy. A party from one of these divisions began to skirmish with the larger body; two of them threatened to charge it; whilst one division, to whom the treasure was intrusted, passed the enemy, pushed on towards the Ghaut, and made the best of their way into the Concan. Sivajee would have avoided an action had he been sure of saving his booty, but he was obliged to move slowly to favour the escape of the division in charge of it. In the meantime Daood Khan came up, when Sivajee wheeled about, attacked, and drove him back; after which, having left a party to defend his rear, he moved on to the large body. Finding them drawn up on the banks of a tank, he instantly charged them, which, being unexpected, the whole were put to the rout, and, amongst the rest, a body of Mahrattas, commanded by the widow of the Deshmookh of Mahoor, whom he took prisoner, treated her with great respect, and sent her home with valuable presents.*

On Sivajee's return, he made great preparations, both by sea and land. Ten thousand horse under Pertab Rao Goozur, and 20,000 foot commanded by the Peishwa, marched for the northward, whilst a fleet of 160 vessels passed Bombay, intended, as was supposed, to co-operate in an attack on Baroach; but if such was the intention, it appears to have been abandoned in favour of more extensive operations. The fleet was recalled, and they returned to Dabul with a large Portuguese ship which they had captured off Damaun. The Portuguese, on the other hand, took 12 of Sivajee's vessels, and carried them into Bassein.†

Pertab Rao Goozur was ordered to make an incursion into Candesh, then a very rich and populous province, which Sivajee, judging from his late victory, justly supposed would be found unprotected. Pertab Rao levied contributions, and plundered several large towns, particularly Kurinja; but the most memorable circumstance of this expedition was the exaction of a writing from the village authorities on his route, in which they promised to pay to Sivajee, or his officers, one-fourth of the yearly revenue due to government. Regular receipts were promised on the part of Sivajee, which should not only exempt them from pillage, but ensure them protection.‡ Hence we may date the first imposition of Mahratta chouth on a province immediately subject to the Moghuls.

* Mahratta MSS.

† English Records, partly confirmed by Mahratta MSS.

‡ Mahratta MSS. and English Records. The Surat factors particularly notice this incursion, which they suppose was headed by Sivajee in person. They mention his having exacted the promise of chouth, and that he "*very severely* plundered Kurinja, and carried away all the chief men, except such as escaped in women's clothes," from which it is evident that the Moghuls knew by experience that part of Sivajee's regulations regarding protection to females.

Moro Punt, at the head of the infantry, took several forts, amongst A. D. 1671, which Oundha and Putta are particularly mentioned, and January. the important fortress of Salheir.

During these extraordinary successes of Sivajee, the inactivity of the Moghuls is chiefly to be ascribed to their want of troops. Whilst the Peishwa was besieging Maholy, there was a considerable force at Joonere, and 5,000 spare troops at Surat; but Sivajee could, at that time, collect at least 40,000 men to dispute their advance, or intercept their retreat. A deficiency of force, however, on the part of the Moghuls, was not the only cause which operated in Sivajee's favour. Common report represented Sultan Mauzum as in league with him; and we have seen that a good understanding did exist between them. Jeswunt Sing was certainly no enemy to Sivajee; at his recommendation frequent applications were made for reinforcements, which he well knew Aurungzebe was too jealous to grant. There is, as we have already observed, no satisfactory evidence of Sultan Mauzum's intended rebellion; but in desiring reinforcements, and in not doing his utmost against Sivajee, he may have been influenced by the natural desire of all the sons of the Moghul emperors, to strengthen their own party, as at the death of their father they had no alternative between them and the grave, excepting a prison or a throne. The same reason may have made him regard the increasing depredations of Sivajee without regret, as they afforded a pretext for enlisting followers, and a prospect of compelling Aurungzebe to accede to his views. But in this hope he was disappointed. Jeswunt Sing was recalled, and 40,000 men were sent into the Deccan under the command of Mohabet Khan, who was so completely independent of Sultan Mauzum that he scarcely allowed 1,000 horse to remain with the prince at Aurungabad.

Mohabet Khan commenced operations against Sivajee by endeavouring to reduce his forts; but, at the setting in of the rains, he had only retaken Oundha and Putta, when he withdrew to cantonments, and the ensuing season was considerably advanced before his army appeared in the field.* At length, one-half of the force under Dilere Khan attacked Chakun, and the other half laid siege to Salheir. Sivajee, sensible of the great importance of the latter fort, determined on making an effort to save it.

A. D. 1672. The garrison, from some cause not clearly explained, had not been able to lay in a sufficient store of provisions, and 2,000 of Sivajee's best horse, stationed in its immediate vicinity, had been cut to pieces by a body of Patans—circumstances which rendered speedy succour essential.† On this service Moro Punt and Pertab Rao Goozur were both detached with 20,000 horse, and ordered to give battle. As soon as the Moghul general‡ heard of their approach, he sent the greatest part of his force to oppose them under an officer named Ikhlās Khan. Pertab Rao, who commanded the advance of the Mahrattas, seeing Ikhlās Khan eager to attack him, waited his approach, drew him on to charge, fled before him, until the Moghul troops were broken, when turning around, supported by Moro Punt, he gave them a signal defeat. The Moghuls recovered their order and rallied to the last; but they were charged, broken, and routed with prodigious slaughter; 22 officers of note were killed, and several of the principal commanders wounded and

* Mahratta MSS., partly confirmed by English Records.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ I conclude that Mohabet Khan was the general who sent Ikhlās Khan to oppose the Mahrattas, and that there is a mistake in the Mahratta manuscript, which mentions that he was detached by Dilere Khan.

made prisoners. The Mahrattas lost Sur Rao Kakray,* a commander of 5,000, and had upwards of 500 killed and wounded.

This victory was the most complete ever achieved by Sivajee's troops, in a fair fought action with the Moghuls, and contributed greatly to the renown of the Mahrattas. Its immediate consequence was the abandonment of the siege of Salheir, and a precipitate retreat of the army to Aurungabad. Sivajee treated the prisoners of rank, who were sent to Raigurh, with distinction, and, when their wounds were healed, he dismissed them in an honourable manner.† Such prisoners as chose to remain were admitted into his service; and deserters, both from the Beejapoor and the Moghul armies, began to join the Mahratta standard in considerable numbers.‡

During the rains Sivajee possessed himself of several places in the northern Concan, which had belonged to Koollee rajas, or petty polygars, whom he compelled to join him. As he was at war with the Portuguese, and was threatening to drive them from the coast, unless they paid him tribute, it was expected, from the vicinity of the Koollee possessions, that he would attack the forts of Damaun and Bassein. An attempt was made by a party of Sivajee's troops to surprise the small fort of Gora-bupder, on the island of Salsette, then in possession of the Portuguese; but they were repulsed. The English at Bombay were so much alarmed at this near approach to their settlement, that they began to strengthen their fortifications, and became solicitous to conclude some treaty with Sivajee, which should have for its object indemnification for past losses and reciprocal advantages hereafter. Hitherto the English had not suffered materially by the ravages of Sivajee; and at Bombay, even when he was attacking the factory at Surat, an interchange of civilities used to take place; the reason of which was that the island of Bombay was dependent on the continent for grain and firewood, and Sivajee's coast would have been greatly exposed had the English suffered the Moghuls to pass through their harbour for the purpose of attacking him. Ever since the plunder of Rajapoor in January 1661, the English had been petitioning Sivajee for indemnification. They estimated their loss at upwards of 10,000 pagodas; and Sivajee continued to assure them that, if they would assist him against Jinjeera, or even re-establish their factory, he would make good the injury. The English, on the other hand, declared themselves neutral,—that they were mere merchants, who never took up arms except to defend their property, and that, before they could return to Rajapoor, they required security for the fulfilment of his promises.§

In the meantime a change had taken place in the government of the Moghul provinces. Both Mohabet Khan and Sultan Mauzum were recalled, and Khan Jehan Buhadur,|| governor of Guzerat, was appointed viceroy of the Deccan. Khan Jehan, under a supposition that his force was not

* Sur Rao Kakray was one of Sivajee's earliest followers; he was originally a leader of Mawulees, and particularly distinguished himself at the attack on Jowlee and escalade of Rohira.

† Mahratta MSS., partly confirmed by Scott's Deccan and English Records.

‡ Mahratta MSS., and English Records. The standard of Sivajee, or the national flag of the Mahrattas, is called the *Bhugwa Jenda*. It is swallow-tailed, of a deep orange colour, and particularly emblematic of the followers of Mahdeo.

§ English Records, confirmed by Mahratta MSS.

|| He was then Buhadur Khan. He got his title of Khan Jehan Buhadur afterwards, but, to prevent confusion in the name, I have at once adopted that by which he is best known.

adequate to offensive operations, adopted a scheme of blocking up the Ghauts to prevent Mahratta incursion, and defend the passes left open with artillery; but this plan was disapproved by Dilere Khan, his second-in-command. That officer had been successful in his attack on Chakun the preceding season; he exposed the fallacy of a defensive system, and recommended a vigorous attack on the principal forts with the force at their disposal, however inadequate. But his arguments had no effect on the new viceroy; and the Mahratta horse, as might have been expected, instead of entering Candeish by the passes where Khan Jehan posted himself, appeared in different parties about Aurungabad and Ahmednugur.* The viceroy went in pursuit of them in various directions, but without success, and at last cantoned, for the rains, at Pairgaom on the Beema, where he erected a fortification, and gave it the name of Buhadurgurh.†

Whilst the Khan was thus employed, Sivajee undertook a secret expedition to Golcondah, where he is said to have exacted a contribution to a large amount,‡ and safely conveyed the money to Raigurh. On the march, or immediately after his return, he let loose the greater part of his cavalry on the Moghul territory, levying contributions from towns, and plundering the smaller villages. In the details of this predatory warfare both the Mahrattas and Moghuls claim advantages; if the former fled, they generally brought off their booty—an object which the horsemen were taught to regard as the most substantial honor.

During Sivajee's absence at Golcondah, his towns and villages on the coast had sustained great damage by a descent from the combined fleets from Surat and Jinjeera.§ The batteries at Dhunda Rajepoor were also stormed and destroyed, and Ragoo Bullal, who commanded them, was killed.||

But the loss thus sustained was compensated by his visit to Golcondah; and the successful campaign of the ensuing year greatly increased his power and resources.

On the 15th of December 1672, the Sultan of Beejapoor had a paralytic stroke, brought on by excess of various kinds; and although he lingered several days, during which he made some arrangements respecting the regency, he never arose from his bed.

His son, Sultan Sikundur, was then in the fifth year of his age. Ali Adil Shah had no other son, and only one daughter, Padshah Beebee. Abdool Mohummud, the prime minister, was of a respectable private character, but shrunk from the task which his situation imposed. The other principal persons at the Beejapoor court were Khowaus Khan, Abdool Khureem Bahlole Khan,¶ and Muzuffir Khan.

These three, with their dependents and attendants, were more intent on strengthening their own factions, than on devising measures for the public

* Scott's Deccan, English Records, Mahratta MSS.

† It does not retain this name, but it continued for upwards of 40 years one of the principal depôts of the Moghul army.

‡ Wilks, Orme, Mahratta MSS.

§ English Records, Mahratta MSS.

|| Mahratta MSS. This Ragoo Bullal was the same person who murdered the raja of Jowlee.

¶ In Fryer's Travels, in the English Records, and in Mahratta MSS., he is called Bahlole or Bullal Khan, and in Persian writings, by his proper name, Abdool Khureem Bahlole Khan, or simply Abdool Khureem. He was the son of Bahlole Khan, an Afghan, originally a follower of the famous Khan Jehan Lodi, and afterwards, as already mentioned, a general under the Nizam Shahee state. He came over to the service of Beejapoor after Futeh Khan had murdered his sovereign, Mortiza Nizam Shah II.

advantage. Abdool Mohummud has the credit of being exempted from this censure; but he was destitute of that firmness which is necessary to overawe the factious, and maintain an ascendancy over men's minds, in times of civil discord. In the present instance, certainly no situation could be less enviable; faction agitated the miserable remains of a fallen state, whilst Sivajee on one side, and the Moghuls on the other, threatened its annihilation.

In this state of affairs Abdool Mohummud recommended that Khowaus Khan should be appointed regent, and that he himself, with the two principal nobles who remained, should each be sent to command in different parts of the kingdom. Kulburga, and the parts adjoining the Moghul territory, he reserved for himself; Abdool Khureem to have Merich, Panalla, Dharwar, Soonda, Bednore, and the Concan; and Muzuffir Khan to have charge of the rest of the Carnatic. The king, although exceedingly averse to this arrangement, was compelled to adopt it, and Khowaus Khan was sent for to his bed-side, to receive charge of his son and his last injunctions, as recommended by the minister. Khowaus Khan accepted their regency, and promised to fulfil the instructions; but after the king's death, when he had established his power, he postponed sending Abdool Khureem and Abdool Mohummud to their governments, lest they should make their own terms with the Moghuls; but he despatched Muzuffir Khan to the Carnatic. He endeavoured to reconcile the others by giving Abdool Khureem command of the troops, and by treating Abdool Mohummud with every mark of outward respect. Each party had Bramin dependents, who not only fomented the disputes of their masters, but, through their Hindoo connections, Sivajee had minute information of all that passed; and as his compact with Abdool Mohummud ceased with the death of Ali Adil Shah, he instantly prepared to take advantage of the distractions which prevailed at Beejapoor.*

In the month of March 1673, he secretly assembled a large force at A. D. 1673. Vishalgurh. A detachment from this body surprised and retook Panalla; but the main object was an attack on the rich mercantile town of Hooblee. The command of the expedition was intrusted to Annajee Dutto; and the booty acquired exceeded anything of the kind before taken by the Mahrattas. The account given of the plunder in their manuscripts is incredible; but there is no doubt of its having been very considerable. Merchants of all nations were pillaged; and the Beejapoor troops, stationed for the defence of the town, completed what the Mahrattas had left. The English factory shared in the general misfortunes.† Mr. Aungier, the deputy governor at Bombay, frequently endeavoured to obtain indemnification, both for the losses at Hooblee and Rajapoor, and took judicious opportunities of pressing the demands. Sivajee persisted in declaring that his troops had not molested the English at Hooblee; and, being still in hopes of obtaining their assistance against the Surat and Jinjeera fleets, he continued to express his desire for a treaty, and to hold out expectations of granting reimbursement for the losses at Rajapoor. Mr. Aungier was also frequently solicited for assistance by the opposite party, particularly by the Seedee; but he maintained a strict neutrality; and several circumstances occurred which gave both the one and the other a high respect for Mr. Aungier's judgment and firmness.‡

* Beejapoor MSS.

† Mahratta MSS., Orme, and English Records.

‡ They lost 7,894 pagodas.

Sivajee crossed the war with Beejapoor, and, anxious to possess himself of the whole coast, he sent his fleet to take possession of Carwar, Ankola, and various other places; whilst he excited the deshmookhs to rebel, and drive out the Mahomedan thannas. The rana of Bednore, alarmed by the plunder of Hooblee, early solicited protection, agreed to pay a yearly tribute, and permitted a wukeel from Sivajee to reside at his capital.*

As Sivajee was desirous of prosecuting the war on Beejapoor without interruption, he endeavoured to conciliate Khan Jehan by again feigning a desire to be received under the imperial protection, through the Khan's mediation. The viceroy was, or pretended to be, deceived; but it is more than probable that this officer, very soon after his arrival in the Deccan, became subservient to Sivajee's views, on condition of his refraining from pillage in the Moghul territory.

In the month of May a detachment of Mawulees surprised Purlee; but its capture having put the garrisons in the neighbourhood on the alert, Satara, a fort that had always been kept in good order by the Beejapoor government, which was next invested, sustained a siege for several months, and did not surrender till the beginning of September. It is remarkable that this fort had been long used as a state prison, anterior, perhaps, to the Edil Shahee dynasty. Sivajee little contemplated its being made applicable to a similar purpose for the persons of his descendants.†

The forts of Chundun, Wundun, Pandoogurh, Nandgheeree, and Tattora, all fell into his hands before the fair season.

The loss of Panalla, the sack of Hooblee, the insurrections about Carwar, and the capture of all these forts, obliged Khowsaus Khan to detach Abdool Khureem with an army to the westward. Abdool Khureem regained possession of the open country about Panalla; but Pertab Rao Goozur, having been sent off by Sivajee, appeared in the neighbourhood of Beejapoor, where he plundered with impunity. These depredations induced the regent to recall Abdool Khureem, but Pertab Rao intercepted him between Merich and Beejapoor, and both parties commenced skirmishing. As Pertab Rao outnumbered the army of Beejapoor, by threatening a general attack on one side, and cutting off foragers and stragglers with a part of his troops on the other, he so harassed them that Abdool Khureem applied for an armistice, and was permitted to return unmolested to Beejapoor. The terms on which this truce was granted are not known, but Sivajee was greatly displeased; and, to add to his mortification, Pertab Rao, on being severely censured, made a very distant excursion into Berar Payeen Ghaut, contrary to Sivajee's intention, who had previously commenced the siege of Ponda, which lay between his territory and his late acquisitions to the southward.*

Abdool Khureem, conceiving that an opportunity thus presented itself of retaking Panalla, a great effort was made at Beejapoor to recruit the army. The intention was early imparted to Sivajee, but he was prevented, by the absence of Pertab Rao Goozur, from making a corresponding exertion to prevent the design, without subjecting his own plans to great derangement.

In the month of February, preparations being completed, Abdool

A. D. 1674. Khureem marched with a large force towards Panalla.† He had already arrived in the neighbourhood of that place, when Pertab Rao, with the principal part of the horse, at last made

* Mahratta MSS.

† Logurh was the state prison of Ahmednugur.

‡ Beejapoor and Mahratta MSS.

his appearance. Sivajee instantly sent him word that he was greatly displeased by his conduct, and desired that he would "never come into his presence until he had plundered the army of Beejapoor." This message was conveyed to Pertab Rao when about to commence the attack. Stung with the reproach, he departed from his usual method, and at once closed with the enemy.* In a rash charge, on a compact body of the Beejapoor troops, he was cut down with many of his men, and the main body of his army completely routed. Abdool Khureem pursued them with great slaughter, until the fugitives found shelter under the guns of Panalla. But, whilst this took place in the main body, one party of Mahrattas, under Hussajee Mohitey, a commander of 5,000 horse, had not been engaged. They came up when the Beejapoor troops were dispersed in the careless ardour of pursuit, and, falling upon them unexpectedly, completely changed the issue of the contest. No troops are so soon rallied as Mahrattas on the slightest turn of fortune in their favour. The fugitives became the pursuers; victory succeeded defeat, and Abdool Khureem was again compelled to retire with disgrace to Beejapoor.† In the division of Hussajee Mohitey, two officers greatly distinguished themselves; they were promoted in consequence, and their names, Sнтажее Ghorepuray and Dhunnajee Jadow, afterwards became renowned in the annals of Maharashtra. Sivajee greatly extolled the conduct of Hussajee Mohitey, and appointed him surnobut, with the title of Humbeer Rao.‡ The services of Pertab Rao Goozur were not forgotten; Sivajee mourned his loss, made handsome provision for his relations and dependents, and married his younger son, Raja Ram, to the daughter of the deceased. Pertab Rao's death was followed by that of Abajee Sonedee; Sivajee had declared that no office should be hereditary in a family unfit for the employment; but Ramchundur Punt, the son of Abajee, being qualified to fill the vacant situation, he was appointed Muzzimdar.

The siege of Ponda continued until the setting in of the monsoon, when it was raised. Sivajee had purchased a supply of artillery from the French at Surat; but he was not able to effect a breach. The whole of the horse, owing, it is supposed, to a scarcity above the Ghauts, cantoned this season at Chiploon.*

Sivajee, who had long struck coins, and styled himself raja and maharaja, was at this time consulting many learned Bramins on the propriety of declaring his independence, assuming ensigns of royalty, and establishing an era from the day of his ascending the throne. A celebrated Shastree of Benares, named Gaga Bhutt, who arrived at Raigurh, and of whose coming Sivajee pretended to have an intimation from Bhowanee, was appointed to conduct the inauguration. After many solemn rites, and every observance of the Shasters which could make the ceremony revered by Hindoos, Sivajee, at a propitious moment, was enthroned at Raigurh on the 6th June. About a fortnight after, on the death of his mother, Jeejee Bye, Sivajee was a second time placed on the throne, but the date of the abishik, or era, commences from the thirteenth day of the moon's increase in Jesht, or June, according to the previous installation. The first ceremony was partly witnessed by Mr. Henry Oxenden, who had been sent from Bombay on a mission to

* Mahratta MSS.

† Mahratta and Beejapoor MSS.

‡ As the reader is not yet familiar with the former name, I shall continue to use his title of Humbeer Rao, as that by which he is generally known in the Mahratta country.

Sivajee, for the purpose of concluding the long-pending treaty. The preliminary articles were signed by a native agent on the 6th April. The treaty consisted of 20 articles, the substance of which the Mahrattas have preserved under four heads :—First, indemnification for the losses at Rajapoor, with permission to establish factories at Rajapoor, Dabul, Choule, and Kallian ; and to trade all over Sivajee's territory, buying and selling at their own prices, without being liable to the imposition of fixed rates : second, they were only to pay an import duty of 2½ per cent. *ad valorem* : third, coins were to pass reciprocally : and fourth, wrecks were to be restored. The mode of settling the indemnification, which was dictated by Sivajee, shows his idea of the principles of trade ; but it is particularly characteristic of a Mahratta agreement, not only in its intricacy, but in the evasion of any direct money payment. Sivajee was to allow the English 10,000 pagodas ; that is, the English agreed to purchase 5,000 pagodas worth of goods from Sivajee for three years, they paying him half the value, so that they would then recover 7,500 pagodas ; and, for the balance of 2,500 pagodas, he granted to the factory, when it should be re-established at Rajapoor, an exemption from customs until it amounted to an equivalent. It was with some difficulty that Sivajee was brought to consent to those articles which regarded the wrecks and the coin. He observed that the crews of ships should be assisted and protected ; but the wrecks being long considered the inherent property of the king of the country, he could not relinquish the right ; and that, with respect to English coin, it should always pass for its intrinsic value. Finally, however, he agreed* to all the articles, and Mr. Oxenden's embassy occasioned a more favourable impression towards the English on the part of Sivajee ; but, though the factory at Rajapoor was re-established, it was never profitable, and it is doubtful if the English ever recovered what was settled by the treaty. Mr. Aungier's immediate successors had not the talents nor the weight of that able man, who died at Bombay in 1676.

On Sivajee's enthronement, the names of such offices as were expressed in Persian were changed into Sanscrit, and some were designated by higher sounding titles. None of the new distinctions were preserved after Sivajee's death, except the eight ministers, or Asht Purdhans. Their duties continued the same as already explained, except that there was one commander-in-chief of the cavalry and infantry, and the Nyadeish was not administered by two persons. The names of the ministers, and the old and new appellations of their offices, were then as follow :—

<i>Name.</i>	<i>Original Title.</i>	<i>New Title.</i>
1. Moro Punt Pingley.	Peishwa.	Mookh Purdhan.
2. Ramchundur Punt Boureekur.	Muzzimdar.	Punt Amat.
3. Annajee Dutto.	Soornees.	Punt Suchew.
4. Duttajee Punt.	Wankunees.	Muntree.
5. Humbeer Rao Mohitey.	Surnobut.	Senaputtee.
6. Jenardin Punt Hunwuntay.	Dubeer.	Somunt.
7. Ballajee Punt.	Nyadeish.	Nyadeish.
8. Rugonath Punt.	Nya Shastree.	Pundit Rao.

Sivajee, by being weighed against gold,† the amount of which was afterwards distributed to Bramins, and by performing numerous charities

* Oxenden's Narrative, Mahratta MSS., and English Records.

† Dr. Fryer mentions that he weighed about 16,000 pagodas, which is equal to about ten stone.

as recommended by the rules of his religion, obtained a high rank amongst Rajpoots, from whom the Bramins could now pretend to prove his descent. The titles* he assumed were very lofty, and in future, on all public occasions, he imitated the grandeur and dignity of royalty.

Since the convention of Poorundhur, Sivajee had always pretended a right to the chouth of various parts of the Beejapoor territory, and of the whole of the Concan.† There is no mention of his having made this demand from the English; but he this year sent Moro Punt to Kallian for the purpose of exacting it from the Portuguese at Bassein.‡ It is not known by what means they evaded the payment; the Mahratta histories of Sivajee's life do not state that the Portuguese ever admitted the chouth; but frequent mention is made of their having paid tribute, and probably some compromise was made on the occasion alluded to.

Some aggressions on the part of the Moghul troops headed by Dilere Khan, having furnished Sivajee with an excuse for breaking his compact with the viceroy, Moro Punt attacked and retook Oundha and Putta, and made an unsuccessful attempt to surprise Sewnerree, the birth-place of Sivajee, which was never destined to fall into his hands. But the failure was compensated by the success of Humbeer Rao, the Senaputtee, who ascended one of the passes near Surat, divided his horse into several bodies, plundered the country to Burhanpoor, and from thence to Mahoor. One of his parties levied contributions in the Baroach district, being the first body of Mahrattas that ever crossed the Nerbuddah.

Sivajee himself laid siege to Ponda, after he had again possessed himself of all the thannas between Panalla and Tattora; but as soon as he was occupied in the Concan, and had carried down all the infantry that could be spared, Nimbalkur and Ghatgay, the Deshmookhs of Phultun and Mullaoree, attacked the garrisons, drove out the thannas, and recovered most of the open country for the king of Beejapoor.†

Humbeer Rao, after he had passed the Godavery on his route homewards, was very hotly pursued by Dilere Khan, and with difficulty brought off the valuable booty he had taken. A detachment of the Moghuls plundered the Kallian district, whilst Sivajee was still engaged besieging the fort of Ponda. A breach was at last effected by springing a mine, and the killidar, after a very creditable defence, surrendered. Upon this Sivajee proceeded to the southward, levied contributions in the Concan, plundered many places, ascended the Ghauts, penetrated into the Soonda country, and returned, laden with spoils, to Raigurh.†

At the opening of the season, Humbeer Rao again entered the Moghul territory, and did great mischief, whilst Khan Jehan Buhadur and Dilere Khan were engaged in another quarter.

Khowaus Khan, the regent of Beejapoor, finding his situation perilous, and having a greater regard for his own interests than the fulfilment of his trust, opened negotiations with Khan Jehan, agreed to hold Beejapoor as a dependent province of the empire, and to give Padshah Beebee, the young king's sister, in marriage to one of the sons of Aurungzebe.

When this proceeding became known, the nobles, at the head of whom was Abdool Khureem, entered into a conspiracy against Khowaus Khan, and he was assassinated by one Khureem Shirza, engaged for the purpose.

* These were Kshittrya Koolavutumsa, Sree, Raja Siva, Chuttur Puttee, or the head ornament of the Kahitree race, his Majesty, the Raja Siva, possessor or lord of the royal umbrella.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ Orme, English Records.

His death was not regretted, especially on account of his having agreed to give away the king's sister, in whom the people of Beejapoor took particular interest. The orders of Abdool Khureem to prepare for defence were obeyed with an alacrity unusual under the late regent, and when Khan Jehan Buhadur advanced, as was expected, towards the Beejapoor frontier, Abdool Khureem marched to oppose him. Several actions were fought, which ended advantageously for the army of Beejapoor; and as Dilere Khan was favourably disposed towards his countryman Abdool Khureem, a truce, and afterwards an alliance, was concluded by the mediation of the former.*

Sivajee for the third time took possession of the open country between A. D. 1676. Tattora and Panalla; and, in order to prevent future inroads by the jagheerdars in his neighbourhood, he gave orders for connecting those places by building a chain of forts, which he named Wurdungurh, Booshengurh, Sewdasheogurh, and Muchindergurh. Although of no great strength, they were judiciously chosen to support his intermediate posts, and to protect the highly productive tract within the frontier which they embrace. Whilst engaged in this arrangement, he was overtaken by a severe illness, the nature of which is unknown; but it confined him at Satara for several months. During this period he became extravagantly rigid in the observance of religious forms enjoined by his faith: but he was at the same time planning the most important expedition of his life.† The preliminary arrangements with other powers, the space over which his views extended, the combination of sagacity and enterprize, and the surprising success of the undertaking, are altogether so remarkable, that, in order to be fully understood, some preliminary observations regarding the general state of the country would be proper on this account alone, but a brief retrospect is also necessary as an introduction to the important events of the next 30 years.

* Beejapoor and Mahratta MSS., Scott's Deccan.

† Mahratta MSS. Mr. Orme mentions this illness as having confined him at Raigurh.

CHAP. IX.

FROM A. D. 1676 TO A. D. 1680.

State of politics in the Deccan when Sivajee undertakes his expedition into the Carnatic.—How suggested.—Preliminary arrangements.—Sivajee departs.—Conference and alliance with Kootub Shah at Hyderabad—proceeds to the southward—extraordinary devotions.—Progress of the conquests.—Negotiations with Venkajee.—Golcondah is invaded by the Moghuls, and the army of Beejapoor—they are repulsed.—Death of Abdool Khureem.—Musaood Khan, by the influence of Dilere Khan, appointed regent.—Sivajee sets out on his return—takes Bellary, &c.—Venkajee attacks Sivajee's troops, and is defeated.—A body of Mahrattas in the service of Beejapoor defeated by Sivajee's troops.—Successes of Jenardin Punt, who, by the aid of Humbeer Rao, reduces the Doab.—Proceedings of Moro Punt.—Sultan Mauzum returns to Aurungabad as viceroy.—Dilere Khan again ordered against Beejapoor.—Musaood Khan calls in the aid of Sivajee, who commits dreadful devastation in the Moghul provinces—plunders Jaulna—is attacked, and in danger of being worsted, when he retrieves the day by his personal exertions—is subsequently saved from great danger by one of his guides.—Twenty-seven forts taken.—Musaood Khan earnestly solicits further assistance.—Sumbhajee deserts to the Moghuls.—Dilere Khan's proposals.—Emperor's objections.—Sumbhajee returns to his father.—Dilere Khan raises the siege of Beejapoor—crosses the Kistna with a body of horse, and is attacked and defeated by Jenardin Punt.—Sivajee's claims in consequence of the assistance afforded to Beejapoor. Supremacy of Tanjore, &c., transferred to Sivajee.—Venkajee's independence affected by this arrangement—his behaviour in consequence.—Sivajee's excellent advice.—Sivajee's death and character—possessions and treasures.—The ministers, influenced by Soyera Bye, propose setting Sumbhajee aside, and appointing Raja Ram to the succession.—Sumbhajee discovers the plot—takes command of Panalla—displays considerable energy—seizes Jenardin Punt.—Moro Punt and Humbeer Rao join Sumbhajee.—The garrison of Raigurh and the army declare for him.

THE Emperor Aurungzebe, hitherto occupied in establishing his authority, regulating affairs, or suppressing revolt in the north, had never lost sight of his early and favourite scheme of annexing the whole Deccan to the empire ; but whilst his own presence was required in other parts, he was too suspicious to intrust the conquest to any deputy. He was, therefore, persevering in a systematic plan, calculated, as he conceived, to weaken and undermine the powers in that quarter so effectually that, when he could spare sufficient leisure, he might, with an overwhelming force, sweep all before him, and find a country rather to settle than to subdue.

Khan Jehan Buhadur was not an officer competent to the task of

reducing the Deccan ; but even if he had been, the army under his command was quite insufficient for such a purpose. The weakness of the Moghuls, defeated as large detachments of them were by the Mahrattas, on more than one occasion, seemed likely to afford encouragement for a confederacy of the other powers against them ; but in the divided state of affairs both at Beejapoor and Golcondah, principally maintained by his intrigues, Aurungzebe probably viewed it in a contrary light, as being less likely to rouse combination. His ambassadors were employed to create dissensions, not only by exciting jealousy between the Mahomedan courts, but by bribing every man in power, and stirring up factions in the internal governments.

Although Sivajee's daring robberies and incursions excited the utmost indignation, he was still contemptible as a power in the eyes of Aurungzebe ; and, whilst so considered, his ravages, directed against Beejapoor or Golcondah, were favourable to the emperor's plan. In this view, we may, in some measure, account for the conduct of Khan Jehan, who, for a long time, enjoyed as much of Aurungzebe's confidence as any of his officers, although it must have been well known to the emperor that Sivajee frequently purchased his connivance or forbearance ; for the fact was notorious in the European settlements.

With regard to Beejapoor and Golcondah, although the exertions of Abdool Khureem had obtained a temporary peace, he himself, as head of the faction which had destroyed Khowaus Khan, had nothing to hope from the Moghuls. His interests were completely those of the state ; and had it not been for his connection with Dilere Khan, and the other Afghans of the Moghul army, it was far more natural for him to have become the ally of Sivajee than of Aurungzebe. The Moghul faction in Beejapoor were the regent's enemies ; and the emperor, preserving the forms which the pacification required, sent there as his envoy Mullik Berkhardar, a native of Kashmeer, on whose address he placed reliance, to draw over the nobility not yet of his party, and to perplex the regent by every apparent civility and every mischievous intrigue.

At Golcondah the Moghul influence had long preponderated ; the death, however, of Abdool Kootub Shah, in 1672, had not been attended with the advantages which Aurungzebe may have anticipated. The nearest heir, Abou Hoossein, the son-in-law and successor of the late king, notorious for dissipated habits in his youth, was, on ascending the throne, completely reclaimed. Although a weak prince, he on some occasions asserted the dignity of his high place ; but he was under the influence of two brothers, Mahdhuna Punt and Akhana Punt, who, although reckoned men of ability, particularly the former, had all that disposition to refinement in intrigue which constitutes a principal defect in Bramin statesmen. Aurungzebe's measures partake precisely of that character ; and the result proves, not only the insignificance of the deepest cunning, but how much a homely maxim might serve as a lesson for kings. The emperor did not contemplate the whole effects of his system ; and the treachery and corruption, encouraged or tolerated at this period, were a principal cause of irretrievable confusion in the latter part of his reign.

But without further anticipation, such, in regard to the different powers, is a general view of the state of the Deccan when Sivajee undertook his expedition into the Carnatic. It was first suggested by Rugonath Narain Hunwuntay, whom we have already mentioned as the successor of his father, Naroo Punt, in the management of Shahjee's

jagheer in the Carnatic. Rugonath Narain was a man of superior abilities, but, after the death of his patron, he disgusted Venkajee by his overbearing conduct; and, on the other hand, the young man's interference in the direction of his own affairs gave the minister great offence. Their mutual interests; however, suppressed their growing hatred for a long time; but, after 11 or 12 years, Rugonath Narain left the Carnatic, and proceeded to the court of Abou Hoossein at Golcondah, where he formed an acquaintance with Mahdhuna Punt, and contrived to gain his confidence; but whether he took these steps, foreseeing the scheme to which he afterwards applied them, is uncertain. He came, however, to join Sivajee, by whom, as an old and distinguished servant of his father, and a brother of the Somunt Purdhan, he was received with great respect; and Ramchundur Punt, being the youngest of the ministers, Sivajee displaced him to make room for Rugonath Punt Hunwuntay, on whom he conferred the office of Amat Purdhan. The discussion of Sivajee's claim to share, according to Hindoo law, in half the possessions of Shahjee, and the possibility of making this a cloak for more extensive acquisitions in the south, was a constant subject of consultation during the rains, when Sivajee lay ill at Satara.*

The period was in every respect favourable to the undertaking, as the alliance between Beejapoor and the Moghuls, and particularly the connection between the regent and Dilere Khan, was a certain means of exciting the jealous apprehensions of Mahdhuna Punt. Dilere Khan had always shown himself a determined enemy of Golcondah; and he was likewise known to entertain an equal degree of enmity towards Sivajee.

The first object effected was an agreement with Khan Jehan, by giving him a large sum of money, part, it would appear, publicly, and a part privately. That which was publicly received was styled tribute by the Moghul—an appellation to which Sivajee reconciled himself, even at this stage of his independence, by comparing it to the oil-cake given to his milch cow.*

To secure his possessions, the frontier forts on the eastern side, which he had just completed, were well calculated to repel the inroads of Ghatgay and Nimbalkur; and, in order to guard the coast against the attacks or descents of the Seedee, he left Amajee Dutto, the Punt Suchew, with strong garrisons and a large body of disposeable infantry. His forts between Kallian and Ponda were very numerous; and no place could be attacked without being speedily supported from various quarters. The particular care of this tract was thus made over to the Suchew, but he was directed to assist the Peishwa, Moro Punt, to whom Sivajee delegated the chief management during his absence; this division of power, however, created an unconquerable jealousy between these ministers.

At the close of the year 1676, Sivajee set out, at the head of 30,000

A. D. 1677. horse and 40,000 infantry, towards Golcondah. Carefully abstaining from plunder, his march was conducted with the greatest regularity. Prillhad Punt, the son of the Nyadeish Purdhan, was sent forward to announce his approach, which, although known to Mahdhuna Punt, occasioned astonishment and alarm at Hyderabad. Mahdhuna Punt came out some distance to meet Sivajee, and the day after his arrival at Golcondah he had an interview with Kootub Shah, which lasted for several hours; many consultations followed, and Sivajee

* Mahratta MSS.

had the address to persuade the king that an alliance between them was not only necessary but natural.*

No authentic record of the particulars of the secret compact, which was entered into, has been preserved by the Mahrattas; but the purport seems to have been a division of such parts of Sivajee's conquests as had not belonged to his father Shahjee, and a treaty offensive and defensive against the Moghuls and their allies.† With the usual burlesque advantages, which a power not consulted commonly obtains by such alliances of its neighbours, Beejapoor was to be admitted to all the benefits of this agreement, after its possessions in the Carnatic had been reduced and divided between Sivajee and Kootub Shah, on condition of dismissing Abdool Khureem from the regency, and receiving the brother of Mahdhuna Punt in his stead.‡ What further inducement may have been held out, or whether the ambition or avarice of Mahdhuna Punt may have been more treacherously excited, cannot be discovered; but Sivajee succeeded in obtaining a considerable supply of money, and, what he most wanted, a train of artillery with its equipments. It is probable that he dispensed with all other reinforcements; and the necessity of keeping the whole of the troops of Kootub Shah for the defence of the kingdom was an opinion likely to arise of itself without being suggested by Sivajee.

After a month spent at Hyderabad, Sivajee, having concluded his arrangements, marched due south, and crossed the Kistna at the Neerootey

March.

Sungum, 25 miles below Kurnoul, about the month of March. Whilst his troops advanced slowly by the route of Kuddapah, Sivajee, with a body of cavalry, struck off to the eastward, for the purpose of visiting the temple of Purwuttum,§ where he performed many penances. At last he was worked up into such a state of enthusiasm as to draw his sword for the purpose of sacrificing himself to the deity, when, it is pretended, he was saved by the direct interposition of the goddess Bhowanee, by whose inspiration Sivajee on this occasion uttered one of his many prophecies; and whilst the deity, through him, declared the necessity of his yet remaining to perform many great services for the Hindoo faith, she announced the splendid conquests that were to be immediately achieved in the Carnatic.||

After passing 12 days in this extravagant manner, Sivajee followed his army, which descended into the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut by the Damulcherry¶ pass; and, as he had a double object in view, he left the heavy part of his army to come on by easy stages, whilst he pushed on with the cavalry and a body of his Mawulees. He passed Madras in the first week of May,** and, arriving in the neighbourhood of Ginjee, then belonging to Beejapoor, he obtained possession of it from the sons of Amber Khan, named Roop Khan and Nazir Mohummud, according to a previous agreement through Rugonath Narain,†† Ramajee Nulgay, one of his Mawulee commanders, was appointed havildar of the place, and

* One of the Mahratta MSS. contains a curious dissertation, tending to prove Golcondah the natural ally, and Beejapoor and the Moghuls the natural enemies, of Sivajee.

† Mahratta and Beejapoor MSS.

‡ Called by the Mahrattas Sree Sheyl Mullik Arjoon.

§ Colonel Wilks. The Mahratta MSS. call the pass Winkutrumunguree, but I conclude it is the same.

** Wilks.

†† I here follow my own MSS., although Colonel Wilks has adopted a different account.

¶ Beejapoor MSS.

|| Mahratta MSS.

the same regulations as those established in his forts in Maharashtra were now, at a distance of 600 miles, commenced in Drawed; and Wittul Peeldeo Garoodkur, with the general care of the dependent districts, was directed, in like manner, to introduce his revenue system.

An officer of the Beejapoor government, named Sher Khan, in charge of the district of Trinamullee, made an effort to oppose Sivajee at the head of 5,000 horse; but he was quickly surrounded, made prisoner, and his horses seized, according to the custom of Mahratta victors. Suntajee, the half-brother of Sivajee, had joined him before this affair, and very soon showed that he inherited a portion of the family spirit and ability.

In the meantime, the remaining part of the army which Sivajee had purposely left in the rear, had invested the strong fortress of Vellore. The siege was conducted by a Bramin, named Neerhurry Bullal. He erected his principal batteries on two adjacent hills, which he named Saujra and Gojura; and after a siege of some duration, the detail of which is very imperfectly given in the Mahratta manuscripts, the fort surrendered* about the latter end of September.

During the siege of Vellore, Sivajee had been endeavouring to effect his designs on Tanjore, and had induced his brother to meet him at Trivadey, for the purpose of discussing his claim to share in their father's property. Venkajee, apprized of his designs, would, in the first instance, have resisted by force; but the Naik of Madura, who had agreed to assist him, was detached from the alliance by the address of Rugonath Narain, and Venkajee adopted the alternative of visiting his brother. Sivajee received him with many professions of regard, but he could not persuade him to give up half the property. Whilst the one urged his claim, the other obstinately denied it. Sivajee at first thought of making him prisoner, and compelling him to give up the half of Tanjore, of the jagheer districts, and of the money and jewels; but on further consideration, according to the words of his own letter, as Venkajee had come of his own accord to visit him, such a measure appeared to be "inconsistent with his own character as a brother and a prince;" he therefore permitted him to return to Tanjore. To keep open the door of accommodation, though at the same time he had determined to seize upon the other districts, Sivajee sent messengers to Venkajee to endeavour to prevail upon him to give up half of Tanjore, Arnee, one or two of the forts, and to make an equal division without any quarrel; desiring his brother to recollect that it was not mere territory he desired—of that he possessed and could bestow abundance—but his inheritance (*wutun*) he was bound in honour not to renounce.

After the interview at Trivadey, Sivajee came to Vellore, which had surrendered previous to his arrival. Carnaticgurrh and two other forts† were reduced immediately after, and Vedo Bhaskur, a Bramin who had been in charge of Arnee since the time of Shahjee, brought the keys of the fort, and tendered his services to Sivajee, by whom he was confirmed in his command, and his two sons taken into the service. The jagheer districts of Shahjee, consisting of Kolhar, Bangalore, Ouscotta, Balapoor, and Sera, were all taken possession of by Sivajee before the beginning of the ensuing year; and his horse either levied contributions under the name of chouth and surdeshmookhee, or, where refused, plundered the whole Carnatic subject to the kingdom of Beejapoor.

* In the Beejapoor MSS. of Abou Hoossein Qazee, it is asserted that Abdoolla Khan, the governor, gave it up for a bribe of 50,000 pagodas.

† Called in the Mahratta MSS. Jugdeogurrh and Maharajgurrh.

The truce which Khan Jehan Buhadur had entered into with Sivajee was not approved of by Aurungzebe ; and Dilere Khan, having submitted a proposal for invading Golcondah, assisted by Abdool Khureem and the troops of Beejapoor, on the plan suited to the emperor's system of exhausting the Deccan states, Khan Jehan was recalled, and Dilere Khan ordered to carry his proposals into effect.

The excuse for this combined attack on the part of Dilere Khan and Abdool Khureem was the alliance which Kootub Shah had entered into with Sivajee. But Mahdhuna Punt had foreseen the coming storm ; the invaders were met by an overwhelming force, and were soon compelled to retreat. The troops of Beejapoor had suffered great privation ; numbers deserted in consequence, and those that remained were so disorderly and clamorous for want of pay, that it was impossible to lead them against the enemy.* To add to the general distress, Abdool Khureem was taken ill, and his life being despaired of, Dilere Khan attempted to reconcile the factions, and it was agreed that Musaood Khan, an Abyssinian, son-in-law of Seedee Johur, and jagheerदार of Adonee,† should eventually succeed to the regency. Abdool Khureem died in January 1678, and

A. D. 1678. Musaood Khan was appointed his successor accordingly.

His personal property was the principal motive for choosing Musaood Khan, especially as he promised to pay the debts of Dilere Khan, as well as the arrears due to the troops.‡ He also bound himself to fulfil the agreement made by Khowaus Khan, to preserve peace and order, to have no sort of communication with Sivajee, to abide by the advice of Dilere Khan on all occasions, and to send Padshah Beebee to the Moghul camp. Musaood Khan paid a part of the arrears due to the infantry ; but, after returning to Beejapoor, he would neither pay nor retain a great portion of the cavalry. Large bodies were let loose upon the country in consequence ; some were entertained by Moro Punt in Sivajee's service, and others joined the Moghuls.‡ A gloomy discontent prevailed at Beejapoor ; but on the regent's afterwards promising not to give the king's sister to the Moghuls, he acquired considerable popularity.

Dilere Khan, after the agreement with Musaood Khan was concluded, immediately marched towards Pairgaom ; and Sivajee, on learning the state of affairs, began his march from the Carnatic. He appointed his half-brother Suntajee to the charge of Ginjee and its dependencies, and associated him with Rugonath Narain and Humbeer Rao, Senaputtee, in the general management of his affairs in the Carnatic.

As Sivajee had given up no part of his late acquisitions, the king of Golcondah probably by this time perceived that he had been duped by him ; but a friendly intercourse existed after Sivajee's return to Raigurh.

When Sivajee's troops arrived in the neighbourhood of Bellary, a few of his foragers were killed by some of the people belonging to the fort, which was then in possession of the widow of a Dessaye. As satisfaction was refused, the outrage furnished an excuse for attacking the place, which was invested and taken after a siege of 27 days. Sivajee next besieged and took Kopaul. Buhadur Benda surrendered 15 days afterwards, and the neighbouring country was immediately taken possession of. Jenardin Punt Somunt, one of the Purdhans, was left to settle

* Scott's Deccan.

† He obtained his wealth by the favour of Einayat Oolla, a rich man and jagheerदार of Adonee, who made him his heir.

‡ Beejapoor MSS.

the new acquisition. Sivajee continued his march, but on arriving at Toorgul, he halted; accounts having reached him of an attack made upon his troops in the Carnatic, by his brother Venkajee, who had been repulsed with considerable loss. Upon receipt of this intelligence, Sivajee addressed a long letter* to his brother, in which he recapitulated everything that had occurred, represented the extreme indiscretion of a conduct which had compelled him to take possession of the districts, and now had obliged his officers to repel aggression by force of arms; that the slaughter of the vile Mahomedans, who had joined in the attack, was not to be regretted, but he ought to reflect on the sacrifice of valuable lives which it had occasioned. Sivajee in this letter dwells much on the necessity of union and the propriety of peace, which last he now proposes to grant on receiving the whole of their father's territorial possessions in the Carnatic, for which he promises, either to allow his brother an equivalent in the Panalla districts, or to obtain a grant of territory from his ally, Kootub Shah, in some other part of the country, equal to three lakhs of pagodas annually.

Venkajee, on receipt of this letter, requested an interview with Rugonath Narain; but the latter replied that he was now in the service of his majesty Sivajee, but should be happy to attend upon receiving orders to that effect. This permission having been obtained, Rugonath Narain brought about an accommodation. Venkajee agreed to pay down a considerable sum of money, to divide their father's jewels, and to share the revenue of the territory with his brother. On these conditions Sivajee allowed him to retain Tanjore, and restored the jagheer districts.

Whilst Sivajee remained near Toorgul, a body of horse belonging to Ghatgay and Nimbalkur appeared in the Panalla district, laid waste the country, and retired, plundering, towards Kurar. A detachment from Sivajee's army under Neelajee Katkur overtook them at Koorlee, attacked and dispersed them, recovering much valuable property, which, as it belonged to his own subjects, Sivajee scrupulously restored.

Jenardin Punt being threatened by a body of horse belonging to Beejapoor, Sivajee sent back a part of his troops to reinforce him, whilst he himself, attended by a small escort, reached Raigurh before the commencement of the south-west monsoon, after an absence of 18 months.

Humber Rao, on the conclusion of the agreement with Venkajee, marched towards Maharashtra with all expedition, and Jenardin Punt, apprized of his approach, concerted a combined attack on the Beejapoor troops in the Doab,† which completely succeeded: 500 horses, 5 elephants, and the commander of the party were taken. The whole of the tract between the Toongbuddra and the Kistna was overrun, and the refractory deshmookhs in the neighbourhood of Kopaul and Bellary, who had for some time refused all payments to the government of Beejapoor, were compelled to submit to the troops of Sivajee.‡ The reduced state of Beejapoor, its want of cavalry, and the swelling of the rivers from the

* The original of this and other three letters written by Sivajee to Venkajee are in possession of the hereditary Chitnees, or secretary, of his highness the raja of Satara. They were recovered by the grandfather of the present Chitnees, from a descendant of Rugonath Narain Hunwuntay. I have had them examined, and I have compared them with the handwriting of Ballajee Aujee, Sivajee's Chitnees, and have every reason to believe them authentic.

† The tract between the Kistna and the Toongbuddra is here meant.

‡ Original letter from Sivajee to Venkajee.

rains, prevented Musaood Khan from making an effort to recover these valuable districts.

During Sivajee's absence, Moro Trimmul, the Peishwa, provided for the security of the territory with his usual activity and ability. The war with the Seedees, who were reinforced every season by the Moghul fleet from Surat, continued to be waged with rancorous enmity. Descents upon the Mahratta coast, actions with vessels on both sides, attempts to burn the Seedee's fleet, and a slow but lasting cannonade on Jinjeera, was the manner in which the warfare was maintained.* The only event which it seems requisite to particularize, was the supersession of Seedee Sumbhole by Seedee Kassim, in consequence of an order from the emperor. The title conferred on the new chief, who is admitted by the Mahrattas to have been an excellent officer, was Yakoot Khan—the same as that of his predecessor.

It was probably in consequence of the truce between the Moghuls and Beejapoor that Moro Punt was induced to entertain numbers of the discharged cavalry of Beejapoor, being apprehensive that Dilere Khan meditated hostilities on his return to Pairgaom; but Aurungzebe was displeased with the adjustment which Dilere Khan had made, and informed him that he ought to have effected a more complete arrangement by providing for the nobility, paying the arrears of the troops, and taking the government under the imperial protection; he, therefore, commanded him to endeavour to amend his error whilst it was yet reparable, to pay the arrears of the cavalry, and to draw over as many of the officers as he could.† Sultan Mauzum was again appointed to the government of the Deccan, but the command of the army in the field remained with Dilere Khan. The Afghan party in Beejapoor were easily detached; but many of those who were violently factious, although averse to the existing authority, had still a greater dislike to the Moghuls. The envoy formally demanded Padshah Beebee as the only means of averting an immediate siege. Musaood Khan refused compliance. One of the factions, headed by Syud Mukhtoom, and instigated by Mullik Berkhardar, assembled in arms to enforce the request at a time when the regent was unprepared; but a battle in the midst of the city was prevented by the king's sister, who herself repaired to the spot, and declared her intention of proceeding to the Moghul camp, vainly but generously imagining that, by this sacrifice, her brother and his kingdom might be saved.‡ The Mahomedan inhabitants of Beejapoor, who yet remain, revert with fond garrulity to this anecdote, and to many traditional legends of their last and favourite princess.

Padshah Beebee reached Dilere Khan's camp when the Moghuls were advancing to invest the city, a fit escort was furnished to conduct her to

A. D. 1679. Aurungabad, but the imperial army prosecuted its march. Musaood Khan in this dilemma sought assistance from Sivajee, who agreed to attack Dilere Khan, or effect a diversion in favour of the besieged. For this purpose Sivajee assembled a large body of cavalry at Panalla, and marched towards Beejapoor; but, finding the besiegers strong, and not choosing to encounter the Patans, of whom a

* All these affairs have been patiently and minutely detailed by Mr. Orme, and are interesting, because connected with the early history of one of our Indian Presidencies. Bombay was frequently involved in the broils of its neighbours, and sometimes exposed to the insolence of both parties.

† Beejapoor MSS., and Scott's Deccan.

‡ Beejapoor MSS.

large portion of Dilere Khan's army was composed; he only made a show of attacking, advanced slowly until within 24 miles of the camp, when he turned off to the northward, rapidly crossed the Beema, and attacked the Moghul possessions, literally with fire and sword, leaving the inhabitants houseless and the villages in ashes. Dilere Khan did not relinquish the siege, and Sivajee continued his depredations from the Beema to the Godavery. He crossed the latter river, attacked Jaulna, and, although Sultan Mauzum was at Aurungabad, plundered the town leisurely for three days, pointing out, as was his custom on such occasions, the particular houses and spots where money and valuables were secreted. Nothing escaped him, and no place was a sanctuary; the residence of the *peers*, or Mahomedan saints, which Sivajee had hitherto held sacred, were on this occasion pillaged.* The laden booty was a certain signal that Sivajee would take some route towards Raigurh, and a body of 10,000 horse having been collected, by the prince's orders, from various parts under Runmust Khan, pursued, overtook, and attacked Sivajee near Sungunnere on his route to Putta. A part of his troops were thrown into confusion, owing principally to the impetuosity of Suntajee Ghorepuray; Seedojee Nimbalkur, an officer of distinction, was killed;† but Sivajee led a desperate charge,‡ and by great personal exertion retrieved the day. The Moghul troops were broken, and he continued his route; but he had not proceeded far when he was again attacked by the Moghuls, who had been joined by a large reinforcement under Kishen Sing, one of the grandsons of Mirza Raja Jey Sing. This division cut him off from the pass to which he was marching, and Sivajee's army was unable to contend with such an accumulated force. But the superior intelligence of one of his Jasooses,§ or guides, saved Sivajee in this emergency. He conducted him across the hills by a pass unknown to the Moghuls, by which he gained several hours' march in advance, and safely reached Putta.|| The Moghul troops returned to Aurungabad, and Sivajee judged the opportunity favourable for possessing himself of the whole of the forts near Putta, 27 in number; for which purpose he ordered a body of infantry to join Moro Punt from the Concan, in order to reduce as many of them as possible; and a large detachment of cavalry was likewise placed at the Peishwa's disposal.

Sivajee remained at Putta until he received an express from Musaood Khan, entreating him to return southward, and make an effort to relieve the city: "that Dilere Khan had run his approaches close to the walls, and that nothing but prompt exertion could save them."¶ Sivajee again set off for Beejapoor, when news reached him that his son Sumbhajeo had fled and joined Dilere Khan. He directed his army to pursue their route under Humbeer Rao, whilst he himself retired to Panalla to devise means of bringing back Sumbhajeo.

The conduct of his eldest son had for some time been a source of grief and vexation to Sivajee; and in consequence of Sumbhajeo's attempting

* Sivajee's death is said to have happened in consequence. Khafee Khan, who has adopted the story, is seldom so injudicious.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ This part of the account is confirmed by Sivajee's letters to his brother, where he says—"It was a time proper to disregard life."

§ Jasoos literally means, and is professionally, a spy, but they are employed in all Deccan armies as guides, messengers, and letter-carriers.

|| Mahratta MSS. Sivajee himself takes no notice of this flight, but, by the mere name of Wisamgurh, or the place of rest, which he then gave the fort, there is circumstantial evidence of his having been hard pressed, when repose was so necessary.

¶ Original letter from Sivajee, who quotes the words of Musaood Khan.

to violate the person of the wife of a Bramin, his father for a time confined him in Panalla, and placed a strict watch over him after he was released. Sumbhaje, impatient under this control, took advantage of his father's absence, and deserted to Dilere Khan,^a by whom he was received with great distinction.†

Dilere Khan sent accounts of this event to the emperor, and proposed, as the Mahrattas were becoming so very powerful, to set up Sumbhaje at the head of a party, in opposition to his father, in order to divide their interests, and facilitate the capture of the forts. But this scheme, although it appeared to Dilere Khan similar to what was then carried on against Beejapoor and Golcondah, was disapproved by the emperor, as it would ultimately conduce to strengthen predatory power; and it is remarkable that this reason, than which none could be more just at that period, should be recorded by a Mahratta biographer of Sivajee.‡ Although it rests on no other authority, we cannot but remark that, had such an opinion guided Aurungzebe's measures at an earlier period, and the view been a little more extended, so as to have preserved the other Mahomedan states from becoming first a prey, and then an accession of strength, to the Mahrattas, the policy of this emperor might have met its meed of praise, with far more justice than we can discover in those eulogies which have been frequently bestowed upon it.

But before sufficient time had elapsed to obtain a reply from court, Dilere Khan, intent on his own scheme, took measures for carrying it into effect. He sent a detachment of his army from before Beejapoor, accompanied by Sumbhaje, as raja of the Mahrattas, to lay siege to Bhopaulgurh, the extreme outpost of Sivajee's possessions to the eastward, which was taken.

Humber Rao, detached by Sivajee towards Beejapoor, fell in with 8,000 or 9,000 cavalry under Runnust Khan, the same officer lately sent by Sultan Mauzum against Sivajee; and he again sustained a severe defeat.

Moro Punt took Ahoont and Nahawagurh, both forts of great strength, and dispersed his army all over Candeish, which was plundered and laid waste. Humber Rao hovered about the camp of Dilere Khan, whilst the besieged, encouraged by Musaood Khan, continued a most resolute defence. Dilere Khan pressed the siege, but personal exertion could not avail when all supplies were cut off. He at last was compelled to abandon all hope of reducing the place; and, at the end of the rains, attacked the open country, plundered Hutnee, crossed the Kistna as soon as fordable, divided the troops, and was laying waste the Carnatic, when Jenardin Punt, with 6,000 horse, attacked the party commanded by Dilere Khan in person, completely defeated him, intercepted his parties, cut several of them to pieces, and compelled him to retreat.

By this time orders had arrived from the emperor recalling Sultan Mauzum, disapproving of Dilere Khan's measures, and reinstating Khan Jehan in command of the army, and in the government of the Deccan. Sumbhaje was ordered to be sent prisoner to Delhi; but Dilere Khan, who had permitted Sivajee's emissaries to have access to him, now contrived at his escape; and, although Sivajee was reconciled to him, he confined him in the fort of Panalla until he should give proofs of amendment.

Sivajee, as the price of his alliance with Beejapoor, required the cession A. D. 1680, of the tract around Kopaul and Bellary, also the cession of all claims to sovereignty on the conquered territory in Drawn, the principality of Tanjore, and the jagheer districts of Shahjee.

exp. Beejapoor.

† Beejapoor MSS.

† Scott's Deccan.

† Kistnaje Anund Subhasud.

These conditions being complied with, Sivajee went to the neighbourhood of the city of Beejapoor, where he had an interview and a secret consultation with Musaood Khan.

The supremacy granted to Sivajee was considered by Venkajee as a death-blow to his independence ; he was already not only subjected to the interference of Rugonath Punt, but Sivajee, on pretence of assisting him with fit agents, took a large share of the management into his own hands. Venkajee, impatient of control, appears to have been so greatly mortified, that he resigned himself to melancholy, neglected his affairs, and omitted even the usual care of his person, and the observances enjoined by his religion ; he became careless and abstracted from all worldly affairs, and assumed the conduct rather of a devotee than of an active chief, such as he had hitherto shown himself. On this occasion Sivajee addressed a letter to him, full of energy and good sense. This letter was amongst the last* that Sivajee ever dictated ; he was taken ill at Raigurh, occasioned by painful swelling in his knee-joint, which became gradually worse, and at last threw him into a high fever, which, on the seventh day from its commencement, terminated his existence on the 5th day of April 1680, in the 53rd year of his age.

Such was the end of Sivajee. We have passed over some details in his warfare with the Seedees, which may require retrospective notice, and have been drawn forward by a chain of more important events, until we have reached that point where we naturally pause, to look back on the

* As the letter alluded to is neither very long nor prolix, which precludes the insertion of the others, a translation is subjoined as nearly literal as can be understood.

"Sivajee to Venkajee."

After compliments. "Many days have elapsed without my receiving any letter from you ; and, in consequence, I am not in comfort. Ragoo Punt has now written, that you, having placed melancholy and gloom before yourself, do not take care of your person, or in any way attend to yourself as formerly ; nor do you keep up any great days or religious festivals. Your troops are inactive, and you have no mind to employ yourself on state affairs. You have become a Byragee, and think of nothing but to sit in some place accounted holy, and let time wear away. In this manner much has been written to me, and such an account of you has given me great concern. I am surprised when I reflect that you have our father's example before you—how did he encounter and surmount all difficulties, perform great actions, escape all dangers by his spirit and resolution, and acquire a renown which he maintained to the last ? All he did is well known to you. You enjoyed his society, you had every opportunity of profiting by his wisdom and ability. Even I myself, as circumstances enabled me, have protected myself, and you also know, and have seen, how I have established a kingdom. Is it then for you, in the very midst of opportunity, to renounce all worldly affairs, and turn Byragee—to give up your affairs to persons who will devour your estate—to ruin your property, and injure your bodily health ? What kind of wisdom is this, and what will it end in ? I am to you as your head and protection ; from me you have nothing to dread. Give up therefore all this, and do not become a Byragee. Throw off dependency, spend your days properly ; attend to fasts, feasts, and customary usages, and attend to your personal comforts. Look to the employment of your people, the discipline of your army, and turn your attention to affairs of moment. Make your men do their duty : apply their services properly in your quarter, and gain fame and renown. What a comfort and happiness it will be to me to hear the praise and fame of my younger brother. Rugonath Pundit is near you, he is no stranger to you, consult him on what is most advisable to be done, and he will consider you in the same light as myself. I have placed every confidence in him—do you the same ; hold together for your mutual support, and you will acquire celebrity and fame. Above all things, be not slothful ; do not allow opportunity to slip past without receiving some returns from your army. This is the time for performing great actions. Old age is the season for turning Byragee. Arouse ! bestir yourself. Let me see what you can do. Why should I write more ? you are wise."

life of any human being who has just ceased to be. Sivajee was certainly a most extraordinary person; and, however justly many of his acts may be censured, his claim to high rank in the page of history must be admitted. To form an estimate of his character, let us consider him assembling and conducting a band of half-naked Mavulees through the wild tracts where he first established himself, unmindful of obstruction from the elements, turning the most inclement seasons to advantage, and inspiring the minds of such followers with undaunted enthusiasm. Let us also observe the singular plans of policy he commenced, and which we must admit to have been altogether novel, and most fit for acquiring power at such a period. Let us examine his internal regulations, the great progress he made in arranging every department in the midst of almost perpetual warfare, and his successful stratagems for escaping or extricating himself from difficulty; and whether planning the capture of a fort, or the conquest of a distant country; heading an attack or conducting a retreat; regulating the discipline to be observed amongst a hundred horse, or laying down arrangements for governing a country; we view his talents with admiration, and his genius with wonder. For a popular leader, his frugality was a remarkable feature in his character; and the richest plunder never made him deviate from the rules he had laid down for its appropriation.

Sivajee was patient and deliberate in his plans, ardent, resolute, and persevering in their execution; but even in viewing the favourable side, duplicity and meanness are so much intermixed with his schemes, and so conspicuous in his actions, that the offensive parts of a worse character might be passed over with less disgust. Superstition, cruelty, and treachery are not only justly alleged against him, but he always preferred deceit to open force when both were in his power. But to sum up all, let us contrast his craft, pliancy, and humility with his boldness, firmness, and ambition; his power of inspiring enthusiasm while he showed the coolest attention to his own interests; the dash of a partizan adventurer, with the order and economy of a statesman; and, lastly, the wisdom of his plans which raised the despised Hindoos to sovereignty, and brought about their own accomplishment when the hand that had framed them was low in the dust.

Sivajee's admirers among his own nation speak of him as an incarnation of a deity, setting an example of wisdom, fortitude, and piety. Mahrattas, in general, consider that necessity justifies a murder, and that political assassination is often wise and proper. They admit that Sivajee authorised the death of Chunder Rao, the raja of Jowlee; but few of them acknowledge that Afzool Khan was murdered. The vulgar opinion is that the Khan was the aggressor; and the event is spoken of rather as a commendable exploit than a detestable and treacherous assassination.

From what can be learned of Sivajee in domestic life, his manners were remarkably pleasing, and his address winning; he was apparently frank, but seldom familiar; passionate in his disposition, but kind to his dependents and relations. He was a man of small stature, and of an active rather than strong make; his countenance was handsome and intelligent; he had very long arms in proportion to his size, which is reckoned a beauty among Mahrattas.* The

* Mahratta MSS., and tradition among his descendants, and the descendants of his ministers and domestics.

In the Ali Namu, Nusserut satirizes the big feet and long arms of the Mahrattas. There is no likeness of Sivajee preserved either at Kolapoor or Satara; and none of

sword* which he constantly used, and which he named after the goddess Bhowanee, is still preserved by the raja of Satara with the utmost veneration, and has all the honors of an idol paid to it.

Sivajee, at the time of his death, was in possession of the whole of that part of the Concan extending from Gundavee to Ponda; with the exceptions of Goa, lower Choule, Salsette, and Bassein, belonging to the Portuguese; Jinjeera, in possession of the Abyssinians; and the English settlement on the island of Bombay. He had thannas in Carwar, Ankola, and several places on the coast, where he shared the districts with the deshmookhs. The chief of Soonda acknowledged his authority, and the rana of Bednore paid him an annual tribute. Exclusive of his possessions around Bellary and Kopaul, his conquest in Drawed, his supremacy as well as share in Tanjore, and the jagheer districts of his father in the Carnatic, Sivajee occupied that tract of Maharashtra from the Hurnkassee river on the south, to the Indooranee river on the north, between Poona and Joonere. The districts of Sopa, Baramuttee, and Indapoor were occasionally held, and always claimed by him as his paternal jagheer; and the line of forts, built from Tattora to Panalla, distinctly mark the boundary of his consolidated territory to the eastward. He, however, had a number of detached places. Singnapoor, at the temple of Mahdeo, was his hereditary enam village; † the fort of Parneira, near Damaun, was rebuilt by Moro Triumful; and his garrisons and thannas occupied a great part of Buglana, and several strong places in Candeish and Sungunnere. His personal wealth was immense; and, making large allowance for exaggeration in the Mahratta manuscripts, he had, without doubt, several millions in specie‡ at Raigurh.

The territory and treasures, however, which Sivajee acquired were not so formidable to the Mahomedans as the example he had set, the system and habits he introduced, and the spirit he had infused into a large proportion of the Mahratta people.

None of his successors inherited his genius, but the rise and fall of empires depend on such an infinite variety of circumstances, that those instruments which often appear to human foresight the least likely to produce a particular end, are the very means by which it is accomplished.

Sivajee had four wives—Suhjee Bye, of the family of Nimbalkur; Soyera Bye, of the Sirkay family; Pootla Bye, of the family of Mohitey; and a fourth wife, whose name and family are unknown. Of these, two

the Europeans who saw him have recorded any description of his person. His body was burnt at Raigurh, where there was a tomb erected over the collected ashes. There is a building in the fort of Malwan, which is considered as his cenotaph. The origin of this building, however, is as old as the fort when first erected by Sivajee, who placed *Poojarees*, or persons to observe certain forms of worship, during which "the sea should not encroach on the walls, nor should an enemy prevail." Sumbhaje made some additions to this establishment; and Raja Ram, after the fall of Raigurh, made it the cenotaph, or rather the place of commemoration of Sivajee. The Bramins in charge still enjoy the advantages of the original endowment, and have made several additions, with a view of imposing on the credulity of the vulgar, who repair with offerings to the shrine. They have an effigy, and the *real* sword of Sivajee, whose body, by their account, lies buried there.

* Sivajee's sword is an excellent Genoa blade of the first water. Its whole history is recorded by the hereditary historian of the family.

† Given by one of the Ghats to his father Shahjee.

‡ Sivajee's treasury, besides rupees, contained, as might have been expected, coins of all descriptions; Spanish dollars, Venetian sequins, goldmohurs of Hindostan and Surat, and pagodas of the Carnatic, are all enumerated in the lists, with many others. Ingots of gold and silver, cloth of gold, &c., &c., &c.

survived him, Soyera Bye and Pootla Bye; the latter immolated herself, but was burnt some weeks after her husband's corpse, owing to the secrecy which was observed respecting his death.

Suhyee Bye, the mother of Sumbhaje, died in 1659, two years after his birth; Soyera Bye was the mother of Raja Ram, and, being an artful woman, not only had great influence with her husband, but a considerable ascendancy over several of the principal ministers, especially Annajee Dutto, the Punt Suchew. Sivajee, during the last days of his life, had expressed to Moro Punt, Annajee Dutto, and others, that, in the event of his death, much evil was to be apprehended from the misconduct of Sumbhaje; and these words were interpreted by Soyera Bye and her faction as a will in favour of Raja Ram, then a boy of ten years old. Moro Trimmul Peishwa, although Annajee Dutto had always been his rival, was at first drawn into a plan of administering the government under a regency in the name of Raja Ram. The other Purdhans likewise acquiesced in the arrangement, and measures were immediately taken to carry it into effect.

Sivajee's death was to be kept a profound secret until Sumbhaje's confinement should be rendered perfectly secure. The funeral obsequies were performed privately by Shahjee Bhonslay, a relation of the family. A force under Jenardin Punt Somunt, whom we have seen so active in the Carnatic, was directed to march to Panalla; the garrison of Raigurh was strengthened; 10,000 horse were stationed at the neighbouring village of Panchwur; and Humbeer Rao, the Senaputtee, was ordered with a large army to take up a position at Kurar. As some time was necessary for any of these movements, letters were despatched to Heerajee Furzund, in charge of Sumbhaje at Panalla, to apprise him of what was going forward. But Sumbhaje had either been informed of the event, or suspected his father's death, for, on the appearance of the messenger with the letters, he seized and threatened him with instant death if he did not give up the packet. Its delivery discovered the whole. Heerajee Furzund fled into the Concan; Sumbhaje took command of the fort, and was obeyed by the garrison; but he immediately put two of the principal officers to death. Not knowing whom to trust beyond the walls of the fort, he made preparations for defending it, and resolved to await events. Jenardin Punt, finding the place in Sumbhaje's possession, sat down to blockade it, and after some weeks was content to leave his guards at their posts, whilst he took up his abode in the town of Kolapoor.

Raja Ram was placed on the throne in May, and the ministers began the conduct of affairs in his name; but as latent rivalry is easily excited, the Peishwa and the Suchew soon became jealous of each other.

Sumbhaje, in the meantime, having gained over a part of Jenardin Punt's troops, took a chosen band of his Mawulee garrison, proceeded through the Punt's lines in the night, seized him in the town of Kolapoor, and carried him back to Panalla, a prisoner. Humbeer Rao Mohitey, delighted by this exploit, so worthy of the son of Sivajee, became immediately inclined to Sumbhaje's cause; and Moro Punt, who had set out from Raigurh on the news of Jenardin Punt's disaster, instead of exerting himself for the cabal, offered his services to Sumbhaje, by whom he was confirmed as Peishwa, but never succeeded in gaining his confidence. Humbeer Rao advanced and paid his respects, when Sumbhaje immediately quitted Panalla, and proceeded towards Raigurh. Before his arrival the garrison had risen in his favour, and confined such as would have opposed his authority. The army at Panchwur came over to him in a body, and Sumbhaje entered Raigurh in the end of June 1680.

CHAP. X.

FROM A. D. 1680 TO A. D. 1689.

Cruelties exercised by Sumbhaje on assuming power—execution of Soyera Bye.—Inauspicious commencement of his reign.—Unavailing attempts to drive the Seedee from the island of Kenery.—Sultan Mohummud Akber seeks an asylum in Sumbhaje's territory.—Plot in favour of Raja Ram.—Executions.—Execution of Annajee Dutto.—Moro Punt imprisoned.—Rugonath Narain Hunwuntay—his spirited remonstrances, and their consequences.—Sumbhaje attacks Jinjeera.—Moghuls make an incursion into the Concan, and are compelled to retreat.—Assault on Jinjeera repulsed—siege raised.—Sumbhaje attacks the Portuguese—endeavour to conciliate the English.—Portuguese besiege Ponda, and are compelled to retreat with heavy loss.—Kuloosha, the prime minister of Sumbhaje.—Decay in the institutions of Sivaje.—State of the army—lands over-assessed.—Approach of Aurungzebe.—Survey of the state of the Deccan, from the first year after Sumbhaje's accession, up to the fall of Beejapoor and Golcondah.—Extraordinary revolution amongst the English at Bombay.—Aurungzebe's operations.—Salheir is surrendered.—Sultan Mauzum is sent to attack Sumbhaje in the Concan.—Imposition of the Jizee—reflections.—Death of Dilere Khan.—Aurungzebe arrives at Ahmednugur—description of his camp.—Operations of Sultan Mauzum, Humbeer Rao, and Khan Jehan.—Distress of Sultan Mauzum's army—returns extremely reduced—operations.—Mahrattas plunder Baroach, and proclaim Mohummud Akber emperor.—Operations against Beejapoor and Golcondah.—Murder of Mahdhuna Punt.—Truce with Golcondah.—Siege and capture of Beejapoor—description of the present state of its ruins.—Fall of Golcondah.—Arrangements in the conquered districts.—Mode in which the Moghuls took possession of, and regulated, a district.—Operations of the Mahrattas.—Humbeer Rao defeats Shirzee Khan, but falls in the battle.—Operations in the Carnatic.—Profligacy and imbecility of Sumbhaje.—Sultan Mohummud Akber quits him in disgust.—Remarkable consequences of the laxity of discipline in Sumbhaje's army.—State of the Hindoo population in Maharashtra.—Impolicy of Aurungzebe.—Remarks on the state of the country, extending, by anticipation, to a period of twelve years after the subversion of the Deccan kingdoms.—Operations of the emperor.—Piracies of the English.—Sumbhaje surprised and made prisoner, together with his minister—behaviour—execution.—Summary of his character.

SUMBHAJEE'S conduct, from the time of his father's death until he entered his capital, discovered a vigour and method the more satisfactory from being unexpected; and had he taken advantage of the general submission, and published a declaration of amnesty, the address and energy he had shown would have suppressed all recollection of his early faults; but the barbarity of his disposition

was displayed from the moment he passed the gate of Raigurh. Annajee Dutto was put in irons, thrown into prison, and his property confiscated. Raja Ram was also confined; Soyera Bye was seized, and, when brought before Sumbhajee, he insulted her in the grossest manner, accused her of having poisoned Sivajee, loaded her with every epithet of abuse, and ordered her to be put to a cruel and lingering death. The Mahratta officers attached to her cause were beheaded; and one, particularly obnoxious, was precipitated from the top of the rock of Raigurh. This severity, justly deemed unnecessary and cruel, besides causing an inveterate enmity in the minds of Soyera Bye's relations, was considered a most inauspicious commencement; and on the occasion of his being seated on the throne, in the early part of August, many unfavourable auguries were reported in the country.*

The armistice which Sivajee effected with the Moghul viceroy, Khan Jehan Buhadur, when quitting his own territory on the Carnatic expedition, produced no compromise with the Abyssinians of Jinjeera; a petty warfare was constantly maintained in the Concan between the Seedee and the Mahrattas; but hostilities became more rancorous after the accession of Sumbhajee.

The island or rock of Henery, near the entrance of the harbour of Bombay was fortified by Sivajee in 1679, which being resented by the English, an attempt by them, in conjunction with the Seedee, was unsuccessfully made to dispossess him of it; but Kenery, another island of the same description, which stands by the side of Henery, having been in the same surreptitious manner occupied by the Seedee during the ensuing season, Sumbhajee's first efforts were spent in endeavouring to drive out the Seedee, and with no better success than had attended the attempt on Kenery. The English as little relished the occupation by the one party as by the other.†

Sumbhajee, whilst his fleet and troops were thus employed, proceeded to

A. D. 1681. Panalla, for what purpose is not clearly ascertained, though perhaps it may have been to conduct some negotiations with the Beejapoor government. He remained there until recalled to Raigurh by the appearance of an illustrious fugitive who sought an asylum in his territory. This personage was Sultan Mohummud Akber, the fourth son of the Emperor Aurungzebe, who, having been won over by the Rajpoots, consented to head a rebellion against his father, but the scheme was frustrated by the emperor's address, and the prince fled towards Sumbhajee's country, which he was fortunate enough to reach, though he was hotly pursued, and the strictest orders issued, to all the imperial officers of the districts in his route, to intercept him.‡

Sumbhajee sent an officer to welcome his arrival, appointed the village of Dodsay for his residence, the name of which, in compliment to his guest, was changed to Padshapoor; but some affair, of which Mahratta manuscripts take no notice, detained him at Panalla, and prevented his visiting the prince on his first arrival. In the meantime the restless faction of Annajee Dutto, in order to forward their own views, and procure his enlargement, took advantage of Sumbhajee's absence to propose some overtures to Sultan Mohummud Akber in favour of Raja Ram. The news of this fresh conspiracy was first communicated to Sumbhajee by Dadajee

* Mahratta MSS.

† Orme, Mahratta MSS., English Records.

‡ Orme, Scott's Deccan, Khafee Khan, Mahratta MSS., and copy of an original letter from Mohummud Akber to Sumbhajee.

Rugonath, Deshpandya of Mhar, and excited suspicions towards his guest, until the prince himself communicated the circumstances, which entirely dispelled his doubts, and Sumbhajeé visited and welcomed him with much cordiality.

The intrigue on the part of the friends of Annajee Dutto was said to have been supported by the whole of the Sirkay family in the Concan, whose motive was revenge for the death of Soyera Bye. Ballajee Aujee Chitnees, a man of the Purbhoo caste, who had stood high in Sivajee's favour,* and had been employed by Sumbhajeé himself on a confidential mission to Bombay, was accused of being a principal instigator in the meditated treachery. This person, together with his eldest son, one of his relations named Samjee Aujee, Heerajee Furzund, such of the Sirkays as could be apprehended, and, lastly, Annajee Dutto himself, were at once led out to execution, tied to the feet of elephants, and trampled to death. The principal members of the Sirkay family fled in consternation, and several of them entered the Moghul service. Sumbhajeé's severity, even if just towards Ballajee Aujee, which is doubtful, was extremely impolitic in regard to Annajee Dutto. To put a Bramin to death is always looked upon with horror, and the fate of the gallant Punt Suchew, who had performed such important services during the rise of Sivajee, was viewed, by every one capable of appreciating his worth, as a violent and harsh measure, calculated rather to create fear and dissension than to insure obedience and unanimity.

Of this number was Moro Punt Pingley, Peishwa, who, as his jealousy was extinct in his rival's death, did not fail to inveigh with honest boldness against the impiety and impolicy of his execution. A Kanoja Bramin from Hindostan, named Kuloosha, who had by some means insinuated himself into Sumbhajeé's favour, and who was the secret adviser of his actions, recommended the imprisonment of Moro Punt. The Peishwa was accordingly thrown into confinement, and Sumbhajeé, with the aid of this inexperienced man, equally presumptuous with himself, undertook the conduct of all state affairs.

Ramdas Swamy, the friend and spiritual director of Sivajee, whose life and conduct seem to have merited the universal encomiums of his countrymen, a few days previous to his death, wrote Sumbhajeé an excellent and judicious letter, advising him for the future rather than upbraiding him for the past, and pointing out the example of his father, yet carefully abstaining from personal comparison.

About the same time Rugonath Narain Hunwuntay undertook a journey from the Carnatic, having left Hurjee Raja Mahareek in charge of the government during his absence. On his arrival at Raigurh, as he brought with him a considerable treasure, the balance saved from the revenue of the districts, he was well received, and, as was due to one of the Purdhans, and so distinguished an officer, a full durbar was assembled on the occasion. Rugonath Narain took this unusual opportunity† of entering on public affairs, and represented all the evils likely to result from the disregard shown to experienced servants, and to the forms of government instituted by Sivajee; he pointed out what ought to be done, and, whilst main-

* By an original sunnud it appears that Sivajee had offered to make him one of the Purdhans, which he declined accepting. The reader will recognise in Ballajee Aujee the person in whose handwriting many of those papers are preserved, to which this history is much indebted.

† State affairs are seldom discussed in full durbar, and no business is entered upon at a first visit.

taining his arguments, boldly censured Sumbhajee's proceedings, and predicted his fall.

It would seem difficult to account for the temerity of Rugonath Narain, especially as his brother, Jenardin Punt, was still in confinement; but Sumbhajee was probably sensible that any violence towards Rugonath Narain might at once place the Carnatic at his uncle's disposal; and it is remarkable that decided language from a man whom he respects generally overawes the most ungovernable Mahratta. Sumbhajee promised to release Moro Punt and Jenardin Punt, and Rugonath Punt himself was civilly dismissed to his government. He died, however, before he reached Ginjee, and Sumbhajee not only fulfilled his promise of releasing Moro Punt and Jenardin Punt, but advanced the latter to the rank of Amat, vacant by his brother's death, confirmed Hurjee Raja in the government of the Carnatic, and Neeloo Punt Moreishwur, the son of Moro Punt, Peishwa, was appointed under him as mootaliq, or chief agent of affairs. But this amendment was but temporary, and the favourite Kuloosha obtained a complete ascendancy over his mind.*

On the occasion of Sumbhajee's meeting with Prince Akber, it was rumoured abroad that the Mahrattas and Rajpoots were about to unite for the purpose of dethroning Aurungzebe, and placing Sultan Akber on the throne.† But vanity and anger are more active stimulants to common minds than ambition or glory; no speculation of that kind diverted Sumbhajee from the more humble design of reducing Jinjeera; to possess himself of a place which his father had failed in taking, to avenge the pillage of several of his villages, and the daily insults experienced from the Seedee, were the causes which combined to make this an object of paramount interest.

He, in the first place, directed Khundoojee Furzund, one of his creatures, to desert to Jinjeera, and endeavour, by corrupting some of the Seedee's people, to blow up the magazine when the attack was about to commence. A large body of troops were assembled, and the command of the expedition given to Dadajee Rugonath Deshpandya, with the promise, in case of success, of being made one of the eight Purdhans.*

The plot of Khundoojee Furzund was discovered by means of a female slave, before the attack commenced, and he, with many of his accomplices, were put to death.*

Sumbhajee, accompanied by Sultan Akber, proceeded to Dhunda Rajepoor, for the purpose of stimulating the exertions of the troops. He proposed filling up the channel by an immense mound of earth and stones, and thus advancing to the assault. The work was actually in progress, when he was suddenly called upon to oppose a body of Moghul horse under the command of Hoessein Ali Khan, which advanced from Ahmednugur, by the route of Joonere, descended the Ghauts, and ravaged the Kallian district north of Panwell. Sumbhajee attacked them in front, prevented their penetrating to the southward, and, having stopped their supplies on all sides, the Moghul general retired before the rains.

The siege of Jinjeera was continued by Dadajee Rugonath, and in the month of August, the defences having been battered down, an assault was attempted by means of boats, but the slippery rock and beating of the surf prevented the assailants from keeping their footing. They were repulsed with the loss of 200 men, and the attempt on the island was abandoned.*

* Mahratta MSS.

† Orme.

After the siege was raised, and the besieging army withdrawn, the Seedees made constant inroads, destroying cows, carrying off the women, and burning the villages. They even penetrated to Mhar, and seized the wife of Dadajee Rugonath, the officer so lately employed against them.*

These insults greatly enraged Sumbhaje; he threatened to punish the English and Portuguese for maintaining a neutrality towards Jinjeera, and during the remainder of the monsoon he made preparations for an attack on the Seedee's fleet. In the month of October, the principal commanders of his armed vessels sailed out of the Nagotna river in quest of the Seedee, whose fleet was at anchor off Mazagon, in Bombay harbour. On perceiving the approach of the Mahrattas, the Seedee immediately got under weigh, and stood up towards the Tannah river, when, having chosen his position, he lay-to, and waited for the Mahrattas. Seedee Missree, the relation of Seedee Sumbhole, who had deserted to Sumbhaje, led the attack, and was well supported by the other officers. But Yakoot Khan in person commanded the Jinjeera fleet; and, although he had only 15 vessels to twice that number of Sumbhaje's which attacked him, he gained a complete victory. Seedee Missree was mortally wounded, and taken prisoner in his own vessel, which, with three others, was captured by the Seedee.† Some of the Mahratta fleet were sunk, defending themselves to the last.‡

Sumbhaje, exasperated by this defeat, began to carry his threats against the Europeans into effect; he commenced with the Portuguese, by plundering some of their villages, and was preparing to fortify the island of Elephanta in Bombay harbour, for the purpose of annoying the English, and preventing the Seedee's vessels from anchoring at Mazagon during the monsoon; but he was diverted from this latter scheme, and suddenly resolved on endeavouring to form an alliance with the English against the Moghuls and the Seedee. His inducement to this plan was intelligence of great preparations on the part of Aurungzebe, and the arrival at Aurungabad of Sultan Mauzum, whom the emperor had sent forward, appointed for the fourth time to the government of the four Soobehs of the Deccan.

According to his projected change of politics, Sumbhaje sent an ambassador to Bombay, who pretended to inform the council of a scheme which the Moghuls had laid for reducing the island, and proposed an alliance against them and the Seedees. The council listened to these overtures, with a view of procuring an exemption from certain duties which were levied by Sumbhaje's officers, on the trade of the factories on the Coromandel coast; but, although the negotiation was protracted to some length, neither party at this time obtained their desire.‡

Sumbhaje was again called to repel an inroad into the Concan by a detachment under Runmust Khan, supported by another Moghul officer, named Roh Oolla Khan, whom the prince had detached against him. These troops advanced to Kallian Bheemree, ravaged the country, as had been done the preceding season, but returned to Ahmednugur before the rains, without having effected anything worthy of notice.§

In prosecution of the war against the Portuguese, Sumbhaje attacked Choule in the month of June, but he could make no impression on a regular European fortification. The viceroy of Goa did not confine his

* Mahratta MSS.

† Orme, and Mahratta MSS.

‡ Orme.

§ Mahratta MSS., Orme, Scott's Deccan.

operations to defensive warfare. He took the field in the month of October, and invaded Sumbhaje's territory with a considerable army, 1,200 of whom were Europeans. The Portuguese in their warfare exhibited greater barbarity than Mahratta freebooters. They not only carried fire and sword into the defenceless villages, but destroyed the temples, and attempted to convert their prisoners by force.*

The viceroy neglected no means of hostility; he had anticipated Sumbhaje's intention of fortifying the island of Aujee Dewa, and now gave orders to some armed vessels stationed there to cruize against Sumbhaje's fleet, and distress the trade of Carwar. The viceroy advanced in person with the army, and laid siege to Ponda. Sumbhaje, who possessed all the ardent bravery of his father, though without his prudence or his talents, immediately marched at the head of an inconsiderable force to raise the siege, and on coming in sight of Ponda, although his numbers were inferior to the Portuguese, he commenced an attack on their rear.

The fort was at this time breached, and might have been stormed, but the viceroy, with the ideas of a European, unused to Indian warfare, alarmed lest his retreat should be cut off, and Goa exposed to danger, immediately resolved on retiring. He effected his retreat; but at the expense of the whole of his camp equipage, stores, guns, and equipments: 1,200 of his men were slain, of whom 200 were Europeans.

On arriving at the back water which separates the island of Goa or Pangin from the main land, Sumbhaje, who had headed repeated charges, again led on the horse, intending to have dashed across with the fugitives; but the Portuguese, from a better knowledge of the ford, and from having stationed boats, and lined the opposite banks with troops, repulsed the attempt. Sumbhaje rallied his men, and again tried to ford, but although he headed the troops himself, and persevered until his horse was swimming, he was at last obliged to desist, owing to the flood-tide.†

Sumbhaje on this occasion particularly signalized himself, and Bhowanee, the sword of his father, which he used, could not have been better wielded; but, with his usual obstinacy, he persisted in his rash design of crossing over into the island, and ordered boats to be brought for the purpose. Two hundred of his men were embarked and transported, when the Portuguese boats coming round, intercepted the return of the Mahrattas, and the enraged troops of the viceroy fell upon the 200 men thus exposed to their fury, and destroyed most of them.‡

The siege of Choule was continued without success; but Caranja was taken possession of, and retained for nearly a year. Several places belonging to the Portuguese between Bassein and Damaun were attacked and destroyed, and the viceroy made overtures for peace, but as Sumbhaje demanded five crores of pagodas as a preliminary, they were at once broken off.

The Mahratta horse, a part only of which were required on these services in the Concan, were, as usual, let loose to plunder, and subsist in the upper country during the fair season, and this year they were fruitlessly pursued by a force from Aurungabad.§

To follow them in all cases, or to trace their incursions with precision from about the period at which we have arrived, is scarcely possible. Nor is it necessary. If we can account for the growth of their preda-

* Orme says they were burnt by the Inquisition; but although many barbarities are alleged against the Portuguese by the Mahrattas, they nowhere assert this.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ Orme.

§ Mahratta MSS., Scott's Deccan.

tory power amidst the general warfare and confusion throughout the Deccan, and connect the principal incidents by which their empire was extended, it is all that can prove interesting or instructive in their history.

From the time of Moro Punt's confinement, Kuloosha was entrusted with the entire management of public affairs; nor did the partial enlargement of the Peishwa, for the short time he afterwards lived, produce in this respect any change. Sumbhaje, when not actually employed in the field, gave himself up to idleness or to vice; none could have access but Kuloosha; and if any one ventured to approach without the favourite's permission, Sumbhaje flew into a passion, and punished the intruder. Kuloosha, as possessing a religious character, could not consistently be admitted to any other rank among the Purdhans than that of Pundit Rao; in addition to that honour, he was dignified with the title of Chundagau-Matya Kuvée-Kulus.* Although in the Mahratta manuscripts Kuloosha is loaded with many epithets of abuse, he is seldom accused of having been the pander of Sumbhaje's vices; it is even admitted that he was a learned and courtly man, and that he excelled in poetry, but his total incapacity for his high station, and the ruinous consequences, both of his neglect and his measures, may be very clearly gleaned from the Mahratta writings: in these the ascendancy gained over the mind of Sumbhaje is ascribed to magic, in which Kuloosha is believed to have been a perfect adept.

The system which Sivaje introduced soon fell into decay, wherever the efficiency of the establishments depended upon the vigilance or care of the executive authority. This was first perceivable in the army, where the discipline and strict orders of Sivaje were neglected. When the horse took the field, stragglers were allowed to join, plunder was secreted, women followers, who had been prohibited on pain of death, were not only permitted, but women were brought off from the enemy's country as an established article of plunder, and either retained as concubines or sold as slaves.

The small returns brought back by the commanders of the horse were insufficient for the pay of the troops; they took the field in arrears, and permission to keep a portion of their plunder was an ample and desirable compensation for the regular pay allowed by Sivaje.

Sumbhaje was prodigal in his expenses, and as he considered his father's treasure inexhaustible, even the favourite minister was unwilling to rouse his dangerous temper by touching on that theme. No revenue was received from the Carnatic after the death of Rugonath Punt; the districts in that quarter maintained themselves; but as loss rather than advantage was now the result of most of the expeditions by which, in the time of Sivaje, so much was amassed, Kuloosha conceived he had discovered an easy mode of replenishing the treasury, by raising the land-rent, through the addition of various assessments; but when he came to collect the revenue, he found that the receipts were as much diminished from what they had been in the time of Sivaje, as the assessments were nominally increased.

The managers of districts were in consequence removed for, what appeared to him, evident peculation. The revenue was farmed, many of the ryots fled from their villages, and speedy ruin threatened the terri-

* Which may be rendered into English, "Expounder of the Vedas, and illustrious poet." It is from the second title, Kuvée-Kulus, that he derived his name Kub Kulus, or occasionally Kublis Kawn, amongst Mahomedans and Europeans, and his nickname of Cubjee amongst the Mahratta soldiery.

tory of Sumbhajee, without the approach of Aurungzebe, who this year advanced to Burhanpoor with a vast army, for the purpose of carrying his designs on the Deccan into execution.

The ostensible impediments to the emperor's plans were, in comparison to his apparent means, very inconsiderable. The state of Hyderabad was the most formidable as to men and money, and the king, Abou Hoosein, was possessed of great private riches in jewels. His administration, conducted principally under Mahdhuna Punt, was popular amongst a large proportion of his Hindoo subjects, but many of the principal Mahomedan officers were disgusted at the sway exercised by a Bramin over both their prince and country. Their jealousy was fomented by the secret emissaries of Aurungzebe; but Abou Hoosein, sensible of the minister's value, did not withdraw his confidence or support.

Mullik Berkhordar, the envoy of Aurungzebe, residing at the capital of Beejapoor, not only succeeded in drawing over many of the principal officers who were pensioned or employed by the emperor, but to his influence may be ascribed the decay of Musaood Khan's power. The faction opposed to the regent was headed by Syud Mukhtoom, an Oomrah of no distinction, but he was supported by Shirzee Khan, the best officer then left in the Beejapoor army. Shirzee Khan's enmity towards Musaood Khan originated in the preference shown the latter for infantry, which was contrary both to the interest and judgment of the former: many of the best horse under Shirzee Khan had been discharged, and Musaood Khan had been obliged to call in the aid of Sivajee, at the expense of ceding some of the finest districts in the kingdom. This faction forced Musaood Khan to quit Beejapoor and retire to Adonee, probably about a year* after Sivajee's death. By whom the new administration was conducted is uncertain; but as the envoy of Aurungzebe had always represented the treaty with the Mahrattas as a great source of displeasure to the emperor, one of its first acts, after the removal of Musaood Khan, was an injudicious attempt to recover some of the fertile territory near the banks of the Kistna, of which Sivajee had acquired possession. Merich was retaken, and the breach which this occasioned between Sumbhajee and the Beejapoor government seems to have been irreparable. It was the interest of Sumbhajee to unite with the Mahomedan states on this occasion, and Mahdhuna Punt made some endeavours to effect a confederacy, but there were so many parties and interests, such jealousy and imbecility, that no state could call forth its own resources, still less could all combine in one grand effort. For whilst Aurungzebe's emissaries pretended, at each of the courts of Beejapoor and Hyderabad, that the emperor meant to extend to it particular favour and protection, some of the members of the state were weak enough to be lulled by such palpable illusions, and many of the nobles were traitors; so that the ostensible authorities in each government, distrusting all around them, were careful not to suggest proceedings which might ensure their own assassination or precipitate the hostility of the emperor. When Musaood Khan was obliged to reduce the army, he maintained but a small number of cavalry in addition to the Mahratta munsobdars, who, in fear of losing their jagheers, enams, and hereditary rights, still acknowledged themselves the servants of the Beejapoor state. Some of the members of the different

* The Beejapoor manuscripts and traditions afford nothing better than conjecture on this subject; nor could I ascertain if there was a regent after Musaood Khan retired.

families had, however, enrolled themselves with Sivajee, and continued under the standard of Sumbhajee.

The Mahratta munsuddars, formerly under the Nizam Shahee state, in like manner paid obedience to the Moghuls, whilst many of their relations were in the army of Sumbhajee. Wherever there were disputes regarding hereditary rights, which is generally the case amongst village and district officers, as well as enamdars, jagheerdars, and all old Hindoo families, the party not in possession, as the country became more and more unsettled, always went over to the invading enemy, prompted by motives of self-interest, but more by feelings of spite and personal enmity, in hopes of finding some occasion for wreaking vengeance on the opponent. If the invader prevailed, the occupant was frequently ejected, and he took the same mode of being reinstated; or if fortunate enough to make his peace by timely submission, the other party awaited another opportunity.

Aurangzebe understood and took advantage of these feuds. The reader, at all acquainted with the Hindoo character, can conceive the bitter rancour with which they pursued these quarrels, when there are several instances of one party becoming a Mahomedan, in order to ruin his adversary and gratify revenge. The services of the Hindoo munsuddars, under the Mahomedan states, became exactly in proportion to the measure of punishment or reward which the government they acknowledged could inflict or bestow.

This brief survey of the state of the Deccan must be understood to apply to that period which followed the first year of Sumbhajee's accession, up to the fall of Beejapoor and Golcondah, when additional causes of disturbance and confusion will appear. But previously to entering upon the war which was directed by Aurungzebe in person, it is fit to notice an extraordinary event which occurred amongst our own countrymen, in their then small establishment on the west of India, of which Surat was, at that time, the residence of the governor, or president of the council, under whom the East India Company's factories on the coast were managed.

In December 1683, the garrison of Bombay, at the head of which was Captain Keigwin, confined the deputy of the governor of Surat, declared they held the island for the king, and that they would submit to no other authority. This act of rebellion being limited to a small insulated space, and Keigwin its instigator, a firm, resolute man, who maintained order amongst his inferiors, notwithstanding the pernicious example he had set, the ruinous consequences so much to be dreaded were happily obviated, and an amnesty having been promised by Sir Thomas Grantham, whom the president in council at Surat had named to act under a general commission obtained from the king, the whole island was surrendered and restored to the lawful authorities, 11th November 1684.

The state of parties in England had probably as great an effect in occasioning this proceeding as its immediate cause. The interests of commercial adventurers, and the rival East India Company, which sprang up about this time, created a variety of reports, and spread opinions in India prejudicial to the existing company. This, no doubt, tended to diminish that respect for them in the eyes of their own servants, which was of so much importance to the preservation of their authority.

The directors injudiciously chose this period for reducing their expenses by decreasing the allowances of their military. The president in council at Surat carried the orders into effect in that ungracious and arbitrary manner which appears to have marked the government of Sir John Child,

and, in the state of feeling which these various causes were likely to produce in high-spirited rash men, the revolt which ensued, however inexcusable, is not surprising.

It was fortunate that the president had not the means of attempting to enforce immediate obedience, otherwise it is possible the rebels might have been driven to the infamous alternative of making over the island to the Moghuls or the Mahrattas. Keigwin's management, however, in several respects, merited commendation, particularly in having obtained from Sumbhajee not only a confirmation of the articles agreed to by Siva-jee, but a grant for the establishment of factories at Cuddalore and Thevenapatam, an exemption from duties in the Carnatic, and the balance of compensation for losses sustained by the English at different places formerly plundered by the Mahrattas.*

We now return to affairs of greater magnitude than those of the infant A. D. 1684. establishments of the East India Company, connected, however, not only with our subject, but intimately linked with the causes by which the British nation has obtained such vast power in that distant portion of the globe.

Aurangzebe, whom we have mentioned as marching to Burhanpoor, remained there for some months regulating several departments in finance, and settling plans for the approaching grand arrangements he had in contemplation. He first ordered Sultan Mauzum, now dignified with the title of Shah Alum,† to proceed in advance from Ahmednugur with his whole army, and reduce Sumbhajee's southern territory, whilst Sultan Azim was directed to reduce his northern forts about Candeish, Buglana, and Sungumnere, and to commence by besieging the important fortress of Salheir, the acquisition of which by Moro Punt had afforded such facility for Mahratta inroads through Candeish. Accordingly, Sultan Mauzum descended into the Concan by the Ambaduray Ghaut, near Nassuck, and passing the Kallian district, already devastated, advanced to the southward, where he plundered and burnt the country from Raigurh to Vingorla. Sultan Azim marched towards Salheir, where much resistance was expected, but Neknam Khan, the Moghul killidar of Molheir, who joined the prince on his advance, had obtained a previous promise from his neighbour, the Mahratta havildar, to surrender Salheir as soon as the army came before it. Such negotiations being always doubtful in their issue, Neknam Khan had prudently communicated the agreement to the emperor only; the place, however, was evacuated, and the prince, with the feeling of a very young commander, disappointed in the expected fame of the conquest, expressed great displeasure at being sent on such a service. He was shortly after recalled, the emperor promising to employ him in the war against Beejapoor.‡ Shahabodeen Khan was, therefore, ordered to reduce the remainder of the forts, but met with an unexpected resistance from the havildar of Ramseje, by whom his troops being repeatedly repulsed, Khan Jehan Buhadur was sent to repair the failure, but after many vaunting attempts, equally unsuccessful as those of his predecessor, he was compelled to retire with disgrace.

Sultan Mauzum's army, although they had overrun the greater part of the Concan, do not appear to have come prepared for sieges; the forts and places of strength still remained in the hands of Sumbhajee, who

* Orme.

† I shall continue to use the name by which he is already known to the reader.

‡ Khafee Khan.

during this inroad sent his cavalry to subsist in the upper country, whilst he himself retired with Sultan Akber to Vishalgurh. The distresses occasioned by the ravages of the invading army soon recoiled upon themselves, and scarcity prevailed in their camp. Sumbhajee, taking advantage of the improvident waste they had made, ordered down his horse, and directed them, assisted by the different garrisons of the forts, to stop the roads, cut off supplies, harass them by desultory attacks, and destroy the foragers and stragglers. The Mahratta horse found subsistence from the grass and grain stored under the protection of the forts, but the Moghuls were soon in great distress, and thousands of followers, horses, and cattle perished.

The emperor, apprized of their situation, but unwilling to sanction what might seem a defeat, directed the force under Shahabodeen Khan to proceed for the purpose of opening the communication; and orders were sent to the Moghul governor at Surat to embark supplies for Dhunda Rajepoor and Vingorla. The demand being urgent, the vessels were sent off, as laden, without waiting for convoy, and Sumbhajee's cruisers, apprized of their approach, took the greater part. Such a scanty supply arrived that it became impossible to exist in that situation, and Sultan Mauzum was obliged to retire towards the Ambah Ghaut, which he ascended, and afterwards cantoned his army, during the monsoon, near Walwa on the banks of the Kistna.

Shahabodeen Khan, when directed to march for the relief of the prince, advanced as far as Nizampoor near Raigurh, when he was opposed by Sumbhajee, whom he defeated, probably in a very partial action; but small advantages are always over-estimated in unsuccessful campaigns. Shahabodeen, being a personal favourite with the emperor, and at the head of a body of Tooranee Moghuls, his countrymen, whom it was the emperor's desire to conciliate, was honoured with the title of Ghazee-udeen, and the recollection of his failure at Ramseje purposely obliterated. Such, we may here observe, is the earliest account we have, in the history of the Deccan, of the ancestor of the family of Nizam-ool-Moolk, afterwards so conspicuous in the annals of that country.

The emperor, in the meantime, had quitted Burhanpoor, and arrived at Aurungabad. During his stay at the former city, amongst other arrangements, he issued orders for the collection of the jizeea,* a poll-tax levied on all his subjects not Mahomedans, which was to be as strictly exacted in the Deccan as in the northern part of the empire.

To reconcile such a measure with that character for wisdom which has been assigned to Aurungzebe is impossible; it would even be inexplicable in a person of ordinary capacity; but the workings of fanaticism always warp the understanding, and Aurungzebe may have supposed that his undertaking merited divine favour, by giving the people about to be conquered the alternative of conversion or taxation. There could be no political reason for such an edict, although his apologists may point out the mean one of gratifying the Mahomedan vulgar, and affording an earnest of what his emissaries professed at Beejapoor and Golcondah, that he was coming to the Deccan for the purpose of suppressing idolatry, and placing Mahomedan power on such a footing as would, in future, uphold the dignity of the faith of Islam.

The imperial service sustained considerable loss this year by the death

* The Jizeea was thirteen rupees per annum, for every 2,000 rupees worth of property possessed by Hindoos.—Scott's Deccan.

of Dilere Khan. He had great experience in Deccan warfare, had seen more service than most officers of his time, and had signalized himself on many occasions. He was always suspected, and in his old age neglected, by the emperor, after having fought his battles for 26 years—a just retribution when we know that, in joining the crafty Aurungzebe, he became a traitor to the cause of the generous, confiding, and unfortunate Dara.

Sumbhajeel was still at war with the Portuguese, and the latter had instigated the chief of Soonda and the Dessayes of Karwar to throw off their allegiance. Sumbhajeel, about the end of the rains, sent some of his troops into northern Concan, and again plundered the exposed parts of the Portuguese possessions in that quarter; he himself came to Panalla to watch the motions of Sultan Mauzum's army.

The emperor, at the opening of the fair season, leaving Khan Jehan at Aurungabad, moved with the grand camp, in more than ordinary magnificence, towards Ahmednugur.

The number of his forces is not specified by any Moghul historian, and the estimate formed by the Mahrattas is quite incredible. The display of power, however, presented by Aurungzebe's march into the Deccan, was grand and imposing to a degree which has seldom been surpassed. Besides foreigners, his cavalry, assembled from Cabul, Candahar, Mooltan, Lahore, Rajpootana, and the extended provinces of his vast empire, was the flower of his army, and presented an array of gigantic men and horses completely armed and accoutred, whom, it might be imagined, the more slender and lighter-armed natives of the Deccan could hardly venture to oppose. His infantry was also numerous, and was composed of musketeers, matchlockmen, and archers, well equipped; besides bodies of hardy Bundelas and Mewattees accustomed to predatory contests among the mountains, and the better able to cope with the Mahratta Mawulees. To these were afterwards added many thousands of infantry, raised in the Carnatic. Besides a number of field-pieces, which accompanied the royal tents, there were several hundred pieces of cannon manned by natives of Hindostan, and directed by European gunners, and a great number of miners were attached to the park of artillery, with artificers of every description. A long train of war-elephants was followed by a number of the same animals on the emperor's private establishment, employed to carry the ladies of his seraglio, or to convey such of his tents as were too large to be borne on camels. Numerous led horses, magnificently caparisoned, formed a stud for the emperor's riding; a menagerie accompanied the camp, from which the rarest animals in the world were frequently brought forth, and exhibited by their keepers before the emperor and his court; whilst hawks, hounds, hunting tigers, trained elephants, and every accompaniment used for field sport, swelled the pomp of this prodigious retinue. The canvas walls, which encompassed the royal tents, formed a circumference of 1,200 yards, and contained every description of apartment to be found in the most spacious palace. Halls of audience for public assemblies and privy councils, with all the courts and cabinets attached to them, each hall magnificently adorned, and having within it a raised seat or throne for the emperor, surrounded by gilded pillars with canopies of velvet, richly fringed and superbly embroidered; separate tents as mosques and oratories; baths and galleries for archery and gymnastic exercises; a seraglio as remarkable for luxury and privacy as that of Delhi; Persian carpets, damasks, and tapestries; European velvets,

satins, and broad-cloths; Chinese silks of every description, and Indian muslins and cloth of gold, were employed in all the tents with the utmost profusion and effect. Gilded balls and cupolas surmounted the tops of the royal tents; the outside of which, and the canvas walls, were of a variety of lively colours, disposed in a manner which heightened the general splendour. The entrance into the royal enclosure was through a spacious portal, flanked by two elegant pavilions, from which extended, on each side, rows of cannon, forming an avenue, at the extremity of which was an immense tent containing the great state drums and imperial band;—a little farther in front was the post of the grand guard on duty, commanded by a nobleman, who mounted with it daily. On the other sides, surrounding the great enclosure just mentioned, were separate tents for the emperor's armoury, harness, &c.; a tent for water, kept cool with saltpetre; another for fruit, a third for sweetmeats, a fourth for betel, and so on, with numerous kitchens, stables, &c., &c. Such luxury in a camp is scarcely to be conceived; but, besides what has been described, every tent had its exact duplicate, which was sent on in advance to be prepared against the emperor's arrival. His march was a procession, and, when he entered his pavilions, a salvo from 50 or 60 pieces of ordnance announced the event; and he assumed and maintained every form and ceremony observed at the established residences of the imperial court.

The magnificence of such a spectacle, which formed a remarkable contrast with the plain, and even austere, personal habits of the emperor, was intended to strengthen his power by the awe with which it impressed his subjects; but as his state was imitated by his nobles, it proved a serious encumbrance to the movements of his army, while the devouring expense of such establishments pressed hard on his finances, and soon crippled even the most necessary of his military and political arrangements.

We may easily suppose that the inconveniences of this style of magnificence, of which all the Moghul camps in some degree partook, must have been already experienced by Sultan Mauzum during his campaign in the Concan. Whilst he lay at Walwa above the Ghauts, he took possession in the emperor's name of such parts of the country as he could cover, and deeds are yet extant confirming in his own name grants of lands originally given by the Beejapoor government. In the month of October a pestilence broke out in his camp, which swept off many of his men, and greatly diminished his force; but, on receiving the emperor's orders to reduce the south-west districts above the Ghauts, formerly taken by Sivajee from Beejapoor, he advanced without hesitation for that purpose, and Azim Shah, who had commenced the war against Beejapoor with indifferent success, opened the campaign to the northward by laying siege to Sholapoor.

Sumbhajee's troops in the Concan under the command of Humbeer Rao, apprized of the exposed state of Candeish, were secretly reinforced by several detachments, and moved off to the northward. They suddenly appeared at Burhanpoor,* plundered it of much property and riches for several days, and retired as rapidly as their heavy loads would permit, leaving the whole country, in their route from Burhanpoor to Nassuck, in a blaze.

* I place this according to Mr. Orme's date, who has it from the records of the factory of Candeish, and circumstances corroborate its correctness. The fact is distinctly mentioned by *Mahratta* manuscripts, and *Khafee Khan*; but the dates widely disagree, and are in both obviously misplaced.

Khan Jehan, on hearing of this inroad, moved from Aurungabad in pursuit ; but, in place of marching to Chandore or Unkye Tunkye to cut off their retreat, which he might have done, he crossed the range of hills at the Ajunta pass, and wheeled round to the left, but he never came within five marches of the Mahrattas. After having followed them to a considerable distance to the southward, he received orders to place thannas in the country between Joonere and Singurh, whilst the young prince, Kaum Bukhsh, was sent to cover Burhanpoor.

Khan Jehan took possession of Poona and the adjacent country, where he left Khakur Khan as foudjar, and was proceeding, by the emperor's order, to support Azim Shah, who had taken Sholapoor, and was advancing towards Beejapoor : but the prince, finding that he could not contend with Shirzee Khan, had re-crossed the Beema, which made the junction of Khan Jehan unnecessary.*

Sultan Mauzum, meanwhile, had successively captured Gokauk, Hooble, and Dharwar, in which he had met with little resistance ; but famine, pestilence, and the drafts from his force required to garrison the new acquisitions, had so greatly reduced the numbers and efficiency of his troops, that when attacked by a small detachment, sent against him from Beejapoor, he was scarcely able to defend himself. Roh Oolla Khan was immediately sent forward with a party to his assistance, and Khan Jehan was ordered to cover Roh Oolla Khan. Until this succour arrived, the prince's army was constantly harassed ; most of the horses being dead, nobles and troopers were reduced to the necessity of marching and fighting on foot, which even the common horsemen considered a degrading hardship. The wreck of this fine army returned to Ahmednugur, more effectually reduced than if they had been vanquished in many battles.†

After assisting Sultan Mauzum's shattered army, and escorting the prince to the frontiers, Khan Jehan and Roh Oolla Khan returned, and cantoned at Hulmullee, in the Beejapoor territory, during the monsoon. At the opening of the season these two officers were ordered to invest Beejapoor.

Mahdhuna Punt's endeavours to effect union in opposing Aurungzebe were ineffectual, even when the intentions of the latter in regard to Beejapoor were avowed. Sumbhaje made no effort to aid that state, but he engaged to assist Golcondah, and received a subsidy of one lakh of pagodas from Abou Hoosseïn. This alliance was communicated to the emperor, and the conditions came to his knowledge at a subsequent period. He immediately ordered Khan Jehan to advance into the Hyderabad territories, under pretence of receiving the arrears of tribute. Sadut Khan accompanied the army as envoy, with secret instructions, not merely to demand satisfaction for this alliance with Sumbhaje, but to provoke any fit cause of widening the breach, and producing a rupture with Hyderabad.

The emperor marched from Ahmednugur towards Sholapoor, and directed a body of troops stationed at Joonere, under Ghazee-ud-deen, to move towards Ahmednugur. The Mahrattas, again seizing this opportunity, made a rapid march to the northward, crossed the Taptee and Nerbuddah, and assaulted and took the city of Baroach within a few hours after their approach was known.‡ It is probable that Sultan Akber was

* Khafee Khan, Mahratta MSS., Bernier, Scott's Deccan, Orme.

† The account of Sultan Mauzum's campaign is taken from Khafee Khan, Orme, Scott's Deccan, the enam deeds alluded to, and copies of original letters from Mohummud Akber to Kuloosha.

‡ Orme.

the instigator, if not the leader, of this enterprize ; he was actively employed against his brother during the campaign in the Concan,* and on this occasion the party proclaimed him emperor, plundered and exacted all they could, and did not retire until the approach of the soobehdar of Guzerat, who had assembled the troops of the province, and marched against them.†

The sack both of Burhanpoor and Baroach are principally to be ascribed to Aurungzebe's want of military arrangement. Intent on his own schemes against the Mahomedan states, he neither covered his own country, nor took time to study the genius of the people, whom his early ambition and his present negligence alike fostered, and for whom he still entertained a contempt, fatal to the security of his empire.

The operations against Beejapoor were renewed. Sultan Azim moved forward about the end of the year, and approached the capital with a large army. The officers of Beejapoor, although they had before opposed him on the frontier successfully, now retired before him. This was judicious. Very little rain had fallen this year, a scarcity prevailed, and the little grain which had been produced in the neighbourhood of Beejapoor was, as usual, secured within the fort. To the northward, in the province of Aurungabad, the harvest had been more plentiful, but grain was exceedingly dear in the grand camp at Sholapoor, which drew its supplies from the northward. To have attacked Azim Shah, therefore, in the neighbourhood of the emperor's camp, would comparatively have been of little advantage. They allowed him to approach the city, when they cut off the communication between him and the camp at Sholapoor, interrupted his supplies, destroyed foragers, harassed the army by false attacks and

skirmishes, and in a very short time Azim Shah was in great distress. The scarcity in his own camp prevented the emperor from forwarding supplies from Sholapoor. Ghazee-ud-deen Khan was therefore ordered to bring 20,000 bullock-loads of grain from Ahmednugur, and carry it on to Azim Shah's force, reinforced by a strong detachment under Dulput Rao from the grand army. This service was well performed by Ghazee-ud-deen. The Beejapoor troops saw the necessity of cutting off his convoy, and made a desperate attempt to effect their purpose, but they were defeated ; and, after a well-contested action, the prince's troops were rescued from the disgrace and destruction which the loss of delay of the convoy had rendered unavoidable. On this occasion the princess Janee Begum, wife of Azim Shah, proceeding with the convoy to join her husband, mounted her elephant, and advanced into the battle encouraging the troops. Aurungzebe expressed himself more gratefully to Ghazee-ud-deen for thus relieving his son, than for any service ever performed by his officers.‡

Khan Jehan, according to the orders which were given, had advanced towards Hyderabad, but Mahdhuna Punt's preparations were in a more forward state than was expected, and Ibrahim Khan, the supposed friend

* Original letters to Kuloosha.

† It is mentioned in Scott's Deccan that Sultan Mohammud Akber was supported by a body of Mahrattas in an attempt to proceed to Hindostan, and that he was defeated near Chakun ; but the successful attack on Baroach is the only one in which I think it probable that he was a principal actor. He was engaged in the Concan, and was at Palee and at Beemgurh when Sultan Mauzum's troops were attacked, as appears by copies of letters from Mohammud Akber to Kuloosha Kuvee-Kulus, which I obtained from the late raja of Kolapoor.

‡ Khafec Khan, and Scott's Deccan.

of the minister, met the Moghuls at Mulkair, with an army of 70,000 men. Khan Jehan's force being quite unequal to contend with this host, and a retreat being exceedingly dangerous under such circumstances, he threw up intrenchments, and sent intelligence of his situation to the emperor. Sultan Mauzum was immediately despatched with a body of troops to his relief. In the meantime Ibrahim Khan, who had a fine army, and had Khan Jehan completely in his power, made no vigorous attacks, and, on the advance of Sultan Mauzum, his conduct was so treacherous, or his exertions so feeble, that the Moghuls marched on to Hyderabad with little opposition. The king retired into the fortress of Golcondah, notwithstanding Mahdhuna Punt's remonstrances; but at this time Ibrahim Khan treacherously deserted to the Moghuls, the city of Hyderabad was taken possession of, and, contrary to Sultan Mauzum's orders, plundered by the troops. The wisest minister is obnoxious in times of public misfortune; the enemies of Mahdhuna Punt, at the instigation of the king's mother-in-law, or some of the treacherous factions in league with the Moghuls, took advantage of the general outcry amongst the populace, and assassinated him. Abou Hoossein, although he had many amiable qualities, was destitute of the firmness and decision in which only his safety could be found, and, being thus left without an adviser, sued for peace. Aurungzebe, perceiving that the troops, the wealth, and the preparations at Hyderabad were more formidable than he had contemplated, and that Beejapoor seemed likely to make considerable resistance, agreed to a peace, on being promised two crores of rupees in treasure and effects, which Sultan Mauzum was left to collect. The prince and Khan Jehan fell under the emperor's displeasure for not securing the plunder of Hyderabad, and Aurungzebe, recollecting the vast treasure he had obtained there in 1655, became jealous of the wealth they were supposed to have secreted, for purposes similar perhaps to what his own had been. Khan Jehan was therefore ordered to Lahore, and, although he rejoined the emperor some years afterwards, he was never again actively employed.*

The emperor now moved to Beejapoor. The walls of the city were of immense extent, and the fort, which communicates with it, is six miles in circumference. To invest the latter closely, therefore, required the presence of the grand army. There were different breaching batteries erected, but the principal one, under the immediate superintendence of Turbeut Khan, was on the south face.

Shirzee Khan, Abdool Raoof, and Seedeas Zalim and Jumshed were the officers who defended the fort, under the young prince Sikunder. The garrison was not numerous, but, although ill-paid and short of provisions, they still showed some remains of Patan valour, and fought with obstinacy. The emperor as he saw they must surrender, and as the occasion was not pressing, prudently deferred the assault after the breach was practicable, choosing rather to trust a little to the effects likely to be produced in them by reflection on their hopeless situation, embittered by privation, than to assault men, who, under such circumstances, would have fought with desperation, and exulted in an opportunity of dying with their swords in their hands.

Aurungzebe was not disappointed; for, although they had still an inner fort much stronger than the outward works, the garrison were so much in want of provisions that they were compelled to surrender on or about 15th October 1686. Shirzee Khan concluded the terms through Ghazee-ud-deen,

* Scott's Deccan, Khafee Khan, Beejapoor MSS., &c.

to whom the emperor, agreeably to custom, when he received such proposals through any of his officers, was pleased to assign the nominal honour of the conquest.*

The principal officers were admitted into the imperial service, and a munsub of 7,000 horse, with the title of Roostum Khan, was conferred on Shirzee Khan. The young prince Sikundur Adil Shah was kept a close prisoner in the Moghul camp for three years, when he died suddenly, not without suspicion of having been poisoned by Aurungzebe.†

Beejapoor henceforth ceased to be a capital, and was soon after deserted. The walls, which are of hewn stone and very lofty, are to this day entire, and, being surmounted by the cupolas and minarets of the public buildings, still present to a spectator from without the appearance of a flourishing city; but, within, all is solitude, silence, and desolation. The deep moat, the double rampart, and the ruins of the splendid palaces in the citadel, attest the former magnificence of the court. The great mosque is a grand edifice, and the tomb of Ibrahim Adil Shah, already mentioned, is remarkable for its elegant and graceful architecture, but the chief feature in the scene is the mausoleum of Mohummud Adil Shah, the dome of which fills the eye from every point of view, and, though in itself entirely devoid of ornament, its enormous dimensions and austere simplicity invest it with an air of melancholy grandeur, which harmonizes with the wreck and desolation that surround it. In the climate where Beejapoor is situated, the progress of decay is extremely rapid, and, until lately, nothing whatever was done to arrest its effects; but, when viewed as mere ruins, the remains of that city, as they at present exist, are exceedingly grand, and, as a vast whole, far exceed anything of the kind in Europe.

After the reduction of Beejapoor, immediate preparations were made by Aurungzebe for attacking Golcondah; but previously to violating the treaty so lately concluded by Sultan Mauzum, Aurungzebe added meanness to his want of faith, by directing Sadut Khan to procure as much treasure, and as many of Abou Hoossein's jewels, as could be extorted, by working on the hopes or the fears of that weak prince.

A Moghul foudjar,§ or military governor of a district, was appointed to command in Beejapoor; and another, named Kasim Khan,|| was sent with a detachment across the Kistna, to occupy as much of the country as possible, and induce the Dessayes, or zumeendars as they were commonly styled by the Moghuls, to acknowledge the imperial authority. Shirzee Khan, of Beejapoor, was sent to invade Sumbhajee's districts, and marched in the direction of Satara.

Whilst the emperor advanced towards Kulburga, on pretence of paying his devotions at the tomb of a celebrated saint, Ghazee-ud-deen was directed to move in a direction east and somewhat south of Beejapoor, intended, probably, to intercept any rein-

* Beejapoor MSS., Khafee Khan, Scott's Deccan.

† Beejapoor MSS. It is said he was put to death in consequence of some popular commotion in his favour. He is buried in Beejapoor.

‡ This dome measures 180 feet in diameter, which is larger than that of the Pantheon at Rome, or, I believe, of St. Paul's in London, and very little less than that of St. Peter's.

§ The officer immediately superior to the foudjar in a great province was the Nazim, but we seldom find this office mentioned in the later conquests of the Moghuls in the Deccan.

|| It would appear by Scott's Deccan, vol. i., p. 75, that Kasim Khan was left as Foudjar at Hyderabad, after the capture of Golcondah; but this mistake probably originates in his having been reinforced at that period from Hyderabad.

forcements that might be sent from Suggur, Adonee, or any part of the Carnatic to the assistance of Golcondah. The emissaries of Aurungzebe were busily employed corrupting the troops of Hyderabad by bribes and promises; many of the officers were drawn over, and the envoy, Sadut Khan, by the lowest artifice, obtained possession of the jewels, even to the ornaments of the women, which the king stripped off, vainly hoping that this degrading compliance would satisfy the emperor or excite his commiseration. But feelings of pity never swayed the conduct of Aurungzebe; he declared war against Abou Hoossein by a manifesto, in which the principal articles of accusation, after a general charge of profligacy, were the employment of a Bramin minister, and an alliance with the idolator Sumbhajee. Roused at length to indignation against the merciless tyrant by whom he was thus persecuted, but deserted by many whose services he had a right to expect, Abou Hoossein retired to the fort of Golcondah, supported by a few brave troops and officers who still remained faithful. The gallant defence of the fort, the heroic devotion of some of his followers, and the dignified self-possession he maintained to the last, have preserved his memory in Deccan tradition as the brave and good *Tannah Shah*, a title of doubtful meaning by which he is known in Maharashtra, but said to have been the name of a fugueer with whom the king was in habits of intimacy previous to his elevation.

The fort of Golcondah, after a siege of seven months, fell by treachery in the end of September 1687.* Hyderabad is still a populous city, and forms, as our progress will explain, the capital of the soobehdar of the Deccan. Though much inferior to Beejapoor, it retains traces of a royal residence. The great mosque in particular is a fine edifice, and the tombs of the Kootub Shahee kings, with their glittering cupolas, overlooked by the fort of Golcondah, forms one of the most striking prospects in India.

It was during the memorable siege of Golcondah that Sultan Mauzum, falling under the unjust suspicion of the emperor, was placed in confinement; and he remained in that situation, in his father's camp, for six years, when he was released and sent as governor to Cabul. His only fault seems to have been a remonstrance in behalf of the persecuted object of the emperor's unjust enmity, more honourable and generous than judicious, as it was attended with such effects to himself and to the unfortunate Abou Hoossein, who was sent to the fortress of Doulutabad, where he ended his days.†

To secure the new conquests, and reduce the whole of the territories subject to Beejapoor and Golcondah, was now the first consideration. Reinforcements were sent to Kasim Khan in the Carnatic, to whose proceedings, as connected with the detail of Mahratta progress, we shall presently revert.

* Khafee Khan, Orme.

† An anecdote is told respecting him, which is probably true, but which I notice as characteristic of the pompous politeness of the Mahomedans of India. During Abou Hoossein's confinement in the emperor's camp, previous to being despatched to Doulutabad, a tune, played by one of the Hindostanee musicians of the imperial band, gave the captive king great delight, and he wished he had a lakh of rupees to bestow upon him. The wish was repeated to Aurungzebe, and instantly complied with.

Many of the natives of India are exceedingly susceptible of the powers of music, and some of the Hindostanee airs are beautiful. Only a few specimens of an inferior description have ever reached the public in England; but should Major Tod, in his intended history, or in his personal narrative, publish any specimens of the old Rajpoot music, which he now only plays from memory, this anecdote of the last of the kings of Golcondah may be better understood.

Khanzad Khan was sent to reduce the fort of Suggur, between Kulburga and Beejapoor, in possession of a chief of the Berud tribe, a caste of people in the Carnatic precisely similar to the Ramoosees of Maharashtra. This chief was a polygar, and could command 12,000 infantry, principally of his own tribe. His fort was situated amongst hills and jungles, extremely difficult of access; but, in dread of the Moghul name, he surrendered. As it was an invariable rule of Aurungzebe to bestow great honors on all who unresistingly acknowledged his authority, this Ramoosee Naik, greatly to the amusement of the courtiers, was raised to the rank of a commander of 5,000 in the Moghul empire. He survived his honors but a few days; and his son Pemnaik, finding himself uncomfortable in the splendour of his new situation, withdrew to the woods, and, collecting a band of his tribe, took up his abode in Wakinkerah, a walled village near Suggur, where, by plunder and robbery, he gradually added to his numbers, and in less than 20 years we shall find the last personal effort of the mighty Aurungzebe directed to reduce the Berud Naik of Wakinkerah.

Azim Shah and Ghazee-ud-deen, at the same time that the other detachments were sent off, marched against Adonee, still in possession of Musaood Khan, formerly regent of Beejapoor. Considering resistance as altogether hopeless, Musaood Khan resigned his possessions, but declined entering the imperial service, and died in respectable obscurity.

The eastern quarter of Golcondah was not overlooked. Rajamundree, and the seaports of Mausulipatam and Ganjam, were taken possession of; the detachments were successful in all quarters,* and the governors of Kuddapah, Conjevaram, and Poonamalee submitted.†

Those tracts of Carnatic and Drawed, which had been subject to the subverted kingdoms of Beejapoor and Golcondah, were indiscriminately termed Carnatic by the Moghuls; but the districts which had belonged to the former state were known as Beejapoor Carnatic, and those which had appertained to the latter as Hyderabad Carnatic. The former lay in the upper country, or Carnatic proper; the latter extended from Guntoor along the Coromandel coast, and included portions of territory intermixed with the Mahratta possessions, as far south as the Coleroon. No part of the Payeen Ghaut belonged to Beejapoor, as all its possessions in that quarter were conquered by Sivajee; but several places in the Bala Ghaut, or Carnatic proper, were still comprehended in the Hyderabad Carnatic, amongst which may be enumerated Gootee, near Adonee, and the districts of Gurumcondah, Gandicotta, and Sidhout.

After the fall of Golcondah, the grand camp moved towards Beejapoor, whilst the detachments, whose destination we have briefly noticed, were occupying and settling the country on every side; and before we revert to the share which the Mahrattas had in the events of this period, it is fit to explain, without a superfluous enumeration of all the establishment, the mode in which the Moghuls took possession of a district.

Two officers were appointed to it, the foudjar and the khalsa dewan. The foudjar was a military officer, in command of a body of troops, charged with the care of the police, and the protection of his division. He held, or, according to circumstances, assumed, a greater or less degree of power. The regular amount allowed him, for the maintenance of the district establishment was about 25 per cent. of the government collections. The duties of the dewan were entirely of a civil nature, and he

* Khafee Khan.

† Orme.

was intrusted with the collection of the revenue, whether of the exchequer or on account of a jagheerदार. The Moghul commanders, who received what were called jagheers from the newly-acquired territories of Hyderabad and Beejapoor, seldom had lands permanently made over similar to the tenure by which the Mahratta munsuddars held their possessions; the usual practice was to grant assignments for a term of years, on specified districts, for the support of their troops. Thus the foudjars were more on the footing of feudatories than the jagheerदars. The foudjars, in conjunction with the dewan, farmed out the districts to the deshmookhs or Dessayes, and the dewan realized the amount from them. There were commonly several foudjars in each soobeh. The Moghul conquests in the Deccan, which had formerly consisted of four soobehs, now, with the addition of Beejapoor and Golcondah, were formed into six.

During the rapid progress of Aurungzebe's conquests, the personal inactivity of Sumbhajee is ascribed, by the Mahratta writers, to the effects of the incantations of the magician Kuloosha. The fact appears to have been that Sumbhajee's habits had become abandoned, and he was generally lost in the stupor or derangement occasioned by a brutal excitement of the senses. He still might be roused to temporary activity; but although many of his father's officers, besides the few who were employed, were well qualified to assist at this crisis, they were deterred from acting by the jealousy of Kuloosha, or the violence of his master.*

The Mahratta munsuddars, who had been in the service of Beejapoor after the fall of the capital, sent professions of duty to the emperor, but they showed no readiness to join his standard.† Shirzee Khan was, as we have seen, detached for the purpose of attacking Sumbhajee's possessions, and the munsuddars alluded to were ordered to co-operate, but it is not ascertained that they joined him. Shirzee Khan, after penetrating as far as Wace, was attacked and defeated by Humbeer Rao, the Senaputtee, a victory dearly purchased by the loss of Humbeer Rao, who was mortally wounded on the occasion.* The advantage which the Mahrattas had gained was not neglected in consequence of this misfortune; several of their detachments pushed forward and occupied a great part of the open country towards Beejapoor. Parties of Mahratta horse made their appearance at Golcondah during the siege‡ of that place, but they acted with no vigour, and scarcely caused any interruption to the operations. The most important diversion which Sumbhajee attempted, was by sending off a detachment to the Carnatic under the orders of Kessoo Punt Pingley, the late Peishwa's brother, with Suntajee Ghorepuray as his second-in-command.§

The preconcerted plan was to unite with Hurjee Raja Mahareek, and their ultimate design, the occupation of the districts in the upper Carnatic, which had been the jagheer of Shahjee, and were still held by Venkajee, from whom Sumbhajee had received neither share nor tribute since his accession. But, on the arrival of the army at Ginjee, disputes and jealousies arose between Kessoo Punt and his nephew Neloo Punt; and it was supposed, or perhaps given out by the latter, that Kessoo Punt had some secret orders to dispossess Hurjee Raja of the government.*

* Mahratta MSS.

† Original letters in the possession of different families.

‡ Khafee Khan.

§ Mahratta MSS. Such of my readers as are familiar with Mahratta names, will have some difficulty to identify Kessoo Punt Pingley with Mr. Orme's Keisswa Puntolo, which is, it seems, the mode of pronouncing the name by the natives of the Coromandel coast.

Venkajee, whether aware of this expedition, or foreseeing that it would not be in his power to defend the paternal jagheer, was at this time in treaty with Chick Deo Raj, raja of Mysore, for the sale of Bangalore ; but the negotiation having become a matter of notoriety, the Mahrattas at Ginjee were intent on possessing themselves of it before the transfer should take place, and the Moghuls became equally desirous of anticipating them. The dissensions which prevailed at Ginjee, which, as in all other situations, are the bane of active service, delayed the Mahrattas. Kasim Khan arrived first, took Bangalore without resistance, and sold it a few days afterwards to Chick Deo Raj for three lakhs of rupees—the same sum as the raja had agreed to pay to Venkajee.*

Kessoo Punt and Suntajee Ghorepuray, frustrated in their design upon Bangalore, entered the country of Mysore, where they levied contributions and remained several months, but made no permanent conquests, and, after hearing of the fall of Golcondah and the rapid progress of the Moghuls, they returned in the end of the year to Ginjee.

Hurjee Raja, alarmed at the approach of the Moghuls, and the submission of the neighbouring officers, at last united with Kessoo A. D. 1688. Punt, and they succeeded in possessing themselves of several places ; but a large body of the Moghul troops arriving in the neighbourhood, and no cordial union existing among the Mahrattas, they were compelled to relinquish these new acquisitions, and retire to the protection of their forts on each side of the Paliar.†

Ouscotta, another of the oldest Mahratta possessions in the Carnatic, was this year wrested from Venkajee by the raja of Mysore, which might have easily been prevented by the aid of Sumbhajee's troops ; but where Mahrattas have hereditary disputes, they can seldom be induced to set them aside, even in behalf of their common interests.

Their power in the Carnatic was rapidly declining ; and, if their strength in Maharashtra had not depended on causes altogether different from anything consolidated or regular, Aurungzebe's plans of conquest would not have proved visionary, and the Mahratta name must have speedily sunk into its former obscurity.

Sumbhajee had become completely careless of all general business ; he spent his time between Panalla and Vishalgurh, or at a favourite house and garden in Sungumeshwur. The only plan on which he seems to have been particularly intent, in his present state of imbecility, was connected with his early success, and during his lucid intervals he was planning the capture of Goa, but failure attended all his intrigues. The whole power was in the hands of Kuloosha, and the time of the minister seems to have been more occupied in managing his master's humours, than in attending to the important business of the state. Prince Mohummud Akber, whose advice and intelligence had been of service to Sumbhajee, became disgusted with his situation, and after the fall of Beejapoor, finding he had nothing to hope and much to fear by remaining longer in India, obtained Sumbhajee's permission, hired a vessel at Rajapoor, commanded by an Englishman, withdrew to the court of Persia, where he resided for 20 years, and died at Ispahan in 1706.

The laxity, to which we have already adverted as having taken place in the discipline of the Mahratta army soon after Sivajee's death, greatly increased in a few years ; and, although extremely detrimental to Sumbhajee's resources as head of an organized state, it had a wonderful effect

* Wilks.

† Orme.

extending predatory power; for every lawless man, and every disbanded soldier, whether Mahomedan or Mahratta, who could command a horse and a spear, joined the Mahratta parties, and such adventurers were often enriched by the plunder of a day. The spirit which, independent of every other cause, was thus excited amongst a people fond of money, and disposed to predatory habits, can easily be imagined. The multitude of horsemen nurtured by former wars were already found too heavy a burden on a regular state, and no resources could support them. The proportion of the best troops which was retained in the imperial service would probably have soon enabled Aurungzebe to suppress the disorders commonly attendant on Indian conquest, had there been no spirit kindled amongst the Mahratta people. But a pride in the conquests of Sivajee, their confidence in the strength of the forts, the skill and bravery of several of the Mahratta leaders, the ability and influence of many of the Brahmins, and, lastly, the minds of the Hindoo population aroused by reports of the odious poll-tax, to jealous watchfulness on the tenderest point, had, in addition to what we have already enumerated, excited a ferment which required not only vast means, but an entire change of measures, before it could possibly be allayed.

Aurungzebe possessed great military strength and pecuniary resource; he also had considerable local knowledge, and, in the first instance, the same power of confirming or withholding hereditary rights, as his predecessors in conquest. Titles, munsubs, and jagheers were frequently bestowed, and still more frequently promised, with a liberality greater than any former conqueror had shown; but presumption, jealousy, and bigotry soon deprived him of many of those advantages. He was not fully aware of the strength or the nature of predatory power, and instead of crushing it by the aid of the established governments, he pulled down those constituted authorities without replacing them; he involved himself with enemies on every side; he discharged the soldiery, whom, in addition to his own troops, he could not maintain, and thus sent armies into the field against himself. He supposed that he was not only acquainted with the details of arrangements necessary in a newly-conquered country, but capable of superintending them; he placed little confidence in his agents, whilst he, at the same time, employed Mahomedans in all situations, to fill which, in many instances, policy and humanity alike dictated the selection of Hindoos. The confusion and disorder which ensued could not be tranquillized by the emperor's fancied wisdom, or the flattery and praises of his court and countrymen. The Mahrattas, more especially the Bramins, are not a people so easily dazzled as the Mahomedans, and, in the course of a very short time, they began to discover the weakness of the Moghuls.

The powerful Mankurees,* Duflay, Ghatgay, Manay, Nimbalkur, &c., during the siege of Beejapoor, hovered about the imperial camp until the

* Mankuree literally means a great man. It was originally, as above used, the name by which those Mahrattas who had been munsubdars under the old Mahomedan monarchies in the Deccan were, and still are, distinguished. Latterly, however, it was assumed by every Mahratta at the head of a body of horse, who could boast of being a *wutundar*. *Manpan*, or rights and privileges, are words in the mouth of every *wutundar*; and these rights and privileges, which, from the manner in which they are talked of and maintained, an Englishman might suppose involved the safety of their lives and properties, or the liberty of the subject at the least, are very often merely slight forms of that kind of respect indicated by precedence on particular occasions.

fall of the capital, when they withdrew to their jagheers, sending their wukeels with humble professions of duty, and sometimes attending themselves ; but from this time they joined plundering parties of their own countrymen, or submitted to the Moghuls, as circumstances invited or compelled them. There were few plunderers independent of Sumbhajee's parties or some Mankuree, because the foudjar's troops were always too powerful for common depredators. A few *Pindharees*,* as all not belonging to Mahratta parties were termed, appeared about Beder, but they were soon suppressed, or driven to join the Mahratta standard. No irregulars of that description received pay, but were frequently taken under the protection of some Mahratta chief, and allowed to encamp near him, on condition of presenting frequent nuzurs, or, in other words, giving up a part of their plunder.

The Mankurees, whilst their envoys were in the imperial camp professing "perpetual obedience and fidelity to Aurungzebe, the king of the world," frequently sent their parties to plunder the Moghul districts ; and, in case of discovery, the Bramin wukeel, who had secured the patronage of some great man at court by bribery, was ready to answer for, or excuse, the irregular conduct of his master's followers. The Moghul foudjars were instructed to conciliate the Mahratta chiefs on condition of their agreeing to serve with fidelity. The chiefs were negotiating with the foudjar ; their wukeels were intriguing at court ; their own villages were secure ; and their followers, under the general name of Mahrattas, were ravaging some other part of the country.

The Moghul officers, who had jagheer assignments in the Deccan, soon found that they could raise very little revenue ; their corruption was increased by poverty, and the offenders, who had, in the first instance, plundered their districts by purchasing the connivance of the foudjars, bribed the jagheerdars at court with a part of the pillage.

The hereditary rights and the family feuds which had been before usefully applied as an instrument of government, now became, in the general confusion of this period, a great cause of increasing disorder. The intricate nature of some of the hereditary claims in dispute, and the ingenuity of Bramins, who were always the managers, made every case so plausible, that the officers of government found little difficulty in excusing, or at least palliating, many acts of gross injustice, to which they scandalously lent themselves. Thus the rightful owners had often good reason for complaint ; they absented themselves with their troops, joined the plunderers, and, when induced or compelled to come in, they boldly justified their behaviour by the injustice they had suffered.

When an hereditary office was forfeited, or became vacant in any way, the Moghul government selected a candidate on whom it was conferred : but the established premium of the exchequer was upwards of six and a half years' purchase, or precisely 651 per cent. on one year's emoluments, one-fourth of which was made payable at the time of delivering the deeds, and the remainder by instalments ; but, besides this tax, an infinite number of fees and perquisites were exacted by the clerks, all which lent encouragement to confiscations and new appointments. The emperor increasing in years was soon overwhelmed in more important cares than

* About the borders of Maharashtra and the Carnatic there are a number of Pindharees ; they cultivate lands in time of peace, and plunder when the country is unsettled ; they have been there for some hundred years ; many of them speak Hindostanee, and call themselves Rajpoots.

the mere details of business ; his ministers and their underlings were alike negligent and corrupt, and even after deeds and papers were prepared, years elapsed before the orders they contained were put in execution.* In these remarks we have both recurred to events, and, in some degree, anticipated the consequences of those that are to follow ; but such is a correct picture of the times for upwards of 12 years after the fall of Beejapoor and Golcondah. At the end of that period, the effects and continued growth of the causes enumerated completely undermined the Moghuls, and their power crumbled like the aged and still splendid fabric, which it is impossible to repair, but which a few revolving seasons must level with the ground.

Upwards of a year was spent by the emperor at Beejapoor, during which success attended his arms in every quarter, and nothing in Sumbhaje's upper country, except the strong forts, remained unsubdued. The Moghul troops had possessed themselves of Tattora, and of the range of forts built by Sivajee between that place and Panalla ; and Aurungzebe was now preparing to enter on a regular plan for reducing the whole of the forts, being, in his opinion, all that remained to complete the conquest he had so long meditated. His design, however, was soon partially obstructed by the breaking out of a disease in his camp, which swept off numbers of his troops ; but on moving to Auklooj, on the banks of the Neera, it subsided.†

About this period the attention of the emperor was attracted to the English, and, in consequence of piracies which began to be committed by individuals, several of the factories belonging to the East India Company were seized. This was no uncommon measure for Aurungzebe to adopt when any of the Moghul ships were taken, and he more than once threw the president at Surat into confinement. On the present occasion the Seedee was ordered to drive them from Bombay. Yakoot Khan made a descent upon the island, and possessed himself of Mazagon, Sion, and Mahim, but could make no impression on the fort. The attack, however, continued, until the English appeased Aurungzebe, by the usual expedients of bribes to the courtiers, and the humblest submission. The Seedee quitted the island after he had remained upon it nearly a year.

After the emperor's arrival at Auklooj, plundering parties of Mahrattas were frequently heard of, but intelligence was received that one very large body had appeared near Nassuck, where the Moghul troops in the neighbourhood were not sufficient to oppose them. The Prince Azim Shah was detached with an army to that quarter ; a considerable force under Yeatikad Khan, the son of Aurungzebe's prime minister, Assud Khan, was ordered to prepare for the invasion of the Concan ; and Tukurrib Khan, an active partizan, who had been a distinguished officer under the unfortunate Abou Hoosseini, was sent with a detachment into

* The account of the state of the country, and Aurungzebe's administration at this period, is taken from Mahratta manuscripts, original Mahratta and Persian letters, deeds and statements, and also from Khafee Khan and Scott's Deccan.

† The disease which broke out in Aurungzebe's army at Beejapoor is mentioned by the same name as that which the natives of India now apply to the spasmodic cholera, but they bore no resemblance to each other. The disease was epidemic, and, before it attacked the camp with such violence, had prevailed for some years both in the Deccan and in Guzerat. Khafee Khan describes it as commencing by a slight swelling under the ear, the arm-pit, or groin, attended with inflamed eyes, and severe fever. It generally proved fatal in a few hours, and those who did recover, became wholly or partially deaf or blind.

the district of Kolapoor, of which he was also appointed foudjar. The Moghul troops were in possession of the open country in that quarter, but the Mahrattas still occupied Panalla with a strong garrison. Tukurrib Khan, having on his arrival taken pains to inform himself of everything in his neighbourhood, hearing that Sumbhajee spent his time at Sungumeshwur, entirely off his guard, conceived the bold project of seizing his person.

Having procured correct intelligence, and guides well acquainted with the Ghauts and the intricate windings of the route, he chose a few active infantry, and a small party of horse, with which, accompanied by his son, Ikhllass Khan, he set off from Kolapoor in prosecution of his enterprize. He was close upon Sungumeshwur before he was discovered, and when at last Sumbhajee's Jasooses ran to him with the intelligence, he was found intoxicated, and told them he would cut their noses off if they dared to bring such insulting stories about the approach of Mussulmans to him.

Ikhllass Khan had given little time for warning ; he dashed on at the head of a small party, entered the gate of the Gurhee before the Mahrattas could close it, cut down all who opposed him, and thus secured an entrance to his father.

Most of Sumbhajee's followers saved themselves by a precipitate flight ; the few that remained, at the head of whom was Kuloosha, endeavoured to defend their master, but Kuloosha being wounded by an arrow, they were speedily overpowered, and Sumbhajee, although he attempted disguise, was discovered by some valuable ornaments on his person, of which he had not time or presence of mind to divest himself. Besides Kuloosha there were 24 persons taken with him.*

Tukurrib Khan brought his prisoners in safety to Kolapoor, and, on reporting his success, was directed to bring them under a strong escort to the imperial camp, which, previous to the arrival of Tukurrib Khan, had moved up the Beema, and cantoned at Tolapoor,† at the junction of the Indooranee river, 16 miles north-east of Poona.

No effort was made to rescue Sumbhajee ; the measures of his favourite, added to his own misconduct, had rendered them both deservedly odious to the generality of his subjects ; and even had his army been disposed to undertake any enterprize in his favour, its loose and disordered state would probably have prevented the attempt.

On the arrival of the prisoners in the neighbourhood of the imperial camp, they were bound and exalted upon camels ; Sumbhajee was deprived of his turban ; drums, and all sorts of noisy music, sounded before him, and countless thousands flocked on all sides to see his entry into the camp. The prisoners were exhibited before Aurungzebe, and afterwards ordered into confinement, previous to their final sentence.

Some of the Moghul nobility suggested the propriety of sparing the life of Sumbhajee, as a means of inducing his troops to surrender the forts ; and Aurungzebe also, with this view, perhaps did intend to spare him conditionally. But Sumbhajee, roused to a sense of his situation, stung with shame and remorse, expected and wished for nothing but

* Khafee Khan, Mahratta MSS.

† This village, originally called Nagurgaom, is said to have been named Tolapoor, or the place of weighing, in order to commemorate Shahjee's plan of weighing Morar Punt's elephant, by placing him on a boat, marking the draught of water, removing the elephant, replacing his weight with stones, and weighing them—an anecdote preserved in every Mahratta account of him, and recorded by Colonel Wilks.

death, and made use of every epithet of abuse to induce some rash soldier to kill him. When in this frame of mind, Aurungzebe sent a message offering him life on condition of his becoming a Mussulman. "Tell the emperor," said Sumbhajee, "that if he will give me his daughter I will become a Mussulman," and concluded his reply by an invective on the prophet.

No words more insulting than that speech could be used to a Mahomedan. The emperor, enraged, determined to make a terrible example of him; he ordered a red-hot iron to be drawn across his eyes, his tongue to be cut out, and his head to be severed from his body.

Sumbhajee, in exact conformity with this mandate, was publicly executed in the camp bazar at Tolapoor, about the beginning of August 1689, together with his favourite Kuloosha.* The Bramin minister, however unworthy in many respects, has, by a story characteristic of the invention of Mahomedans, and by the hatred of some of the Mahrattas, been unjustly accused of forming a scheme for betraying his master.

Sumbhajee's character has been sufficiently depicted, and scarcely requires a summary. He inherited some military virtue, and was far from deficient in ordinary ability; but dissipation, vice, rashness, and cruelty completely obscured his few good qualities, and a longer life would, in all probability, have greatly increased the catalogue of his crimes. But the Mahratta people, though for the last three years much estranged from him, heard of the murder of the son of Sivajee with indignation, and this cruel execution, meant to strike the leaders with terror, aroused their vengeance without alarming their fears.

* Mahratta MSS., Orme, &c.

CHAP. XI.

FROM A. D. 1689 TO A. D. 1707.

Raja Ram.—Meeting of the principal Mahratta leaders at Raigurh.—*Raja Ram* declared regent during the minority of *Sumbhaje's* son.—Important consultations, in which *Prillhad Neerajee* takes a conspicuous part.—Siege and capture of Raigurh.—The son and widow of *Sumbhaje* taken.—*Merich* and *Panalla* taken.—*Raja Ram* flees to *Ginjee*—narrowly escapes being intercepted—establishes the form of the court of *Sivajee*—creates the rank of *Pritee Needhee*.—*Suntajee Ghorepuray* and *Dhunnajee Jadow* sent back to *Maharashtra*.—*Raja Ram* ascends the throne.—*Zoolfikar Khan* sent against *Ginjee*.—Siege delayed.—Aspect of affairs in the Deccan.—Proceedings of *Ramchundur Punt*.—Origin of *ghas-dana*.—*Rajgurh* and *Panalla* retaken.—Proceedings of *Suntajee* and *Dhunnajee*—and of *Aurangzebe*.—*Ginjee* invested.—Supersession of *Zoolfikar Khan* by the arrival of *Kaum Buksh*.—Jealousies to which it gives rise.—*Aurangzebe* fixes his principal cantonment at *Brimhapoor*.—Portuguese and English.—*Suntajee* and *Dhunnajee* repair to the Carnatic—attack the *Moghuls* with great success—a truce—dissolved by the emperor.—Siege of *Ginjee* renewed.—*Kasim Khan*, with several other officers, compelled by *Suntajee* to surrender, together with their troops.—*Himmut Khan* defeated and slain.—Siege of *Ginjee* pressed.—*Raja Ram* is permitted to escape.—*Ginjee* taken.—Disensions amongst the *Mahrattas*, which increase in consequence of the death of the *Pritee Needhee*.—A sedition obliges *Suntajee Ghorepuray* to flee from his own troops.—*Satara* becomes the seat of the *Mahratta* government.—Changes and promotions.—*Kanhojee Angria*, on the death of *Seedjee Goojur*, succeeds to the command of the fleet.—*Suntajee Ghorepuray* basely murdered by *Nogjee Manay*.—*Raja Ram* takes the field with a very large army—plunders the country, and imposes the *chouth* in *Candeish*, *Gungthuree*, and *Berar*, leaving officers to collect it.—*Zoolfikar Khan* recalled from the Carnatic.—New plan of operations—a pursuing and a besieging force.—*Zoolfikar Khan* attacks and pursues *Raja Ram*.—Emperor takes *Wussungurh*—invests *Satara*—description of its defences—its siege and surrender.—Capture of *Purlee*.—Distress of the *Moghul* army, in consequence of the setting in of the monsoon.—Death and character of *Raja Ram*.—His widow, *Tara Bye*, assumes the regency.—*Pureshram Trimbeck* appointed *Pritee Needhee*.—*Mahrattas* under *Dhunnajee Jadow*, and minor chiefs.—Description of a body of *Mahratta* plunderers contrasted with the splendour of a *Moghul* camp.—Great devastations.—State of the *Moghuls*.—*Aurangzebe* perseveres in his plan of reducing the forts,—general devastation and confusion.—Weakness of the *Moghuls*.—Power of the *Mahrattas*—its nature.—State of feeling in the country.—*Moghuls* make overtures for an accommodation—broken off.—*Aurangzebe* quits the neighbourhood of *Poona*, and moves to the eastward.—*Wakinkerah* besieged, and finally reduced.—*Mahrattas* retaking their forts—they attack the grand army on its march.—Emperor in danger of being taken.—Death and character of *Aurangzebe*.

FROM the time of the execution of Soyera Bye, the widow of Sivajee, her son Raja Ram had been confined by his half-brother Sumbhajee in the fort of Raigurh. This confinement does not appear to have been more rigid than Sumbhajee found consistent with his own security. Raja Ram had the free use of the fort, and upon the death of his first wife, Sumbhajee married him to two others—the one named Tara Bye, the other Rajis Bye; the former of the family of Mohitey, the latter a daughter of Ghatgay of Cagul. Raja Ram lived on terms of friendship with Yessoo Bye, the legitimate wife of Sumbhajee, who, with her son Sivajee, resided in Raigurh.

On the news of Sumbhajee's death, the principal Mahratta leaders repaired to Raigurh, when it was determined, in consultation with Yessoo Bye, that Raja Ram should be declared regent during the minority of Sivajee, afterwards known by the name of Shao, and who was then entering his sixth year. At this council the principal people, besides the parties mentioned, were Jenardin Punt Hunwuntay, Prillhad Neerajee, the son of the late Nyadeish Purdhan, Ramchundur Punt Bowreekur, Khundoo Bullal Chitnees, Mahadajee Naik Pansumbul, Santajee Ghorepuray, Dhunnajee Jadow, and Khundee Rao Dhabaray.

Prillhad Neerajee, with that ascendancy which superior minds acquire in times of real difficulty, took the lead in the consultations of this important assembly. They planned their measures with wisdom, unanimity, and firmness. They took a full view of the power and the preparations of Aurungzebe. They calculated their means of resistance, and saw, without dismay, a public treasury exhausted, the laxity of all discipline, the unprovided state of the forts, and even the probability of their being reduced. Their first endeavours, therefore, were directed to lay in provisions in the forts, and to keep the garrisons as complete as possible. The regulation of Sivajee, which gave the troops composing the garrisons a perpetual and hereditary subsistence from lands dependent on the forts, was of infinite importance at this period. Orders were immediately issued to preserve these institutions carefully; and the commanders of the forts, in addition to being warned to lay in as much grain as possible, were particularly enjoined to observe the orders for cutting and stacking the grass of the pasture-lands under the protection of the forts, so as to preserve subsistence for the horse, when forage in more accessible parts might not be procurable—a wise precaution of Sivajee, which had already proved useful during the time of Sumbhajee.

It was resolved that Raja Ram should move about from place to place along the line of forts from Raigurh to Vishalgurh; but, in order to distract the attention of the Moghuls, to make none of them his fixed residence; and should it be found unsafe for him to remain in Maharashtra, it was settled that he should quit the country, and repair to Ginjee, on the coast of Coromandel.

Yessoo Bye and her son remained in Raigurh, and the family of Raja Ram retired to Vishalgurh. The Mahratta chiefs were to act according to circumstances, but to keep most of their horse for the present at no great distance from the person of Raja Ram.

The Moghul besieging force, under Yeatikad Khan, destined for the Concan, could not enter that country before the fair season. The first place attacked was Raigurh; but the Moghuls, though assisted by the Seedeas, made little progress for several months, till a discontented Mahratta, named Sooryajee Peesal, who had served in the army of Sivajee, joined Yeatikad Khan, and engaged to bring a body of choice Mawulees

provided he should be intrusted with the command of them, and obtain the Khan's assistance in getting possession of the hereditary rights of the Deshmookh of Wase, to which he pretended a claim.

A. D. 1690. These conditions being accepted, Peesal performed his part of the agreement, and the early surrender of the fort was principally ascribed to his exertions. Peesal accompanied Yeatikad Khan, and the Seedee had several of his ancient possessions restored to him.

The widow of Sumbhaje and her son Sivajee fell into the hands of Yeatikad Khan: they were conveyed to camp, where the Khan was received with particular distinction, and honoured with the title of Zoolfikar Khan. Yessoo Bye and her son found a friend in Begum Sahib, the daughter of Aurungzebe, and the emperor himself became partial to the boy, whom he named Sahoo, an appellation which, pronouncing it Shao, he ever after chose to retain.

After the capture of Raigurb, detachments from the grand army advanced to Merich and Panalla, which were surrendered to the Moghuls, and Raja Ram was now advised to make good his way to Ginjee as soon as possible, before his plan of retiring there should be suspected. As preliminary arrangements, he had, by the advice of Prillhad Neerajee, adopted the precaution of appointing Neeloo Punt Moreishwur to his father's situation of Peishwa—a measure which secured Ginjee in his interests. The command of Vishalgurb, Rangna, and all the forts, with full and complete powers of government in the old provinces, was confided to Ramchundur Punt Bowreekur, with the title of Hookmut-punah. Under him was placed Pureshram Trimbeck, a Bramin, who, from the humble situation of hereditary Koolkurnee of Khinneye, had brought himself into notice, and had given proofs of intelligence and spirit. Seedojee Goojur, dignified with the title of Surkheil, was intrusted with the general command of the fleet, the superintendence of the maritime ports, and the defence of the coast. His second-in-command was a Mahratta, named Kanhojee Angria, whose father, Tookajee Angria, had early distinguished himself in Sivajee's fleet. The foresight of Prillhad Neerajee had also been the means of opening a correspondence with all the principal Mankurees, which, although it did not immediately induce them to make common cause against the Moghuls, directed their inclinations to that end.

Mahadajee Naik Pansumbul, an old man who had great weight with the sillidars of the country, was appointed Senaputtee, and left in Maharashtra. At his recommendation, the different leaders dispersed their horse amongst the villages, with directions to assemble at such place, and by such signal as might afterwards be made to them by the Senaputtee, and that all their friends, brethren, and connections should join the Bhugwa Jenda* wherever it might appear.

After showing himself in his different forts, Raja Ram joined his confidential friends at Rangna, ready to prepare for flight. Having disguised themselves as Lingait Banians, they proceeded to Soonda, and thence across the country, towards the opposite coast. The party of Raja Ram on this occasion consisted of 25 persons, and amongst them are found the names of Prillhad Neerajee, Suntajee Ghorepuray, Dhunnajee Jadaw, and Khundee Rao Dhabaray. Although the plan was well con-

* The orange standard of the Mahrattas. This colour, as already mentioned, is sacred to Mahdeo, and the flag carried religious as well as military feeling along with it.

coerted, Aurungzebe got intelligence of the Raja's flight, and immediate orders were sent to Kasim Khan, foudar in the Beejapoor Carnatic, to intercept him. Similar orders were transmitted by Kasim Khan to his friends, and Raja Ram was in great jeopardy in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, where the slight circumstance of having his feet washed by a servant first attracted attention. The wary observation of Khundoo Bullal discovered that there was a plan for arresting the whole party, and, to disappoint the scheme, Khundoo Bullal, with the majority of the party, remained cooking their victuals, whilst Raja Ram, Suintajee Ghorepuray, and Dhunnajee Jadow went off by one route, and Prillhad Neerajee with Khundee Rao Dhabaray travelled by another.

Khundoo Bullal and his companions were taken, as had been foreseen : they were examined, confined, and beaten to extort confession ; but on their firmly persisting in a preconcerted story, and denying all knowledge of any fugitives from Maharashtra, they were released, and finally joined Raja Ram, who, with the others, had reached Ginjee in safety.

The first news they heard from Maharashtra was the death of Mahadajee Naik, the Senaputtee : this event, although it disconcerted their measures for the time, was fortunate for the Mahratta cause, as it brought Suintajee Ghorepuray into immediate power—an officer of much greater ability and enterprize.

The primary care of Raja Ram was to establish a court on the plan of his father, which, though at first little more than nominal, was of much importance in giving consequence to his party.

The Purdhans now appointed were as follow :—1st, Neeloo Punt Moreishwur, Peishwa ; 2nd, Jenardin Punt Hunwuntay, Amat ; 3rd, Shunkrajee Mulhar, Suchew ; 4th, Ramchundur Trimbuck Poonday, Muntree ; 5th, Suintajee Ghorepuray, Senaputtee ; 6th, Mahadajee Gudadhur, Somunt ; 7th, Neerajee Rowjee, Nyadeish ; 8th, Sreekuracharya, Pundit Rao.

The appointment of Peishwa having been previously filled, and Prillhad Neerajee continuing the soul of their cause, a new rank was instituted which raised him above the Purdhans, by the title of *Pritee Needhee*, literally meaning the likeness or representative of the raja himself. Although Prillhad Neerajee was fond of titles and show—a taste which he probably acquired when envoy on the part of Sivajee at the court of Golcondah—the dignity conferred upon him was entirely unsolicited. Suintajee Ghorepuray, now the oldest representative of the Kapsee family, besides the rank of Senaputtee, was further dignified with some additions to his hereditary titles, and styled Hindoo Rao Mumlukut-Mudar. He was also intrusted with a new standard called the *Juree Putku*, or Golden Pennon ; and in imitation of the imperial officers of the highest rank, he was authorized to beat the *nobut*, or large drum, and assume various other insignia. Dhunnajee Jadow got the title of Jeysing Rao, and, in consequence of the demise of Mahadajee Naik, both Suintajee and Dhunnajee were sent back to Maharashtra “to collect men and plunder the Moghuls.”*

Raja Ram was formally seated on the throne,† and the new court began to exercise all the forms of government. Gold bangles, clothes, shawls, and letters announcing the event, were secretly forwarded, and pompously

* Mahratta MSS.

† Some of the Mahrattas, jealous of the right of the elder branch, do not admit that Raja Ram ever sat on the throne. They say that he sat on the Gadee, or cushion, merely as regent, holding the powers of the state in trust for his nephew Shao, then a prisoner in the Moghul camp.

presented to all the principal Híndoos throughout Maharashtra,* and what is very remarkable, enams, jagheers, &c., in the Mahratta country, then in actual possession of the Moghuls, and places which never had belonged to his predecessors, were profusely bestowed, but few of them were confirmed,† by Raja Ram, or Shao, after they had obtained control over the territory which the raja thus pretended to alienate. Unsubstantial, however, as such gifts were, they had the effect of strengthening his cause, of keeping alive an interest in it, and of drawing numbers of persons to Ginjee.

Aurangzebe, as soon as he heard of these proceedings, detached Zoolfikar Khan with a large army into the Carnatic, vainly hoping that he would be able to strike off this last head of the

Mahratta power; but the hydra had lost none of its vigour; parties under the name of Mahrattas, though they may have been discharged horsemen from Beejapoor and Golcondah, were this season plundering at Nassuck, Bheer, and Beder at the same time; whilst hundreds of horse, that had shared in the campaigns of Sivajee, were flocking to Suntajee Ghorepuray and Dhunnajee Jadow, the oldest and most popular leaders among them. The want of funds was greatly felt by Suntajee in his attempts to organize a force on the old system, which he never was able fully to effect, but Ramchundur Punt gave him every aid in his power.‡

In the exposed state of the Payeen Ghaut, as Prillhad Neerajee considered that Suntajee and Dhunnajee could give more effectual aid to Ginjee by remaining in Maharashtra, he engaged a Mahomedan officer, formerly in the service of Beejapoor, to attempt some opposition on the approach of the Moghuls. The attempt was made, although unsuccessfully, and the officer in question afterwards joined the Moghuls.

In Zoolfikar Khan's army there were a number of Mahrattas, both in the cavalry and infantry. In the latter were the same body of Mawulees that had assisted in the capture of Raigurh,§ and among the former there were two of the relations of Raja Ram, Gunnajee and Ranoojee Sirkay, who, having deserted to the Moghuls when Annajee Dutto was executed, had attained commands, and were esteemed good officers. The second-in-command to Zoolfikar Khan in this army was Daood Khan Punnee,|| a Deccan officer of some repute, but notoriously addicted to drinking. The fort of Ginjee consists of several contiguous hills, strongly fortified, and is many miles in circumference. The Moghuls never considered an army capable to undertake a regular siege, unless sufficiently large to surround the place invested, and completely obstruct communication. Zoolfikar Khan, finding his force inadequate for this purpose, after he had commenced some works, represented that a reinforcement was necessary, and, until it should arrive, he left a detachment at Ginjee, and undertook an expedition to the southward, where he levied contributions both from the rajas of Tanjore and Trichinopoly.

* Mahratta MSS., Khafee Khan.

† In the course of my official duties after the late conquest of Maharashtra, I have had some of these very deeds, which neither Raja Ram nor any of his successors admitted, presented in hopes that they would be recognised by the British government.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ By the proceedings of a punchayet respecting the Deshmookhee of Wasee, during the early part of the reign of Shao, which may be considered a very authentic and useful manuscript, and is now in possession of the Hindoo Deshmookh, it appears that Peesal, the Mawulee commander, came over to Raja Ram during the siege of Ginjee, but, failing afterwards in obtaining all he wished, again rejoined Aurungzebe, and became a Mussulman to gain his end.

|| I believe he was the ancestor of the Nabob of Kurnoul.

But this requisition for troops was not immediately complied with ; the Deccan was far from being in that state which made it easy for Aurungzebe to spare large reinforcements, without running great risk of having the whole country in a state of insurrection. The depredations of the Naik of Wakinkerah had become so troublesome, that an army, under the Prince Kaum Bukhsh and Roh Oolla Khan, was ordered to destroy his town ; but they were obliged to besiege it, and came ill-prepared to overcome the defence which was maintained against them.*

Ramchundur Punt was as useful in Maharashtra as the Pritee Needhee A. D. 1692. at Ginjee ; he had an excellent second in Pureshrum Trimbeck, who used great exertions in restoring the arrangements of the forts, and giving spirit and zeal to the garrisons. Ramchundur moved from place to place, but fixed his principal residence at Satara, where, by the aid of his head carcoon, Shunkrajee Narain Gaudekur, he not only attended to every military disposition, but regulated the revenue, and established some order in the country. He had raised troops of his own, and had cut off several straggling parties of the Moghuls, before Suntajee and Dhunnajee returned ; but when they joined him, Ramchundur proposed a plan for surprising the foudjar at Wae, to which Suntajee, greatly pleased,† immediately consented, took the foudjar with all his troops prisoners, and established a Mahratta thanna in the place. The mere presence of Suntajee and Dhunnajee animated Ramchundur's followers, and he incited his commanders to follow their example. He sent them out to make their established collections, as the chouth and surdeshmookhee were termed, from the Moghul territory ; and as they became encouraged by success, his officers added a third contribution for themselves, under the head of *ghas-dana*, or forage-money. In this manner a distinct army was raised, of which the principal leaders were Powar, Thorat, and Atowlay. The commanders received honorary presents and rewards from court ; the title of Wiswas Rao was conferred on Powar, Dinker Rao on Thorat, and Shumsher Buhadur on Atowlay. Ramchundur was particularly partial to the Mahratta *dhungurs*, or shepherds, a great number of whom served among his troops ; and any of the ancestors of those who afterwards became great chiefs in the empire, began their career under Ramchundur Punt.

Shunkrajee Narain, hitherto known as an able carcoon, had received charge of the Wae district, and had retaken Rajgurh, which, after the fall of Raigurh, had been surrendered to the Moghuls. A still more important service was performed by Pureshrum Trimbeck, who surprised and retook Panalla.

Suntajee headed another attack on the Moghul officer stationed near Merich, against whom he was as successful as at Wae ; and Ramchundur, in consequence, by virtue of the powers vested in him, gave him a grant of the Deshmookhee of Merich. As soon as Suntajee and Dhunnajee had collected a sufficient body of troops, mindful of their object of effecting a diversion in favour of Ginjee, they made their appearance on the banks of the Godavery, which was the only part of the country where scarcity, from one cause or other, did not prevail. They there plundered and destroyed everything, and cut off several of the Moghul convoys coming from Hindostan. Parties were soon sent against them ; but Aurungzebe

* Khafee Khan, and Scott's Deccan.

† It is not known what was the stratagem proposed which pleased Suntajee so much, and which he executed so successfully.

found that he had not ordinary freebooters to suppress ; instead of fleeing from his detachments, they defeated three of them successively, took the commander each time prisoner, and, according to a rule invariably observed by Santajee, exacted a large ransom before they would grant their release. This system was according to Sivajee's general rule, but contrary to his practice ; for he took a pride in releasing great men, although he always made what he could by the middling class of prisoners. Santajee conformed to Sivajee's discipline as far as was practicable, and was particular in obtaining security for the good conduct of his followers, always preferring Mahratta wutundars to any other class of men. Dhunnajee Jadow was not so strict nor so good an officer as Santajee, but he was a more popular leader.*

Whilst they were thus spreading their ravages to the northward, Aurungzebe shifted his encampment on the banks of the Beema, apparently undecided with respect to his future operations. He at last resolved to support Zoolfikar Khan, and, at all events, reduce Ginjee. The Prince Kaun Bukhsh, under the guidance of the prime minister Assud Khan, was destined for the service. He was directed to leave Roh Oolla Khan at Wakinkerah, the siege of which was afterwards abandoned, and move on the route to Ginjee, where he was soon joined by Assud Khan with a large army. On approaching the Payeen Ghaut, parties of horse made their appearance, and by skirmishing delayed their advance, but they finally sat down before the place and invested it.

Zoolfikar Khan, on being deprived of the command by the arrival of the prince, was exceedingly mortified ; and even Assud Khan, after the late success of his son at Raigurh, considered the supersession unjust on the part of the emperor, particularly as it was well known that it had been brought about by Joudpooree,† the prince's mother, and the favourite wife of Aurungzebe.

The Mahratta ministers, who, like all Bramins, are ever on the watch for such opportunities, speedily turned this jealousy, which they foresaw would prove reciprocal, to their own advantage. They courted both, but they first gained Zoolfikar Khan, who entered into a secret compact with Raja Ram for the purpose of obstructing the prince's measures, which he did, either by thwarting his plans, where the execution depended on himself, or by preparing the besieged to counteract every intended operation.‡

The emperor, probably conceiving that his army must draw the Mahrattas southward, moved to Gulgulla ;§ but Ghorepuray still continued to the northward, and Ramchundur's parties levied contributions as far east as Sholapoor.¶ Aurungzebe, finding his feint unsuccessful, brought back his unwieldy host to Brimhapooree, on the Beema, below Punderpoor, where he established his principal depôt, and built a cantonment, in which he held his court ; and from that point the operations of his armies and the affairs of his empire were directed for several years.||

* Mahratta MSS., partly confirmed by Khafee Khan and Scott's Deccan.

† I had fallen into the mistake of my predecessors by writing the name Oudepooree ; but I learn from my friend Major Tod, the best authority for information respecting the Rajpoots, that she was not a princess of Oudepoor, but of Kishengurh, a minor division of Joudpoor ; and that the name by which she was known was Joudpooree.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ Khafee Khan, Scott's Deccan.

|| Mahratta MSS., original papers, Khafee Khan, Scott's Deccan.

The Portuguese about this time had fallen under his displeasure, and

A. D. 1695. war was waged against them in every part where they had settlements in India. Great cruelties were exercised on the defenceless inhabitants subject to that nation in the northern Concan,* but numbers found an asylum in their forts of Damaun and Bassein; at last the Moghul courtiers, bribed by the viceroy at Goa, represented the advantage of making peace with the Portuguese, for the purpose of procuring cannon in order to reduce the Mahratta forts—a sure way to carry their point, as the emperor's age and imbecility had become apparent, and to flatter his favourite scheme rendered even the wily Aurungzebe the dupe of that despicable deceit and artifice which he had all his life practised on others. A like means was used to pacify him with regard to the English. The ravages of the pirates continued; and, as the Moghuls always concluded that one, or both the English East India Companies were engaged in these depredations, the emperor, although a considerable revenue was derived from the customs on their trade, would have driven them from the coast, had they not been protected by the fort

A. D. 1696. of Bombay, which, defended by their artillery, was considered impregnable. One capture, that of the *Gunj-Suwaee*, the largest of the Moghul ships, proceeding from Surat to Mocha with many pilgrims as passengers, gave particular offence, and occasioned the seizure of the chief at Surat, with several other Englishmen, who were imprisoned for a considerable period until the affair was adjusted.

In the meantime, years had been already wasted before Ginjee. Suntajee Ghorepuray, after committing great havoc, and defeating or eluding all that were opposed to him in Maharashtra, left two active officers, Pursojee Bhonslay† and Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, both of whom had served under Sivajee, to give spirit to the Mahrattas in Gunthuree and Berar. With an army of upwards of 20,000 horse, Suntajee passed to the west of the grand camp by the Satara road, pushed on towards the Carnatic, and as soon as he got within a certain distance of Ginjee, detached about one-third of his troops under Dhunnajee Jadow, who, making rapid marches, brought the first news of his approach by attacking some of the Moghul posts in the neighbourhood of the fort. Orders were immediately issued to the different small divisions to concentrate and form larger bodies to the right and left; but the Moghuls, always slow to obey, were not aware of the activity of the horse that now attacked them, whilst Dhunnajee, assisted both by troops and signals from the fort, cut in upon them, and did great execution before the manœuvre ordered could be executed.‡

Suntajee Ghorepuray, with less haste, brought on the main body of Mahrattas. Upon his arrival at Covrepauk, he was opposed by the foudar, Ali Murdan Khan, with a considerable army; but the foudar was speedily routed, the whole of his baggage and camp-equipage plundered, and he himself, on his flight towards the camp at Ginjee, was overtaken, made prisoner, and released for a high ransom.

The victorious Mahrattas, with their usual activity when successful,

* From local usage on the west of India, we are in the habit of applying the designations of northern and southern Concan to the Concan north and south of Bombay.

† He was originally a common sillidar, and a wutundar of the village of Dewoog, near Satara, where he was born. This person was the ancestor of the rajas of Nag-poor. In one manuscript he is said to have been a native of the village of Hingun-berde, near Poona.

Scott's Deccan, Khafee Khan, Mahratta MSS.

beat in the Moghul outposts in every direction, destroyed their foragers, and so completely cut off their communications that neither supplies nor intelligence could reach them. Reports of the emperor's illness and death were industriously circulated by the Mahrattas, who then made overtures to Kaum Bukhsh, and proposed to make him emperor. The prince either listened to their proposals, or at all events Assud Khan and his son affected to believe that he did, and they determined on placing him under restraint. The Mahrattas, apprized of what was going forward, taking advantage of the bustle and dissension which the circumstance naturally created in the Moghul camp, attacked and harassed them with additional vigour. The personal troops of Kaum Bukhsh refused to fight; all became alarm and uproar; at last the Moghuls burst their cannon, abandoned their batteries, and were in turn besieged in their lines.

Whilst in this situation, and in great distress for supplies, a truce was proposed; from which party it originated seems uncertain, but the probability is that it came from the Moghuls; an agreement, however, was concluded between Assud Khan and Santajee. The Moghuls were to be permitted to retire to Wandewash unmolested, and to remain until Assud Khan should receive a reply from the emperor, according to which it was stipulated that he should abide.*

Aurungzebe, foreseeing all the consequences of this ill-advised proceeding, immediately ordered Assud Khan and the prince to the presence, moved with the grand camp to Beejapoor, and directed Zoolfikar Khan to prosecute the war.

But the siege of Ginjee was not immediately renewed. The Mahrattas were accused of not having observed the truce, because they attempted to cut off a convoy of provisions which the foudjar of Carnatic Beejapoor was escorting to camp, and which he saved by throwing himself into Covrepauk. Their having retaken Permacoil and several other forts was still less justifiable; and Zoolfikar Khan, in order to recover these places and punish the violation of the agreement, marched to the southward, and re-possest himself of the forts. Continuing his march, he entered into an alliance with the raja of Trichinopoly, and obliged the raja of Tanjore, one of the sons of Venkajee, to restore several places wrested from the latter, and to pay a considerable contribution to himself; after this arrangement, Zoolfikar Khan re-crossed the Coleroon, and again sat down before Ginjee.†

The clandestine intercourse was still carried on with Raja Ram; ‡ and it is not improbable, from his desire to protract the siege, that Zoolfikar Khan, upon the demise of the emperor, may have had designs of ultimately establishing an independent government in the Carnatic for himself.

During Zoolfikar Khan's absence in Tanjore, Santajee Ghorepuray laid waste the Beejapoor Carnatic. To punish his depredations, a considerable force was sent off from Beejapoor under different leaders, and, being joined by Kasim Khan, foudjar of the province, the whole were about to march in quest of Santajee; but their advanced tents had scarcely been pitched when his troops attacked and destroyed the guard, and the Mahrattas were flying about the main body on all sides, before the great men had time to caparison and mount their elephants.

Kasim Khan's authority did not extend beyond his own troops; the other leaders, as rash as they were destitute of resource, followed their

* Scott's Deccan, Mahratta MSS. † Scott's Deccan. ‡ Mahratta MSS.

own plans, and each body fought or defended itself as it best could; while the Mahrattas, profiting by their distraction, never ceased harassing them, charging and firing upon them by day, and rocketing them by night. At last the Moghuls on the third day sought shelter under the walls of the gurhee of Dodairee. There was a small quantity of provisions in the place, which, though sold by the Banians from the top of the walls at an enormous price, was soon exhausted. This state of privation became intolerable; but they were beaten troops badly commanded, and could not try, by a brave effort, to save themselves. An attempt was made to rescue them, but Suntajee attacked and defeated the party coming to their relief, whilst it was still at a distance, so that the despairing men heard nothing of the effort. In this situation the Moghul officers surrendered. Kasim Khan had served with reputation: he did not survive the disgrace, but took poison and died. The other officers, besides being stripped, had to pay a large ransom for their release, and, on their return to the imperial camp, they were divested of their honors, and appointed to distant and inferior commands.*

Himmud Khan, the officer who had made the unsuccessful attempt to relieve Dodairee and the son of Khan Jehan Buhadur, being, at his own request, reinforced from the grand camp by an army sufficient to cope with the Mahrattas, proceeded in search of Suntajee. He was soon found. The Mahrattas, on being vigorously charged on the plain, fled, and Himmud Khan pursued the fugitives, until they had, according to Mahratta custom, drawn him into difficult and broken ground, when they turned round, attacked in their usual desultory manner, killed Himmud Khan, totally defeated his army, and plundered his baggage.

Suntajee, retiring towards Ginjee, was attacked by Zoolfikar Khan, and pursued to a considerable distance. When the latter turned to resume the siege, Suntajee attended him a march in the rear.† This manœuvre is not unusual with Mahrattas; in the instance alluded to, however, the pursuit was probably a mere feint, as an intimacy subsisted between Zoolfikar Khan and Suntajee, which there is some reason for suspecting that the rivals of the latter afterwards misrepresented to his prejudice.

At Ginjee the same languid operations continued, and the siege at this

A. D. 1697. time would probably have been bloodless, but for the inebriety of Daood Khan, Zoolfikar Khan's lieutenant, who, when intoxicated, always turned out his men to storm the fort and exterminate the infidels;‡ these fits only produced frequent skirmishes; but the conduct of Zoolfikar Khan having at last aroused the suspicion of the emperor, the Khan was privately warned by his friends that, unless he speedily effected the reduction of Ginjee, and the capture of all the principal people, no influence could save him from disgrace and ruin. This information the Moghul general communicated to Raja Ram, and as he was now obliged to press the siege, he connived at a plan for the Raja's escape, through his relations the Sirkays, who agreed to convey him safe to Vishalgurh, to take charge of his family, and to join him themselves on the first opportunity, provided they received certain hereditary rights, and the town of Dabul in the Concan in enam. All these conditions being settled, Raja Ram, by the assistance of the Sirkays, escaped through

* Khafee Khan and Mahratta MSS., partly confirmed by Scott's Deccan.

† Khafee Khan, Scott's Deccan, Mahratta MSS.

‡ Wilks.

the Moghul lines, and reached Vellore, where he was received by Mannajee Moray, the commandant.*

After remaining there a short time, he set off with his conductors for Vishalgurh, where he safely arrived in December. Ginjee was taken early

A. D. 1698. in January. It was carried by escalade,† and the wives and family of Raja Ram, who had joined him from Rajapoor by sea, were, as preconcerted, made over to the Sirkays as their relations, which Zoolfikar Khan permitted, on the Sirkays making a public representation of the loss of honor they should sustain, in case of their female relations being exposed unveiled, or given in charge to persons of another caste. They were shortly after conveyed to Maharashtra.

Zoolfikar Khan ordered many of Raja Ram's people into perpetual confinement; and although he had acted this deceitful part to screen his treachery from the emperor, many were executed as plunderers and insurgents; amongst others, Naroo Prillhad, the son of Prillhad Neerajee, suffered as a rebel. The Pritee Needhee had died previous to the fall of Ginjee.‡

During the preceding year, the main body of the Mahrattas did little against the common enemy. Dissensions had for some time prevailed between Suntajee and Dhunnajee; but by the judicious counsel of the late Pritee Needhee, the raja had long remained neutral in their quarrel, and thus prevented an open rupture. But after the death of Prillhad Neerajee, Raja Ram had no such prudent monitor. He had for some time smothered his jealousy of Suntajee Ghorepuray, which now uncontrolled, and worked upon by others, gave Ghorepuray an enemy where he had the best right to expect a protector, and Dhunnajee Jadow, encouraged by the raja, raised a strong faction against him. Nor did Aurungzebe neglect so favourable an opportunity of practising his favourite policy of creating division among his enemies; he had emissaries among the Mahrattas, who fomented their jealousies, and kept him informed of all that passed.

Suntajee's army was corrupted, and he had but just time to escape with a few followers from a combined attack made upon him by a part of his own and Dhunnajee Jadow's troops. This sedition happened in the neighbourhood of Beejapoor;§ parties were sent in pursuit of Suntajee, whilst the main body of the Mahrattas separated. One-half accompanied Dhunnajee Jadow into the Carnatic, where Zoolfikar Khan had lately been exerting himself with great success against the smaller detachments of the Mahrattas, and was very anxious to possess Vellore, which he thought would effectually suppress their power in that quarter. The other half of the Mahratta army marched to join the raja at Satara, which, at the recommendation of Ramchundur Punt, became the seat of government.‡

Jenardin Punt having died, the office of Amat was restored to Ramchundur Punt, from which he had been removed by Sivajee, in 1676, to make room for Rugonath Punt Hunwuntay: his late services eminently entitled him to high honor and reward, and his principal carcoon, Shunkrajee Narain Gaudekur, was raised to the rank of Suchew, which office had become vacant by the retirement of Shunkrajee Mulhar to Benares during the siege of Ginjee. The appointment of the new Suchew displeased Pureshram Trimbuck, who conceived his claims to that honor greater than those of Shunkrajee Narain.

* Mahratta MSS., and English Records.

† Khafee Khan, and Scott's Deccan.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ Khafee Khan.

Timmojee Rugonath Hunwuntay, the son of the late Jenardin Punt, having effected his escape from prison at Ginjee in a very dexterous manner, rejoined Raja Ram, by whom, in consequence of his family pretensions and supposed talents, he was raised to the rank of Pritee Needhee.

Seedojee Goojur, who died about this period, had been engaged in constant warfare with the Seedee, and with various success ; but by the activity of Kanhojee Angria, the Mahratta fleet had made many valuable prizes. Vessels of all nations were attacked ; repeated descents were made along the coast, and few of the defenceless mercantile towns, from Travancore to Bombay, escaped a visit from these depredators. The Mahrattas continued in possession of most of their forts on the coast ; they had maritime depôts at Severndroog and Viziadroog, but the principal rendezvous of their fleet continued, as in the time of Sivajee, at Kolabah.* The Sawunts, Deshmookhs of Waree, when their districts were not overrun by the Moghuls, adhered to Raja Ram ; but the Dessaye of Carwar continued independent, and, as usual under such circumstances, assumed the title of raja.

Suntajee Ghorepuray, whom we left pursued by parties of his enemies, was hunted from place to place, and had hitherto foiled them all ; but Nagojee Manay, Deshmookh of Muswar, stimulated by private revenge, continued the pursuit with unrelenting perseverance ; until, having overtaken Suntajee in the act of bathing in a small rivulet to refresh himself, at a moment when he thought his enemies far behind, though alone, tired, and defenceless, the assassin rushed down and slew him on the spot. Having severed the head from the body, he brought it to the skirts of the imperial camp, and sent it to Aurungzebe. Nagojee shortly after sent a petition for re-admission into the imperial service, which he had entered and quitted in the same manner as all the hereditary officers and Mankurees were in the habit of doing at this period. A free pardon, high encomium, and additional honors were readily bestowed, which proves the acceptable service he had rendered by this murder. Suntajee Ghorepuray was one of the best officers of whom the Mahratta annals can boast, and his eulogy is best recorded when we say he was the terror of the Moghul detachments for seven years.

The death of Suntajee and the atrocity of the deed brought back many of his followers to a sense of their own ingratitude. His sons Ranoojee and Peerajee, and his nephew Seedojee, who had fled from the army in dread of Dhunnajee, were soon rejoined by a number of Suntajee's followers, on which they erected their family standard, and began to plunder the Moghul territory on their own account.†

Raja Ram, after he had remained a short time at Satara, proceeded with his army to the northward, where he was joined by Pursajee Bhonslay, Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, Neemajee Sindia, Atowlay Shumsher Buhadur, and other commanders who had for some time been plundering in Candeish, Gungthuree, and Berar. The combined armies, which now formed a greater force than Sivajee had ever commanded, proceeded under Raja Ram, who entered Gungthuree, claiming as his established right the chouth and surdeshmookhee. All who submit-

* Mahratta MSS., Bombay Records.

† Mahratta MSS., and an account of the Ghorepuray family received from the late Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray Umeer-ool-Oomrah, which was originally compiled for the late Sir Barry Close. I likewise received a history of the Ghorepuray family from the late Mr. Thackeray, which I lodged with the Literary Society of Bombay.

ted to the payment of these demands were protected, and the Moghul garrisons that remained passive spectators were not molested, but such as made unsuccessful opposition were put to the sword. On this occasion the Mahrattas were more systematic in their exactions than they^{*} before had been ; where they could not obtain ready money they took promissory notes from the Patells, according to the practice first introduced by Sivajee, and in this manner went on through Nandere, Berar, and Candeish.

When he had nearly completed his tour, Raja Ram left Khundee Rao Dhabaray in Buglana, Neemajee Sindia in Candeish, Pursajee Bhonslay in Berar, and Hybut Rao Nimbalkur in Gungthuree, to collect, what they termed, the outstanding balances due to the Raja.

Pursajee Bhonslay, when appointed to this duty in Berar, got the title of Sena Sahib Soobeh, and Hybut Rao Nimbalkur was styled Sur Lushkur ; both these officers received the Juree Pujka, or Golden Pennon, on this occasion. Raja Ram, on his return, attacked Jaulna, which he was plundering, when the Moghul army came suddenly upon him ; they attacked and pursued his troops with a vigour and perseverance to which they had of late seldom been unaccustomed ;^{*} but to account for their activity on this occasion, we must revert to the proceedings of Zoolfikar Khan and Aurungzebe.

In the Carnatic affairs under Dhunnajee Jadow had not been prosperous. Zoolfikar Khan, although a corrupt, ambitious man, was an active commander, and now the only Moghul officer of whom the Mahrattas stood in any awe. He had repeatedly defeated Dhunnajee, when the emperor, hearing of the march of Raja Ram, sent express orders for Zoolfikar Khan to repair to the cantonment at Brimhapoorree. It was then determined, in consultation with Assud Khan, and several of the principal officers, to adopt a new plan of operations, by which, whilst one army attacked the Mahrattas in the field, another was destined for the reduction of their forts. This last the emperor reserved for himself, giving the command of the pursuing army to the Prince Bedar Bukht, the son of Azim Shah, with Zoolfikar Khan as his lieutenant, whose first effort was the attack and pursuit of Raja Ram's army, to which we have just alluded.

The emperor's preparations being completed, the cantonment at Brimhapoorree was evacuated, much to the regret of the indolent Moghul officers, many of whom had built excellent houses at that station. A depôt was formed under the protection of the Gurhee of Machnoor, which was within the line of the cantonment, and a strong guard was left for its protection. Aurungzebe's march was nearly due west, and he encamped under the fort of Wussuntgurb, on the twentieth day after quitting the Beema. Batteries were erected, and in three days the garrison surrendered. The emperor named the fort *Kuleed-i-futih*, or "the key of victory," and was much pleased by the event. As Panalla had been unsuccessfully attacked by Moiz-ud-deen, the son of Sultan Mauzum, some years before, the Mahrattas were impressed with an idea of its being about to be besieged, and directed all their preparations towards its defence. But Aurungzebe marched for Satara—a movement wholly unexpected, as the fort was not provisioned for above two months. This neglect

* was considered a great misfortune, and gave rise to a suspicion that Ramchundur had purposely left it unprovided ; of this suspicion Aurungzebe afterwards took advantage ; and when Ramchundur, during the siege, was called away to Singurb in consequence of the illness of Raja

* Mahratta MSS., and original papers, both Persian and Mahratta.

Ram, Aurungzebe wrote a letter* which fell into the hands of Pureshrim Trimluck, and widened a breach that had for some time existed between him and Ramchundur Punt.†

Aurungzebe, on his arrival before Satara, pitched his own tents on the north side of the fort, on the site of the present village of Kurinja. Azim Shah was stationed at a village on the west side, which has since retained the name of Shapoor. Shirzee Khan invested the south side, and Turbeent Khan occupied the eastern quarter; chains of posts between the different camps effectually secured the blockade. The fort of Satara occupies the summit of a hill of moderate height, but very steep; its defences consist of a scarp of upwards of 40 feet in perpendicular black rock, on the top of which there is a stone wall. It was defended by Pryagjee Purvoo, havildar, who had been reared in the service of Sivajee. He vigorously opposed the Moghuls, and disputed every foot of ground as they pushed forward their advanced posts. As soon as they began to gain any part of the hill, he withdrew his troops into the fort, and rolled down huge stones from the rock above, which did great execution, and, until they could throw up cover, were as destructive as artillery. The blockade, however, was complete; no communication could be held with the country; and as the small stock of grain in the garrison was soon exhausted, the besieged must have been compelled to surrender; but Pureshrim Trimluck, who had thrown himself into the fort of Purlee, purchased the connivance of Azim Shah, and conveyed provisions to the besieged †

The divisions on the west and south faces erected batteries, but the grand attack was directed against the north-east angle, which assumes nearly the shape of a tower, and is one of the strongest points; the rock being 42 feet high, and the bastion, now on the top of it, consists of 25 feet of masonry, making a total height of 67 feet.

Turbeent Khan undertook to mine this angle, and, at the end of four months and a half, had completed two mines. So confident A. D. 1700. were the Moghuls of success, that the storming party was ready formed, but concealed, as much as possible, under the brow of the hill, from the view of the garrison. Aurungzebe was invited to view the spectacle, and a stratagem was formed to draw all the garrison towards the bastion, by the emperor's moving off from that side in grand procession, so that when the match was ready to be applied, hundreds of the Mahrattas, attracted by his splendid retinue, crowded to the rampart, and, amongst others, Pryagjee, the commandant. The first mine was fired; it burst several fissures in the rock, and occasioned so violent a concussion, that a great part of the masonry was thrown inwards, and crushed many of the garrison in its ruins. The storming party, in their eagerness, advanced nearer; the match was applied to the train of the second and larger mine, but, being improperly constructed, it burst outwards with a dreadful explosion, and upwards of 2,000 of the Moghuls are said to have been destroyed on the spot. Pryagjee, the Mahratta commandant, was buried in the ruins by the first explosion, close to a temple dedicated to the goddess Bhowanee, but was afterwards dug out alive. His escape was considered a happy omen, and, under other circumstances, might have been of much consequence in animating the Hindoo garrison to prolong the defence; but Azim Shah could no longer be induced to connive at the transport of the grain; proposals for surrendering were therefore made through him, and

* Copy of the original in possession of the raja of Kolapoor.

† Mahratta MSS.

the honor of the capture, which he so ill-merited, was not only assigned to him, but the place received his name, and was called by the emperor Azin Tara.

Satara surrendered about the middle of April, and Purlee was immediately invested; the siege lasted till the beginning of June, when, after a good defence, the garrison evacuated it. The south-west monsoon having set in with all its usual violence, the Moghul army, from a total want of arrangement, was exposed to considerable distress and hardship before the camp could be moved to a distance from the hills. After much loss, both of baggage and of lives, the army reached Kowaspoor, on the banks of the Maun, where the rains are comparatively light.*

In the meantime a great change had taken place in the Mahratta government. Raja Ram, when the Punt Amat was called to see him, had just returned from Jaulna, having experienced a long and fatiguing pursuit from Zoolfikar Khan. He was suffering from a spitting of blood and inflammation of the lungs, brought on by violent exertion during this retreat. After lingering about 30 days, his illness proved mortal: he expired in the fort of Singurb, about the middle of March, a month before the fall of Satara.†

The ruin of Suntajee Ghorepuray is the only crime which stains the memory of Raja Ram. But that alone is of magnitude; and if we admit as an excuse that he was worked upon by the enemies of Suntajee, the weakness of the man but detracts from the virtues of the prince. He possessed some share of the military enterprize of his father, but he had no genius for civil government; his measures were ably directed by Prillhad Neerajee, who appears to have been a very uncommon person, and, in his total disregard of self-interest, is almost a singular instance amongst Bramin statesmen. Raja Ram was naturally mild in his disposition, addicted to no vices, and was distinguished by uncommon liberality to his followers.

The death of Raja Ram, although the news was received in the emperor's camp at Satara with great rejoicing, produced no event favourable to the subjugation of the Mahrattas. The Raja left two sons: the elder, named Sivajee, by Tara Bye Mohitey, was ten years old at the time of his father's death; and the younger, named Sumbhajee, by Rajis Bye Ghatgay, was in his third year.

Tara Bye, with the assistance of Ramchundur Punt Amat, Shunkrajee Narain, and Dhunnajee Jadow Senaputtee, immediately assumed the reins of government, and her son Sivajee having been seated on the gadee, or cushion of state, Rajis Bye, with the general consent, was placed in confinement.

Timmojee Rugonath being found unfit for his high station, Pureshram Trimluck was raised by Tara Bye to the rank of Pritee Needhee, and received general charge of all the forts. This preferment excited much jealousy on the part of Ramchundur Punt, who does not appear to have been aware that there were suspicions of his fidelity; but the decided tone and conduct of Tara Bye obliged him to appear reconciled to the measure. Tara Bye did not fix her residence in any fort, but moved about according to circumstances. Dhunnajee Jadow took to the open field: confining his operations to no particular part of the country, he

* Khafee Khan, and Mahratta MSS.

† Mahratta MSS. Mr. Orme, who is often on the borders of truth, without being rewarded as his research deserved, mentions this as the manner of Sivajee's death.

spread his horse in every quarter, and performed many signal exploits. Nimbalkur, Bhonslay, and Dhabaray likewise distinguished themselves in the same manner; whilst Thorat, Chowan, Sindia, Powar, Atowlay, and various other chiefs, headed large bodies of troops in different directions, and levied tribute under the various heads of chouth, surdeshmookhee, and ghas-dana :^o the last-mentioned item of ghas-dana was generally considered the personal perquisite of the chief.

Contrasted with the splendour of the Moghul camp already described, we may view the horde accompanying one of these freebooters. Different from the organized bands of Sivajee, but still more destructive to a country, an irregular assembly of several thousand horsemen, united by preconcerted agreement in some unfrequented part of the country. They set off with little provision, no baggage except the blanket on their saddles, and no animals but led horses, with bags prepared for the reception of their plunder. If they halted during a part of the night, like the Pindharees of modern times, they slept with their bridles in their hands; if in the day, whilst the horses were fed and refreshed, the men reposed with little or no shelter from the scorching heat, excepting such as might be occasionally found under a bush or a tree; and during that time their swords were laid by their sides, and their spears were generally at their horses' heads stuck in the ground; when halted on a plain, groups of four or five might be seen stretched on the bare earth sound asleep, their bodies exposed to the noon-day sun, and their heads in a cluster, under the precarious shade of a black blanket or tattered horse-cloth extended on the point of their spears. The great object of this class was plunder; and the leaders and their troops, though they generally rendered a partial account to the head of the state, dissipated or embezzled the greater part of their collections.

The Mankurees began to profess obedience to the descendant of Sivajee, and sometimes joined his standard; but they always plundered on their own account when an opportunity offered. The Ghorepurays committed great devastations along the eastern confines of Maharashtra, from the Godavery to the Kistna. The revenues raised by the emperor in the Deccan had become very inconsiderable, and, to support his army and the splendour of his court, he drew vast treasures from Hindostan; caravans after caravans were poured into the Deccan,—the Mahrattas frequently intercepted them, and the imperial troops on many occasions behaved in the most dastardly manner.

The victories and marches of Zoolfikar Khan, as detailed in Persian manuscripts, are scarcely credible; but, on the testimony of his enemies, he is justly entitled to very great merit for his indefatigable exertions, at a time when so few of the Moghul officers discovered the smallest talent or energy. Public virtue was unknown amongst them, and they were corrupt, slothful, and indifferent. One cause of this general debasement was the great age and increasing infirmities of the emperor, and the character of his sons. The prospect was full of trouble. Men paused at the threshold of a period which must open with great commotion, and seemed rather inclined to reserve energy for the coming struggle, than to exert themselves in the tiresome endless warfare in which they were engaged.

The reign of Aurungzebe, however, was prolonged beyond all expectation, and the old man persevered to the last in his fruitless endeavours to stifle Mahratta independence. During the ensuing four years he was almost entirely occupied in the siege of the

forts, and in that period he successively reduced Panalla, Vishalgurh, Singurh, Poorundhur, Rajgurh, and Torna.* Chundun, Wundun, and

A. D. 1702. Pandoogurh were also surrendered to his officers. But in the meantime the Mahrattas multiplied. In 1702 they levied contributions from Surat and Burhanpoor, and extended their operations every year. Wherever the demands of chouth and surdesh-mookhee were promptly acknowledged, they carefully refrained from plundering. In 1705 the emperor received accounts, almost at the same

A. D. 1705. time, of their having crossed the Nerbuddah in great force, and extended their ravages to the heart of Malwa; that the whole of Candeish and Berar were overrun; and that 15,000 Mahrattas had broken into Guzerat,† defeated the troops of the assembled foudjars, and that nothing appeared but slaughtered soldiers, houseless ryots, and the ripened fields in devastation or flames.

On this intelligence great preparations were made; Zoolfikar Khan was sent after the body in Malwa, Ghazee-ud-deen was appointed soobehdar of Berar, and Azim Shah despatched to Ahmedabad to take charge of the government of Guzerat. Each had a considerable army, and it was hoped, from the character of the generals, that these countries would soon be cleared.

But these apparently vigorous efforts of the government were unsubstantial; there was motion and bustle, without zeal or efficacy: the empire was unwieldy, its system relaxed, and its officers were corrupt beyond all example. It was inwardly decayed, and ready to fall to pieces as much by its own irrecoverable weakness, as by the corroding power of the Mahrattas, whom the Mahomedan wars had trained, and their imbecility now allured to that predatory life to which the natives of Maharashtra are prone; as yet, however, their plundering hordes did not comprehend that they were conquerors. A general sentiment pervaded the whole body of Hindoo population in the Mahratta country, but it was not so actively excited as to create a general union, for a purpose so exalted as that of throwing off a foreign yoke, and vindicating their civil and religious liberties. There was a common sympathy, but there was no common effort; their military spirit was not so much excited by patriotism as by plunder; and those who enjoyed greater advantages under the Moghuls, in consequence of the struggle, than they were likely to do by the establishment of the independence of their country, eagerly desired a continuation of the war.

Many of the Moghul officers in charge of districts were in the pay of both parties, and likewise wished that the existing confusion might continue. Parties of Mahrattas in the service of the Moghuls met, rioted, and feasted with their countrymen, and at parting, or when passing within hearing of each other, they used to mock the Mahomedans by uttering an *Uthumduillillah*,‡ and praying for long life to the glorious Alumgeer.§

* Torna was escaladed in the night, and carried, sword in hand, by Uman Oolla Khan, the only officer who particularly distinguished himself in these sieges. Khafee Khan says, all the rest of the forts were obtained by bribing the killidars.

† Khafee Khan, Scott's Deccan, and Mahratta MSS.

‡ A common exclamation of the Mahomedans, signifying "Praise be to God."

§ Mahratta MSS., and original Mahratta and Persian letters. It is unnecessary to acquaint most of my readers that Alumgeer, or "Conqueror of the World," was the title assumed by Aurungzebe on his accession, but I have followed the example of my predecessors in Deccan history, and have retained his own name.

The following translation from an original Persian letter throws considerable light on the state of the country about this period. It bears no date, but from severa

Upon the reduction of Rajgurbh and Torna, the emperor, after halting some months near Joonere, finally quitted the neighbourhood of Poona, of which place he had also changed the name to Moyabad, and marched towards Beejapoor.

Some of the Moghul officers were anxious to negotiate a peace ; and the favourite son of the emperor, Kaum Bukhsh, whose plans were early

circumstances is evidently written when Aurungzebe was besieging Panalra or Vishalgurbh. It fell into my hands, amongst several bundles of original Persian letters and papers, belonging to a Bramin's family, and I was at some pains to ascertain its history. The writer of the letter was a Bramin, who had been very active in assisting the Moghuls to reduce the country in 1688-89. In consequence of his services he had been dignified with the titles of Raja and Maharaja, and appointed to the revenue management of the district of Kuttao. During the absence of Puddajee Ghatgay Deshmookh, who had gone abroad to plunder at the time, this Bramin got temporary charge of the valuable deshmookhee claims of Boodh and Mullaoree ; however, upon the return and submission of the deshmookh, he lost these advantages, but retained charge of the fort of Booshengurbh, the management of that district, and the village of Kuttao, which last his posterity enjoy in enam to this day. Puddajee Ghatgay was placed under his surveillance. This letter, either never sent or afterwards recovered, is written from Kuttao to a Moghul officer in charge of the province, but at that time collecting a convoy of grain at Phultun and Barramuttee, to be conveyed to the grand camp.

After compliments—"Your letter has been received, wherein you mention your intention of proceeding to Nubheer Shahdroog (Panalla), and forwarding the grain to camp, and that the thanna of Mulkapoor has been plundered, of which you desire to have correct intelligence. The same thieves have cut off all supplies from the thanna of Kurrar, by which that place is much distressed. The names of the thieves are Mahdoo Rao (Pureshrum's brother), Tookhoo Mulhar, Sunda Nandera, Lingoo Manay, Bhala Ghatgay, Shahjee Nimbalkur, and others. They have 10,000 horse, and are now near this place, between Ound and Korygaom. Oosman Khan, who was proceeding from the presence to join you, was furnished by me with 100 horse and 100 infantry, but he has been obliged to remain here (in Kuttao), and cannot advance.

"The thieves find shelter in Mortizabad, and various other districts, from whence they sally forth and plunder. Once or twice I have sent parties after them, and have cut them up. By the connivance of foudjars, jagheerdars, and kreroes, who all share with them, these people are protected. On this head I have made representations to court, and have even obtained mace-bearers, and made them produce the stolen articles ; these people therefore are all inimical to me. Regarding the thieves, I have further sent for intelligence, and if we are sufficiently strong, you and I can unite and attack them. Meer Lootf Oolla has written that your favour is very great towards me, and therefore it is now generally known that our friendship is great, and of long standing. You must know that Puddajee, the thannadar of Boodh, has given his sister to * * * 2 and thus formed a connection with him ; he actually went to Ound, when the thieves were there, taking with him Beeroo Bye, the mother of Shao Nimbalkur : they eat out of the same plate together ; he was feasted by them, and they by him, for three days, during which they had great-rejoicing. It is your province to watch over and guard the king's garrisons. The imperial army is now within 20 kos of us. What will it be when they move to a distance, and what may we not expect ? If you do not believe this representation, send your own spies to ascertain the truth of it. Until you seize and confine all such offenders, how can we ever expect to suppress them ? You should restore charge of the Boodh and Mullaoree districts to me, from whence I have been displaced, and if you approve of the application, forward it to court."

Underneath there is written, evidently a private postscript—"I have had a secret interview with Mahdoo Rao, Pureshrum's brother, and I told him that, if Pureshrum give up Kelneh, and visit the emperor, he will certainly be put to death, and that nothing is now to be apprehended, as the rains are at hand. Mahdoo Rao has written thus to Pureshrum."

1 These titles are still enjoyed by his descendants. This Bramin family is the only one in Maharashtra in which the practice of secluding the women exists.

2 Indistinct in the original.

directed to the establishment of an independent kingdom at Beejapoor, and who in his views seems always to have had some injudicious scheme of conciliating the Mahrattas by admitting a part of their claim, now contrived to obtain the emperor's consent for opening a negotiation with Dhunnajee Jadow.

Overtures were first begun by proposals for releasing Shao, the son of Shumbhaje. The negotiation proceeded, and Aurungzebe had, for a few days, been brought to consent to the payment of ten per cent. of the whole revenue of the six Soobehs of the Deccan as surdeshmookhee, for which the Mahrattas were to engage to maintain order with a body of horse. On the news of this concession, the Mahrattas, who, notwithstanding their predatory character, are at all times exceedingly eager to have any right formally recognised, flocked to Dhunnajee's camp. Their expectations rose with their assembled numbers : but their increasing insolence, their tone changed from supplication to demand, their near approach to the camp, and their stipulating for honorary dresses to 70 principal officers among them, entitled to that distinction from the emperor, led Aurungzebe to suspect treachery as well as insult. He therefore broke off the negotiation, and recalled his ambassador, who was attacked soon after he left the Mahratta camp—a circumstance which confirmed the emperor in his opinion.* Aurungzebe seems to have returned to the eastward, from an apprehension that the disorders prevalent in Maharashtra were likely to spread over Telingana and the Carnatic ; but although there were partial disorders occasioned by Beruds in the one, and Pindharees in the other, the inhabitants of those countries are a very different race, and were less prone to those habits of predatory enterprize which had long distinguished the natives of Maharashtra. The people of the Carnatic are not unwarlike : in bodily frame they are at least as robust as the Mahrattas, and at this period a great part of the emperor's infantry were men raised in that country. Banditti, however, started up in various parts, and so daring had their chiefs become, that some of them carried on an open traffic for the goods plundered by their gangs. The independent Mahratta chiefs, particularly the Ghorepurays, had of late years committed constant ravages about Beejapoor, Kulburga, and Beder.† Pemnaik, the Naik of Wakinkerah, although repeatedly compelled by the imperial generals to pay large fines, no sooner saw the Moghul troops retire to a distance, than he recommenced every species of rapine. The Mahrattas maintained a good understanding with this chief, and Dhunnajee Jadow, whilst the emperor was besieging the forts in the Syhadree mountains, lodged his family in Wakinkerah, as affording greater security than any other place. The power of the Naik had become so formidable, that the emperor, after his arrival at Beejapoor, judged it necessary to proceed against him in person.‡

Wakinkerah was merely a fortified town, but the siege lasted many months. Pemnaik defended himself with resolution, drove back the Moghul advanced posts, whilst Dhunnajee Jadow perpetually harassed their camp. The imperial officers had become so dastardly, and the troops so shameless, that the mere appearance of Dhunnajee's cavalry made them turn to flight.§

* Khafee Khan.

† Scott's Deccan, Khafee Khan, Mahratta MSS.

‡ Khafee Khan, Scott's Deccan.

§ The Mahrattas say that, when a horse refused to drink, and started at his own shadow, it was a common joke amongst the Moghuls to ask him why he was afraid—"One would think you saw Dhunnajee in the water." This anecdote is recorded by Mr. Scott Waring.

The best officers were at a distance. Zoolfikar Khan was directed to join, and a like order was sent to Daood Khan in the Carnatic.* The former had returned to Aurungabad, after driving Neemajee Sindia from Malwa ; and as the Mahrattas had been principally employed to the northward, the Carnatic had not been infested by large bodies of them for several years. The important fortress of Vellore was surrendered in 1704 by Mannajee Moray to Daood Khan,† for which Moray was promised a munsib by the emperor, but he never came to demand it, having, on his return to Maharashtra, gone off to join his countrymen. Daood Khan left Sadut Oolla Khan as his Naik or deputy in both Carnatics, and arrived in the emperor's camp shortly after Zoolfikar Khan. They were both officers of courage and experience ; they attacked the place with resolution, and the town of Wakinkerah was evacuated, after the environs had been stormed and taken, with heavy loss on both sides.*

The Mahrattas, in the meantime, were plundering the open country in every direction. Ramchundur Punt Amat had particularly distinguished himself by retaking Panalla and Pawungurh by escalade. Tara Bye, on this event, determined to reside at Panalla, and admitted Ramchundur Punt to a very large share of power. Pureshrum Trimbeck, the Pritee Needhee, had retaken Wussuntgurh and Satara. The latter was surprised by the artifice of a Bramin named Annajee Punt. This man had escaped from prison at Ginjee, and assumed the character of a mendicant devotee. Having fallen in with a party of Moghul infantry marching to relieve the garrison of Satara, he amused them with stories and songs, obtained alms from them, and so ingratiated himself with all, that they brought him with them, admitted him into the fort, and, on account of the amusement he afforded, allowed him to live there. Annajee Punt had formerly been a carcoon of Mawulee infantry, and soon saw the practicability of surprising the place, if assisted by a few of his old acquaintances. He patiently watched his opportunity, informed Pureshrum Trimbeck of his design, and having introduced a body of Mawulees into the fort, the enterprizing but remorseless Bramin put every man of the garrison to the sword.

Shunkrajee Narain Suchew did not remain inactive ; as soon as the Moghul troops withdrew from that part of the country of which he was the chief manager, he retook Singurh, Rajgurh, Rohira, and some other places. The Moghul garrisons were composed of a large proportion of Carnatic infantry ; and these men, latterly, could not be brought to stand the onset of the Mawulees.

The loss of these forts, particularly Singurh and Panalla, gave Aurungzebe great vexation, and augmented an illness under which he laboured, and from which he recovered very slowly.

Zoolfikar Khan was sent to retake Singurh, and, previous to his departure, the emperor committed Shao to his charge. Zoolfikar Khan, partly from hatred to Kaum Bukhsh, bitterly inveighed against the overtures that had been made for peace, and Aurungzebe was equally conscious of the error ; yet, with some design of releasing Shao, he had now recourse to the half-measure of causing letters to be written to the Mahrattas from Shao as their lawful prince, inviting them to submit. Had he released him at once, a division would probably have taken place amongst the

* Scott's Deccan, Khafee Khan.

† Original firman from Aurungzebe to Mannajee Moray in possession of his descendants.

Mahrattas. Under any circumstances, the other expedient was unwise, but particularly inconsistent in Aurungzebe, as it was, in effect, acknowledging the legitimacy of Sivajee's government, and consequently admitting the injustice of Sumbhajee's execution. The result was, as might have been expected, of no avail.

Zoolfikar Khan was successful in obtaining possession of Singurh, owing to the want of supplies ; but as soon as he retired, it was as speedily retaken by Shunkrajee Narain, from the same cause. The grand army, moving towards Ahmednugur, was attacked by the Mahrattas on the march, a great part of it was defeated, and had the Mahrattas improved an advantage which they gained, the emperor of the Moghuls, their inveterate foe Aurungzebe, would have been a prisoner in their hands. It is curious to observe how the Moghul writers undesignedly record their own humiliation on this occasion, by dwelling upon this fortunate escape with abundant self-congratulation. The character of the imperial army was in some degree retrieved by the gallant charge of Khan Alum, a brave officer, whom, under the name of Ikhlash Khan, we have seen so active at the capture of Sumbhajee.

Aurungzebe arrived at Ahmednugur, and, on pitching his camp on the same spot which it had occupied in such splendour 21 years before, he predicted that his end was near, by observing that he had this day finished his campaigns, and that his last earthly journey was completed. The contrast between his former and his present circumstances is remarkable ; but when we also reflect on the intervening events, we have not merely a striking picture, but a curious history of the growth of predatory power, and of the means by which it was nurtured. Aurungzebe had only three surviving sons—Sultan Mauzum, or Shah Alum, governor of Cabul ; Azim Shah ; and Kaum Bukhsh. Azim Shah joined his father at this period, and was appointed to the government of Malwa ; Kaum Bukhsh was appointed to Beejapoor, and was immediately sent to take charge of his new government.

In the meantime Zoolfikar Khan, who continued pursuing and attacking the Mahrattas, had gone off across the Kistna to aid the son and nephew of his old opponent, Suntajee Ghorepuray, who had been attacked by Dhunnajee Jadow, in consequence of their having plundered in some of Tara Bye's districts ; Zoolfikar Khan had assisted the Ghorepuray, and driven off Dhunnajee, when news reached him that the emperor had died

Feb. 21. at Ahmednugur on the 28th Zeekaad A. H. 1118 (or 21st February 1707). He therefore immediately suspended operations, and marched with all expedition to join the Deccan army, which fell under the command of Azim Shah, the prince nearest to the grand camp.

In regard to the character of Aurungzebe, the facts connected with the rise of the Mahrattas are sufficient to prove that, from the time he usurped the throne, there is nothing in his conduct which deserves the high encomium which has in general been bestowed on his talents and government. Previous to his elevation, he displayed very considerable ability, together with an iniquity almost unparalleled. His boundless ambition was concealed by deep dissimulation, and his boldness was equal to his hypocrisy. His success in placing the diadem of Hindostan on his own head, after overcoming his powerful rivals ; his literary acquirements ; his attention to business ; and the simplicity of his personal habits, amidst a court so remarkable for splendour and magnificence, gave a tone to general opinion amongst his contemporaries, which his

subsequent misconduct and misrule could not entirely efface. He was ambitious of a character for wisdom ; and his low craft and mean policy are partly ascribed to this weakness. His greatest political error was the overthrow of Beejapoor and Golcondah, instead of applying their resources to the suppression of predatory power. His suspicion and bigotry, his presumption and obstinacy, alike tended to prevent the tranquillization of that tumult of which his own measures were a principal cause ; whilst his pomp weakened the efficiency of his armies, and exhausted the finances which should have maintained his wars.

CHAP. XII.

FROM A. D. 1707 TO A. D. 1720.

Shao—origin of the name—he is released.—*Tara Bye* declares him an impostor, and disputes his pretensions.—Origin of the rajas of *Akulakote*.—*Shao* obtains possession of *Satara*—ascends the throne.—Origin of the celebrated *Ballajee Wishwanath*.—Proceedings of the *Moghuls*.—*Shao's* progress.—War with *Tara Bye*.—Agreement with *Daood Khan*.—Death of *Dhunnajee Jadow*.—*Tara Bye* recovers *Panalla*, and establishes her court at *Kolapoor*.—Death of *Sivajee*.—Accession of *Sumbhajee*, and confinement of *Tara Bye*.—Advantages secured to *Shao* by the death of the *Punt Suchew*.—Dissolution of the agreement with the *Moghuls*.—*Mahrattas* under *Chunder Seyn Jadow* proceed to collect their dues.—A trifling dispute between *Chunder Seyn Jadow* and *Ballajee Wishwanath* leads to important consequences.—*Ballajee* is protected by *Shao*.—*Jadow* retires to *Kolapoor*, and afterwards joins the *Moghuls*.—Origin of *Nizamool-Moolk*—is appointed viceroy of the *Deccan*.—War with the *Moghuls*.—After a battle, the *Mahrattas* retreat to the *Salpee Ghaut*—accommodation.—Disturbances.—A daring robbery, supposed to be committed by *Khundee Rao Dhabaray*—who establishes himself near *Rajpeeplee*.—*Nizamool-Moolk* favours the *Kolapoor* party.—*Seedjee Ghorepuray* declares for *Sumbhajee*, and is made *Senaputtee* at *Kolapoor*—obtains possession of *Sondoor*.—Great confusion and anarchy.—*Ballajee Wishwanath* is treacherously made prisoner by *Dummajee Thorat*—and ransomed.—Success of *Ballajee Wishwanath* against *Kishen Rao Kuttaokur*.—Defeat of *Byroo Punt Pingley Peishwa* by *Kanhojee Angria*.—Alarming progress of *Angria*.—*Ballajee Wishwanath* effects a favourable arrangement with him, and is made *Peishwa*—obtains possession of *Poorundhur* for himself—reduces *Thorat*—establishes order in the *Poona* district.—Improvement in the aspect of *Mahratta* affairs.—Allusion to the extraordinary expansion of their power from about this period—and to the *Bramin* scheme for creating union amongst the *Mahratta* chiefs.—Character of *Shao*.—The Emperor *Ferokhsere* conciliates the *Mahrattas*.—*Hoossein Ally Khan* appointed viceroy of the *Deccan*—is opposed by *Daood Khan*, who is killed.—*Zoolfikar Beg* defeated by *Khundee Rao Dhabaray*.—Battle near *Ahmednugur*.—*Dhabaray* is made *Senaputtee*.—*Ferokhsere* encourages the *Mahrattas* to resist the viceroy—the latter negotiates with the *Mahrattas*—concludes a treaty with *Shao*—marches, supported by a large body of *Mahrattas*, to *Delhi*.—*Ferokhsere* deposed, and *Mohummud Shah* raised to the imperial dignity.—The famous grants for the chouth, *surdeshmookee*, and *swuraje* delivered to *Ballajee Wishwanath*—who, accompanied by *Khundee Rao Dhabaray*, returns to *Satara*.—Scheme of the arbitrary division of *Mahratta* revenue—explained—distributed.—Officers appointed to the general superintendence of particular parts of the country.—*Kanhojee Angria*.—*Mahratta* chiefs have assignments of revenue within the districts of each other.—Eager desire of all to possess, and to maintain, hereditary rights in their native villages.

It has been already mentioned that, upon the fall of Raigurh, the widow and son of Sumbhaje were carried prisoners to the imperial camp. They were received within the enclosure of the royal tents, and at the request of Begum Sahib, the emperor's daughter, a place was assigned to them near herself, and she continued to show them unremitting kindness during many years of captivity. The boy was at first constantly with her, and Aurungzebe, during his visits to his daughter, took much notice of him. Shao's original name was Sivajee, but that by which he afterwards became known was a familiar name given him by Aurungzebe; and his choosing to retain it in preference to that of his renowned grandfather, is as remarkable* as that our English appellation of "*the Sahoo Raja*," meaning the sovereign of the Mahratta nation, applied from his long reign to Shao's successors as well as to himself, should have had its origin in an unbecoming pun of the emperor Aurungzebe. The attendants who followed the family into captivity were allowed to communicate with the Mahrattas in the Moghul army—an indulgence which did not extend to Shao, his mother, or to Muddon Sing, the illegitimate son of Sumbhaje, also made captive at Raigurh. Every kind of intercourse with the Mahrattas in rebellion was, to all the family and their followers, most strictly forbidden.

Yessoo Bye was a woman of much prudence, and carefully avoided intrigues. When Aurungzebe began to revolve the scheme of releasing Shao, he proposed to marry him to the daughters of two of the most distinguished Mahrattas in the imperial service, and to secure them in his interests by additional favours; these were, Jadow of Sindkheir, to whom the emperor had given the title of Roostum Rao; and Sindia, Patell of Kunneirkheir,† whose illegitimate offspring, as heads of a Mahratta principality, are well known in the modern transactions of India. Shao was connected with Jadow by the mother's side, and the proposal being agreeable to all parties, the nuptials were celebrated in a respectable manner, but without pomp; and the emperor, besides conferring favours on Jadow and Sindia, bestowed on Shao the districts of Akulkote, Inda-poor, Sopa, and Neywassa in jagheer. On this occasion Aurungzebe, amongst other presents to Shao, gave him a sword he had himself frequently worn, and restored two swords, which Shao's attendants had always urged him, if possible, to recover; the one was the famous Bhowanee of Sivajee, and the other the sword of Afzool Khan, the murdered general of Beejapoor, both taken at Raigurh.‡

But Aurungzebe, as we have seen, could not resolve on giving effect to this plan, and after his death Shao continued in the camp of Azim Shah, and was, by that prince, carried to a considerable distance beyond the Nerbuddah, when on his march, at the head of the army lately employed in the Deccan, to contend for the throne with his brother, Sultan Mauzum, who was advancing from Lahore.§

* The more remarkable because reflectively it was an insult, and at best a very coarse joke. It is either much for, or against, the emperor's *bon-mot* that a corresponding word is not easily found in English. *Sahoo* means the reverse of thief, and was used in allusion to Shao's father and grandfather, of whom Aurungzebe seldom spoke but as *the thief*, *the robber*, &c.

† Mahratta MSS. In this chapter the English reader will find more than usual number of harsh names, which he may be inclined to think might have been omitted with advantage; but they will, in most instances, deserve attention, as those of the ancestors of the principal Mahratta chiefs.

‡ All the three swords are in possession of the raja of Satara.

§ Khafee Khan.

Tara Bye and her ministers improved the opportunity which the absence of the main body of the Moghul army afforded. Dhunnajee Jadow defeated Lodi Khan, the foudjar of Poona, re-took Chakun, and the Mahrattas were rapidly occupying, as well as plundering, the country, when Azim Shah, by the advice of Zoolfikar Khan, determined to release Shao, but to retain his mother, brother, and family as hostages for his good conduct; promising, however, that, in case he should succeed in establishing his authority, and continue steadfast in attachment and allegiance, he should receive the tract conquered by his grandfather from Beejapoor, with an additional territory between the Beema and Godavery.*

Shao sent forward one of his attendants, personally known to Pursojee Bhonslay and Chimmajee Damoodhur, then at the head of some Mahratta troops in Berar and Candesh, for the purpose of announcing his approach, and soliciting their assistance. They immediately joined him, and their example was soon followed by Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, Neemajee Sindia, and other chiefs. Letters, intimating his approach, were despatched by Shao to Tara Bye; but, as she did not choose to relinquish a power she had so long held, or renounce her son's pretensions to the sovereignty, she affected to believe him an impostor, assembled the whole of her ministers, declared her intention of opposing this pretender, and called upon all the principal officers to attest their fidelity to the cause of her son by the most solemn oaths. On their compliance she appointed Ramchundur Punt and Neeloo Punt to assist her with their counsel; Dhunnajee Jadow and Pureshram Trimbuck to command in the field; Shunkrajee Narain to defend the Ghaut-Mahta; and Kanhojee Angria, Surkheil, who had been appointed by Raja Ram to the command of the fleet, upon the death of Seedojee Goojur, was placed in charge of the coast. Poond Sawunt, of Waree, also sent assurances of fidelity to Tara Bye.

Shao, on hearing of these proceedings, halted at the Godavery, in hopes of being able to dispel any opinion there might really exist of his being an impostor; but his army having increased to 15,000 men, he determined, by the advice of Pursojee Bhonslay, to move forward without further delay. Dhunnajee Jadow and the Pritee Needhee advanced to oppose him. The people of the country seemed inclined to the cause of Tara Bye, and one village had the audacity to fire on his troops. Several of his men being killed, the place was assaulted, and a severe example made of the offenders. During the attack, a woman, bearing a boy in her arms, rushed towards Shao, and threw down the child, calling out that she devoted him to the raja's service. Shao took charge of him, and, in commemoration of his first success, called him Futih† Sing, to which he afterwards added his own surname of Bhonslay, and always treated him like his own son. Such was the extraordinary origin of the rajas of Akulkote.

As the armies drew near to each other, means were successfully employed to detach Dhunnajee Jadow from the cause of Tara Bye; and the Pritee Needhee, finding he was not supported in an action which took place at the village of Kheyr, 22 miles north of Poona, withdrew from Dhunnajee's troops, and fled to Satara. Shao, joined by Dhunnajee, advanced to Chundun Wundun, of which he obtained possession. He seized the families of all persons acting against him; sent a summons to Shunkrajee Narain, Punt Suchew, to deliver up Poorundhur, which he had taken a short time before,

* Mahratta MSS.

† "Futih" means victory. The child's father's name was Lokhunday.

and an order to Pureshram Trimbuck to surrender Satara ; neither, of them obeyed ; but Shaik Meerah, a Mahomedan officer who commanded under the latter, confined him and gave up the fort.

Shao, on obtaining possession of Satara, formally seated himself on the throne, in the month of March 1708. Gudadhur Prillhad A. D. 1708. was appointed Pritee Needhee, and Byhroo Punt Pingley was made Peishwa. The brother of Byhroo Punt, Neeloo Punt Moreishwur, who still adhered to Tara Bye, died, shortly after at Rangna. Dhunnajee Jadow was confirmed in his rank of Senaputtee, and the right of making collections in several districts was delegated to him. At this period of confusion the revenue was realized on no fixed principle, but levied, as opportunity presented itself, in the manner of contribution. The principal carcoons employed by Dhunnajee in revenue affairs were Abbajee Poorundhuree,* Koolkurnee of Sassoor (Sasswur), near Poona, and another Bramin, Koolkurnee of Sreewurdun, in the district of Choule, a village then claimed by the Seedee, from which, in consequence of some intrigue connected with the Seedee's enemy Augria, he had fled to Sassoor, and had been recommended to Dhunnajee Jadow by Abbajee Poorundhuree and Pureshram Trimbuck. The name of this Koolkurnee, afterwards so celebrated as the founder of the Pershwa's power, was Ballajee Wishwanath Bhutt.†

Meanwhile the two eldest sons of Aurungzebe, Sultan Mauzum and Azim Shah, had fought a bloody battle near Agra, in which Sultan Mauzum was victorious. The army from the Deccan, commanded by Azim Shah, engaged under great disadvantages, owing to the pertinacity of that headstrong prince, who, at least, accelerated discomfiture by his want of preparation, and by his neglect of arrangement among his troops. He paid the forfeit of his obstinacy with his life. There fell with him his two sons, together with Turbeet Khan, Dulput Rao Boondelay, Ram Sing Harra, the gallant Khan Alum, and a great proportion of the officers experienced or distinguished in Mahratta warfare.

Kaum Bukhsh, who was sent to Beejapoor by Aurungzebe a few days before his death, assumed the ensigns of royalty, and declared himself emperor upon the demise of his father ; his authority was at first acknowledged, but having no stability of character, he was soon deserted by most of his troops ; he first endeavoured to conciliate the Mahratta Mankurees, who showed some disposition to listen to his overtures, but they were soon disgusted with his petulance and folly. Sultan Mauzum, who had used his victory with moderation, and was now on his march to the Deccan, generously offered him the kingdoms of Hyderabad and Beejapoor : but Kaum Bukhsh preferred the desperate chance of encountering the whole army of Hindostan, and was killed near Hyderabad, in an attack made upon him by his old and inveterate enemy, Zoolfikar Khan, who was joined on the occasion by a body of Mahrattas sent by Shao, under the command of Neemajee Sindia.‡

The affairs of Kaum Bukhsh were considered so desperate that, after he had refused the offer made by Sultan Mauzum, it was conjectured that he

* The ancestor of the present great family of Poorundhuree.

† Mahratta MSS. It is proper to mention that, among Mahratta Bramins, Bhutt and Grehust, in speaking of their own caste, are nearly synonymous with clerical and secular. Custom has introduced this distinction. Bhutt, however, in the text, was merely the surname of Ballajee Wishwanath, not a religious appellation.

‡ Khafee Khan, *Memoirs of Eradut Khan*, original letter from Zoolfikar Khan to Shao.

intended to follow the example of his uncle, Sultan Mohummud Akber, and retire to Persia ; orders were sent to all the seaports to intercept him, and two lakhs of rupees, with an extension of the company's privileges, were promised by Zoolfikar Khan to Mr. Pitt, governor of Madras, if he would apprehend the fugitive. To this Mr. Pitt agreed, but refused the present.*

Zoolfikar Khan, who was in the army of Azim Shah in the battle of Agra, after supporting his reputation as an officer, escaped from the field, and Sultan Mauzum, by the advice of his excellent minister, Monaim Khan, not only pardoned, but promoted him to high rank, conferring on him the vicereignty of the Deccan, and the title of Umeer-ool-Oomrah. By Zoolfikar Khan's representations, Sultan Mauzum at first lent his countenance to Shao's party, which tended to increase the raja's consequence amongst his countrymen, and would have been followed by more substantial advantages in a formal grant of the surdeshmookhee, but Monaim Khan, unused to Bramin artifice, having been visited by the wuakeels of Tara Bye, was persuaded by them that Tara Bye's son, Sivajee, was the lawful raja of the Mahrattas. Zoolfikar Khan, impatient at his listening to these pretensions, betrayed an irritation which the minister resented ; and Sultan Mauzum, unwilling to disoblige Monaim Khan, and at the same time not displeased to find an excuse for deferring such a concession, seemed to comply with the minister's proposal in favour of Sivajee, and desired that the deeds for the surdeshmookhee should be made out in his name ; he, however, postponed their delivery until the claim to the Mahratta supremacy should be decided by the issue of the contest which was then in progress between the candidates.†

Shao's army was cantoned at Chundun Wundun, in the neighbourhood of Satara, during the monsoon, and he neglected no preparation to enable him to reduce his rival. Amongst other expedients he made an unsuccessful application to Sir Nicholas Waite, the governor of Bombay, for a supply of guns, ammunition, European soldiers, and money.‡ At the opening of the fair season, after celebrating the Dussera, preparations were made to renew the war against Tara Bye. Panalla was invested, the siege pressed with vigour, and the havildar who commanded offered to surrender on condition of being confirmed in his station. This proposal

was readily acceded to ; and Vishalgurh was surrendered by the agent of Pureshrum Trimbuck on the same terms.

A. D. 1709. Shao next marched towards Rangna, where Tara Bye then was ; but, hearing of the approach of the army, she quitted Rangna and fled to Malwan. The havildar of Rangna refused to surrender, and opposed the besiegers with resolution ; an assault was made and repulsed, and Shao, on the approach of the monsoon, abandoning the siege, retired to Kolapoore, where he cantoned the troops.§

At the opening of the fair season it was intended to prosecute the war, but about that time an agreement was entered into with the Moghuls, which waved the grand question of hereditary claim, and rendered the reduction of Tara Bye a point of less pressing personal interest to Shao. Zoolfikar Khan, who attended the court of Sultan Mauzum on his return to Hindostan, left Daood Khan Puneer as his deputy in the six Soobehs of the Deccan, and obtained for him the government of Burhanpoore, in

* Original letters from the Madras Records. This Mr. Pitt was the father of Lord Chatham.

† Khafee Khan.

‡ Bruce's Annals.

§ Mahratta MSS.

addition to his other appointment. Daood Khan settled, with such Mahratta chiefs as acknowledged Shao's authority, to allow them, with certain reservations, one-fourth of the revenue, but reserved the right of collecting and paying it through his own agents. Daood Khan's intimacy with most of the Mahratta chiefs, his connection with Zoolfikar Khan, and the terms of friendship between the latter and Shao, not only preserved Shao's ascendancy, but, except in instances where independent plundering bands occasionally appeared, procured a tolerably correct observance of the terms mentioned.*

In the end of the year Shao returned to Satara, and married two wives, one of the Mohitey, and another of the Sirkay, family. His other two wives were still with his mother at Delhi, where one of them, the daughter of Sindia, shortly afterwards died. Dhunnajee Jadow, after a long illness caused by the breaking out of an old wound in his leg, died on his way from Kolapoor, on the banks of the Warna. His carcoon, Ballajee Wishwanath, had accompanied him on that service, and during his sickness had the management of all his affairs, which created an unconquerable jealousy on the part of Chunder Seyn Jadow, Dhunnajee's son, and several Bramins in his service.

The army had scarcely returned to Satara when Tara Bye, encouraged

A. D. 1710. by the havildar at Panalla, marched towards that place, reinforced by the troops of Poond Sawunt, and it was immediately restored to her. It was now resolved, in order to give her party credit, and the appearance of a rising cause, to make that fort and the neighbouring town of Kolapoor the future residence of her court. Ramchundur Punt continued steadfast in the interest of her party, and

A. D. 1711. Shunkrajee Narain likewise maintained her cause. As the territory of the latter was reckoned the foundation-stone of the empire, from Sivajee's having first established himself there, Shao determined to reduce the Suchew, instead of renewing the attack on Panalla. About this time he entertained the design of removing his capital to Ahmednugur, but as it gave offence to Zoolfikar Khan, Shao, at his desire, relinquished the intention.†

An army proceeded towards Poona, and succeeded in obtaining possession of Rajgurh; but most of the Suchew's forts being well stored with provisions, and garrisoned by veteran Mawulees, were reckoned impregnable. It was, therefore, with no small satisfaction that Shao heard of his having put a period to his existence,‡—an act which, it is said, he committed from remorse, in consequence of having taken a solemn oath to maintain the cause of Tara Bye against his lawful prince.

Just at this time, in the month of January, Sivajee, the son of Tara

A. D. 1712. Bye, died of the small-pox. This prince was an idiot, but his death occasioned a considerable change at Kolapoor. Ramchundur Punt seized the opportunity to remove Tara Bye from the administration, and to place Sumbhajee, the son of Rajis Bye, the younger widow of Raja Ram, in her stead—a measure which had the sanction of Hindoo usage, and was therefore supported by common consent. Tara

* Khafee Khan.

† Original letters from Zoolfikar Khan.

‡ He performed the *Jul Sumadh*, or voluntary death by water, which is not uncommon among Hindoo devotees. It is effected by placing a wooden platform upon several earthen pots with their mouths turned down, to which the planks are fastened, and small holes are bored in the earthen vessels; the whole is placed on deep water, on some river accounted holy, and the devotee seats or ties himself on the platform, which gradually sinks with him.

Bye, and Bhowanee Bye, her son's widow, said to have been pregnant at the time of her husband's death, were put into confinement, and Ramchundur Punt, unfettered by Tara Bye, began to exert himself with renovated vigour.

But Shao, whilst Daood Khan's government continued, was secured in the ascendancy; he was also surrounded by most of the experienced ministers, and was totally exempt from that cruelty and excess which his enemies gave out that he inherited, with many other vices, from his father Sumbhaje. The loss of Shunkrajee Narain was a severe blow to the cause of the opposite party, and Shao, in that temper of conciliation for which he is deservedly applauded, seized the advantage which the sanction of lawful authority always bears, and immediately despatched clothes of investiture to Narroo Shunker, son of the late Suchew, then a child of two years old, at the same time confirming, as a matter of course, his mootaliq, or principal agent, in that situation. This measure immediately secured to him the services of that party, and the Suchew never afterwards departed from his allegiance. Shao was not equally successful in binding all the members of the Pritee Needhee's family to his interest.

He released Pureshram Trimluck, restored his honors by the removal of Gudadhur Prillhad, and confirmed him in his formal charge of Vishalgurh and its dependencies. The Pritee Needhee sent his eldest son, Kistnaje Bhaskur, to assume the management of the fort and district: but he had no sooner obtained possession, than he revolted, tendered his services to Sumbhaje, and was made Pritee Needhee at Kolapoor. On this defection Pureshram Trimluck was again thrown into confinement, and Shao, under a belief that the revolt had been encouraged by him, intended to have put him to death, but he was dissuaded from this design, which, even if just, would have made him odious in the country.

In consequence of changes at the imperial court, Daood Khan was removed to the government of Guzerat, which dissolved the agreement between the Moghuls and the Mahrattas.

Chunder Seyn Jadow, who had been appointed Senaputtee on the demise of his father, was sent off from Satara with a considerable army, and directed to levy the chouth, surdeshmookhee, and ghas-dana from the Moghul districts. He was attended on this occasion by his father's carcoon, Ballajee Wishwanath, who was now charged with collecting and appropriating a share of the revenue for the raja—a situation of control which, under no circumstances, was likely to be favourably viewed by the Senaputtee. The jealousy formerly entertained was increased tenfold, and on a very slight cause, arising from a dispute about a deer run down by one of Ballajee's horsemen, the suppressed enmity burst out in attempted violence; and Ballajee was obliged to flee for his life, first to Sassoor, where the Suchew's agent in Poorundhur did not think it prudent to protect him, although he begged hard to be permitted to enter that fort. The horsemen, his pursuers, were in sight; but the commander of the fort was obdurate. With a few followers, amongst whom were his sons Bajee Rao and Chinnaje, Ballajee Wishwanath attempted to cross over to Pandoogurh, a fort in the opposite valley; but Jadow's horsemen were already in his route, and searching for him in every quarter. In this dangerous extremity he contrived to conceal himself for a few days, until two Mahrattas, the one named Peelajee Jadow, and the other surnamed Dhoomal, then common sillidars in his service,

collected, by their influence with their relations, a small troop of horse, and promised to sacrifice their lives, or carry him and his sons that night to the Machee* of Pandoogurh.

Ballajee Wishwanath, as the manuscripts state, "did not particularly excel in the accomplishment of sitting upon a horse,"† but the sillidars, although they had a skirmish, performed their promise, and the commander of the fort protected him by Shao's orders. Chunder Seyn Jadow peremptorily demanded his being delivered up to him, and threatened, in case of refusal, to renounce his allegiance for ever. Shao was not prepared to punish this insolent demand, but he refused to give up Ballajee, and sent orders to Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, Sur Lushkur, then near Ahmednugur, to march for Satara immediately. In the meantime Ballajee Wishwanath was cooped up in Pandoogurh, which was surrounded by the Senaputtee's troops. Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, already jealous at not being made Senaputtee, and greatly incensed at Jadow's behaviour, obeyed the order with all speed; the latter, hearing of his arrival at Phultun, quitted Pandoogurh, and marched to Dewoor. The armies fought, and the troops of Jadow being defeated, he retired to Kolapoor, accompanied by Ghatgay Shirzee Rao. The latter was confirmed by Sumbhaje in his hereditary possessions at Kagul, but both went off to meet Cheyn Koolich Khan (Nizam-ool-Moolk), who had just been appointed, for the first time, to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, and from whom Jadow received a large tract of territory in the neighbourhood of Palkee, 25 miles east of Beder, as a jagheer for the support of his troops.‡

After the death of Sultan Mauzum§ in 1712, the distractions which prevailed by the usual contentions of the Moghul emperor's sons, the subsequent revolution effected for his grandson Ferokhsere, and the barbarous execution of Zoolfikar Khan, were followed by important changes in the government of the Deccan. Of these changes, the first to be mentioned was of much importance, both as it removed Daood Khan from the government, and as it brought a person to the temporary charge of the viceroyalty, who subsequently bore a leading part in Deccan affairs. This was the appointment of Cheyn Koolich Khan, the son of Ghazee-ud-deen. His original name was Meer Kummur-ud-deen; the title of Cheyn Koolich Khan, with a munsub of 5,000 horse, was conferred on him, when a very young man, by Aurungzebe, under whom, in the latter years of that emperor's reign, he held the important post of soobehdar in the province of Beejapoor. Cheyn Koolich Khan had materially contributed to the success of the two Syuds, Abdoollah Khan and Hoossein Ally Khan, to whose bravery, skill, and exertions Ferokhsere owed his throne.¶ Amongst courtiers

* Machee is a village attached to all hill-forts, commonly situated on the face of the hill completely under protection, and is sometimes fortified.

† His biographer adds, "and at this time required a man on each side to hold him on."

‡ *Mahratta MSS.* Hudeequ-i-Alum. This Persian MS., to which I here refer for the first time, is a voluminous history of Nizam-ool-Moolk and his successors. It is a modern and respectable work, written by Mohummud Aboo Turab, and dedicated to Meer Alum, the well-known minister of Nizam Ally. I had two copies of this work, the one was lent to me by Mr. William Erskine.

§ Or Shah Alum I.
¶ Khafee Khan, Khuzaneh Amirah, and Muassir-ool-Oomrah. The two last Persian authorities are both valuable. The Khuzaneh Amirah was written in the Deccan by Meer Gholam Ally, a native of Belgram, in the province of Oude. He is celebrated as a poet as well as a historian; he is the author of the *Suroo Azad*, and his works are much prized by the Mahomedans of the Deccan. The *Muassir-ool-Oomrah* (Biography of the Moghul nobles) is much celebrated in the Deccan; it was written by Shah Nuwaz Khan, or Sumsam-ud-Dowlah, with whose public character the reader of oriental history is already acquainted, from the works of Mr. Orme, Colonel Wilks, and others.

as well as states, friendship is as often the result of common enmity as of common interest; Cheyn Koolich Khan, who was known to have been the enemy of Zoolfikar Khan, was immediately appointed to succeed to the vice-royalty of the deceased minister, and dignified with the title of Nizam-ool-Moolk, whilst Daood Khan was removed to the government of Guzerat.*

It was at this period that the disaffected Senaputtee went over to Nizam-ool-Moolk, by whom he was well received, and rewarded in the manner already mentioned. He was accompanied by Ghatgay Shirzee Rao, of Kagul, and an officer named Rumbhajee Nimbalkur; the latter became distinguished in the Moghul service, and got the title of Rao Rumbha, which descended to his posterity. Nizam-ool-Moolk, on arriving at Aurungabad, seemed disposed to favour the cause of Sumbhajee, which, without enquiring into the private motives that may have inclined him to that party, was now the wisest policy the Moghuls could have adopted. Jadaw eager for revenge, and Nizam-ool-Moolk, desirous of suppressing the ravages of Shao's officers, sent an army against the Sur Lushkur, who retired from the Godavery to the Beema. Shao, in order to support him, sent forward a body of troops under Ballajee Wishwanath, whom he now dignified with the title of *Sena Kurt*, or agent in charge of the army. Ballajee effected a junction with Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, who fell back to the neighbourhood of Poorundhur, where they proposed to stand an engagement. A battle was fought, in which the advantage claimed by the Mahrattas is contradicted by their subsequent retreat to Salpee Ghaut. A detachment of Mahrattas from the Moghul army, under Rumbhajee Nimbalkur, took possession of the Poona district, and Rumbhajee obtained a jagheer in the neighbourhood. At length an accommodation took place, the terms of which are not ascertained, but hostilities ceased, and the Moghuls returned to Aurungabad.† Nizam-ool-Moolk kept his troops in motion during the fair season; but after he went into cantonments for the rains—a plan he invariably adopted—the Mahrattas, acting under different leaders, resumed their depredations.

All the deshmookhs and deshpandyas in the Moghul districts of Maharashtra fortified the villages where they resided, on pretence of defending themselves, but they frequently joined or assisted their countrymen, of whatever party, in escape, defence, or concealment. One very rich caravan of treasure, escorted by a large detachment under Mohummud Ibrahim Tebreezee, was attacked on the route from Surat to Aurungabad, the troops were entirely destroyed, and the property carried off.* This robbery was probably committed by Khundee Rao Dhabaray. For many years that officer had subsisted his followers in Guzerat and Kattywar, and exacted a tribute in those provinces. He acknowledged Shao as his chief; and when Daood Khan was appointed to Guzerat, he withdrew from the neighbourhood of Ahmedabad, and established himself in the strong country about Naundode and Rajpeeplee, † whence, it is likely, from the nature of the attack, this was his first sally.

As Nizam-ool-Moolk favoured the Kolapoor party, Sumbhajee's influence was increased as that of Shao was diminished. Seedojee Ghorepuray, ‡ the son of Byherjee, nephew of the famous Suntajee, and youngest brother of the first Moorar Rao of Gootee, was induced to declare for Sumbhajee, by whom he was dignified with the title of Senaputtee, and several of the Ghorepurays, both of Kapsee and Moodhole, joined the

* Khafee Khan.

† Ranoojee, the grandson of Suntajee, fell in battle.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

Kolapoor party : but Seedojee and his ally, the Patan Nabob of Savanoor, were too intent on their own schemes of conquest and plunder to quit the Carnatic. It was about this period that Seedojee made a great acquisition by obtaining possession of Sondoor, a fort situated in a valley of singular strength, within 25 miles of Bellary.

Kishen Rao Kuttaokur, a Bramin, raised by the Moghuls,* took post in the country about the Mahdeo hills, and, without joining either party, plundered the districts on his own account. Dummajee Thorat, an officer long under Ramchundur Punt, strengthened a gurhee in the village of Hinghee or Hingungaom, near Patus, about 40 miles east of Poona, and levied contributions for 30 miles round. He was of the Kolapoor party, and acknowledged no chief except his old patron Ramchundur Punt, under whom he had first established himself, and from whom he received Sopa and Patus as a jagheer, during the siege of Ginjee. Even in Mahratta estimation he was a lawless ruffian.† Oodajee Chowan, another of Ramchundur's officers and a native of Hutnee, took the gurhee of Buttees Serala, and in a short time became so formidable, that Shao was glad to enter into a compromise, by conceding the chouth of Serala and Kurar, which Chowan long continued to receive as a personal allowance. There were several other petty depredators who declared themselves Sumbhajee's adherents, but the most formidable of all was Kanhojee Angria, then in possession of the coast from Sawuntwaree to Bombay, who was extending his sway over the province of Kallianee in the Concan.

Such was the state of anarchy which now prevailed that, without a sudden change of fortune, and a greater efficiency in Shao's government, his authority over the Mahrattas must soon have become nugatory. Ballajee Wishwanath instilled some vigour into his councils, and began to take a lead in public affairs. He proposed to reduce Dummajee Thorat, and set out for that purpose; but he was seduced to a conference, treacherously seized, and thrown into confinement, together with his friend Abbajee Poorundhuree, his two sons Bajee Rao and Chimnaje, and several of their immediate retainers.

Thorat threatened them with the torture of fastening horses' feeding-bags, filled with ashes, on their mouths, and with ultimate death, unless he received a large ransom for their release. After enduring many indignities, the amount of their ransom was at last agreed upon and paid by Shao, who now applied to the Suchew to stop the progress of Thorat. The Suchew accordingly prepared to attack him; but his troops were defeated, and both the Suchew and his mootaliq were taken and thrown into confinement at Hingungaom.‡

At the same time that the Punt Suchew undertook this service, two expeditions were prepared at Satara—the one, under the Peishwa, Byhroo Punt Pingley, went to protect the Concan and repel Angria; and the other, commanded by Ballajee Wishwanath, was ordered to suppress Kishen Rao

* The same whose letter is given in a note, chap. xi.

† An anecdote of this freebooter is related by his countrymen with much horror. It is necessary to premise that one of the most sacred of oaths amongst Mahrattas is taken by holding the leaves of the tree called *Bel*, conjoined with turmeric, which, in the Mahratta language, is known by the name of *Bandar*. Thorat was accused of having forfeited his oath, and treacherously seized Ballajee Wishwanath, after swearing on the *Bel-Bandar*. "And what of that?" said Thorat—"don't I eat *Bandar* daily, and what is *Bel* but the leaves of a tree?"

‡ Naroo Shunker, the Punt Suchew, was then a child; but amongst Hindoos, the guardian generally considers the presence of his ward necessary on occasions of importance.

Kuttaokur. This Bramin had become so bold and confident, that he marched to Ound to meet Shao's troops, but he was totally defeated, principally by the bravery of Sreeput Rao, the second son of Pureshram Trimbeck, the Pritee Needhee, who had urged his son to perform some action which might wipe away the misconduct of his elder brother, and procure his father's release. Shao, accordingly, once more restored the Pritee Needhee to his liberty and rank. Kishen Rao, after perfect submission, was pardoned, and received the village of Kuttao in enam, a part of which is still enjoyed by his posterity.

This success was of considerable importance, but a like good fortune did not attend the Peishwa's expedition. Byhroo Punt was defeated and made prisoner by Angria. The fort of Logurh was taken; Rajmachee surrendered; and it was reported that Angria was about to march for Satara. All the force that could be spared was collected to oppose him, under Ballajee Wishwanath, who undertook the command, with hopes of being enabled, from his former connection with Angria, to effect an accommodation more desirable than any that might result from a protracted contest with a powerful neighbour. Ballajee knew Angria to be a leader of considerable ability as well as enterprize, and that his resources were not bounded by the extent of the districts in his possession, but were chiefly obtained by daring and extensive piracies. Ballajee was successful in his endeavours; and Angria, on condition of receiving 10 forts,* and 16 fortified places of less strength,† with their dependant villages, on being confirmed in command of the fleet and his title of Surkheil, agreed to renounce Sumbhajee, to release the Peishwa, to restore all his conquests, except Rajmachee, and to maintain the cause of Shao.

By this agreement the Seedee found himself deprived of some places of which he had enjoyed the revenue for 20 years. The consequence was an immediate rupture between that chief and Angria, in which Ballajee Wishwanath, co-operating against the Seedee, invaded his territory, and soon compelled him to submit.

Ballajee having performed this service in a manner so entirely to Shao's wishes, was received, on his return to Satara, with the greatest distinction; and, in consequence of the failure of Byhroo Punt Pingley, that minister was removed from the dignity of Mookh Purdhan, and Ballajee Wishwanath was appointed Peishwa in his stead. His friend Abbajee Poorundhuree was confirmed as his mootaliq, and Ramajee Punt Bhanoo‡ as his Furnuwees.

Manajee Moray, after the desertion of Chunder Seyn Jadow, had received clothes of investiture as Senaputtee, but had not performed the services that were expected of him; he was now ordered, with Hybut Rao Nimbalkur, to accompany Ballajee into the Poona district, for the purpose of reducing Dummajee Thorat. As Ballajee was apprehensive that the Suchew, who was still a prisoner in Hingungaom, might be killed if the

* These were—1, the island of Kenery (Kundeyree); 2, Kolabah; 3, Severndroog; 4, Viziadroog; 5, Jyegurh; 6, Deodroog; 7, Kunnikdroog; 8, Futtingurh; 9, Oochitgurh; and 10, Yeswuntadroog.

† 1, Byroogurh; 2, Kotla; 3, Vickutgurh; 4, Manikgurh; 5, Mirggurh; 6, Sagurgurh; 7, Russalgurh; 8, Palgurh and Ramdroog; 9, Gurhee Karaputtun; 10, Ramdroog; 11, Rajapoor; 12, Amber; 13, Sataolee; 14, Kamtey; 15, Sreewurdun; and 16, Munrunjun.—(Copy of original papers.)

‡ Ancestor of the celebrated Nana Furnuwees.

place were attacked, he was prevailed upon by Yessoo Bye, the Punt Suchew's mother, to endeavour to obtain his release before hostilities commenced. This was accordingly effected, and Yessoo Bye, in gratitude to the Peishwa for saving her son, made over to him the Suchew's rights in the Poona district, and gave him up the fort of Poorundhur, as a place of refuge for his family, then residing in Sassoor. On the same pretence Ballajee obtained a grant of it from Shao, by which concession that prince forged the first link in the chain which afterwards fettered his own power, and reduced his successors to empty pageants of Bramin policy.

The force assembled in the Poona district was too powerful for Thorat. He was soon forced into the gurhee of Hingungaom, which was breached and stormed. Dummajee Thorat was made prisoner, and the gurhee was destroyed.

The Sur Lushkur returned to the Godavery, after quarrelling with the raja for not appointing him Senaputtee, and they were never reconciled. The Peishwa induced the Moghul agent,* in charge of the Poona district, to make over the superior authority to him, on promising that Rumbhajee Nimbalkur's jagheer should be respected. He immediately suppressed a banditti which infested it; gave his attention to restoring order in the villages; discontinued all farming of revenue; and encouraged cultivation, by the usual means of very low and gradually increasing assessments.†

The affairs of the Mahrattas began to wear a more favourable aspect in all quarters; but after the confusion, weakness, and total anarchy which have just been described, the rapid expansion of their power from about this period, under the authority of Shao, is on any view very remarkable, and at first, until the cause be investigated, might seem quite incredible. The circumstances, however, which preserved that prince's ascendancy will be satisfactorily explained; and, as to the domestic confusion among the Mahrattas, it may be considered the reaction of their predatory power; their present state was like a flood with its channel completely obstructed, which rises on its natural barriers, till, surmounting or bursting through them, it inundates the plains.

The influence of Ballajee Wishwanath continued to increase, and no affair of importance was undertaken without his advice. A conciliatory policy was agreeable to Shao, and dictated all Ballajee's measures. The system of Sivajee was the groundwork of their arrangements; but, since the time of Sumbhajee, the necessity of preserving the raja's supremacy, by profusely issuing deeds, confirming to the successful Mahratta leader the possession of all the territory in which he could establish himself, was ruinous both to their union and resources as a nation. The nature, however, of the tribute which Sivajee's genius had instituted, suggested a remedy for the endless divisibility which every additional acquisition of territory was likely to create. The expedient adopted, which must have been long contemplated, will be shown in its proper place; and although it but temporarily insured its end, is the most ingenious, as well as the deepest, scheme of Bramin policy which is to be found unconnected with their religious system. The ministry, as far as practicable, was composed of the old retainers, and the situations of those who adhered to the Kolapoor party were conferred on their near relations.

* He was a Mahratta, named Bajee Kuddum.

† Mahratta MSS.

The following is a list of the ministry at this period :—

Pritee Needhee—Pureshrum Trimbuck.

The Eight Purdhans.

1. Peishwa, or Mookh Purdhan—Ballajee Wishwanath.
2. Amat—Amba Rao Bapoo Rao Hunwuntay.
3. Suchew—Naroo Shunker.
4. Muntree—Naroo Ram Shenwee.
5. Senapattee—Maun Sing Moray.
6. Somunt—Anund Rao.
7. Nyadeish—Honajee Anunt.
8. Pundit Rao—Moodghul Bhutt Oopadheea.

Pursojee Bhonslay and Hybut Rao Nimbalkur both died about this time. The son of the former, Kanhojee Bhonslay, was confirmed by Shao in all his father's possessions, and succeeded to his title of Sena Sahib Soobeh; but the rank of Sur Lushkur was conferred on Dowulshee Somwoushee, together with all the rights and honors of the situation. The son of Hybut Rao, whose succession was set aside, quitted Shao's standard, joined Chunder Seyn Jadow, and afterwards received Barsee and other districts as a jagheer from Nizam-ool-Moolk.

Shao was not destitute of ordinary ability; he was naturally generous, liberal to all religious establishments, observant of forms enjoined by the Hindoo faith, and particularly charitable to Bramins. The Ghaut-Mahta and the rugged Concan were his birthright, but, unused to climb Ghauts, or wander and live in the wilds of the mountain-forest, like his hardy grandfather, Shao's childhood was spent within the enclosure of the imperial seraglio, and it is not surprising that, seduced by the pomp and luxury of which he partook, his habits should have continued those of a Mahomedan. He occasionally showed all the violence of the Mahratta character,* and for the time anger overcame his indolence; but in general he was satisfied with the respect and homage paid to his person, and the professions of obedience invariably shown by the ministers to his commands; he was pleased at being freed from the drudgery of business, and in following his favorite amusements of hawking, hunting, and fishing; he did not foresee that he was delegating a power which might supersede his own. As legitimate head of the Mahrattas, the importance of that nation was increased by the manner in which he was courted by the Moghuls; and the dignities and rights conferred upon him, in consequence of his situation, gave an influence and respect to the name of Shao, which, under other circumstances, he could never have attained. Both the sons of Sivajee followed the example of their father, from the period when he mounted the throne, and always declared their independence; but Shao acknowledged himself a vassal of the throne of Delhi, and whilst styling himself king of the Hindoos, he affected, in his transactions with the Moghuls, to consider himself merely as a zumeendar, or head deshmookh of the empire.

The Emperor Ferokhsere, soon after his accession, upon the cessation of hostilities at the Salpée Ghaut, appointed Shao to the rank of 10,000 horse;† and for 17 months, or during the first government of Nizam-ool-Moolk, the policy and vigour of that viceroy had greatly tended to control the Mahrattas.

* In comparison with the Bramins, the Mahrattas are extremely violent, which forms a striking contrast with the inflexible placidness which the former can command.

† Original letter from Ferokhsere to Shao.

Ferokhsere, at a very early period, began to entertain a jealousy of the Syuds, to whom he owed his elevation, and mutual distrust soon followed. He consented to appoint the younger Syud, Hoossein Ally Khan, to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in hopes that, by separating the brothers, he should weaken their power and compass their destruction. In applying for this appointment, Hoossein Ally Khan intended to follow the example of Zoolfikar Khan, and govern by deputy; but, relying on the emperor's assurances, he was prevailed upon to depart for the Deccan, openly declaring, however, that if anything should be meditated against his brother, he would be in the capital in 20 days. Ferokhsere, under whose authority Daood Khan was removed to Guzerat, now despatched secret instructions to that officer to oppose the new viceroy, promising that, if successful, he should be appointed to the six Soobehs of the Deccan in his stead. Daood Khan, from his known influence with the Mahrattas, and other circumstances, was considered a person peculiarly fit for this commission, which, at the command of the emperor, he readily undertook. The only Mahratta, however, that had come forward, or had time to join him, was Neemajee Sindia, who, content with a jagheer he received from Zoolfikar Khan, in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, attached himself, during the dissensions of his countrymen, to the Moghul viceroy for the time being.

A. D. 1716. On the present occasion, in observance of the same temporizing rule, when Hoossein Ally Khan and Daood Khan came to a battle, Neemajee Sindia galloped about at a distance, awaiting the result, and seeing victory declare in favour of Hoossein Ally, after the death of Daood Khan, the Mahratta congratulated the victor, and joined his standard.*

Ferokhsere, disappointed in his treacherous scheme, but still intent on the destruction of the brothers, with the greatest professions of cordiality, secretly encouraged resistance to the viceroy's authority, both amongst the servants of his government and the Mahrattas—a base and silly policy which, in the end, could hardly fail to meet with its deserts.

The first expedition, directed by Hoossein Ally Khan against the Mahrattas, was for the purpose of opening the communication between Surat and Burhanpoor, and suppressing the depredations of Khundee Rao Dhabaray, who had established a line of posts along that route, and exacted one-fourth of the effects of all travellers who did not purchase his passport. Eight thousand men were sent off, under Zoolfikar Beg, to destroy this freebooter; but Dhabaray, hearing of their march, threw himself in the way, suffered himself to be pursued in the usual manner, until the Moghuls were broken, when, wheeling round, the experienced Mahratta completely defeated them, killed the commander, and plundered his troops even of their clothes.†

Maakoob Sing, the dewan of Hoossein Ally Khan, set out, accompanied by Chunder Scyn Jadow, to avenge this disgraceful defeat. Khundee Rao effected a junction with the troops of the Sur Lushkur, and gave the Moghuls battle near Ahmednugur. A severe conflict took place, in which both parties claim the advantage, but the Moghuls returned to Aurungabad.‡ Khundee Rao Dhabaray, who had been long absent from court, went to Satara after these successes, paid his respects to Shao, and was

* Khafee Khan.

† Khafee Khan, Muassir-ool-Oomrah, and Mahratta MSS.

‡ Mahratta MSS., and Khafee Khan. I have here rather followed the Mahratta than the Moghul account, because subsequent events corroborate the former.

raised to the rank of Senaputtee of the empire, Manajee Moray having been removed for inability and misconduct.⁶

The Mahratta officers, encouraged by their success, and by the secret overtures of Ferokhsere, now extended their encroachments; and, in addition to the chouth, which they had agreed to receive from Daood Khan in lieu of all claims, they everywhere levied the surdeshmookhee.

It was under these circumstances that Hoossein Ally Khan, distracted by Mahratta depredations on one side, and court intrigues on the other, had recourse to negotiations with Shao.† Shunkrajee Mulhar, originally a carcoon under Sivajee, and appointed Suchew by Raja Ram, at Ginjee, retired, as has been mentioned, during the siege of that place, to Benares. Having become tired of a life so little in unison with his former habits, he engaged, although then a very old man, in the service of Hoossein Ally Khan when appointed to the Deccan. He soon gained the confidence of his master, and at an early period entered into a correspondence with his old friends at Satara. He represented to the viceroy that, if the Mahratta claims were recognised, they would have an interest in the prosperity of the country; that this was the only way to restore tranquillity, and a certain means to obtain powerful allies, by whose aid he might rest secure from present intrigues, and eventually defy the avowed hostility of the emperor.

In these opinions he was supported by Mohammud Anwar Khan, the governor of Burhanpoor, a person high in the confidence of Hoossein Ally Khan. Shunkrajee Mulhar was therefore despatched to Satara, for the purpose of effecting an arrangement and alliance between the Moghuls and his countrymen.

This mission laid open a grand prospect to the aspiring mind of Ballajee Wishwanath. Besides the chouth and surdeshmookhee of the six Soobehs of the Deccan, including the Beejapoor and Hyderabad Carnatic, with the tributary states of Mysore, Trichinopoly, and Tanjore, Shao demanded the whole of the territory in Maharashtra which had belonged to Sivajee, with the exception of his possessions in Candeish; but in lieu of which, territory adjoining the old districts, as far east as Punderpoor, was to be substituted. The fort of Sewneree was required to be given up, and the fort of Trimbeck restored. The old districts in the Carnatic were also demanded, and a confirmation of some conquests lately made by Kanhojee Bhonslay, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, in Gondwanah and Berar; and, lastly, the mother and family of Shao were to be sent from Delhi as soon as practicable.

On these conditions Shao promised to pay to the imperial treasury,—for the old territory, a peshkush, or tribute, of ten lakhs of rupees: for the surdeshmookhee, or ten per cent. of the whole revenue, he bound himself to protect the country, to suppress every species of depredation, to bring thieves to punishment, or restore the amount stolen, and to pay the usual fee of 651 per cent. on the annual income, for the hereditary right of surdeshmookh: for the grant of the chouth he agreed to maintain a body of 15,000 horse in the emperor's service, to be placed at the disposal of the soobehdars, foudjars, and officers in the different districts; but upon the grant of the chouth no fee was to be paid. The Carnatic, and the soobehs of Beejapoor and Hyderabad, which were then overrun by the partizans of Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor, Shao promised to clear of plunderers, and to make good every loss sustained by the inha-

* Mahratta MSS.

† Khafee Khan, and Mahratta MSS.

bitants of those provinces from the date of the final settlement of the treaty.

Shunkrajee Mulhar had already sufficiently proved his desire to forward the interests of his countrymen, and Shao appointed

A. D. 1717. him to conclude the terms, which, according to the above proposals, were, with some exceptions, conceded by Hoossein Ally Khan.*

The territory and forts not under the viceroy's control were to be recovered at some season of leisure, or in any manner which Shao might think fit; in the meantime a body of 10,000 horse were sent to join the viceroy. Suntajee and Pursojee Bhonslay, relations of the Sena Sahib Soobeh, Oodajee Powar, Wiswas Rao, and several other commanders, were detached in charge of the Mahratta troops for this duty. Agents were at the same time sent to inquire into the state of the districts, and collect the extensive shares of revenue now assigned to them, whilst the Bramin ministers were devising a system for realizing their intricate claims, which it was by no means their object or their interest to simplify.

The emperor, however, refused to ratify the treaty which had been exchanged; and an unworthy favorite having given him great encouragement in his intrigues for the destruction of the Syuds, he became less guarded in his measures, and an open rupture seemed inevitable. Hoossein Ally Khan, therefore, prepared to march for the capital, and solicited aid from Shao.† Such an opportunity was not neglected. Ballajee Wishwanath and Khundee Rao Dhabaray proceeded to join the viceroy with a large body of troops, for which he agreed to pay them a certain sum daily, from the date of their crossing the Nerbuddah until their return; and Hoossein Ally Khan further promised that the treaty should be ratified, and the family of Shao released and delivered to his officers.‡ Ballajee Wishwanath was instructed by Shao, on his departure, to endeavour, if possible, to obtain the cession of the forts of Doulutabad and Chandah, and an authority for levying the tribute, which had been for some time imposed by the Mahrattas, in Guzerat and Malwa. The plea on which these extraordinary pretensions to tribute were made was, that the chiefs who had already levied contributions in those provinces would break in and plunder, unless Shao could receive such an authority as must oblige the chiefs in question to look to him only for, what they termed, their established contributions, and that he would, under these circumstances, be responsible for the protection and improvement of the territories.

The combined army marched to Delhi, where the wretched Ferokhsere, as irresolute in his actions as he was bold in his intrigues, could not be prevailed upon to act any consistent part: he was alike submissive and deceitful; the friends, who would have acted for him, were suffered to be removed; and, finally, after some tumult, he was confined by the Syuds, and subsequently put to death. Two princes of the royal household succeeded each other on the throne, and died within seven months.

* Mahratta MSS. Copy of an original memorandum, and several original papers. Khafee Khan also partially confirms this account.

† The Moghul historians mention that the viceroy pretended to receive from Shao a son of Sultan Mohammud Akber, then residing at the Mahratta court. The Mahrattas do not record this circumstance; but, although very possible, as it was attended by no result, I have rejected it.

‡ Khafee Khan, and Mahratta MSS.

Roshun Ikhtiar, the son of Jehandar Shah, and grandson of Sultan A. D. 1719. Maumzum, was then raised to the imperial dignity by the title of Mohummud Shah; but the two Syuds, by whom all these changes were effected, conducted the affairs of the empire with absolute sway, and with the usual watchful jealousy of usurpers. They held the reins with a strong hand, but they were naturally desirous of retaining the services of such nobles of experience and ability as were not supposed hostile to their party. Of this number was Nizam-ool-Moolk, but that officer was secretly inimical to their power: he had been removed from his government in the Deccan to make room for Hoossein Ally Khan, and appointed to Mooradabad, where he had distinguished himself by his activity in reducing to order some rebellious zumeendars of the province, who had sheltered themselves in the Sewalik mountains. He was recalled to court by the emperor, and remained at Delhi for some time unemployed, but was at last despatched as governor of the province of Malwa, at the recommendation of the elder Syud. Although daring and ambitious, he inherited the temporizing policy of his father, and he was induced, on the confinement of Ferokhsere, to profess his allegiance to the pageant emperor whom the Syuds had set up. He continued in his government of Malwa; but observing the troubles and disorders likely to arise, he waited in expectation of some favorable opportunity to aggrandize himself, during the revolutionary period of which he foresaw the approach.

Ballajee Wishwanath and his Mahrattas remained at Delhi until the accession of Mohummud Shah; and during the tumult A. D. 1720. which preceded the confinement of Ferokhsere, Suntajee Bhonslay and 1,500 of his men were killed by the populace in the streets of Delhi.* The army was paid by the Syuds, according to the agreement, and Shao's mother and family given over to Ballajee Wishwanath. Both the Peishwa and Senaputtee being anxious to return to the Deccan, they were permitted to depart; and, according to the treaty with Hoossein Ally Khan, they received three imperial grants† for the chouth, surdeshmookhee, and swuraje. The chouth,‡ or one-fourth of the whole revenue of the six Soobehs of the Deccan, including the Hyderabad and Beejapoor Carnatic, and the tributary states of Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Mysore; the surdeshmookhee,§ or ten per cent. over and above

* Seyr Mutuakhereen, and Mahratta MSS. In the latter, the manner of his death is differently related; but here the former is the preferable authority. He is said to have been the natural son of Pursojæ Bhonslay. The Seyr-ul-Mutuakhereen is a well-known Persian work, which was translated into English by a renegade Frenchman, named Mustapha. His manuscript translation is in the library at the India House.

† The original grants are in possession of the raja of Satara: they are in the name of Mohummud Shah, dated in the first year of his reign, A. H. 1131 (A.D. 1719). The Emperor Mohummud Shah was not, in fact, placed on the throne till 1720; but during the months that intervened between his elevation and the dethronement of Ferokhsere, two princes had filled the throne, whose names were expunged from the records.

‡ The deed for the chouth is dated 22nd Rubbee-ool-Akhir, A. H. 1131, and grants to Shao the fourth of the whole revenue of the six Soobehs of the Deccan, simply on condition that he shall maintain 15,000 horse, for the purpose of assisting the military governors in preserving order and tranquillity in the country.

§ The surdeshmookhee grant is dated 4th Jummadee-ool-Uwul, or twelve days after that of the chouth. It does not specify in the body of the deed that it is granted as a hereditary right; but the customary fee on such occasions is stated on the back of the instrument, as will be seen in the accompanying extract, which also shows the estimated revenue of the six Soobehs of the Deccan, as registered by the Moghuls.

the chouth; and the swuraje,^a literally meaning *our own sovereignty*, or the districts possessed by Sivajee at the time of his death, which were granted to Shao, excepting the detached possessions in Candeish, the fort of Trimbuck, with the adjoining district, and the conquests south of the Wurdah and Toongbuddra rivers, which were not ceded. In lieu of such of these claims as lay to the north of the Beema, districts beyond the line of forts from Tattora to Muchindergurh, as far east as Punderpoor, were wholly ceded to Shao, and also those districts which Aurungzebe had promised to him at the time of his marriage in that emperor's camp. The country watered by the Yairla, Maun, and Neera, celebrated for good horses and hardy soldiers, and the residence of some of the most ancient families in Maharashtra, who had not hitherto formally acknowledged the descendant of Sivajee, were by this cession placed under his authority.

The Mahrattas pretend that the conquests in Berar by Pursojee and Kanhojee Bhonslay, and their right to tribute in Guzerat and Malwa, were confirmed at the same time; but although some very indefinite verbal promise may have been given, and Ballajee Wishwanath left a wukeel, named Deo Rao Hingunee, for the purpose, as is alleged, of receiving the sunnuds, yet subsequent events prove the falsity of the assertion. No such confirmation appears in the imperial deeds; the usual fees levied on an hereditary assignment are specified on the back of the grant for the surdeshmookhee, but none of the three were given as perpetual alienations.

When Ballajee Wishwanath departed for Delhi, he left his dewan, Abbajee Poorundhuree, as his mootaliq, or deputy, in charge of his seal of office, and the duties of Peishwa continued to be carried on at the Mahratta court in Ballajee's name. On his return to Satara with the imperial deeds, the scheme for collecting and distributing the revenues, which all admit to have been projected by Ballajee, was examined, and the system before

The fee so calculated was commuted to 1,17,19,390 rupees, in consequence of the depopulated state of the districts.

	Rs.	A.	P.
Soobeh Aurungabad	1,23,76,042	11	3
Ditto Berar	1,15,23,508	14	3
Ditto Beder	74,91,879	12	3
Ditto Beejapoor	7,85,08,560	14	1
Ditto Hyderabad	6,48,67,483	0	0
Ditto Candeish	57,49,819	0	3

	Rupees		
The surdeshmookhee estimated in rupees at	18,05,17,294	6	1
Peshkush, or established fee on hereditary rights conferred, 651 per cent.	1,80,51,730	0	0
The immediate payment on delivering the deed, one-fourth, or	11,75,16,762	0	0
The remainder, payable by instalments	2,93,79,190	8	0
	8,81,37,571	8	0

* The following is a list of the 16 districts included in the grant of the swuraje:—1, Poona; 2, Sopra, including Barramuttee; 3, Indapoor; 4, Waee; 5, the Mawuls; 6, Satara; 7, Kurar; 8, Kuttao; 9, Maun; 10, Phultun; 11, Mulkapoor; 12, Tarla; 13, Panalla; 14, Azerah; 15, Joonere; and 16, Kolapoor. The pergunnas north of the Toongbuddra, including Kopaul, Gudduck, Hullyal, and all the forts which were captured by Sivajee. The Concan consisting of—1, Ramnugur, including—1, Gundavee; 2, Jowur; 3, Choule; 4, Beemgurh; 5, Beemree; 6, Kalliance; 7, Rajpooree; 8, Dabul; 9, Jowlee; 10, Rajapoor; 11, Ponda; 12, Akola; and 13, Koodal.

The above contain all that is useful from these deeds: to give a full translation is quite unnecessary, especially as, to the generality of readers, the substance will prove more intelligible.

alluded to, which had already been partially introduced, was now generally promulgated. A brief analysis of their plans for collecting and appropriating the revenues will afford more insight into the character of the people, and the nature of Bramin power, than the subject promises. It furnishes not only some explanation of the mode adopted for preserving a common interest among the Mahrattas, and affording pretexts for encroaching on the Moghuls, but it exposes the laboured artifice by which the illiterate Mahratta chief becomes wholly dependent on his Bramin accountant.

The surdeshmookhee, or ten per cent. on the revenues of the six Soobehs of the Deccan, was first set aside, and termed by the ministers the *raja's wutun*—a gratifying sound to the ears of a Mahratta, whether prince or peasant.

The imposition of the surdeshmookhee, of course, reduced, in a proportionate degree, the actual collections from a country, the resources of which were already drained to the utmost; but the nominal revenue continued the same. To have collected even one-fourth of the standard assessment would probably, at this period, have been impossible; but the Mahrattas, in all situations, endeavoured to secure, in lieu of their chouth, at least 25 per cent. of the real balance. But, although they seldom could collect it, they always stated the chouth as due upon the tunkha, or standard assessment; because, even should a day of retribution arrive, no claim of peshkush could be made by the Moghuls on that head, as none was specified on the deed.

In regard to the surdeshmookhee, it suited both their foreign and domestic policy to keep that claim undefined; but one system in practice, that of exacting as much as they could, was as simple as it was invariable.

Of the 75 per cent. which remained to the Moghuls, one-third, or 25 per cent., was received, according to established usage, by the foudjar, and the balance was collected sometimes for the imperial exchequer, but generally on account of some jagheerdar, to whom, as I have already mentioned in a former chapter, the Moghul conquests in the Deccan were assigned for the support of troops. This general mode of appropriating the revenue accounts for the seizures, resumptions, and cessions of territory, under the name of jagheer, which was taken, re-taken, and interchanged, during the later wars in the Deccan, between the Nizam and the Peishwa. It likewise explains the practice which prevailed in many villages, even up to the period of the late conquests in Maharashtra by the British government, of bringing 50 per cent. of the net revenue to account under the head of jagheer, for which the koolkurnees, in less than a century, could assign no reason except the custom of their forefathers.

The swurajo, applied in the first instance to that part of the territory north of the Toongbuddra possessed by Sivajee at his death, was, upon the return of Ballajee Wishwanath, extended in its signification to the whole of the Mahratta claims, exclusive of the surdeshmookhee. Of these claims, one-fourth, or 25 per cent., was appropriated to the head of the state, in addition to the surdeshmookhee; and this fourth was known by the name of the *raja's babtee*.* the balance was termed mokassa.†

* This was to distinguish it from other Babtee, or items of revenue. Thus they say, Surdeshmookhee Babtee, Mokassa Babtee, or items of revenue under these heads respectively.

† This word was no doubt adopted from the old name of the Beesjapoor revenue officer. The Mahrattas are not very choice in their etymology, and appear to have been particularly arbitrary in fixing their revenue nomenclature. Nargounda, for instance, which is a corruption of the common Carnatic name for head Patell (Sur Patell, in Maharashtra), was applied to express 3 per cent. upon their whole revenue,

Upon the mokassa there were two shares left at the disposal of the raja—the one was Sahotra, or six per cent., and the other Nargounda, or three per cent., both calculated on the whole swuraje. The balance of the mokassa was 66 per cent. of the whole of the Mahratta claims, exclusive of the surdeshmookhee.

The Sahotra was bestowed by Shao on the Punt Suchew, as an hereditary assignment; but it was only collected by the Suchew's own agents within the territory wholly possessed by the Mahrattas: separate collectors were sent by the raja to realize it in distant districts. The Nargounda was granted to different persons, at the raja's pleasure.

The Purdhans, independent of salaries from the treasury, had many enam villages conferred upon them. Ballajee Wishwanath received several districts adjoining Poona in personal jagheer, including the fort of Logurh. The Pritee Needhee, the Peishwa, and the Punt Suchew were charged with the collection of the Babtee on the raja's account. Thus there were distinct agents for realizing the babtee and surdeshmookhee, for the Sahotra of the Punt Suchew, for the Nargounda of the assignee to whom it belonged, and for mokassa to different officers for maintaining troops.

The mokassa was distributed amongst a great number of chiefs, as military jagheer, burdened, according to circumstances, with dues to the head of the state, both money and of troops. The districts of old Mahratta jagheerders were exempted from the chouth, but they generally were liable to the payment of surdeshmookhee, besides furnishing their quota of horse. Such jagheers, in a grant of mokassa for a large tract, were always stated as deductions, and long before districts were conquered, former grants and assignments of their revenue were distributed. Numberless personal jagheers and enams of lands and of whole villages were alienated by Shao: the former commonly required the performance of some service, but the latter were entirely freehold. The raja's authority was considered necessary to collect the revenues thus conceded; but authority, for which they were constantly petitioning, was a mere mockery. The Bramins soon proved, at least to their own satisfaction, that the raja's sunnud was sufficient for levying tribute in districts not specified in the imperial deeds. A district once overrun was said to be under tribute from usage, whilst the others were plundered *by virtue of letters patent*.

There were particular quarters of the country assigned to the principal officers, which, as far as they can now be ascertained, were as follow: The Peishwa and Senaputtee, charged with the command of a great proportion of the raja's personal troops, were ordered to direct their attention to the general protection and defence of the territory. The former had authority to levy the government dues in Candeish, and part of the Bala Ghaut; the latter was vested with similar authority in Buglana, and a right to realize the dues established by usage from Guzerat. Kanhojee Bhonslay, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, had charge of Berar Payeen Ghaut, and was privileged to make conquests and exact tribute from

exclusive of the surdeshmookhee. The office of Nargounda, or Nargaora, was common under the Beejapoor government, in the districts south of the Kistna. Nar in the Carnatic is (I believe) applied, like turuf in Maharashtra, as a name for a smaller division of a district, and Gaora is synonymous with Patell. When Shao got possession of Panalla, he bestowed the hereditary right of Nargaora on his Chitnees, which, for some reason unexplained, had been forfeited by a Mahratta named Nagojee Bhaskur to the Beejapoor government. In this case, the Nargaora wutun, having been granted in the Arabic year, 1110 (A.D. 1709-10), before the plan of revenue distribution was thought of, it was simply an hereditary right, as head Patell of the turuf.

Gondwanah to the eastward. The Sur Lushkur had Gunthuree, including part of Aurungabad; Futih Sing Bhonslay was appointed to the Carnatic; whilst the general charge of the old territory from the Neera to the Warna, and the collections from Hyderabad and Beder, were left to the Pritee Needhee and the immediate agents of the raja. The Chitnees had particular charge of several districts in the Concan. The Punt Suchew enjoyed the revenue of the whole Sahotra, besides his old possessions in jagheer. The agents for collecting the raja's zumeendaree dues were styled Naib Surdeshmookh.

Kanhojee Angria, retaining his districts in the Concan, levied his chouth, as he termed it, by continuing to plunder the ships of all nations that appeared on the coast. For a time Angria refrained from molesting the English; but in consequence of his taking the ship *Success*, under British colours, war was renewed in 1717, and the settlement of Bombay was endangered by his intrigues with a Bramin, known by the name of Rama Kamatty,* who was employed in a confidential manner, and in command of the sepoys, by the governor, Mr. Charles Boone. On the accession of Mr. Phipps as president in council, the war was vigorously prosecuted; but Kanhojee Angria continued to deride the efforts†

* Probably Komptee. There is a class of Carnatic Bramins so named; but Kamatties are of the labouring class, and much employed in Bombay as palanquin-bearers.

† The following letter to the Bombay government is a curious specimen of his correspondence. It was received at Bombay, in November 1720, after an attempt on Viziadroog (or Gheriah), by an expedition under Mr. Walter Brown. I have given the letter nearly as it appears on the records, but have taken a few liberties with the translator's orthography:—

Translation of Kanhojee Angria's Letter to the Honourable the President.

"I received your Excellency's letter, and have understood all your Excellency writes me. 'That the differences that continue even until now are through my means; that the desire of possessing what is another's is a thing very wide of reason; that such-like insults are a sort of piracy; that such proceedings cannot continue long; that had I from my beginning cultivated trade and favoured the merchant, the port I now govern might, by the divine favour, have in some measure vied with the great port of Surat, and my name have become famous; all which,' your Excellency says, 'is not to be brought about but by opening a fair trade: that he that is least expert in war generally comes off a sufferer thereby; and that he who follows it purely through a love that he hath thereto, will one time or another find cause to repent; that if I had considered this some thing sooner, I might have found some benefit and convenience thereby.' Your Excellency says, 'you are very well acquainted with the manner of my government from its beginning, and for that reason you would not on any account open a treaty with me until I set at liberty the people of your nation that are prisoners here: after that, you would receive any proposition from me that was friendly, or might tend to an accommodation.'

"At all which I very much admire, especially when I find your Excellency persuaded that I have been the cause of the past differences and disputes, the truth of which your Excellency will soon find when you examine both sides; for as touching the desire of possessing what is another's, I do not find the merchants exempt from this sort of ambition, for this is the way of the world; for God gives nothing immediately from himself, but takes from one to give to another. Whether this is right or no, who is able to determine?

"It little behoves the merchants, I am sure, to say our government is supported by violence, insults, and piracies; for as much as Maharaja (which is Sivajee) making war against four kings, founded and established his kingdom. This was our introduction and beginning: and whether or no, by these ways, this government hath proved durable, your Excellency well knows, so likewise did your predecessors; and whether it is durable or no, I would have your Excellency consider, it is certain nothing in this world is durable, which if your Excellency does consider, the way of this world is well known.

"Your Excellency is pleased to say, 'if I had regard to the weal of the people, and favoured commerce, my power would be much augmented, and my port become

both of the English and Portuguese, who united to suppress his piracies. Angria used to pay a tribute to the raja in guns, muskets, military stores, and ammunition. He also presented frequent nuzurs, in articles from Europe and China; and he was sometimes charged with a very extraordinary duty, that of executing state criminals.

All the principal Mahratta officers had, as a further means of preserving intercourse and union, particular claims assigned to them on portions of revenue, or on whole villages in the districts of each other. The greatest Mahratta commanders, or their principal Bramin agents, were eager to possess their native village; but, although vested with the control, they were proud to acknowledge themselves of the family of the patell or koolkurnee; and if heirs to a miras field, they would sooner have lost wealth and rank than been dispossessed of such *wutun*, or inheritance. Yet, on obtaining the absolute sovereignty, they never assumed an authority in the interior village concerns, beyond the rights and privileges acquired by birth or purchase, according to the invariable rules of the country.

Such is a brief outline of the system and arrangements settled by the Mahratta ministry on the return of Ballajee Wishwanath; and such was the mode by which a common interest was created, and for a time preserved, among the Mahratta chiefs; whilst the character of Shao, the influence and power of Ballajee Wishwanath, the abilities of his sons Bajee Rao and Chimnaje, and the preponderance of Bramin opinion and authority, paved the way, though by gradual steps, for the supremacy and usurpation of the Peishwas.

like that of Surat;’ but I never have been wanting to favour the merchants, trading according to the laws of this country, nor of chastising those transgressing the same, as your Excellency well knows. ‘The increase of power depends on the divine will, in which human diligence little availeth.’ Until this day I have kept up the power that was necessary: whether I shall continue it or no for the future, who can tell? but that will be as God is pleased to determine.

“Your Excellency was pleased to write, ‘that war proves most fatal to those where the use of the sword is not understood;’ but in the government of His Excellency Charles Boone, nobody can say there was not loss on both sides; for victories depend on the hand of God, and for this reason great men take little notice of such losses.

“Your Excellency is pleased to write, ‘that he who follows war, purely through an inclination that he hath thereto, one time or another will find cause to repent;’ of which I suppose your Excellency hath found proof; for we are not always victorious, nor always unfortunate.

Your Excellency was pleased to write, ‘that you well understood the manner of my government, and for that reason you could not enter upon any treaty of peace with me, unless I would first set at liberty the people of your nation that are prisoners here.’ I very well know your Excellency understands the manner of my government from its beginning, therefore this gives me no wonder; but if your Excellency says you will admit any proposition, after having your people released, I must then likewise say, my people are prisoners under your Excellency: how can I then give liberty to yours? But if your Excellency’s intent was cordially to admit any overtures of peace for ending our present disputes, and do really write me for that end concerning the liberty of your people, I am to assure you my intent is cordially the same. It is therefore necessary that some person of character intervene, and act as guarantee between us, to whom I will presently send your Excellency’s people. Your Excellency will afterwards do the like by mine: the prisoners on both sides, having by this means obtained their liberty, afterwards we shall enter on what relates to our friendship and treaty of peace for the avoidance of prejudice on both sides. For this end I now write your Excellency, which I hope will meet with regard; and if your Excellency’s intention be to treat of peace and friendship, be pleased to send an answer to this, that, conformable thereto, I may consider on what is most proper to be done. As your Excellency is a man of understanding, I need say no more.”

CHAP. XIII.

FROM A. D. 1720 TO A. D. 1726.

Nizam-ool-Moolk, throwing off his dependence on the Syuds, determines on possessing himself of the resources of the Deccan—defeats Dilawur Khan, who falls in the contest.—Battle of Balapoor—the deputy viceroy, Alum Ally Khan, slain—conduct of the Mahrattas on the occasion.—Hoossein Ally Khan, accompanied by the emperor, sets out from Delhi to quell the rebellion of Nizam-ool-Moolk, but is assassinated.—Battle of Shahpoor.—Syud Abdoolah Khan defeated and made prisoner.—Rejoicings at Delhi—promotions—congratulations.—Conduct of the new administration.—Important changes at the Mahratta court.—Deaths of Pureshram Trimbuck, Ballajee Wishwanath, and Khundee Rao Dhabaray—elevation of Sreeput Rao and of Bajee Rao.—Death of Dummajee Gaekwar, ancestor of the reigning family at Baroda.—Negotiations with Nizam-ool-Moolk—his views and policy—is appointed vizier of the empire, and proceeds to Delhi.—Courtiers conspire against him.—Hyder Koolee Khan, governor of Guzerat, incited to rebellion—quelled by Nizam-ool-Moolk, who appoints his uncle, Hamed Khan, governor at Ahmedabad, and returns to Delhi—is appointed wukeel-i-mootluq—withdraws from court, and returns towards the Deccan.—Proceedings of Bajee Rao.—Origin of Holkar and Sindia.—Proceedings of Oodajee Powar.—Character of Bajee Rao—views directed towards Malwa—opposed by Sreeput Rao—discussions.—Commanding eloquence of Bajee Rao.—Nizam-ool-Moolk, on his return to the Deccan, is opposed by Mubariz Khan—battle of Shukurkhera.—Mubariz Khan defeated and slain.—Appointment of Raja Geerdhur Buhadur as governor of Malwa, and of Sur Boolund Khan as governor of Guzerat—the deputy of the latter is defeated by the uncle of Nizam-ool-Moolk, assisted by Kantajee Kuddum Bhanday.—Roostum Ally, governor of Surat, betrayed by Peelajee Gaekwar—is also defeated.—Hamed Khan grants the chouth to Kantajee and Peelajee—the quarrel in collecting it—on which the chouth of Guzerat, west of the Myhie, is assigned to Kantajee, and that of the country east of it to Peelajee.—Sur Boolund Khan marches for Ahmedabad.—Battle at the Shah-i-bagh.—Distracted state of Guzerat.—Bajee Rao's incursions into Malwa.—Notice of an expedition to the Carnatic.

THE measures which the Syuds adopted were the reverse of conciliatory ;
 A. D. 1720. they were respected by the people, but they neither gained the good-will of the nobility, nor of the pageant emperor whom they had raised. Nizam-ool-Moolk, governor of Malwa, who always meditated the means of aggrandizing himself, encouraged by these appearances of discontent, and secretly incited by persons in the confidence of Mohunmud Shah, formed the resolution of throwing off his dependence on the Syuds, and of resisting their authority by possessing himself of the resources of the Deccan. He was aided in his projected

scheme by Murhummut Khan, a disaffected officer of considerable talent, whom he had gained, and the awakened suspicions of the Syuds determined his purpose.

Assuming the title of Asif-ja, Nizam-ool-Moolk crossed the Nerbuddah at the head of 12,000 men. The fort of Asseergurh was given up to him by Talib Khan for a sum of money; Burhanpoor was surrendered by Mohummud Anwar Khan, and the whole of Candeish, in a very short time, submitted. Chunder Seyn Jadow, Nimbalkur, the son of Hybut Rao, the late Sur Lushkur, Rao Rumbha Nimbalkur, several other Mahrattas discontented with Shao, and some troops belonging to Sumbha-jee from Kolapoor, attached themselves to his standard.*

At this juncture there were two armies in the interests of the Syuds, at no great distance from each other; the one, under Dilawur Ally Khan, was on the frontiers of Malwa, and the other was the army of the Deccan, stationed at Aurungabad, with the deputy viceroy, Alum Ally Khan, a nephew of the Syuds, left in charge of the government, when his uncle Hoosein Ally Khan departed for Delhi to depose Feroکشere. As the rains were at hand, Nizam-ool-Moolk probably contemplated that the advance of the former might be obstructed by the swelling of the Nerbuddah and Taptee, and that he should be able to decide the fate of the Deccan, and become master of its resources, before the deputy viceroy could be reinforced from Hindostan. Dilawur Ally Khan, however, marched with such rapidity, that he crossed the rivers whilst still fordable, but either incapable of perceiving, or disdaining the advantage which would have been insured by forming a junction with the troops at Aurungabad, and intent only on attacking his enemy, he marched straight for Burhanpoor. Nizam-ool-Moolk prepared to receive him, and, being aware of the impetuous character of his adversary, adopted an order of battle suggested by his experience of Deccan warfare: he sent forward and displayed a part of his army, to stimulate the ardour of Dilawur Ally Khan, who rushed upon them, pushed forward in imagined victory, was drawn into an ambuscade, defeated, and slain.†

Alum Ally Khan, the deputy viceroy, had not assembled the whole of his army, when news of this disaster reached Aurungabad; the troops of Shao, under Kanhojee Bhonslay, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, and Hybut Rao Nimbalkur speedily joined Shunkrajee Mulhar, who, since the departure of Hoosein Ally Khan, had resided with the deputy viceroy, as the envoy of Shao. Khundee Rao Dhabaray, who had just returned from Delhi, was likewise despatched from Satara with a body of horse. Alum Ally Khan advanced towards Burhanpoor, and sent forward the Mahrattas to harass his opponent. Nizam-ool-Moolk, who had been busily employed in preparing his own troops, and sowing sedition among those of his adversary, likewise advanced; but the Poorna river being greatly swollen, his march was for a time interrupted, until a ford was discovered. The Mahratta horse on each side had frequent skirmishes as the Moghul armies approached each other; but Nizam-ool-Moolk, previous to engaging, stationed his Mahrattas at a village some distance in the rear. Choosing an arrangement nearly similar to that by which his late success had been achieved, Nizam-ool-Moolk attacked his adversary at Balapoor

* Mahratta MSS., and Khafee Khan.

† The Surat Records, containing the report of the day (Monday, 20th June 1720), give a different account, and say,—“Nizam-ool-Moolk prevented the junction.” That he should do so was probable, but I have followed the concurring testimony of the Moghul historians, supported by Mahratta MSS.

in Berar Payeen Ghaut, drew him into an ambuscade, where, after great efforts of personal valour, and after many of his troops had fled, or deserted to his enemy, Alum Ally Khan at length fell, surrounded by Mahrattas slain in his defence. On this occasion the Mahrattas behaved as faithful auxiliaries, and fought with bravery; they lost no person of note, except Shunkrajee Mulhar, who was mortally wounded, and made prisoner.*

The news of this second victory, which was gained by Nizam-ool-Moolk about the end of July, was received at Delhi with consternation by the Syuds, but with secret satisfaction by the emperor. Various were the plans proposed by the two brothers, but it was at last determined, instead of yielding the government of the Deccan to Nizam-ool-Moolk—a measure strongly advised by their Hindoo agent, Ruttun Chund—that the younger Syud, Hoossein Ally Khan, should march for the Deccan, taking with him the emperor, and a well-appointed army sufficient to crush this formidable rebel.

Accordingly Hoossein Ally Khan, accompanied by the emperor, having made every preparation, took leave of his brother, and commenced his march southward. The Tooranee Moghuls, friends and countrymen of Nizam-ool-Moolk, dreaded the event of a war in the Deccan; but, stimulated by the success of Nizam-ool-Moolk, whom they considered a chief of their tribe, and encouraged by the connivance of the emperor, a conspiracy was formed against the life of Hoossein Ally Khan by three daring individuals, on one of whom fell the lot of striking the blow. The assassin effected his deadly purpose at the expense of his life. The surviving conspirators, Mohummud Amin Khan and Sadut Khan, joined by Hyder Koolee Khan, immediately placed the emperor at the head of such troops as they could command, proclaimed their resolution of freeing him from the tyranny of the Syuds, and, after considerable bloodshed, obtained the ascendancy in camp. An Indian army readily changes masters, and even under circumstances of national hostility, where the commander of the vanquished has been slain, and his followers accept of service from the victor, the new chief, to use their own expression, "whose salt they eat," frequently advances at their head with as much confidence as if they had never been his enemies; on the present occasion, although the army had previously looked on Hoossein Ally Khan as their master, they were employed under the name and authority of Mohummud Shah. The chiefs of the conspiracy, therefore, after they had prevailed over the immediate dependants of the Syuds, found no difficulty in securing the fidelity of the army, and the imperial standards were advanced towards the capital. Syud Abdoollah Khan, on hearing of this revolution, by means of the treasure at his command, assembled a large army in a few days, and placing on the throne a rival to Mohummud Shah, marched forth to punish the murderers of his brother. The armies met at Shahpoor, where a bloody contest, long dubious, at length ended in the defeat of Abdoollah Khan, who was wounded and made prisoner.

Mohummud Shah, on thus becoming entire master of the empire, in gratitude for the services he had experienced, appointed Mohummud Amin Khan his vizier, Khan Dowran received the title of Umeer-ool-Oomrah, Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the son of Mohummud Amin, was raised to high dignity, Hyder Koolee Khan and Sadut Khan were also promoted, and all those who had distinguished themselves in the battle of Shahpoor were rewarded and honored.†

* Khafee Khan, and Mahratta MSS.

† Seyr Mutuakhareen.

The emperor entered his capital in splendid procession, and for many days nothing was heard but rejoicing and festivity. Letters of submission and professions of loyalty poured in from every quarter; Nizam-ool-Moolk offered his congratulations; Shao's envoy was equally prompt in paying homage; and the chiefs of the European factories, through the different soobehdars and foudjars, sent humble offers of congratulation and best wishes for his majesty's long and happy reign.

The reign of Mohummud Shah was indeed long, but ages of ordinary decay were crowded into that period. The rapid ruin of the empire, and the terrible fate overhanging the venerable Delhi, form a melancholy contrast with the gaiety and splendour which now gladdened its inhabitants, and for which the Moghul capital was still celebrated. Suitable answers and returns were made to all the messages, letters, and presents which crowded in upon the young emperor. Nizam-ool-Moolk, whose successful revolt had been the primary cause of the present happy revolution, was particularly honored, and shortly afterwards, in consequence of the sudden death of Mohummud Amin Khan, he was not only permitted to retain his viceroyalty, in addition to his government of Malwa, but raised to the office of vizier of the empire; arrangements, however, in the Deccan and Carnatic, to which we shall presently revert, prevented his appearing at court until the month of January 1722.

Amongst the appointments of this period, it is proper to mention those of Hyder Koolee Khan to Guzerat, which he at first governed by deputy; and of Sadut Khan, first to Agra and afterwards to Oude; during the short time the latter held both governments, he also entrusted Agra to a deputy. Sadut Khan has been already mentioned as an active conspirator against his former patrons the Syuds, and he afterwards bore a large share in the events of his time, but he is best known in British India as the ancestor of the present king of Oudh.

The first event which attracted the attention of the new administration at Delhi, and on the issue of which that of all India was probably fixed, arose from the rebellion of the Rajpoot prince of Joudpoor, Ajeet Sing, who, originally in the interest of the Syuds, had possessed himself of Ajimere. Hyder Koolee Khan and Sadut Khan proposed marching to reduce him to obedience, but Khan Dowran, the principal minister in the absence of Nizam-ool-Moolk, unwilling to relinquish the command of the expedition, was at the same time afraid of losing his influence when at a distance from the young emperor; he was also averse to quit the pleasures of the capital, and at last assented to the appointment of Kummur-ud-deen Khan for this service. The latter, however, required some preliminary concessions in regard to his powers of command, which could not be complied with; in short, the expedition was abandoned, and the imperial authority compromised, by admitting excuses and professions of submission from Ajeet Sing, which were tendered to the emperor through Khan Dowran. Nor did a mere pardon suffice; by the influence of Khan Dowran, Ajeet Sing was appointed to the government of Agra, in consequence of the assassination of the deputy of Sadut Khan, and thus, as the Khan was not consulted, the emperor's enemy was conciliated at the expense of his friend.

In the meantime several important changes had also taken place at the Mahratta court, chiefly owing to the death of three of the principal ministers—Pureshrum Trimbeck, Ballajee Wishwanath, and Khundee Rao Dhabaray. Sreeput Rao, second son of the Pritee Needhee, had succeeded his father Pureshrum Trimbeck, previously to the return of Ballajee Wish-

wanath from Delhi. The Peishwa's health had suffered considerably from the fatigue of the journey, and the labour he had bestowed on different arrangements after his return : he therefore obtained permission from the raja to retire for a short time to Sassoor, where his family resided, but his constitution being completely exhausted, he only survived a few days.*

October. He left two sons, Bajee Rao and Chimnajee, and two daughters—Bhow Bye, married to Abbajee Naik, the brother of Bappoojee Naik, a rich banker of Barramuttee ; and Annoo Bye, the wife of Narain Rao Ghorepuray, of Eettul Kurinjee—connections which have reference to future circumstances. Ballajee's eldest son, Bajee Rao, was not formally invested with the dignity of Peishwa for nearly seven months after his father's death ; the reason for this delay is nowhere explained, but it may be attributed to the absence of the principal officers, or Bajee Rao may have joined the army, which did not return beyond the Godavery for some time after the battle of Balapoor.

The troops of Khundee Rao Dhabaray behaved with great bravery on that occasion ; and one of his officers, Dummajee Gaekwar, who with several of his sons had long stood high in Khundee Rao's estimation, had so particularly distinguished himself, that on his return he recommended him to Shao in the warmest manner. The raja, in consequence, appointed him second-in-command under Khundee Rao, with the title of Shumsher Buhadur. Such was the origin of the ancestor of the reigning family at Baroda. Neither Dummajee nor Khundee Rao Dhabaray survived their return above a few months : the son of Khundee Rao, Trimback Rao Dha-

A. D. 1721. baray, was honored with the dress of Senaputtee in May —the same month in which Bajee Rao received his clothes of investiture as Peishwa. Peelajee Gaekwar, an active partizan, the son of Junkojee Gaekwar, succeeded to the situation of his uncle Dummajee ; and Chimnajee, the second son of the late Peishwa, was appointed to a similar command under his brother. Chimnajee likewise received the district of Sopa in jagheer. Abbajee Punt Poorundhuree, their father's mootaliq, according to the rule of appointment by the raja, was re-invested by Shao with scrupulous ceremony. During the interval between the death of Ballajee Wishwanath and the appointment of Bajee Rao, Abbajee Punt Poorundhuree transacted ordinary affairs with the seal of the late Peishwa ; but a great part of the business fell into the hands of Khundoo Bullal Chitnees, and Sreeput Rao, Pritee Needhee. The former gave his attention principally to Angria, the Seedee, and affairs in the Concan ; whilst the Pritee Needhee, aided by Anund Rao, Somunt Purdhan, conducted the important negotiations which were pending with Nizam-ool-Moolk.

The son of Anund Rao, named Mahtajee, was employed as Shao's wukeel, and the temporizing policy and character of Nizam-ool-Moolk are strongly marked in his conduct during the year which followed the victory at Balapoor. At first, whilst he apprehended an attack from Hoossein Ally Khan, he cemented his friendship with Sumbhajee, of Kolapoor, and conciliated Shao by promising to give up all that the royal grants conceded. No sooner was he apprized of the ascendancy acquired by his party at Delhi, and of the loss the Mahrattas had sustained in the death of Ballajee Wishwanath, than he began to start objections to the establishment of Shao's collectors, founded on some pretensions set up by Sumbha-

* One authority, the Calendar of the Poona Duffur, states his death in April 1721 ; but the origin of the mistake is accounted for by the delay which occurred in the appointment of his successor.

jee and Chunder Seyn Jadov. But the wise precautions of Ballajee Wishwanath, and the communion of interest which the distribution of the ceded revenues had produced, placed the raja of the Mahrattas in a far more commanding situation than that in which he had stood during the first period of the government of Nizam-ool-Moolk in the Deccan. The wukeel remained at Aurungabad, where his arguments would probably have been of little avail, but a vast army of Mahrattas was assembling in Gungthuree, under the Sur Lushkur, and their appearance no doubt had considerable effect in expediting the delivery of orders to permit the Raja Shao to establish his collectors. A fresh firman, obtained by the Mahratta wukeel at Delhi from Mohummud Shah, opportunely arrived to remove from Nizam-ool-Moolk the appearance of having yielded to menace, and afforded an opportunity of evincing the promptitude with which he obeyed the imperial commands.

Nizam-ool-Moolk, in raising objections, had not contemplated the train which had been laid under the administration of Ballajee Wishwanath; he wished to procrastinate, and to involve the Mahrattas in war with each other, but he was, for various reasons, desirous not to precipitate hostilities between the Mahrattas and himself. He dreaded the increase of their power, only as far as it affected his own views; the prospect of aggrandizement at the imperial court, which opened to him upon the death of the vizier, Mohummud Amin Khan, seemed incompatible with his plan of independent sovereignty, but he was unwilling to relinquish the one or the other.

His prompt obedience to the royal commands may have been favourably viewed by a young monarch, just emancipated, although it confirmed the alienation of half the revenues of the Deccan; but Nizam-ool-Moolk, in whatever light his conduct might have been regarded at court, on this occasion had the address to gain the good opinion of Shao, to flatter and conciliate the Pritee Needhee, and to gain the Somunt by bribery.

On a general view, his plans were calculated to preserve his rank at court, and his power in the Deccan; to keep alive the old, and to create new, dissensions among the Mahrattas: to preserve a connection with that nation, in case it should ultimately be useful to direct their attacks from his own to the imperial territories; and, however inconsistent some of those designs may seem, in this system of political artifice, through the remainder of a long life, Nizam-ool-Moolk not only persevered, but generally prospered.

His first object was to ascertain, by personal observation, the character of the new Moghul government, and what he might expect or apprehend from the emperor's present friendship or future enmity. He was on his way to court, when he was recalled for a short time in consequence of disturbances in the Beejapoor Carnatic; to which, after concluding some arrangements, he appointed a new soobehdar, and resumed his march for the capital, where, as already related, he arrived in January 1722.

Nizam-ool-Moolk, on assuming the post of vizier, endeavoured to effect

A. D. 1722. some reform at court; but the emperor was not only fond of that mirth and festivity natural to his years, but weak in mind, and, as is generally the case with persons of that disposition, disolute in his behaviour. The manners of Nizam-ool-Moolk were austere, and disagreeable both to the emperor and his courtiers. Prompt at every base intrigue, they soon devised a scheme of freeing themselves from the society of Nizam-ool-Moolk. Hyder Koolee Khan had departed for his government at Ahmedabad before the return of Nizam-ool-Moolk from the Deccan, and having committed some irregularities, the courtiers, by

threatening him with punishment from the vizier, Nizam-ool-Moolk, and working on the passions of both parties, soon inflamed them to the utmost, and drove Hyder Koollee Khan to further acts of disrespect and disobedience. Nizam-ool-Moolk had censured the manner in which the rebellion of Ajeet Sing had been passed over; and being now offered the post of soobehdar of Guzerat, with the commission of reducing Hyder Koollee Khan, he readily accepted it. On this service it was hoped the Nizam might be long employed, or fall a victim to the chances of war.

Hyder Koollee Khan had a well-appointed army, and his qualities as a soldier were unquestionable. Nizam-ool-Moolk, however, having sent emissaries amongst his troops, the greater part of those on whom Hyder Koollee Khan had reliance deserted, which made such an impression upon him, that he feigned insanity, and fled in dismay to court, leaving his adversary in the undisturbed occupation of the province. Nizam-ool-Moolk, on obtaining this intelligence, halted at Onjein, whither most of the principal officers in Guzerat repaired to pay their respects to him. All his appointments and arrangements were made without proceeding to Ahmedabad; and as he took every opportunity of increasing his own resources, and of informing himself of what was passing in the country, he set aside five of the most productive districts in different parts of the province as his personal jagheer; these were—Dholka, Baroach, Jumbooseer, Mukboolabad, and Bulsar. The usual establishment of civil and military officers were confirmed or appointed to the imperial districts. The jagheerdars in that province were on a different footing from those appointed by Aurungzebe in his late conquest of the Deccan, and agents, generally of their own nomination, superintended the revenue and police within their respective boundaries.

Nizam-ool-Moolk sent his uncle, Hamed Khan, as his deputy to Ahmedabad, and leaving his cousin, Azim Oolla Khan, deputy governor of Malwa, he returned to Delhi. But his presence was so disagreeable to the emperor, and mutual disgust was with so much difficulty suppressed, that Nizam-ool-Moolk gladly entered into a compromise, accepted the honor of wukeel-i-mootluq, or supreme deputy in the empire, and resigned his post of vizier. Soon after, in the month of October 1723, he took an opportunity, on pretence of going on a hunting excursion, to depart for his viceroyalty in the Deccan; and from that time, although he always professed obedience to the emperor, even when waging war against him, Nizam-ool-Moolk became wholly independent; and the countries south of the Nerbuddah, the conquest of which had engaged the Moghul princes in much more than a century of war, were torn for ever from the throne of Delhi.*

Whilst these events were passing in Hindostan, Bajee Rao, soon after his appointment as Peishwa, set out with an army for Candeish, where he levied his mokassa, although not without opposition. From the period

* Khuzaneh Amirah, Hudeequ-i-Alum, Seyr Mutuakhereen, and Mirat Ahmudee. The Mirat Ahmudee is a voluminous Persian history of Guzerat, written in Ahmedabad: it was commenced, A. D. 1747, by Ally Mohummud, the son of the Moghul Dewan of the province, assisted by Meetya Lal, a Hindoo, who died before the work was completed. It was finished, A. D. 1756, by Ally Mohummud. Though not always to be depended upon, it is the best native account of that province, and, conjoined with contemporary English records, is very valuable. I am indebted to Mr. Romer, the chief of Surat, for the Mirat Ahmudee, and for extracting the whole of the old records of the Surat factory, which he found connected with the history of the Mahrattas. I take this opportunity of expressing my sense of his liberality and kindness.

of his accession he gave a considerable portion of his attention to extending Mahratta conquests to the northward, and his views were early directed to Malwa. Circumstances generally obliged him to return annually to Satara and Poona; and during three expeditions, before the rains

of 1724, although he had sent detachments into Malwa, it is not ascertained that he crossed the Nerbuddah in person until the end of that year; nor did he remain in Malwa for any length of time, until upwards of eleven years after his accession as Peishwa; various affairs in the Deccan required his presence, which, with the intrigues of Nizam-ool-Moolk, and domestic opposition, restrained both his ambition and his enterprize.

Before the year 1724, Bajee Rao had, at different times, defeated the soobehdar of Burhanpoor, and an officer, named Daood Khan, sent against him by Azim Oolla Khan, from Malwa. In one of these battles, two of Bajee Rao's officers, who afterwards attained high rank, were first brought into notice: the one, Mulharjee Holkar, was a sillidar who commanded a party of horse of his own; he was a Mahratta Dhungur, a class of Shooders already mentioned, and a native of the village of Hohl, on the Neera, of which his father was Chougula;* he had served under Kantajee Kuddum Bhanday, one of the raja's officers, and had collected a small body of horse. The other officer was Ranoojee Sindia, descended from a younger branch of the family of Kunneirkheir, a village 15 miles east of Satara. The Sindias, according to the legends of the country, have been distinguished sillidars since the time of the Bahminee dynasty; there are two Mahratta families, or rather tribes, of this name: the one is distinguished by their hereditary Patell village of Kunneirkheir, and the other by the appellation of Ruwee† Rao. Both families claim a Rajpoot descent; those of Kunneirkheir had a munsab under Aurungzebe; and Sindia's daughter, who was given by that emperor in marriage to Shao, died in captivity at Delhi. Sindia remained faithful to the Moghuls; and as his fate was never known, it is conjectured that he was killed in some distant country,‡ possibly with Azim Shah in the battle of Agra in 1707. The family, however, had fallen into decay, and Ranoojee, who revived its fame with additional celebrity, was reduced to a state of abject poverty, serving as a Bargeer, first in the Pagah of Ballajee Wishwanath, and afterwards in that of his son. To contrast his original with his subsequent condition, he is said to have carried the Peishwa's slippers, and to have been marked by Bajee Rao as fitted for a place of trust by the care he took of the humble charge committed to him.§

Another officer, who attained additional distinction about this period, was Oodajee Powar Wiswas Rao. His father was first raised by Ramchundur Punt Amat, when he governed the country during the siege of Ginjee, and the young man, having joined Shao, obtained the command of a considerable body of the Pagah horse. He was employed on various services,|| and appears to have been an active partizan: like most con-

* The Patell's assistant. There are none of the Chougula's descendants now in Hohl.

† Ruwee means the sun; but I could not ascertain the origin of the title.

‡ Mahratta MSS., and tradition.

§ Mahratta MSS., and Sir J. Malcolm's Report on Malwa. The same tradition is current in different parts of the country.

|| Original memorandum of instructions at different times issued by Shao where Oodajee Powar is mentioned.

temporary Mahratta leaders of experience, such as Kantajee Kuddum, Peelajee Gaekwar, and Kanhojee Bhonslay, he calculated on the surest advantage in the more distant ventures, where his appearance was least expected. He made incursions into Guzerat and Malwa; plundered the former as far as Lunawarra, and found the latter province so much drained of troops, that he was enabled to remain some time in the country, intimating to the raja that, if supported, he might collect the chouth and surdeshmookhee in every direction. How long he maintained his station in the country, on his first inroads, is uncertain; but it is probable that he was obliged to retire from Dhar,* where he first established himself, upon the appointment of Geerdhur Buhadur, whose exertion in the defence of Malwa was one principal cause of preventing the Mahrattas from getting a firm footing in that province for more than ten years after the accession of Bajee Rao.

The progress of Oodajee Powar, the news of successes by Kantajee Kuddum Bhanday and Peelajee Gaekwar in Guzerat, and the dissensions between Nizam-ool-Moolk and the imperial court, opportunely occurred to favour the Peishwa in his views of extending the Mahratta conquests in Hindostan, which were at first disapproved by Shao, and from prudential motives, as well as party feelings, strongly opposed by Sreeput Rao, the Pritee Needhee; but here some explanatory digression is required.

The reader has already obtained considerable insight into the character of Nizam-ool-Moolk. That of his great rival, though occasional ally, Bajee Rao, might have been allowed to develop itself; but the history of the period is intricate, owing to the varying plans, or the domestic affairs of the different powers, the vast space to which attention must be directed, and the numerous actors that will start up every year to consequence or to sovereignty; but the leading personages are the Nizam† and the Peishwa.

Bajee Rao was early trained to habits of business by his father; he had accompanied him to Delhi, and was present at one or more interviews which took place between Ballajee and the Raja Jey Sing of Jeypoor—a circumstance which promoted a future connection with that celebrated chief. Bred a soldier as well as a statesman, Bajee Rao united the enterprise, vigour, and hardihood of a Mahratta chief with the polished manners, the sagacity, and address which frequently distinguish the Bramins of the Concan. Fully acquainted with the financial schemes of his father, he selected that part of the plan calculated to direct the predatory hordes of Maharashtra in a common effort. In this respect the genius of Bajee Rao enlarged the schemes which his father devised; and, unlike most Bramins, of him it may be truly said he had both the head to plan and the hand to execute. To the assiduous industry and minute observation that seem inherent in his caste, he superadded a power of discrimination that taught him to direct his mind to those leading points of political importance which tended so materially to extend Mahratta sway during the period of his administration.

Besides his foreign enemies, Bajee Rao had a domestic rival of some abilities in the Pritee Needhee. Jealousy, in public situations, is a passion which the most subtle Bramins can rarely command or conceal; it prevails in a remarkable degree amongst all of them, but it is most conspicu-

* Dhar is a fortress in the west of Malwa, of great antiquity.

† Universal custom amongst the English scarcely authorizes this misnomer; but I have sometimes used the *Nizam* instead of *Nizam-ool-Moolk*, *Nizam Ally*, &c., or the *Soobehdar of the Deccan*.

ous between Bramins of different tribes.* The rivalry of Sreeput Rao tended to preserve the raja's ascendancy, as head of the state, for a longer period than it might otherwise have existed ; but whilst it usefully controlled the conduct of Bajee Rao and Chinnaajee Appa, both of whom are said to have been naturally domineering, it also, for some years, cramped the efforts of the Peishwa, obliged him to return to Satara more frequently than was conducive to the success of distant expeditions, and aided Nizam-ool-Moolk in his endeavours to excite internal dissensions amongst the Mahrattas.

The Peishwa's first proposal for exacting, what he called, the establish-ment tribute from Malwa, and extending Mahratta conquests into Hindostan, was violently, and, as already noticed, for a time successfully, opposed by the Pritee Needhee. The latter represented it as "rash and imprudent ; that the head of the state might not be called upon to account for casual inroads, but that to grant such an authority to the Mookh Purdhan must draw upon them the whole power of the empire, and precipitate hostilities with Nizam-ool-Moolk, whose victorious army was still at their gates ; that, so far from being prepared for resistance, there was a total want of regularity even in the arrangements laid down, that they could scarcely quell a common insurrection, and that entering on a war, when they had not yet secured what had been ceded, was the extreme of folly and of rashness." The Pritee Needhee added that "he was a soldier as well as the Peishwa, and as ready as Bajee Rao could be to head any expedition, when it might become expedient ; that after they had established their collectors, and arranged other parts of the country, it would be advisable, before pursuing their conquests in the north, to reduce the Carnatic, and recover the territories conquered by Sivajee ; that, although Futih Sing Bhonslay held sunnuds for collecting the mokassa of the Carnatic, his troops, from the power of Sumbhajee at Kolapoor, and his abettors, Chowan, Ghorepuray, and the nabob of Savanoor, could scarcely venture to cross the Kistna, and that the first effort should therefore be made in that quarter."

Such were probably the real opinions of Sreeput Rao, but the wisdom of Bajee Rao was of a much higher order. He comprehended the nature of predatory power ; he perceived its growth in the turbulence and anarchy, for which the system of distributing the revenue was the first remedy ; he foresaw that confusion abroad would tend to order at home ; and that, as commander of distant expeditions, he should acquire the direction of a larger force than any other chief of the empire : that the resources of the Deccan would not only improve by withdrawing the hordes of horse which unprofitably consumed them, but must fall under the control of that person who could most readily procure employment and subsistence for the troops ; and who, at the same time, could conciliate, as well as overawe, the insubordinate and predatory bands, of all castes and descriptions, composing the Deccan soldiery.

Whilst he suppressed his latent designs, and partly admitted the justice of Sreeput Rao's observations, he endeavoured, by his commanding eloquence, to arouse enthusiasm or ambition in the raja, by recapitulating the conquests of his illustrious grandfather, and reminding him of the powerful kings, the mighty emperor, with whom he had successfully contended : he painted the present condition of India,—the weakness, indolence, and imbecility of the Moghuls,—the activity, energy, and

* Bajee Rao was a Concanist ; Sreeput Rao a Deshist, of the class Yajurwedee.

enterprize of the Mahrattas ; he observed that, "if the great Sivajee had been of the same opinion as the Pritee Needhee, he would have thought it necessary, before venturing into the Carnatic, to reduce Beejapoor and Golcondah. As to their domestic quarrels beyond the Kistna, it would be time to think of them hereafter ; and that, by the influence of the raja's good fortune, every desire would be accomplished." After a speech on one occasion of considerable length, which seemed to have a great effect on Shao and all present : "Now is our time," said this gallant Peishwa, "to drive strangers from the land of Hindoos, and to acquire immortal renown. By directing our efforts to Hindostan, the Mahratta flag in your reign shall fly from the Kistna to the Attock." "You shall plant it on the Himmalaya," exclaimed the raja ; "you are indeed a noble son of a worthy father."

Bajee Rao, improved the opportunity by urging Shao not to think of minor objects, and, alluding to the Moghul empire, "let us strike," said he, "at the trunk of the withering tree ; the branches must fall of themselves."

At what time this consent was obtained, or in what year the original commission was issued, is not ascertained. The form of obtaining the raja's authority on all such occasions was rigidly observed by the Peishwas, at a stage when their supremacy was very far advanced ; because, by virtue of that authority, and their station as Mookh (or chief) Purdhan, even when their usurpation became complete, it suited the Bramin character, of acting as nominal servants and real masters, to rule the Mahratta chiefs as the delegate of their prince.

But as both the remote and immediate causes of the Mahratta power are only to be explained by fixing our attention as much on the general state of the country as on their domestic policy, the affairs of the Moghuls are now, more than ever, interwoven with this history.

The departure of Nizam-ool-Moolk for his government in the Deccan, in a manner which bespoke distrust, aggravated by contempt, excited anger and revenge in the mind of the emperor. Secret orders were sent to Mubariz Khan, soobehdar of Hyderabad, to raise an army, and oppose Nizam-ool-Moolk. The viceroyalty of the Deccan, for which he received a firman, was to be the reward of his success.

Nizam-ool-Moolk endeavoured, by his usual artifice of creating sedition, to break the power of his rival, and remained some months negotiating before he advanced against him. He at last arrived at Aurungabad in July 1724, and after protracted discussion, when his plans had partly succeeded, he took the field, and a decisive battle was fought at Shukurkhera, about the 1st October, in which Mubariz Khan, after great efforts of personal valour, was surrounded and slain. He was gallantly supported by four of his sons, two of whom fell with him, and two were desperately wounded. Nizam-ool-Moolk sent the Khan's head to court, with a congratulatory letter on the victory attained by the emperor's arms.

When Mubariz Khan began to make head in the Deccan, he threw a strong garrison into Golcondah, under Khwajeh Ahud, another of his sons, supported by Sundool Khan, who had long been governor of that place : many other forts were commanded by officers in his interest, and as his cause was popular, Nizam-ool-Moolk saw the necessity of gaining or

* "*In the Kunur Khund*" (beyond the Himmalaya mountains) is the literal translation of Shao's exclamation.

† Mahratta MSS.

reducing Khwajeh Ahud, and of obtaining possession of the forts as soon as possible. He, therefore, marched towards Hyderabad, where, after some time, he effected his design by conciliation. The emperor, in order to reduce the power of Nizam-ool-Moolk as much as possible, had issued a firman, depriving him of his governments in Guzerat and Malwa; Sur Boolund Khan was appointed to the former, and Raja Geerdhur* Buhadur to the latter; as the troops in the interest of the Nizam had been withdrawn from Malwa to support his pretensions in the Deccan, the Raja Geerdhur occupied the province without opposition.†

Shujaet Khan was appointed deputy governor of Guzerat by Sur Boolund Khan; but although Hamed Khan, who had been left in charge of the province, on the part of his nephew Nizam-ool-Moolk, could not prevent his occupying the capital, he determined not to relinquish his government without a struggle. Having repaired to Dohud, he invited Kantajee Kuddum Bhanday, one of Shao's officers, to join him—an invitation which Kantajee, on promise of getting the chouth, readily embraced. They first came to Kuppurwunj, where Hamed Khan having established a correspondence with his friends at Ahmedabad, procured correct intelligence of Shujaet Khan's movements, watched his opportunity, and attacked, defeated, and slew him within a few miles of Ahmedabad, where Hamed Khan's authority was again acknowledged. On this event, Roostum Ally Khan, the brother of Shujaet Khan, foudjar of Surat, who had just gained some advantages over Peelajee Gaekwar in the neighbourhood of that city, made a truce with Peelajee, and invited him to join in an attack on Hamed Khan. Peelajee had been previously engaged by the emissaries of Nizam-ool-Moolk to assist his uncle Hamed Khan, but accepted the overtures of Roostum Ally, until he could ascertain precisely which side was the most advantageous. He accompanied Roostum Ally towards Ahmedabad, crossed the Myhie at Fazilpoor, and had a skirmish with Hamed Khan at Arass, where Roostum Ally drove back his opponents by the fire of his artillery. By this time Peelajee had made his bargain with Hamed Khan, and recommended Roostum Ally to charge the fugitives, leaving his guns to the care of a party in the rear—a fatal advice, which Roostum Ally had no sooner followed than Peelajee overturned the gun-carriages, and joined in attacking his late ally. Roostum Ally defended himself with bravery, until his reduced numbers showed him the impossibility of escape, when he stabbed himself to the heart, in order to avoid the ignominious treatment he expected in case of being made prisoner.

Peelajee's treachery was rewarded by an equal share of the chouth with A. D. 1725. Kantajee, and both in conjunction proceeded to levy their assignments. But the division of the money led to perpetual disputes; Peelajee, as the agent of Dhabaray Senaputtee, considered himself the superior authority in Guzerat, and Kantajee, as an officer of the raja's, despised his pretensions. For some time these differences only produced heavier impositions on the towns and villages, until, on their approach to Cambay, where they began, as usual, to burn the suburbs for the purpose of intimidation, the inhabitants, aware of their dissensions, affecting to consider Kantajee the superior, sent a messenger to

* He was a Nagur Bramin, a tribe common in Guzerat, who, since the times of the Mahomedan kings of that country, had been distinguished in the Mahomedan service, both as men of business and as soldiers.

† Seyr Mutuakhereen, Khuzaneh Amirah, Mahratta MSS., &c.

Peelajee hinting this circumstance, and offering him 20,000 rupees to leave the place. Peelajee, exasperated by the insult, confined the messenger; Kantajee insisted on his being released, and both flew to arms to assert their prerogative. After a severe conflict, within sight of the walls, Peelajee was discomfited, and retired to Mahtur, a village near Kaira. The contribution from Cambay was levied by the victor, and 5,000 rupees demanded from the English factory, where the agents pleaded exemption, in consequence of privilege of trade from the "Shao Raja," but at which "the armed villains," as Mr. Innes, the chief of the factory, in bitterness of heart, terms them, "only laughed."

Hamed Khan, foreseeing the desertion of one or other of his allies, made them sign an agreement, by which the chouth east of the Myhie was assigned to Peelajee, and that to the west to Kantajee. The Mahrattas still preserve their original custom of retiring to quarters during the monsoon; and soon after the battle at Cambay, Peelajee retired to Sonegurh, near Surat, and Kantajee to a jagheer district he held in Candeish.

Sur Boolund Khan, who had been unjustly removed from Cabul, was, at this season of difficulty, courted by the emperor, and earnestly solicited to repair to his government in Guzerat, for the purpose of suppressing the formidable insurrection of Hamed Khan. The emperor was the more urgent, as he had been disappointed in a scheme he had meditated of controlling the Tooranee Moghuls, by the release of Abdoollah Khan, the elder of the Syuds, who dethroned Ferokhsere; but the unprincipled courtiers sacrificed him to their envy and fear, and removed him by poison. Sur Boolund Khan consented to assume the government; and every facility being afforded, as he was an excellent and popular officer, a large army was soon assembled under his command, and, though delayed for a time by the emperor's professing his intention of accompanying him, at last proceeded on his route to Ahmedabad. Nizam-ool-Moolk, aware of the abilities of his uncle's opponent, wrote to him to resign the province with a good grace; but Hamed Khan, not choosing to follow this suggestion, prepared to defend himself. He had almost despaired of being joined by the Mahrattas, and was obliged to leave Ahmedabad defended by a weak garrison, and retire before the advanced division of Sur Boolund Khan's army. He had only reached Mahmoodabad when he heard that the Mahrattas had crossed the Myhie, and as soon as they joined him, he returned to Ahmedabad. But a party in the city, in order to pay court to the new governor, had overpowered his troops and forced them out. Hamed Khan encamped at the Shah-i-Bagh, a royal garden still in existence, on the day that Sur Boolund Khan's advanced troops arrived at Udaledje; but as some of the gun-carriages belonging to the main body had broken down, this advanced force discovered that they were farther from support than they had contemplated, and hearing of the proximity of Hamed Khan, immediately took the alarm and began to entrench themselves. This precaution encouraged the Mahrattas; and Hamed Khan, watching their humour, led them on to attack the intrenched camp, where he gained a complete victory. But the advantage was purchased with great loss, and the Mahrattas would not risk another battle. Hamed Khan, therefore, became, like them, a mere plunderer, and commenced a warfare on the Mahratta plan. Foujdars were appointed, and the usual arrangements made with more than ordinary vigour by the new governor; but Kantajee and Peelajee continued to plunder during the remainder of the season, until the approach of the rains, when they took their annual

flight.* A deceitful calm succeeded ;—the fall of the rain brought back the cheering green, and the beautiful province of Guzerat, which, for hundreds of miles, may vie with the finest parks of the nobles of England, was clothed in all its natural beauties, by rapid verdure and luxuriant vegetation. Tranquillity seemed to reign, where a short time before nothing was to be seen but perpetual skirmishing, murder and robbery in open day, caravans pillaged even when strongly escorted, and villages burning or deserted.†

Bajee Rao, in the meantime, took advantage of the confusion caused by Moghul dissensions to carry his arms into Malwa, where, although opposed by Raja Geerdhur, he was successful for two seasons in obtaining plunder and contribution. It is probable that Nizam-ool-Moolk may at least have connived at his incursions, but there is no proof of any direct communication with the Peishwa. Bajee Rao, by virtue of the authority vested in him by Shao, granted deeds to Powar, Holkar, and Sindia to levy chouth and surdeshmookhee, and to retain half the mokassa in payment of their troops.

In 1726 the Peishwa was with a very large army under Futih Sing

A. D. 1726.

Bhonslay, which proceeded into the Carnatic, plundered the districts, and levied a contribution from Seringapatam.‡ No particulars of this campaign have been discovered ; but it appears, by a letter written 12 or 13 years afterwards by Bajee Rao to his brother, that they lost a number of men without gaining advantages which had been anticipated. From his former sentiments, and these symptoms of disapprobation, expressed in the letter alluded to, it may be inferred that Bajee Rao had objected to the expedition ; but, upon his return to Satara, he found more serious reasons of dissatisfaction in the measures pursued by the Pritee Needhee. The cause of his displeasure originated in the artful schemes of Nizam-ool-Moolk, which, but for the penetration and vigour of Bajee Rao, would probably have unlinked the connecting chain by which Ballajee Wishwanath had joined the interests, as well as the inclinations, of most of the Hindoo chieftains of the Deccan.

* These flights the Mahrattas term "*going to the white crow*," which they say alludes to a bird of passage, like a crow, that comes in some parts of the country once a year ; hence also they have a phrase for a defeated enemy, "*they are off to the white crow*."

† I have extracted this account from the Mirat Ahmudee, Surat Records, and Khuzaneh Amirah. The last authority mentions a battle near Cambay, in which the Mahrattas sustained a total defeat by Nujeem-ud-deen, and this account is followed by the Seyr Mutakhereen ; but although the skirmishes appear to have been constant, I have not found satisfactory confirmation of any such decisive event, nor of the death of Shaik Allah Yar, said to have been killed in that action.

‡ Mahratta MSS. Colonel Wilks merely notices this incursion. Besides the MSS. already enumerated, I have perused upwards of twenty MS. histories of the Peishwas. Of the best, two were procured by Ballajee Punt Nathoo at Poona, one was given by Mahdoo Rao Bastia, one sent by Mahdoo Rao Putwurdhun of Merich, and another by Gopaul Rao of Tasgaon. The best Mahratta Buker of the Bhonslays of Nagpoor is one written for Mr. Jenkins, and sent to me by Captain A. Gordon.

CHAP. XIV.

FROM A. D. 1727 TO A. D. 1734.

Plans of Nizam-ool-Moolk for consolidating his own power, and of creating dissensions among the Mahrattas.—Negotiates with Shao through the Pritee Needhee, and obtains the relinquishment of the chouth in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad.—The agreement disapproved of by the Peishwa.—Nizam-ool-Moolk prosecutes his plans by endeavouring to revive the feud between Shao and Sumbhajee—frustrated by the Peishwa—war.—Able conduct of Bajee Rao—forces Nizam-ool-Moolk into terms.—Negotiations with Sur Boolund Khan.—Bajee Rao obtains grants of the chouth and surdeshmookhee for Guzerat.—Proceedings of Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor—he is defeated by the Pritee Needhee.—Treaty between the Mahrattas of Satara and Kolapoor.—War between the Peishwa and the Senaputtee.—Battle of Dhuboy—Bajee Rao victorious, and Dhabaray slain.—Nizam-ool-Moolk diverts the Peishwa's attack from his own to the imperial territories.—Agreement between the Peishwa and the Senaputtee relative to Guzerat.—Abhee Sing, raja of Joudpoor, appointed to supersede Sur Boolund Khan.—Policy of Nizam-ool-Moolk.—Bajee Rao proceeds to Malwa.—War in Guzerat between Peelajee Gaekwar and Abhee Sing—the latter sends emissaries on pretence of negotiating—Peelajee is assassinated.—The Peishwa is called to the assistance of the Raja Chitoor Sal, in Bundelcund—forces Mohummud Khan Bungush into a fort.—Bundelcund evacuated by the Moghuls.—Territory granted to Bajee Rao as a reward.—Raja Jey Sing appointed governor of Malwa—concludes an agreement with Bajee Rao, and concedes the government to him.

THE declining empire of the Moghuls having been thrown into a state of great anarchy by Nizam-ool-Moolk and his countrymen, the Tooranee Moghuls, the Nizam, relieved from immediate apprehensions from Mohummud Shah, became alarmed at the spreading power of the Mahrattas, and beheld, in their systematic and persevering encroachments on the divided revenue of the Deccan and Carnatic, the extinction of his own resources as well as those of the empire. To avert these evils, by endeavouring to consolidate his own power, and to create divisions among the Mahrattas, the measures which he adopted seem to have been planned with considerable skill ; but in forming designs, founded on the character of the people, he overlooked the abilities of his opponent, nor contemplated that he should, in pursuit of his own schemes, only strengthen the power of the Peishwa.

Since the battle of Shukurkhera, Nizam-ool-Moolk had fixed his eye on Hyderabad, the ancient capital of the Kootub Shahee kings, as fittest for the seat of government of the independent sovereignty which he himself had founded ; and it was very desirable to remove the Mahratta collectors from that quarter on any terms. Although Nizam-ool-Moolk had confirmed the imperial grants in Shao's favour, a great deal of what was

yielded was not actually given up ; numerous points remained unadjusted. Shao's part of the agreement to prevent plundering was not fulfilled, and constant discussions were the consequence. A new authority, for a part of the old Mahratta territory, was granted by Nizam-ool-Moolk, which particularly specified the fixed personal jagheers that Shao agreed to exempt from sequestration. Jagheer assignments in the old territory about Poona, which the Nizam had given to Rumbhaje Nimbalkur, one of the disaffected officers who had joined him, were exchanged for new grants to the eastward, about Kurmulla—a measure on the part of Nizam-ool-Moolk particularly conciliatory to Shao. After this, a settlement was concluded,^{*} through the Pritee Needhee, by which Shao agreed to relinquish the chouth and surdeshmookhee in the neighbourhood of Hyderabad ; an equivalent in money was to be paid for the former, and for the latter Shao received some jagheer territory near Indapour, of which district he was an hereditary deshmoorkh ; † a jagheer in Berar was conferred on the Pritee Needhee. Nizam-ool-Moolk had thus effected his first object by negotiation, but the exchange met with the decided disapprobation of Bajee Rao, who was ever an enemy to consolidation of the nature in question ; and disputes ran so high between him and the Pritee Needhee, that Nizam-ool-Moolk, encouraged by appearances, and the support and alliance of Chunder Seyn Jadow, Rao Rumbha Nimbalkur, ‡ jagheerdar of Barsee, and Sumbhaje, raja of Kolapoor, resolved to complete the design he had formed. With this view he proposed to espouse the cause of Sumbhaje, and to endeavour to create a complete division in Shao's government, by reviving the former feuds between Shao and Sumbhaje. His connection with Dhabaray and Peelaje Gaekwar ; his hopes of finding, through the Raja Geerdhur, employment for the Peishwa's officers in Malwa ; and the boasted superiority of his own troops, were strong inducements for making the attempt.

Nizam-ool-Moolk commenced by a formal hearing of the claims of Sumbhaje in a demand made for an equal division of the revenue ; and, according to a prevalent custom in the Deccan, he sequestered the property in dispute by removing the collectors of the surdeshmookhee, and displacing the mokassadars of Shao, until their respective rights should be equitably adjusted. Assuming this privilege as viceroy, he pretended to become the friend and arbiter of both parties ; but Bajee Rao was not to be duped by the old artifice of engaging the Mahratta cousins in an hereditary dispute, and quickly turned the Nizam's weapons to his own advantage ; for Shao, true to the inherent feeling of a Mahratta, of whom, even amongst the peasantry, the mildest men often became the

* The whole of the particulars of this agreement are not known. Some very long details of the early part of the settlement, which led to the final exchange, are preserved ; but the most essential parts regarding the exchange of the jagheer, and the fixed payment for the chouth and surdeshmookhee, are lost. I do not think they have been purposely destroyed by the Mahrattas, as many years afterwards I find original letters from Mahdoo Rao, the Peishwa, and Nana Farnuwees, written on an occasion when there were pending negotiations with the Nizam, requesting that search might be made for this document. The Hudequ-i-Alum merely mentions that Nizam-ool-Moolk settled that the soobeh of Hyderabad should be exempted from the surdeshmookhee, and that a ready-money payment should be given in lieu of the chouth and the customs.

† Half of this deshmoorkhee was purchased by Shahjee after he entered the service of Mohumud Adil Shah.

‡ The Nimbalkurs of Barsee are distinct from the Nimbalkurs of Kurmulla ; the head of the latter has the title of Rao Rumbha. The former is one of the family of Hybut Rao Sur Lushkur.

most violent of human beings when the possession of wutun is concerned, and who, for some time, had been reconciled to Nizam-ool-Moolk, was at once, on hearing of this interference, aroused to implacable resentment against him, and for the time against all who had formerly vindicated or now dared to justify his conduct. He looked to Bajee Rao for counsel and for vengeance; for these he would have bartered life, and for these he now virtually sold the supremacy of his empire. He, at first, was determined to march in person, but it was represented that such a procedure would place him on an equality with Sumbhajee, of Kolapoor; whereas none but the emperor was worthy of contending with the king of the Hindoos. Full powers were therefore delegated to Bajee Rao; and the great influence which the Peishwa had acquired, may be observed in the promptitude with which many of the most unruly and factious of the sillidar families willingly gathered round the standard of the nation.

Nizam-ool-Moolk perceived his mistake, and sought to amend it by writing to Shao and the Pritee Needhee that he was solely actuated by a wish to benefit the raja, in order to prevent the usurpation of the Concanee Bramins, by whose creatures every situation was filled; that the mokas-sadars and collectors of the surdeshmookhee had been replaced by others belonging to the raja's relation, Sumbhajee, whom he had appointed the raja's deputy, as surdeshmookh of the six Soobehs of the Deccan; and that the raja, when freed from the control of the Bramins alluded to, might afterwards appoint agents entirely of his own selection. But the animosity of Shao, worked up to the highest pitch by the Peishwa's representations, was not to be appeased by offers, which, under the colouring given to them by Bajee Rao, only added insult to injury. Both parties, therefore, prepared to attack each other, as soon as the rains should subside and enable their horse to cross the rivers.

Nizam-ool-Moolk awaited the junction of his allies. Bajee Rao was first in the field, and laid waste the district of Jaulna before the Moghul army was prepared to oppose him. Early in the month of November the Mahrattas were attacked by Ewuz Khan, at the head of the Nizam's advanced force; Bajee Rao partially engaged him, but retired, first towards Mahoor, then returned rapidly towards Aurungabad; without stopping to plunder, he gave out that Burhanpoor should be reduced to ashes, and marched on to Candeish, laying waste the country in his route. Ewuz Khan, followed by Nizam-ool-Moolk, pursued him, in order to save Burhanpoor. Bajee Rao, as soon as the pursuing army, with all their equipments, had passed the Ajunta Ghaut, sent a party towards Burhanpoor, wheeled off with the main body to his left, and proceeded with great speed to Guzerat, where he not only plundered, but, taking advantage of Nizam-ool-Moolk's notorious duplicity, and the enmity subsisting between him and Sur Boolund Khan, he caused it to be believed by the latter that the Nizam was the supporter of his invasion—a rumour which gained strength by accounts of the approach of the latter towards Surat. Nizam-ool-Moolk, after being misled, losing some time at Burhanpoor, and fruitlessly following the Peishwa, at last perceived his error, retraced his steps to the Deccan, and determined to destroy Poona. But he had not reached Ahmednugur, when Bajee Rao, having passed the Karsar-bharee Ghaut, totally destroyed the districts of Gandapoor and Byzapoor, which, from former tenure, or the late exchanges, were wholly jagheer. Nizam-ool-Moolk re-crossed the Godavery, when the Peishwa, after some

days' skirmishing, drew him into a situation favourable to his purpose, set fire to the grass, destroyed the forage,

and effectually straitened his supplies. The Mahrattas suffered severely by the fire of the artillery, but they cut off such detached parties as they could overpower, and drove off the draught cattle. At last, in some broken ground, around which, for several miles, there was no water, the Mahrattas completely surrounded the Nizam's army, and so effectually impeded his march, that night closed before he could extricate himself from his embarrassing situation. Nizam-ool-Moolk had foreseen that this species of warfare would be practised, and, in entering upon the campaign, expected that the part of light troops should be performed by his associates. He had reproached them with their want of vigour, and recommended their adopting the same system against their countrymen as Bajee Rao was practising. But Chunder Seyn Jadov represented that most of his troops were Moghuls; and Sumbhajee acknowledged, not only that his numbers were inadequate, but that he suspected his carcoons were in league with the enemy. There is something explanatory of the nature of the alliance, and characteristic of the Mahratta, in Sumbhajee's requesting, at the conclusion of an interview, to say a word in private to Nizam-ool-Moolk, and then begging of him "not to give the money, on account of the subsidy, to his carcoons, as they would defraud the troops;" whilst the Bramins, by another representation equally private, represent "that Sumbhajee would spend the whole on dancing-girls, dissipate it in drinking and debauchery, and leave them to starvation, and the troops to revolt."

Nizam-ool-Moolk had never been so dependent on Mahratta allies; the attacks he had experienced, and the privation his army endured, obliged him to accede to a negotiation with the Peishwa, which was begun by Bajee Rao, through Ewuz Khan. The Nizam, however, first forced his way to a situation where water was procurable; Bajee Rao demanded that Sumbhajee should be sent to his camp; that security should be afforded for the future collection of the Mahratta shares of revenue, by giving up several fortified places; and that all arrears, not yet realized, should be made good. Nizam-ool-Moolk agreed to all the articles, except that of delivering up his ally. Bajee Rao represented that he was a near relation of the raja's, and that he should be treated with equal respect; but it was at last settled that Nizam-ool-Moolk should guarantee his safe arrival in Panalla, when Shao should be at liberty to take what steps he might think proper for the settlement of their family dispute.

After an interchange of presents,* when Bajee Rao and Nizam-ool-Moolk met for the first time, the armies retired upon the conclusion of the treaty.† Its final ratification was of consequence to both parties, but especially to Bajee Rao, who was then negotiating with Sur Boolund Khan, in hopes of obtaining the cession of the chouth and surdeshmookhee of Guzerat. Sur Boolund Khan, who had at first exerted himself to check Mahratta incursions, was induced to listen to the terms proposed by Bajee Rao, in order to save the country from total ruin. He had repeatedly applied to court for a supply of money, as it was at first impossible to raise any revenue of consequence from the districts in their exhausted state; but his demands were entirely neglected. He had endeavoured to conciliate Peelajee and Kantajee by grants of chouth, but they collected all the revenue, and afforded no protection to the country. Chimnajee Appa arrived

* This interchange of presents is termed Zeafut, a feast, or entertainment; a Mahomedan has no objection to eat food prepared by a Hindoo on such occasions; but on the part of the Hindoo the Zeafut is confined to receiving the presents.

† Mahratta MSS., Hudeequ-i-Alum.

with a large army, exacted a heavy contribution from Pitlaud, and plundered Dholka; but he promised, on the part of his brother, that if the chouth and surdeshmookhee were yielded, the districts should be effectually secured from the depredations of all other freebooters. Sur Boolund Khan at length agreed to the Peishwa's proposals, and granted deeds, in

A. D. 1729. the year 1729, to Sham Rao, the wukeel of Bajee Rao, the minister of the Raja Shao, ceding the *surdeshmookhee*, or ten per cent. of the whole revenue, both on the land and customs, with the exception of the port of Surat and the district around it; together with the *chouth*, or one-fourth of the whole collections on the land and customs, excepting Surat, and five per cent. on the revenues of the city of Ahmedabad.*

Sur Boolund Khan mentions in the deeds that these cessions in Guzerat are granted in consequence of the progress of improvement, the increasing population, and the general tranquillity in the Deccan. The conditions affixed to the deed for the *surdeshmookhee* are nearly similar to those mentioned in the same grant for the Deccan provinces: but the deed for the *chouth* is more specific; 2,500 horse are constantly to be kept up, the fourth part of the actual collections only to be paid, no more than two or three persons to be placed in each district as collectors on the part of the Mahrattas, no extra demands whatever to be made on the ryots, and every assistance to be afforded in maintaining the imperial authority. One condition attached to the deed is, that Bajee Rao, on the part of Shao, agrees to prevent Mahratta subjects from taking part with, or in any way supporting, disaffected *zumeendars*, and other disturbers of the public peace—a clause which is fully explained by the opposing interests of Bajee Rao, Kantajee Kuddum, and Trimluck Rao Dhabaray. Peelajee Gaekwar, the agent of Dhabaray, was, it appears, leagued with the Bheels and Kooles of the country, and on that account especially was considered particularly formidable by the Mahomedans. After these deeds were obtained, the *mokassa* and the collection of a part of the *surdeshmookhee* were assigned to Dhabaray; but jealousy of Bajee Rao's interference in the affairs of the province occasioned an implacable enmity on the part of that chief.

Whilst Bajee Rao's presence was necessary to the northward in order to support Chimnajee in Guzerat, Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor, instigated by Oodajee Chowan, refused to listen to overtures made by Shao, and encamped in *bravado*, on the north side of the Warna, with all his baggage, women, and equipments, and began to plunder the country. An opportunity thus presented itself for the Pritee Needhee to recover his lost influence with Shao, which he partly effected by surprising the camp of Shumbhajee and Oodajee Chowan, and driving them to Panalla, with the loss of the whole of their baggage. Many prisoners were taken by the Pritee Needhee; amongst others, Tara Bye, and her daughter-in-law, Rajis Bye, the widow of Sivajee of Kolapoor; both these persons were placed in confinement in the fort of Satara. This defeat brought on an immediate accommodation. The Mahratta districts and claims, with the exception of some forts, in the tract of which the rivers Warna and Kistna to the north, and the Toongbuddra to the south, were the boundaries, were wholly ceded. Kopaul, near the Toongbuddra, was relinquished by Shao in exchange for Rutnaguiry;

* Original deeds from the records of the government of the Peishwas, made over to me by the Hon'ble M. Elphinstone.

and the territory of the Concan, extending from Salsee to Ankolah, was comprehended in the sovereignty of Kolapoor.

The Gurhee of Wurgaom, occupied by Oodajee Chowan, on the south bank of the Warna, which in the border warfare had cost many lives, was destroyed by mutual consent, but the claims of Chowan were left undetermined. Merich, Tasgaom, Hutnee, several villages along the northern bank of the Kistna, and some fortified places in the Beejapoor district, were given up to Shao. This treaty was offensive and defensive, and provided for the division of further conquests to the south of the Toongbuddra, which, on co-operation, were to be equally shared. Grants of enam land or hereditary rights conferred by either party, within their respective boundaries, were confirmed.

Although enemies were not wanting to detract from the reputation of A. D. 1731. the Peishwa, and to extol that of his rivals, the success of the Pritee Needhee did not materially affect the ascendancy which Bajee Rao had attained; but Nizam-ool-Moolk was still bent on opposing him, and found a fit instrument for his purpose in Trim-buck Rao Dhabaray. Ever since the Peishwa had obtained the deeds from Sur Boolund Khan, Dhabaray had been negotiating with the other Mahratta chiefs, and assembling troops in Guzerat. At length, finding himself at the head of 35,000 men, he had resolved to march for the Deccan in the ensuing season. Bajee Rao was well aware of the Senaputtee's enmity, but was not alarmed by his preparations until he discovered that Nizam-ool-Moolk was to support him in the Deccan. Immediately on being apprized of their intention, he determined to anticipate them, although, when joined by all his adherents, his whole army did not amount to above half that of Dhabaray. The latter gave out that he was proceeding to protect the raja's authority, and was supported by Peelajee Gaekwar, Kantajee, and Rughoojee Kuddum Bhanday, Oodajee, and Anund Rao Powar,* Chimmajee Pundit,† Koor Buhadur, with many others. Bajee Rao proved that Dhabaray Senaputtee was in alliance with Nizam-ool-Moolk, and declared that he was leagued for the purpose of dividing the Mahratta sovereignty with the raja of Kolapoor—a measure inconsistent with sound policy, and contrary to the divine ordinances of the Shasters.

The preparations of Nizam-ool-Moolk hastened the march of Bajee Rao; and as his army, though so inferior in numerical strength, was composed of the old Pagah horse, and some of the best of the Mahratta Mankurees, he moved rapidly towards Guzerat, but he commenced negotiating from the day of his quitting Poona, and continued it until the hour of attack. His advanced troops, however, under Awjee Kowray, having fallen in with a party of the enemy under Dummajee, one of the sons of Peelajee Gaekwar, soon after crossing the Nerbuddah they were attacked and completely defeated. Bajee Rao, not discouraged by this unfortunate commencement, determined, when about to engage his countrymen, con-

* Previous to the formation of this league, the Powars, whose rendezvous continued about Dhar in Malwa, had been always at war with Peelajee Gaekwar.

† This was probably Chimmajee Damoodhur. He was a very active marauder; but Chimna Raja, so often mentioned in the Surat records, means Chimnajee, Bajee Rao's brother: even when the army was commanded by the Peishwa in person, the force is often mentioned as that of Chimna Raja. The members of the factories were frequently deceived by false reports, and they make some ridiculous mistakes in the names, which it is sometimes difficult to detect. The *Sow Roger*, for Shao Raja, though not a very elegant alteration, is easily discovered.

trary to his usual plan, to close with them immediately. The new levies did not await the shock, but fled on the first charge; Kantajee Kuddum went off with the fugitives, leaving the old troops of Khundee Rao Dhabaray to defend his son. Trimbug Rao was mounted on an elephant, and seeing the flight of his troops, chained the animal's legs. Bajee Rao was on horseback, and exerted himself with all the energy so great an occasion demanded; but the field was still disputed with obstinacy, and the issue doubtful, when Trimbug Rao, in the act of drawing his bow, was shot by a random ball from a matchlock; his death left complete victory to Bajee Rao, with all but nominal control of the Mahratta sovereignty.

In this battle, which took place between Baroda and Dubhoy, in Guzerat, about the 1st of April, Jowjee Dhabaray, Mullojee Powar, and one of the sons of Peelajee Gaekwar, were slain with their commander. Oodajee Powar and Chimmajee Pundit were taken prisoners. Anund Rao Powar, Peelajee Gaekwar, and Koor Buhadur were wounded, but escaped.* Both Dubhoy† and Baroda were at this time in the hands of Peelajee; the latter was afterwards taken from him by the Moghuls, but Bajee Rao, at the suggestion of Sur Boolund Khan, then intended to reduce it for himself. A treaty was, however, concluded in the month of August, and the Peishwa, at the close of the monsoon, returned to Satara. He would have punished the treachery of Nizam-ool-Moolk, but that crafty politician, whose schemes had recoiled on himself, warded a blow which he could with difficulty have withstood, by directing its aim against the head of the empire.

Bajee Rao readily acceded to the Nizam's views; it suited his favourite policy, and it gave employment to persons likely to disturb the domestic arrangements he aimed at establishing. Troops were immediately despatched towards Malwa under his brother Chimmajee, whilst he himself remained, for a time, engaged in the interior arrangements of government, at Poona and Satara. Such appear to have been the rise and progress of the events and intrigues, which ended in a secret compact between Bajee Rao and Nizam-ool-Moolk, securing to the former supremacy as Peishwa, and to the latter a kingdom in the Deccan.

The victory over Dhabaray, like the issue of every civil war, left impressions on the minds of many, not easily effaced; but the Peishwa adopted every means of conciliation in his power. It had been a custom to feed some thousand Bramins for several days every year at Tullygaom,‡ near Poona, the enam village of Dhabaray; this charitable practice Bajee Rao continued at Poona, and gave sums of money, at the same time, to the assembled Shastrees and Waeedeeks. This festival, continued by his successors, was known by the name of Dukshina.§

Yeswunt Rao, the son of the deceased, was raised to the rank of Sena-puttee; but being too young to take the management upon himself, his mother, Ooma Bye, became his guardian; and Peelajee Gaekwar, their

* Mahratta MSS., original letters in the handwriting of Bajee Rao, Surat Records, letter from Mr. Daniel Innes, factor at Cambay, dated 7th April 1781.

† Dubhoy first fell into the hands of Oodajee Powar, from whom it was taken by Peelajee.

‡ There are two Tullygaoms near Poona—one north-east, or Tullygaom Dumdairay, and the other north-west, Tullygaom Dhabaray, on the Bombay road, the one above alluded to.

§ Dukshina means a charitable donation in money.

former mootaliq, was confirmed in that situation, with the title of Sena Khas Kheyi, in addition to his hereditary one of Shumsher Buhadur.*

In order to prevent disputes, an agreement was drawn up under the authority of Shao, and subscribed by the Peishwa and Senaputtee, stipulating that neither party should enter the boundary of the other in Guzerat and Malwa. Within the limits of the former province the Senaputtee was to have entire management; but he bound himself to pay one-half of the revenue to government through the Peishwa. All contributions, levied from countries not specified in the deeds given under the authority of Sur Boolund Khan, were to be made over to the raja after deducting expenses.

The cession of chouth and surdeshmookhee from the province of Guzerat was highly disapproved at the imperial court, although no attempt had been made to assist Sur Boolund Khan, or to avert the calamity and disgrace, which that officer foretold must be the consequence of neglecting his applications for assistance. Sur Boolund Khan was superseded by Abhee Sing, raja of Joudpoor, who proceeded with the army to take possession of his new government. Sur Boolund Khan opposed him for a considerable time, but at last an accommodation took place, and the latter went off towards Delhi, where he was afterwards extremely ill-used and unworthily disgraced. Although an enemy of Nizam-ool-Moolk, the disrespect and indignity with which Sur Boolund Khan was treated, is given as the reason for the intimate connection which was now cemented between the former and Bajee Rao. The Mahomedan historian† is partly right; but selfish, not generous, motives furnish the real interpretation of Nizam-ool-Moolk's consideration for Sur Boolund Khan. Perceiving Bajee Rao's complete ascendancy, the appointment of the Hindoo prince Abhee Sing to supersede Sur Boolund Khan, the imbecility of the emperor, and the treachery as well as depraved venality of his courtiers; knowing also that he had rendered himself in the highest degree obnoxious, Nizam-ool-Moolk had good grounds for apprehending that the Peishwa might be able to obtain the viceroyalty of the Deccan. The plan, however, which he adopted, under these circumstances, belongs to the higher order of politics, and seems to have been framed for the purpose of diverting the Mahrattas from the destruction of the resources of his own country, and of making his own power a balance between that of the emperor and the Peishwa.

Previously to invading Malwa in person, Bajee Rao had an interview with Nizam-ool-Moolk, and endeavoured to induce him to advance a subsidy for the assistance he was affording; but the Nizam considered the inducement sufficiently strong without paying his auxiliaries. The districts in Candeish, by the present agreement, were to be protected by the Peishwa in his passage to and from Malwa, and nothing more than the usual tribute was to be levied in the six Soobehs of the Deccan,—a proposal to which Bajee Rao readily acceded.‡

* I have in my possession three accounts of the origin of the Gaekwar titles, from respectable sources, all differing from each other, and from the text: after all, I may be wrong, but, even in such an insignificant matter, I have spared no pains to be correct. I have seldom given translations of the Mahratta titles, as even the Mahrattas themselves differ in the significations attached to them, and as I know nothing of Sanscrit, I was dependent on the Bramins about me for the few interpretations I have given. Sena Khas Kheyi has been translated, "*commander of the special band*,"—perhaps "*leader of the sovereign's tribe*" would be more correct.

† Seyr Mutuakhereen.

‡ Mahratta MSS., and original letters.

Various parts of the province of Malwa had been already laid under contribution by Powar, Holkar, and Sindia. A. D. 1732. The Raja Geerdhur on every occasion had exerted himself with great fortitude and energy, but was at length killed in an action with Oodajee Powar and Chimnajee Pundit* in 1729; but his relation, Dia Buhadur, having been appointed soobehdar in his room, continued to repel the Mahratta inroads with bravery, and frequently with success; till at last, attacked by Chimnajee Appa the Peishwa's brother, Peelajee Jadow, and Mulhar Rao Holkar, at Talah† near Dhar, he was also slain, and his troops were defeated. Bajee Rao, on crossing the Nerbuddah, assumed command of the army in Malwa, and sent his brother and Peelajee Jadow back to Satara, to maintain his influence at court, and to concert measures for settling the Concan, which was in a very disturbed state; the Peishwa having been obliged to withdraw a force, at first intended for the entire settlement of that country, including the reduction of Jinjeera.

In the meantime, after the Peishwa left Guzerat, the foudjar of Abhee Sing recovered the fort of Baroda; but the cause of Peelajee Gaekwar was popular, he had gained several victories, and occupied many of the principal thannas, when Abhee Sing, on pretence of entering upon a final agreement with him, sent some emissaries, apparently for the purpose of settling the preliminaries. These emissaries had frequent interviews with Peelajee, till at last, one evening, after having sat until it was dusk, they took leave and went outside the tent, when one of their number, on pretence of having forgot something of consequence, returned to the tent, and, whilst affecting to whisper in Peelajee's ear, drew a dagger and stabbed him to the heart. The assassin was instantly killed, but the rest of the emissaries escaped. This murder was perpetrated at Dhakoor, a well-known village in the district of Tausrah.‡

The murder of Peelajee Gaekwar was not attended by the advantages expected from it by Abhee Sing; Dilla, Dessaye of Padra, near Baroda, who had lived in friendship with Peelajee, instigated the Koolees and Bheels to rise all over the country, and watching an opportunity, afforded by the march of troops to quell the insurgents, sent intelligence to Mahadajee Gaekwar, the brother of Peelajee, who then occupied Jumbooseer, and advised him to attack Baroda. He accordingly followed this recommendation, and obtained possession of it about the same time that Dia Buhadur was killed in Malwa, in 1732, since which time it has always belonged to the family of Gaekwar. But besides this success on the part of the Mahrattas, Dummajee, the eldest surviving son of Peelajee, advanced from Sonegurh with a great force, occupied many of the principal districts in the east of Guzerat, and made incursions as far as Joudpoor, till Abhee Sing, resigning Ahmedabad to a deputy, was forced to return to protect his paternal dominions.

Mohummud Khan Bungush, governor of Allahabad, was the new soobehdar appointed to Malwa. Shortly after the period A. D. 1733. of his obtaining the government, he entered Bundelcund, and established himself in the territory of the Raja Chitoor Sal. On this proceeding the Rajpoot prince solicited aid from Bajee Rao, which was

* This Chimnajee Pundit was not the brother of Bajee Rao, but the person taken by the Peishwa, in the battle with the Senaputtee, already mentioned.

† Original letter in the handwriting of Chimnajee Appa. I take the name of the place where the battle was fought from Sir J. Malcolm's Report on Malwa.

‡ Mirat Ahmudee.

readily afforded. The Peishwa moved expeditiously into Bundelcund, surrounded Bungush, and forced him to seek refuge in a fort, where he was reduced to the greatest distress, till rescued by a band of Afghans of his own tribe, headed by his son. The province, however, was completely evacuated by his troops, and Chitoor Sal was so entirely satisfied with the aid afforded by his new ally, that he conferred on him a fort and district in the neighbourhood of Jhansee worth two and a quarter lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, adopted him as his son, and at his death, which happened very soon after, bestowed on him one-third of his possessions, or an equal share with his sons Juggut Raj-gee Deo and Hurdesa, the former styled raja of Kalpee, and the latter of Bundelcund ; but it would appear that, although they may have managed separately, they shared in common.*

After the defeat of Mohummud Khan Bungush, Raja Jey Sing was appointed by the emperor to the government of the provinces of Agra and Malwa. A. D. 1734. Nothing could be more favourable to the views of Bajee Rao ; but as Jey Sing was now situated, the honor of the Rajpoot was at variance with the subsisting understanding between him and the Mahrattas. This circumstance may account for his hesitating to comply with their demands ; but he at last came to an agreement with Bajee Rao, yielded him the government of Malwa in the following year, and for the time, the emperor, by Jey Sing's persuasions, tacitly acquiesced in the arrangement.†

* Original papers, Poona Records.

† Seyr Mutuakhereen, Mahratta MSS., Hudeequ-i-Alum.

CHAP. XV.

FROM A. D. 1734 TO A. D. 1739.

Mahratta affairs.—Rughoojee Bhonslay is appointed Sena Sahib Soobeh.—Affairs of the Concan—of Sawunt—Angria.—Unsuccessful campaigns of the Pritee Needhee against the Seedee.—Revolution at Jinjeera.—The Peishwa returns from Malwa—proceedings.—Arrangements made in the Concan.—Mulharjee Holkar's incursions—policy of the vizier Khan Dowran.—Nizam-ool-Moolk courted by the emperor.—Muziffir Khan marches against the Mahrattas.—Holkar's conduct towards him.—Holkar continues levying contributions—makes an incursion into Guzerat.—Momin Khan appointed governor of that province.—Bajee Rao's pecuniary embarrassments.—Negotiations with the imperial court—obtains an assignment on Malwa, and a tribute from the Rajpoots—further negotiations—obtains the surdeshpandeegeeree of the Deccan.—Nizam-ool-Moolk resolves on assisting the emperor against the Mahrattas.—Preparations of the Moghuls—and of Bajee Rao.—Sadut Khan drives the Mahrattas across the Jumna.—Bajee Rao appears at the gates of Delhi—operations—retires—returns to the Deccan.—Circumstances regarding Angria, which led to a war with the Portuguese, and the invasion of Salsette.—The Peishwa is called off to Malwa to oppose Nizam-ool-Moolk—who, joined by the imperial army, advances from Delhi.—Bajee Rao surrounds Nizam-ool-Moolk at Bhopaul—forces him into terms—their nature.—Prosecution of hostilities against the Portuguese—conduct of the English—its causes—progress of the Mahrattas.—War between the Peishwa and Rughoojee Bhonslay.—Disastrous intelligence from Delhi, occasioned by the arrival and proceedings of Nadir Shah.—Chimnaje Appa prosecutes a successful war against the Portuguese.—Memorable siege of Bassein.—Nadir Shah retires from Delhi.

I HAVE thus endeavoured to show the steps by which the Mahrattas spread themselves in Guzerat, and established a footing in A. D. 1734. Malwa; their domestic policy, their affairs in regard to Berar and the Concan, now claim our attention, before we return to their operations in Malwa, or enter on the more important proceedings, which the present chapter will record.

During the Peishwa's absence, Kanhojee Bhonslay, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, had been accused of disobedience, and confined at Satara; and Rughoojee, the son of Kanhojee's cousin, Bembajee, had been appointed to the situation of Sena Sahib Soobeh in his stead. Rughoojee had served with a small party of horse, both under his relation Kanhojee, and with one of the petty Mahomedan* princes in Gondwanah; his station was too humble to bring him into general notice, but he had, in a confined sphere, distinguished himself by superior intelligence, activity, and spirit. The

* They were originally Hindoo polygars, and converted by Aurungzebe.

particulars of the intrigue by which Kanhojee Bhonslay was deprived of his title and jagheer are not known, but from the selection of Rughoojee as his successor, agreeably to the choice of the raja, it is probable that Bajee Rao had no share in it. Rughoojee had accompanied Shao in his excursions, and from being a very bold and expert hunter, had ingratiated himself with the raja, and obtained a great ascendancy over him. Shao married him to the sister of one of his own wives, of the Sirkay family, which, except their having the same surname, and that they may possibly* have been originally relations and rivals for the hereditary right of Patell of their village, is the only connection which can be traced between the families of Satara and Nagpoor.

On receiving the sunnuds for Berar, Rughoojee gave a bond to maintain a body of 5,000 horse for the service of the state; to pay an annual sum of nine lakhs of rupees; and, exclusive of ghas-dana—a tribute which the Sena Sahib Soobeh since the time of Raja Ram had been allowed to reserve—the half only of all other tribute, prize property, and contributions was to be accounted for to the head of the government. He also bound himself to raise 10,000 horse when required, and to accompany the Peishwa, or to proceed to any quarter where he might be ordered.

This arrangement was effected during the absence of Sreeput Rao Pritee Needhee, who had been sent into the Concan by the raja. The Pritee Needhee, being the friend of Kanhojee Bhonslay, endeavoured to obtain some mitigation of his sentence, and proposed that Akola and Balapoor, in Berar Payeen Ghaut, should be restored, on condition of his maintaining 200 horse; but it does not appear that this arrangement was carried into effect. Kanhojee was an officer of great enterprize; he had made some partial conquests in Gondwaneh, and headed one incursion into Kuttack. He died at Satara, after having lived there many years, a prisoner at large.

Whether Nizam-ool-Moolk had made any preparations in consequence of these dissensions, is uncertain; but Chimnajee Appa conceived, or affected to believe, that he meditated an attack. He, therefore, pitched his camp about 40 miles east of Satara, leaving Peelajee Jadow with an inconsiderable body of horse, being the only troops at Satara in the immediate interest of the Peishwa.

When Bajee Rao advanced into Malwa, it was his design to engage the raja's mind with petty affairs in the Concan. Divisions of authority, contending factions, and the turbulent disposition of some of its inhabitants afforded ample field, within the small tract from Goa to Bombay, for engaging and fatiguing attention; but as these authorities had also a large share in the transactions of the Bombay government during the last century, they demand, as a record of our own history, particular enumeration. Sawunt, the principal Deshmookh of Waree, occupied his hereditary territory in that quarter, but having suffered from Kanhojee Angria's attacks, prior to the late peace between the rajas of Satara and Kolapoor, he bore an enmity to Angria's family ever after.

Kanhojee Angria's death happened about the end of the year 1728.† During his life all attempts at reducing his power proved fruitless. The

* There is a tradition of their having been rivals in an hereditary dispute which may have been invented to prejudice the rajas of Satara against the Bhonslays of Nagpoor, and prevent their desire to adopt any member of that powerful family. It is a point of honor to maintain the hereditary difference.

† Mahratta MSS. I am not certain of this date, as I have not observed it in the English Records.

Bombay government, incensed at his piracies and contumelious conduct, joined with the Portuguese in an expedition against Kolabah. The land forces furnished by that nation, and three English ships of the line, under Commodore Matthews, co-operated; but the attempt failed, owing to the cowardice of the Portuguese. This expedition took place in 1722, and, two years afterwards, the Dutch, with seven ships, two bomb vessels, and a body of troops, made an attempt on Viziadroog, at that time better known by its Moghul name of Gheriah; but this attack also failed. Angria seized many English vessels, and, about a year before his death, took the *Darby*, a ship richly laden, belonging to the East India Company. The crews of his vessels, like all Mahrattas when successful, became very daring, and his forts on the coast were considered impregnable.*

Kanhojee Angria left two legitimate and three illegitimate sons. The two former succeeded to his possessions; the elder, named Sakkajee, remained at Kolabah, and the younger, Sumbhajee, resided at Severndroog. The elder died a short time after his father, and Sumbhajee, keeping with him the eldest of his half-brothers, appointed the other two to the charge of Kolabah. The eldest of these, Yessajee, had charge of the interior management, whilst Mannajee commanded the naval and military establishment. The latter, some time after, having quarrelled with his family, sought protection and assistance from the Portuguese; and having obtained the aid of some troops, he escalated Kolabah, and carried it sword in hand. He cruelly put out the eyes of his brother Yessajee, and confined him, for which Sumbhajee, as soon as the Portuguese retired, attacked him. Mannajee, however, having obtained aid from Bajee Rao, compelled Sumbhajee to raise the siege, and, in consequence of the assistance afforded, ceded the forts of Kootla and Rajmachee to the Peishwa.†

The Seedee, who at this time was chief of Jinjeera, had held that situation for several years, with the old Moghul title of Yakoot Khan. The districts which had been placed under the Seedee's charge by Aurungzebe, including Mhar, Raigurh, Dabul, and Anjenweel, had been defended against every effort of the Mahrattas, and frequently, in consequence of their inroads, the Seedee levied contributions from Shao's districts. As force was not likely to prevail, the Pritee Needhee, Jewajee Khundee Rao Chitnees, and others of the raja's ministers, formed schemes for ruining the Seedee by intrigue. A person named Yacoub Khan, well known in those times as one of the most daring pirates on the coast, and distinguished by his familiar appellation of Shaikjee, possessed the entire confidence of the Seedee. This man was a descendant of the Koollee rajas of the Concan, and hereditary Patell of Goagurh. In one of the incursions of the Seedees he was, when a child, taken prisoner, and bred a Mussulman. At a very early period he distinguished himself, and, on getting command of a ship, became as celebrated for his stratagem as his bravery. The Pritee Needhee gained this Shaik Yacoub, and entered into a secret treaty with him, by which he was to receive the command of the fleet, the whole of the Seedee's possessions, with the exception of some forts, several villages in enam, and the surgounda,‡ or two per cent. of the whole revenue of the lower Concan, from the river Penn to the boundary of the Kolapoor territory. His brother was to be appointed second-

* Orme, Bruce's Annals, partly confirmed by Mahratta MSS.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ The same as Nargounda, only here confined to two instead of three per cent.

in-command at Raigurh, and one lakh of rupees was to be distributed as a largess amongst the troops and crews of the vessels, in case of success in effecting a revolution.*

To aid this scheme, a force was sent into the Concan, in 1733, under the Pritee Needhee, his mootaliq Yemmajee Sewdeo, and Oodajee Chowan; the intrigues, for reasons which are not explained, were unsuccessful, but a war ensued, the effects of which fell principally upon the helpless peasantry. Little impression could be made on the Seedee's garrisons; the Pritee Needhee, after many months, was finally worsted, and when encamped at Chiploon, the fort of Goelkot, although strongly garrisoned, was disgracefully surprised and taken. Chimnajee Appa incurred the raja's displeasure for not sending assistance to Sreeput Rao after repeated orders,† and Shao at last told him—"If you do not, I must go myself."‡ Peelajee Jadow was at length despatched, but none of the other officers at Satara would undertake to support the Pritee Needhee, except on condition of receiving the conquered districts in jagheer; he was, therefore, compelled to return to Satara with great loss of reputation. About this time the chief at Jinjeera died, leaving several sons, the eldest of whom, Seedee Abdoollah, was murdered by his brothers, supported by other conspirators, with the view of usurping the government in prejudice to Seedee Rehman, one of the brothers not in Jinjeera at the time of the murder, and who bore no part in the conspiracy.

Yacoob Khan immediately embraced the cause of Seedee Rehman, and A. D. 1735. called on Shao for support; but nothing could be done until the return of Bajee Rao, who, after leaving Holkar and Sindia with a large body of cavalry in Malwa, returned to the Deccan, and, on crossing the Godavery, intimated to the raja that he should march straight to Dhunda Rajepoor. All the disposeable infantry were directed to join the Peishwa, and Peelajee Jadow was sent off, reinforced with a body of the Pagah horse, to support Mulhar Rao Holkar in Malwa.

Seedee Rehman and Yacoob Khan joined Bajee Rao, who commenced operations by attacking some of the forts. Futih Sing Bhonslay and the Pritee Needhee proceeded to co-operate; but the only assistance which they rendered was the recovery of Sivajee's capital, Raigurh, the killidar of which had been previously corrupted by Shaik Yacoob. The Peishwa reduced the forts of Tala and Gossala; but his further progress was interrupted by the advance of Seedee Rehman, one of the brothers, at the head of a body of troops from Jinjeera. They attacked the Peishwa vigorously, but could not prevail over the numerous forces of the Mahrattas. Seedee Rehman was killed, and his troops were pursued to Dhunda Rajepoor. Batteries were erected against Jinjeera, whilst Mannajee Angria assailed it from the sea.

The operation of cannonading Jinjeera had been repeated from the time of Sumbhajee every year the Mahrattas were in possession of Dhunda

* Original papers in possession of the Chitnees at Satara.

† Original letters from Shao to Chimnajee, and from the Peishwa's mootaliq, procured from the Dawursee Swamee. Many interesting letters from Bajee Rao and Chimnajee were lent to me by the descendants of the disciples of the Dawursee Swamee. The Swamee was a much venerated person in the country, and was the Mahapooroosh of Bajee Rao and his brother, and seems to have possessed their entire confidence. The Peishwa's letters to the Swamee, and to his brother, detail the actions of his life in a familiar manner, without disguise, and are quite invaluable. I was permitted to translate, but not to copy them. The originals continue in possession of the Swamee's disciples at Dawursee, a village within a few miles of Satara.

‡ This part of the letter is a postscript in his own handwriting.

Rajepoor. Bajee Rao perceived the impracticability of reducing it, at least for many months ; and as he foresaw many bad consequences from remaining in the Concan, he listened to overtures made by the besieged, entered into a treaty, by which they recognised the pretensions of Seedee Behman, gave up half the revenues of eleven mahals* to him, and ceded the forts of Raigurh, Tala, Gossala, Oochitgurh, and Beerwaree to the Mahrattas.

Upon this successful termination of hostilities, Bajee Rao, with additional power and influence, returned to Satara, and was appointed soobehdar of the late acquisitions.†

After Bajee Rao's return to the Deccan, the troops of Mulhar Rao Holkar made incursions beyond Agra. Khan Dowran, the vizier of Mohummud Shah, attempted to check the progress of the Mahrattas rather by the pen than the sword, forgetting that all negotiations with a predatory state, without previously punishing its aggressions, only tend to excite further depredation. He laid plans for obtaining the aid of Nizam-ool-Moolk without appearing to solicit it—a conduct little less inconsistent than that of the fickle emperor, who now earnestly courted him ; but the Nizam was nursing his resources, and the period had not yet arrived when he could perceive that his presence at Delhi would be hailed as that of the saviour of the empire.

Khan Dowran's attempts were feeble, but his preparations were always splendid ; all Delhi was in bustle when his expeditions set out ; but they commenced in bombast and ended in ridicule. His brother, Muzuffir Khan, moved forth to drive the plunderers and robbers across the Nerbuddah. Holkar sent a few of his light troops to molest his march during the day, and to throw rockets into his camp during the night ; but he never allowed himself to be interrupted in the collection of contributions, in which he was employed, for the purpose of endeavouring to satisfy the importunate demands of his master, the Peishwa, whose pecuniary distress had become very great. Muzuffir Khan advanced as far as Seronje, whence he returned, and was received at Delhi as if he had performed signal services, acquiring fame among his friends by the contempt of his enemies. The province of Malwa, and the country south of the Chumbul, although some of the forts remained in possession of the imperial officers, were completely overrun, and the Rohillas, as well as the Mahrattas, took possession of several places.‡ Kantajee Kuddum Bhanday, who the year before had been constrained by the power of Dummajee Gaekwar to quit Guzerat, persuaded Holkar to make an incursion into that province, where they appeared unexpectedly ; levied contributions as far as the Bunass ; plundered several towns to the north of Ahmedabad, amongst which were Eder and Pulhanpoor,§ and departed as suddenly as they had come.

Abhee Sing was shortly after removed from the government of Guzerat, and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, Momin Khan, was appointed to officiate ; but the deputy of Abhee Sing would not evacuate the city of Ahmedabad, and Momin Khan was at last obliged to court an alliance with Dummajee, in order to expel him.

* Smaller divisions of a district.

† Mahratta MSS., and original letters. In parts where I have only Mahratta authority, I am seldom quite certain of my dates, as many of the original letters have only the date of the week, and of the moon.

‡ Seyr Mutuakhereen, and Mahratta letters.

§ Mirat Ahmudee.

Bajee Rao, owing to the vast army he had kept up, both to secure his

A. D. 1736. conquests and to overcome his rivals, had become greatly involved in debts. His troops were in arrears; the Soucars (or bankers), to whom he already owed a personal debt of many lakhs of rupees, refused to make any further advances, and he complained bitterly of the constant mutinies and clamours in his camp, which occasioned him much vexation and distress.* He levied the chouth and surdeshmookhee in Malwa, and applied, through Raja Jey Sing, for their formal cession in that province; and likewise for a confirmation of the deeds granted by Sur Boolund Khan for Guzerat. The Tooranee Moghuls, who formed a considerable party in the ministry, were decidedly against a compromise so disgraceful; Khan Dowran and the emperor, by whom it had been already tacitly yielded, were disposed, by the advice of Jey Sing, to acknowledge the title in due form; but, in the course of the negotiation, which ensued between the imperial minister and the Peishwa, both parties went beyond their original intentions, and hastened the advancing reconciliation between Mohunmud Shah and Nizim-ool-Moolk.

The emperor, in the first instance, agreed to relinquish, in the form of an assignment, 13 lakhs of rupees of the revenue of the districts south of the Chumbul for the ensuing season, payable by three instalments at stated periods; and to grant an authority to the Peishwa to levy a tribute from the Rajpoot states, from Boondoe and Kotah on the west, to Budawur on the east, fixing the annual amount at 10,60,000 rupees. The latter concession, Khan Dowran probably expected, was more likely to create enmity than to establish friendship between the Mahrattas and the Rajpoots. This minister imagined himself superior to a Mahratta Bramin in political artifice, and continued to negotiate when he should have had no thought but to chastise. The Raja Jey Sing was the medium through whom Khan Dowran sent an envoy of his own, named Yadgar Khan, to treat with Bajee Rao. The sunnuds for the chouth and surdeshmookhee were secretly prepared, and given to the agent, with instructions to reserve them; but Dhondoo Punt Poorundhuree, the Peishwa's wukeel residing with Khan Dowran, discovered this preliminary admission, and apprized Bajee Rao of the circumstance. Mahrattas, in every negotiation, invariably begin by requiring much more than they expect. If they find their proposal acceded to, they rise in their pretensions, and very often, from a tone of the most obsequious complaisance, assume an overbearing insolence of manner, and a style of pointed threat and menace, which, to those who have only seen them submissive, is scarcely conceivable.

Bajee Rao's demands now exceeded all bounds; at different stages, during the discussions, he required the whole provinces of Malwa in jagheer; the Rohillas, who had established themselves, to be dispossessed; the forts of Mandoo, Dhar, and Raiseen; the jagheer and foudjaree of the whole tract south of the Chumbul; 50 lakhs of rupees from the royal

* Among Hindoos an attitude of worship or adoration is to place the forehead at the threshold of a temple, or at the feet of the idol, and is used in humble supplication to a superior. The following extract of a letter from Bajee Rao to his Mahapooroosh must of course be understood figuratively; but it shows the embarrassments under which he laboured:—"I have fallen into that hell of being beset by creditors, and to pacify soucars and sillidars, I am falling at their feet, till I have rubbed the skin from my forehead." Part of this distress originated in the high rates of pay which he was obliged to give, in order to outbid Nizam-ool-Moolk, and secure the best of the Deccan soldiery.

treasury, or an equivalent assignment on Bengal; Allahabad, Benares, Gya, and Muttra in jagheer; and a hereditary right as surdeshpandya of the six Soobehs of the Deccan.*

All these concessions were evaded by the emperor, excepting the last; to that he acceded, on Bajee Rao's agreeing to pay a fee of six lakhs of rupees. This grant was precisely similar to that of the surdeshmookhee, but coinciding with the proportion of the emoluments of deshmoorkh and deshbandya: those of the surdeshmookhee being ten, the surdeshpandeegeeree was five, per cent. This grant, however, fell upon the Deccan; it was a stroke levelled at Nizam-ool-Moolk by Khan Dowran, and had the immediate effect of rousing the Nizam's jealousy, whilst encouragement from the Moghul faction, and pressing invitations from Mohummud Shah to repair to Delhi and save the empire, at length induced Nizam-ool-Moolk to think of turning the scale against his predatory allies. In the meantime negotiations produced no cessation of activity on the part of Bajee Rao, and his demands were so exorbitant, that it was determined, after protracted consultations, to assemble a vast army, by the mere display of which, it seemed as if they expected to annihilate the Mahrattas. The plains in the neighbourhood of the capital were accordingly covered with tents, and the preparations were as splendid as the operations proved feeble. The Peishwa, on hearing that Khan Dowran and Kuminur-ud-deen Khan, each at the head of a great army, had advanced towards Muttra, deposited his heavy baggage with his ally, Juggut Raj, in Bundelcund, and advanced to a position on the banks of the Jumna, 40 miles south of Agra. He had attacked the raja of Budawur for refusing to settle his claims, and levied contributions in every direction. Mulhar Rao Holkar, Peelajee Jadaw, and Wittoojee Bolay committed great depredations in the Dooab, until driven across the Jumna by Sadut Khan, who marched from Oudh, and unexpectedly assailed the Mahrattas. He wrote an exaggerated account of his success to court, stating that he had wounded Mulhar Rao Holkar, killed Wittoojee Bolay, and driven the whole Mahratta army across the Chumbul; that 2,000 were killed, and 2,000 were drowned in the Jumna. On Sadut Khan's arrival at Agra, Bajee Rao quitted his ground on the banks of the Jumna, and moved to a more open country in a north-east direction, his former position being confined by the Chumbul on his left flank, and his camp intersected by deep ravines—very unfavourable to his mode of fighting.†

Sadut Khan's account of his success, as written by himself to the emperor, was communicated to Bajee Rao by his wukeel, who remained with Khan Dowran, until the latter, accompanied by Mohummud Khan Bungush, joined Sadut Khan at Agra, when, by the advice of the latter, the wukeel was dismissed. Nothing was talked of in Delhi but the hero Sadut Khan, who had driven the Mahrattas back to the Deccan. "I was resolved," says Bajee Rao, "to tell the emperor truth, to prove that I was still in Hindostan, and to show him flames and Mahrattas at the gates of his capital."

Six days before Khan Dowran joined Sadut Khan, Bajee Rao, foreseeing that they would unite, was on his march to Delhi. Quitting the great road

* Original papers, and Poona Records.

† The Seyr Mutuakhereen gives the Moghul account of this campaign, the only one to which the author of that work had access. I have not omitted due consideration of both sides of the narrative.

and skirting the hills of Mehvat, where they formed the boundary of the territory of Chooramun Jath, and keeping 14 miles to the left of Oorlass,* where Kummur-ud-deen Khan was encamped, he advanced at the rate of 40 miles daily, and pitched his camp close to the suburbs. Some elephants and camels coming out of the city were seized, and a party of Hindoos, when going to a temple for the performance of a religious ceremony, were stripped;† but the Peishwa prudently abandoned his first intention of plundering and burning, as he conceived the booty might retard his retreat, and that burning the suburbs would but show a disrespect and contempt, which would impede his negotiations with the emperor and Khan Dowran, both of whom, he well knew, were disposed to grant a large share of his demands. He therefore next day wrote two letters—one to the emperor, and the other to Raja Bukht Mull. Their purport is not mentioned, but the emperor requested that a wukeel might be sent, which Bajee Rao refused, unless a guard came out for his protection. He, however, returned a polite message, stating “that as he apprehended mischief to the city from the contiguity of his troops, he was about to retire to the Jheel Tank.” This moderation encouraged a party of 8,000 men from the city, under Muzuffir Khan, Meer Hoossein Khan Kokah, Raja Sew Sing, and other nobles of the court, to venture forth and attack the Mahrattas. Bajee Rao despatched Suttojee Jadow with a few skirmishers to reconnoitre them; and, upon Suttojee’s sending notice that they were coming out to attack him, Mulharjee Holkar, followed by Ranoojee Sindia, immediately wheeled about, fell upon them, killed and wounded upwards of 600, drove them back into the city, and took 2,000 of their horses, and one elephant. Raja Sew Sing was amongst the slain, and Meer Hoossein Khan Kokah was mortally wounded.

The Mahrattas lost very few men, and had only one officer‡ wounded. This action was soon over, and Bajee Rao was about to refresh his men, when the army of Kummur-ud-deen Khan came in sight. Bajee Rao had a skirmish with him; but as night was approaching, and as he perceived that the enemy was supported by troops from the city as well as by Khan Dowran and Sadut Khan, who were close at hand, he determined to retreat, and before morning moved eight miles to the westward of the late field of battle. In the skirmish with Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the Peishwa lost 30 men. Khan Dowran and Sudut Khan effected a junction with Kummur-ud-deen Khan on the following morning; and Bajee Rao retreated towards Gwalior, by the route of Rewaree and Mundawar, both of which he plundered, and was neither interrupted nor pursued. It was Bajee Rao’s intention to cross the Jumna, and plunder the Dooab before the rains; but being apprehensive that Nizam-ool-Moolk might interrupt him before he could collect the revenue in Malwa, he ordered his brother to watch the Nizam’s preparations:§ and, “if he attempt,” says the Peishwa’s letter, “to cross the Rewa (Nerbuddah), fall instantly on his rear, and put heel-ropes upon him.”||

* This is probably the Hindoo name for the place, as I cannot find it in any of our maps.

† This fact Bajee Rao mentions to his brother without reserve or comment.

‡ Indrajee Kuddum, belonging to Ranoojee Sindia’s party. I mention his name, merely to show the minuteness of the Peishwa’s report.

§ A private letter, or rather journal, in the handwriting of Bajee Rao to his brother Chimnaje Appa. Without various corroborative testimonies as to the facts, it bears that internal evidence of truth which commands confidence.

|| Such of my readers as may have seen a horse break from his pickets, and attempt to gallop off with his heel-ropes, will understand the Peishwa’s injunctions in their full force.

No opportunity presented itself of crossing the Jumna, and as his presence became requisite in the Deccan, Bajee Rao, upon a promise of obtaining the government of Malwa and 13 lakhs of rupees, again sent his wukeel to Khan Dowran, and set out on his return to Satara, where he paid his respects to the raja, and immediately proceeded into the Concan.

The Portuguese, who had assisted in taking Kolabah, not having received some districts promised to them in the neighbourhood of Rewadunda, now appeared, as the allies of Sumbhaje Angria, against Mannajee, in another attack upon Kolabah. The Peishwa was sent to repel this attempt, in which he succeeded, took Mannajee under his protection, on condition of his paying the yearly sum of 7,000 rupees, and presenting annually to the raja foreign articles from Europe or China,* to the value of 3,000 rupees more. The war with the Portuguese led to the invasion of Salsette. Visajee Punt Leiley, a carcoon in the service of the Peishwa, corrupted some natives in the Portuguese service.† The Mahrattas first possessed themselves of a small fort‡ on the opposite side of the river from Bassein, on the night of the 6th April, put the commandant, with his garrison, to the sword, and occupied the river, so as to prevent all succour from Bassein to the other forts on the island; numbers of their troops crossed on the 7th, and the fortifications of Tannah being then unfinished, and a whole curtain wanting, the Portuguese governor of Salsette, Don Lewis Botelho, who was there, without attempting to defend it himself, called a council of war, and decided on retiring to Caranja, leaving Captain John de Souza Pereira to defend the fort, and Captain John de Souza Ferraz to command the garrison of Bandora, opposite to Mahim. Pereira behaved with spirit, and gallantly repulsed two assaults, in the last of which he was severely wounded; but the officer who succeeded him, having been seized with a panic, when there was no enemy in sight, shamefully took to flight. The English at Bombay, interested in the defence of Bandora, sent both men and ammunition to that post; but, on other occasions, declared their neutrality.§ The Peishwa, to secure these conquests, and to maintain the war against the Portuguese, entertained some Arabs, and a very large body of infantry, principally Mawulees and Hetkurees. But news from Delhi obliged him to withdraw a part of his forces from the Concan.

The emperor, having at last prevailed on Nizam-ool-Moolk to repair to court, the government of Malwa and Guzerat were restored to him, but in the name of his eldest son, Ghazee-ud-deen; the conditions were, that he should drive the Mahrattas from those provinces; and every inducement that could flatter his ambition, or stimulate his avarice, was held out to prevail upon him to undertake this service in person.

The fullest powers were granted by the emperor for assembling all the tributary rajas under his standard, whose forces, added to his own troops, enabled him to take the field with 34,000 men under his personal command, and a train of artillery accounted the best in India. Abool Munsoor Khan Sufdur Jung,|| nephew of Sadut Khan, and the raja of Kotha, covered his rear. The Nizam began operations with abundant caution, crossed over into the Dooab, and kept the Jumna on his right flank, re-

* Mahratta MSS. One manuscript states that some of his forts were also to be placed under havildars and carcoons, to be appointed by the raja.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ Probably Gorabundur.

§ Letter from Don Conde de Sandomel, viceroy of Goa, to the king of Portugal, 25th of January 1788.

|| Afterwards nabob of Oude, and the father of the well-known Shujah-ud-Dowlah.

crossed the river at Kalpee, obliged the rajas of Bundelcund to join him, and advanced into Malwa.

Bajee Rao assembled all the troops he could collect, and, by the time he reached the Nerbuddah, found himself at the head of an army estimated at 80,000 men.* Neither Yeswunt Rao Dhabaray, nor any of the Sena-puttee's officers, joined him; and Rughoojee Bhonslay evaded the order, under pretence that he apprehended an invasion of Berar.

When Bajee Rao crossed the Nerbuddah, Nizam-ool-Moolk was at Seronje. The two armies met near Bhopaul in the month of January, when the Nizam, instead of advancing at once on his adversary, took up a strong position in the neighbourhood of the fort of Bhopaul, with a tank in his rear, and a rivulet in his front.† This extreme caution may be said to have decided the fate of the war; the Mahrattas, who had approached under some alarm, no sooner fancied themselves superior, than they in fact became so. They insulted the Nizam in his lines; and, when a part of his army chose their own position for battle, the Mahrattas attacked them with vigour. The action was principally maintained, on the part of Nizam-ool-Moolk, by the Rajpoots, under the son of Raja Jey Sing, supported by the troops from Bundelcund, and the neighbouring rajas, all of whom, except the raja of Boondce, had united with Nizam-ool-Moolk. The Rajpoots lost about 500 men and 700 horses; the Mahratta loss was principally from the fire of the artillery, and estimated by the Peishwa himself at 100 killed and 300 wounded. Ranoojee Sindia, Peelajee Jadow, and Syajee Goozoor were the officers who led the Mahratta troops into action. The Peishwa, during the engagement, was within two rockets flight of the Nizam, anxiously watching an opportunity, in hopes that he would quit the strong ground on which he stood, when it was Bajee Rao's intention to have made an effort to cut him off; but in this he was disappointed. No decisive advantage was gained by the Mahrattas during the attack; but the Nizam recalled his troops, and allowed himself to be hemmed in on all sides; provisions and forage soon became exceedingly scarce; a detachment from the army, under Sufdur Jung and the raja of Kotah, was intercepted and defeated, with the loss of 1,500 men, by Mulhar Rao Holkar and Yeswunt Rao Powar. Sufdur Jung retreated, and the Mahrattas, exulting, straitened the army at Bhopaul, cut off their supplies, and kept them on the alert day and night. Dispirited by privation, and harassed by tiresome watching, many of the troops, especially the Rajpoots, would have deserted, but Bajee Rao would admit of no overtures; he now had an opportunity of showing his superiority to all India, and well knew that, as long as the blockade could be secured, the greater the numbers the greater their straits. It seemed unaccountable to Bajee Rao how Nizam-ool-Moolk should have thus put himself into his power. "The nabob," says the Peishwa in a letter to his brother, "is both an old man and a man of experience; how he has got himself into this difficulty I cannot comprehend; it will ruin him in the opinion of all at Delhi."

Preparations were made both in Hindostan and in the Deccan to effect his relief. Khan Dowran, perhaps, saw the distress of his rival with secret pleasure; and the emperor's command, not to advance until he should march in person, was an intimation to Bajee Rao that he had nothing to

* Letter from Chimnajee Appa, who says he crossed the Nerbuddah "by the route of Kurgouna, near Poonashah, at the head of 80,000 men."

† Original letter in the handwriting of Bajee Rao.

apprehend from the northward. The Nizam's principal hopes of succour were from the Deccan; troops were assembled, both at Hyderabad and Aurungabad, by his second son, Nasir Jung, whom he had left as his deputy; and messengers were secretly despatched from the camp at Bhopaul to hasten their march. Bajee Rao, on the other hand, exerted himself with the utmost earnestness to prevent their approach; he wrote, beseeched, and threatened Rughoojee Bhonslay, without effect; he entreated the raja to compel the Senaputtee, then at Sonegurh, near Surat, to join him; and Shao, to that end, wrote a peremptory mandate with his own hand. Chimnajee Appa took post on the Taptee, and the intended relief for the Nizam assembled at Phoolmurry,* north of Aurungabad. The Peishwa urged his brother in the strongest manner to collect every man he could: "bring up Futih Sing Bhonslay, Sumbhoo Sing Jadow, and the Sur Lushkur from the southward; if Dhabaray Gaekwar and Bhanday are not on their march to join me, let them take post with you on the Taptee; let every Mahratta join, and one grand and united effort may make us masters of the Deccan."

The Nizam made an attempt to move, but, owing to the encumbrance of heavy baggage and stores, he was compelled to return; his troops, in retiring to their former ground, were driven under the walls, or crowded within the fortifications of Bhopaul. Bajee Rao, from the want of artillery, could not effect a breach, but he poured in such a shower of rockets, and so galled the Moghuls with matchlocks, that Nizamool-Moolk determined on making a last effort to extricate himself. He deposited his baggage in Bhopaul and Islamgurh, and began his retreat under cover of a powerful artillery, and a number of swivels mounted on camels. The Mahrattas charged the guns, but failed in taking them. The retreat, however, was only at the rate of three miles a day. The Mahrattas acted vigorously, but began to be discouraged by the execution from the guns;† at last the Nizam, on the twenty-fourth day from the

February 11. commencement of the attack, about the 11th February, was compelled to sign a convention at Doorae Suraee, near Seronje, promising, in his own handwriting, to grant to Bajee Rao the whole of Malwa, and the complete sovereignty of the territory between the Nerbuddah and the Chumbul; to obtain a confirmation of it from the emperor, and to use every endeavour to procure the payment of a subsidy of 50 lakhs of rupees, to defray the Peishwa's expenses.‡ "I tried hard," says Bajee Rao, "to get something from the nabob himself, but this I scarcely expected. I recollected his unwillingness to part with money when I entered on an agreement to assist him"—alluding to their compact six years before.

The Peishwa remained for a time levying contributions south of the Chumbul, and carrying on negotiations at court, where the threatening invasion of Nadir Shah, at that time besieging Candahar, although mentioned by Mahomedan writers as an apology for the Nizam's failure

* This is the common Mahratta appellation; Phoolloomree is its proper name.

† Chimnajee had been with the Peishwa in the first campaign against Nizamool-Moolk, and had suffered from the Nizam's guns. Bajee Rao, as some apology for allowing him to move at all, significantly observes—"Appa, you know what kind of an artillery he has."

‡ The Nizam was surrounded from the 3rd to the 26th Ramzan. On the latter day the agreement was concluded. A copy of this paper was sent to Sir John Malcolm, when he was writing his report on Malwa, and I mention the date particularly, because I observe that, owing to a mistake in attaching the name of Ballajee, instead of that of his father, to the paper, he has been led into an error in regard to it.

against the Mahrattas, had as yet excited little alarm at court, and the inhabitants of Delhi, like all enervated and selfish people, were as careless of danger at a distance as terrified and helpless on its approach.

In the meantime the war in the Concan was maintained against the Portuguese; to keep them in check, a body of horse had been sent down towards Goa, under Venkut Rao Narain Ghorepuray; and Khundoojee Mankur, in the northern Concan, laid siege to the fort of Asseeree, near Tarrapoor; but Don Antonio Cardim Frois, an officer of reputation, had superseded the late governor of Bassein and Salsette, and exerted himself with some success in the recovery of their possessions. Colonel Pedro de Mello, with about 500 Europeans and 4,000 Portuguese, natives of India, attacked Khundoojee Mankur, stormed and destroyed the batteries at Asseeree, and was preparing to make a great effort for the recovery of Tannah. The governor of Bombay apprized the Mahrattas of the intended expedition, and advised them to make peace with the Portuguese; at the same time the English sold them both powder and shot,* but Khundoojee Mankur was reinforced, and Mulhar Rao Holkar was sent with all speed to Tannah, where he arrived in time to repulse an attack on the fort, led by Don Antonio Frois in person, who bravely fell in the attempt.

Although Bombay was then insignificant, it afterwards became a great English settlement, and the subtle part which its chiefs acted on that occasion, leaves room to regret that political animosity, and the spirit of commercial rivalry, should have tended to a conduct which certainly, in some degree, detracts from our national reputation. Like everything of the kind, it was exaggerated by the exasperated feelings of the other party; and although it must be admitted that the Portuguese had great reason to complain, their assertion that the English assisted the Mahrattas in the defence of Tannah, and that an English gunner pointed the cannon which killed their commander,† appears from all contemporary authority to be totally unfounded. We are also bound in justice to add, in regard to such part of the conduct of the English as deserves censure, that it was principally to be ascribed to the treatment they had experienced from the Portuguese. Bombay, with its dependencies, was ceded by the crown of Portugal to Charles II., in 1661, as the dowry of his queen. In the year following, when the English appeared and demanded possession, the Portuguese refused to give up Salsette, which they, contrary to what had always been understood, declared was not a dependency of Bombay. The English at first declined receiving any part of the cession, and the troops they had

A. D. 1739. brought, 500 in number, were landed on the island of Ajujeedeva. But 381 of them having fallen a sacrifice to the climate of that unhealthy spot, Ensign Humphray Cooke, who became the surviving commander, was glad to accept of Bombay on any terms. When the Portuguese, therefore, were dispossessed of Salsette by the Mahrattas, it was natural for the English,

* Mahratta MSS. The commandant of Bassein had good proof of this, for the Mahratta shot, which the year before were all hammered, were now thrown of cast iron, and bore the English stamp.

† I do not know whether it was Mr. John Horne or Mr. Stephen Law. Mr. Law succeeded Mr. Horne some time during the first part of the year 1789. Mr. Law, in a letter to the Court of Directors, 4th September 1789, is anxious to exculpate the government, and declares the complaints of the Portuguese gross misrepresentations, which so far exonerates the home authorities from suspicion of conniving at such acts of their servants; but what reason could the Mahrattas have for misrepresentation?

‡ Records of the Portuguese government at Goa.

in a public point of view,* to regard their misfortunes without regret, especially as it afforded a better chance of one day obtaining or conquering from the Mahrattas what they could not recover as their just rights from the Portuguese.

After the rains, the body of horse under Wenkut Rao Narain Ghorepuray, the Peishwa's brother-in-law, returned to the neighbourhood of Goa, whilst Chimnajee Appa was sent down with Sindia and Holkar into the Concan, attended by a very large army, a number of guns, and a vast body of infantry. Ranoojee Sindia, detached from the main army, took Kuttulwaree and Dannoo early in January; and before the month of February, Seergaom was surrendered, and Kelwa and Tarrapoor were carried by storm. At the last-mentioned place the defence and assault were desperate: there were four mines constructed by the Mahrattas, two of which succeeded, and effected large breaches in a bastion and curtain; the different leaders vied with each other in the attack. Bajee Bew Rao, Ramchundur Hurry, Yeswunt Rao Powar, and Tookajee Powar (the last an officer of Angria's) rushed forward with their respective colours; but the Portuguese gallantly opposed them, and for a time success was doubtful. At length Ranoojee Bhonslay, having crossed the ditch at a place where there was no breach, applied scaling ladders to the wall, and entered sword in hand; "but the garrison," says Chimnajee Appa in his account of the attack, "still fought with the bravery of Europeans," and defended themselves till completely overpowered. The few that remained alive, amongst whom was their commander, Don Francis de Alarcao, demanded and received quarter.†

Whilst the war was thus vigorously prosecuted against the Portuguese, and Ranoojee Bhonslay of Oomrautee, the uncle of Rughoojee, the Sena Sahib Soobeh, had, as related, distinguished himself at Tarrapoor, his nephew had seized the opportunity of extending his possessions to the eastward; he had plundered Kuttack, and during the period when the Nizam was surrounded at Bhopaul, Rughoojee made an incursion to the northward, as far as Allahabad, defeated and slew the soobehdar, Shujah Khan, and returned loaded with booty. These expeditions, undertaken without regular sanction, were highly resented by Bajee Rao. He marched from Poona for the purpose of punishing his misconduct, and sent forward Awjee Kowray to plunder in Berar. But that unfortunate officer‡ was attacked and defeated by Rughoojee in the end of February. Bajee Rao was preparing to avenge his loss, when news reached him of the arrival of Nadir Shah, the defeat of the Moghuls, the death of Khan Dowran, the capture of Sadut Khan, and, finally, that the victorious Persian was dictating the terms of ransom at the gates of Delhi. These accounts exceedingly alarmed Bajee Rao; but the subsequent intelligence which he received at Nusseerabad informed him of the imprisonment of the emperor, the plunder of Delhi, the dreadful massacre of many of its inhabitants,§ and seemed for a time to overwhelm him. "Our domestic quarrel with Rughoojee Bhonslay is now insignificant," says the Peishwa; "the war with the Portuguese is as naught; there is now but one enemy

* Individuals of the Portuguese nation who fled to Bombay experienced the utmost kindness and commiseration from the inhabitants. The governor gave them money for subsistence, and refitted some of their ships at the public expense.

† Letter from Chimnajee Appa to the Dawursee Swamee. Official report from Don Martin Silveira de Menezes, from Bassein, 18th February 1789.

‡ He was defeated by Dummajee Gaekwar before the battle of Dubhoj, in 1781.

§ Eight thousand by the lowest computation.

in Hindostan." He appears to have conceived that Nadir Shah would establish himself as emperor, but he was not dismayed when he heard reports that a hundred thousand Persians were advancing to the southward. "Hindoos and Mussulmans," says Bajee Rao, "the whole power of the Deccan must assemble, and I shall spread our Mahrattas from the Nerbuddah to the Chumbul." He called on Nasir Jung to arm against the common foe, and Chimnajee Appa was ordered to desist from the Concan warfare, and join him with all-speed. Before Chimnajee received this command, a detachment from his army, under Khundoojee Mankur, had reduced the forts of Versovah and Darawee; he was in possession of the whole of Salsette,* and had begun the siege of Bassein. It was invested by an advanced force under Shunkrajee Narain on the 17th of February. The commandant represented with humility that he was willing to pay the Mahratta tribute, and that the Portuguese asked no more than the terms granted to the Seedee of Jinjeera. But he was mistaken in supposing that such a tone would avert the attack of a victorious Bramin. Chimnajee was unwilling to relinquish the capture of an important fortress which would secure his conquests, and without which the Portuguese had a key which opened a passage to the recovery, not only of what they had lost, but to the whole Concan from the Ghauts to the sea, and from Damaun to Bombay; therefore, although the mandate from his brother was urgent, he determined to secure Bassein. Aware of the risk to which he exposed himself by the chance of discomfiture, during the whole of March and April he pressed the siege by every possible exertion. Numbers were daily killed in his batteries and trenches, where shells and huge stones, thrown from mortars, did terrible execution. The numerous guns of the besieged were at last silenced, and a breach had been effected in one of the curtains, but it was not yet practicable. The mines of the besiegers were repeatedly counteracted; at length five were prepared, but so unskilfully, that the first only partially exploded, and of three mines close together, intended to be fired at once, two only went off. These, however, made a very large breach, which the Mahratta troops resolutely and promptly mounted, when the remaining mine having caught fire, blew hundreds of the assailants in the air. The Portuguese flung a quantity of hand-grenades amongst the crowds in the rear, whilst they plied those who had ascended with musketry, and drove them back with much slaughter. The defences were repaired with alacrity, the besiegers returned to the attack; but, before attempting an assault at the former breach, the remaining mine under the tower of St. Sebastian, which had been constructed under the superintendence of Mulhar Rao Holkar, was fired: half the bastion was brought to the ground, and the assailants, after losing two of their colours, at last effected a lodgment. The besieged, however, although 40 of their number were killed, and upwards of 130 wounded at the breach of St. Sebastian, disputed every inch of ground, threw up a retrenchment of gabions, and mounted fresh guns, from which they kept up an incessant fire. At last, worn out by fatigue, and distressed for want of provisions, the sea face being blockaded by Mannajee Angria, they sent offers of capitulation, which were accepted on the 16th of May, and eight days were allowed to embark their private property and families. The Portuguese lost, in killed and wounded, according to the Mahratta account, 800 men, whilst Chimnajee Appa acknowledges his own loss at upwards of 5,000 from the commencement to the end of this

* Called Sashtee by the Mahrattas.

remarkable siege, the most vigorous ever prosecuted by Mahrattas. The Portuguese only enumerate their loss at the last breach. The capitulation was made by Captain de Souza Pereira, the same officer who before defended Tannah; Silveira de Menezes, the commanding officer, having been killed during one of the assaults.*

Holkar and Sindia, as soon as Bassein fell, were sent to join Bajee Rao with all speed, but by that time news had arrived of the retreat of the Persians.† Nadir Shah restored the throne to its degraded owner, and wrote letters to all the princes in India, announcing the event; amongst others, he addressed a letter to Shao, and one to Bajee Rao. He informs the latter that he has reinstated Mohummud Shah, and now considered him as a brother; that, although Bajee Rao was an ancient servant possessing a large army, he had not afforded the emperor assistance; but that all must now attend to Mohummud Shah's commands, for if they did not, he would return with his army and inflict punishment upon the disobedient.‡

* Original Mahratta, and copies of the original Portuguese, reports, which coincide in almost every particular. The Mahrattas during the whole campaign lost 12,000 or 14,000 men in killed and wounded.

For the valuable information which I obtained, in May 1822, from the records of the Portuguese government, I here beg to offer my acknowledgments to his excellency the viceroy of Goa, who most liberally supplied me with copies of the whole correspondence relative to the conquest of Salsette.

† By the Bombay Records, at the East India House, it appears that Nadir Shah quitted Delhi 5th May 1739.

‡ Original letter from Nadir Shah to Bajee Rao.

CHAP. XVI.

FROM A. D. 1739 TO A. D. 1740.

The government of Malwa not formally conceded to Bajee Rao as promised by Nizam-ool-Moolk.—The Peishwa's arrangements in Malwa and Bundelcund, previous to attempting the conquest of the Deccan.—Motives which deterred and prompted the Peishwa.—Rughoojee Bhonslay is induced to undertake an expedition into the Carnatic.—The Peishwa attacks Nasir Jung—plans frustrated at the outset—departs for Hindostan.—Chimnaje Appa recalled into the Concan to support Ballajee Bajee Rao.—Operations against Sumbhaje Angria—interrupted by intelligence of the death of Bajee Rao.—Brief retrospect of the rise and progress of the Mahrattas.—State of the Moghul empire, and of the powers in India.—Imperial court.—Nabob of Oude.—Rajpoots.—Origin of the Jhats—of Aliverdy Khan—of the Rohillas.—State of the Deccan and Carnatic.—Nabobs of Arcot—Kurnoul—Kurpa—and Savanoor.—Tanjore.—English—French and Portuguese.—Raja of Soonda.—Dessaye of Carwar.—Mysore.—Artificial revenue system of the Mahrattas—Remarks on—Character of Bajee Rao.—His sons, Ballajee Bajee Rao, Rugonath Rao, Jenardin Bawa, and Shumsher Buhadur.

SHORTLY after the departure of Nadir Shah, Bajee Rao sent a letter to A. D. 1739. the emperor expressive of his submission and obedience, and a nuzur of 101 goldmohurs, which was acknowledged in suitable terms, and a splendid khillut* sent in return. He is assured by the emperor that the rank, jagheers, districts, and inheritance, already conferred on him, shall be confirmed, and that he may depend on finding his interests best promoted by continuing steadfast in his duty to the imperial government.†

Although no new sobehdar, nor any deputy of Nizam-ool-Moolk, was appointed to Malwa, yet no sunnud was sent conferring the government on Bajee Rao. This omission the Peishwa considered a breach of faith on the part of Nizam-ool-Moolk; but the Nizam's army being still in Hindostan, and some of Bajee Rao's best officers and troops advancing from the Concan, he deferred enforcing his claims until a fitter opportunity. In the meantime he was busied in arranging the affairs of the province of Malwa, and strengthening his connection with the Rajpoot princes in the western quarter, along the banks of the Chumbul from Kotah to Allahabad, but especially with Juggut Deo and his brother Hurdesa, rajas of Bundelcund. With these two princes he entered into a very particular and secret

* A sirpa is an honorary dress, consisting of cloths for the turban, trowsers, girdle, and gown, complete; hence its name sir-pa, or head to foot. A khillut comprehends not only the dress, but all the additions of jewels, horse, elephant, and arms, according to circumstances and the rank of the parties. On the occasion alluded to, Bajee Rao received two ornaments of jewels for the turban, and a pearl necklace, together with a horse and an elephant.

† Original letter from Mohummud Shah.

alliance for the purpose of mutual protection and support against the Mahomedans. The contracting parties became bound by the most solemn oaths. The rajas of Bundelcund agreed to accompany Bajee Rao in all his incursions across the Jumna and Chumbul, and, with the exception of the territory of Budawur,* to share in all prize and conquest in a proportion corresponding to the numerical strength of their respective forces; they promised, "in case of Bajee Rao's being engaged in a war in the Deccan, to defend Bundelcund for at least two months, and if, at the end of that time, the Mahrattas should not be advancing to their assistance, they will make the best terms they can as a means of temporary safety, but break them the moment they are joined by their Hindoo allies." Bajee Rao's share of the territories of the former raja, Chittoor Sal, exclusive of Jhansee, was now fixed at five lakhs of rupees.†

These arrangements to secure the northern frontier were preparatory to a war with Nizam-ool-Moolk, or an expedition into the Carnatic. The late success against Nizam-ool-Moolk, his departure from the terms of agreement, his great age, the probability of contentions among his sons, encouraged or stimulated the Peishwa to attempt the subjugation of the Deccan; but the deficiency of his resources for so great a design was the chief obstacle which deterred him from this undertaking. On the other hand, the prospect of contributions and plunder, by which he might liquidate his debts, and perhaps some secret encouragement from Arcot,‡ were strong allurements for venturing into the Carnatic. But Bajee Rao was critically situated, and circumstances impelled him to choose the Deccan as the theatre of his operations. The party of Dhabaray, or rather of Dummajee Gaekwar, the agent of Ooma Bye (as her son Yeswunt Rao, even when he grew up, was incompetent to his situation), possessed very considerable resources, and, from causes already detailed, was always inimical to the Peishwa.

Rughoojee Bhonslay was jealous of the Bramin ascendancy; he meditated a revolution by getting the raja into his own power; and as Shao had no prospect of an heir, Rughoojee may have contemplated the possession of the Mahratta supremacy by being adopted as his son. Futil Sing Bhonslay, the only Mahratta likely to supersede him in the raja's choice, possessed neither ability nor enterprize, and had failed to create power by acquiring popularity among the soldiery. Rughoojee had many difficulties to overcome in prosecuting a scheme of the kind. Although a party existed inimical to the Peishwa, Bajee Rao's friends and dependents surrounded the raja, and possessed his ear, if not his entire confidence; nor could Rughoojee Bhonslay nor Dummajee Gaekwar concert a plan or transact the slightest business without Bramin agency; should Bajee Rao, however, quit the position which he occupied between the territories of those two, there would be no obstacle to their uniting against him.

The subsisting difference between Rughoojee and Bajee Rao arose from Rughoojee's having plundered the province of Allahabad, and not having joined when he was ordered, according to the terms on which he held his lands and title. The Peishwa affirmed that he had no authority for levying contributions north of the Nerbuddah, and declared his deter-

* I do not know whether this exception was meant in favour of the rajas of Bundelcund, or the Peishwa.

† Poona Records.

‡ Colonel Wilks states that the Mahrattas were invited by Meer Assud, the dewan of Suddur Ali. Some confirmation of this appears in Tippee's circular letter, translated by Mr. Edmonstone; but I have met with no trace of it in any Mahratta record.

mination, at the time of his marching from Poona in the end of 1738, to enforce restitution—not to the owners, but to the Mahratta state—and to punish the aggression. A temporary compromise took place on the arrival of the Persians at Delhi; but the dispute was unsettled, and nothing but a sense of injury to their mutual interests prevented an open war.*

This state of affairs laid the foundation of schemes which had a great effect in extending the spreading but unstable power of the Mahrattas. Unfortunately there are few direct proofs to illustrate this part of their history. It is however certain that Bajee Rao and Rughojee had a meeting, and that they were reconciled.

From all that has been stated, as well as from subsequent events, there is reason to suppose that Bajee Rao unfolded as much of his schemes to Rughojee as were necessary to engage his co-operation; and the plunder of the Carnatic, an eventual addition to his own territories in the Deccan, and a future partition of Bengal and Hindostan, may have been urged by the Peishwa to excite his ambition and cupidity. In this conference may also be seen the real spring from which a host of Mahrattas were poured into the Carnatic.†

* Mahratta MSS., and original letters.

† The only authentic record I have recovered of the arrangement which preceded this expedition, and that bears no date, is a copy of the original authority by the raja, which is not more loose and vague than many Mahratta documents equally important. By this paper, I conjecture that the Peishwa furnished the infantry, and, from subsequent events, it is probable that he by this means weakened his own army. The cavalry under Rughojee was furnished by different leaders. I do not know who Koosajee Yessajee Bhonslay, the person mentioned in the paper, was, but he is supposed to have been the commander of the infantry.

Literal translation of an authority issued by Shao Maharaj to the Sena Sahib Soobeh. To Rajman Rajasree Rughojee Bhonslay, Sena Sahib Soobeh,—

The following orders are issued to you regarding the arrangements to be made in the province of the Carnatic, south of the Toongbuddra:—

Districts the collections from which wholly belong to the Raja Shao.

1. Trichinopoly.
2. Tanjore.
3. Arcot, including Ginjee.
4. Seringapatam, after deducting what is fixed by the treaty with government.

Other Districts.

1. Sera.
2. Adonee.
3. Kurnoul.
4. Kurpa.
5. Phoot Mahal (or portions of various districts).

According to the amount which may be received from the above-mentioned places, the surdeshmookhee, babtee, sahotra, &c., having been deducted, the remainder being mokassa, one-half of it to be the share of Koosajee Yessajee Bhonslay, and the other is to belong to the raja (Shao).

In this manner the whole of the four first-mentioned places, and the surdeshmookhee and babtee, and one-half of the mokassa of the remaining places, being formed into one sum, one-half of it is to be taken by you for the expenses of your troops, and the other half, being the amount belonging to government, is to be paid into the state treasury, by means of _____. You and he, with mutual consultation, having made proper arrangements, are to gain possession of hill forts, forts, and territory. Whatever cavalry are required to be stationed for garrisoning forts and fortified places, are to be placed in them by you; and he will place whatever infantry are requisite. In this manner the forts are to be garrisoned. The sum, however, payable for the present year, is fixed at seven lakhs, which is to be paid to the

1 Blank in the Mahratta paper, but supposed to be "the Mookh Purdhan" (Bajee Rao).

In prosecution of his plans of conquest in the Deccan, Bajee Rao, seizing the opportunity afforded by the absence of Nizam-ool-Moolk at Delhi, commenced his operations about the end of the year, by surrounding Nasir Jung, the second son of the Nizam, who was encamped in the neighbourhood of Aurangabad with 10,000 men; but a very large body of horse and foot, with a numerous artillery, advanced to his relief, and, having effected a junction, Nasir Jung, thus reinforced, attacked Bajee Rao, crossed the Godavery in defiance of the Mahratta army, and moved in the direction of Ahmednugur, plundering the villages in his route.* The Peishwa, being joined by Chimnajee

A. D. 1740. Appa, with a body of fresh troops, principally Concan infantry, repeatedly attacked the Moghuls, and Nasir Jung was at length compelled to retire towards the Godavery; but after several months the Mahrattas, tired of the unprofitable war, gladly entered on terms of accommodation, and a treaty was concluded at Moongy Pyetun, by which both parties pledged themselves to maintain peace, and mutually to refrain from plundering in the Deccan.† Hindia and Kirkoun, districts on the banks of the Nerbuddah, were conferred on Bajee Rao in jagheer,‡ and the Peishwa, without visiting Poona or Satara, in great vexation, amounting almost to despair,§ set off with his army towards Hindostan. Chimnajee Appa was called to support Ballajee Bajee Rao, the Peishwa's son, engaged in hostilities in the Concan.

Sumbhajee Angria, still intent on recovering Kolabah from his half-brother Mannajee, taking advantage of the absence of so large a body of troops, had again attacked Mannajee's districts, and having rapidly taken Choule, Alibagh, Thull, and Sagurgurh, laid siege to Kolabah, and cut off the garrison from fresh water. Mannajee applied to Ballajee Bajee Rao, who was with the raja in the neighbourhood of Satara. Five hundred men were accordingly sent to support the garrison, and an express despatched to Chimnajee Appa for instructions. Chimnajee had ordered his nephew to repair to Kolabah in person, and applied to the governor

government as above; according to what is written, having brought affairs to a conclusion, by performing the service of the Swamee (the raja), your conduct will be approved, and let the end be accomplished according to what is written. What occasion is there for writing much? Dependence is wholly placed in you by Swamee. You are wise.

* The respectable author of the Khuzaneh Amirah was not aware of the junction of these troops. Shah Nuwaz Khan, author of the Muasir-ool-Oomrah, was probably present during the service; but he does not, in his memoirs of Nasir Jung, mention the strength of the army with which he crossed the Godavery. Nasir Jung appears to have been accompanied by the whole of his father's park of artillery, which may have been sent back from Malwa; and Chimnajee Appa, in an original letter, states his army at 30,000 cavalry, 20,000 infantry, 150 guns, 300 swivels and jingals (or wall pieces) mounted on camels, and 300 rocket camels. Allowing him to have greatly over-estimated them, as enemies, there was still too large a force to authorize as a general such a venture on the part of Bajee Rao.

† Original letter from Chimnajee Appa, Mahratta MSS. Nasir Jung's army did not pass Ahmednugur. Sir J. Malcolm is under a mistake in supposing that Nasir Jung burnt Poona.

‡ Khuzaneh Amirah, "Hudeequ-i-Alum, Mahratta MSS. Chimnajee Appa mentions that some jagheer districts towards the Nerbuddah, formerly promised by Nazam-ool-Moolk, were ceded, but their names are not specified by him.

§ The following passage occurs in one of his letters to his Mahapooroosh. It is without date, but supposed to be written at this period of disappointment. "I am involved in difficulties, in debt, and in disappointments, and like a man ready to swallow poison: near the raja are my enemies, and should I at this time go to Satara, they will put their feet on my breast. I should be thankful if I could meet death."

in council at Bombay (with whom he had concluded a treaty, and maintained a friendly intercourse since his late campaign in the Concan) to support the garrison at Kolabah, and assist them with water, which was immediately done. Ballajee, or, as he was then invariably designated, Nana Sahib, arrived at Kolabah on the fifth day's march, and distinguished himself on his first service, by an attack on a party stationed under the protection of Heerakot, which he drove into Sumbhaje's camp, killed 25 or 30 men, and took Toolajee, the half-brother of Sumbhaje, prisoner.* The English had arrived before Nana Sahib; they forced the fleet of Sumbhaje to run down to Severndroog, and compelled him to move his camp from the seaside, where it was pitched on their arrival, and to throw up an intrenchment to protect his people from a heavy cannonade which they opened from their ships. Sumbhaje applied to the English for permission to retire to Severndroog,† but they refused to listen to his request. He, however, effected his escape by some means of which the Mahratta letters and manuscripts afford no particulars. Chimnajee Appa having joined Nana Sahib, they were concerting the reduction of Rawadunda, when accounts reached them of the death‡ of Bajee Rao, which happened on the banks of the Nerbuddah on the 28th day of April 1740. On receiving this intelligence, Shunkrajee Narain was appointed soobehdar of the Concan, Khundoojee Mankur was left in command of a body of troops, whilst Chimnajee Appa and his nephew, after the usual ceremonies of mourning, which occupy ten or twelve days, returned to Poona, and shortly afterwards repaired to Satara.

The death of Bajee Rao is an event in Mahratta annals, which, on his account alone, deserves a pause. In the history of this nation, whose very existence was the confusion of other states, an occasional survey, however brief, of those powers with whom they have transactions, is absolutely necessary. The reader may now, indeed, be less at a loss to comprehend who the Mahrattas were, than European contemporaries of Bajee Rao, who heard of a people unknown a century before,§ that had overturned ancient monarchies, who were plundering and burning on the east and on the west, from the Hooghly to the Bunass, and from Madras to Delhi; yet from the diffusive nature of their conquests, one may be apt, without some survey of the kind, combined with a retrospective view of their past history, to lose sight of the rise and progress of their power, and of their relative importance in India. The Mahomedan wars, from the commencement of the seventeenth century, the plans and conquests of Siyajee, the state of the Deccan after his death, the increase of habitual

* He was released, but in what manner does not appear.

† Chimnajee Appa's letter.

‡ On the death of a near relation, Hindoos are supposed unclean for ten days, during which they are to be rigidly abstemious in every respect; this observance is called *sootuck*. Where the relationship is not near, or the death happens at a great distance, one, two, or three days are sufficient. The funeral rites ought to be performed by the nearest relation, and always last ten days, during which, or until the twelfth or thirteenth day, the mourner is considered unclean. After a corpse is burnt or buried, the soul is supposed to hover round the spot for ten days before it wings its flight, to receive judgment from Yem Dhurm. In whatever place a Hindoo hears of the death of a parent, he shaves his mustachios, and performs all the rites as if present where the death happened. Bramins observe the anniversary of the death of their relations, and on the new moon of every month perform certain ceremonies to their manes.

§ Even up to the period of the death of Raja Ram, they were less known among Europeans by the name of Mahrattas than by that of the *Siyaees*.

rapine by the absence of controlling authority, the immense predatory power which was thus prepared, and the means of directing it, placed by the Moghuls in the hands of Shao, had all their share in accumulating the mighty mass of Mahratta force; and when we consider the skill with which Ballajee Wishwanath and his successor combined and guided the whole weight of such a tremendous engine of destruction, we cease to feel surprised at the havoc which it spread. Other causes besides Mahratta progress had concurred to complete the humiliation of the Timoorian dynasty, and, at the period of Bajee Rao's death, the vast fabric of the Moghul empire was disjoined or in ruins.

Mohummud Shah had received his liberty and his crown, after both had been subjected to the will of a despot. Delhi had been plundered of upwards of 30 millions of pounds sterling; thousands of its inhabitants had been cruelly massacred; and Cabul, Tatta, and Mooltan were added by Nadir Shah to his kingdom of Persia.

Khan Dowran, who was killed in a precipitate attack on the Persian army, had been succeeded as vizier by Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the friend of Nizam-ool-Moolk, so that the faction of the Tooranee Moghuls remained in power, though contrary to the secret wishes of the emperor. Nizam-ool-Moolk, dignified with the title of Umeer-ool-Oomrah, remained for some time at Delhi; but, having heard that his son, Nazir Jung, meditated rebellion, he obtained the emperor's sanction for transferring his title of Umeer-ool-Oomrah to his eldest son, Ghazee-ud-deen, and commenced his march for the Deccan.

Sadut Khan, the nabob of Oude, died before Nadir Shah left Delhi, and his nephew and son-in-law, Abdool Munsoor Khan Sufdur Jung, was appointed his successor.

The principal Rajpoots, still tributary to the emperor, were those of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Oudepoor. Both the last-mentioned states had been subjected to partial devastation from the Mahrattas; but the intimate connection subsisting between Jey Sing and Bajee Rao^{*} prevented such aggressions in the districts of Jeypoor.

The Jhats, originally a tribe of Shooders from the banks of the Indus, had, a short time before the death of Aurungzebe, established themselves in the territory between Agra and Jeypoor. Their chief, Chooramun, attained power during the confusion of the times, and the plunder of the baggage of Aurungzebe's army is said to have furnished the means of beginning the fortifications of Bhurtpoor. Though situated at such a distance from each other, the Mahratta progress was the cause of the rise of the Jhats; and being afterwards, from the time the Mahrattas crossed the Chumbul, drawn together by mutual interest, a friendly intercourse has, for the most part, subsisted between them.

About this period, the usurper, Aliverdy Khan, established his authority over the provinces of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa. From a humble situation in the service of Shujah-ud-deen Khan, nabob of Bengal, Aliverdy had been appointed the nabob's deputy in Behar. Surfuraz Khan, the heir-apparent to the nabobship, was stationed at Dacca, and Moorshed Koollee Khan, the son-in-law of Shujah-ud-deen, was the deputy governor of Orissa, having for his dewan a native of Arabia,† named Meer Hubeeb.

* Bajee Rao had a secret agent residing with Jey Sing. The name of the envoy (Venkajee Ram) is mentioned in one of Bajee Rao's original letters.

† Mahratta MSS. Gholam Hoosein Khan, author of the Seyr-ool-Mutuakhereen, calls him a native of Persia, a pedlar from Iran. Meer Hubeeb was intimately known to the Mahrattas, who always designate him as an Arab.

On the death of Shujah-ud-deen, Surfuraz Khan was appointed nabob. Aliverdy Khan rebelled, and slew him in battle. He also attacked and drove Moorshed Koolee from Orissa. Meer Hubeeb, the dewan, a person afterwards so instrumental in Mahratta progress, also fled, but subsequently submitted, and entered the service of the successful insurgent. Aliverdy Khan was acknowledged by the emperor as nabob of Bengal, in consequence of sending a part of the property and jewels of Surfuraz Khan to court.

New states sprung up even in the environs of Delhi; the founder of the principality, afterwards known by the name of Rohillah, had been for some time rising into notice. The person who first established himself was the son of a Hindostanee Ahee,* a class of shepherds nearly similar to the Dhungurs of Maharashtra. An Afghan adopted him, when a boy, as his son, and gave him the name of Ali Mohammud Rohillah, which procured for him and all his followers the appellation of Rohillahs. He began his career under the deputy governors of Mooradabad, as commander of a small party of Afghan cavalry. He afterwards got possession of lands on pretence of paying a higher rent for them; and at last, on an attempt to suppress his encroachments, he raised an insurrection, and defeated the deputy of the vizier Kummur-ud-deen Khan, in whose jagheer, situated in the Dooab, little more than a hundred miles to the southward of the capital, all these circumstances happened.

In the Deccan and Carnatic, Nizam-ool-Moolk divided the revenue with the Mahrattas, except in the Swuraje, and where territory had been wholly ceded in jagheer; the Nizam, in other situations, claiming sovereignty, as the Mahrattas did tribute, over all those states and principalities to the southward of the Toongbuddra, which had submitted to Aurungzebe.

Dost Ally, the nephew of that Sadut Oolla Khan who, in the year 1706, was left by Daood Khan as his deputy in the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut, had, in 1732, succeeded his uncle as nabob, but without obtaining the sanction of Nizam-ool-Moolk or the authority of the emperor.

The country was breaking into many small states; the nabobs of Kurnoul, Kurpa, and Savanoor, the descendants of governors under the dynasties of Beejapoor and Golcondah, were closely connected with some of the Mahrattas, and had been, for some time, nearly independent. The son-in-law of the nabob of Arcot, the well-known Chunda Sahib, had obtained possession of Trichinopoly, on pretence of affording protection to the widow of its late raja.

The nominal raja of Tanjore was the grandson of Sivajee's brother Venkajee. Tookajee, the youngest of Venkajee's three sons, was the only one who had issue; and at this period two sons of Tookajee's remained alive; the one, Syajee, was legitimate, the other, Pertaub Sing, was the son of a concubine. The government was administered under the name of the former, but the power was held by a Mahomedan officer, who, since the time of Tookajee, had been vested with the command of the fort of Tanjore. Syajee, who some years afterwards placed himself under the protection of the English at Madras, was dispossessed by this officer, who raised Pertaub Sing to the head of the government in 1741; but the new raja would not submit to the control of his minister, and freed himself from a state of tutelage by assassination.

The English and French, who were so soon to take a part in the contentions and usurpations of the times, still remained on the defensive, unconscious of their own strength, or unwilling to exert it; and although the

* Mr. Forster says he was a Jath.

former, when driven to arms, had manfully asserted their rights on all occasions, yet the merchants of those two great nations, in common with those of other European factories, sought only to increase their trade and privileges by humble submission, and frequent bribes or presents to the petty courts surrounding them.

The Portuguese had been severely humbled by the Mahrattas. The English at Bombay courted the Peishwa, through his brother Chimnajee Appa, for the purpose of obtaining an extension of commercial privileges, and a treaty had been settled with Chimnajee Appa at Bassein, in July 1739.

The raja of Soonda and the dessaye of Carwar had assisted the Portuguese in their war against the Mahrattas; but the rana of Bednore, whose territory adjoined that of Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor, appears to have remained neutral.

The Mysore state, though a declared tributary of the Moghuls, and of the raja Shao, had for 12 or 15 years, by the commotions of its neighbours, and the vigour of some of its officers, been exempted from the scene of plunder and exaction which devastated the greater part of India.

Such was the disjointed state of the Moghul empire at this important period. The detail of events has unfolded the parties, the feuds, and the domestic policy of the Mahrattas; but something remains to be said of the administration and character of Bajee Rao.

Having already dwelt upon the artificial divisions of revenue, adopted as a means of cementing union among the Mahrattas, it is fit to enquire how far it tended to that end, and how long the detail of the system was preserved. That it did create union, and give an immediate direction to predatory power of the Deccan, is unquestionable; and it is probable the Mahrattas would never have spread their conquests so far, had not this means been devised for conciliating and controlling the chiefs. It was founded on a principle of self-interest, which, fitly directed to the views of a community, is unerring in its results; but it must always be remembered that this principle, when misapplied or misunderstood, may tend as much to stir up sedition, and to create hostility, as to preserve union and ensure combination. Bajee Rao had not leisure to attend to detail or arrangement; the minute divisions, which were made of the revenues ceded by the Moghuls, served to provide hundreds of Bramin carcoons with bread; and every one interpreted the amount of his own, or his master's claims to surdeshmookhee, batee, mokassa, &c., rather according to his power to enforce his demands, than his ability to prove their justice.

The more solid institutions of Sivajee are yet found amongst his native mountains, but the origin of the distribution of revenue in the year 1720 was, in less than 50 years, understood by few people in the Mahratta country,* and is now useful chiefly as an historical record.

* There is an original memorandum from Nana Farnuwees, without date, amongst the old papers at Satara, desiring to know the period and origin of the distribution. On this paper is marked, seemingly as a memorandum of the answer sent, *Scorpus* 1117 (about Anno Domini 1717). I have frequently found Bramin revehue officers, in other respects very intelligent men, who said there was no difference in the origin of jagheer and mokassa, both being bestowed, as they observed, "for the maintenance of troops, and consequently they must always have been the same." The want of research and historical observation amongst the Mahrattas, in common with all Hindoos, is a greater obstacle to the attainment of information than can be conceived in a European country. Everything must be wormed out of them by attentive perseverance; in that way there is a wide field for the enquirer; but unfortunately it takes years of experience before a European is qualified to question a native of India.

Since writing the above note, I have discovered a letter written in the year 1766,

With regard to Bajee Rao, when we look to the perplexities, both foreign and domestic, in which he was involved, the confusion which continued to prevail in every branch of the administration is far from surprising. He manifested little disposition towards regular government : many of his countrymen accuse him of avarice, of some disregard to the observances of his faith, and of being so entirely a soldier as to neglect every branch of finance and jurisprudence. Their opinions are entitled to full consideration, but will not greatly detract from the superior character of Bajee Rao. If he inherited some of the defects of his caste, he was free from their bigotry, and but slightly tainted with the meaner vices, which render the general character of Bramins, when in power, despicable. The strictures of his countrymen are best answered by his embarrassments and his career. It is true he was inordinately ambitious, and in his last scheme of subjugating the Deccan, he completely miscalculated his means ; yet he made the best amends for his want of foresight, by receding from the attempt in a creditable manner. Bajee Rao's plans, like those of most men when formed amidst a choice of difficulties, surrounded by faction, intrigues, and danger, did not extend to remote futurity. As a politician, however, in suppressing much domestic opposition, in quickly discerning, and promptly counteracting, the designs of Nizam-ool-Moolk, he evinced penetration, talent, and vigour. His enlarged views, in fitly directing the only power at his disposal, might lead us to suppose him capable of the greatest undertaking, but a summary of character must reject speculation. As a predatory leader, his qualities were great ; he was brave and eloquent, enterprising and skilful. The period at which he lived, and the circumstances under which he acted, are so very different from those of Sivajee, that a comparison cannot be succinctly drawn. Yet the distinctions are sufficiently obvious, and Bajee Rao, though a better man, must remain a much less distinguished character in history.

Bajee Rao was handsome in his person, and his manner was more that of a frank soldier than of a smooth courtier ; when in the field with his troops, he kept up no state, and shared in all the privations of the meanest horseman. An anecdote illustrative of his character is preserved from the following circumstance. Before Nizam-ool-Moolk had seen Bajee Rao, during the first campaign in which they were opposed to each other, the former desired a famous painter in his service to repair to the army of Bajee Rao, and bring his likeness, taken in whatever attitude he might first see him. The painter executed his task, and, on his return, exhibited the Peishwa mounted, with the head and heel ropes of his horse in his feeding-bag, like that of a common Mahratta, his spear resting on his shoulder, whilst he was rubbing with both his hands some ears of ripened Joowaree,* which he was eating as he rode.

Bajee Rao left three sons. Ballajee Bajee Rao, the eldest, succeeded him as Peishwa ; his second son was Rugonath Rao, afterwards so well known to the English ; and his third was Jenardin Bawa, who died in early youth. He also left one illegitimate son by a Mahomedan mother, whom he bred a Mussulman, and named Shumsher Buhadur.

where similar queries are put, to know the meaning of the *Swuraje territory*. "The *Swuraje*," says the writer of the answer (Govind Rao Chitnees), "is the territory west of the Beema, and all which you call *Swuraje*, beyond that, is *Zuburdustee*" (violent usurpation).

* A sort of grain (*Holcus Saccharatus*) common throughout the Deccan. The meal the Peishwa was making is a very common one in a Mahratta army, and if they have nothing else, they do not consider it great privation. A Mahratta cultivator frequently subsists for weeks on the ripening grain, with no other sustenance.

CHAP. XVII.

FROM A. D. 1740 TO A. D. 1749.

Operations of the Mahrattas in the Carnatic.—Rughojee Bhonslay endeavours, without success, to prevent the accession of Ballajee Bajee Rao as Peishwa.—A new governor appointed to Malwa.—The Peishwa's petitions to the emperor.—Death of Chimnajee Appa.—His son Sewdasheo Chimnajee Bhow.—The Peishwa obtains a grant from the raja,—importance attached to it at this period.—Bhaskur Punt invades the Bengal provinces.—The Peishwa reduces Gurrah and Mundelah.—Dummajee Guekwar invades Malwa—retires.—The Peishwa confirms Anund Rao Powar in the possession of Dhar.—Chouth of the whole of the imperial territory promised to the Peishwa.—Progress of Bhaskur Punt,—is at last compelled by Aliverdy Khan to retreat.—Rughojee Bhonslay, in person, invades Bengal.—The Peishwa, on promise of the government of Malwa and other advantages, supports Aliverdy Khan, and defeats the army of Rughojee Bhonslay—obtains the government of Malwa,—returns to Satara,—is obliged to resign Bengal to Rughojee Bhonslay, to prevent his combining with other chiefs against him.—Affairs of Nizam-ool-Moolk.—Suppresses the rebellion of his son, Nasir Jung.—Proceeds to the Carnatic—arrangements.—Rughojee Bhonslay's troops renew their incursions into Bengal.—Bhaskur Punt, with most of his principal officers, treacherously murdered by Aliverdy Khan.—Deoghur and Chandah annexed to the territory of Rughojee Bhonslay.—The Peishwa's proceedings.—Expedition into the Carnatic under Sewdasheo Chimnajee.—Specific agreement with the rajahs of Bundelcund.—Rise of Ahmed Shah Abdallee,—his first invasion of Hindostan—is repulsed by the imperial army, and retreats to Cabul.—Death of the Emperor Mohummud Shah.—Accession of his son Ahmed Shah.—Death of Nizam-ool-Moolk.—Revolutions in the Carnatic.—Nasir Jung with a vast army proceeds to that quarter.—Important domestic arrangements of the Mahrattas.—Discovery of Ram Raja.—Plots and intrigues at Satara during the last illness of Shac.—Important deed consigned to the Peishwa.—Ballajee's proceedings on the death of the raja.—Bare manner in which he compasses the destruction of Sucknoar Bye Sirkay.

THE army which entered the Carnatic, under the command of Rughojee Bhonslay, was composed of troops belonging to the raja, the Peishwa, the Pritee Needhee, Futhi Sing Bhonslay, and various chiefs of less note. The Ghorepurays of Sondoor* and Gooty were invited to join, by letters from Shao and the Peishwa; and Moorar Rao,* the grand nephew of the famous Suintajee Ghorepuray, and adopted son and heir of Moorar Rao of Gooty, appeared under the national standard for the first time, since the death of his distinguished

* This is the *Moorari Row*, so often mentioned by Mr. Orme in his admirable war of Coromandel.

and ill-requited relation. He demanded his rank as Senaputtee, or commander-in-chief of the Mahratta army, but consented to waive it on obtaining a promise of three districts near the Toongbuddra.* According to Mahratta manuscripts, the whole force which entered the Carnatic amounted to 50,000 men.† They descended by an unfrequented road, appeared in the rear of Dost Ally, in the neighbourhood of the Damulcherry pass, attacked and slew him, defeated his troops, and took his dewan, Meer Assud, prisoner. They commenced levying contributions all over the province, until bought off by Sufdur Ali, the son and heir of the late nabob, with whom, before retiring, they entered into a secret compact, to return and crush Chunda Sahib, then in possession of Trichinopoly, whose popularity and power had for some time excited the jealousy and apprehension of Sufdur Ali and Meer Assud. No bait could be more alluring to the Mahrattas than Trichinopoly, and the troops only retired 250 miles towards Maharashtra, to prepare for the promised conquest, and lull suspicion of an attack.‡

Whilst the main body of his army remained encamped on the Sew Gunga, Rughoojee Bhonslay returned to Satara, and endeavoured to prevent Ballajee Bajee Rao's succession as Peishwa, by proposing Bappoojee Naik§ of Barramuttee, a connection, but an enemy, of the late Peishwa, for the vacant office. Bappoojee Naik was possessed of great wealth, and his enmity to Bajee Rao arose from a very common cause, that of having lent money, which his debtor could not repay. Rughoojee's party used the irritated creditor as their tool, and very large sums were offered to Shao on condition of Bappoojee's being raised to the vacant Peishwaship.

The Pritee Needhee, although adverse to the supremacy of the Peishwa, was yet more inimical to the pretensions of Rughoojee, and as he did not engage in the intrigue, Ballajee Bajee Rao, assisted by his uncle Chimanajee, was at last invested in August 1740. A more serious cause of uneasiness to Ballajee Bajee Rao arose from his being answerable for his father's debts, and Bappoojee Naik enforced his demand with all the importunity and harassing pertinacity which is often exercised by the Mahratta creditor.|| From this persecution Ballajee was relieved by the influence and credit of his dewan, Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, a service of which the Peishwa ever after retained a grateful recollection.

* Mahratta MSS.

† They are stated at 100,000 by Orme; but any large army is reported to be a lakh.

‡ Orme, Wilks.

§ Bramin soucars and money-changers assume the appellation of Naik.

|| The mode of recovering a debt is by a species of dunning called *tuqazu*; the most common practised is to hire a few of those men, who make it a trade. They sit at the debtor's door, follow him wherever he goes, and crave with humility, or demand with insolence, according to time and circumstance. By the invariable rule of the country, the debtor is obliged to subsist the duns thus placed upon him, and as they are adepts in the art of tormenting, protected also by the great power of opinion, they soon contrive to render the debtor sufficiently miserable. But if the debtor be obstinate, and the creditor think himself equal to the task, he may undertake the *tuqazu* by placing his debtor in *dhurna*; the creditor seats himself by his debtor, or at his door, during which, whilst the former abstains from food, it would be accounted infamous and dishonourable for the latter to eat or drink. Bappoojee Naik practised first the *tuqazu*, and afterwards the *dhurna*. I refer my English readers to an account of *dhurna* (*dherna*) given by Lord Teignmouth in the 4th volume of the *Asiatic Researches*, and quoted in Mr. Mills's History of India. I have known the *dhurna* practised, but never very rigorously; and I do not think that fear of the creditor's starving himself to death would have much effect on a Mahratta debtor; his stomach would be much sooner affected than his conscience.

Rughoojee, on finding his schemes abortive, carried Bappoojee Naik with him towards the Carnatic, and returned to reap the expected harvest at Trichinopoly, accompanied by Sreeput Rao, the Pritee Needhee, and Futih Sing Bhonslay. In regard to the subsequent operations of the Mahrattas in the Carnatic, very little illustrative of what has already been so ably recorded,* has fallen within my observation in the Mahratta country. It appears, however, that the Tanjore state, though then agitated by factions, entered into a friendly correspondence with their countrymen, but whether to avert attack, or to afford assistance, is not mentioned. Trichinopoly surrendered 26th March 1741, and Chunda Sahib† was brought a prisoner to Satara, where he remained in custody of an agent of Rughoojee Bhonslay for about seven years, his complete enlargement having been effected in the year 1748. Moorar Rao Ghorepuray was left in command of the fort of Trichinopoly, and a part of his garrison was composed of infantry belonging to the Peishwa. Their expenses were defrayed by Shao; besides which, it was settled that 20,000 rupees of the share of tribute from the province of Arcot should be annually paid to Ballajee Bajee Rao.‡

On the death of Bajee Rao, the government of Malwa, being considered disposable, was conferred on Azim Oolla Khan; but this appointment proved merely nominal. One of the first acts of the new Peishwa was to forward petitions to Delhi respecting various promises made to his predecessor. These applications were transmitted through Jey Sing and Nizam-ool-Moolk. A supply of ready money was what Ballajee most earnestly craved, and 15 lakhs of rupees, as a free gift, were granted by the emperor. Proposals for an agreement§ were then drawn up, in the joint names of the Peishwa and Chinmajee Appa, wherein they request that they may receive the government of Malwa; after which they promise to pay their respects personally to the emperor; to prevent every other Mahratta officer from crossing the Nerbuddah; to send a body of 500 horse, under an officer of rank, to remain in attendance on the emperor's person; and to ask no more than the gift of money already bestowed. They agree to send 4,000 horse for service, who will punish refractory zumeendars, as far as their numbers may enable them; and they faithfully promise not to sequester the rent-free lands or jagheers, assigned for charitable or religious purposes. It does not appear that any notice

was taken of the application; but Ballajee, whose disposition was naturally conciliatory, was anxious to have the government of Malwa conferred as a right, according to treaty with his father; and with this view, when Nizam-ool-Moolk was marching to the Deccan in order to suppress Nasir Jung's disobedience (a subject to which we shall presently advert), Ballajee paid him a respectful visit near the Nerbuddah, and sent a body of his troops to join him.|| At this period he sustained a great loss in the death of his uncle, Chinmajee Appa, which

* Orme and Wilks.

† Better known in the Deccan by his less familiar name of Hoossein Dost Khan. He does not appear to have been confined in the fort, nor to have endured a close imprisonment, but merely to have had an attendant guard wherever he went—a supposition which is confirmed by the facility with which Dupleix appears to have intrigued with him when a prisoner.

‡ Mahratta MSS., and original paper.

§ There were several copies of papers, similar to the purport of that which is quoted, found in the Poona Records; I have selected the one most explicit, which appears to have been the ultimatum.

|| Khuzaneh Amirah, &c.; and original letter from Ballajee Bajee Rao.

happened in the end of January 1741. Eleven days previous to the event, Khundoojee Mankur, under Chimnajee's direction, had reduced Rewadunda,* the last place remaining to the Portuguese between Goa and Damaun. Chimnajee Appa, from his successes against a European nation, has a greater reputation amongst the Mahrattas, as an officer, than he perhaps deserved. Impressed, from obvious circumstances, with an idea, which, however true in most instances, it was dangerous for his countrymen to entertain, he believed that the strength of an army lay in its infantry and guns. To this opinion of the father may probably be traced a prepossession on the part of the son, Sewdasheo Chimnajee Bhow,† then a boy ten years old, which, strengthened by other circumstances, may have led to the injudicious conduct of that campaign, which 20 years afterwards terminated so fatally on the plains of Panniput.

On the demise of his uncle, the Peishwa returned from the northern districts, and spent nearly a year in civil arrangements at Poona and Satara. Continuing to manifest the greatest apparent respect for the raja, he obtained from Shao a grant by which the whole of the territory conquered from the Portuguese was conferred on him, and also, with the exception of Guzerat, the exclusive right of collecting the revenues, and of levying contributions north of the Nerbuddah.

At the present conjuncture the authority thus obtained was of considerable importance. We have briefly noticed in the preceding chapter the rise and progress of Aliverdy Khan in Bengal; the defeat of Moorshed Koollee Khan, and the conduct of his dewan, Meer Hubeeb. It appears that, immediately after his master's defeat, Meer Hubeeb had invited Bhaskur Punt, the dewan of Rughoojee Bhonslay, who was left in charge of the government of Berar during his master's absence in the Carnatic, to advance into the province of Kuttack; but Bhaskur Punt, having found it necessary to apply for his master's permission, before an answer could be received, and the troops prepared, Aliverdy Khan had conquered the province, and Meer Hubeeb had submitted to his authority.° Another opportunity, however, soon presented itself to Bhaskur Punt of carrying his arms to the eastward; and no sooner had he set out on his expedition, than the Peishwa, eager to establish his power over those territories, for which the authority obtained from the raja was, as usual, assumed as a right, marched, though late in the season, towards Hindostan, and made himself master of Gurrah and Mundelah before the monsoon. He was obliged to encamp on the banks of the Nerbuddah during the rainy season, and probably meditated an expedition into Allahabad, when he was called upon to defend his rights in Malwa, invaded by Dummajee Gaekwar and Baboo Rao Sewdasheo.

This inroad seems to have been instigated by Rughoojee, merely to obstruct the Peishwa's progress to the eastward: and on Ballajee's arrival in Malwa, the army of Guzerat retired. On this occasion Anund Rao Powar, to whom Bajee Rao never became reconciled after his uniting with Trimbeck Rao Dhabaray, was permitted to pay his respects to Ballajee, and was by him confirmed in possession of Dhar and the surrounding districts°—a politic measure, which not only secured Powar in his interests, but opposed a barrier on the western side of Malwa to incursions from

* Mahratta MSS.

† Bhow, brother, is applied also by Mahrattas to a cousingerman. Hence, as the Peishwa's cousin, he was commonly styled Bhow Sahib, and the Bhow, as well as Sewdasheo Rao Bhow.

Guzerat. Since the Peishwa's arrival at Mundelah, a negotiation had been going on between him and the emperor, through the mediation of Raja Jey Sing, supported by Nizam-ool-Moolk. The chouth of the imperial territory was promised, and a khillut, more splendid than had ever been conferred on his father,* was transmitted to Ballajee. It does not, as may be here remarked, appear that any deed for collecting this general chouth was ever granted by Mohummud Shah; sums of money and convenient assignments were the mode of payment. The object in the pending treaty was, on the part of the Peishwa, to obtain sunnuds for the promised government of Malwa; on that of the court of Delhi, to procrastinate, and to widen the breach between the Peishwa and Rughoosjee Bhonslay.

In the meantime Bhaskur Punt had invaded Behar: he was induced to make that province the theatre of his first operations, in the expectation of finding the country drained of troops, owing to an insurrection in Kuttack, which had burst forth in consequence of the tyranny and misconduct of the grand-nephew† of Aliverdy Khan, whom he had left as governor of the province. Aliverdy Khan, as Bhaskur Punt had anticipated, returned to Kuttack for the purpose of quelling the disturbance, which, however, he speedily effected; and in the month of April was already on his return march to Moorshedabad, when news was suddenly brought to him that the Mahrattas had entered Behar, emerged from the hills and woods near Ramgurh, turned to the right, and had fallen upon the district of Pachaet, in their usual manner of plundering and extorting.

The Mahratta army consisted of 10,000 or 12,000‡ horse, and report had swelled their numbers to nearly four times that amount.§ Aliverdy Khan, although only at the head of 3,000 or 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, resolved to oppose them; but the Mahrattas attacked him with great success, surrounded his army, carried off most of his baggage, and reduced him to great distress. Many of his men deserted or were killed; the whole of what remained amounted only to 3,000, but with these he determined rather to die than submit to the severe demands which the Mahrattas would have exacted. Although sorely harassed for several days, he fought his way, and made good his retreat to Cutwa. In one of the first attacks, Meer Hubeeb, who was in the army of Aliverdy Khan, having been made prisoner, joined the Mahrattas, and exerted himself so much as to gain the confidence of Bhaskur Punt. That officer proposed retiring for the rains, which Meer Hubeeb opposed; but as Bhaskur Punt could not at first be persuaded to remain, Meer Hubeeb requested command of a detachment, with which he marched to Moorshedabad, rescued his brother, who resided in the city, plundered the banking-house of Juggut Sett Alumchund of the enormous sum of two millions and a half sterling, overtook Bhaskur Punt, and at length succeeded in convincing him that it was better to remain in Bengal, and that it would be preposterous to quit so rich a harvest as he might expect to reap. Accordingly he wheeled about, and, through the aid of Meer Hubeeb, obtained possession of the town of Hooghly by stratagem. Most of the places from Cutwa to the neighbourhood of Midnapoor fell into his hands, and the swelling of the Hooghly alone prevented the Mahrattas from entering the district of Moorshedabad. Whilst affairs

* Articles enumerated in an original letter from the emperor.

† The notorious Shujah-ud-Dowlah, who afterwards confined the English in the blackhole, on the capture of Calcutta, 20th June 1756.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ In the Seyr Mutuakhereen their numbers are more moderately estimated at 25,000; but still that exceeds their actual numbers twofold.

were in this state, an officer from the imperial court arrived on the frontiers of the province of Bengal to demand the arrears of tribute due by the nabob. Aliverdy Khan represented his situation and the impossibility of satisfying these just demands, until he could expel the Mahrattas; he at the same time earnestly solicited a reinforcement. Aliverdy Khan likewise applied to the Peishwa, and with a view of inducing him to invade Rughoojee Bhonslay's districts in Berar, despatched a considerable sum as a subsidy for that purpose: the convoy, however, was cut off by the order or connivance of Sufdur Jung, the governor of Oude.

But whilst thus negotiating for every succour he could devise, Aliverdy Khan wisely placed his chief dependence on his own exertions; he assembled every man he could command, and made vigorous preparations for attacking Bhaskur Punt's camp at Cutwa, as soon as the season should permit. Before the rivers had fallen, he prepared a bridge of boats, which, in the night, he threw first across the Hooghly, and then over the Adjee, which enabled him to gain the opposite bank; although, in consequence of a break in the fastening which had laced the boats together, 1,500 men were plunged into the Adjee, and totally lost before the accident was discovered. The Mahrattas, by whom this attempt was quite unexpected, did not oppose the nabob, but fled eastward, until they had misled their pursuers in the hills and jungles of Behar, when they again re-entered the district of Midnapoor. But Aliverdy Khan soon recovered their track, and, with the most active of his troops, continued to pursue them. They seldom turned except to skirmish, and having lost all confidence, in consequence of an indecisive action which took place at Ballasore, they fled from Bengal, and returned through the province of Orissa to Berar. Rughoojee Bhonslay had arrived with his army from the Carnatic some time before his fugitive dewan appeared, and, having resolved to support his pretensions in Bengal, advanced towards the province by the same route as that by which Bhaskur Punt had entered.

In the meantime, the emperor, on being apprized of the irruption into Bengal, ordered Sufdur Jung, nabob of Oude, to drive out Bhaskur Punt; and, at the same time, applied to Ballajee Bajee Rao to afford his aid. As inducements to the Peishwa, an assignment on Aliverdy Khan, for the arrears of chouth due from Azimabad, was sent to him by the emperor, and an assurance of confirming him in the government of Malwa.

The reward was prized too highly, and the service was too desirable to be refused. Having quitted Malwa, the Peishwa proceeded through the province of Allahabad, and marched straight on Bogliipoor. In order to prevent injury to the country, he avoided high roads in the neighbourhood of cultivation, but, to the great alarm of the timid inhabitants, who were in terror of an army even of Mahratta friends, he arrived at Moorshedabad.

A. D. 1743. Rughoojee Bhonslay, with a powerful army, was advancing as an enemy from the eastward, and as Ballajee well knew that princes are most liberal at such seasons, he pressed the settlement of accounts with Aliverdy Khan before he would take the field. Payment being promised, Rughoojee, who had by that time arrived between Cutwa and Burdwan, decamped as soon as he heard that a settlement had taken place, and retreated towards the hills. Aliverdy Khan instantly marched in pursuit; but Ballajee, who intended to act according to his agreement, seemed to have a poor opinion of the nabob's ability to pursue Mahrattas. He therefore took another road, soon passed the Bengal troops, and in a few days overtook, attacked,

and defeated Rughoojee's army.* Bhaskur Punt, who was at the head of a party in reserve, immediately retreated through Orissa; but Ballajee Rao, after his victory, returned to Malwa, in order to secure the long-promised government.

The conduct of the Peishwa in the late campaign left no reasonable excuse on the part of Mohummud Shah for refusing to perform the engagement; but to save the credit of the imperial name, the feeble palliative of conferring the appointment on the Peishwa, as the deputy of Prince Ahmud, the emperor's son, was adopted at the suggestion of Jey Sing and Nizam-ool-Moolk, through whom the transaction was concluded.†

The rest of the treaty differs little from the former proposition, made in the joint names of Ballajee and his uncle Chimmajee, as already detailed; but instead of 4,000, Ballajee promised to furnish 12,000 horse, the expense of the additional 8,000 being payable by the emperor.‡

From the period of Ballajee Rao's accession, the most friendly intercourse subsisted between him and Jey Sing; several written agreements are preserved, containing mutual assurances of alliance and support. Jey Sing was guarantee for the observance of the treaty with Mohummud Shah, and there is another remarkable reservation for the imperial dignity affixed to the treaty in question, by bringing forward Mulhar Rao Holkar, Ranoojee Sindia, and Peelajee Jadow as the securities, who in due form declare that, should the Peishwa recede from his duties, they will quit his service. An absurd pledge for the fulfilment of an agreement from those whose interest lay in dissolving it, and which does not so much prove the consequence to which those commanders had attained, as the state of humiliation to which the emperor was reduced. There might be political design mixed with this plan of security, for feeble governments are full of far-fetched artifice; but the imperial court, if it thus projected its own salvation by dissensions among its enemies, did not reflect on their relative situations, nor perceive that Mahratta combination was likely to be ensured, until the Moghul empire was totally subverted.

The Peishwa returned to Satara to pay his respects, and go through the form of producing his accounts of the revenue. These accounts were made out by the Peishwa, as a general in command of a body of the raja's troops; the receipts, disbursements, and balance were set forth; and it is a remarkable fact that, after the rajas of Satara had become perfect ciphers in the Mahratta government, the Peishwa's accounts continued to the last to be made out in the manner described.

* The best account of Ballajee Bajee Rao's campaign in Bengal, to which I have had the benefit of access, is the *Seyr Mutuakhereen*, which is my authority for the greater part of the Bengal transactions at this period, assisted, however, in several parts by Mahratta MSS. and letters.

† The following is the substance of the firman received by Bajee Rao upon his appointment. From the Emperor Mohummud Shah, 22nd Jummadée-ool-Uwul, in the 24th year of the reign. "The dignity of the Shahzadu's Deputy in Malwa, together with the income attached to that situation, having been conferred on you, proper arrangements must be made in that province so as to afford the subjects, paying revenue to government, due favor and protection, and to punish all such as are evil disposed and disaffected. You must prevent the use of intoxicating drugs and spirituous liquors; and you must administer justice equally, so that the strong shall not oppress the weak, and that no species of violence be tolerated." (Original from the Poona Records.)

‡ Original papers.

But other reasons of great importance required Ballajee's presence at this juncture. Rughoojee Bhonslay, after his defeat, had sent wukeels to the Peishwa, assuring him of his sincere desire of reconciliation, and of his being now fully convinced that the plans of Bajee Rao were those best suited to his own, and the real interests of the Mahratta nation. He continued the same professions with apparent sincerity, but as he was on full march towards Satara, the Peishwa thought it necessary to be on his guard, particularly as Dummajee Gaekwar was also approaching. The Pritee Needhee had become infirm by sickness, but his mootaliq, Yemmajee Sewdeo, was an active, able man, adverse to the Peishwa's supremacy, and, although not leagued with Rughoojee, was intimately connected with the faction of Dhabaray. Under these circumstances, Ballajee Bajee Rao had to make his election between a war with the Mahratta chiefs, or the resignation of Bengal to Rughoojee Bhonslay. The question did not admit of hesitation; he chose the latter; but it being understood that the country north of the Mahanuddee as well as the Nerbuddah was comprehended in his agreement with the emperor, he made a merit of conceding his right of levying tribute to Rughoojee, and a secret compact, in which the raja was used as mediator, was finally concluded.

The object of the contracting parties seems avowedly to have been not so much an alliance as an agreement to avoid interference with each other. The raja's authority was in this instance convenient to both. A sunnud was given to the Peishwa, conferring on him his original mokassa; all the jagheers bestowed on himself, or acquired by his father and grandfather; the governments of the Concan and Malwa; and the shares of revenue or tribute from Allahabad, Agra, and Ajimere; three talooks in the district of Patna, 20,000 rupees from the province of Arcot, and a few detached villages in Rughoojee's districts. On the other hand, it was settled that the revenues and contributions from Lucknow, Patna, and Lower Bengal, including Behar, should be collected by Rughoojee Bhonslay. The latter was also vested with the sole authority of levying tribute from the whole territory from Berar to Kuttack.

It was agreed that Dummajee Gaekwar should be obliged to account to the Peishwa for the amount of the contributions he had levied in Malwa, but nothing was urged at this time respecting the large arrears due by Dhabaray to the head of the government. It does not appear that any settlement was concluded, but Dummajee seems to have remained some time in the Deccan, although his presence was much required in Guzerat. The Peishwa's southern and eastern boundaries in Hindostan were well defined by the Nerbuddah, the Soane, and the Ganges; but the sunnud delivered on this occasion authorised him to push his conquests to the northward as far as practicable.*

With these domestic arrangements of the Mahrattas, Nizam-ool-Moolk had no interference. We have already mentioned that he quitted Delhi in consequence of the meditated rebellion of his son Nasir Jung. On returning to the Deccan in the beginning of 1741, Nizam-ool-Moolk used every endeavour to induce his son to submit without coming to hostilities. At last Nasir Jung sent messengers to treat, which so alarmed his partizans, that most of them endeavoured to make the best terms they could. Nizam-ool-Moolk gradually drew them over, continued to use fair words towards his son, until, in an emotion of generosity, Nasir Jung hastily sent back the whole of the park of artillery. This concession might have obtained an

* Original papers and Mahratta MSS.

unreserved pardon, but as soon as Nizam-ool-Moolk had him in his power, he wished to humble him completely. Nasir Jung, assuming the garb of a fukeer, retired in penitence to Rozu, near Doulutabad, but his father continued to manifest the same stern behaviour ; till at last the young man was so much piqued, that he listened to the suggestions of Futih Yab Khan, one of his companions, by whom he was persuaded that he might still compel his father to submit to any terms.

Nizam-ool-Moolk, according to his custom, had cantoned his troops for the rains, a part at Aurungabad, and the rest at different towns in the neighbourhood. Futih Yab Khan suggested to Nasir Jung that they must first seize some strong fort ; and undertook to surprise Molheir, of which Mutuwussil Khan, Nasir Jung's brother-in-law, was governor. Futih Yab Khan succeeded in the enterprize, and Nasir Jung immediately joined him. Nizam-ool-Moolk did not expect this attempt, but made no preparation in consequence. Apprized of his supineness, Futih Yab Khan proposed to surprise him in Aurungabad. Nasir Jung advanced from Molheir with 7,000 horse, reached Doulutabad before intelligence of his march had been received, and had he pushed on, would probably have succeeded in taking his father prisoner. He seems, however, to have been seized with some compunction for the part he was acting, and passed the day in prayer at the shrine of a celebrated saint ; whilst Nizam-ool-Moolk, apparently serene, but much alarmed, was calling in his detachments ; his gun bullocks were all at a distance grazing, and very few men were in readiness ; but he immediately pitched his tents, and moved out from the city. Before next morning, which was the 23rd July, he had a respectable force drawn up, with which he coolly awaited the approach of his son, who advanced at the head of his followers, and was repulsed. Finding his troops giving way, Nasir Jung impetuously charged his father's standard, pushed on towards his elephant, and slew three of his bravest attendants, one after the other. The driver of his own elephant being killed, Nasir Jung sprang into his place ; when his brother-in-law, Mutuwussil Khan, approaching him, drew an arrow to the head, which must have transfixed him, had not his son Heedayet Moideen Khan, who sat on the same elephant, stayed his hand, and saved his uncle's life : at that moment, Syud Lushkur Khan, an officer of experience, who knew Nasir Jung, and the pride as well as the generosity of his disposition, pushed his elephant close by the side of his, saluted him, and respectfully made room on the seat of his elephant ; when, overcome by this act of courtesy, Nasir Jung took the place, and was thus carried prisoner to Aurungabad. Shah Nuwaz Khan, who, as well as Syud Lushkur Khan, was destined to act a conspicuous part in Deccan affairs, had embarked with his friend Nasir Jung in this desperate enterprize, stood by him to the last, and must have been cut down, but one of his friends in the army of Nizam-ool-Moolk, after Nasir Jung was taken, opening a way by which he might escape, called to him to desist and save himself. He followed this advice, and to the concealment and obscurity in which he was for seven years obliged to live, Indian history is indebted for his valuable biography, the Muasir-ool-Oomrah.

Nizam-ool-Moolk was exceedingly gratified by his son's preservation, but he threw many of his adherents into confinement, and to mark his sense of Nasir Jung's rebellion, imprisoned him for a short time in the fort of Kandhar, near Nandere, but relieved him before proceeding on an expedition to the southward : his motives for that undertaking we shall now explain.

Whilst the affairs of Bengal occupied the Mahrattas, the attention of Nizam-ool-Moolk was directed to the Carnatic, and in his protracted absence from the Deccan may be perceived the reason of his conciliatory conduct to Ballajee Rao, in aiding his pretensions to the government of Malwa. The murder of Suddur Ali, nabob of Arcot, by his brother-in-law, Mortiza Khan, in 1742; and the general confusion existing in the Moghul territories south of the Kistna, presented a favourable opportunity for Nizam-ool-Moolk's interference, to establish his power, and to restore tranquillity to the country. He accordingly marched from Hyderabad at the head of an immense army in January 1743, and upwards of a year was spent in concluding the arrangements he had contemplated. To obtain possession of Trichinopoly was an object of importance, but as matters stood with the Mahrattas, as the acquisition was much prized by them, it must have been an affair of some political management. The family of Ghorepuray, however, was never firmly united with their countrymen after the murder of Suntajee; it is true they would rather have joined the Mahrattas, but superior advantages, and the chance of plunder, would induce them to fight on the side of Moghuls or Europeans. Moorar Rao was recognized as chief of Gooty by Nizam-ool-Moolk,* and evacuated the Carnatic with all his troops in August 1743.†

The Mahratta armies which assembled at Satara in the beginning of 1744 were probably contemplated with some anxiety by Nizam-ool-Moolk, whose march was soon directed towards Hyderabad, having left Anwar-ud-deen Khan, at his own request, in charge of the government of the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut, and appointed his own grandson, Heedayet Moideen Khan, better known by his title of Muzuffir Jung, to the Carnatic Bala Ghaut (or Carnatic proper), conferring on him the district of Adonee in jagheer, and fixing his head station at Beejapoor, whilst that of Anwar-ud-deen continued, as in the time of Daood Khan and the Newayeteh Nabobs,‡ at the long-established capital of Arcot. Nizam-ool-Moolk, finding he had nothing to apprehend from the Mahrattas, directed his attention to affairs of internal government, and reduced several forts, the killidars of which were in rebellion.

The Mahrattas were too much occupied in their own schemes to think of taking advantage of the Nizam's absence. Rughoojee Bhonslay was intent on recovering his lost footing in Bengal, and the Peishwa, in order to excuse himself to the emperor for not acting against Rughoojee, remained in the Deccan. Rughoojee had returned to Berar in the rains, but as soon as the season opened, Bhaskur Punt, Aleo Kurawul, and several officers of note,§ supported by 20,000 horse, were sent into Bengal by the route of Orissa. Aliverdy Khan prepared his troops, but, on pretence of coming to an agreement, opened a negotiation with Bhaskur Punt, invited him to a *ziافت*, or entertainment, with 20 of his principal officers, and most treacherously murdered them. One Surdar, named Rughoojee Gaekwar, who remained in charge of the camp, was the only one out of 22 principal officers who escaped this perfidious massacre: he conducted the retreat of the army to Berar by the same route they

* Orme and Wilks.

† Orme.

‡ The Newayeteh Nabobs is the appellation by which Sadut Oolla Khan, Dost Ally, and Suddur Ally are known in the Deccan. The Newayetehs are a distinct race of Mahomedans, and said to have been driven from Arabia, to seek refuge on the western shores of India, in the eighth century.—See Wilks, vol. I., page 242.

§ Mahratta MSS.

had come, but many of the Mahratta stragglers were cut off by the exasperated peasantry.

An opportunity, however, soon occurred of renewing the incursions. An insurrection against Aliverdy Khan's government by the Afghans in his service obliged him to leave Orissa, in some degree, exposed, and in charge of a Hindoo governor. Rughoojee Bhonslay, apprized of the state of the province by certain Gosaeens whom he entertained as spies, invaded Orissa, obtained possession of several districts, and demanded 30 millions of rupees as the price at which he would spare the remainder, and quit the country. Aliverdy Khan contrived to amuse him until he had suppressed the rebellion, when he sent a vaunting message to Rughoojee, which put an end to all negotiation. After the rains hostilities commenced, but ceased for a time, after a partial defeat of the Mahrattas at Cutwa,* Rughoojee being obliged to return to his own territories, in consequence of a disputed succession to the principality of Deogurh, in Gondwanah, where the sons of a raja named Bukht Boolund, converted by Aurungzebe to Mahomedanism, had quarrelled, and one of them, named Wullee Shah, not only confined his two brothers, Akbar Shah and Boorhan Shah, but, on being assisted by Neelkunt Shah, another Hindoo renegade, raja of Chandah, Wullee Shah refused to pay either chouth or surdeshmookhee to the Mahrattas. Akbar Shah was desirous of obtaining assistance from the Nizam, but Boorhan Shah courted the Mahrattas.

The insurrection of Wullee Shah and Neelkunt Shah ended in the subjugation of their territory. Deogurh and Chandah were both annexed to the possessions of Rughoojee, but Ruttunpoor was assigned to Boorhan Shah, the brother of Wullee Shah, with an income for his support, and his posterity still reside at the court of Nagpoor in the enjoyment of a part of it. Akbar Shah died a pensioner of the Nizam's government.†

Shortly after Rughoojee had entered Bengal, during the Afghan insurrection, Ballajee Bajee Rao arrived at Belsha, in Malwa, A. D. 1745. from which place he addressed letters to the emperor, full of assurances of perpetual fidelity, but excusing himself from paying his respects in the royal presence. He expressed surprise at Aliverdy Khan's inactivity in not repulsing Rughoojee, which the emperor in his reply accounts for by charging Ballajee with not having stopped the ghauts in Rughoojee's rear as preconcerted. But the agreement which had taken place with Rughoojee precluded all interference; the Peishwa evaded the discussion, and on pretence of business in the Deccan, after making his annual collections, speedily returned to Poona.‡

In the following year he sent his cousin, Sewdasheo Chimnajee Bhow, accompanied by Sukaram Bappoo,§ the carcoon of Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, on an expedition into the Carnatic, to punish some of the deshmooks, who had driven out the thannas of the Peishwa's old creditor, Bappoojee Naik Barramutteekur. That person, by the interest of Rughoojee Bhonslay, had obtained the

* Seyr-ool-Mutuakhereen, and Stewart's History of Bengal.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ Original letter, sand Mahratta MSS.

§ Sukaram Bhugwunt Bhokeel, Koolkurnee of Hewra, and the descendant of Puntjee Gopinat, who betrayed Afzool Khan into the hands of Sivajee, was the principal minister at the period when the British government first took an active part in the politics of the Poona durbar, and is best known by his familiar name of Sukaram Bappoo.

cheuth and surdeshmookhee between the Kistna and Toongbuddra, in farm, from the raja, for the annual sum of seven lakhs of rupees ; but the opposition he experienced, and the heavy charges for maintaining the troops, totally ruined him in a few years. The expense of the present expedition, which he was compelled to defray, added to his embarrassments, but he would not consent to relinquish the contract in favor of the Bhow, as was proposed to him. Sewdasheo Chinnajee levied contributions as far as the Toongbuddra, and reduced the fort of Bhadur Benda, to which the Mahrattas had a claim of long standing.* On Sewdasheo Chinnajee's return from this expedition, he was invested by the raja with the same rank as had been enjoyed by his father,† and being ambitious, and bolder than his cousin the Peishwa, he began to assume considerable power. He chose as his carcoons Wasdeo Joshee and Rughoonath Huree, two able men who had been brought up under Kanhojee Angria. The

A. D. 1747. Peishwa himself concluded a new and more specific agreement with the rajas of Bundelcund, by which, after deducting the district of Ryhlee, which had been wholly ceded to the late Peishwa, one-third of the territory, estimated at 16½ lakhs of rupees,‡ was made over to Ballajee Bajee Rao, besides a like share from the profits of the diamond mines of Pannah.

The Peishwa, during this period of comparative tranquillity in the Deccan, gave encouragement to agriculture, protected the villagers and grain merchants, and improvement was everywhere visible. But events occurred about this time in Hindostan, the Deccan, and Carnatic which were the forerunners of fresh troubles, and great revolutions in every part of India.

The season of 1747-48 is memorable in Hindostan by its being the period of the first invasion of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, king of the Afghans, who are distinguished in India by the various appellations of Dooranee, Abdallee, and Giljya.§ Ahmed Abdallee, the person who was now their acknowledged sovereign, was son of a chief of a tribe of Afghans, named Abdallee, settled in the province of Herat, when it was conquered by Nadir Shah. Ahmed, from being the prisoner, became a military follower, of Nadir, and was gradually promoted to considerable rank. On the assassination of Nadir Shah, Ahmed left the Persian army with the whole of his tribe, who were in camp, and, retiring to Herat, which he occupied, was soon acknowledged as king by the whole Afghan nation, and now possessed the eastern half of the dominions of Nadir Shah.

One of the nephews of Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the vizier, who had taken charge of the governments of Mooltan and Lahore, in prejudice to his elder brother, was advised by a treacherous Moghul, named Adina Beg Khan, to unite his fortunes with the rising Ahmed Shah Abdallee—an advice which he had no sooner begun to put in practice, than Adina Beg informed his uncle of the circumstance, and the nephew, ashamed of his conduct, returned to his allegiance ; but the traitor, Adina Beg, had already gone so far in the negotiation with Ahmed Shah that the latter was not to be interrupted in his progress ; his troops advanced, and he

* Mahratta MSS.

† Second-in-command under the Peishwa.

‡ Rupees 16,51,636. (Original papers.)

§ I mention these names as necessary in common conversation with the natives of India. A native of Maharashtra, for instance, only knows them by the name of Giljya, whilst Afghans generally are merely distinguished as Patans.

obtained possession of Mooltan and Lahore, almost without resistance, and proceeded towards Delhi. He was, however, at this time successfully opposed by the Moghul army, sent forward by the emperor, under his son, Prince Ahmed, and the Afghan army retreated towards Cabul. On this service, Kummur-ud-deen Khan, the vizier, having been killed, his son, Meer Munnoo, received the governments of Mooltan and Lahore, and set out to take charge of those provinces. Prince Ahmed returned towards Delhi, but, before he reached the capital, the emperor had breathed his last. On the prince's accession to the throne, by the title of Ahmed Shah, in the end of April, he bestowed the office of vizier on Sufdur Jung, nabob of Oude.* He had offered the viziership to Nizam-ool-Moolk, but he excused himself on account of his great age, and only survived Mohummud Shah a very short time, having died at Burhanpoor in his 104th year, on the 19th June 1748.

Nizam-ool-Moolk left six sons, namely, Ghazee-ud-deen, Nasir Jung, Sulabut Jung, Nizam Ally, Mohummud Shureef, and Meer Moghul. The two first were of the same mother, all the others were of different mothers. Ghazee-ud-deen being at Delhi, where he held the rank of Umeer-ool-Oomrah at the time of his father's death, Nasir Jung assumed the government.†

A few months after the death of Nizam-ool-Moolk, the emperor wrote a letter with his own hand, inviting Nasir Jung in a very pressing manner to come to court, and the latter had arrived at the Nerbuddah, when the invitation, for some reason not satisfactorily explained, was withdrawn.

A. D. 1749. The circumstance appeared at the time fortunate to Nasir Jung, as news of an alarming nature had just reached him of a rebellion, headed by his nephew Muzaffir Jung, and aided by Chunda Sahib, with a body of French troops. Very shortly afterwards intelligence was received of the defeat and death of Anwar-ud-deen, governor of the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut, at the battle of Ambour, on which Nasir Jung applied to Rughojee Bhonslay for a body of his troops, promising to grant some cessions of territory as the reward of their service.‡ He also summoned the whole of the Moghul dependents and tributaries in the Carnatic to be prepared to join his army, as he advanced to the southward. Moorar Rao Ghorepuray, as jagheerdar of Gooty, the raja of Mysore, the nabobs of Kurpa, Kurnoul, and Savanour, and Mohummud Ally, second son of the late Anwar-ud-deen, with his supporters, the president and council of the English settlement at Madras, were the principal authorities who joined, or sent their troops to accompany Nasir Jung.

The Deccan, thus completely drained of troops, presented an inviting field to the Peishwa, but domestic arrangements of the utmost importance demanded his presence at Satara. The raja Shao had, for some years, been in a state of mental imbecility,§ brought on, it is said, in consequence of the death of his youngest wife, Sagoona Bye Mohitey; but as

* Seyr Mutuakhereen.

† Khuzameh Amirah, &c.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ He was for some time afflicted with that harmless silly madness, which is sometimes ludicrous, even whilst it excites commiseration. It first appeared on an occasion when he had to receive a visit from two Mahratta sardars in full darbar, by his dressing out his favourite dog in gold brocade, covered with jewels, and putting his own turban on the dog. He never resumed any covering for his head after he recovered his senses. This dog had once saved his life when hunting a tiger, and, amongst other freaks, he issued sunnuds, conferring a jagheer upon him, and entitling him to use a palanquin, in all which the raja was humoured, and the palanquin establishment literally kept up.

his health declined, he recovered the use of his intellect,* and the dependents of the Peishwa about his person urged him to adopt a son. The raja, on the loss of his only child, some time before his derangement, had declared, contrary to all his former invectives against him, that he would adopt Sumbhaje, raja of Kolapoor, provided he had issue; but as this was not the case, it was now proposed that he should institute an inquiry for some of the lineal descendents of Wittoojee, the brother of Mallojee, and uncle of Shahjee. Search was accordingly made, but none were discovered; and it was then suggested to receive the son of some respectable sillardar of that Patell family, of which there were a great number. This proposal, however, Shao said he had a strong reason for declining, and at last told Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree and Govind Rao Chitnees that Tara Bye, who was still alive, and residing in Satara, had somewhere concealed her grandson Rama, the son of the second Sivajee, who was born in 1712, after the death of his father. It is not known by what means Shao became possessed of this secret; and the subject, intricate in itself, has been so studiously involved in mystery as to excite a suspicion that the Peishwa was convinced of the legitimacy of Ram Raja, and found it necessary, for the purpose of rendering him insignificant, to invent, or at least to connive at, the insinuation that the whole was a trick of state. Tara Bye, on hearing of the intended adoption of Sumbhaje of Kolapoor, was heard to say—"I will prevent that;" and, on being now closely questioned and encouraged, declared the existence of her grandson. The eldest surviving wife of Shao, Suckwar Bye Sirkay, true to the inherent violence and ambition of her family, on becoming acquainted with this declaration on the part of Tara Bye, which deprived her of all chance of the power she expected, by seeing a minor placed on the throne under her own care, immediately opened a communication with Sumbhaje, inciting him to oppose the pretensions of the alleged grandson of Tara Bye, whom she declared an impostor. She promised to aid Sumbhaje with her utmost means; she engaged Yemmajee Sewdeo in her cause; and Jugjeewun, the younger brother of Sreeput Rao, who had been appointed Pritee Needhee on the death of the latter in 1747, also promised her all the support in his power. Dummajee Gaekwar gave his assent to the proposal, and emissaries were despatched into the Ghaut-Mahta and Concan, a tract ever prone to insurrection, to raise men and be prepared for her purpose. Ballajee Bajee Rao repaired to Satara, with an army of 35,000 men; but so cautious was he of committing any act which might outrage the Mahratta feeling, already jealous of Bramin power, that he did not attempt to separate Suckwar Bye from her husband, or to impose any restraint likely to arouse the active enmity of her relations. But although he knew the extent of her plots, and was also aware that Suckwar Bye had a plan to assassinate him, he was at the same time suspicious of Tara Bye; and the known enmity of the latter to Ballajee Bajee Rao is indeed the principal evidence of the truth of her extraordinary story. The pregnancy of Bhowanee Bye, the wife of the second Sivajee, was strongly suspected by Rajis Bye, the younger wife of Raja Ram, at the time of Sivajee's death, and it required all the care and circumspection of Tara Bye to preserve

* Shao had some wit, and his reply to a letter received about this time from Raja Jey Sing of Jeypoor, shows that he retained it to the last. The raja asks what he had performed for the Hindoo faith, and what charities he had bestowed. "I have," replies Shao, "conquered from the Mussulmans the whole country from Rameshwur to Delhi, and I have given it to the Bramins."

the infant from destruction. She, however, found means to convey the child from the fort of Panalla, and having given him in charge to the sister of Bhowanee Bye, he was carried to Tooljapoor, and thence to Barsee, where he was reared in obscurity.

The Peishwa was at a loss what to do, and during three months spent at Satara before the raja's death, he was alternately swayed by ambition and apprehension: he sometimes thought of at once asserting his supremacy, by setting aside the raja entirely,* but on the whole he considered it most expedient to support the assertion of Tara Bye; yet, although he was scrupulous in every outward form of respect towards the prince whom he acknowledged, he was not afterwards desirous of suppressing a current report at Poona, already alluded to, of the whole being fictitious. When the power of the Peishwa was complete, and the end answered, such a pageant as the raja was, in some respects, inconvenient to the usurper, and to countenance a belief of the imposture was the first step to his being wholly set aside; but the voice of the country was too strong, and an heir of the house of Sivajee would have been joined by thousands in the tract where that chieftain first established himself.

Suckwar Bye, in order to conceal her plot, always gave out that, in the event of Shao's death, she would burn with the corpse; this declaration proved her ruin, for the wily Bramin affected to believe it; and took care to circulate the report, until it became so general that its non-fulfilment would, in the eyes of the whole country, have become a reflection on the honor of her family.

Although Suckwar Bye seldom quitted the raja, and kept him constantly surrounded by persons in her interest, Ballajee found means to obtain a private interview, at which he induced the raja to give him a deed, empowering the Peishwa to manage the whole government of the Mahratta empire, on condition of his perpetuating the raja's name, and keeping up the dignity of the house of Sivajee, through the grandson of Tara Bye, and his descendants. This paper also directed that the Kolapoor state should always be considered an independent sovereignty; that the jagheers, as now existing, were to be confirmed to the holders, leaving power with the Peishwa to conclude such arrangements with the jagheerdars as might be beneficial for extending Hindoo power:† for protecting the temples of the gods, the cultivators of the fields, and whatsoever was sacred or useful.

The raja had scarcely ceased to breathe when a body of horse galloped into the town of Satara, surrounded and seized the Pritee Needhee, and his mootaliq, Yemmajee Sewdeo; placed them in irons on the instant, and sent them off, strongly escorted, to distant hill forts. Every avenue about the town was occupied by troops, and a garrison of the Peishwa's

* The following letter from Sewdasheo Chimnaje to the Peishwa recommends his usurping the power at once. After compliments,—“It seems impossible to judge of what will be the result of all this. The Bye's doings are not to be depended upon; keep continually on your guard. The Bye is not a person to blunder in that which she sets about. Let nothing induce you to act contrary to what has hitherto been professed, or let anything appear respecting your intentions; but, in the event of the raja's decease, you must take the upper hand of all. Whilst the raja is in existence, do not allow so much as a grain of oil-seed to appear different in your conduct. As matters proceed, continue to write to me constantly. Despatched 16th Shuwal.”

† This of course, if once admitted, gave the Peishwa, as the raja's delegate, entire power over many of the jagheerdars, and, in every instance of succession, the right of investing the new jagheerdar.

was placed in the fort, whilst a party was detached to reinforce the escort of Ram Raja, who had not arrived when Shao died.

Suckwar Bye had not recovered from the first emotions of consternation and rage, at finding her whole plans unmasked and defeated, when the Peishwa sent her an insidious message, "begging that she would not think of burning with the corpse of her husband, for that he and all her servants were ready to obey her commands;" and not content with working on the mind of an angry woman to incite her to self-destruction, he sent for her brother, Koarjee Sirkay, represented the dishonor that threatened to attach to his house, and promised him a jagheer in the Concan, on condition of persuading his sister to immolate herself, "not only for the honor of the family of Sirkay, but for that of all India under the sway of the late raja." By such arts Ballajee Bajee Rao secured his victim. But let not the reader suppose that those of his own countrymen, who know the secret history of this base transaction, and whose minds have not been perverted by the calm villany of a Bramin court, attempt to palliate it, as a sacrifice in conformity with their faith; on the contrary, they mention it with much detestation, and say that even the ordinary mode of execution would have been far more manly and far less objectionable.

CHAP. XVIII.

FROM A. D. 1750 TO A. D. 1754.

The Peishwa secures Rughoojee Bhonslay in his interest.—Poona becomes the capital of the Mahrattas.—Arrangements made by the Peishwa on the will of the late raja.—Insurrection of Yemmajee Sewdeo—suppressed by Sewdasheo Rao Bhow.—Agreement of Sangola between the raja and the Peishwa.—A difference arises between the Peishwa and Sewdasheo Rao Bhow.—Origin and progress of Ramchundur Baba Shenwee.—The Peishwa supports Ghazee-ud-deen, the eldest son of Nizam-ool-Moolk.—Death and character of, Nasir Jung.—Muzuffir Jung, supported by the French, assumes the viceroyalty of the Deccan.—Rise of Raja Rugonath Dass and Hyder Jung.—Death of Muzuffir Jung.—Elevation of Sulabut Jung.—The Peishwa, for the purpose of opposing Sulabut Jung and M. Bussy, proceeds to the Kistna, but is suddenly recalled to Satara, in consequence of an attempt to supersede his authority on the part of Tara Bye, supported by Dummajee Gaekwar.—Gaekwar circumvented—treacherously seized and imprisoned.—Tara Bye retains possession of the fort.—Rigid captivity of the raja.—The Peishwa attacks Sulabut Jung.—War carried into the Mahratta country.—Moghul army, directed by Bussy, penetrates as far as Korygaom on the Beema.—Negotiation broken off :—renewed.—Armistice concluded.—Raja Rugonath Dass assassinated.—Successful operations of Rughoojee Bhonslay.—Death of Meer Hubeeb.—Affairs at the imperial court.—Abdallee—Rohillahs.—Holkar and Sindia called in by the nabob of Oude to assist in subduing the Rohillahs—conquest effected.—Holkar recalled to the Deccan :—his march suspended.—Approach of the Abdallee.—Mahrattas evacuate the Rohillah territory.—Mooltan and Lahore ceded to the Abdallee.—Ghazee-ud-deen, accompanied by Sindia and Holkar, commences his march for the Deccan.—Proceedings of Sulabut Jung.—Syud Lushkur Khan and Shah Nuwaz Khan brought into power.—Arrival of Ghazee-ud-deen at Aurungabad.—Extensive cessions granted by him to the Peishwa.—Ghazee-ud-deen is poisoned.—Sulabut Jung confirms the cessions made to the Peishwa.—Intrigues of Syud Lushkur Khan against the French.—Cessions made to the French for the support of their subsidiary force.—Affairs at Satara.—Expedition into the Carnatic and Guzerat.—History of Guzerat from the year 1735 until the capture of Ahmedabad in 1755.—Rughonath Rao proceeds to Hindostan, and returns to Poona in the ensuing year.—The Peishwa sends another expedition into the Carnatic.—Death of Rughoojee Bhonslay,—his sons.—Janojee succeeds as Sena Sahib Soobeh.—Affairs accommodated between the Peishwa and Tara Bye.—Progress of Janojee Bhonslay.—Affairs at Delhi.—Meer Shahabodeen, son of the late Ghazee-ud-deen—his rise and progress at the imperial court—his unprincipled conduct ;—calls in the aid of the Mahrattas ;—is appointed vicer—deposes the emperor,—deprives him of sight,—and raises a grandson of Jehandar Shah to the throne.

PREVIOUSLY to Shao's demise, orders in his name had been sent to Yeswunt Rao Dhabaray and Rughoojee Bhonslay, requiring their presence at Satara. The former had become totally imbecile from habits of

A. D. 1750. debauchery, and, as had probably been foreseen, neither Dhabaray, nor Dummajee Gaekwar, the commander of his army, attended. Most of the other jagheerdars were present, but if any were disposed to resist the Peishwa's authority, they remained passive, until they should see what part Rughoojee Bhonslay would assume. But Rughoojee's ambition was now controlled by the caution of age, and the admonition of experience. He was not only intent on directing annual incursions into Bengal, but, owing to the absence of his son Janojee, who accompanied Nasir Jung into the Carnatic with 10,000 horse, and to the number of troops which he was compelled to leave in his own territories, he arrived at Satara, in the month of January 1750, with a force only estimated at 12,000 men. His disposition was pacific towards the Peishwa, but he made some demur in acknowledging Ram Raja. He required, in testimony of his being a Bhonslay, and the grandson of Raja Ram, that Tara Bye should first eat with him in presence of the caste, deposing on the food they ate together that Ram Raja was her grandson. On this being complied with in the most solemn manner, Rughoojee declared himself satisfied; and, after a long conference with the Peishwa, he gave his assent to the propriety of the plans submitted for his consideration. As a proof of the good understanding which subsisted between them, Ballajee took occasion to proceed in advance to Poona, leaving the raja in Rughoojee's charge, and requesting that he would accompany him to Poona, with the whole of the jagheerdars, for the purpose of concluding the arrangements made by the will of the late raja. From this period Poona may be considered the capital of the Mahrattas. Ballajee, in the success of his schemes, almost overlooked Tara Bye; but, although upwards of 70 years of age, she soon convinced him that it was dangerous to slight a woman of her spirit. On pretence of paying her devotions at the tomb erected over her husband's ashes, in the fort of Singurh, she went there, and endeavoured to persuade the Punt Suchew to declare for her as head of the Mahratta empire. Ballajee, after much persuasion, induced her to come to Poona, and having flattered her ambition with the hope of having a large share in the administration, at last obtained her influence with Ram Raja in confirming the many schemes he had now to carry into effect.

Rughoojee Bhonslay received new sunnuds for Berar, Gondwanah, and Bengal; and some jagheer lands which had belonged to the Pritee Needhee, adjoining Berar, were transferred to him. The sunnuds for half of Guzerat were sent to Yeswunt Rao Dhabaray, which, as he had never yet accounted for a share of the revenue to the state, gave Dummajee Gaekwar to understand what he might expect from the increasing power of the Peishwa. Ranoojee Sindia died* about this period, and his eldest son, Jyapa, was confirmed in his jagheer. The whole of Malwa, estimated at about 150 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, was, with the exception of about 10 lakhs, divided between Holkar and Sindia—that is, 74½ lakhs were conferred on the former, and 65½ lakhs on the latter. The remaining 10 lakhs were held by various jagheerdars, of whom Anund Rao Powar

* I have not been able to ascertain the date of Ranoojee Sindia's death. By a history of Sindia's family, procured for me by Major Robert Close, the resident envoy with Dowlut Rao Sindia, it appears that the event happened at Shujahalpoor, but the date is not recorded.

was the most considerable : all of them were subservient to the views of the Peishwa, and from them he had to apprehend no opposition.

Ballajee Rao, without intending to employ them, confirmed the eight Purohads, and for a short time nominated Gungadhar Sree Newass as Pritee Needhee ; but, on the application of Rughojee Bhonslay and of some other jagheerdars, when about to return to their respective districts, he made them a promise to release Jugjeewun Pureshran, and did accordingly restore him to his rank and liberty. But as the raja's establishment was to be much reduced, and it was necessary to secure in his interests such of his officers as he could not employ, the Peishwa reserved a great part of the Pritee Needhee's lands as jagheers and assignments to the persons in question, particularly the tract west of Kurar, between the Oormooree and the Warna, where he apprehended an insurrection supported by the raja of Kolapoor.

Futib Sing Bhonslay, the adopted son of Shao, was confirmed in the possession of his jagheer in various minor claims on shares of revenue, and in the title of raja of Akulkote, which, except the detached claims alluded to, are still enjoyed by his descendants. An appointment created by Shao for a relation of the Muntree, and which was termed *Ajahut Surdeshmookh*, or general agent for collecting the surdeshmookhee, was nominally preserved ; but jagheer lands were assigned in lieu of the right of interference, in the collections of the ten per cent., on the six Soobehs of the Deccan.

The appointment of Sur Lushkur was taken from the family of Somwoushee, and given to Nimbajee Naik Nimbalkur. All these changes and appointments were made in the name of the raja, but it was now well understood that the Peishwa's authority was supreme in the state, and generally admitted without dissatisfaction.

But Yemmajee Sewdeo, who recovered his liberty at the same time with the Pritee Needhee, threw himself into the fort of Sangola, near Punderpoor, where he raised an insurrection, and made head against the Peishwa, until suppressed by Sewdasheo Chimnajee Bhow.

The Peishwa, in the measures which have been detailed, owed much of his success to his dewan, Mahadajee Punt, who, next to his cousin Sewdasheo Rao, possessed greater influence over Ballajee Bajee Rao than any other person. Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, on his expedition to Sangola, was accompanied by Ram Raja, for the purpose of giving Yemmajee Sewdeo no excuse for resistance ; and, during their stay at that place, the raja agreed to renounce the entire power, and to lend his sanction to whatever measures the Peishwa might pursue, provided a small tract around Satara was assigned to his own management—conditions to which Ballajee Rao subscribed, but they were never fulfilled. The raja, under a strong escort, returned from Sangola to Satara, when an extraordinary difference arose between the Peishwa and his cousin Sewdasheo Rao, which had well-nigh overturned the whole of the plan which Ballajee Rao had been labouring to establish.

Sewdasheo Rao had at this time connected himself with Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, a person to whom, although his conduct was extremely exceptionable, especially in the manner by which he obtained power, the Mahratta country is much indebted. This person, originally known by the name of Ramchundur Mulhar,^a was koolkurnee of the village of

* When Bramins rise in the world, they generally drop their father's name, unless they were very great men. For instance, Sewdasheo Chimnajee, had his father been a person of no note, would have styled himself Sewdasheo Punt ; Ramchundur dropped his father's name, Mulhar, when he became a great man.

Aroolee subject to the Sawunts of Waree, from whose power he was obliged to flee as a defaulter in the revenues of his village. He came to Satara, where he was taken into the service of Kucherswur Baba Uteetkur, and by him recommended to Bajee Rao, under whom he distinguished himself, both as a soldier and a man of business. Bajee Rao appointed him dewan to Ranoojee Sindia, and it partly accounts for Ranoojee's proverbial poverty that Ramchundur made a large fortune. At Ranoojee's death he bribed Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, in hopes of being continued, by his interest, as the dewan of Jyapa; but as Jyapa disliked him, and Mulhar Rao Holkar opposed the arrangement, the Peishwa removed him from the situation. This circumstance, trifling as it appears, was the seed from which sprung much mischief. It was the foundation of enmity between Holkar and the Bhow, and between Ramchundur and the Peishwa. Sewdasheo Rao appointed Ramchundur his own dewan, and at his suggestion applied to the Peishwa for the same share of authority as had been held by his father, Chinnaajee Appa. Ballajee refused, as it must occasion the supersession of Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, to whom he owed innumerable obligations; on which Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, after his expedition to Sangola, made overtures to the Kolapoor raja, was appointed his Peishwa, and obtained the cession of three forts—Pargurh, Kullaniidhee, and Chungdurhee—together with a jagheer of 5,000 rupees a year. A war was prevented by the admirable conduct of Mahadajee Punt, who voluntarily resigned his situation, and Sewdasheo Rao, quitting his Peishwaship at Kolapoor, returned as prime minister to Poona.

The arrangements before and consequent to the raja's death had, as already adverted to, prevented the Mahrattas from seizing an opportunity of enlarging their conquests in the Deccan, afforded by the absence of so great an army in the Carnatic. A negotiation with Ballajee Rao had been opened by Ghazee-ud-deen, the eldest son of Nizam-ool-Moolk, through Mulhar Rao Holkar. The Peishwa agreed to support his pretensions, and wrote to the emperor, Ahmed Shah, requesting that Ghazee-ud-deen might be appointed viceroy, assigning as a reason that the whole Deccan, from the absence of the army and the disorders in the Carnatic, would soon be overrun by independent plunderers.* In the meantime the Peishwa, having prepared his troops, moved towards Aurungabad; but, before quitting Poona, he prevailed on the Punt Suchew to give him the fort of Singurh in exchange for Toong and Tikona; and in order to soothe Tara Bye, whose great age had not rendered her less active and intriguing, he incautiously removed his own troops from the fort of Satara, and, having placed in it the Gurhkurees and old retainers, who had great respect for the widow of Raja Ram, gave up the entire management to her. The raja was kept with a separate establishment in the town of Satara, but perfectly at large, and a splendid provision was assigned to him and his officers, the expense of which amounted to the annual sum of 65 lakhs of rupees.*

About the time that Ballajee Bajee Rao was summoned to Satara on account of Shao's illness, Nasir Jung proceeded on the well-known Carnatic expedition, which ended so disastrously for that prince. Moorar Rao Ghorepuray and some other Mahrattas continued in the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut; but Janojee Bhonsalay, Rughoojee's son, left the army, either upon the defeat of Muzuffir Khan in March 1750, or with Shah Nuwaz Khan, who quitted Sulabut Jung, and repaired to Aurungabad during the

* Mahratta MSS.

stege of Kurnool,* in March 1751. The fall of Nasir Jung was wrought by the intrigues of M. Dupleix. He gained a Bramin, named Ramdass, a native of Sicacole, in the confidence of Nasir Jung, and through him raised seditions in the army, which Dupleix called into operation by an attack on the camp. Nasir Jung was treacherously shot, on the 5th December 1750, by Mohummud Khan, the Patan nabob of Kurpa, one of the conspirators. Nasir Jung was totally destitute of his father's prudence, and, if successful in his fortunes, would probably have sunk into a Mahomedan sensualist; but he was, in some respects, a superior person, and with a better education in a European country he had many of the qualities to form the gallant knight and the accomplished gentleman. He possessed bravery and generosity, a taste for poetry and literature, and as he came to an untimely end, his memory is cherished by the Deccan Moghuls, to whom he is known partly by his own writings, but principally from the works of his friend, Meer Gholam Ally of Belgram.

Muzuffir Jung assumed the viceroyalty of the six Soobehs of the Deccan by aid of his allies, the French. The traitor Ramdass, a fit instrument for the unprincipled ambition of Dupleix, was raised to the situation of prime minister, by the title of Raja Rugonath Dass. Nor must we omit to mention Abdool Rehman, the dewan of Monsieur Bussy, better known by his title of Hyder Jung. The father of this man, a defaulter of revenue under the Nizam's government at Mausulipatam, had, on several occasions, when in power, been friendly to the French, and in his distress fled to Pondicherry, where he was protected and treated with much kindness by Dupleix. His son Abdool Rehman, then a boy, soon acquired the French language, was useful to Dupleix in carrying on his intrigues with Ramdass; and, upon the success of them, accompanied Bussy when he marched with Muzuffir Jung: he was soon styled the French dewan, and received from the new-made nabob the title of Hyder Jung. But the Patan nabobs, dissatisfied at not receiving all they had expected by the death of his predecessor, conspired against Muzuffir Jung, who, although, victorious, fell

A. D. 1751. in action in the end of January 1751. Sulabut Jung, the third son of Nizam-ool-Moolk, was chosen to succeed him.

Ballajee Bajee Rao, on the plea of requiring money to assist his ally, Ghazee-ud-deen, demanded a contribution from Syud Lushkur Khan,† then governor of Aurungabad, the secret friend of Ghazee-ud-deen, which, on pretence of coercion, Syud Lushkur Khan levied to the amount of 15 lakhs of rupees. On obtaining this supply, the Peishwa proceeded to the banks of the Kistna, in order to oppose Sulabut Jung, who, attended by the French corps under Monsieur Bussy, was advancing towards Hyderabad. The armies had scarcely come in sight of each other, when news from Satara, of an alarming nature, was received by the Peishwa, in consequence of which he closed with the first overtures made by Sulabut Jung, and returned to the westward with the utmost expedition.‡

Tara Bye, when the Peishwa departed to Aurungabad, sounded Ram Raja, in regard to his assuming the control usurped by his servant Ballajee Rao; but not finding him fit for her purpose, she pretended to have had no serious intentions in the proposal, but despatched messengers to Dum-majee Gaekwar, representing the unprotected state of the country, and recommending his immediate march to Satara, to rescue the raja and the Mahratta state from the power of the Bramins. This request was imme-

* Khuzaneh Amirah, Suroo Azad, and Mahratta MSS.

† Or Rookun-ud-Dowlah.

‡ Mahratta MSS., Orme, Khuzaneh Amirah, &c.

diately acceded to ; and Tara Bye, as soon as certain accounts were received of Gaekwar's approach, invited the raja into the fort of Satara, and made him prisoner. She then reproached him with his want of spirit ; regretted that " she had ever rescued him from a life of obscurity, for which only he could have been destined ; declared that he could not be her grandson, or the descendant of the great Sivajee ; that he was neither a Bhonslay nor a Mohitey, but a base-born Gonedulee,* changed in the house where he had been first conveyed ; that she would make atonement on the banks of the holy Kistna for ever having acknowledged him." She ordered the havildar to fire upon his attendants, most of whom, unconscious of what had happened, remained near the gate of the fort ; and she directed the guns to be pointed at the houses in the town below, belonging to the partizans of the Concanee Bramins. Trinbuck Punt, commonly called Nana Poorundhuree, Govind Rao Chitnees, and the officers in the Peishwa's interests at Satara, were at first disposed to ridicule this attempt as that of a mad old woman ; but on hearing of the approach of Dummajee Gaekwar from Sonegurh, they quitted the town, and assembled troops at the village of Arla, on the banks of the Kistna. On the advance of Gaekwar by the Salpee Ghaut, although they had 20,000, and their opponent only 15,000 men, they made an irresolute attack, and retired to Neemb, where they were next day followed up, attacked, and defeated by the Guzerat troops. Dummajee Gaekwar immediately went to pay his respects to Tara Bye ; and several forts in the neighbourhood were given up to her. Satara was well stored with provisions, and the Pritee Needhee promised to aid her cause. It was the intelligence of these proceedings which recalled the Peishwa ; but before he returned, Nana Poorundhuree had redeemed his lost credit, by attacking and compelling the army of Dummajee Gaekwar to retire to Jore Khora, where they expected to be joined by the Pritee Needhee from Kurar, and by troops from Guzerat. In this hope, however, they were disappointed ; and as Shunkrajee Punt, soobehdar of the Concan, was assembling troops in their rear, whilst the Peishwa's army, which had marched nearly 400 miles in 13 days, was close upon them, Dummajee sent a messenger to treat with Ballajee, who solemnly agreed to abide by the terms proposed, and enticed him to encamp in his neighbourhood, where, as soon as he got him into his power, he demanded the payment of all the arrears due from Guzerat, and the cession of a large portion of his territory. Dummajee represented that he was but the mootaliq of Dhabaray, the Senaputtee, and had no authority for complying with what was required. On this reply the Peishwa, sent private orders to seize some of the family of Gaekwar and of Dhabaray residing at Tullygaom, and imprison them in the hill fort of Logurh ; whilst, at a set time, he treacherously surrounded, attacked, and plundered the camp of Dummajee Gaekwar, and sent him into confinement in the city of Poona.† The Peishwa next tried to induce Tara Bye to give up the fort and the raja ; but, having assembled her garrison, she required an oath from every man that he would stand by her to the last ; such of them, however, as chose, were allowed the option of quitting the fort or joining in the solemn asseveration. Some of the Peishwa's troops became impressed with an idea that she was a Deo (or good spirit), and others that she was a Dyt

* Gonedulees are a low caste of musicians, in the house of one of whom Ram Raja had been first concealed.

† In consequence of this treachery, it is said that Dummajee ever after refused to salute the Peishwa, except with his left hand.

(or evil spirit), but all the Mahrattas were so strongly of opinion that Tara Bye was the rightful regent, that Ballajee found there was more to be apprehended from proceeding to extremities than leaving her unmolested; although her party, to become formidable, only required a leader of reputation. Perplexing as the affair was in the meantime, the conduct of Tara Bye proved in the end advantageous to the Peishwa, as it took from him the odium of being the first to confine the raja to the fort of Satara. Tara Bye did not merely confine him to the fort; his prison, which still exists, was a damp stone dungeon, and his food was of the coarsest grain.

Dummajee Gaekwar was the only person whom the Peishwa dreaded; but as he was a close prisoner at Poona, Ballajee now proceeded towards Aurangabad, in prosecution of his engagements with Ghazee-ud-deen; and wherever Sulabut Jung's authority was acknowledged, he carried on the usual Mahratta plan of contribution or plunder. Monsieur Bussy, who was the principal adviser in directing the movements of the Moghul army, was himself at the head of a battalion of 500 Europeans, and a body of 5,000 disciplined sepoys, and, as the best means of repelling these aggressions, recommended that the war should be carried into the Mahratta country. Sulabut Jung advanced accordingly to Ahmednugur, where he deposited his heavy stores and baggage, whilst Raja Rugonath Dass, his prime minister, opened a communication with Tara Bye,* and also with Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor.† The Peishwa and his officers were not prepared for this unexpected plan of operations, and were proportionally disconcerted on finding their own schemes anticipated. They had intended, by supporting Ghazee-ud-deen or Sulabut Jung, according to circumstances, to weaken both; to conquer the whole Deccan; or to obtain large cessions, which, they foresaw, must at all events be granted to them by the one party or the other. To repel Sulabut Jung they had recourse to the Mahratta system, and with 40,000 horse surrounded and attacked the Moghul army in their usual desultory manner; but the French artillery, consisting of eight or ten field-pieces, galled them severely, and the Moghuls, supported by this powerful auxiliary, advanced towards Poona, totally destroying every village in their route. The Peishwa, alarmed at their progress, endeavoured to negotiate; and, at the same time, to augment dissension and jealousy, which had already become considerable among Sulabut Jung's officers, in regard to the views of the French. Monsieur Bussy, as the best means of counteracting such schemes, and securing his influence, exerted himself with judgment and energy. On one occasion he planned an attack on the Mahratta camp, and chose the night of the 22nd November, at the moment of an eclipse of the moon, when the Hindoos are employed in devotional exercises. The whole Mahratta army fled before him, and some valuable booty was taken, particularly some gold utensils belonging to the Peishwa. This exploit, although the Mahrattas sustained very little loss,‡ made a great

* Original letter from a spy in the service of Tara Bye, to Govind Rao Chitnees.

† Copy of original letter to the raja of Kolapoor.

‡ The Mahratta army was encamped at Rajapoor on the bank of a river which I am inclined to think is Rajapoor on the Ghore river, not far from the spot which was long a cantonment of the Bombay army. Only one man of any consequence was wounded—Baboo Rao, the son of Rammajee Punt Mahdoo Bhanoo—by a cannon-ball in the foot; from this circumstance, and the Mahrattas not having suffered materially, it is evident that their account is correct, and the surprise was incomplete; if the French had got close, they would have used grape or cannister, which, independent of the still more destructive musquetry, would have told both on the men and horses.

impression, and had, perhaps, more effect in raising the reputation of Bussy amongst the natives of India, than affairs of moment, where he displayed much ability and decision.

The Mahrattas, although surprised, appeared in the course of the ensuing day as active as ever, but the Moghuls continued to advance, plundered Ranjangaom, and totally destroyed Tullygaom (Dumdairay). At last, on the 27th November, they were attacked by the Mahrattas in the most determined manner, and nothing but the French artillery prevented a total defeat. The Mahrattas on this occasion were led by Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, the late dewan, supported by two of the sons of Ranoojee Sindia, Duttajee and Mahadajee, and Koneir Trimbeck Yekbootee. The last-mentioned person performed feats of valour, obtained the distinguishing appellation of Phakray, or the heroic, and from that day bore a silver bangle on his horse's leg, which, among Mahrattas, implies that the rider is always to conquer or die.* This success did not prevent the advance of the Moghuls; but on their arrival at Korygaom, on the Beema, a spot which was afterwards to become so famous to the British arms, Raja Rugonath Dass, in consequence of overtures from the Peishwa, had an interview with Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, and an armistice would have taken place, but news arrived that one of the Mahratta officers had surprised the fort of Trimbeck, which the Peishwa refused to restore, and Sulabut Jung insisted on immediately proceeding to retake it. The Moghul army returned to Ahmednugur to replenish their ammunition, and take on their battering guns. They moved towards

A. D. 1752. Joonere, but the Mahrattas constantly harassed them: accounts of difficulties of the road for transporting their guns, and intelligence of Rughoojee Bhonslay's progress to the eastward, conspired, with other circumstances, to damp the hasty and short-lived ardour of Sulabut Jung. His troops were in arrears, and clamorous for their pay, and the more their services were required, the more urgent they became: many of the principal officers were discontented, and it was at last determined, by Bussy's advice, to close with the Peishwa's overtures. An armistice was concluded, and the army of Sulabut Jung returned towards Hyderabad. But the symptoms of disaffection did not cease. Rugonath Dass, the dewan, was assassinated at Balkee, on the 7th April, in a tumult, apparently created by the soldiery on account of their arrears.

But whilst these events were passing in the west, the experienced Rughoojee, whose operations have been alluded to, was engaged in making those acquisitions which closed his long and active life, with great reputation among his countrymen. His anxiety to return from Poona towards Berar in 1750 was owing to apprehended commotions in his own territory, and to his desire of seizing what he deemed a favourable conjuncture for prosecuting his views. His son Janojee, having returned from the army of Nasir Jung, was sent into Kuttack, to support Meer Hubeeb, and invade Bengal. That province had been freed from Mahratta ravages for a whole year, but they now returned with a keener desire to possess themselves of its resources; and Aliverdy Khan, seeing no other relief, ceded the whole of the province of Kuttack, as far north as Ballasore, which was granted in the name of Meer Hubeeb, as the nominal deputy of the nabob of Bengal, but as the real servant of Rughoojee Bhonslay. Meer Hubeeb did not long

* This Koneir Trimbeck afterwards led the assault at Hooly Onore and escaped, but was shot through the head when standing with Sewdasheo Chimmajee Bhow, in Monsieur Bussy's batteries, before Savanoor, in May 1756. His relations were handsomely provided for by jagheer assignments.

enjoy the situation thus acquired. Owing to the jealousy of his coadjutor, Janojee, he was, on pretence of having withheld balances of revenue, confined until he should render an account, but unable to brook the disgrace, he rushed out with a few followers upon the guards placed over him, and was cut to pieces. Twelve lakhs of rupees in lieu of further claims was the amount which was settled for the chouth of Bengal and Behar; but the reason of Rughoojee's accepting a sum so inadequate is found in the events which were passing in the Deccan. As soon as the Peishwa and Sulabut Jung went to war, Rughoojee surprised and took Gawelgurr and Nurnallah, made himself master of Manikdroog, occupied the districts dependent on these forts, and whilst Sulabut Jung, by Bussey's advice, advanced towards Poona, Rughoojee not only laid the whole country between the Payeen Gunga and Godavery under contribution,* but drove out the Moghul thannas, and established his own.

Before the succeeding events in the Deccan can be explained, it becomes necessary to revert to the eldest son of Nizam-ool-Moolk, and to those affairs of the imperial court in which the Mahrattas were engaged. Ghazee-ud-deen Khan, although desirous of proceeding to the Deccan, had been detained at Delhi since the death of his father, and it seems probable, from his commencing the negotiation with the Mahrattas, that bribes may have been employed by his brothers to insure his being kept there. The

A. D. 1748. imperial court, soon after the accession of Ahmed Shah, was subjected to a fresh alarm, by intelligence of the return of Ahmed Shah Abdallee towards Lahore, of which, as well as of the province of Mooltan, Meer Munnoo, son of the late vizier, Kummur-ud-deen Khan, was governor. Meer Munnoo purchased the forbearance of the Abdallee, by the cession of the revenues of four districts; and this expedient left the vizier, Sufdur Jung, at liberty to follow up certain schemes which he had in progress against the Rohillahs. The growing power and encroachments of these adventurers excited the vizier's particular jealousy, as they threatened to extend themselves over his own territories in the province of Oude. The death of Ali Mohummud Rohillah, which happened a short time before Sufdur Jung's appointment as vizier, had afforded him an opportunity of raising dissensions amongst those who pretended to the succession, and, during the period when Ahmed Shah Abdallee threatened Lahore, civil war raged amongst the Rohillahs.† At last, Sadoollah Khan, the third son of Ali Mohummud, by the abilities of Hafiz Rehmut, his guardian, became the successful competitor, and although his two elder brothers, who during the struggle were prisoners amongst the Abdallee, afterwards returned to claim their inheritance, Sadoollah Khan, whilst supported by Hafiz Rehmut, maintained the ascendancy he had gained.‡ But Sufdur Jung, as soon as apprehensions from the Abdallee were tranquillized, marched into Rohilcund, reduced the territory to temporary obedience, and appointed one of his dependents, a Kaeeth, named Newul Rae, to be governor of his new conquests; the Rohillahs, however, soon rose upon Newul Rae, whom they defeated and slew. Sufdur Jung, proceeding to punish their rebellion, was also totally defeated, and therefore called to his aid Mulhar Rao Holkar, Jyapa Sindia, and the Jath prince, Sooruj Mull. With these auxiliaries he soon overran the country of the Rohillahs, forced most of them to seek refuge in the Kumaon hills, and gave up the greater part of their territory as assignments, in lieu of subsidy, to Holkar and Sindia.† Whilst Mahratta affairs

* Mahratta MSS.

† Seyr Mutuakhereen.

‡ Forster's Travels.

were in this prosperous state in Hindostan, their capital in the Deccan was, as we have seen, endangered by the advance of Sulabut Jung. Rugonath Rao, who had proceeded on an expedition to Surat, was recalled; and Mulhar Rao Holkar received the most pressing letters from the Peishwa to repair to the Deccan, with or without Ghazee-ud-deen. Holkar, then near the Kumaoon hills, immediately on receipt of these letters, moved to the southward, and had crossed the Ganges, when he was informed by the vizier, and by news from Delhi, that peace had been concluded in the Deccan. Upon this intelligence Holkar wrote to the Peishwa, stating his readiness to advance to his aid, but that, in consequence of these reports, he should await further orders.* In the meantime, the vizier, Sufdur Jung, was summoned to Delhi, in consequence of another invasion of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, who, on this occasion, made himself master of Mooltan and Lahore, the entire cession of which was conferred upon him by the emperor before Sufdur Jung could reach the capital. Had it not been for this precipitate measure, the vizier would have used every endeavour to expel the Abdallee, and had engaged Holkar and Sindia as auxiliaries by promise of great rewards, the more necessary as they were obliged to withdraw their troops from the lately assigned districts.†

On this occasion the Mahrattas, before they evacuated the districts, consistent with their usual policy of making the best bargain they can on both sides, are said to have exacted a bond for 50 lakhs of rupees from the subjugated Rohillahs.‡

When Sufdur Jung arrived in the neighbourhood of the capital, he heard of the irrevocable concession that had been made to the Abdallee, and was therefore at a loss how to employ or compensate his Mahratta auxiliaries;† but the Peishwa, who had only concluded an armistice until a favourable opportunity of breaking it should offer, continued to urge the advance of Holkar and Sindia to his support, and carried on a close intercourse with Ghazee-ud-deen, both through Holkar and his own wukeels at Delhi.§ It was therefore easy to satisfy all parties, by permitting Ghazee-ud-deen to proceed, accompanied by his Mahratta allies, to try his fortune on that field of adventure, the Deccan.

On the assassination of Raja Rugonath Dass, Sulabut Jung, who was at Hyderabad, sent for Syud Lushkur Khan and Shah Nuwaz Khan, the ablest and most popular men under his government, who were then residing at Aurungabad. Both were inimical to the French—the former secretly, the latter openly; both, however, had latterly endeavoured to obtain the good opinion of Bussy, whose influence over Sulabut Jung was already paramount. By Bussy's advice Syud Lushkur Khan was raised to the office of dewan, and Shah Nuwaz Khan was made soobehdar of the province of Hyderabad. Syud Lushkur Khan was intimately connected with the Mahrattas, and secretly favoured the cause of Ghazee-ud-deen. When positive accounts reached Sulabut Jung that Ghazee-ud-deen was on his route to the Deccan, Syud Lushkur Khan had the address to persuade Sulabut Jung and Bussy, that, by his resigning his situation as dewan, and pretending to go over to the Mahrattas, he should be able,

* Mahratta MSS., where his letter is given.

† Seyr Mutuakhereen.

‡ Forster's Travels. The Mahratta MS. in this part merely says that Holkar interceded with the vizier for the Rohillahs, and made peace between them: the writer of a Mahratta MS. would probably leave the article of the bond, or some equivalent, to be understood as a thing of course.

§ Mahratta MSS.

from his influence with many of their chiefs, to induce a great number of them, either to join Sulabut Jung as allies, or to remain neutral in the quarrel. Shah Nuwaz Khan was accordingly appointed to act as vizier, whilst Syud Lushkur Khan proceeded to the residence of Janojee Nimbalkur at Kurmulla.* On the approach of Ghazee-ud-deen, the Peishwa moved towards Burhanpoor. Syud Lushkur Khan and Janojee Nimbalkur had an interview with him, at which Syud Lushkur Khan, as if the envoy of Sulabut Jung, began by stating that his master had received letters from the emperor, from which it appeared that Ghazee-ud-deen was merely to proceed to Aurungabad, settle the government in his own name, appoint his brother deputy, and return to Delhi. The Peishwa, however, perfectly understood that he intended to join Ghazee-ud-deen, and wished to obtain his support; but, however desirable it might be to have a fit minister at Hyderabad in his own interest, he was sensible of the abilities of Syud Lushkur Khan, and doubtful of what might be his conduct when he obtained power. He, nevertheless, wrote to Ghazee-ud-deen respecting these overtures. The letter was referred to his ministers, Syud Ashkar Khan and Mohummud Anwar Khan, who, dreading Syud Lushkur Khan more as a rival than an enemy, desired the Peishwa to detain both him and Nimbalkur, and bring them on to camp.† When the whole army, joined by the Peishwa, and the Moghul troops from Burhanpoor, who declared for Ghazee-ud-deen, arrived in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad, it amounted to 150,000 men. Whilst both sides were

September 12. preparing for the campaign, as soon as the rains subsided, negotiations began on the part of Sulabut Jung; and circumstances appeared which rendered it as impossible to deny the validity of the elder brother's title from Delhi, as his undoubted claim by priority of birth. In the meantime the Peishwa required, and obtained, from Ghazee-ud-deen, in behalf of himself and his officers, the entire cession of the territory west of Berar, from the Taptee to the Godavery.‡ There seemed to be a prospect of settling the claims of all parties, when Ghazee-ud-deen, in an evil hour, accepted an invitation to an entertainment provided in the city, partook of a poisoned dish prepared by the hands of the mother of Nizam Ally, and expired the same night.§

Sulabut Jung was thus left without a rival, and became desirous of

* Mahratta MSS., and Khuzaneh Amirah

† Mahratta MSS., Hudeequ-i-Alum, Khuzaneh Amirah, Orme.

‡ Mahratta MSS., Khuzaneh Amirah, &c.

§ Mahratta MSS. Mr. Orme, following a common, but certainly an unnatural, supposition, states that he was poisoned by his own mother—a mistake which may perhaps have arisen from not being aware that all Nizam-ool-Moolk's sons were by different mothers, except Ghazee-ud-deen and Nasir Jung, who were full brothers. Colonel Wilks mentions that the poison was administered by the mother of Sulabut Jung; and Mr. Mill, without adverting to the relative situations of Aurungabad and the Moghul capital, because the author of the Seyr Mutuakhereen is better informed regarding the affairs of Delhi, and because the murder of Ghazee-ud-deen was favourable to the French, accuses both of patriotic credulity, and rejects the story of the poison. That the fact is not stated in Persian MSS. is easily accounted for; the authors wrote under the government of Nizam Ally, of whose mother, whether true or false, but especially true, such a story would have cost them their lives. The Seyr Mutuakhereen may be cited as written far beyond the stretch of his power, but its information is avowedly derived from the works of Meer Gholam Ally, written in the Deccan.

The author of the Seyr Mutuakhereen, in some extracts regarding the Mahrattas, seemed to me to misunderstand the Khuzaneh Amirah; but as I never saw the entire original of the former, the supposed errors may be those of the translator, not of the author.

withholding the cessions yielded by his brother to the Mahrattas; but having once admitted the validity of Ghazee-ud-deen's appointment, the whole Mahratta power being now collected, supported by Mohummd Anwar Khan, and the Burhanpoor chiefs, whose safety for the time lay in making common cause with Ballajee Rao, Bussy saw that it was both consistent and necessary to avoid war, and the alienation of the provinces in question was confirmed by Sulabut Jung, on condition that Rughoojee Bhonslay withdrew his garrisons beyond the Payeen Gunga, with which he immediately complied.

After peace was thus restored, the Mahratta armies proceeded to their respective territories—Holkar and Jyapa Sindia to Hindostan, and the Peishwa to Poona. Syud Lushkur Khan was reinstated as prime minister, and Sulabut Jung departed for Hyderabad. On the route to that place, M. Bussy was taken ill, and was obliged to proceed to Mausulipatam, on the sea coast, for the recovery of his health. Syud Lushkur Khan took that opportunity of weaning Sulabut Jung from Bussy's influence, and in the course of a few months artfully detached the French corps, and contrived to carry Sulabut Jung to Aurungabad, preparatory to the entire removal of Europeans from his territory. Bussy's illness was long and severe, but as soon as he could travel, he collected his troops and repaired to Aurungabad, where he procured the dismissal of Syud Lushkur Khan, and the appointment of Shah Nuwaz Khan as minister.

The excuse made for detaching his corps was the difficulty of raising funds, which was obviated for the future by territorial cessions on the east coast, consisting of Sicacole, Rajamundree, and Ellore.* M. Bussy placed a body of 150 Europeans and 2,500 sepoys to protect his new acquisitions, the gross revenue of which was afterwards extravagantly estimated by the French at upwards of 30 millions of rupees.† Bussy farmed the revenues to Vijayaram Raje, a principal deshmoorkh, who had recommended himself by his ability. The rent was moderate, enforced without rigour, accurate accounts were prepared, and most of the hereditary officers, if not those possessing rent-free lands, were confirmed in their property—facts which do Bussy and his nation great honor.‡

The Peishwa had no sooner made the arrangements immediately necessary for the occupation of the districts ceded to him, and their appropriation amongst the chiefs, than he prepared a large force for an expedition into the Carnatic. The troops of Mysore were engaged as allies of the French in the well-known war of Coromandel, and the period was so favourable for recovering arrears of tribute, that he, on that account, deferred other plans which he had projected on the side of Guzerat. But before he took his departure in person, Ballajee endeavoured to pave the way for effecting a compromise with Tara Bye. During his absence at Aurungabad she had occupied the districts of Waee and Satara, aided by 5,000 or 6,000 Mahrattas and Ramoosces, whom she had entertained in her service. A large force was therefore sent to invest Satara, and starve her into submission. Anund Rao Jadow, the havildar of the fort, convinced of the folly of resistance, had formed a design of carrying the raja out of her power; but the circumstances coming to her knowledge, she ordered

* Orme, Hudeequ-i-Alum, Khuzaneh Amirah.

† Orme.

‡ Grant's Political Analysis. The native historians do not agree with Mr. Grant respecting the French management of the northern circars, but his authority is quite conclusive.

him to be beheaded—a sentence which the garrison executed on their own commander, as well as on several others subsequently implicated in a like scheme. Baboo Rao Jadow, a person unconnected with the late havildar, and a relation of the Jadows of Sindkheir, was appointed to the command of the fort. The Peishwa, on his way to the Carnatic, sent to assure Tara Bye that, if she would submit, the control of the raja's person and establishment should remain at her disposal; but to this proposal Tara Bye would not listen, unless Ballajee Bajee Rao would come to Satara, acknowledge her authority, and give such personal assurances as should satisfy her on the subject.

The expedition into the Carnatic was the most profitable, in regard to A. D. 1754. the recovery of tribute, of any in which Ballajee Rao had been engaged. When the Mahrattas proceeded beyond their boundary, to collect revenue and to make war were synonymous; whenever a village resisted, its officers were seized and compelled by threats, and sometimes by torture, more or less severe, to come to a settlement; ready money was seldom obtained, but securities from bankers, with whom all the villages had dealings, were preferable, as they were exchanged by the holders for bills payable in any part of India. When the garrisons of fortified places made an unsuccessful resistance, they were put to the sword. On the present *Moolkgeeree* (such was the name given to these expeditions) Hooly Onore was taken by storm, and the Peishwa was bought off from attacking Seringapatam by a sum of money; whilst professions of attachment and submission, and promises of greater regularity in the future payment of the Mahratta claims, were also tendered on the occasion. Ballajee Rao, content with this success, returned with his cousin Sewdasheo Chimnaje to Poona, in the month of June; and his brother Rugonath Rao, as soon as the rains abated, set off, accompanied by Duttajee Sindia and Sukaram Bappoo, on an expedition to Guzerat.

In regard to the history of that province, it has been already mentioned that Nujeem-ud-Dowlah, Momin Khan, was appointed, by an order from the imperial court, to the charge of its government, on the removal of Abhee Sing in 1735. Nizam-ool-Moolk was re-appointed soobehdar of Guzerat in 1737, when he returned to Delhi; it proved, however, but an empty honor, as the confusion of the period left nothing but nominal authority to the emperor in Guzerat. Baroach, which Nizam-ool-Moolk had assigned to himself as one of the districts of his personal jagheer, when he superseded Hyder Koollee Khan, was held by an officer named Abdoollah Beg, as foudjar, under the government of Sur Boolund Khan; but when the latter was superseded by Abhee Sing, Abdoollah Beg placed himself under the authority of Nizam-ool-Moolk, from whom he received the title of Nek Alum Khan, and neither acknowledged Abhee Sing, nor admitted the pretensions of the Mahrattas.

In the meantime Momin Khan had been endeavouring to establish his authority; but the deputy of Abhee Sing, a native of Marwar, named Ruttun Sing Bhandaree, continued to dispute the possession of Ahmedabad, until at last Dummajee, after making a treaty, and exchanging turbans with Momin Khan, sent a force along with him, under an agent named Rungajee, to expel Ruttun Sing. They were repulsed in an assault, but Ruttun Sing at last capitulated. Rungajee and Momin Khan obtained possession of Ahmedabad about the 20th of May 1737, and an equal share of the authority and the revenue was assigned to the Moghuls and the Mahrattas, which, as might have been expected, occasioned constant disputes.

Dummajee continued to levy all the usual Mahratta dues in Guzerat undisputed, and an annual tribute from Kattywar, until the death of Momin Khan, in February 1743. Abdool Uzeez Khan, then at Aurungabad in the Deccan, was appointed his successor by an imperial firman, and immediately began to raise troops. After he had got together a few thousand men, he departed to assume the charge of his new government, passed Surat, and arrived near Baroach; but he was suddenly attacked at Oklaseer by Dummajee, or one of his relations, and his party totally destroyed. Abdool Uzeez Khan was never after heard of, and Futhi Yab Khan, the supporter of Nasir Jung's rebellion, was among the killed. Fukhir-ud-Dowlah was then sent from Delhi to take charge of Ahmedabad in 1744. At that period Dummajee was obliged to repair to Satara, until the dispute with Rughojee Bhonslay and the Peishwa was settled; but a detachment of his troops, under his agent Rungajee, opposed Fukhir-ud-Dowlah, and prevented him from obtaining possession. Khundee Rao Gaekwar, taking advantage of his brother Dummajee's absence, made several important changes, removed Rungajee from Ahmedabad, and appointed an agent of his own in his stead. He also gave some support to Fukhir-ud-Dowlah; but Dummajee, speedily returning, dissolved their connection before it proved injurious to the Mahratta cause, by giving up to Khundee Rao the fort of Boorsut, the valuable district of Neriad, and appointing him his deputy at Baroda. Dummajee, by this judicious management, preserved an ascendancy over the numerous members of his own family, which was probably more difficult than other obstacles in maintaining his power in the province. He would not acknowledge Fukhir-ud-Dowlah, but supported Fidaee-ud-deen Khan, the brother, and Mohtuffir Khan, the son, of his old friend Momin Khan, in the government.

The precise period when Dummajee Gaekwar obtained a share of the revenue and customs of the town and port of Baroach has not been ascertained; but in 1747, Kedarjee, the cousin of Dummajee, was invited to take a share in disputes among several competitors for authority in Surat, and was by one party promised three lakhs of rupees as the reward of his assistance. He accepted this offer; but the object having been effected without his interference, and the stipulated payment refused, he began to plunder the country in the vicinity. Syud Acheen, the person who had entered on the agreement, having no other means of satisfying him, offered one-third of the revenue of Surat until the amount should be liquidated—a proposal which Kedarjee, at Dummajee's desire, accepted. Great disturbances continued to prevail in Surat when Dummajee was a prisoner at Poona, and this was one of many reasons which made Dummajee so anxious to procure his liberty. The Peishwa was desirous of effecting a general arrangement in Guzerat; but before he would listen to Dummajee's overtures, he bound him down by the strongest securities. He fixed a sum of 15 lakhs of rupees as an acquittance for the amount then due, which was far from immoderate: but the lenity of the Poona government is accounted for by a bribe of one lakh of rupees, which was paid by Dummajee to Ramchunder Baba Shenwee for himself and his master, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow. The Peishwa also exacted a bond for an equal partition both of the districts then held by the Gaekwar family in Guzerat, and of all future conquests. Dummajee agreed to give up half the territory, and, after deducting his expenses, to render a fair account of half the surplus, in all situations where tribute, shares of revenue, contributions, or prize property were realized. Dummajee also engaged to maintain 10,000 horse,

and to assist the Peishwa when necessary ; to pay, as the mootaliq of Dharavay, Senaputtee, an annual tribute of 5,25,000 rupees for his share of the Guzerat province ; to contribute annually a certain sum for the support of the raja's establishment ; to aid the Peishwa in establishing garrisons in the districts ceded by this agreement ; and, finally, to join in enforcing their mutual claims to tribute over the whole peninsula of Guzerat. But, until a convenient period of fulfilling these conditions, Dummajee, though no longer closely confined, was kept a prisoner at large, attended by a guard of Ballajee's confidential troops.*

Of the port of Surat, which was still accounted the chief emporium on the west of India, the Peishwa was very desirous of obtaining complete possession, and, at the time of the above agreement with Dummajee, was, as will be hereafter noticed, engaged for that purpose in negotiations with the English, who had views in the same quarter.

In 1751, in hopes of obtaining possession of it without the intervention of allies, Rugonath Rao was sent to Surat, but he was, as has been mentioned, recalled to the Deccan before his object could be effected. His second expedition, which brings us to the period at which we had arrived, was undertaken with the more extensive view of completing those general arrangements comprehended in the settlement with Dummajee, whose release appears to have taken place a short time previous† to the march of Rugonath Rao, as he joined him with his army soon after he entered the province, and they proceeded together,

levying tribute, and reducing the country. Their progress A. D. 1755. was not interrupted until their arrival before the city of Ahmedabad. During Dummajee's confinement, Juwan Murd Khan Babey, an officer originally appointed to the charge of the Moghul quarter by the brother of the deceased Momin Khan, had usurped the whole power of the city, but he permitted Dummajee's collector to realize his master's dues. When the Mahrattas arrived at Ahmedabad, Juwan Murd Khan Babey happened to be absent at Pulhanpoor, but, hastening back, he was just in time to save the city from being carried by escalade. A new spirit was communicated to the garrison by his presence, and both the siege and defence were maintained with great resolution. Wittul Sewdeo, the ancestor of the great jagheerdars of Vinchoor, here greatly distinguished himself ; and Naroo Shunkur, the person who built the strong fort of Malygaom in Candeish, was one of the most active of the assailants, having under his command a large body of Arab infantry. The conduct of Juwan Murd Khan Babey procured him an honorable capitulation, and, on condition of his giving up the city, Puttun Burnugur, Radunpoor, Beejapoor, and several other districts north of Ahmedabad, situated between the Sabarmuttee and the Bunass, were conferred upon

* The amount originally paid by Dummajee is invariably stated, both in Persian and Mahratta MSS., at upwards of a crore, or ten millions of rupees ; but the above is extracted from the state accounts found at Poona. Besides the annual payment of 5,25,000 rupees, it appears, by these accounts, that Dummajee Gaekwer paid during the time he was at Poona, in the season of 1752-53, nuzurs, and exactions amounting to 1,10,000 rupees ; of which one lakh was equally divided by the Peishwa, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, Runchundur Baba Shenwee, and Gopika Bye Rastia, the Peishwa's wife. Nana Poorundhuree got 5,000 rupees, and 5,000 rupees probably went amongst the inferior servants. In the ensuing year he paid in all 7,90,000 rupees.

† It is generally stated that Dummajee was not released until he gave up Dubhoy to Rugonath Rao ; but he was in Guzerat, and had prepared his troops by the time Rugonath Rao arrived, as appears by an original letter in the possession of Mulhar Ram Rao, Chitnees at Satara.

him in jagheer ; but about ten years afterwards Dummajee took the greater part of these districts from him.

Ahmedabad, the capital of Guzerat, was finally taken possession of by the Mahrattas in April 1755.* The revenue was to be equally divided between the Peishwa and Gaekwar, but the whole garrison was furnished by the Peishwa, except one gateway, which was occupied by the troops of Dummajee ; the latter, however, paid 6,000 rupees annually to assist in defraying the expenses. An officer, named Sreeput Rao, was left as the Peishwa's agent in Ahmedabad ; when Rugonath Rao, having taken leave of Dummajee at Baroda, proceeded with Duttajee Sindia to Hindostan, where he was joined by Khundee Rao, the only son of Mulhar Rao Holkar. They overran Ajimere, levied the chouth and surdeshmookhee in the imperial territory, and insisted on receiving tribute from friend and foe. The Rajpoot states were compelled to pay a contribution, and the Jaths also yielded an acknowledgment, although they resisted the demand, and repulsed an attack on the fort of Kombhere, in which Khundee Rao Holkar was killed. Rugonath Rao did not return to the Deccan till 1756.†

Whilst the Peishwa's arms were thus successful to the northward in November 1754, another expedition from Poona proceeded to the Carnatic, and levied contributions as far as Bednore. The Peishwa accompanied the army to Eroor on the Kistna, where he gave over the command to Mahadajee Punt Poorundhuree, and returned on a pilgrimage to the source of the Godavery, where the waters of the Ganges are supposed to emerge every thirteenth year, and where many thousands of Hindoo devotees repair for the purpose of bathing in the sacred stream.‡

Ballajee Bajee Rao was naturally of an inactive disposition ; and as he had agents on whom he placed dependence, habitual indolence was a natural consequence. The principal military arrangements were entrusted to his brother Rugonath Rao, whilst the whole weight of the civil administration devolved on his cousin Sewdasheo Chimnaje. The system of village government had always preserved the country from total anarchy, and some protection was now afforded from that general system of plunder and violence, which had been universal for a period exceeding the life of man. The commencement of a system of order is ascribed to Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, and after his death Sewdasheo Rao Bhow improved on his suggestions.

In regard to events in the eastern part of the Mahratta dominions in the Deccan, the most important was the demise of Rughoojee Bhonslay, which, after his great success in the war against Sulabut Jung, happened in the month of March 1753. He divided his territory amongst his four sons—Janojee, Sabajee, Moodajee, and Bimbajee ; the two elder sons, Janojee and Sabajee, were born of the younger wife, and the two younger sons, Moodajee and Bimbajee, born of the elder wife, were nephews of

* Mirat Ahmudee ; but the date which that work gives, viz., April 1753, is incorrect. I take the date from the Mahratta accounts ; and since writing the above, I have been confirmed in my belief of its correctness, by observing that General Walker, formerly resident at Baroda, repeatedly mentions, in his reports to the Bombay government, that Ahmedabad was taken by Rugonath Rao and Dummajee in 1755.

† I was less successful in recovering materials for elucidating the history of Rugonath Rao's expedition, after he quitted Guzerat, than I could have wished, especially as I think there must be some records of it in Hindostan or Malwa, more satisfactory than anything to be found in the Deccan.

‡ The period is termed Shewhust, or frequently Singust, especially by Europeans.

the late ranees of Satara, Suckwar Bye Sirkay. Rughoojee, however, left the supremacy to Janojee, with the certain prospect of being confirmed as Sena Sahib Soobeh by the Peishwa. Rughoojee with his last breath recommended to his sons the advantage of preserving union in the Mahratta empire, and amongst each other; but precept, however solemn, carries no such weight as the most common experience. In the course of one month Janojee was compelled to reduce his brother Moodajee to obedience by force of arms, and, owing to the time lost in operations, he was prevented from receiving his title and investiture, until the Peishwa's return from the Carnatic.

Encouraged by Janojee's approach to Poona, and on assurances of safety and protection from the Peishwa, Tara Bye, leaving the garrison of Satara, and the custody of the raja's person to Baboo Rao Jadow, repaired to the Peishwa's capital, accompanied by Bimbajee Bhonslay, the youngest brother of Janojee, who had attached himself to her party, and married one of her relations of the Mohitey family. At Poona, Tara Bye was received with so much attention and consideration, that she agreed to the Peishwa's proposals, as formerly made, provided he would promise to accompany her to the temple of Jejoory, and there solemnly swear to abide by his present declarations. The Peishwa acquiesced, on condition that Baboo Rao Jadow should be dismissed, to which Tara Bye reluctantly consented. Taking advantage of her obstinate temper, he gained his end of keeping the raja a prisoner, by pretending a great desire to see him released.

Ram Raja was a prince deficient in ordinary ability, and the miserable thralldom he underwent, during a long confinement under the circumstances we have described, entirely broke his spirit and ruined his health.

Janojee Bhonslay, having agreed to the terms before subscribed by his father, of furnishing 10,000 horse when called upon for the service of the state, and of paying nine lakhs of rupees annually to defray the expenses of the raja's establishment, obtained formal investiture as Sena Sahib Soobeh, and the concurrence of the Peishwa to those articles concluded with Aliverdy Khan in regard to Orissa in 1751. He then took his departure for Berar, carrying with him Bimbajee, whose relationship to the Sirkays, and his new connection with the Mohitey family, excited jealous apprehension at the court of Poona. Janojee, on his route to the eastward, levied the tribute of ghas-dana both from the Mahratta and Moghul territory. This exaction excited the resentment of Sulabut Jung, on which Janojee began to plunder his districts; but being attacked by a very inferior force under a Moghul officer, who took his dewan prisoner, he was compelled to restore a great part of his plunder, and to retire to Nagpoor.*

It was probably when smarting under this disappointment and disgrace that he accepted an invitation from Jaffeir Ali Khan, the dispossessed soobehdar of Sicacole and Rajamundree, to invade those districts, which he laid waste, and for a short time plundered with impunity, until troops were assembled to repel him. He then sent off an escort with his plunder; and, to insure its safe retreat, maintained a partial engagement with the troops of Vijyaram Raje, the zumeendar who rented Sicacole and Rajamundree from M. Bussy. The zumeendar was supported by a body of French troops, but Janojee secured the object for which he fought, and the booty reached his own territories in safety.†

* Mahratta MSS.

† Orme.

Affairs at Delhi were not long exempted from Mahratta interference, owing to the dissensions of the court, which arose to a height greater than ever. Meer Shahabodeen, the son of the late Ghazee-ud-deen, bore a conspicuous part in the troubles and crimes of the period. This youth, on the news of his father's death, pretending to be absorbed in grief—a garb which wickedness frequently assumes—interested the vizier so much in his apparently melancholy situation, that he obtained for him all his father's honors, the title of Ghazee-ud-deen,* and the post of Umeer-ool-Oomrah. But no sooner were his ends attained, than he perfidiously conspired to ruin his benefactor, assisted to obtain the office of vizier for Intizam-ud-Dowlah, the husband of his aunt,† and finally brought on a civil war between the late vizier and the emperor. This war continued in and about the capital for six months. Sufdur Jung, at the end of that time, relinquished the contest, and retired to his own territory at Lucknow.

During these troubles Meer Shahabodeen, who audaciously took the lead, had called to his aid Mulhar Rao Holkar and Jyapa Sindia, but, they arriving after the departure of Sufdur Jung, Meer Shahabodeen carried them with him to act against Sooruj Mull, whom he wished to punish for joining the late vizier. The Jath prince retired within his forts, but Meer Shahabodeen persevered in his plan, and applied to the emperor for a train of artillery. Intizam-ud-Dowlah, however, being aware of the unprincipled disposition of his relation, as well as of his talents and ambition, notwithstanding the services capriciously rendered to himself, dissuaded the emperor from sending the guns—an advice which was supported by strong political remonstrances from Sooruj Mull. To counteract these representations, Meer Shahabodeen sent an agent to Delhi; but he, finding the emperor disposed to follow the advice of the vizier, enticed away a number of the soldiers belonging to the artillery, and began to plunder the environs of the capital. The emperor, intending to succour Sooruj Mull, moved out from the city against Meer Shahabodeen and the Mahrattas. Mulhar Rao Holkar, who regarded Jyapa and Shahabodeen as young men whom he was not bound to consult on such occasions, without intimating his design, set off by himself, came upon the imperial camp when totally unprepared, threw a few rockets, which created such confusion that the whole army fled in terror, and Holkar gained all the advantages of a victory by the plunder of their baggage. Meer Shahabodeen, on this success, joined Holkar at Delhi, and obtained from the emperor the office of vizier for himself, to the exclusion of Intizam-ud-Dowlah. He next deposed the emperor, raised a grandson of Jehandar Shah to the imperial dignity, by the title of Alumgeer II., in the end of May 1754, when the unfortunate Ahmed Shah was confined and deprived of sight. This revolution was soon after followed by the death of the former vizier, Sufdur Jung, who was succeeded by his son, Shujah-ud-Dowlah, in his government at Oude.‡ Violence, rapine, and anarchy continued to increase in Hindostan; but affairs of greater interest carry us back, for a series of years, to the detail of Deccan affairs, directly connected with the history of Maharashtra.

* Meer Shahabodeen is frequently mentioned by his father's title of Ghazee-ud-deen, but to prevent confusion I shall retain his original name.

† Intizam-ud-Dowlah was married to the sister of Meer Munnoo, and was the son-in-law, not the son, of Kummur-ud-deen Khan, as mentioned in the Seyr Mutuakhereen.

‡ Seyr Mutuakhereen, English Records.

CHAP. XIX.

A. D. 1755 AND A. D. 1756.

The Peishwa's troops, assisted by the English, reduce a part of Angria's territory.—The Peishwa proceeds against Savanoor.—A secret plot between the Peishwa and Shah Nuwaz Khan alluded to.—Particulars of the connection between Ballajee Bajee Rao and the English—their views on Surat.—Expedition against Angria under Commodore James.—Capture of Severndroog.—Dastardly conduct of the Mahratta fleet.—Second expedition against Angria under Ramajee Punt and Khundoojee Mankur on the part of the Peishwa, and under Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive on the part of the English.—Previous successes of the Mahrattas.—Siege and capture of Gheriah.—Reprehensible conduct of the English in regard to the prize property.—They endeavour to retain possession of Gheriah.—Siege and reduction of Savanoor.—Plot developed.—M. Bussy's corps dismissed from the service of Sulabut Jung.—Bussy marches from Savanoor towards Mausulipatam—takes post at Hyderabad, is reinforced.—Influence re-established with Sulabut Jung.—Negotiation between the Bombay government and the Peishwa.—Treaty of Poona A. D. 1756.

THE civil administration at the Mahratta capital continued under the management of Sewdasheo Chinnajee. The Peishwa remained at Poona for nearly a year, and during that time, by the assistance of the English, in the manner hereafter explained, his troops had reduced a part of Angria's country, including the important fortress of Severndroog. After the monsoon the Mahratta army in the Concan was strengthened in expectation of further aid from the presidency of Bombay, but whilst the preparations were going forward, the Peishwa's presence was again required in the Carnatic. Muzuffir Khan, an officer who had commanded M. Bussy's sepoys, and had gone over to the Peishwa in 1752, accompanied the army sent by the Peishwa in the preceding year into the Carnatic under Mahadajee Punt. Having taken offence at some interference in the muster of his corps, he quitted the Peishwa's service, and proceeded to Seringapatam, but afterwards joined the nabob of Savanoor. As the nabob refused to give him up, and was supported by his old allies the Ghorepurays of Gooty and Sondoor, the Peishwa assembled a great army, which was augmented by the junction of Janojee Bhonslay, with his contingent of 10,000 horse; the whole force crossed the Kistna, took Bagulkote, and then proceeded to attack Savanoor. The prime minister of Hyderabad, Shah Nuwaz Khan, who was at this time, for a special purpose, in secret league with the Peishwa, observing this formidable assembly of troops on the part of the Mahrattas, with well-dissembled alarm collected troops for the avowed purpose of forming an army of observation on the Kistna. Wukeels were in due form sent by the Peishwa to declare his pacific intentions, and to solicit aid against the nabob of Savanoor, the subject of Sulabut Jung, whose conduct he repre-

sented as hostile to both states, and his power, if not instantly crushed, of a nature to threaten the subjugation of the Carnatic. Sulabut Jung and Monsieur Bussy having been brought to accede to an alliance, the Moghul army marched to assist the Mahrattas, then besieging Savanoor.*

Leaving the combined army engaged in these operations, it is fit to revert to the affairs of the Concan, and the expeditions against Angria; for, although to the Mahrattas the transactions on the west coast appeared, and comparatively were, insignificant, they acquire an importance, because they explain the first continental acquisitions of the English in Maharashtra, of which the whole population are now subjects of Great Britain, or politically under its control.

Mr. Richard Bouchier, on the 24th November 1750, announced to the Peishwa that he had succeeded to the government of Bombay and its dependencies on the 17th of the same month; and from that period a more intimate intercourse commenced between the Mahrattas and the English. They had for some years been mutually desirous of settling Surat, and suppressing the depredations of Toolajee Angria. Ballajee Bajee Rao, on the first service he had seen, in the year 1740, was impressed with a high idea of the English from their conduct when they relieved Mannajee Angria at Kolabah. The warfare in the Carnatic had greatly contributed to raise their military reputation, and their fidelity to their master (as Mohummud Ally was termed), whose cause they had once embraced, had much effect in raising their national character in the minds of the natives of India.

Ballajee had early promised to assist Mr. Bouchier in restoring order in Surat, where, from the weakness of the Moghul government, there were three or four authorities besides the agents of Dummajee Gaekwar and the English factory. Seedee Musaood, an officer of the Seedee of Jinjeera, who had command of that part of the Seedee's squadron whose proper duty was to protect the trade of Surat, having part of the revenue assigned for that sole purpose, was a principal cause of the many broils which took place in that city. The English at Bombay had always maintained a friendly intercourse with the Seedees of Jinjeera, because theirs was the only territory in the vicinity from which they could procure beef for supplying their ships. In other parts of the Mahratta coast, cows and bullocks were sacred; for to prey on human flesh would not be more revolting to the feelings of a European than eating beef to the prejudices of a Hindoo. Seedee Musaood had taken advantage of the distractions in Surat, and the confusion in the government at Jinjeera, virtually to throw off his dependence on all authority, and, like most of the African race who have attained power in India, he was overbearing in his deportment and tyrannical in his behaviour.

The depredations of the pirates on the coast were still continued; for although Sumbhajee Angria was dead, and Mannajee remained in nominal obedience to the Peishwa, and generally pacific towards the English, Toolajee, who had succeeded to the territories of his half-brother Sumbhajee, situated between Bancoote and Sawuntwaree, disavowed the Peishwa's authority, and seized and plundered all ships, not bearing his own passport, which he could overpower. The raja of Kolapoor and the Sawunts of Waree followed a like system, and by the English were indiscriminately termed Malwans—a name given to them from the fort of Malwan, or Sindeedroog, which commanded the principal fort on their coast, and belonged to the raja of Kolapoor.

* Mahratta MSS., Khuzaneh Amirah.

The war which took place between the Mahrattas and the Moghuls, subsequent to the murder of Nasir Jung, prevented the Peishwa from effecting the settlement in Surat. An agreement was made with the English for their co-operation against that place through Ramajee Punt, sur-soobehdar of the Concan, at the time when Rugonath Rao was recalled, to assist in the war against Sulabut Jung. This derangement of

A. D. 1751. their plan was a great disappointment to the Bombay government, after the expectations they had formed; and therefore, that their expensive preparations might not be abandoned without some effort, they entered into an agreement,* independent of the Mahrattas, with Nek Alum Khan, nabob of Baroach; but the scheme proved unsuccessful.

The occupation of Guzerat, the siege of Ahmedabad, and the Carnatic expeditions, prevented the Peishwa from joining to reduce Surat, or from

A. D. 1755. co-operating in attacking Toolajee Angria, until the beginning of the year 1755. The Mahrattas had then a short interval of leisure, and the presidency of Bombay, when unexpectedly called on, in the month of March, although such an expedition was to them in the highest degree desirable, began to start difficulties respecting the lateness of the season, though these objections may have been purposely raised, as they certainly made the Mahrattas more urgent in their application. Ramajee Mahdeo Furnuwees, the sur-soobehdar of the Concan, was deputed by Ballajee to settle a plan of operations, and conclude the agreement. The council, although they had no king's ship at Bombay, resolved to make the attempt, and Commodore James, of the company's marine, was selected for the command of the expedition, which consisted of a 44-gun ship, a ketch of 16 guns, and two bomb vessels. Six or seven articles were subscribed by the contracting parties, by which the English were to have the command of the marine, but mutual approbation was necessary in the conduct of all operations. The vessels that might be taken from Angria were to be divided by the captors, but the guns and stores were to belong entirely to the Peishwa. Bancoote, with the fort of Himmutgurh, and the sovereignty of the river on which it stands, with five villages, were to be ceded in perpetuity to the English. But the president and council seem to have considered these stipulations as pledging them too far, and therefore one of the articles guardedly states that the English only engage to keep the sea, and prevent Angria's fleet from throwing succours into the northern forts of Severndroog, Anjenweel, and Jyegurh.

The strongest forts which Toolajee Angria possessed were Severndroog and Viziadroog. The latter, as already mentioned, was better known in those days by its Moghul name of Gheriah. On account of the approaching monsoon it was deemed inexpedient to reduce Gheriah, or any of the forts south of those three specified in the articles. The small squadron under Commodore James sailed from Bombay harbour on the evening of the 22nd March. A wanton delay on the part of the Mahratta fleet enabled Angria's vessels at Severndroog to avoid the English ships. Commodore James, after a fruitless chase as far as Jyegurh, returned to Severndroog; where he commenced operations on the 2nd April; stood close under the fortifications, and by noon of the fourth day from the commencement of the attack, was in possession of the four distinct forts of which Severndroog consists, without the loss of a man—an achievement which, from

* Bombay Records, November 1751.

the previous idea entertained of the pirate Angria, and the strength of the fortifications, was matter of surprise even to those who accomplished it. The whole success was justly attributed to the vigour and judgment of Commodore James, and the resolution of his handful of troops and sailors. The Peishwa's fleet never ventured within gun-shot; and Naroo Punt, a carcoon of Sebundeas, who commanded, being unaccustomed to the sea, although he had headed several assaults on land, behaved in the most dastardly manner. Shumsher Buhadur, the Peishwa's half-brother, was sent down from Poona with a body of troops to reinforce Ramajee Mahdeo, and several of the forts in the neighbourhood of Severndroog surrendered to him. Elated by this success, the Mahrattas pushed on to Rutnaguri; but the stay of the ships was limited to the end of April, and although subsequently directed, at the Peishwa's earnest solicitation, to continue till the 15th of May, the season was too far advanced to permit of their acting with effect, owing to the heavy swell which is caused by the setting in of the southerly winds, about a fortnight before the rains. Commodore James finally returned to Bombay on the 18th May. Severndroog was punctually made over to the Mahrattas; but Bancoote, by the wish of the English, was not given over till after the ensuing October, when they got possession. The reason of requiring this cession was to obviate that dependence on the Seedee which has been explained. The Peishwa was assured by Mr. Bouchier that the assistance he desired should be granted at the opening of the season, when the expected arrival of the king's ships from the opposite coast, under Admiral Watson, would place more powerful means at his disposal.

Before that time, however, the presidency obtained aid on which they had not calculated, by the arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel Clive, with a large detachment of soldiers from Europe. The French establishments in the Deccan had created a jealous alarm in England, and it was there projected to send a force to Bombay, with the view of entering into an alliance with the Mahrattas, which had for its object the expulsion of the French from their districts in the Deccan, and from the service of Sulabut Jung. The articles of the truce agreed to by Mr. Saunders and Monsieur Godeheu, in the preceding year, on the coast of Coromandel, precluded, in the opinion of the Bombay government, the employment of this force on its original destination, until accounts should be received from Europe, approving or annulling the articles in question.* The Madras presidency were of a contrary opinion, but on this subject their arguments and their whole design certainly more resemble the sophistry and artifice of a Dupleix, than the strong straightforward sense which distinguished the general conduct and deliberations of that government.†

The governor of Bombay, in consultation with Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, resolved to seize the opportunity, afforded by the presence of so large an armament, to reduce Toolajee Angria. A commission, consisting of Mr. Hough, one of the members of council, Admiral Watson, and Colonel Clive, was invested, by the governor in council, with powers to conclude all necessary arrangements and agreements according to instructions, with which they were furnished. Three ships of the line, one ship of 50, and another of 44 guns, with several armed vessels belonging to the Bombay marine, amounting in all to 14 sail, proceeded, in the

* Letters from Mr. Bouchier to Mr. Pigot, 25th September 1755; Bombay consultations, 21st January 1756; letter to the Court of Directors, 31st January 1756.

† Despatch from the Madras government to Bombay, 30th November 1755.

month of February, on this expedition, having on board 800 European soldiers and 1,000 native infantry.

Since the month of November a body of the Peishwa's troops, under Khundoojee Mankur, had been successfully employed against Toolajee Angria, and had, with the exception of Gheriah, reduced the whole of his forts along the coast to the northward of that place. No loss of any importance was sustained by them in the attacks, but at Rajapoor, one of the places which they took, after they had got possession, 300 men were killed by an accidental explosion, owing to the careless manner in which the Mahrattas expose their gunpowder. When the English armament

A. D. 1756. appeared off Gheriah, Toolajee repaired to the Mahratta camp for the purpose of making the best terms he could : Ramajee Punt and Khundoojee Mankur were negotiating for the surrender, which was deemed by the British authorities a violation of the agreement concluded in the preceding year ; and therefore, in order to prevent their obtaining possession, Admiral Watson attacked the sea face on the 12th February, whilst Colonel Clive, landing with the troops the same night, invested it on the land side, so as to prevent the Mahrattas from having any communication with the garrison. If the Mahratta authorities intended to possess themselves of Gheriah, in the manner alleged, which, from several circumstances, as well as their known chicane, is more than probable, the British authorities might be deemed justifiable in anticipating them ; but, on this point, and their subsequent attempt to keep the fort, the evidence is not so satisfactory as to allow our countrymen the merit of a decision entirely correct, or a disinterestedness wholly unimpeachable. Ramajee Punt had intimated, on the arrival of Admiral Watson, that he was in treaty, and promised to come on board for the purpose of obtaining the sanction of the commissioners. He did not come at the time appointed, and his carceen had the assurance to offer Mr. Hough a bribe of any sum, on condition that he could get the admiral to suspend operations. The admiral, therefore, was certainly justified in commencing the attack ; but it appears that the property contained in Gheriah was well known, and a committee of ten officers, of which Admirals Watson and Pooke, Mr. Hough, and Colonel Clive were members, had, before they left Bombay harbour, agreed to share the whole prize property without reference to their allies.* If the Mahrattas had intelligence of this proceeding, they had an equal right to anticipate the English. Ramajee Punt, when he found Colonel Clive had occupied a position between him and the fort, perceived what was intended, and endeavoured to get in a few of his men by any means. With this view he made secret overtures to Captain Andrew Buchanan, the officer on picket, offering him a bill on Bombay for 80,000 rupees, if he would permit him and a few of his people to pass into the fort—an offer which was rejected as became a British officer ; but it is a circumstance worthy of notice, as elucidating the character of the times, that the Bombay government thought common honesty so rare, as to present Captain Buchanan with a gold medal in consideration of his extraordinary good behaviour.

Gheriah surrendered to Admiral Watson on the evening of the 13th February. During the bombardment, a shell thrown amongst Angria's fleet, which lay at some distance up the river, burst in the *Restoration*, a

* Copy of their proceedings on the Bombay Records. The other officers who sign these proceedings are Captains Knowles, Latham, Speke, and Harrison, of the navy, and Major Chalmers and Captain Skeddy, of the military service.

vessel Angria had taken from the Bombay government, set her on fire, and, the flames rapidly communicating, his whole fleet in the course of an hour was totally destroyed. The captors of Gheriah declared that the Mahrattas had no right to share in the prize property, and divided about ten lakhs of rupees according to the plan agreed upon before they weighed anchor. Toolajee Angria's family were taken in the fort. Toolajee was also taken, put in irons, and thrown into one of the Peishwa's hill forts near Raigurh.

The president and council, on obtaining possession of Gheriah, were unwilling to relinquish it. They wished to give back Bancoote in exchange for Gheriah; but this offer the Mahrattas peremptorily refused, and urged their right in the clearest manner to its unreserved surrender according to the articles of agreement. The Peishwa in the course of his representations made repeated applications to Madras, and complaints to the king of England; but to all these remonstrances Mr. Bouchier declared that the articles had been infringed by the Mahrattas, that they had not fixed the limits of the Bancoote cession, that Toolajee Angria had not been delivered up to them, and, worse than all, that the Peishwa had contracted for a supply of goods from the Dutch. This last objection alluded not to the agreement made by Ramajee Punt, but to that settled with the Raja Shao, through the agency of Chimnajee Appa in 1739; the two first were evasive, the last did not relate to the point in question. Mr. Bouchier even condescended to present 5,000 rupees to the carcoon of Ramajee Punt, in order to induce him to persuade his master to accede to the exchange, and he agreed to waive the question of Toolajee Angria, on the simple assertion of the Mahrattas that he should be well treated, and never receive any territory within 40 miles of the sea. In one respect they kept their word: Toolajee Angria, after long endurance of rigid captivity in the fort of Wundun near Satara, was removed to the fort of Sholapoor, where he died. Two of his sons made their escape 12 or 14 years after their capture, and were protected at Bombay during the government of Mr. Crommelin.

In the early part of these discussions the Peishwa was employed at Savanor. When he was urging Sulabut Jung to enter on that expedition, in order to excite the jealousy of Bussy, and blind his usual penetration with regard to the design which was in progress, Ballajee Rao wrote to the presidency of Madras for a supply of European artillerymen and guns. The members of that government were not quite certain who this Ballajee Rao was, "but as, according to the best information they could obtain, he was said to be the head of all the Mahrattas," they agreed to assist him, if he would send a detachment of his army to meet and escort their troops to his camp.* The Peishwa's whole object consisted in the application, and there the matter of course dropped. The army of Sulabut Jung having joined the Mahrattas, Bussy, than whom no Frenchman better knew the art of display, prepared his artillery, and in the face of the two armies, amounting to 100,000 men, opened a fire on Savanor, so heavy and efficacious as to intimidate the garrison and excite the lasting admiration of the besiegers. Prior to this the Peishwa, through the agency of Bulwunt Rao Mendlee,† one of his own officers, had contrived to detach the Ghorepurays from the alliance,‡ and Moorar Rao, in con-

* Letter from the Madras government, 14th April 1756.

† One MS. states that Ghorepuray made his peace through the agency of Holkar.

‡ Mahratta MSS. supported by a copy of a letter found in the Poona Records, from the Peishwa to Bulwunt Rao Gunput Mendlee, which alludes to his agency on that occasion.

sequence, it is said, of his former engagements with the French, procured the interposition of Bussy in his favour with the government of Sulabut Jung,* of which this Mahratta chief was, it will be recollected, a dependent.† The nabob of Savanoor was admitted to terms, and on giving up a part of his territory, and making due submission to Sulabut Jung and the Peishwa, a reconciliation took place. Muzuffir Khan was entertained, probably at first secretly, in the service of Sulabut Jung, and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray, with his own and the Sondoor Mahrattas, returned to Gooty in the month of May.

A considerable part of these arrangements was preparatory to the secret scheme contemplated by the Peishwa‡ and Shah Nuwaz Khan, of compelling the French to quit the Deccan. Shortly after the fall of Savanoor, it was intimated to M. Bussy that the services of his corps were no longer required by the soobehdar of the Deccan. This unexpected communication at once laid open to Bussy the extent of the machinations against him, and he took his measures for counteracting them with admirable prudence and decision. Few Europeans in India have been placed in greater difficulties than those which were surmounted by M. Bussy on this occasion. His corps consisted of 200 cavalry and 600 infantry, all Europeans, 5,000 sepoy, and a fine train of artillery, enough to have made the whole army of the Deccan pay dear for their treachery; but Bussy knew the influence of the deserter Muzuffir Khan over some of his oldest sepoy, and had great reason to doubt their fidelity. He was surrounded by a host of enemies in a part of the country where he was an entire stranger, and he at once adopted a plan which divided his enemies, secured his retreat, and enabled him to recover his power at the court of Sulabut Jung. He accepted his dismissal from the service, demanded passports to Mausulipatam, and marched straight to Hyderabad, where, immediately on his arrival, he occupied some strong buildings, and prepared for defence.

After he quitted the allied camp, his design having been suspected, a detachment was sent in pursuit of him, accompanied by 6,000 of Sulabut Jung's Mahrattas, under Ramchundur, the son of Chunder Seyn Jadow, and Janojee Nimbalkur (Rao Rumbha) of Kurmulla; but Bussy effected his purpose with little loss. One of his first acts on discovering the conspiracy was to write off an account of his situation to Pondicherry and Mausulipatam, where the French authorities used every possible exertion to reinforce him. He also expected a body of 600 recruits, Arabs and Abyssinians, whom he had enlisted at Surat; but Janojee Nimbalkur, hearing of their approach, intercepted the party, and killed 50 of them before they submitted as prisoners.

Shah Nuwaz Khan was with Nasir Jung when he lost his life in the Carnatic, and although he had dissembled his enmity, he was never reconciled to the French. He had a better opinion of the English nation, and at his suggestion an application was made to Madras for a body of troops to assist in expelling Bussy. That presidency would have taken advantage of an offer which accorded so entirely with their views, but the

* Wilks.

† Upon the surrender of Trichinopoly to Nizam-ool-Moolk in 1743, he was confirmed as jagheerdar of Gooty.

‡ The scheme, if we are to credit the evidence obtained by Mr. Spencer, who was at Poona as an envoy from Bombay a few months afterwards, originated with the Mahratta court, and the whole intrigue was managed by Amrut Rao, the wukeel of Bulwunt Rao Mendlee.

disastrous account of the capture of Calcutta, on the 20th June, by Shujah-ud-Dowlah, nabob of Bengal, the grand-nephew and successor of Aliverdy Khan, arrived at Madras in July, and obliged the English to send every disposable man to recover their lost settlement, and avenge the fate of their murdered countrymen.

In the meantime Bussy maintained his post at Hyderabad against the army of Sulabut Jung, and contrived to secure in his interests Ramchundur Jadow and Janojee Nimbalkur, the principal Mahrattas in the Moghul service. They did not oppose the advancing reinforcement from Mausulipatam, and although great efforts were made to cut them off, the troops joined Bussy in the middle of August.*

A reconciliation with Sulabut Jung immediately took place, and Bussy, for the time, attained greater power than ever. Muzuffir Khan was not surrendered to the French, as Bussy desired, but he was dismissed from the service, and shortly after appeared at Poona, where, on making humble apologies to the Peishwa, and many promises of future good behaviour, he was again entertained, contrary to the advice of Sewdasheo Chimnaje.†

The Peishwa returned to Poona on the 20th July, and, in a reconciliatory letter, announces that event to Mr. Bouchier; begs of him to send some gentlemen to Poona for the purpose of settling several points of importance, but requests that Gheriah may be immediately restored. He also informs the governor of an unsuccessful attack by the Portuguese upon the fort of Ponda—an attempt made, as afterwards appears, for the purpose of deterring the Mahrattas from the projected conquest of Goa, contemplated by Sewdasheo Rao Bhow. The Portuguese viceroy lost his life at Ponda by the misbehaviour of his troops, but other events prevented the Mahrattas from attacking Goa. Mr. Bouchier, amongst the arguments used to induce the Peishwa to take back Bancoote in exchange for Gheriah, lays great stress on its advantageous situation as a barrier to the Mahrattas against the Portuguese. Ballajee, in reply, does not conceal his contempt for that nation, and artfully parries the argument by hinting at an effectual method of obviating the necessity of a barrier by at once assisting to expel them.‡

As soon as the weather permitted, Mr. John Spencer, accompanied by

* I have here gone more into events already well known than may appear altogether necessary, but having deviated in some degree from Mr. Orme's account, and considerably from that of Colonel Wilks, where my authority is less clear than, under such difference of opinion, I could wish, I shall submit my reasons to the judgment of the reader. Colonel Wilks states that the Peishwa made overtures to Bussy the day after he quitted the camp, and adduces arguments which, without evidence, do not appear to me satisfactory on this point. The Madras presidency were apprehensive that the French might enter Ballajee Rao's service, as appears on the Bombay Records, but on what grounds is nowhere explained. Colonel Wilks also states that the Peishwa sent a corps to protect Bussy; but the Mahrattas who followed him seem to have been entirely Moghul subjects. There is another point of some importance, as it regards a person whose character has always excited attention. Colonel Wilks mentions that M. Bussy was obliged by circumstances to take post at Hyderabad. If the fact be so, it greatly detracts from M. Bussy's reputation. His great merit on that occasion certainly was, as a politician, in exerting the influence he had acquired to maintain his post, facilitate the march of the reinforcement, and preserve opinion in his favor. If he intended to retreat to Mausulipatam, why was one of his first steps to write off for reinforcements both to Pondicherry and Mausulipatam? Had Bussy continued his march to Mausulipatam, he could not have forced his way back to Hyderabad.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ Original letters, Bombay Records.

Mr. Thomas Byfield, both members of the Bombay council, proceeded to Poona according to the Peishwa's request. Although Mr. Spencer was junior to Mr. Byfield, the executive part of the mission was committed to him, and he conducted it with ability. He had a long interview with the Peishwa in the beginning of October, at which Rugonath Rao and Sewdasheso Rao Bhow were present.* By that time the restoration of Bussy's influence at the court of Hyderabad was known, and the Peishwa was sincere in a desire he expressed of obtaining the services of a body of English troops. But Mr. Spencer was instructed by the president in council, who acted upon fresh orders from the Court of Directors, to evade any solicitation of this nature that might be made, and to decline entering upon the engagement for which troops had been sent out in the preceding season—a scheme which was therefore never communicated to the court of Poona. Mr. Spencer told the Peishwa of the application which the Madras presidency had received from Sulabut Jung for a body of English troops to assist in expelling the French, a connection of which Ballajee Rao unreservedly expressed his disapprobation.

A treaty was concluded with the Peishwa at Poona on the 12th October.

October 12. The exclusion of the Dutch from the trade of the Mahratta dominions, the surrender of Gheriah within 24 days after the departure of Mr. Spencer and Mr. Byfield from Poona, and the cession of 10 villages, including Bancoote, with the sovereignty of its river, to the East India Company, are the substance of 18 articles of which the agreement consists. The Peishwa also consents to waive all claims on the honorable company up to the date of the treaty, to give Toolajee Angria no territory below the Ghauts, to settle an equivalent with the Seedee for one-fourth of the customs levied by him from the vessels in Bancoote river, and to exact no additional inland duties on English merchandize.†

* Mr. Spencer's report of his mission on the Bombay Records.

† English Records. This treaty was published in the appendix to the 5th Report from the Committee of Secrecy.

CHAP. XX.

FROM A. D. 1756 TO A. D. 1760.

Rugonath Rao proceeds on an expedition to Hindostan.—Object of Ballajee Rao in his late treaty with the English.—Expedition to the Carnatic.—Attack on Seringapatam.—Affairs compromised.—District of Sera retaken.—The Peishwa returns to Poona.—Proceedings of Bulwunt Rao Mendlee, left in the Carnatic for the purpose of prosecuting the Peishwa's views.—Battle of Kuddapah.—Conduct of the Mysore government, acting on the suggestions of Hyder Ally.—Designs of the Peishwa on Bednore and Mysore,—prevented by affairs of the Hyderabad court.—Plot for effecting a revolution, and expelling the French;—particulars of that conspiracy, and of the circumstances connected with it.—Murder of Hyder Jung.—Death of Shah Nuwaz Khan.—Flight of Nizam Ally to Burhanpoor.—Bussy recalled to Pondicherry.—Remarkable instance of credulity in the Bombay government.—The English obtain possession of Surat Castle.—Proceedings of the Mahrattas in the Carnatic.—Proceedings of Nizam Ally—is attacked by Janojee Bhonslay at the instigation of Busalut Jung.—Nizam Ally is courted by the English.—Obtains the office of prime minister.—Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, the minister of the Peishwa—his character.—Dissensions in the Peishwa's family.—Altercation with Rugonath Rao.—Muzuffir Khan employs an assassin to murder Sewdasheo Rao;—the assassin is seized and executed with his employer.—Ahmednugur betrayed into the hands of the Mahrattas.—Sewdasheo Rao takes command of the army, and Rugonath Rao becomes prime minister.—War with the Moghuls in the Deccan.—Cessions acquired by the Mahrattas as the price of peace.—Reflections on the pre-eminence to which the Mahrattas had attained.—Reverses in Hindostan—affairs in that quarter.

As soon as the rains subsided, Rugonath Rao was sent into Hindostan,

A. D. 1756. accompanied, as before, by Sukaram Bappoo as his dewan, and joined by Mulhar Rao Holkar. The Peishwa prepared a large army which was destined for the Carnatic, under his

A. D. 1757. own command, but he did not cross the Kistna before the ensuing February.

In his negotiation with the Bombay presidency, the paramount object of Ballajee Rao was the possession of Gheriah; that obtained, as he had waived all claims on the East India Company, he still pretended a right to the recovery of the treasure and stores carried off as prize by the captors. He again addressed a letter to the king, and forwarded it, as before, through the Madras government. His letter to that presidency, accompanying the address to his majesty, was not couched in the strain of frankness and cordial friendship he had assumed to Mr. Spencer—a change which is the first indication of European politics in any degree influencing the conduct of the Mahrattas. It was occasioned both by the renewal of war between Great Britain and France in the month of May preceding, and by the late mis-

fortunes, and still uncertain state of affairs, at Calcutta. This policy was adopted, not probably with any hope of restitution, but preparatory to demands for chouth and surdeshmookhee from the Moghul provinces of the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut, in which the English had now so direct an interest.

Sixty thousand Mahrattas appeared before Seringapatam in the month of March, and demanded an enormous sum as arrears of tribute. On their march to that capital, the independent principalities south of the Kistna had all, except the nabob of Kurpa, made suitable submission, and the Ghorepurays attended their countrymen with a body of 6,000 horse. As Nunjeraj, the minister of the Mysore state, who had usurped the powers of the administration, declared his inability to pay the contribution demanded from Seringapatam, a battery of 30 cannon was opened against it by Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, under the direction of Muzuffir Khan. Negotiation was for a time at an end, but a shot having struck the top of the Hindoo temple of Runga Swamy, and a gun happening at the same instant to burst in the battery, which killed several of the men who worked it, the circumstance was accounted ominous by both parties; a compromise ensued, by which the Mahrattas agreed to take 32 lakhs of rupees, instead of a much larger sum demanded in the first instance.* Five lakhs of rupees were immediately paid in money and jewels, and districts assigned in trust for the remainder. The Peishwa next intended to retake the districts of Sera, Bangalore, Ouscotta, Balapoor, and Kolhar, to which the Mahrattas could claim a right since the days of Shahjee, although they had been successively wrested from Venkajee, and his successor, of the house of Tanjore. The district of Sera was occupied, but, on the approach of the monsoon, the Peishwa returned towards Poona with the greater part of his army, and, owing to the lateness of the season, had great difficulty in re-crossing the Kistna. Bulwunt Rao Mendlee was left with a large detachment for the purpose of reducing these ancient possessions, and with a power, somewhat discretionary, of levying the chouth and surdeshmookhee from Arcot. Bulwunt Rao took Ouscotta belonging to the nabob of Kurpa, and Moolwaukil was given up. Kudapannattum was also taken, and peremptory demands made upon the nabob of Arcot for the payment of arrears of chouth, which was, after much discussion, settled by the nabob for two lakhs in ready-money, and two and a half lakhs in assignments.† The members of the Madras government endeavoured to annul the agreement; they had, in the first instance, evaded the claim, by representing the disordered state of the province, the expenses and the efforts they had made for the support of order and the preservation of the country, and the scanty revenues which the territory still yielded. They also endeavoured to divert the Mahrattas towards the French districts, or northern circars;‡ but Amrut Rao, Bulwunt Rao's dewan, adhered firmly to his demands, and succeeded in obtaining them.

Moorar Rao Ghorepuray had retired to Gooty in consequence of not being put in possession of one of the captured forts, which appears to have been

* The Mahratta MS. says 36 lakhs, but I here follow Colonel Wilks, as he probably had access to official papers on the subject. The Mahratta MSS. also differ in the account of the manner in which the amount was paid; but although they are circumstantial, and state nothing respecting the subsequent interference of Hyder, I here also prefer trusting to Colonel Wilks.

† Orme.

‡ Letter from Mr. Pigot, governor of Madras, to Bulwunt Rao and the Peishwa.

promised; the Peishwa had authorised Bulwunt Rao to comply with his wish, provided he was certain he could be depended upon,* but Moorar Rao had joined a confederacy against his countrymen, by uniting with the nabobs of Kurpa, Savanoor, Kurnoul, and others, to which the confederates solicited the support of the English; a want of troops, however, prevented the presidency of Madras from availing themselves of an auxiliary force, which, in any ordinary season, would have induced them to resist the Mahratta demands. It is not ascertained whether Bulwunt Rao complied with the latitude allowed in favor of Ghorepuray, but Moorar Rao is not mentioned as having acted on either side in a battle fought by the Mahrattas on the 24th September, near Kuddapah,† against the nabobs of Kurpa and Kurnoul, in which Bulwunt Rao Mendlee was victorious; the nabob of Kurpa was killed,‡ and his capital plundered; but Abdool Nubee Khan, the cousin and heir of the late nabob, still defended the country, and occupied the Mahrattas for a period much longer than they could spare. In the meantime, the Mysore government, by the advice of Hyder Ally, then rising into notice, having broken their agreement, refused to pay the stipulated contribution, and expelled the Mahratta agents from the districts assigned for that purpose. The Peishwa prepared a force under Gopaul Hurry at Poona, intended ultimately to unite with Bulwunt Rao against Mysore, supported by a body of 10,000 Mahrattas, which, towards the end of the monsoon, were employed§ near the Godavery, under the Peishwa's son, Wiswas Rao. But as Gopaul Hurry could not cross the Kistna before November, and might not be joined by Wiswas Rao until the beginning of the year, the Peishwa directed Bulwunt Rao to reduce Bednore.|| He recommends him "to march to that place as soon as possible, that the garrison had been very sickly, that the rana's son, as well as the rana, was dead, and that the whole would fall into his hands before the arrival of Gopaul Hurry, when they must conjointly attack Chittledroog."

Had this scheme been practicable at the time, it would in all probability have prevented the rise of Hyder Ally;¶ but Bulwunt Rao was detained in the districts of Kuddapah, or in levying contributions from polygars, until the month of February, and before that date events had occurred at the court of Hyderabad which called Bulwunt Rao's force to the northward, and fully employed the attention of the Peishwa.

Sulabut Jung, by the advice of Shah Nuwaz Khan, had appointed his brothers, Nizam Ally and Busalut Jung, as governors of provinces—the former to Berar, and the latter to Beejapoor, whither they had proceeded in 1756. Bussy, in the end of that year, departed from Hyderabad, accompanied by his dewan Hyder Jung, to regulate the French districts to the eastward, and was thus employed when an opportunity presented itself of reducing some of the English factories in that quarter. Sulabut Jung, in the meantime, took the field, and his operations, at the suggestion of Shah Nuwaz Khan, were directed against Ramchundur Jadow, ostensibly to call him to account for not keeping up his established quota

* Letter from Ballajee Rao, September 1757.

† The town is known by both names, Kurpa and Kuddapah.

‡ Orme.

§ The Peishwa in one of his letters says, in reducing a district called *Jookoo* or *Noohooj*; but the word cannot be distinctly read, neither can the situation be ascertained, nor in whose hands the district was when reduced by Wiswas Rao.

|| Copy of an original letter from the Peishwa to Bulwunt Rao Gunput Mendlee.

¶ See Wilks, chap. xii, vol. i.

of horse, but in reality to punish him for not acting against the French reinforcements when marching from Mansulipatam to join Bussey at Hyderabad. Jadow was deprived of most of his jagheer; the minister spent the season in revenue arrangements, and Sulabut Jung, attended by his brother Busalut Jung from Adonee, cantoned for the rains at Aurungabad, after having taken the government of Doulutabad from Sadut Bokharu, the killidar in whose family it had been from the time of Aurungzebe. It was now given in charge to a dependent of Shah Nuwaz Khan; and here began a scene of intrigue as eventful and complicated as might occur to the fancy of a dramatist. The sum of the plot seems to have been to confine Sulabut Jung in Doulutabad, to place the government in the hands of Nizam Ally or Busalut Jung, and to expel the French from the Deccan. The Peishwa was probably in the first instance apprized of it,* and the real object of Wiswas Rao's march to the Godavery may have been to aid the design. As late as the month of September he did not, as may be observed by his instructions to Bulwunt Rao, expect that it would obstruct his designs on the Carnatic.

In the month of August a pretended sedition was raised by the soldiery at Aurungabad on account of their arrears of pay. Shah Nuwaz Khan was beset by their clamours; he neglected to satisfy their claims; the troops insisted on his being removed from the administration; demanded his dismissal from Sulabut Jung, and the appointment of Busalut Jung as minister in his stead. Although, contrary to his own wishes, Sulabut Jung yielded to their request, the troops were not to be satisfied, and Shah Nuwaz Khan was forced to seek safety in Doulutabad, where he prepared to defend himself against their unjustifiable violence. It is conjectured that the conspirators may have expected Sulabut Jung would pay the seemingly injured minister a visit of condolence in the fortress, but some of his immediate dependents, perhaps the European officer at the head of the French guard, suspected a snare, and induced Sulabut Jung to promise the minister protection, but to demand his submission. The exercise of a little common sense in upholding right rules often disconcerts the deepest cunning; but the derangement of the plan only thickened the plot. Shah Nuwaz Khan, on being desired to surrender, fired on the troops. Nizam Ally was summoned from Berar by Busalut Jung to assist in the siege; Shah Nuwaz Khan called in the assistance of the Mahrattas as allies, but some person about Sulabut Jung, who had more penetration than himself, prevailed on him to countermand the advance of Nizam Ally. The latter, however, declared he could not hear of his brother being so treated by a rebel minister without hastening to his support. He advanced accordingly, and troops from all quarters were called in by Busalut Jung. Still, however, the troops attached to Sulabut Jung, of whom 200 were Europeans and 500 disciplined sepoys left by Bussey, were not to be overpowered with impunity, and the conspiracy was aimed rather at the liberty than the life of Sulabut Jung. The Mahrattas began to plunder the country: the necessity of union was now much talked of, and Shah Nuwaz Khan suffered himself to be prevailed upon to submit. Great preparations were made to oppose the Mahrattas. Nizam Ally, to whom the office of minister had been resigned by Busalut Jung, made all the dispositions for the order of battle and of march.

* It is even probable that the Peishwa may have been a principal instigator in the whole conspiracy about to be detailed, although that does not rest on any direct evidence.

The humble post of protecting the baggage was assigned to Shah Nuwaz Khan. The friends of Sulabut Jung remonstrated against his allowing his brother to have the entire management of his army, and, his pride and resentment being aroused, he told Nizam Ally that he could not submit to it. The latter at first affected indignation, but afterwards so completely soothed his brother by assurances that his welfare and honor were his only care, that Sulabut Jung forgave all, obliged him to take back the seal of state he had resigned, and bestowed on him their father's title of Nizam-ool-Moolk Asif Ja. Very shortly after this reconciliation, intelligence was received that Ramchundur Jadow, proceeding to pay his respects and join the army of Sulabut Jung, was attacked, surrounded, and driven into the town of Sindkheir, where he was besieged by the Peishwa's troops.* Orders of march were instantly issued; but the same influence which hitherto had prevented Sulabut Jung from falling into the power of his enemies, once more frustrated their designs. He would not move. Nizam Ally, however, proceeded to Sindkheir, went through the farce of rescuing Ramchundur Jadow, of beating the Mahrattas, and compelling them to make peace. Although the latter, with more show of reason, afterwards claimed the victory, the nominal defeat was a disgrace to which Ballajee Rao would willingly have submitted, in consequence of his having received a cession of territory, yielding an annual revenue of upwards of 25 lakhs of rupees.† How Nizam Ally could reconcile this transaction to his brother cannot be ascertained, and can only be accounted for by supposing that the agreement was secret. Ballajee Rao returned with Nizam Ally to Aurungabad as a friend; but the arrival of Bussy, with a well-appointed force, consisting of 200 European cavalry, 500 European infantry, 5,000 sepoys, and 10 field-pieces, besides his detachment with Sulabut Jung, threw the whole cabal into confusion, and, except the audacious Nizam Ally, intimidated the rest of the conspirators. All were ready to pay their respects, and no one more prompt than the late minister Shah Nuwaz Khan. He had been led farther into the mazes of intrigue than he had contemplated; he had seen enough of Nizam Ally to be assured that Sulabut Jung was a better man, and he was probably sincere in his desire to replace everything on its former footing; but, once embarked, there is no saying where the current of factious guilt may drive, or who shall be absorbed in its whirlpool.

Bussy, with the measured manner which it became him under such circumstances to assume, paid his respects to Sulabut Jung as the superior whom he served; met the Peishwa half-way in a tent prepared for the occasion; visited Nizam Ally, but, as one whose designs were more than suspicious, accompanied by a strong escort; received Sulabut Jung; but referred Shah Nuwaz Khan, who had descended from his rank as minister, to his agent Hyder Jung, for the double purpose of marking a distinction, and obtaining, through his keen-sighted dewan, thus placed on an equality with the ex-minister, a complete insight into the views of the faction.

Thus far Bussy acted right, for he acted of himself; but the disadvantages to a European in India, however honorable and upright his intentions, who suffers himself to be guided by natives beyond a

* The body of troops which attacked Ramchundur Jadow was commanded by Mahadajee Sindia, still a very young man, but who had already distinguished himself at the battle fought on the plain between Korygaom and Tullygaom Dumdairey, 27th November 1751.—Mahratta MSS.

† The exact amount 25,08,223 rupees, 13 annas.—Poona Records.

proper regard to their opinions and prejudices, and who is dependent on them for the interpretation of the language, are exemplified in the subsequent events.

Shah Nuwaz Khan unfolded everything to Hyder Jung ; but, as was likely under such circumstances, ascribed his motives rather to the weakness of Sulabut Jung than to his jealousy of the power of the French. The friends of Shah Nuwaz Khan had strongly advised him to put no confidence in Hyder Jung ; and his conduct in this instance is attributed by his countrymen to that inexplicable predestination which is a rule of their faith. On being made acquainted with the scheme, under such colouring as Hyder Jung thought fit to give to it, Bussy was led to deceive Shah Nuwaz Khan by promises of forgiveness and restoration to the ministry. To have restored Shah Nuwaz Khan was now, perhaps, the wisest expedient that could be adopted. He was respected in the country, knew its resources, and, notwithstanding the fictitious want of money he had created, the revenues under his management were in a state of progressive improvement. He had experienced the irresistible power of the French, the weakness and futility of faction, and he had seen the premature disposition to villany in the bold mind of the young Nizam Ally.

Bussy, if he found it inconvenient to replace him in the ministry, had not even the excuse of necessity for stooping to duplicity ; he had only to act on the broad principle of right, and trust to what was in his power—a strong arm and a good cause. But influenced, unfortunately, by the representations of an Asiatic, his conduct became entangled in the tricks and intrigue which true wisdom despises. His plans seem in this instance to have had no very definite purpose even in his own mind, though there is abundant ground to suspect that his dewan may have contemplated his own elevation, and played deep for the high place of Moghul minister in the Deccan.

Hyder Jung having corrupted the killidar of Doulutabad, Bussy became the principal actor in a scheme by which he gained little honor from having obtained possession of that fortress.* Shah Nuwaz Khan was made prisoner, and the greater part of Nizam Ally's troops were debauched by bribes, amounting in all to eight lakhs of rupees, and came over to Hyder Jung. Of the number was Ibrahim Khan Gardee, who had been brought up as an officer of sepoy's under Bussy, and had gone over to Nizam Ally in Berar, in consequence of having incurred Bussy's displeasure. The Peishwa, who was very desirous of possessing Doulutabad, returned from a position 50 miles to the west of Aurungabad, and in vain used every argument with Bussy to prevail upon him to deliver it up to the Mahrattas. Nizam Ally, however, in the hope that the Peishwa would join him after their late transaction, promised the fort of Doulutabad, and many other cessions, as the price of an alliance which should raise him to the viceroyalty of the Deccan ; but Ballajee Rao saw no advantage from his overtures.

Busalut Jung, the present minister, was neither of a dangerous nor a formidable character, but he was capable of being made an instrument either for a good or a bad purpose. For some reasons it would have been ill-advised to remove him, especially as he had become secretly inimical to Nizam Ally, whose audacity pointed to extreme measures, from which Busalut Jung recoiled ; but the designs of Hyder Jung remained incomplete whilst Nizam Ally was at liberty ; he therefore determined on placing

* For particulars, see Orme, vol. ii., book ix., page 845.

him in confinement, as well as Shah Nuwaz Khan ; and at first thought of immuring him in Doulutabad, but the influence of Nizam Ally, even with the soldiery who had quitted his service, was considerable, and the proximity of Doulutabad to the province of Berar made that fortress a fitter prison for Shah Nuwaz Khan than for Nizam Ally. Whether Bussy ever would have authorised his dewan to take the steps he meditated is certainly very questionable ; if he had, it is not improbable that Hyder Jung, in time, would have sacrificed his French friends to his own ambition. Hyder Jung and Nizam Ally had now each their own reasons for dissimulation ; the one proffered friendship, and the other affected content. Hyder Jung wished Nizam Ally to accept the government of Hyderabad, that he might be nearer Golcondah, where he intended to imprison him. Nizam Ally received the proposal with much seeming satisfaction : intercourse was re-established, and everything was made ready for departure ; Hyder Jung paid him a visit prior to his setting out, and Nizam Ally, having prepared for his reception, murdered him in the tent. A great tumult ensued as soon as the event was known ; the French line beat to arms ; Shah Nuwaz Khan, who was confined under a guard of Europeans and sepoy, was supposed to be the instigator of Hyder Jung's murder, and a Hindoo soobehdar* of French sepoy, with all of whom Hyder Jung had been extremely popular, entered the tent during the uproar, and put Shah Nuwaz Khan, together with his son and Yemen-ud-Dowlah, to death. Nizam Ally fled towards Burhanpoor the same night.† The tragedy was thus close on the 11th May. The Peishwa with the Mahratta army returned to Poona, and Bussy, shortly after, not choosing to encourage Sulabut Jung in a war against Nizam Ally, bent his course towards Hyderabad. When on the march to that capital, he received from M. Lally those peremptory orders of recal which at once deprived his nation of the great power and influence he had established. The Mahrattas, like the rest of India, were unable to comprehend such an inexplicable measure ; the removal of the French garrison from Doulutabad, and the actual march of Bussy towards Pondicherry, was viewed by Ballajee Rao with wonder and with joy ; but Sulabut Jung, to whom the departure of M. Bussy was equally unaccountable, saw in it the extinction of his last hope in the world, and, until soothed with assurances of the probability of his return, he continued in a state of perfect despair.

It has been stated that the Peishwa returned from a position 50 miles west of Aurungabad for the purpose of trying to prevail upon Bussy to give up Doulutabad ; but the reason of his having moved to the westward, in the first instance, remains to be explained. The Bombay presidency, as we have seen, had long been urgent with the Peishwa to aid them in establishing their trade and privileges on a secure and respectable footing in the city of Surat ; but finding they were not likely to obtain his aid, they, with abundant caution, proposed trying to effect the object

* His name was Luximon, and the Moghul author exultingly informs his readers that the murderer of a Syud was afterwards killed in Sicacola, probably in the battle between Forde and Confians, in December following, at Peddipore.

† I have come to the above judgment on these dark intrigues from a comparison of Orme, Wilks, Mahratta MSS., the life of Shah Nuwaz Khan, the Khuzaneh Amirah, Hudeegu-i-Alum, and all the authorities wherein the subject is mentioned. Both Mr. Orme and Colonel Wilks state that Shah Nuwaz Khan was under a guard of Sulabut Jung's troops ; but though that mode of confinement might have been adopted to prevent unnecessary odium towards the French, and is, in the way Colonel Wilks has stated, very common, the Mahomedan authority is against them.

themselves, and Mr. Ellis, the agent on the spot, arranged a plan which promised certain success. The Peishwa, apprized of everything that was going forward, sent Shunkrajee Punt, the soobehdar of Kallian, to amuse Mr. Bourchier, until he should find it more convenient than it was at that juncture to detach a force to Surat; but Shunkrajee Punt, judging by the president's indifference, and the preparations of the armament, that they would proceed to the execution of the enterprize by themselves, Ballajee Rao determined to prevent it, by making a feint of threatening the presidency itself. With this view he moved from Aurungabad a few marches to the westward, and, by means of the native agent employed by the English at Poona, he made them believe that he was about to march for Nassuck, and thence to Bassein with his army; he also caused the agent to insinuate that the Mahrattas were treacherous people, not to be depended on, and that it would be prudent to keep a strict guard on the island of Bombay. The governor in council, on receipt of this intelligence, *unanimously resolved* not only to defer the expedition, but to desire Mr. Ellis to send down all the military and marine force he could possibly spare, to defend the settlement. This remarkable instance of credulity

proves the great want of experience of the Bombay government; * they, however, got possession of Surat castle some months afterwards, though with considerable loss of officers and men. †

The Peishwa's first object, on the opening of the season, was to detach a force under Gopaul Hurry to Mysore, for the recovery of the districts from whence the Mahratta agents had been expelled by Nunjeraj, at the suggestion of Hyder Ally. Gopaul Hurry established the Mahratta thannas, took Cenapatam by surprise, and besieged Bangalore. The Mahrattas were opposed by the Mysore army, which was on this service intrusted, for the first time, to the rising general, Hyder Ally; and the campaign terminated in the payment of the 32 lakhs of rupees before stipulated, one-half of which was paid in gold, and the other by bills on the security of bankers; after which the Mahrattas evacuated the pledged districts, and peace was concluded with the state of Mysore. ‡ Gopaul Hurry then proceeded to the Damulcherry pass, whilst the French were besieging the English in Madras, and endeavoured to exact money from each of the belligerents, but he was treated with considerable contempt by both parties. To be revenged on the French, he took possession of the temple at Tripittee, intending to have collected the offerings § at the ensuing festival; but the main body of his troops was recalled to Poona, and the garrison he left in the temple was driven out by troops belonging to the nabob of Arcot.

Sulabut Jung had appointed Busalut Jung his dewan at the suggestion of M. Bussy; their union was certainly the most likely mode of upholding the government of Sulabut Jung, and overaweing the factious at his court; but the party of Nizam Ally gained strength as soon as Bussey had departed for Pondicherry, and the only French troops in the Deccan were confined to their own districts, the northern circars, under M. Conflans.

* Bombay Records.

† Bombay Records, and Grose's Voyage to the East Indies.

‡ Wilks, and Mahratta MSS.

§ Offerings which are made by Hindoo pilgrims, at stated periods, to the idols in many parts of India, and which are afterwards generally considered the acknowledged revenue of the state; these festivals are termed Jattras, when the temples of celebrated deities are visited by votaries from all parts of the country.

Nizam Ally, soon after he reached Burhanpoor, exacted a heavy contribution from that city; and Mohammud Anwar Khan, the person who 40 years before had contributed, by his advice, to obtain the chouth and surdeshmookhee for the Mahrattas, is said to have died in consequence of the harsh treatment to which he was subjected. With the money thus obtained Nizam Ally began to raise troops. He was shortly after again joined by Ibrahim Khan Gardee with his corps when he quitted Burhanpoor, and took up a position about 100 miles south of that city, at the town of Basum. The minister, Busalut Jung, instigated Janojee Bhonslay, Sena Sahib Soobeh, to attack his brother; accordingly, Bappoo Kurundeea, one of Janojee's officers, intercepted his artillery, which was coming to join him from Burhanpoor, and took the whole of it. In consequence of this aggression, Nizam Ally made a sudden march towards Ankolah, which he surprised and plundered; but being attacked by a superior force, under Janojee in person, he retired on Burhanpoor, for the purpose of equipping some guns for Ibrahim Khan. As soon as he had furnished himself with this auxiliary, invaluable against Mahrattas, he returned, attacked, and completely defeated Janojee's army. His success soon obtained him friends; Janojee concluded an alliance with him, and he had received encouragement from the Peishwa. He had also been courted by the English, not in consequence of his victory, but as a son of Nizam-ool-Moolk who, beyond reconciliation, had committed himself with their enemies the French. As soon, therefore, as he understood that Sulabut Jung had quitted Hyderabad, for the purpose of assisting the garrison of Mausulipatam, which was besieged by the English, Nizam Ally, after taking possession of Aurungabad, moved towards the capital.*

The advance of Nizam Ally hastened the conclusion of a treaty between Sulabut Jung and Colonel Forde, although Busalut Jung, who was partial to the French, endeavoured to obstruct the arrangement. The treaty did not provide for the assistance of the English against Nizam Ally, as every inducement on that point was resisted by Colonel Forde.† Sulabut Jung returned to Hyderabad, where, on the arrival of Nizam Ally, much dissension arose among the brothers, but Sulabut Jung was constrained to restore the office of dewan to Nizam Ally, and Busalut Jung departed for his government, the seat of which was Adonee.

At the court of Poona the principal affairs of administration continued under the management of Sewdasheo Rao Bhow. His able coadjutor, Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, had been dead for four or five years, and his wealth, which was great, had been left at the disposal of the Bhow, who appropriated one-third for charitable and religious purposes, and shared the remainder equally with the son of the deceased. Sewdasheo Rao was violent and avaricious, but active and vigorous: and though proud and unbending in his character, he had a large share of good nature and of good sense. He was corrupt, but not in the opinion of his countrymen, for with them to take money for assistance or support in a good cause is legitimate and avowed—a principle which, if tolerated on whatever pretence, in any public officer of a government, must soon spread universal peculation, bribery, and misrule.

His friend Ramchundur warned him on his death-bed of the opposition and jealousy he might expect from Gopika Bye Rastia, the Peishwa's wife, as soon as her children became of an age fit to be intrusted with public

* Mahratta MSS., Orme, Khuzaneh Amirah, and Hudeequ-i-Alum.
† Orme.

affairs. To prevent these, Sewdasheo Chimnajee was the first to propose that the Peishwa's eldest son, Wiswas Rao, should be early employed; and he honorably endeavoured to instil into all the sons of his cousin the necessity of great acquirements for enabling them to fill the high stations to which they were born, and always recommended that they should be engaged in business and in war, as early as possible. The affection which Ballajee Rao had always shown towards his cousin Sewdasheo Rao received a severe shock by his intended desertion when he went to Kolapoor; and notwithstanding the conduct of Sewdasheo Rao, both towards her sons and in the administration, the seeds of hatred, perceived by Ramchundur in the mind of Gopika Bye, grew up the more rank when the actions of the minister were such as defied detraction, and ought to have silenced her jealous fears. The activity and diligence of Sewdasheo Rao were a reproach to the less energetic disposition of the Peishwa; but, independent of jealousy, where confidence has once been shaken, abundant materials for discord continually arise between a prince and his minister, without the influence of a woman's wiles to blow it into flame.

The forms of courtesy and the appearance of perfect concord continued until the return of Rugonath Rao from Hindostan, when the minister, having found reason to blame the expenditure and arrangement that had taken place during the campaign, by which a debt was brought against the state, instead of booty to its coffers, Rugonath Rao told him "he had better take command of the next expedition himself," and abruptly quitted the apartment; their dissensions continuing, spread to the rest of the family, and soon became publicly known. Whether encouraged by the mere circumstance of their differences, without the connivance of any of the parties, or actuated solely by personal revenge, is not ascertained, but an attempt was made on the life of Sewdasheo Rao, instigated by Muzuffir Khan, the officer already mentioned as having been received into the Peishwa's service after his dismissal from that of Sulabut Jung.

Sewdasheo Rao did not approve of his being re-admitted by Ballajee Rao; and Nizam Ally, having dismissed the corps of Ibrahim Khan Gardee as a conciliatory concession to Sulabut Jung, they were immediately entertained by Sewdasheo Rao. Ibrahim Khan was the kinsman of Muzuffir Khan, but the latter, who had just returned from an expedition against a Koolee raja near Surat, probably suspected that this measure was a prelude to his own supersession. The assassin he engaged, who was one of his own corps, attempted to strike the blow in a durbar tent, pitched on the spot where the British troops are now cantoned, and where Sewdasheo Rao was seated for the transaction of public business. He would have effected his purpose, but Nagojee Goozur, an active sillidar, who stood behind the Bhow, seized the assassin's arm, and the point of the dagger caused but a slight wound in his back. The man was put to the torture, and confessed that he was employed by Muzuffir Khan. The latter, on being sent for, did not deny the fact; and, without further enquiry, he was instantly led out to execution, and put to death, with the criminal he had hired.* A Purvoo, in the employ of Muzuffir Khan, being also implicated, was thrown into a hill fort, and never after heard of—the usual fate of state prisoners sent to hill forts by the Mahratta government.

It having been determined that Sewdasheo Rao should take command of the army during the ensuing season, whilst the civil administration

* Mahratta MSS.

was committed to Rugonath Rao, the troops were assembled for the purpose of proceeding to the northward, when accounts arrived of the success of an intrigue for the surrender of Ahmednugur, which was betrayed into the hands of a Bramin agent of Sewdasheo Rao, by Kuwee Jung, the Moghul killidar, for a sum of money. A war with Hyderabad immediately ensued. Sulabut Jung and Nizam Ally were ill-prepared for this event; their army was in arrears, and mutinous; an insurrection, caused by Soorya Rao, the deshmoookh of Neermul, had just been quelled; and the resources of the country, during the late factious intrigues, had been neglected or wasted. But the disgrace of relinquishing without a struggle the ancient capital of the Nizam Shahee kings, the reduction of which a century and a half before had cost so much Moghul blood, prevailed over the sober dictates of prudence, and the main army, without preparation or equipment, but with a vast quantity of baggage and cumbersome artillery, moved towards Beder, and from thence to Dharoor. Sulabut Jung and Nizam Ally, attended by a small force of 7,000 or 8,000 men, were moving towards Oodgeer.

The Peishwa in person proceeded to Ahmednugur with a large army, intended as a reserve, whilst Sewdasheo Rao moved in an easterly direction, took the fort of Buhadurgurh on the Beema, and was on the borders of the Moghul territory, when he received intelligence of the enemy's motions and position as already described. He immediately detached a force in advance, when Sulabut Jung and Nizam Ally, instead of quitting the artillery which accompanied them, and pushing forward to their main body, took post at Oodgeer, and began to waste their ammunition in skirmishing with the Mahratta light troops. This injudicious conduct afforded Sewdasheo Rao leisure to bring up 40,000 horse; whilst the regular corps of infantry, 5,000 strong, with a light artillery under Ibrahim Khan Gardee, was advancing to reinforce him.

The brothers saw their error when too late; but they moved from

A. D. 1760. Oodgeer in hopes of being able to join their main body, or that troops from Dharoor would be sent to their support.

In both these expectations they were disappointed; the troops at Dharoor, either entirely occupied in watching the motions of the Peishwa, or not apprized of their situation, made no effort to relieve them. The Moghul guns made little impression on the open straggling horse of the Mahrattas, but the constant skirmishing impeded the march, and in a few days Ibrahim Khan Gardee, with his infantry and guns, arrived. His artillery, which was served after the European manner, made great havoc on the crowded bodies of Moghul cavalry, and those who ventured to extend their order were immediately charged by the Mahrattas, whilst their grain and forage were effectually cut off. Nizam Ally attempted to negotiate, but Sewdasheo Rao desired him to surrender—a disgrace to which neither of the brothers would submit. A desperate charge was made on Ibrahim Khan's corps, which was completely broken, eleven of his standards taken, and many of his men killed: but this success was but of short duration; a body of Mahrattas attacked the right wing under Shoukut Jung, and cut nearly 3,000 Moghuls to pieces.

Nizam Ally renewed his negotiations, and sent his seal of state as minister to Sewdasheo Rao, signifying that he left it to his generosity to make the terms. A treaty was accordingly concluded, by which the forts of Doulutabad, Sewneree, Asseergurh, and Beejapoor were given up to the Mahrattas; the possession of Ahmednugur was confirmed, and districts yielded, which included the province of Beejapoor and a part of Beder;

together with the province of Aurungabad, excepting the city and two of its pergunnas, Hursoul and Sittarah. The annual revenue of these cessions^a amounted to upwards of 62 lakhs of rupees ; and, according to an obvious policy, invariably observed by the Peishwa, 41 lakhs were given over as military jagheer to his officers, who always shared in the advantage or disadvantage by territory acquired or lost. The Moghul possessions in the Deccan were now confined to an insulated space, which must, it seemed, be soon wholly overwhelmed. A compactness and power would thus be insured to the Peishwa's dominion, which promised to preserve the Bramin ascendancy, and spread the authority of Hindoos over the vast empire where they had, for many centuries, been a conquered people in their native land. The pre-eminence to which the Mahrattas had attained was animating and glorious ; their right to tribute was acknowledged on the banks of the Coleroon, and the Deccan horse had quenched their thirst from the waters of the Indus. The Mahratta people felt a pride in the conquests of their countrymen ; and action, enterprize, and wealth raised them in political consequence above the mass of that humble race, who, by a system of opinions, stand fettered among nations in the growth of wisdom, and are content to live and to die in the same occupation, and with equal apathy, as their thousand progenitors. How far this stimulus in Maharashtra might ultimately have improved them, or elevated them in the scale of human nature, may be left to the consideration of those who indulge in such speculations ; but in their conquests, certainly, no other nation can sympathize : they were not animated by that patriotism which devotes itself merely for its country's weal, or its country's glory ; the extension of their sway carried no freedom even to Hindoos, except freedom of opinion ; and it rarely brought protection, or improved the habits and condition of the vanquished. Destruction, rapine, oppression, and tyranny were their more certain concomitants ; and although entitled to the negative praise of not being bloodthirsty, they were unfeeling and ungenerous victors. The Mahratta people, however, who have not followed the profession of arms, and where families, unconnected with camps and courts, have lived content in the simple enjoyment of their hereditary rights and fields, are, except in one respect—their habitual disregard of truth, which is strangely contrasted with their probity in dealings with each other—a remarkably moral, kind, humane, and hospitable race.

Ballajee Rao had achieved a conquest by the exertions of his cousin, which afforded the highest gratification to his ambition ; but it was not unalloyed. Accounts of great reverses were, about the same time, received from Hindostan, which lead us back to notice the principal events that had taken place in that quarter.

* Poona Records.

Sewdasheo Rao obtained these cessions in four separate deeds—

	Rs.	a.	p.
1. In his own name	1,97,499	5	0
2. In the name of the Peishwa's second son	20,44,115	14	1
3. In the name of the Peishwa's third son	85,02,247	14	0
It is not known in whose name the other sunnad was issued, but the districts and the amount of their revenue are recorded as follows :—			
Pergunna Meyhekur	1,73,269	15	2
" Durrucheegaom	85,500	0	0
Boolundee Burhanpoor	1,75,000	0	0
Pergunna Purboney	55,524	9	0
Chaloo Pytan and Ambad	52,000	0	0
		4,92,294	8 2

Total amount of cession...Rs. 62,36,157 9 8

CHAP. XXI.

A. D. 1760 AND A. D. 1761.

Meer Shahabodeen seizes Mooltan and Lahore—is promptly expelled by Ahmed Shah, who advances into Hindostan, plunders Delhi and Muttra, but is compelled to retire in consequence of a pestilence.—Meer Shahabodeen calls in the aid of Rugonath Rao against the emperor and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah—recovers possession of Delhi and of the emperor's person.—Rugonath Rao conquers Mooltan and Lahore for the Peishwa—appoints Adina Beg sur-soobehdar, supported by the troops of Sindia.—Account of the sons of Ranoojee Sindia.—Duttajee is summoned from Rohilcund, which he had invaded at the instigation of Meer Shahabodeen to oppose the Abdallee.—Meer Shahabodeen puts the Emperor Alumgeer II. to death.—Abdallee recovers Mooltan and Lahore—advances on Delhi—surprises Sindia's division—Duttajee and Joteba are killed.—Holkar surprised and routed.—Sewdasheo Rao Bhow marches from the Deccan to oppose the Afghans—is joined by large armies on his advance—takes possession of Delhi.—Rajpoots and Jhats withdraw from the confederacy.—Sewdasheo Rao proclaims Mirza Juwan Bukht emperor—storms Kunjpoora.—Ahmed Shah crosses the Jumna—events from October till January.—Battle of Panniput, where the Mahrattas sustain a dreadful defeat—barbarity of the Afghans—consequences of the disastrous intelligence in Maharashtra.—Death and character of Ballajee Bajee Rao.—State of the country under his government.

THE revolution at the fallen court of Delhi, which took place in the year 1754, did but increase the troubles and confusion in the northern parts of India. The new vizier,* after evincing much hardihood during a mutiny of his troops, which he quelled by a merciless attack and plunder of all the body in which it broke out, having left Alumgeer II., an emperor he had raised to the throne, in the capital, departed with the emperor's son, the prince Ali Gohur, towards Mooltan and Lahore—provinces which he proposed to re-annex, to the imperial throne. These vast tracts of territory were conquered, as has already been mentioned, by Ahmed Shah Abdallee; and Meer Munnoo, who first defended them against him, afterwards accepted the government of them from the Abdallee king. Meer Munnoo died suddenly: his son, though still a child, was confirmed in the government by Ahmed Shah, under the guardianship of the widow of Meer Munnoo. Great mismanagement ensued; universal poverty and misrule drew many to swell the numbers of a sect which had subsisted for a considerable period under the name of Seiks, and whose rapid increase tended to augment the confusion of the country.

* It may not be unnecessary to remind the reader that the person alluded to is Meer Shahabodeen, the son of Ghazee-ud-deen, and grandson of Nizam-ool-Moolk. He is often mentioned in the English records, and in various publications, as Ghazee-ud-deen II. I have thought it best to retain his original name, especially as it ought to be Ghazee-ud-deen III.

The son of Meer Munnoo died ; and the widow, who still, as guardian, claimed the right of governing, after being confined for a time by one of her own officers, at last submitted to a compromise, and shared the authority with him. Under these circumstances, Meer Shahabodeen, the vizier, reasonably concluded that to obtain possession of the country would not be difficult ; but he did not extend his views to the defence which it would be necessary to prepare against the coming of the Abdallee to recover them. It appears that a daughter of Meer Munnoo had been betrothed to Meer Shahabodeen. To aid his projects, he first gained the traitorous Adina Beg, who had been the first cause of the Abdallee invasion ; and, in consultation with him, Meer Shahabodeen, on his arrival in her neighbourhood, sent to the widow of Meer Munnoo, applying for his affianced bride—a request from the vizier which, on the part of the widow, was received with much satisfaction, and with which she readily complied. But Shahabodeen seized the government, conveyed the widow of Meer Munnoo to Delhi, and appointed Adina Beg to the charge of the provinces.

Ahmed Shah Abdallee, enraged at these proceedings, crossed the Attock* with a large army, the provinces were unresistingly again occupied, and the king marched onwards to Delhi. Meer Shahabodeen humbled himself, and Ahmed Shah condescended to forgive him ; but Delhi was plundered, and its unhappy people again subjected to pillage, and its daughters to pollution. The city of Muttra shared a like fate, and Agra was only saved by the breaking out of a violent disease in the camp of the Afghans, which compelled their king to abandon his conquests, and hasten beyond the influence of pestilence to the more congenial climate of Cabul. He returned early in the year 1756. Prior to his quitting Delhi, he had sent his own son Timoor Shah as viceroy of the Punjab, including Mooltan and Lahore ; and had appointed Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, a Rohillah chief of reputation, to the office of Meer Bukhshee, and to the rank of Umeer-ool-Oomrah at the imperial court. Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, prior to the coming of the Abdallee, had attached himself to Meer Shahabodeen ; and the latter, displeased at his being set up as his own rival, and promoted without his concurrence, as soon as the Abdallee retired, stripped him of his honors, and conferred his rank and appointment on Ahmed Khan Bungush. The Emperor Alumgeer, with Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, was in possession of Delhi ; and, as the one supported the other, Meer Shahabodeen determined to reduce them. For this purpose, on the advance of Rugonath Rao into Malwa, where he arrived in the end of 1756, Meer Shahabodeen entered on an alliance with Rugoba ;† and by his assistance soon recovered Delhi, and the control of the emperor's person. Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah must have fallen a prisoner into his hands, but Mulhar Rao Holkar, who was more friendly to all the Rohillahs than any of the other Mahratta chiefs, protected Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, and aided his escape from the citadel to his own territory, situated about 70 miles to the north-east of Delhi.

Rugonath Rao remained for a time encamped in the neighbourhood of the capital, when he was summoned to a great conquest, splendid indeed, but to it may be ascribed the immediate cause of the disastrous war which first checked the progress of the Mahrattas, and distinctly marks the date of their decline.

* This was the fourth Abdallee invasion of Hindostan, but Ahmed Shah was probably in the army of Nadir Shah, and if so, this was the fifth time he had crossed the Attock.

† Rugoba is the familiar name of Rugonath, and that by which the reader will frequently find this well-known personage mentioned.

Ahmed Shah Abdallee, before he appointed his son Timoor to the viceroyalty of the Punjab, gave him, as his minister and adviser, Jehan Khan, who, apprized of the knowledge which Adina Beg Khan possessed of the resources of the country, applied to him, and for a time derived benefit from his management of some distant districts. Adina Beg was invited to Lahore, but, suspicious of Jehan Khan's designs, he refused to go, and withdrew to the mountains. He was therefore treated as a rebel, but he successfully opposed the troops sent against him, by raising the Seiks, who, from devotees and mendicants, now appeared as soldiers. He also invited the Mahrattas into the province, and Rugonath Rao, then at Delhi, embraced the proposal with alacrity, met and totally defeated the Abdallee governor of Sirhind, speedily overran the country, and entered Lahore as a conqueror in the month of May 1758. He appointed Adina Beg sur-soobehdar of Mooltan and Lahore,* and left Shabajee, a relation of Sindia's, to support him with a body of Mahratta troops. Rugonath Rao then returned towards Poona; but his improvidence in this as well as in most expeditions of his life was very conspicuous; the magnitude of his conquests brought no revenue to the exchequer; and upwards of 80 lakhs of rupees, over and above his receipts, were charged on the present occasion—a circumstance which, as has been alluded to, called forth the strictures of his cousin, and gave vent to those feelings of family jealousy with which Sewdasheo Rao Bhow was beset.

Rugonath Rao, before he quitted Hindostan, left Mulhar Rao Holkar and Duttajee Sindia in Malwa, whilst Junkajee, the son of Jyapa Sindia, remained near Delhi at the head of a body of troops, for the purpose of collecting tribute from the Rajpoot states, and of supporting, if necessary, the troops in Lahore.†

Ranoojee Sindia, so much distinguished under the great Bajee Rao, had three legitimate and two illegitimate sons; of the former were Jyapa, Duttajee, and Jooteba; of the latter, Tookajee and Mahadajee. The whole of the five sons survived their father, except Tookajee. Ranoojee Sindia died shortly after Shao; his sons Duttajee and Mahadajee were generally employed to command the troops with the Peishwa, whilst Jyapa was acting in Hindostan.

In consequence of a dispute between Ram Sing and Bejee Sing, the sons of Abhee Sing, raja of Joudpoor, regarding the division of their father's territory after his death, the former solicited aid A. D. 1759. from the Peishwa, who directed Jyapa to support Ram Sing and settle their affairs. Jyapa was at first successful against Bejee Sing, whom he besieged in Nagour; but the latter, following the infamous example of his father in regard to Peelajee Gaekwar, engaged two persons who, under the promise of a jagheer, repaired to Jyapa as accredited negotiators, and, watching their opportunity, assassinated him. Of the murderers one escaped, and Jyapa's army retired, but Rugonath Rao afterwards accomplished the object of the expedition, took Ajimere, and established a tribute over the Joudpoor territory.‡

The most distinguished of the remaining sons of Ranoojee were Duttajee

* It is said that Adina Beg Khan agreed to hold the provinces of the Mahrattas, paying an annual tribute of 75 lakhs of rupees.

† Seyr Mutakhereen, partly supported by Mahratta MSS.

‡ Mahratta MSS. and Tareekh-i-Dukhin, a Persian MS. in Mr. Erskine's library, written by Boodh Sing, a native of Lahore, at the request of Major James Browne;—a valuable little manuscript. I have not been able to ascertain the date of Jyapa's murder, nor does Sir John Malcolm's report give it.

and Mahadajee, who first brought themselves into notice against Sulabut Jung and the French in the war of 1751. Both of them were now left in Hindostan, and not long after Rugonath Rao's departure, Duttajee, incited by the restless vizier Meer Shahabodeen, advanced with a large force to reduce the territory of the Rohillahs. Operations were at first directed against Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah only, who, being unable to withstand such numbers, took post and entrenched himself on the bank of the Ganges, until relieved by Shujah-ud-Dowlah, who, although he detested the Rohillahs as much as his father had done, was yet sensible that to unite against the Mahrattas was the only chance of safety to himself. Upon the advance of Shujah-ud-Dowlah, Govind Punt Boondelay, the soobehdar in charge of the Peishwa's share of Bundelcund,* was directed by Duttajee to advance with his troops, and lay waste the whole territory of the Rohillahs—an order which he promptly obeyed, and committed great havoc both in the Doab and east of the Ganges, where he drove the whole of the chiefs to seek shelter in the Kumaon hills. Shujah-ud-Dowlah advanced towards Govind Punt, and, as soon as he came near, detached a part of his army, principally composed of Gosaeens, who attacked and routed Govind Punt with great slaughter, and drove his troops with much confusion across the river, in which many of them were drowned.

After this event, negotiations having been opened with Duttajee, he was induced to grant terms, not on account of the defeat of Govind Punt, but from having received intelligence that Ahmed Shah Abdallee was advancing in great force to recover the provinces of Mooltan and Lahore. Although the Rohillahs anxiously looked to the arrival of the Abdallee, and were then in communication with him, they did not hesitate to give the strongest assurances of friendship to Duttajee, and confirmed their agreement on oath. Shujah-ud-Dowlah joined insimilar declarations, with more sincerity at the time, as he bore a personal and hereditary dislike to Ahmed Shah, which generally has much effect on the political conduct both of Hindoos and Mahomedans, and he dreaded the invasion of the Abdallee as much as the encroachments of the Mahrattas.

Whilst these events were passing between the Mahrattas on the one part, and the Rohillahs and nabob of Oude on the other, Meer Shahabodeen, in consequence, it is said, of discovering a correspondence with Ahmed Shah Abdallee, put the emperor, Alumgeer II., to death, together with his own relation, Intizam-ud-Dowlah. He then raised to the imperial dignity a son of Kaum Bukhsa, the youngest son of Aurungzebe, by the title of Shah Jehan; whilst Ali Gohur, or Shah Alum, the son of the late nominal emperor, after having some time before ineffectually applied for aid to Wittul Sewdeo, one of the Peishwa's officers, and to Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, was used as an instrument by the crafty Shujah-ud-Dowlah, and became the nominal head of a confederacy against Meer Jaffier and the English in the well-known warfare of Bengal. Meer Shahabodeen, after having perpetrated those execrable deeds, in order to await the issue of the approaching contest between the Mahrattas and the Abdallee, sought protection with Sooruj Mull, raja of the Jaths, who, with mistaken generosity, afforded him an asylum in one of his forts.

The Mahratta officer in Lahore was speedily put to flight, before Duttajee and Holkar could advance to his assistance. Ahmed Shah crossed the Jumna with the main body of his army, for the double purpose of

* He derived his designations of Boondelay and the Jhansee-Wala from his situation.

favouring the junction of the Rohillahs, and of procuring forage and supplies with greater facility. At the same time his advanced division continued to march on, and Duttajee, fancying it was the main army, retired skirmishing. Holkar, who was in the rear of Duttajee, at some distance, also retired. They had not 30,000 men in both their armies, which appear to have been nearly equally divided. Holkar was negotiating with Sooruj Mull for his assistance, which the Jath promised, but refused to act in the field whilst the Mahrattas were so weak.

In this manner they gradually fell back along the west bank of the Jumna ; but their excesses had made the peasantry their enemies, and they were unusually deficient in regard to intelligence. Whilst the Abdallee vanguard occupied their attention in front, Ahmed Shah, assisted by the local knowledge and activity of Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, suddenly crossed the Jumna, near Delhi, took the division of Duttajee Sindia in flank, completely surprised them, and scarcely one-third of their number escaped. Of that number were Mahadajee Sindia, and his nephew Junkojee, the son of Jyapa ; but Duttajee and Jooteba were killed.

Holkar, on the news of this disaster, continued his retreat with great expedition until beyond Agra, where, stopping to take breath, he heard of a large convoy of supplies escorted by the troops of Ahmed Khan Bungush, and intended for the Abdallee camp. On this intelligence he crossed the Jumna, took or destroyed a great part of the convoy, and again retired until he reached Sekundra, east of the Jumna, but south of the Chumbul, where he fancied himself secure. A body of Afghans, however, detached from their main army, overtook him by a prodigious march, and routed his troops with great slaughter.*

Accounts of these reverses reached the Peishwa when encamped on the Manjera river, after the conclusion of the treaty by which so large a portion of the Deccan was ceded to him. Sewdasheo Rao, exulting in his late victory, requested permission to accompany Wiswas Rao, recover the lost reputation of the Mahrattas in Hindostan, and drive the Afghans beyond the Attock—a proposal in which the Peishwa acquiesced. The natural violence of the Bhow's temper was increased by the family jealousy he had experienced, and the factious intrigues to which it gave rise. His pride was augmented by his extraordinary good fortune in the late campaign, and the spirit of military enthusiasm, so dangerous in a general without experience, took complete possession of his mind. Success had inspired him with a blind confidence, which salutary reverses in a humbler sphere would in all probability have amended ; but it is unfortunate that such lessons cannot always reach individuals in high command until the interests of their country and the lives of thousands may have been sacrificed to the effects of their arrogance and indiscretion.

The Deccan army, prepared to accompany Sewdasheo Rao and his nephew, amounted to about 20,000 chosen horse ; besides 10,000 men, artillery, and disciplined infantry, under Ibrahim Khan Gardee, whose corps was doubled, after the late service against Sulabut Jung and Nizam

* I have, after a comparison of the Persian and Mahratta authorities (perhaps on insufficient evidence), rejected the former, wherein it is stated that Holkar was in the Jeypoor country when Duttajee retreated, and that it was at the Sekundra, near Delhi, that he was surprised. The *Tareekh-i-Dukhin* by Boodh Sing follows the Persian MSS., and accounts for Holkar's venturing so near Delhi, by stating that the Afghans had gone to Nagour in pursuit of Junkajee. I should be glad, though a point of no great importance, to be able to present it to my readers with more confidence.

Ally. The equipment of this army was more splendid in appearance than any Mahratta force that ever took the field.* The camp equipage, which, in the former expensive campaign, had been brought back from Hindostan by Rugonath Rao, was employed as part of the decoration. The lofty and spacious tents, lined with silks and broad-cloths, were surmounted by large gilded ornaments, conspicuous at a great distance; immense parti-coloured walls of canvas enclosed each suit of tents belonging to the principal officers; vast numbers of elephants, flags of all descriptions, the finest horses magnificently caparisoned, and all those accompaniments of an Indian army which give such an imposing effect to its appearance, seemed to be collected from every quarter in the Bhow's camp. Cloth of gold was the dress of the officers, and all seemed to vie in that profuse and gorgeous display characteristic of wealth lightly acquired. It was, in this instance, an imitation of the more becoming and tasteful array of the magnificent Moghuls in the zenith of their glory.

The principal officers with the Bhow's division were Bulwunt Rao Gunput Mendlee, Shumsher Buhadur, Naroo Shunkur (Raja Buhadur), Wittul Sewdeo (Vinchorkur), Trimbuck Sewdasheo (Poorundhuree), with many of the chiefs or connections of the old Mahratta families, who were now but secondary personages in the Deccan, owing to the power of the Peishwas, and the consequent ascendancy of the Bramins.

A large army remained with Ballajee Rao, but orders were despatched to all the Mahratta commanders to join the standard of Sewdasheo Rao Bhow as he advanced towards the Moghul capital. Accordingly, before he crossed the Chumbul, Mulhar Rao Holkar, Junkojee Sindia, Dummajee Gaekwar, Jeswunt Rao Powar, Appajee Rao Atowlay, Antajee Mankesir, Govind Punt Boondelay, and many others of less note had joined with their troops. Most of the Rajpoot chieftains sent parties of their horse; vast numbers of Pindharees, and irregulars of all descriptions, flocked to the increasing host; it seemed the national cause with all Hindoos; and Sooruj Mull, through the agency of Holkar, was induced to meet the army with 30,000 men.

The experienced Jath, however, soon perceived that the unwieldy assemblage under the Bhow, clogged with a cumbersome artillery, and suiting their movements to those of an attendant body of infantry, were ill-adapted to the purpose of the war. He proposed, therefore, that the families and all the heavy equipments should be placed either in Gwalior or Jhansee, or under the protection of some of his own forts, whilst the Mahratta horse and his own could cut off the supplies, and, by constant skirmishing, oblige the Mahomedan princes to withdraw, and compel the Abdallee to retreat. Holkar coincided in this opinion; but Sewdasheo Rao had an aversion to Holkar, the enemy of Ramchundur Shenwee, and from the connection between Holkar and the Jaths he imbibed a prejudice against Sooruj Mull. Common report had spread accounts of wonders performed by Europeans; Sewdasheo Rao himself had witnessed the effects of French discipline and artillery; he had gained great advantages by the employment of Ibrahim Khan, and he haughtily contemned the only advice which might have ensured success.† The army proceeded to Delhi, and attempted the citadel at once. A party of the Mahrattas clambered

* Abajee Gonedeo, a highly respectable old Bramin, now employed in the judicial department at Satara, was then in a civil situation at Sungunnere: he was two days in the Bhow's camp when his army was encamped on the Paira, and gives a most lively description of it.

† Mahratta MSS., Asiatic Researches, vol. iii., Seyr Mutuakhereen.

up one of the towers, and got inside, whilst the main body was assaulting the gateway, and the besieged busy in defending it; but the Mahrattas who had made good their entrance, without ever thinking of opening the gate to keep possession of the place, began to plunder, for some time without interruption, but being at last discovered, the whole body, as helpless as an unarmed mob, were driven out by about twelve men.* The assault was therefore deferred, batteries were opened, and in a short time the fort capitulated.† The Bhow, on this success, proposed placing Wiswas Rao on the throne, and making Shujah-ud-Dowlah his vizier.‡

As the Jumna was already unfordable, Sewdasheo Bhow cantoned his army at Delhi, where his innumerable followers consumed everything in the neighbourhood; all articles of provision and supply became scarce, but the first difficulty that appeared to the Bhow was the want of treasure. In this respect, however, he was more provident than in others; he brought two crores of rupees with him from the Deccan, and Holkar, Sindia, Govind Punt Boondelay, and the Rajpoots furnished three more; but the prospect of want of funds induced Sewdasheo Rao to seize the gold and silver ornaments of the imperial audience-chamber, and to destroy the throne—from all which he only procured the sum of 17 lakhs of rupees.

Against this procedure both Holkar and Sooruj Mull remonstrated in the strongest manner, as they considered it both impolitic and indecorous; but Sewdasheo Rao treated their opinion with scorn, on which Sooruj Mull with his whole force quitted the army in disgust, and the Rajpoots, at the suggestion of some of their friends in the Mahomedan camp, withdrew from the confederacy.§

In the meantime Ahmed Shah Abdallee, whose camp was opposite to Anopshuhur, on the Ganges, had through Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah prevailed on Shujah-ud-Dowlah to make common cause with the Mussulmans against the Hindoos; but as Shujah-ud-Dowlah was less inimical to the Mahrattas than any of the other confederates, Sewdasheo Rao used many endeavours to conciliate or detach him from the alliance, opened a private communication, and also made him the organ of a public negotiation, which continued to be carried on for months between the Mahrattas and the Abdallee. Both the public and private intercourse was laid open by Shujah-ud-Dowlah to his allies, and his answers were dictated at their suggestion.||

When the violence of the monsoon had subsided, Sewdasheo Rao raised Mirza Juwan Bukht, the son of the absent Shah Alum, to the throne of Delhi, and proclaimed Shujah-ud-Dowlah vizier of the empire. He then left Naroo Shunker (Raja Buhadur) with a garrison in the citadel, and proceeded in person to Kunjpoora, a fortified town strongly garrisoned, which he breached and stormed. Ahmed Shah had been very desirous of relieving this post, but the Jumna was not yet fordable. He, however, moved his camp to the banks of that river, continued to amuse the Bhow by negotiation, and, after some failures, at last discovered a ford, which

* Seyr Mutuakhereen.

† Seyr Mutuakhereen, Mahratta MSS., and Asiatic Researches.

‡ Mulhar Rao Holkar, in his account of the campaign, asserts that the Bhow placed Wiswas Rao on the throne: the account in the Asiatic Researches, said to be on the authority of Shujah-ud-Dowlah, mentions that such an arrangement was intended; but it seems to be an exaggeration on the part of Holkar.

§ Mahratta MSS., Holkar's letter, and Seyr Mutuakhereen. All the Mahratta accounts impute Sooruj Mull's defection wholly to the Bhow's misconduct. The Asiatic Researches say that he also was advised by the Mahomedans.

|| Asiatic Researches.

he crossed 20 miles above Delhi ; a great part of his army had gained the western bank before the Bhow would give credit to the intelligence,* and the whole of the Mahomedans were across by the 25th October. On the following morning the advanced guards of the two armies had a severe action, and both sides claimed the advantage ; the Mahrattas intended to attack next day, but Holkar was still anxious to adopt the predatory plan, and act against their supplies. Ibrahim Khan expostulated in a very violent manner ; he said it would be abandoning him and his corps to destruction, and that he would turn his guns on the first body of cavalry that followed such an advice.† These dissensions were with some difficulty suppressed ; and, during their continuance, the Mahrattas retired, skirmishing, to Panniput, where Sewdasheo Rao, by Ibrahim Khan's advice, intrenched himself. He dug a ditch 50 feet wide and 12 feet deep, and raised a rampart on which he mounted cannon, round both his own camp and the village of Panniput. Ahmed Shah likewise encamped with his allies, and fortified himself by placing felled trees around his army.

The Mahomedan force consisted of 41,800 horse, 38,000 foot, and about 70 pieces of cannon : these were choice troops, but the irregulars not mustered were very numerous, and probably amounted to as many more. The Mahrattas have been reckoned at 55,000 horse and 15,000 foot, with 200 pieces of cannon,‡ besides their Pindharees and followers, of whom there are supposed to have been upwards of 200,000 souls.

Soon after the armies had taken post, Sewdasheo Rao directed Govind Punt Boondelay to cut off the enemy's supplies, in which he was for a time very successful ; but Attae Khan, sent out for the purpose, having come suddenly upon him when in a mango grove with only about 1,000 of his men, the rest being dispersed plundering, attacked and killed him, cut off his head, and presented the acceptable present to the Abdallee king. Before the death of Govind Punt, there was a probability that a treaty might be concluded, and the officers in both armies had visited each other ; but as Sewdasheo Rao declared that Govind Punt was only in quest of forage for his own army, mutual accusations of treachery inflamed both parties, and negotiation for a time ceased.§ The loss of Govind Punt was followed by another misfortune ; a party of horse in charge of treasure, each man carrying a bag, were returning with it from Delhi, but having in the night mistaken the Afghan camp for their own, they were cut off with the whole of the treasure.|| Nevertheless the Rajpoots, although they had deserted, contrived to assist the Mahrattas with money, and Sooruj Mull sent a very large sum,¶ which safely reached their camp ; but the distress was soon extreme, and the battalions of Ibrahim Khan became clamorous for arrears.** Holkar proposed that they should attack with their horse, and leave the Gardees (such was the name by which the regular infantry were distinguished) to take care of the camp—a taunt to which the Bhow showed himself superior by acceding to the proposal.††

* Mahratta MSS. One Mahratta account by Rugonath Yadow, the Buker-Nuwees of the Peishwa, states that they were opposed in fording, but all other authority is against the assertion.

† Mahratta MSS., confirmed by Holkar's own letter.

‡ Asiatic Researches.

§ Asiatic Researches and Tareekh-i-Dukhin.

¶ One MS. says a crore of rupees.

** Mahratta MSS.

§ Holkar's letter.

†† Oral information.

This attack was made on the 29th November on the left of the Abdallee camp, where Shah Wulee Khan, the vizier of Ahmed Shah, was posted. The Mahrattas, in number about 15,000, broke in, charged at all they met, and although the Afghans stood, they were broken, and upwards of 2,000 of them killed; at last the vizier having been supported from all parts of the camp, the Mahrattas retired with the loss of 1,000 men.* Holkar led on that occasion; and, although there was constant and daily skirmishing, in which the Mahratta horsemen individually killed their antagonists,† there was no action of importance until the 23rd December, when Sewdasheo Bhow, Wiswas Rao, Holkar, Bulwunt Rao Gunput Mendlee, and several other commanders came out to attack Shah Wulee Khan, who, attended by a body of horse, was proceeding to a mosque in the neighbourhood,‡ and was surrounded by this host of Mahrattas. Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah and many other officers came out to support him, and a very desperate conflict ensued. Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah having advanced beyond the others, towards the entrenchment, Bulwunt Rao then acting as the dewan of Sewdasheo Rao, an officer of courage and experience, instantly seized the advantage, and charged him furiously; 3,000 Rohillahs were killed, and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah for a time in great danger of being taken; but Bulwunt Rao, in the moment of victory, was shot, after the close of day, by a musket-ball, when the Bhow, greatly afflicted by his loss, thought only of retiring to his entrenchment with the body of his friend.§ Actions took place almost daily, and the Rohillahs and Shujah-ud-Dowlah earnestly tried to bring on a decisive action. But Ahmed Shah steadily refused,|| in which he showed himself a good general, acquainted both with the minds of men and the science of war. The irritable impatience in his own camp, where the hardships were trifling compared with the Mahratta distress, told him precisely the state of his enemies, and that every day's delay in their situation only rendered the prey more certain. The Mahrattas were starving: the improvident waste to which they had long been accustomed rendered them totally unable to bear privation, and in action gave them full time to reflect on the state to which they were reduced. Sewdasheo Bhow saw that it was now impossible to avoid a decisive battle; and, although he still negotiated, his own judgment told him it was hopeless. A vast body of his followers, whom hunger had made careless and daring, issued forth from the entrenchment in the night to procure food for themselves or their famished families, when they were discovered, surrounded, and butchered by the Afghans. The Mahrattas called to be led forth to fall by the sword, and not to be left to die in long endurance of useless misery. The chiefs applied to the Bhow, who approved of their resolve, and with his ordinary manner, and in perfect composure, distributed the usual *pan* and *betel* at breaking up of the

6th January
1761.

* Mahratta MSS., Asiatic Researches.

† Oral information; there was a large post (a *run-kham*) erected between the camps by the Bhow, where challenges and duels constantly took place.

‡ Tareekh-i-Dukhin.

§ This was the same officer that levied the contribution from the Carnatic, and with whom Mr. Pigot corresponded in 1757. It is mentioned by the author of the *Seyr Mutuakhereen* that the Rohillahs on this occasion penetrated into the Mahratta entrenchment; this is not stated by Kasseé Punt or Boodh Sing, and is positively contradicted by Naroo Bhugwunt, the Arla Koolkurnee. Of Naroo Bhugwunt I shall take further notice presently.

|| Asiatic Researches.

assembly.* Orders to prepare for battle were issued to the troops. All

7th January. the grain in store was distributed, that they might have one full meal that night; and on the 7th January, an hour before the break of morning, the Mahratta troops were moving out of their entrenchment, left in front; their cannon, swivels, *shuternals* or musketoons mounted on camels, and their rockets, marched first, covered by Ibrahim Khan Gardee; next came Dummajee Gaekwar's horse, followed by those of Wittul Sewdeo, Sewdasheo Bhow and Wiswas Rao, Jeswunt Rao Powar, Shumsher Buhadur, Mulhar Rao Holkar, and Junkojee Sindia.

In this order they slowly advanced towards the Abdallee camp with every symptom of hopeless despair, rather than of steady resolution. The ends of their turbans were let loose, their hands and faces anointed with a preparation of turmeric,† and everything seemed to bespeak the despondency of sacrifice prepared, instead of victory determined. Sewdasheo Rao gave over his own wife and several of the principal families to the particular care of Holkar. His reason for this is supposed to have been that Mulhar Rao was the only chief who might expect to find favour with the unrelenting Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, by whose counsel Ahmed Shah was greatly swayed, and Holkar was therefore the only person whose influence was likely to obtain their eventual protection. Sewdasheo Rao, just

A. D. 1761. before he moved out, sent a note to one of the carcoons‡ of Shujah-ud-Dowlah, who had been employed as an agent in their negotiation, in which was written—"The cup is now full to the brim, and cannot hold another drop," and requested that if anything could be done it might be immediate. At the time this note was received, the scouts of Shujah-ud-Dowlah brought intelligence that the Mahrattas were moving out, on which he proceeded straight to the king, whom he found asleep in his tent with his horse saddled at the door. On being awoke he asked—"What news?" and, when informed of the exigency, mounted his horse, and rode forward about a mile in front of his lines, where he at first began to doubt the intelligence; but by this time the Mahrattas had drawn up their army in the same order as they had moved out, with Ibrahim Khan on the left and Junkojee Sindia on the right; their artillery was placed in front of their line, and a general discharge of cannon announced that they were ready. Upon hearing this, the king, who was sitting upon his horse, smoking a Persian kalleoon, gave it to his attendant, and with great calmness said to Shujah-ud-Dowlah—"Your servant's news is very true, I see." He then ordered out his army, which drew up with its artillery in front. His grand vizier, Shah Wulee Khan, with the Afghans, was posted in the centre; from which Ahmed Khan Bungush, Hafiz Rehmut, and Doondy Khan, Rohillahs, with Umeer Beg and Berkhorad Khan, formed the right wing; and on the vizier's left were posted Shujah-ud-Dowlah, nabob of Oude, and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, Rohillah. Shah Pusund Khan, with a choice body of Afghans, secured the extremity of the left flank. In this order the battle began with a general cannonade, and the lines drew near to each other. Ibrahim Khan Gardee, supported by Dummajee Gaekwar, advanced resolutely on the Rohillahs in the right wing of the Mahomedan army, covering his left

* On the breaking up of an assembly or *levée*, or even in dismissing an ordinary visitor, rose-water, cardamoms, cloves, mace, &c., are first distributed; when the pan leaves and betel are given, it is the signal for departure.

† These preparations signified that they were come forth to die.

‡ Kasee Punt, the same whose well-written account of the campaign is published in the Asiatic Researches by Mr. James Browne.

flank from the attack of Umeer Beg and Berkhardar Khan, by wheeling back two of his battalions in an oblique direction from their right. On the right of the Mahrattas, Junkojee Sindia was immediately opposed to Shah Pusund Khan and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah. The last advanced, throwing up a succession of embankments to cover his infantry—a most extraordinary labour, which he probably undertook with a view to ultimate defence, that in case, as was not improbable, the desperate impetuosity of the Mahrattas should break through the troops, each embankment might then prove a rallying-point.

Sewdasheo Rao, with his nephew and Jeswunt Rao Powar, were opposite to the grand vizier. The great Bhugwa Jenda, or standard of the nation, was raised in the front, and three Juree Putkas were in the field. Ahmed Shah was at some distance in rear of the Mahomedan army. When the combatants respectively had outmarched their artillery, the Mahratta cry of Hur Huree! Hur Huree! was distinctly heard; the battle then very soon became general, and a tremendous charge was made full on the centre, where the troops of the grand vizier, of which 10,000 were horse, were guilty of a great mistake in not advancing to meet the shock. The Mahrattas, in consequence, broke through them, but riders on both sides were dashed to the ground. The dust and confusion were so great that combatants, whilst they fought hand to hand, and grappled in the strife of death, could only distinguish each other by the Mahomedan Allah! and Deen! or the incessant Hur! Hur! Mahdeo! which rent the air from the Mahratta host. Shah Wulee Khan, in full armour, threw himself from his horse, and the bravest of his men followed his example; but most of the Afghans gave way. "Our country is far off, my friends," said the vizier—"whither do you fly?" but he was left for a time, defended only by the broken remnant of his force. Ibrahim Khan Gardee, though with the loss of more than half his men, and himself wounded, was successful; near 8,000 Rohillahs lay dead or wounded; but the left wing of the Mahomedan army was still unbroken. This state of the battle was, about noon, reported to Ahmed Shah, who now evinced the collected decision of a great commander. He directed a chosen band of his personal guards to enter his encampment, and drive out every armed man who had retired from his duty—an order which they promptly executed. Troops were soon sent to support the right wing, and the grand vizier was directed to make repeated charges with 10,000 men at full gallop on the centre of the Mahrattas; whilst Shah Pusund Khan and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah supported the vizier by simultaneous attacks on the flank. These onsets were still met and repulsed; but the physical strength of the Afghans, in the protracted and close struggle, was an overmatch for the slighter frames of the Hindoo natives of the south. The Mahrattas, however, on this terrible day fought valiantly; and no chief was reproachable except Mulhar Rao Holkar. Of his countrymen none doubted his courage, but he did not do his utmost to support his prince, and some do not hesitate to accuse him of treachery. A little after two o'clock in the afternoon Wiswas Rao was mortally wounded; on seeing which Sewdasheo Rao Bhow descended from his elephant, sent, as is said, a message to Holkar "to do as he had directed," and mounting his horse, a famous Arab charger, disappeared in the confusion of the fight. The message to Holkar, if it ever was sent as he alleges, proved instantaneously fatal. Holkar went off, Dummajee Gaekwar followed, and in a moment resistance on the part of the Mahrattas ceased. All was then flight and confusion. Thousands were cut

down, and vast numbers perished by suffocation in the ditch of their entrenchment; men, women, and children crowded into the village of Panniput, where they were surrounded for the night; and here it might seem that the greatest barbarians would have been touched with some feeling of mercy; but the Afghans showed none. To the eternal disgrace of themselves and of humanity, they next morning coolly took out the unfortunate victims, and divided them in their camp. They retained the women and children as slaves; but they ranged the men in lines, and amused themselves in cutting off their heads,* which they afterwards piled as trophies in front of their tents. The body of Wiswas Rao was found, and Ahmed Shah having sent for it to look at, the Afghans assembled in a tumultuous manner, calling out—"This is the body of the king of the unbelievers; we will have it dried and stuffed to carry back to Cabul."

Shujah-ud-Dowlah and the Rohillahs prevailed on Ahmed Shah to permit the body to be burnt by the Hindoos. Shujah-ud-Dowlah also endeavoured to save Junkojee Sindia and Ibrahim Khan Gardec, who were among the wounded prisoners; but the enmity of Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah to the name of Sindia was inflexible, and the crime on the part of Ibrahim Khan, of having fought on the side of Hindoos against the true believers, decided his doom. They were both put to death. A headless trunk, supposed to

* They ranged them in lines, gave each of the unfortunate wretches a few grains of parched grain, and the Bihishtee (or water-carrier) went along pouring a little water into their palms, after which they were beheaded. Naroo Bhugwant, koolkurnee of Arla, one of the persons led out to execution, relates his escape in the following manner. He was carcon in charge of the accounts of a party of Afghans belonging to the Bhow's artillery at the time they left the Deccan. When the Mahrattas attacked their countrymen, the jemadar of the Afghans, Hoossein Khan, who was a person well known, represented to the Bhow that his people were afraid to fight, as they had been assured, both by the Rohillahs and the Abdallee, that they should be executed if they appeared in arms against their own king. He therefore solicited and obtained his discharge; but he assured Sewdasheo Rao that he would return when he could with safety; that he had ate his salt, and regretted his being compelled to leave his service. He afterwards kept up a correspondence with the Bhow, to which the narrator was privy. The Bihishtee, who poured the water into his hand, was the same that had served with Hoossein Khan. He immediately ran to the jemadar, and told him—"Here is our Bramin about to be killed." Hoossein Khan came forward, said something to his countrymen, which the narrator believed was, "he wanted him as a slave," and dragged him violently by the arm towards his tent, where he remained for a day. The jemadar then asked him through an interpreter if he would like to stay with him, or go back to the Deccan, to which the narrator replied that "he would like to stay with him." "Tell him he lies," said the jemadar; shortly after he called him on one side, told him in Hindostanee (which he could speak very well when he chose) that a party of horse belonging to a friend of his would escort him 20 kos from camp, the generous Afghan at the same time gave him five goldmohurs, telling him to be careful his escort knew nothing of his having money; and thus they parted. The narrator, after they had gone some distance, bethought him of the jemadar's advice, and conceiving it likely that his conductors might search him, put his gold into his mouth, and shortly after, when they turned round towards their camp, thought his treasure quite secure. But one of their party, more cunning than the rest, had observed him put the money in his mouth, and when his companions had got to a sufficient distance, he set out after the prize. Presently the narrator, who was running on as fast as he could, heard a cry of "Ho! Bohman!" behind him, and, turning round, saw an Afghan with large eyes and a very long beard in pursuit of him; he stood in terror. "Ho, Bohman!" said he in broken Hindostanee, "what have you got in your mouth?" and obliged him to give up his goldmohurs; he then told him "to go to the devil," and galloped back to rejoin his comrades.

I believe the old man's narration to be perfectly correct, having at an interval of two years cross-examined him on all the points which I had before noted down.

be the body of the Bhow, was found at some distance from the field of battle, and there is scarce a doubt of his having been slain, but his fate was never accurately known. Jeswunt Rao Powar fell in the field, but Shumsher Bhudhur escaped wounded from the battle, and was one of the many massacred by the peasantry. Wittul Sewdeo (Vinchorkur), Dummajee Gaekwar, and Naroo Shunkur,* with part of the garrison at Delhi, returned to their own country. Of the fighting men, one-fourth only are supposed to have escaped, and of the followers about an equal proportion ; so that nearly 200,000 Mahrattas perished in the campaign.

Sooruj Mull treated such of the fugitives as reached his territory with the greatest kindness, and the Mahratta nation to this day view the conduct of the Jaths on that occasion with gratitude and regard.

During the period when Sewdasheo Rao was shut up in his entrenchment, news of his situation from time to time reached the Peishwa, and in the month of November he moved to Ahmednugur, and from thence to the banks of the Godavery. In December the intelligence became still more alarming. Janojee Bhonslay joined him with a body of 10,000 men, and the army moved towards Hindostan. In the middle of January, when crossing the Nerbuddah, a cossid (or letter-carrier) belonging to the soucars,† who was engaged to reach Aurungabad in nine days from Panniput, met the Peishwa's army, and mentioned that the Mahrattas were defeated. He was brought to the Peishwa, who opened the letter in his charge, and read its fatal contents—"Two pearls have been dissolved, 27 goldmohurs have been lost, and of the silver and copper the total cannot be cast up." From these words the fate of Sewdasheo Rao, Wiswas Rao, the officers, and the army was understood.

A confirmation of the account by the arrival of some persons from the army soon placed it beyond all doubt ; amongst the first of the fugitives was Ballajee Jenardin, nephew of Baboo Rao, and afterwards well known as Nana Furnuwees. His mother was taken by the Afghans, but his wife escaped, as did Parwuttee Bye, the widow of the unfortunate Bhow. Grief and despondency at once spread over the whole of Maharashtra. All the military families had to mourn relatives, missing or slain, and the Peishwa never recovered the shock. He slowly retraced his steps towards Poona, but his faculties were much impaired ; a rapid decay of the constitution ensued, and he expired in the end of June, at the temple of Parbuttee, a conspicuous building erected by him in the southern environs of the city of Poona.

This event so closely following the fatal field of Panniput, contributed to increase the general gloom which overhung the country. Ballajee Bajee Rao was one of those princes whose good fortune, originating in causes anterior to their time, obtain, in consequence of national prosperity, a higher degree of celebrity, especially among their own countrymen, than they may fully merit. Ballajee Rao, however, was a man of considerable political sagacity, of polished manners, and of great address. His measures are marked by an excessive cunning, which Bramins in general mistake for wisdom ; he practised all the arts of dissimulation, and was a perfect adept in every species of intrigue. A strong example

* The author of the *Seyr Mutuakhereen* says he and his garrison were destroyed, which is a mistake.

† In India the soucars, or bankers, are generally in possession of the first intelligence which in any way affects the state of the money market. The figurative style used in the letter which will follow is by no means uncommon in India when caution is necessary.

of the worst species of Bramin character is shown in the manner by which he compassed the destruction of Suckwar Bye Sirkay. The private life of Ballajee Rao was stained with gross sensuality ; but though indolent and voluptuous, he was generous and charitable, kind to his relatives and dependents, an enemy to external violence, and to that sort of oppression which such violence implies ; on the whole, he may be regarded as rather a favourable specimen of a Bramin in power.

Previously to Shao's death, little amendment took place in the civil administration ; but the territory, under the immediate care of the Peishwa, had been in a progressive state of improvement since the time of Ballajee Wishwanath, principally owing to the abolition of the pernicious system of letting out the revenues of districts in farm, and to the encouragement afforded to the villagers to protect themselves from the exactions of every petty chief who had the means of enforcing contribution in money, forage, or provisions. Ballajee Rao appointed fixed mamlitdars or soobehdars, each of whom had charge of several districts, and sur-soobehdars were placed in the more distant provinces, under whom there were several mamlitdars. There was, in the first instance, no sur-soobehdar in the territory between the Godavery and the Kistna ; the intermediate districts, the best protected and most productive under the Mahratta rule, were entrusted to the Peishwa's favourites and courtiers, some of whom were his relations. They held absolute charge of the police, the revenue, and the civil and criminal judicature, and in most cases had power of life and death. They were bound to furnish regular accounts, but they always evaded settlement. They governed by deputy, and remained at court, whether in the capital or in the field, in attendance upon the Peishwa. Their districts were of course extremely ill-managed, and in very great disorder ; the supplies furnished for the exigencies of the state were tardy, and, in comparison with the established revenues, insignificant.

The commencement of a better system is ascribed to Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, and, after his death, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow improved on his suggestions. Ballajee Rao was sensible of the advantage to be derived from bringing the collectors of revenue under control ; he had not sufficient energy for the undertaking himself, but he supported the measures of his cousin. Fortunately, Sewdasheo Rao found a fit person in Balloba Manduwagunnee, whom he appointed sur-soobehdar over the soobehdars and mamlitdars in question ; and, after much opposition and odium, not without the necessity, in one instance, of resorting to force, he compelled them to produce their accounts, displaced one or two, and made large recoveries on account of the government. This was a very great step towards amendment in one department, nor were others neglected. A Shastree of respectability, named Bal Kishen Gargeel, was appointed head of the Poona Nyadeish, or court of justice ; and the police, which had generally been an object of some attention in their camps, was much invigorated at the capital. The Peishwa himself had little genius for civil government, but a strong inclination to all sorts of political intrigue. Sewdasheo Rao was open to bribery, and the Mahratta nation generally had not obtained sufficient leisure for great improvements in civil arrangement ; they had scarcely begun to lay down rules when they were called off by some foreign war, or internal dissension. But under the government of Ballajee Bajee Rao, punchayets, the ordinary tribunals of civil justice, began to improve ; because power, if it did not always examine and uphold their decrees, at least did not interfere to prevent the decisions

of the community. The Mahratta dominion attained its greatest extent under Ballajee Rao's administration ; and most of the principal Bramin families can only date their rise from that period. In short, the condition of the whole population was in his time improved ; and the Mahratta peasantry, sensible of the comparative amelioration which they began to enjoy, have ever since blessed the days of Nana Sahib Peishwa.

CHAP. XXII.

FROM A. D. 1761 TO A. D. 1766.

Mahdoo Rao Bullal invested as Peishwa.—Death of Tara Bye.—Prospect of war with Nizam Ally.—Rugonath Rao, as regent, negotiates with the English.—Settlement of a dispute respecting the Seedee of Jinjeera.—Party dissensions among the Mahrattas.—Nizam Ally attacks their territory.—destruction of the temples at Toka.—Moghuls advance towards Poona—vigorous opposition—treaty concluded.—Dispute between Rugonath Rao and Mahdoo Rao—the former retires to Aurungabad, and returns supported by the Moghuls.—Submission of Mahdoo Rao—motives.—The proceedings of Rugonath Rao occasion general discontent.—Nizam Ally breaks the treaty, and, assisted by Janojee, attempts the subversion of the Brannin government.—Poona is plundered and partially burnt.—Rugonath Rao makes an attempt on Hyderabad—returns to the Mahratta territory.—Janojee is detached from the confederacy.—Moghul army defeated with prodigious slaughter—peace concluded at Aurungabad.—Mahdoo Rao reproves Janojee for his treachery.—Rise of Hyder Ally—his conquests—is opposed by Mahdoo Rao.—Judicious and successful operations of the young Peishwa—defeats Hyder with severe loss.—Negotiations—intrusted to Rugonath Rao—treaty.—Offensive alliance between the Peishwa and Nizam against Janojee.—Janojee is compelled to restore three-fourths of the districts received as the price of his treachery.—State of the English in India at this period.—Many of the principal events which led to their ascendancy, blended with the Mahratta history.—Author's views in the intended description of these events.—The records of the governments of India affords the best historical materials in the world.—Observations.

IN the end of September, Mahdoo Rao, the second son of the late

A. D. 1761.

Peishwa, then in his seventeenth year, proceeded to Satara, accompanied by his uncle Rugonath Rao, and received investiture as Peishwa from the nominal raja, who remained precisely in the same state of imprisonment, under the obdurate Tara Bye, as before described, until her demise, which happened in the month of December following, at the great age of 86. To the last moment of her existence she maintained her inveteracy against Ballajee Rao and Sewdasheo Rao, declaring that she expired contented, having lived to hear of their misfortunes and death. The raja's condition was afterwards so far improved that he was brought down from the fort, and suffered to live a prisoner at large in the town of Satara. At a subsequent period he was permitted by Mahdoo Rao to appoint agents for the management of his Patell dues in several villages, and the collection of his other hereditary claims as deshmookh of Indapoor.

Sulabot Jung and Nizam Ally were at Beder when news of Ballajee Rao's death reached them. The latter, as nominal dewan, had already usurped the entire powers of the government; and deeming the present

opportunity favourable for recovering the lost districts from the Mahrattas, he began, under various pretences, to concentrate a large army in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad.

Rugonath Rao, naturally fond of power, contemplated, with no small satisfaction, the prospect of gratifying his favourite inclination during the minority of his nephew. When the preparations of Nizam Ally gave reason to expect a rupture with the Moghuls, he became desirous of putting an end to some existing disputes between the presidency of Bombay and Ramajee Punt, the soobehdar of the Concan, which had arisen in consequence of protection afforded by the English to their ally the Seedee of Jinjeera, who had been besieged the preceding season by Ramajee Punt, assisted by a corps of Portuguese. The conduct of the Bombay government on this occasion was equally judicious and spirited. They saved a petty chief, by whom they had frequently been much accommodated, prevented his throwing his island into the hands of any other European power, and compelled the Mahrattas to respect the British flag, which was hoisted at Jinjeera when Ramajee Punt, after every representation, persevered in his intention of reducing the place. Mr. Crommelin was president in council at this juncture, and an agent having arrived on the part of Rugonath Rao for the purpose of accommodating all differences, an agreement was concluded by the Bombay government, and Govind Sew Ram on the part of the Peishwa.* A gentleman was also sent to condole with Mahdoo Rao on the occasion of his father's death—a customary form which civility requires. The agreement itself was rather an assurance of civility and friendship than a definite treaty; but Rugonath Rao, being ill-prepared to resist the expected invasion of the Moghuls, wished eventually to obtain from Bombay some European soldiers and guns, and prolonged the negotiation for that purpose by sending another wukeel to Bombay on pretence of making some alterations in the agreement, but in reality to negotiate for military aid.

The English East India Company, from the example of their great commercial rivals the Dutch, had early been desirous of obtaining territory. Partly from this circumstance, and the representations of their servants for the last 20 years, they had been exceedingly solicitous to obtain possession of the island of Salsette and the fort of Bassein, not only on account of the advantages expected from the revenue, but as advanced positions essentially necessary to the security of the island and harbour of Bombay. The overtures of Rugonath Rao, therefore, met with the readiest attention; but although he offered to cede territory yielding a revenue of one lakh and a half of rupees at Jumbooseer, and to make several other concessions, yet as the favourite island of Salsette was not of the number, the alliance was suspended.

As the danger from the threatened invasion increased, the overtures were renewed, even Salsette was offered, and though not by any accredited agent, the president and council were sanguine in their hope of accomplishing their object, especially as by every succeeding day's account the Mahrattas, without aid from the English, were likely to be completely worsted.

* It consisted of seven or eight articles regarding detention or stoppage of vessels, wrecks, deserters, and the restoration of all territory taken from the Seedee by Ramajee Punt. The Seedee afterwards took improper advantage of the protection afforded by committing several acts of violence in the Mahratta territory, of which the English were obliged to mark their disapprobation in the strongest manner.

No period indeed for the last 40 years had been more favourable for the restoration of the Moghul authority in the Deccan. The loss of the battle of Panniput was imputed by the Mahratta siliidars solely to the misconduct of the Bramins; the Bramins of the Desh, or country above the Ghauts, acknowledged the fact, but declared that it was to be ascribed entirely to the mismanagement of their brethren of the Concan. The violent party feelings, which arise under every government on occasions of reverses, were heightened in the loose confederacy of this nation by the prejudices of ignorance and of caste; under such circumstances, where so very few could distinguish between misfortune and misrule, dissension was a natural consequence. Nizam Ally was not yet sufficiently apprized of those dissensions* to reap advantage from them; but even if he had possessed the requisite information, one of his first acts, the destruction of the Hindoo temples at Toka, a village upon the Godavery, would have prevented his being joined by any party. It was nevertheless celebrated by the Mahomedan soldiery as a triumph, and Nizam Ally was pushing on towards Poona, when Ramchundur Jadow,† and most of the Mahrattas in the Moghul service, disgusted by the insult offered to their religion, deserted to the Peishwa, and carried with them Meer Moghul, the youngest son of Nizam-ool-Moolk.

The Moghuls, although they continued to advance, were opposed with increasing spirit; and after they were within 14 miles of Poona, Nizam Ally was induced to listen to overtures, and relaxed in an original demand for the restoration of the whole territory conquered by Ballajee Rao. An accommodation took place, by which cessions to the amount of 27 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue from Aurungabad and Beder were relinquished by Rugonath Rao as the price of peace; and the negotiation for European assistance from Bombay was abruptly terminated by extravagant and impertinent proposals from Ramajee Punt.

After the conclusion of the treaty, the young Peishwa, attended by

A. D. 1762. Trimbeck Rao Mama, maternal uncle of the late Sewdasheo Chimnaje Bhow, was sent into the southern territory for the collection of revenue,‡ and Nizam Ally returned towards Beder, where he imprisoned Sulabut Jung in the month of July,§ and about 15 months afterwards secured his usurpation by the murder|| of a brother, whose natural imbecility would have prevented his ever becoming a formidable rival, whilst unsupported by a foreign power.

Shortly after the return of Mahdoo Rao to Poona, disputes arose

* The Bombay government appear to have been at least as well-informed as Nizam Ally, and it is much to be regretted they do not oftener mention the Mahrattas. "We well know," say they, in their secret consultation of 14th December 1761, "that Nizam Ally is now near Poona, that the Bramins cannot raise a force sufficient to oppose them, from the backwardness of their own officers (who look upon the situation of Nana's family as desperate), and the low state of their finances; Tara Boy (the Sow Rajah's widow) and all the Morattas at the bottom, are against them, and would show it at a proper occasion."

† Descendant of Dhunnaje Jadow. Jadow of Sindkheir, has, I believe, maintained his allegiance to the Moghuls since the murder of his ancestor, Lookhjee Jadow Rao, by the son of Mullik Umber.

‡ Mahratta MSS. and Poona Records. Colonel Wilks does not mention this expedition into the Carnatic, and I therefore conclude Mahdoo Rao did not go far beyond the Kistna, if he crossed that river at all.

§ 14th Zeehije A. H. 1175, according to the Mahomedan accounts, which I have adopted, because Sulabut Jung was with the army near Poona. By the English authorities he is said to have been confined on the 18th July 1761.

|| 8th Rubbee-ool-Awul A. H. 1177.

between him and his uncle, in consequence of Mahdoo Rao's desire to be admitted to a share in the administration. Rugonath Rao, as well as Sukaram Bappoo, and several other ministers, were much offended at his presumption; conceiving that affairs could not be conducted without them, they threw up their situations, but Sukaram Bappoo, whose object was to keep well with both parties, resigned, as if a matter to which he was compelled, and always contrived, as far as he was himself concerned, to keep open the door of reconciliation. Mahdoo Rao, in the promptest manner, requested Trimbeck Rao Mama to act in the situation of *dewan*, which he accordingly undertook, assisted by Gopaul Rao Govind Putwurdhun, jagheerdar of Merich; and it is worthy of remark, as extremely creditable to the selection of so young a man, that Ballajee Jenardin Bhanoo, already mentioned, and afterwards well known as Nana Furnuwees, and Hurry Punt Phurkay, were at this period employed as personal carcoons by Mahdoo Rao.

Trimbeck Rao's acceptance of the office of minister excited great jealousy towards him in the mind of Sukaram Bappoo, and an irreconcilable aversion on the part of Rugonath Rao. This state of feeling, aggravated by the strongest animosity between Anundee Bye, the wife of Rugonath Rao, a woman of a very violent character, and Gopika Bye, the widow of the late, and mother of the present, Peishwa, inflamed the parties to open hostility. Rugonath Rao having quitted Nassuck, to which place he had retired, proceeded to Aurungabad, where he was received with the greatest attention by Moraud Khan, governor of that city, immediately assisted with Moghul troops, and in a very short time was joined by a large body of Mahrattas. With this force he proceeded towards Poona, and, half-way between Poona and Ahmednugur, attacked the army of his nephew, which, being very inferior, immediately gave way. Nizam Ally was advancing to the support of Rugonath Rao; Janojee Bhonslay, without avowing his intentions, was approaching from Berar, and every appearance indicated the probability of a great revolution in the Poona government, when Mahdoo Rao, with remarkable foresight and decision, immediately resolved on throwing himself into the power of his uncle, as the only means of preventing a complete division in the state. Whilst his associates were directed to seek their own safety, Mahdoo Rao presented himself before his uncle, urged his reasons for making the concession with much propriety, and, although the latter placed him in confinement, he was obliged to yield him that respect which, at the height of his prosperity, Rugonath Rao himself could never command. As the price of the Moghul alliance, he had promised to restore the forts of Doulutabad, Sewneree, Asseergurh, and Ahmednugur, and territory, from the cessions made in January 1760, yielding a revenue of 51 lakhs of rupees, or an equivalent to that amount. Nizam Ally, finding that a reconciliation had taken place, affected great satisfaction; and having come to Pairgaom on the Beema, a friendly interchange of civilities took place, and orders were issued for the delivery of the districts stipulated; but these orders, for reasons hereafter explained, were suspended, and none of the promised forts, except Doulutabad, were ever relinquished.*

Rugonath Rao being now uncontrolled, appointed Sukaram Bappoo and Neelkunt Mahdeo Poorundhuree his principal ministers, bestowing on the former a jagheer of nine lakhs of rupees, and conferring on the latter the command of the important fort of Poorundhur, which, since first

* Khuzaneh Amirah, Hudeequ-i-Alum, Mahratta MSS.

obtained by Ballajee Wishwanath, had been hitherto carefully retained in the Peishwa's family. Rugonath Rao's next proceeding was still more imprudent. On the demise of Jugjeewan, Pritee Needhee, he had been succeeded by his nephew, Sreenewass Gungadhur, more commonly known by his original name, Bhowan Rao; but Rugonath Rao having displaced him, raised his own infant son, Bhaskur Rao, to the dignity of Pritee Needhee, and appointed Naroo Shunkur (Raja Buhadur), the same officer who, for a time, commanded in the citadel of Delhi, to the office of mootaliq, which was in effect conferring the office of Pritee Needhee upon him. Ramchundur Jadow, who had in the preceding year deserted the Moghul standard, was restored to the rank of Senaputtee, formerly held by his great-grandfather, the famous Dhunnajee; but, as he was disappointed in a promise made to him of receiving, as Senaputtee, the sovereignty of Guzerat, he took the first opportunity of making his peace with Nizam Ally. Kanhojee Mohitey was appointed Sur Lushkur, and Wittul Sewdeo (Vinchorkur)* was also raised to high rank. The situation of Peishwa's Furnuwees, which, since the time of Ballajee Wishwanath, had been continued in the family of Bhanoo, was taken from Moraba Baboo Rao, and conferred on Chintoo Wittul.

These changes occasioned much discontent; but when Rugonath Rao, in A. D. 1763. order to gratify his revenge towards Gopaul Rao Putwurdhun, attacked and took the fort of Merich, it caused disaffection in many persons, who were before disposed to support him in the government during the minority of his nephew; and Gopaul Rao, with several others who had suffered by his measures, readily listened to overtures which were made to them by Wittul Soondur, the minister of Nizam Ally.† This minister was a Bramin of the Yajurwedee tribe, who was raised to the office of dewan, with the title of Raja Pertabwunt, at the period when Nizam Ally confined his brother. Jealous, it is said, of the arrangement concluded by Moraud Khan,‡ Wittul Soondur persuaded Nizam Ally that he had now an opportunity of completely reducing the Mahrattas, and that the most advisable policy was to overturn the government of the Concan Bramins, to declare Janojee Bhonslay regent, of which situation (the raja of Satara being incompetent to the task of governing) it should be pretended that Janojee, by the death of Tara Bye, became the proper representative. To this scheme Janojee readily acceded; but Nizam Ally, whose duplicity rendered him true to no plan, whilst his minister was thus negotiating, secretly renewed a correspondence with the raja of Kolapoor, by which he intended to have an eventual competitor in reserve, in case Janojee's claims should prove inconvenient.§ Everything seemed to promise success; Meer Moghul, having been neglected by Rugonath Rao, returned to his brother; Moraba Furnuwees, Sewdasheo Ramchundur (the son of Ramchundur Shenwee), Bhowan Rao, (the dispossessed Pritee Needhee,) Gopaul Rao Putwurdhun, and many other persons joined the Moghuls. The former agreement, known as the treaty of Paigaom, was

* He was appointed *Punt Raj Adnya*, an office created during Shao's government, about the period of the revenue arrangement. It was intended as an office of control and inspection under the raja, but it soon dwindled into a mere sinecure; as the latter, and with considerable emoluments, it still exists.

† *Mahratta MSS.*

‡ *Hudeequ-i-Alum.*

§ *Mahratta MSS.*, oral information, *Hudeequ-i-Alum*, and original letters from Nizam Ally, procured from the raja of Kolapoor. The letters are addressed to Jeejee Bye, the widow of Sumbhajee, who acted as regent during the minority of her adopted son, named Sivajee.

broken off before the districts were restored, and hostilities recommenced. Rugonath Rao was not prepared for this event, but derived the greatest assistance from his nephew, who on this emergency, although still retained in a state of confinement, afforded his uncle the full support of his influence and counsel. Mulhar Rao Holkar and Dummajee Gaekwar were both present with Rugonath Rao; the army was not sufficient to contend with the undivided force which accompanied Nizam Ally, but they were lightly equipped; and that circumstance, in Holkar's opinion, made them superior to the enemy. They advanced as if to give battle, but avoided an action, passed the Moghul army, and proceeded to Aurungabad, which they attempted to escalate, but were repulsed. On the approach of Nizam Ally, they went off towards Berar, entered the districts of Janojee Bhonslay, and plundered in their usual manner. They levied a contribution of 60,000 rupees from Mulkapoor, and, on being pursued, returned to Mungy-Pyetun; thence they turned off in a south-easterly direction, and committed great havoc in the Moghul territory. Nizam Ally followed them for some time, but, seeing it was impossible to overtake them, he marched straight on Poona, which he determined to plunder; and Rugonath Rao, for the purpose of retaliation, proceeded towards Hyderabad.

As soon as it was known at Poona that the Moghul army was approaching, most of the people removed as much of their property as they could carry away, and fled to the hill forts, or into the Concan. The Peishwa's family and the state papers were sent off towards Singurh, but Bappoo Kurundeea, one of Janojee Bhonslay's officers, advanced so rapidly that some of the property belonging to the fugitives was taken, the village below Singurh was set on fire by his troops, and many manuscripts and state papers, illustrative of Mahratta history, were totally destroyed.

Nizam Ally encamped at a short distance from the city, and allowed his army to plunder it; after which houses not ransomed were torn down or burned. He next proceeded towards Poorundhur, and from thence ravaged the country as far east as the Beema; but the violence of the rains was such as to induce him to adopt the resolution of cantoning his army until the opening of the season. For this purpose he intended to have gone to Beder, but Janojee Bhonslay persuaded him to alter the destination to Aurungabad.

In the meantime Rugonath Rao had returned to watch his motions; the wall which surrounds the city of Hyderabad had prevented him from making any impression on the Moghul capital,* but he exacted a contribution of 1,80,000 rupees from the suburbs.† He had opened a secret negotiation with the Mahratta chiefs in the army of Nizam Ally, and found Janojee Bhonslay, the only one whose defection occasioned serious alarm, willing to listen to an accommodation. His ambitious hopes, formed on joining the Moghuls, had been damped from a suspicion of the duplicity of the dewan, Raja Pertabwunt. Upon a promise, therefore, of receiving territory yielding a revenue of 32 lakhs of rupees, being a portion of that which was promised to Nizam Ally as the price of his assistance to Rugonath Rao, he agreed to withdraw his support, and soon found a very critical opportunity.

As the Moghul army pursued their route towards Aurungabad, Rugonath Rao followed them some marches in the rear. On arriving at the Godavery, Nizam Ally, with a part of his force, crossed over, leaving the

* Hudeequ-i-Alum, and Mahratta MSS.

† Mahratta MSS.

dewan with the remainder, at Rakisbone, on the south bank of the river, until the whole of the stores and baggage had been sent over. At this juncture, Janojee, on pretence of not receiving money to pay his troops, quitted the dewan, and encamped at a distance. This movement was the signal to Rugonath Rao, who made a rapid march, attacked the Moghuls, and, after a sanguinary conflict, finally routed them with immense slaughter. Raja Pertabwunt, the dewan, was among the slain.* The resistance was very determined on the part of the Moghuls, and continued for nearly two days. Rugonath Rao was amongst the foremost in every attack, and at one time, almost alone, was completely surrounded and cut off from his troops; but his own determined bravery, and that of his friend Sukaram Hurry, who fought by his side, enabled him to defend himself until rescued by his nephew. Throughout the battle† the young Peishwa particularly distinguished himself, both by personal energy and the judicious support which he sent, not only to his uncle, but to different points of the attack. The loss on both sides was very great, and on that of the Moghuls is said to have amounted to 10,000 men.‡

Nizam Ally at first endeavoured to aid his dewan by a cannonade from the opposite side of the river, but without effect. He thus became a spectator of the destruction of his troops, without the possibility of succouring them, and was afterwards obliged to retire within the walls of Aurungabad, lest the Mahrattas should be able to ford the river. This object they accomplished in a few days, and arrived at the city, which they again attacked without success, and a number of them were killed. Immediately afterwards Nizam Ally visited Rugonath Rao, and with that apparent contrition which he could so well affect, laid all his errors to the fault of his late dewan, and so worked on the weakness and good-nature of Rugoba, that he not only forgave all that had happened, but, in consideration of the aid with which he had been furnished in his distress, he wished to bestow upon Nizam Ally such part of the cession of 51 lakhs made by the treaty at Pairgaom as remained at his disposal, after deducting the assignment of 32 lakhs promised to Janojee. His ministers, however, dissuaded him from following his inclination to its full extent, and he was induced to confine the gift to ten lakhs, so that nine lakhs§ of the original cession was saved, and a new treaty was concluded with Nizam Ally in October.

At the time of delivering the deeds by which Janojee was paid for his treachery, Mahdoo Rao openly reproached him for his duplicity to both parties, and vehemently condemned the unprincipled and unworthy motives by which he had been drawn in to become a tool for the subversion of a government which had aggrandized his father's house, and raised the

* He was accidentally hit by one of his own men before he received his death-wound from a party of Mahrattas under Dummajee Gaekwar. Moraud Khan, his rival, is accused of having lured the man who wounded him, but this accusation seems more than questionable. A party of Afghans in Holkar's service, with their usual ferocity, cut off the dewan's head, which they carried in triumph on the point of a spear.

† It is called the battle of Taindulza by the Mahrattas.

‡ This is the lowest computation in any Mahratta MS. The Moghul historians have not enumerated the loss sustained by Nizam Ally's army.

§ Mahratta MSS., original accounts from the Poona Records, and oral information. The Mahratta MSS. state the nine lakhs of rupees withheld as territory taken, and it is only by comparison with both Mahomedan and Mahratta evidence, collated with very intricate and voluminous accounts in the Poona Records, that I have been able to find out and simplify these complicated transactions.

Hindoos to the power they enjoyed. This manly candour in a young man educated in a Bramin court, is the more remarkable when we consider the control under which Mahdoo Rao was still held, but over which his judgment and ability were gradually obtaining the ascendancy.

Bhowan Rao was restored to his rank of Pritee Needhee upon the death of Bhaskur Rao, which happened about the period when the treaty with Nizam Ally was concluded. The fort of Merich was restored to Gopaul Rao; and although Moraba Furnuwees was not immediately appointed to any share of the hereditary duties of his office, it was bestowed on his cousin, Ballajee Jenardin, who I shall hereafter designate by his common appellation of Nana Furnuwees.

Whilst the Mahrattas had to maintain these struggles in the Deccan, a

A. D. 1761. new power was rising on the ruins of the Hindoo dynasty of Mysore, under the celebrated adventurer Hyder Ally Khan, which to the southward promised, in a very short time, at least to confine the Mahrattas to their native boundary. Busalut Jung, still hopeful of forming an independent kingdom in the Carnatic, took advantage of the absence of the Mahrattas to plan the conquest of their southern districts, and with this view obtained the alliance of Hyder, whom he appointed nabob of Sera, precisely in the same manner as the Raja Shao used to confer unconquered territories, the right to which, as Colonel Wilks has observed, "could only be inferred from the act of granting." Busalut Jung and his new ally had reduced Ouscotta, Sera, and Bura-Balapur by the end of 1761; and Busalut Jung, soon after, being apprehensive of an attack from his brother Nizam Ally, returned to his capital at Adonee; but Hyder prosecuted his conquests. In 1762 he reduced, or exacted tribute from, the polygars of Chota-Balapur, Raidroog, Harpoonelly, and Chittledroog. In 1763 he conquered Bednore, and confined the ranees and her adopted son in the fort of Mudgerry; Fuzzul Oolla Khan, one of his officers, overran Soonda, and early in the ensuing year Hyder defeated the nabob of Savanoor. He left Fuzzul Oolla Khan in that quarter, to occupy as much as possible of the Mahratta country, whilst affairs of government required his own return to Bednore. Fuzzul Oolla Khan accordingly took Dharwar, and established Hyder's posts nearly as far north as the Kistna.*

The Mahrattas were not unconcerned spectators of the rapid progress of Hyder Ally, and a large army was assembling at Poona to be directed against him. Mahdoo Rao insisted on his right to command this army, whilst his uncle remained at Poona to conduct the government; Sukaram Bappoo joined in supporting the Peishwa's pretensions on this occasion, till at last Rugonath Rao yielded his consent, but quitted Poona in anger, and retired to Anundwelee near Nassuck.† The discussions prior to this arrangement delayed the advance of the Mahratta army beyond the time which mere preparation required, and Gopaul Rao Putwurdhun, who had crossed the Kistna in advance, was defeated with great loss by Fuzzul Oolla Khan. Early in the month of May, Mahdoo Rao entered the Carnatic with an army of 30,000 horse, and about the same number of infantry. Fuzzul Oolla Khan, leaving a strong garrison in Dharwar, fell back on Hyder's army, which had quitted an intrenched camp prepared at Annawutty, and advanced to a strong position, where, when joined by Fuzzul Oolla Khan, the whole army under Hyder's personal command has been estimated at 20,000 horse and 40,000 foot, of which one-

* Wilks.

† Mahratta MSS.

half were disciplined infantry. Mahdoo Rao's superiority in cavalry enabled him to obtain more correct intelligence than his adversary, and, assisted by the experience of Sukaram Bappoo, it was determined not to attack Hyder's united force in the position he had chosen. Detachments were therefore employed in driving out his garrisons from the towns and villages north of the Wurda. This plan of operations induced Hyder to try a stratagem for bringing on a general engagement, for which purpose he moved out with 20,000 men, intending to retire and draw the Mahrattas towards his reserve, which remained in its first position under Fuzzul Oolla Khan. Such a shallow artifice proves how little he then knew of his enemy. The Mahrattas, as is their usual practice, showed a few men, small bodies began to skirmish, and drew Hyder forward, until their parties, still retiring, but gradually thickening, at last presented solid masses of horse, moving round between him and his camp. Hyder was obliged to change his intended feint of retiring into steady dispositions for a retreat to his camp, which was not effected without considerable loss. Next day his army fell back to the entrenched position at Annawutty;* and Mahdoo Rao, as the rains had set in, fixed his head-quarters at Nurindra,† north of the Wurda, sending his horse for shelter into all the villages 20 miles round. After the defeat of Hyder, Abdool Muzeed Khan and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray joined the Peishwa, who, as Ramchundur Jadow had rejoined Nizam Ally, formally restored Moorar Rao to his rank of Senaputtee, as the representative of the family of Ghorepuray—a circumstance the more creditable to the Peishwa, as he declared it but an act of justice to the descendant of the gallant Suntajee, so ill-requested in the reign of Raja Ram.

As soon as the season permitted, Mahdoo Rao laid siege to Dharwar, which capitulated after a breach had been made. The whole country north of the Wurda was then in his possession, except Moondogoor, which continued rain prevented his investing; but when the weather cleared up, it was speedily reduced. Perceiving that the war would terminate successfully, he requested Rugonath Rao to join and assume the command—a remarkable instance of self-command in a general so young, and obviously proceeding from motives purely conciliatory, though at the same time more creditable to the heart of the individual than the judgment of the prince. Rugonath Rao accordingly left Nassuck, and arrived as the army was about to cross the Wurda.‡

Mahdoo Rao's intention was to cut away the thick woods which surrounded Annawutty, and get between Hyder and Bednore, which the Mahrattas had no sooner begun to carry into execution, than Hyder decamped with precipitation. The country was so close that, for the two first days, the Mahrattas could only harass the rear of Hyder's army; but on the third day, the country becoming more open, a body of the Peishwa's troops were moved between Hyder and Bednore, which compelled him to stand an action.§ His troops were attacked with impetuosity, and many of them immediately sought shelter in the woods. Hyder reached Bednore with only 2,500 horse and 10,000 infantry, the rest of his army being for the time dispersed, and several thousands of them destroyed. As the Mahrattas advanced, all the garri-

* Wilks, and Mahratta MSS.

† Mahratta MSS. This place (Nurindra) is not to be found by that name in any map that I have seen.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ Wilks.

sons surrendered on the first summons, except Anuntpoor, which held out for some time, until Hyder had got together some of his dispersed army, when he entered upon a negotiation with Rugonath Rao, to whom both the conduct and conclusion of the treaty were wholly intrusted.* Hyder engaged to restore all districts and places wrested from Morar Rao Ghorepuray, to relinquish all claims on the nabob of Savanoor, and to pay 32 lakhs of rupees to the Peishwa.† The terms were by no means approved of by Mahdoo Rao; but having once granted full authority to his uncle, he adhered to the agreement, and made no objection where an attempt to remedy what was defective would have been a departure from good faith.* He quitted the Carnatic, and recrossed the Kistna in the end of February.

Mahdoo Rao, whilst anxious to conciliate his uncle, and willing to relinquish as large a share of power as was consistent with the dignity of his situation, and his duty to the state, had to contend with the intrigues of party, and to resist the counsel of his mother, Gopika Bye, who naturally jealous, and inflamed by the violent behaviour of Anundee Bye, the wife of Rugonath Rao, advised her son, as a measure of self-preservation, to place his uncle under restraint. Mahdoo Rao, however, long entertained hopes of being able to avoid such an extreme measure. Rugonath Rao, though frequently perverse, was not untractable, except when exposed to the influence of his wife; he probably would have acceded to his nephew's views, but for the malicious and desperate woman by whom his ambition and resentment were alternately excited. The Peishwa was sensible that Rugonath Rao could, at this period, obtain the aid either of Nizam Ally or of Janojee Bhonslay, and, as affairs then existed, perhaps of both. For although Nizam Ally boiled with resentment against Janojee, on account of his treacherous defection, there was, as yet, no breach between them which could not have been speedily accommodated, for purposes of mutual aggrandizement. Nizam Ally during this year had made a successful campaign south of the Kistna, and had reduced his brother Busalut Jung to submission and obedience. The conquest of Hyder Ally and the nabob of the Carnatic, or rather his supporters the English, prevented him from extending his sway over those countries, to the southward of the Kistna, conquered by Aurungzebe, and forming a part of that viceroyalty which his father had seized, and to which he had succeeded by usurpation and murder.

Under these circumstances, with regard to Nizam Ally and Janojee, Mahdoo Rao deemed it his safest policy to conciliate the one at the expense of the other. He soon found that Nizam Ally would readily enter on an offensive alliance against Janojee, with the ultimate hope of engaging the Mahrattas in co-operation against Hyder. A secret compact

A. D. 1766. was accordingly entered into about the beginning of the ensuing year, the particulars of which, if ever committed

to writing, have not been discovered, but the objects of it become tolerably obvious from a variety of facts. The united armies of the Peishwa and Nizam Ally invaded Berar, compelled Janojee Bhonslay to sue for peace, and to restore three-fourths of the districts‡ he had gained by his double treachery during the former war—a politic moderation on the part of Mahdoo Rao, who still left Janojee something to lose, but made it

* Mahratta MSS.

† Wilks. The only Mahratta MS. where I find any mention of the terms, states 15 lakhs of tribute, and the expenses of the war to be defrayed by Hyder.

‡ The amount restored was rupees 24,50,269 10 annas and 1 pie (Poona Records).

apparent, from what follows, that the Moghuls rather than the Mahrattas were gainers by the invasion. Of the districts which were thus restored on the 4th February, nearly two-thirds, or a tract of territory equivalent to 15 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, was given up to the Nizam on the 16th of the same month, and stated in the accounts of the Poona government as ceded "for the firm establishment of peace and friendship." It is more than probable the agreement pointed to conjoint operations for the ensuing season in the Carnatic; but circumstances occurred in the meantime which materially changed the relative situations of the contracting powers.

The English East India Company, after they had overcome their rivals the French, and found time to contemplate the situation into which they had been hurried by national hostility, the treachery of the native powers, the ambition of their servants, and the bravery of their troops, were astonished and alarmed at the height to which they had ascended, and would have relinquished a part of their acquisitions, in order to purchase security for the remainder. But those who fully understood their situation were convinced that they had already gone too far to recede, and that they must be prepared not only to resist, but to punish, aggression.

All the states in India were inimical to Europeans of every nation, and even when bound down by treaties, they were at best but faithless friends, who would never maintain an alliance unless when controlled, either immediately or remotely, by their interests or their fears. Their jealousy, no less than their prejudice, would have prompted them to extirpate the foreigners, and the English had, therefore, only the choice of offensive or defensive war. To have adopted the latter would have lost them the advantage of all favourable conjuncture, and must have obliged them to oppose the united armies of the natives, instead of having to contend with their divided force. They might, indeed, have avoided the contest by resigning the trade, privileges, and dominion they had acquired; but those mistaken philanthropists, who imagine that the happiness of India would have been secured by such a sacrifice, required no other answer than is afforded by the series of mismanagement and devastation which it has already been my duty to record.

It is not my province to trace the rise of the British power in India, but many of the principal events which led to our ascendancy in that quarter are blended with the Mahratta history; and these, as hitherto, I shall endeavour to describe, without favour to my own nation, and without the equally unjust bias which is apt to arise from a desire to guard against so natural a partiality.

The records of the company's governments in India are, probably, the best historical materials in the world: there we find the reasons for every undertaking, the steady rules intended for conduct, the hurried letter from the scene of action, the deliberations of the council, the separate opinions of the members composing it, and their final judgment. The scrutiny, censure, or approval of the Court of Directors from a remote situation, and after a long interval, bring to recollection all that was done and all that was speculated, what has occurred in India in the meantime, and what opinions have stood the test of events. Many inconsistencies appear both in the orders of the Directors at home, and in the measures of their governments abroad, which frequently arose from causes irremediable or excusable, such as the distance of the supreme power, and the defective information at the different presidencies. The divided nature of the authority in India was also, for a long time, a source of great evil;

and even after the act of Parliament had passed, which vested a control in the president and council of Bengal, the defects, as might have been expected, were not immediately remedied ; for it generally requires time, and a judicious exercise of power, to fit any new law to the end for which it is framed.

Much corruption and many reprehensible acts are to be found, especially before the affairs of India had attracted the full attention of the British legislature and nation ; but not only is every act and every deliberation, which other governments have generally the power to conceal, recorded in detail at the different presidencies, but the personal animosity of individuals composing the governments has given the most glaring interpretation to mere errors, and has sometimes occasioned gross misrepresentation of facts. On the other hand, many services, performed without any great degree of exertion or ability, have, in consequence of their results, been extravagantly praised, and given a tone to Indian despatches which prejudices sober judgment, and obscures the honor of toils and of virtues, to which in every department, both civil and military, our countrymen in India have founded claims as just as the instruments of any government, ancient or modern.

CHAP. XXIII.

FROM A. D. 1766 TO A. D. 1772.

Conquest may be too slow as well as too rapid—a middle course adopted by the English.—Proposal for expelling Janojee Bhonslay from Kuttaek.—Views of the Court of Directors on the east and west of India.—Occupation of Rajamundree.—Alliance with Nizam Ally—objects.—Mahdoo Rao enters the Carnatic, levies tribute from Hyder, and returns to Poona.—New treaty between Nizam Ally and the English—Rugonath Rao proceeds on an expedition into Hindostan.—Death of Mulhar Rao Holkar—his widow Aylah Bye appoints Tookajee Holkar to the command of her army.—Rana of Gohud—his rise—rebellious proceedings.—Rugonath Rao fails in an attempt to reduce him—accepts a tribute, and returns to Poona—jealousy and distrust towards his nephew—retires from Poona, and, supported by Holkar, Janojee Bhonslay, and Dummajee Gaekwar, rebels against him.—Curious anecdote of Mahdoo Rao.—Rebellion crushed, and Rugonath Rao placed in confinement.—Mahdoo Rao forms an alliance with Nizam Ally against Janojee—conceals his real design with great political artifice—effect on the English and Hyder—invades Berar—plunders Nagpoor—judicious conduct of Janojee—ravages the Peishwa's territory.—Mahdoo Rao is compelled to raise the siege of Chandah, and return to oppose Janojee—Janojee avoids an action, and cuts off a part of the Peishwa's baggage—treaty of Kunkapoor.—The Peishwa sends an expedition to Hindostan under Visajee Kishen Beneewalla—anecdote relative to Mahadajee Sindia.—Mahdoo Rao's endeavours to improve the civil government.—Ram Shastree—account of—anecdote—admirable character.—The practice of forcing villagers to carry baggage abolished.—Encroachments of Hyder.—The Peishwa proceeds against him—reduces a large tract of territory.—Anecdote of the rival Ghatgays at the storm of Mulwugul—obstinate defence of Nidjeeguhl—operations continued.—Mahdoo Rao is compelled to leave the army from ill-health.—Trimbuck Rao Mama prosecutes the war—defeats Hyder, who loses the whole of his artillery, camp equipage, &c.—Seringapatam besieged—peace concluded—motives and terms.—Proceedings in Hindostan.—Affairs of the imperial courts since the battle of Panniput.—The emperor seeks and obtains the protection of the English.—The East India Company appointed dewan to the nabob of Bengal.—Affairs at Delhi.—Visajee Kishen levies tribute from the Rajpoots—defeats the Jaths near Bhurtpoor.—Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah negotiates with the Mahrattas—reference to the Peishwa—overtures admitted—death of Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah.—The Mahrattas invade Rohilcund.—The emperor quits the protection of the English, and is reinstated on his throne by the Mahrattas.—The Mahrattas overrun the territory of Zubita Khan.—Policy of Shujah-ud-Dowlah in regard to the Rohillahs—on receiving a subsidy, concludes a defensive alliance with them.—Insolence and rapacity of the Mahratta Bramins.—The emperor, assisted by Nujeeb Khan, determines to throw off their yoke.—Death of Mahdoo Rao—his character.—Account of his civil administration.—

General review of the interior management and state of the country and people, including the police—civil and criminal justice—finance—army.

WHILST universally admitted that unwieldy dominion is the forerunner of certain decline, it is not always considered that, under some circumstances, conquest may be too slow as well as too rapid. Illustrative of this observation, we have some striking examples connected with the history of Maharashtra, particularly in the decay of the Portuguese and the rise of the Mahrattas. The middle course, as steered by the English, and the steady march of aggrandizement which they have hitherto pursued in the East, is to be ascribed to the remarkable men who have, at various periods, directed the councils and their armies; and to the caution of a body of merchants, who, though pleased at the gain, were appalled at the venture, and who feared the loss of all they had acquired by each succeeding contest into which they were plunged.

Lord Clive, who returned from England to assume the government of Bengal in May 1765, not only perceived that it was impossible for the English to recede, but was convinced that to advance was essential to their preservation. Of the three great powers—the Mahrattas, Nizam Ally, and Hyder—the first was considered the most formidable. As early as the end of the year 1761, immediately after the death of Ballajee Rao, when Mr. Vansittart was president of the council in Bengal, it was intended to expel Janojee Bhonslay from Kuttack; and it was proposed, not only to the governments of Madras and Bombay, but to the emperor of the Moghuls, to Sulabut Jung,* and Nizam Ally. Although the sister presidencies, for various sufficient reasons, disapproved of the expedition, it was prevented, not seemingly on account of their disapproval, but at the request of the nabob of Bengal.

The Court of Directors were desirous of seeing the Mahrattas checked in their progress, and would have beheld combinations of the other native powers against them with abundant satisfaction: but they were apprehensive of the consequences of granting a latitude to their own servants, or of being engaged as umpires or auxiliaries; and their instructions were designed to prevent their becoming involved in hostilities, especially as principals, in any case short of absolute defence. With these cautious views, however, they were anxious to attain two objects, which they deemed of vital importance to their security; the first, of old standing, was one in which the Mahrattas were directly concerned, the possession of Salsette, Hog Island, and Caranja, in the neighbourhood of Bombay, which every year tended to render more important; the second, the accomplishment of which devolved more particularly on the presidency of Madras, was the occupation of the five districts formerly belonging to the French, on the eastern coast of the peninsula, best known as the Northern Circars. With respect to the first, the Mahrattas, though but a few years before they scarcely regarded the English, were now too jealous of their aggrandizement, willingly to relinquish the islands alluded to; besides which, they attached peculiar value to these possessions, as the fruits of their success against an European nation. In regard to the second, Guntoor, one of the

* This is another reason for supposing that there is a mistake of a year in stating Sulabut Jung's confinement on the 18th July 1761. Such a circumstance must have transpired at Bengal long before the 11th December 1761, which is the date of the letter containing the proposal to the Bombay government.

five districts in question, was appropriated as the jagheer of Busalut Jung. Nizam Ally, having at one time offered to farm the remaining four to the nabob of Arcot, it was hoped he might allow the company to occupy them on the same terms; but although the Madras government offered six times more than he had ever before received, he positively refused to rent them to the English.

In consequence of this obstinacy on the part of Nizam Ally, Lord Clive determined to take possession of the districts at all events, and for this purpose obtained a grant of them from the emperor. The Madras government occupied Rajamundree by force, and it is not surprising that Nizam Ally should have treated as mockery all assurances of their being actuated solely by motives of self-preservation. Encouraged by the deference with which representations were still made to him by the English, and by his alliance with the Mahrattas, Nizam Ally threatened the English with extirpation, and endeavoured to incite Hyder to invade the Carnatic. The Madras presidency, in considerable alarm, tried to form an alliance with Hyder, but he refused to receive the envoy. In this dilemma, Mr. Palk, the governor of Madras, referred to Lord Clive, who recommended a connection with the Nizam, which should have for its object the subjugation of Hyder, and an alliance for restraining the spreading power of the Mahrattas.

The prospect thus held out to Nizam Ally precisely suited his views. He wished to reduce Hyder, and to humble the Mahrattas; he knew the value of regular troops, and he readily listened to the proposals of the English; but as he had already leagued himself with the Mahrattas against Hyder, he deemed it most advisable not to break with Mahdoo Rao, until he had effected the overthrow of the usurper of Mysore. A treaty, however, was concluded between Nizam Ally and the English, by which the Madras government agreed to pay seven lakhs of rupees a year for four of the districts, or to assist Nizam Ally with two battalions of infantry and six pieces of cannon. In case the troops should be required, the seven lakhs of rupees were to be appropriated for their expenses.

The Mahratta court seem to have perceived the object of this combination, and Mahdoo Rao, without waiting for his ally, if such he could be termed, crossed the Kistna in the month of January, and, before the end of March, took Sera, Ouscotta, and Mudgerry, released the ranee of Bednore* and her adopted son, who had been confined in Mudgerry; and after levying 30 lakhs of rupees† of tribute from Hyder, and collecting nearly 17‡ more from different parts of the Carnatic, was prepared to return to Maharashtra before Nizam Ally had made his appearance. When the English and Nizam Ally wished to have brought forward their pretensions to share in the Mahratta tribute, their envoys were treated with broad and undisguised ridicule.§ It is not positively known whether Mahdoo Rao was apprized of the ultimate design of the alliance between Nizam Ally and the English, nor is it ascertained what agreement existed between Nizam Ally and the Mahrattas, but we have an unsupported assertion of Nizam

* She died on the way to Poona.—Mostyn's Despatches.

† Poona State Accounts. Colonel Wilks says 35 lakhs, and that Sera was at that time given up to Hyder in exchange for Gurumconda. Of this last transaction no mention is made in the state accounts, or in the despatches of Mr. Mostyn, resident at Mahdoo Rao's court.

‡ Rupees 16,95,777.

§ Wilks, vol. ii., page 16.

Ally's minister, Rookun-ud-Dowlah, that his master had been duped by the Mahrattas for the third time ;* at all events, it could not have escaped the observation of Mahdoo Rao that the English in the war against Hyder voluntarily appeared as auxiliaries to one of two contracting parties, and that, upon the subjugation of Hyder, Nizam Ally, by the English aid, could dictate, as the Mahrattas probably otherwise would have done, in any partition of his territories. This proceeding, therefore, on the part of Mahdoo Rao, which has been alluded to as ordinary Mahratta artifice to anticipate the plunder,† was a measure perfectly justifiable, for the purpose of effecting an important political object, and disconcerting the plans of his enemies. He recrossed the Kistna in the end of May, leaving the Moghuls and their allies to settle with Hyder as they best could.

The subsequent treachery of Nizam Ally in joining Hyder against the English, and the circumstances which induced him, by a fresh act of treachery, to desert Hyder and renew the treaty with the English, have been elsewhere distinctly and fully recorded ;‡ and as they belong not to this history, it is only necessary to mention, in order to preserve a connexion with subsequent events, that a new treaty was concluded, on the 23rd February 1768, between Nizam Ally and the English, which, though framed on the basis of that which was settled in 1766, differed from it in some very essential particulars, the most remarkable of which was their arrogating to themselves the right and the power to dispose of Hyder's territories. The treaty declared Hyder a usurper ; the Carnatic Bala Ghaut was taken from him by Nizam Ally, as Moghul viceroy in the Deccan, and the office of dewan, for the future management of that territory, conferred upon the English company, for which they agreed to pay an annual tribute of seven lakhs of rupees. Nizam Ally further consented to cede Guntoor, the remaining district of the northern circars, upon the death or misconduct of his brother Busalut Jung. The Mahrattas, without having applied to become parties to this absurd treaty, were, by a special clause, to be allowed their chouth from the territory thus disposed of. The Peishwa had no interference in the warfare which continued for some time between the English and Hyder ; the line of conduct which he adopted, and which will be explained in the regular narrative of events, may be ascribed partly to policy, but principally to the internal situation of his empire.

Rugonath Rao, in the preceding year, after the campaign against Janojee, had set out on an expedition into Hindostan, accompanied by Mulhar Rao Holkar. The prosecution of an intended reduction of many places formerly in the possession of the Mahrattas, or tributary to them, was obstructed, in the first instance, by the death of Mulhar Rao Holkar. His grandson Mallee Rao, only son of Khundee Rao, and a minor, succeeded to his possessions, but died soon after, which gave rise to a dispute between Gungadthur Yeawunt, the dewan, and Aylah Bye, the widow of Khundee Rao, now lawful inheritor. The dewan proposed that some connection of the family should be adopted by the widow ; but to this Aylah Bye, although her dewan's proposal was approved of by Rugonath Rao, would by no means consent. Supported by her own troops, by the Peishwa, and by the voice of the

* Wilks, vol. ii., page 15. The reader has it in his power to judge of the occasions to which Rookun-ud-Dowlah alluded—first, in regard to Rugonath Rao, and second, in the late campaign against Janojee Bhonslay.

† Wilks, vol. ii., page 6.

‡ See Colonel Wilks' *South of India*, vol. ii.

country, she appointed Tookajee Holkar,* an experienced sillidar, a great favourite with the late Mulhar Rao, but no relation of the family, to the command of her army, retaining under her own management the civil administration of the extensive family jagheer. To the death of Mulhar Rao Holkar may probably be attributed the inactivity of the Mahrattas† during this campaign, and the failure of Rugonath Rao in an attempt to reduce the rana of Gohud, a petty chieftain of the Jath tribe, whose uncle rose into notice under the Peishwa Bajee Rao, but who, upon the defeat of the Mahrattas at Panniput, rebelled against them. Rugonath Rao, after a protracted siege of the town of Gohud, accepted a tribute of three lakhs of rupees, and shortly after proceeded towards the Deccan, where he arrived in the month of August, some time after the Peishwa's return from the Carnatic. On Mahdoo Rao's intimating his intention of meeting his uncle at Toka, the latter strongly suspected that there was a plan laid for seizing him. The fact appears to have been that Rugonath Rao's views, at the suggestion of Anundee Bye, were directed to dividing the sovereignty of the empire, and, conscious that attempts to strengthen his party had been discovered, he dreaded the consequences. Mahdoo Rao intended to make a last effort to reclaim his uncle, to repeat his offers of conceding a principal share in the administration, or to give him a handsome but moderate establishment in any part of the country where he might choose to reside. It was not easy to overcome Rugonath Rao's suspicions so far as to induce him to meet Mahdoo Rao, but an interview was at length effected by the mediation of Govind Sew Ram.‡

Rugonath Rao at first refused all offers, and expressed his determination to retire to Benares. Mahdoo Rao replied that he thought such a resolution extremely proper, and, indeed, that he *must* either take the share of the administration which was proposed, or have no interference whatever in the government. To this last proposal Rugonath Rao, piqued at the decided tone which his nephew had assumed, affected the readiest compliance, and gave orders to his officers, in charge of the forts of Ahmednugur, Sewneree, Asseergurh, and Satara, to obey the orders of Mahdoo Rao; he declared that all he desired, before renouncing the world, was the payment of the arrears due to his troops, and a suitable provision for his family and attendants. Mahdoo Rao agreed to pay 25 lakhs of rupees in three months, to place at his disposal a jagheer, situated about the source of the sacred river Godavery, yielding 12 or 13 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, and including six forts, amongst which were Trimbuck,

* Tookajee Holkar paid a nuzur, or fee, to the Peishwa's government, on being appointed commander of Mulhar Rao's troops, of rupees 15,62,000. (State accounts, Poona Records.)

† The reader, acquainted with the history of British India, will recognise the first appearance of Rugonath Rao's army in Bundelcund as that which occasioned the alarm at Korah during a period of serious commotion.—(See Mill's British India, page 251, volume ii.)

‡ Mr. Mostyn, the British envoy at the court of Poona, says by the mediation "of Sukaram Bappoo." (Secret Despatches, dated Poona, 7th December 1761.)

Sukaram, according to his usual duplicity, was intriguing with both parties, that he might at all events be able to retain his place. He would not incur the risk of interference in a reconciliation which he foresaw would only be temporary. Mr. Mostyn also states that "Mahdoo Rao, instigated by his mother, certainly had intentions of seizing his uncle at that interview;" but as he mentions this on hearsay evidence, respecting an intention, and that too relating to what had taken place prior to his arrival at Poona, although his opinion has been generally followed on this point, I have preferred the authority of the natives of the country, who concur in imputing such a wish to Gopika Bye, but no such design to Mahdoo Rao.

Oundha, and Putta ;* but Rugonath Rao was dissatisfied, and only sought a fit opportunity to assert his claim to half of the Mahratta sovereignty.

Mahdoo Rao at this period was courted by the English and Mohummud Ally on the one part, and by Nizam Ally and Hyder on the other. Mr. Mostyn was sent to Poona by the Bombay government, for the purpose of ascertaining the Peishwa's views, and of using every endeavour, by fomenting the domestic dissensions or otherwise, to prevent the Mahrattas from joining Hyder and Nizam Ally. An alliance was not to be resorted to, if it could be avoided, but if absolutely necessary, the conquest of Bednore and Soonda, regarding which the Mahrattas always regretted having been anticipated by Hyder, was to be held out as an inducement for engaging them in the English interests.

The Mahratta court evaded all decisive opinions or engagements, but candidly told the envoy that their conduct would be guided by circumstances.

A. D. 1768. The Peishwa, however, could not quit the Deccan whilst his uncle's conduct manifested symptoms of hostility ; and Sukaram Bappoo's intentions, always affectedly mysterious, continued equivocal.

Towards the end of the fair season Rugonath Rao had assembled a force of upwards of 15,000 men, with which, in hopes of being joined by Janojee Bhonslay, he encamped, first on the banks of the Godavery, and afterwards in the neighbourhood of Dhoorup, a fort in the Chandore range. It was at this period, when despairing of having another son, that Rugonath Rao adopted Amrut Rao, the son of a Concan Bramin, whose family surname was Bhooskootee. His principal supporters in rebellion were Dummajee Gaekwar, who sent him some troops under his eldest son Govind Rao, and Gungadhur Yeswunt, the dewan of Holkar, who was not only a zealous partizan of Rugonath Rao, but entertained a personal pique against the Peishwa, the origin of which is too remarkable to be omitted. At a public durbar in Poona, after Rugonath Rao had retired from the administration, Gungadhur Yeswunt took an opportunity of saying, in a contemptuous manner, "that in the present affairs, his old eyes could distinguish the acts of one who only saw with the eyes of a boy ;" Mahdoo Rao, to the astonishment of all present, jumped from the musnud, or cushion of state, on which he sat, and struck him a violent blow on the face—a singular instance of the effects of anger in a Bramin court, among a people remarkable for their decorum.

Mahdoo Rao, on hearing of the formidable rebellion under his uncle, in order to anticipate a design formed on the part of Janojee Bhonslay to support him, immediately marched to Dhoorup, where he attacked and defeated Rugonath Rao's troops, forced him to seek shelter in the fort, obliged him to surrender, conveyed him a prisoner to Poona, and confined him in the Peishwa's palace.

The season of the year prevented Mahdoo Rao from taking immediate notice of the hostile intentions of Janojee, but he was publicly engaged in negotiations with Nizam Ally and with Hyder, in which he had a triple object : his chief design was to punish Janojee, and his first care was to engage Nizam Ally in an alliance for that purpose ; the second was to draw the tribute from Mysore without the necessity of sending Gopaul Rao's army from Merich, as Hyder, fully occupied in the war with the English, might be thrown off his guard by his extreme anxiety to procure the aid of the Mahrattas ; the third object was to deter the Bengal government

* Mahratta MSS., and Bombay Records.

from entering on an alliance earnestly solicited by Janooje, from the fear that Mahdoo Rao, aided by Hyder and Nizam Ally, would ruin the company's affairs on the coast of Coromandel before their forces from Bengal could join Janooje in Berar.

The governor and council at Bombay, although the agent then at Poona,

A. D. 1769. Mr. Brome, reported precisely as Mahdoo Rao wished him to believe, being less directly interested than Madras, were the first to perceive the depth of this well-planned scheme; and Hyder, as soon as his eyes were opened by finding that the tribute was required as a prelude to the Mahratta alliance, improved on the deception, and endeavoured to turn the reports then in circulation to his own advantage, by drawing the presidency of Madras into an alliance with himself.*

Mahdoo Rao, when he gave out that his preparations were intended to assist Hyder, amongst other stratagems to mask his real designs, sent his fleet to cruise off Bombay harbour; but Visajee Punt, the commander from Bassein, on being called upon by the governor and council to explain his conduct, gave as an excuse that he was watching two Portuguese ships, and assured the president that the Peishwa had no intention of breaking with the English. This assurance strengthened their opinion, and was soon confirmed by reported commotions, the preparations of Janooje Bhonslay, and the advance of a combined army of Mahrattas and Moghuls, under the Peishwa and Rookun-ud-Dowlah, towards Nagpoor.

Janooje laid a judicious plan for the campaign, and opposed the invaders on the old Mahratta system, in which Mahdoo Rao was less experienced than in the half-regular kind of warfare to which his attention had been directed. The artillery, the Arabs, and the infantry partially disciplined, the numerous tents, and the heavy equipments of the Peishwa and Rookun-ud-Dowlah unfitted them for the active war of detachments which Janooje pursued.

The combined armies entered Berar by the route of Basum and Kurinja. Naroo Punt, the soobehdar of the province on the part of Janooje, attempted to oppose them, but was defeated and killed; his nephew, Wittul Punt Bullar, retired towards Nagpoor, where Janooje and Moodajee, with their families and baggage, were encamped. As the Peishwa advanced, they moved off to the westward, and as no attempt was made to cut them off from Gawelgurh, as soon as Mahdoo Rao passed to the eastward, they lodged their families and baggage in that fortress, and were joined at Wuroor Zuroor by their brother Sabajee, at the head of a large detachment. Mahdoo Rao plundered Nagpoor; Janooje made no attempt to save it, but moved to Ramteek, where his whole force united, Bimbajee, the fourth brother, having joined from Chutteesgurh; Janooje then made a feint, as if intending to proceed towards the Peishwa's districts to the northward. Mahdoo Rao, however, was not tempted to follow him; he placed thannas in various districts, collected the revenue all over the country, and laid siege to Chandah. Janooje, in the meantime, wheeled off to the westward, and, marching with extraordinary diligence, passed Ahmednugur, and began to plunder the country on the route to Poona. Mahdoo Rao had at one time proposed, after his capital was destroyed by Nizam Ally, to surround it by a strong wall; but this design was, on mature consideration, abandoned, lest it should ultimately occasion irre-

* Colonel Wilks has overlooked the Bombay letters on this point; Hyder was certainly a master at left-handed diplomacy.—(See vol. ii., page 117, Wilks's South of India.)

parable loss, by holding out a security to property which was best insured by a dependence on the strong hill forts of Singurh and Poorundhur. The inhabitants, on Janojee's approach, sent off their property as usual; and Mahdoo Rao, as soon as he was apprized of the route he had taken, sent Gopaul Rao Putwurdhun and Ramchundur Gunnessh with 30,000 horse in pursuit of him; but Janojee still plundered in the neighbourhood of Poona, and Gopaul Rao was justly accused of being secretly in league with him. The Peishwa and Rookun-ud-Dowlah raised the siege of Chandah; Janojee moved towards the Godavery, pretending that he was about to give fair battle to the Peishwa in the absence of Gopaul Rao, whom he left at some distance in the rear. Nothing, however, was farther from his intention; he passed the Peishwa's army near Mahoor, but detached Bappoo Kurundeea by a circuitous route, who suddenly fell upon the baggage, and succeeded in carrying off a portion of it. Both parties, however, were tired of the war; they had mutually sustained heavy loss; and Janojee, although hitherto as successful as he could have expected, was sensible that, if hostilities continued, they must end in his ruin; but his principal alarm was caused by some intrigues with his brother Moodajee, and he readily embraced the first overtures of pacification afforded by a message from Mahdoo Rao. A treaty, or in the language of the Peishwa, who did not admit the independence which treaty implies, an agreement, was concluded, on terms extremely favourable to the Peishwa, on the 23rd March*—eleven days prior to the masterly manœuvres by which Hyder Ally dictated a peace to the English at the gates of Madras.

The agreement between Mahdoo Rao Peishwa and Janojee Bhonslay, Sena Sahib Soobeh, was concluded at the village of Kunkapoor, on the north bank of the Beema, near Brimeshwur, and consisted of 13 articles, by which Janojee restored the remainder of the districts he had received for deserting the Moghuls at Rakisbone, and gave up certain sequestered shares of revenue, or an equivalent for what rightfully belonged to Futih Sing Bhonslay, raja of Akulkote. The tribute of ghas-dana, hitherto levied by the Sena Sahib Soobeh from the Peishwa's districts in Aurungabad, was discontinued, and in lieu of such tribute due from any other district belonging to the Peishwa or Nizam Ally, a stipulated sum was to be fixed, and paid by an order upon the collectors; but in case the Moghuls should not pay the amount, the Sena Sahib Soobeh should be at liberty to levy it by force; he was neither to increase nor diminish his military force without permission from the Peishwa, and to attend whenever his services were put in requisition; to protect no disaffected sillardars, nor to receive deserters from the Peishwa's army; to maintain no political correspondence with the emperor of Delhi, the soobehdar of the Deccan, the English, the Rohilla, and the nabob of Oude. A wukcel was permitted to reside with the English in Orissa, and at the court of Nizam Ally, but his business was to be strictly confined to revenue affairs. Janojee Bhonslay also submitted to pay a tribute of rupees five lakhs and one (5,00,001) by five annual instalments.† On the other hand, the Peishwa agreed not to molest Janojee's districts by marching his forces towards Hindostan by any unusual route; to pay no attention to the

* 14th Zilkad, Soorsun 1169. The Bombay Records mention the treaty between the Peishwa and Janojee as having taken place 23rd April; in which, if there be no error in my calculation, they have made a mistake by one month.

† This payment of five lakhs is the only part of the agreement which came to the knowledge of the Bombay government.

pretensions of his relations, as long as he continued their just rights ; he was to be permitted to send a force against the English, who were represented as troublesome in Orissa, provided his troops were not required for the service of the state. There are a variety of other items mentioned in the agreement, but the above are the most important ; the form of the Sena Sahib Soobeh's dependence upon the Peishwa is maintained throughout ; but it seems more particularly marked by avoiding the usual terms of an offensive and defensive alliance, instead of which the Peishwa agrees, at the request of the Sena Sahib Soobeh, to assist him with troops in case of an invasion of his territories by any other power.

Of the advantages obtained by Mahdoo Rao, Nizam Ally received three lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, and one lakh was conferred on his minister, Rookun-ud-Dowlah.*

After the close of the campaign against the raja of Berar, the Peishwa sent an army into Malwa, under the command of Visajee Kishen Beneewala, accompanied by Ramchundur Gunnesh, Tookajee Holkar, and Mahadajee Sindia. Their proceedings will be hereafter detailed ; but some circumstances connected with the last-mentioned person, domestic affairs at Poona, and operations in the Carnatic demand our previous attention.

Mahadajee Sindia, after the death of his nephew, Junkojee, although his illegitimacy was against his succession, had, by his services and qualifications, established claims to the family jagheer, which it would have been both impolitic and unjust to set aside, especially as there was no legitimate descendant of Ranoojee alive. His birth tended greatly to lower his respectability in the eyes of the Mahratta sillardars—a circumstance which was a cause of Sindia's subsequent preference for Mahomedans and Rajpoots, and occasioned an alteration in the constitution of his army. Rugonath Rao, seemingly without any reasonable cause,† wished to see him appointed merely the guardian of his nephew, Kedarjee Sindia, the eldest son of Tookajee—an arrangement of which the Peishwa disapproved ; and this difference of opinion not only widened the breach between Mahdoo Rao and his uncle, but ever after inclined Mahadajee Sindia to Nana Furnuwees, Hurry Punt Phurkay, and several others, the ostensible carcoons, but the real ministers, of Mahdoo Rao.

When ordered to Hindostan on the expedition just adverted to, after all the commanders had obtained their audience of leave, Mahadajee Sindia, presuming on the favours shown to him, continued to loiter in the neighbourhood of Poona. Mahdoo Rao, who at all times exacted strict obedience from his officers, had particularly desired that they should proceed expeditiously, in order to cross the Nerbuddah before there was a chance of obstruction by the swelling of the rivers from the setting in of the south-west monsoon ; but two or three days afterwards, when riding out to Theur, his favourite village, 13 miles from Poona, he observed Sindia's camp still standing, without the smallest appearance either of movement or preparation. He sent instantly to Mahadajee Sindia, expressing astonishment at his disobedience and presumption, and intimating that if, on his return from Theur, he found a tent standing or his troops in sight, he should plunder his camp and sequester his jagheer. Mahadajee took his departure promptly ; but this well-known anecdote,

* Mahratta MSS., and copies of original agreements from the Poona Records.

† Many years after this period, in a despatch from Colonel Palmer, resident at Poona, 8th June 1798, it is mentioned that Rugonath Rao conferred Sindia's jagheer on Manajee Phakray ; but the Mahratta MSS. do not allude to such a transaction.

characteristic of Mahdoo Rao, is chiefly remarkable from the contrast it presents to the future power of Mahadajee Sindia at the Mahratta capital.

The Peishwa seized every interval of leisure to improve the civil government of his country. In this laudable pursuit he had to contend with violent prejudices and with general corruption; but the beneficial effects of the reforms he introduced are now universally acknowledged, and his sincere desire to protect his subjects, by the equal administration of justice, reflects the highest honor on his reign. His endeavours were aided by the celebrated Ram Shastree, a name which stands alone on Mahratta record as an upright and pure judge, and whose character, admirable under any circumstances, is wonderful amidst such selfishness, venality, and corruption as are almost universal in a Mahratta court. Ram Shastree, surnamed Parboney, was a native of the village of Maholy, near Satara, but went early to Benares, where he studied many years, and upon the death of Bal Kishen Shastree, about the year 1759, was selected for public employment at Poona, without either soliciting or declining the honor of being placed at the head of the Shastrees of the court. As Mahdoo Rao obtained a larger share of power, Ram Shastree was at great pains to instruct him, both in the particular branch which he superintended, and in the general conduct of administration. An anecdote related of him is equally creditable to the good sense of himself and his pupil. Mahdoo Rao, in consequence of the conversation of several learned Bramins, had for a time been much occupied in expounding and following the mystical observances which the Shasters enjoin. Ram Shastree perceived that to oppose this practice by ordinary argument would only lead to endless disputes with Mahdoo Rao, or rather with his associates; but one day, having come into the Peishwa's presence on business, and found him absorbed in the contemplation enjoined to Hindoo devotees,* during which all other faculties are to be suspended, the Shastree retired; but next day, after making the few arrangements necessary, he went to the Peishwa, and formally resigned his office, which is politely expressed by intimating an intention of retiring to Benares. Mahdoo Rao immediately apologized for the apparent impropriety of his conduct the day before, by stating the cause, which he defended as excuseable and praiseworthy. "It is only so," replied Ram Shastree, "provided you entirely renounce worldly advantages. As Bramins have departed from the ordinances of their faith, and assumed the office of rajas, it becomes them to exercise power for the benefit of their subjects, as the best and only apology for having usurped it. It behoves you to attend to the welfare of your people and your government; or, if you cannot reconcile yourself to those duties, quit the musnud, accompany me, and devote your life strictly to those observances which, I fully admit, our faith enjoins." Mahdoo Rao acknowledged the justness of the rebuke, and abandoned the studies which had misled him.

The benefits which Ram Shastree conferred on his countrymen were principally by example; but the weight and soundness of his opinions were universally acknowledged during his life; and the decisions of the punchayets, which gave decrees in his time, are still considered precedents. His conduct and unwearied zeal had a wonderful effect in improving the people of all ranks; he was a pattern to the well-disposed, but the greatest man who did wrong stood in awe of Ram Shastree; and although persons possessed of rank and riches did, in several instances, try to corrupt him,

* That sort of contemplation which the Mahrattas express by the single word *Jhep*.

none dared to repeat the experiment, or to impeach his integrity. His habits were simple in the extreme; and it was a rule with him to keep nothing more in his house than sufficed for the day's consumption.

One of Mahdoo Rao's first acts was to abolish the system of forcing the villagers to carry baggage—a custom then so prevalent in India, that when first done away in the Mahratta country by Mahdoo Rao, it occasioned discontent among the men in power, and many secretly practised it. But the Peishwa having intelligence of a quantity of valuable articles conveyed in this manner by order of Visajee Punt, soobehdar of Bassein, seized and confiscated the whole; remunerated the people for being unjustly taken from their agricultural labours, and at the same time issued fresh orders, which none, who knew his system of intelligence, ventured to disobey.*

In the ensuing fair season Mahdoo Rao had leisure to turn his attention to affairs in the Carnatic. Hyder, after concluding peace with the English, and obtaining a promise of their eventual support, was under no alarm at the prospect of a war with the Mahrattas. He not only evaded their demands for the payment of arrears of tribute, but levied contributions upon some of the polygars tributary to the Peishwa—an encroachment which Mahdoo Rao was not of a disposition to tolerate. In the month of November he sent forward a large body of horse under Gopaul Rao Putwurdhun, Mulhar Rao Rastia, and the cousins of Gopaul Rao, *viz.*, Pureshram

A. D. 1770. Bhow and Neelkunt Rao Putwurdhun. Mahdoo Rao followed at the head of 35,000 men, of whom 15,000 were infantry. He rapidly reduced the two Balapoor, Kolhar, Nundeedroog, Mulwugul,† and the greater part of the open country on the eastern boundary of Hyder's territory, including 16 forts, none of them considered of very great importance, and 25 fortified villages, of which he destroyed the greater part of the defences.‡ The fort of Mulwugul was carried by an assault led by two rivals of the Ghatgay family, of Boodh and Mullaoree. Their hereditary disputes, known to have existed from the time of the Bahminee dynasty, had been repeatedly revived in the Peishwa's camp, but though settled by a punchayet in favour of Nagojee Raja, Joojhar Rao, the other branch of the family the head of which was Bajee Ghatgay, being dissatisfied, both parties had solicited permission to decide the quarrel, according to the family privilege, "at the spear's point," to which Mahdoo Rao would not consent; but when the assault was about to take place, it was proposed that, of the two, he whose flag first appeared before the Juree Putka on the top of the rampart should be confirmed in all the hereditary privileges. One of the family who carried the flag of Bajee Ghatgay was killed; Dumdairay, the person who had charge of the Juree Putka, also fell, but Nagojee seized the standard, and planting his flag with his own hand, hoisted the Juree Putka over it, amidst an enthusiastic shout from the whole Mahratta army. Unfortunately the lustre of this gallant action was tarnished by the slaughter of the whole garrison.§

The Peishwa's progress was for a time arrested at Nidjeegbul, a place of inconsiderable strength, which held out several months, and repulsed two assaults made by the Mahrattas, in one of which Narain Rao, the Peishwa's brother, was wounded.|| It was at last stormed by the polygar of Chittle-

* Some say that Mahdoo Rao exacted a heavy fine, besides confiscating the property.

† Wilks.

‡ Bombay Records.

§ Mahratta MSS., and a family legend known to every individual of the clan of Ghatgay, although, in their usual loose-way, they mention different names for the fort which was the scene of Nagojee's exploit.

|| By a bullet in the hand. Mahratta MSS.

droog, at the head of his Beruds^o—a class of people who, as already noticed, are said to be originally Ramoossees from Maharashtra.

Hyder, as the Mahrattas advanced on the east, retired to the westward, where, the country being closer, their cavalry were prevented from acting against him with effect. He never ventured within 20 kos of Mahdoo Rao, as his infantry would not face the Mahratta horse on a plain; but a light force under Gopaul Rao, which was sent to watch his motions, and ravage the country, was surprised and put to flight by Hyder on the night of the 3rd or 4th March. This affair was attended by no advantage; the Mahrattas continued to plunder and ravage his territory, and Hyder hoped that they would retire to the northward of the Kistna, on the approach of the south-west monsoon.† But he was disappointed. The state of Mahdoo Rao's health compelled him to return to Poona in the beginning of June; but he left the infantry and 20,000 horse under Trimbuck Rao Mama to prosecute the war. Hyder offered to pay the chouth, but would not restore the amount exacted from the polygars, as he conceived their submission to his authority in 1762 gave him a right to the tribute he had levied.‡

Trimbuck Rao, before the season when he might expect the return of the Peishwa, gained several advantages, reduced the fort of Gurmcondra and some other garrisons.

Mahdoo Rao, as soon as the season permitted, marched from Poona, intending to have joined Trimbuck Rao, but being again taken ill, he gave over the command to Appa Bulwunt, the son of that Bulwunt Rao who

A. D. 1771. fell so much distinguished in one of the battles at Panniput. After the junction of Appa Bulwunt, the Mahratta army consisted of nearly 40,000 horse, with 10,000 infantry, and some guns. Hyder with 12,000 horse and 25,000 infantry, of whom 15,000 were regulars, and 40§ field guns, did not at first venture to take the field, and the Mahrattas encamped a short distance to the north of Seringapatam. Trimbuck Rao, in hopes of being able to draw Hyder from his position, retired a short distance to the northward, when Hyder, who always kept up a correspondence with some of the Mahratta officers,|| is supposed to have been deceived by false information, and took the field, imagining that a great part of Trimbuck Rao's force was detached.¶ He was soon undeceived; and such was his impression, whether from having been formerly beaten by the Mahrattas, or from want of confidence in his army—a circumstance rare in a good officer—this man who had fought with skill and bravery against British troops, did not dare to risk a battle, and at last fled, in the most dastardly and disorderly manner, towards his capital. The whole of his guns were taken, some thousands of his men

* Wilks. The anecdote given by Colonel Wilks of the mutilation of the captive garrison is not preserved in the Mahratta country; therefore, as a mere anecdote, I am not authorized in repeating it, although it is very characteristic of the anger, the violence, and the generosity of Mahdoo Rao. There is, however, an anecdote given by Colonel Wilks, which I must remark, respecting Appajee Ram, vol. ii., page 14. It might do for the licentious court of Poona at any other period, but even if authentic, which I cannot discover, it conveys a wrong impression. Mahdoo Rao would excuse want of form, and even an ebullition of anger, but he never tolerated indecency or impertinence.

† Letters from the Bombay deputies, Mr. Richard Church and Mr. James Sibbald, from Hyder's camp.

‡ Mahratta MSS., Bombay Records, Wilks.

§ Wilks. Mahdoo Rao says, in a letter to the governor of Bombay, 8,000 or 10,000 horse and 45 guns.

|| His own letters to the Bombay government.

¶ Letter from Mr. Sibbald.

and 1,500 of his cavalry were destroyed ; 25 elephants, several thousand horses, and the whole of his camp equipage were the recorded trophies of the Mahrattas, who, as usual, boasted less of their victory than of their plunder.

After this success, Trimbuck Rao invested Seringapatam, but being almost destitute of men capable of working his guns, the attempt was conducted with more than the usual absurdity of a Mahratta siege. It was disapproved by Mahdoo Rao, whose object was to possess himself of Bednore and Soonda during the ensuing season. Trimbuck Rao, after wasting five weeks before Seringapatam, retired in the middle of April to Turry Ghuree,* keeping a strong garrison in Belloor, and exacting heavy contributions in various directions.

Before the roads were completely occupied, Hyder, in the beginning of June, attempted to draw a convoy of military stores with 20 pieces of cannon from Bednore to Seringapatam ; but the whole, including the escort that accompanied them, were intercepted ; and at last, so effectually did the Mahrattas cut off the communication, that Hyder's *Hircarrahs* were obliged to pass through the Koorga Raja's country, and descend the Ghauts in Malabar, as the only route to Bednore. On the 24th October the Mahrattas moved to Bangalore ; Hyder, with about 20,000 men of all descriptions, remained at Seringapatam strongly intrenched.† The only success which attended his arms during the whole season was achieved by his son Tippoo, who intercepted a very large convoy of grain proceeding towards the Mahratta camp. Hyder's situation was considered critical, and a prospect of the total reduction of his country, which formed the only barrier between the Mahrattas and Madras, inclined the Bombay government to afford him their assistance ; but the territory‡ and subsidy demanded as preliminaries on the one part, and the terms proposed on the other, were out of all proportion ; besides which, Hyder artfully endeavoured to make them principals in the war, by requiring of them to attack Salsette, which at once put an end to the negotiation.

The governor and council at Madras deemed it of vital importance to support Hyder Ally, but they were prevented by the wishes of Mohummud Ally and the opinion of Sir John Lindsay, his majesty's minister plenipotentiary, both of whom, in the face of the late treaty with

A. D. 1772. Hyder, urged the Madras government to unite with the Mahrattas.§ But news of the increasing illness of the Peishwa, which was pronounced incurable in the month of March, alarmed all the Mahratta commanders at a distance from the capital, especially those who owed their situations exclusively to Mahdoo Rao. The design of reducing Soonda and Bednore was abandoned ; and, assigning as a reason that the Mahratta sillardars were desirous to return to their homes, which was also perfectly true, Trimbuck Rao listened to Hyder's overtures. Negotiations began in the middle of April, when the Mahrattas were in the neighbourhood of Bangalore ; and a treaty was concluded in June, by which the Mahrattas retained the ancient possessions of the father of Sivajee,|| besides Mudgerry and Gurumconda. Hyder likewise agreed to pay 36 lakhs of rupees as arrears and expenses, and 14 lakhs as the annual tribute,

* Probably Turry Kaira.

† Mr. Sibbald's Reports, and Mahratta MSS.

‡ Mangalore and Pargurh on the coast were the places applied for.

§ Madras Records.

|| Kolhar, Bangalore, Ouscotta, Balapoor, and Sera.

which he in future promised to remit with regularity ; all other Mahratta demands were to cease.*

Mahdoo Rao's disease was consumption, but his health improved considerably during the monsoon, and great hopes were entertained of his recovery ; the progress of his generals in Hindostan had been still more important than his acquisitions in the Carnatic.

The army which crossed the Nerbuddah in 1769, under Visajee Kishen as chief-in-command, consisted, when the whole were united in Malwa, of nearly 50,000 horse. Visajee Kishen and Ramchundur Gunnessh, besides Pindharees, had 20,000 horse, of which 15,000 belonged to the Peishwa. With Mahadajee Sindia there were 15,000, and with Tookajee Holkar about the same number.† There was also a large body of infantry with a numerous artillery,‡ chiefly natives of Hindostan and Malwa, including men of all castes. The Arabs, Abyssinians, and Sindians, of whom there was a small proportion, were accounted the best soldiers of the army, and were mostly obtained from the sea-ports of Cambay and Surat.

For some time after the fatal field of Panniput, the Mahrattas, in consequence of their domestic struggles, and the warfare to the south of the Nerbuddah, had little leisure to interfere with the politics of Hindostan. Mulhar Rao Holkar, on one occasion, in the year 1764, joined the Jaths when besieging Delhi, but soon quitted them, and returned to the Deccan.

A body of Mahrattas from Bundelcund, or Malwa, took service with Shujah-ud-Dowlah, in the war against the English in 1765 ; but, excepting the temporary visit of Holkar to Delhi, above alluded to, the Mahrattas

had not crossed the Chumbul in force for upwards of A. D. 1761. eight years. The Abdallee king, after the great victory he achieved, bestowed the throne of the Moghuls on the lawful heir, Shah Alum ; but as that emperor was then engaged in the well-known warfare against the nabob of Bengal and the English, his son, the prince Jewan Bukht, assumed the ensigns of royalty during the emperor's absence. Shujah-ud-Dowlah, nabob of Oude, was appointed vizier, and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, Rohillah, was restored to the dignity of Umeer-ool-Oomrah. After which Ahmed Shah Abdallee quitted Delhi and returned to his own dominions.

Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah remained with the young prince generally at the capital ; but Shujah-ud-Dowlah first repaired to his own government, and afterwards expelled all the Mahratta carcoons, whom he still found remaining as collectors of revenue in the Doab. He next proceeded to Benares, where, having been joined by the emperor, they advanced together into Bundelcund, took Jhansee,§ and would probably have driven the Mahrattas from that province ; but in consequence of the flight of Meer Cassim from Bengal, Shujah-ud-Dowlah, not content with affording him an asylum, espoused his cause against the English—a course of policy which led to his defeat at the battle of Buxar, on the 23rd October 1764, when the emperor for a time placed himself under the protection of the

* Wilks mentions only 80 lakhs (vol. ii., page 151), which may be correct, but the Mahratta MS. is here supported by the fact of there being 49,50,000 rupees debited to Hyder in the Mahratta state accounts, at the period of Mahdoo Rao's death, for which, as it is regularly credited, they probably had some collateral security.

† Mahratta MSS. This agrees pretty nearly with the statement given by Nujeeb Khan to General Barker in May 1778 ; but by that time Ramchundur Gunnessh had returned with a party of the Peishwa's horse to the Deccan, and the increase may be accounted for by numbers of Pindharees.—(See Appendix No. 21 to the Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy.)

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ Seyr Mutuakhereen.

English.* A treaty with Shujah-ud-Dowlah, in August 1765, restored to him the principality of Oude, which had been subjugated by the British arms, recognized his title as vizier of the empire, and established an alliance with the company's government.

The reader may recollect the manner in which the Moghuls, in the time of Aurungzebe, took possession of a province, and their mode of conducting its administration. To each district there was a foudjar, or military governor, charged with its protection and interior order, and a dewan, or collector and civil manager. There were also soobehdars and nazims, who were military governors of large provinces; but these were merely gradations of rank, to each of which there was a dewan. The foudjar was the active efficient officer; the superiors were mere supervisors. These military governors, when the empire fell into decay, styled themselves nabobs,† and all who could maintain that appellation considered themselves independent, though they embraced every opportunity of obtaining firmans or commissions from the pageant emperor. The English, at the period of Meer Jaffier's death, had Bengal at their disposal, and the emperor's person in their power. The youngest son of Meer Jaffier was made nabob of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa in February 1765;‡ and the East India Company, previously charged with the military protection of this territory, were appointed his dewan in August following. The emperor, Shah Alum, with the assigned revenues of Allahabad and Korah for his support, the only part of the conquered territories of Shujah-ud-Dowlah of which the English thought proper to dispose, continued to reside under the British protection, in hopes that they might be induced to send an army to place him on the throne of his ancestors.

In the meantime the prince Jewan Bukht remained at the Moghul capital, where Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah exercised the entire powers of administration. Sooruj Mull, the Jath prince, was gradually extending his power and consequence: the Mahratta officer‡ in Agra accepted his protection, and admitted a garrison of his troops: he took Rewaree and Ferohnugur from a Beloochee adventurer who possessed them in jagheer; and at last applied to Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah for the office of foudjar in the environs of the capital. These encroachments were so palpable that Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah was obliged to have recourse to arms, and gained an easy and unexpected victory by the death of Sooruj Mull, who was killed in the commencement of the first action.§ His son, assisted by Mulhar Rao Holkar,|| during the short period the latter was absent from the Deccan in 1764, besieged Delhi; but Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, by means of that secret understanding which always subsisted between him and Holkar, induced the Mahrattas to abandon the alliance and return to Malwa.

Such was the state of Hindostan when the Peishwa's army crossed the Chumbul, towards the latter end of 1769. Their first operations were directed against the Rajpoot princes, from whom they levied 10 lakhs of

A. D. 1770. rupees as arrears of tribute. They next entered the territory of the Jaths, on pretence of assisting one of the sons of Sooruj Mull, as great contentions prevailed amongst the

* Mill's History of British India.

† To my Indian readers it is very unnecessary to explain that Nuwab is the Persian word, the plural (as more respectful) of Naib, a deputy.

‡ I cannot discover what officer it was.

§ Seyr Mutuakhereen.

|| The amount paid for his assistance is not known, but one-half of the acknowledged profits, upwards of four and a half lakhs of rupees, was credited to the Peishwa. (State accounts, Poona Records.)

brothers. The Mahrattas were victorious in an engagement fought close to Bhurtpoor, and, after having overran the country, the Jaths agreed to pay them 65 lakhs of rupees—10 in ready money, and the rest by instalments. They encamped at Deeg during the monsoon, and Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, dreading their recollection "of sons and brothers slain," opened a negotiation with Visajee Kishen to avert the calamities he apprehended.* The Mahrattas are mindful both of benefits and of injuries, from generation to generation; but they are not more revengeful than might be expected of a people so little civilized, and in this respect they seldom allow their passion to supersede their interest. Visajee Kishen listened to the overtures of Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah with complacency; but Ramchundur Gunnessh and Mahadajee Sindia called for vengeance on the Rohillahs. On a reference being made to the Peishwa, he so far concurred in Sindia's opinion, that Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah could never be a friend to the Mahrattas; but as they were endeavouring to induce the emperor to withdraw from the protection of the English, in which Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah's assistance might be useful, the conduct of Visajee Kishen was approved.† Accordingly Zabita Khan, the son of Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah, was sent to join Visajee Kishen; but Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah shortly after died when on his route to Nujeebgurh, in October 1770.‡ Immediately after this event, Zabita Khan assumed his father's situation at the capital.

The president and council at Bengal, although it was upon the face of their records that in 1766 Shah Alum had made overtures to the Mahrattas, were not at first apprized of his having renewed the negotiation, and were therefore at a loss to account for the conduct of the

A. D. 1771.

Mahrattas in not making themselves masters of Delhi; instead of which they took the route of Rohilcund. The Rohillah chiefs behaved with no spirit; their country was entirely overrun; the strong fortress of Etaweh fell into the hands of the Mahrattas; and the whole of the Dooab, except Furruckabad, was reduced almost without opposition. The territory of Zabita Khan was not exempt from their ravages; they likewise made irruptions into Korah, and preferred demands upon Shujah-ud-Dowlah, which alarmed the English, and induced them to prepare for resisting an invasion which they deemed probable.

Shujah-ud-Dowlah, however, maintained a correspondence with the Mahrattas the whole time; and the emperor, at last, openly declared his intention of throwing himself on their protection. They returned from Rohilcund to Delhi before the rains, and possessed themselves of every part of it except the citadel, where, on account of the prince Jewan Bukht, they refrained from excess, and treated him with courtesy. Zabita Khan would probably have been detained by them, but Tookajee Holkar ensured his safe retreat to Nujeebgurh. The Bengal presidency, at the head of which was Mr. Cartier, represented to the emperor the imprudence and danger of quitting their protection, but, with sound policy, placed no restraint on his inclination, and Shah Alum, having taken leave of his English friends, was met by Mahadajee Sindia, escorted to the camp of Visajee Kishen, under whose auspices he entered his capital, and was seated on the throne in the end of December 1771.§

* Mahratta MSS., and Bengal Records.

† Mahratta MSS.

‡ Mahratta MSS., Bengal Records, and Forster's Travels.

§ Bengal Records., Mahratta MSS., &c., &c.

The Mahrattas now determined to wreak their revenge on the son of Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah—a design undertaken with the entire concurrence of the emperor, who bore Zabita Khan a personal enmity, but it was principally instigated by Mahadajee Sindia, the chief director of the councils of Visajee Kishen, Ramchundur Gunnessh having returned to Poona in consequence of a quarrel with his superior. Shujah-ud-Dowlah continued his correspondence with the Mahrattas, although he personally declined assuming his post as vizier whilst they maintained supremacy at the imperial court. But the principal object of Shujah-ud-Dowlah, as it had been that of his father, was the subjugation of the Rohillah territory, to which the death of Nujeeb-ud-Dowlah paved the way. He had no objections, therefore, to see these neighbours weakened by the Mahrattas, provided he could ultimately secure the conquest for himself; but he also perceived that the result of a permanent conquest of Rohilcund by the Mahrattas would prove the precursor of his own destruction. The Rohillahs knew him well, and, dreading treachery, Hafiz Rehmud, whose districts adjoined Oude, could not be prevailed upon to proceed to the assistance of Zabita Khan, until assured by Brigadier-General Sir Robert Barker, the officer in command of the British troops stationed in the vizier's territory, that no improper advantage should be taken of his absence from the frontier.*

Several places were speedily reduced; an ineffectual resistance was opposed to Mahadajee Sindia and Nujeeb Khan, at the fords of the Ganges, which they crossed in the face of the Rohillahs, by passing many of their posts as if they had no intention of fording until much higher up the river, when, after throwing them off their guard, they suddenly wheeled about, dashed down upon one of the fords at full gallop, and, crossing over, made a great slaughter. The Rohillahs, in consequence, seem to have been completely panic-struck. Zabita Khan's territory was reduced with scarcely any opposition; the strongest entrenchments, and even forts, were abandoned, before a horseman came in sight.† Puttergurh, where considerable wealth amassed by Nujeeb Khan was deposited, fell into their hands, and the Rohillah chiefs were compelled to the very measure which Shujah-ud-Dowlah desired, namely, to form a defensive alliance with him against the Mahrattas, for which they paid him 40 lakhs of rupees, and by which he secured himself from the Mahrattas, strengthened his own resources, and weakened the means of resistance on the part of the Rohillahs, on whose ultimate destruction he was bent.

Visajee Kishen returned to Delhi for a short time in the month of June; but the main body of the Mahrattas was encamped during the rains in the Dooab, of which they had taken almost entire possession. The constant applications of Visajee Kishen in urging demands, the eagerness with which his Bramin followers snatched at every opportunity of acquiring wealth, the sordid parsimony of their habits when absent from the Deccan, and that meanness and impudence which are inseparable in low minds, greatly disgusted the emperor, and all who were compelled to tolerate their insolence and rapacity. Their behaviour gave Shah Alum such extreme offence, that he was willing to run any risk to rid himself of such allies. Zabita Khan, through Tookajee Holkar, was endeavouring to

* See Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons.

† Seyr Mutuakhereen. The Mahratta MSS. give them more credit than the Moghul historian; but although he is excessively prejudiced against any person in the shape of an Afghan, the Bengal Records are here in support of the Moghul's testimony.

recover both his territory and his father's rank at court. The emperor would not listen to the proposal, and he at last engaged his general, Nujeeff Khan, to resist the Mahrattas by force. Visajee Kiashen was desirous of avoiding extremities, and referred for orders to Poona; but an event had occurred there, which, at the time it happened, was less expected than it had been some months before; Mahdoo Rao breathed his last at the village of Theur, 13 miles east of Poona, on the morning of the 18th November, in the 28th year of his age.* He died without issue; and his widow Rumma Bye, who bore him a remarkable affection, immolated herself with the corpse.

The death of Mahdoo Rao occasioned no immediate commotion; like his own disease, it was at first scarcely perceptible, but the root which invigorated the already scathed and wide-extending tree was cut off from the stem, and the plains of Panniput were not more fatal to the Mahratta empire than the early end of this excellent prince. Although the military talents of Mahdoo Rao were very considerable, his character as a sovereign is entitled to far higher praise, and to much greater respect, than that of any of his predecessors. He is deservedly celebrated for his firm support of the weak against the oppressive, of the poor against the rich, and, as far as the constitution of society admitted, for his equity to all. Mahdoo Rao made no innovations; he improved the system established, endeavoured to amend defects without altering forms, and restrained a corruption which he could not eradicate.

The efficiency of his government in its commencement was rather clogged than assisted by the abilities of Sukaram Bappoo. The influence of the old minister was too great for the talents of his young master; all actions deemed beneficial were ascribed to the former, whilst the unpopularity, which with some party is inseparable from executive authority, fell to the inexperienced Peishwa, and to Mahdoo Rao in a peculiar degree, by reason of an irritable temper, not always under command, which was his greatest defect. This influence on the part of the minister, a man open to bribery, prevented that respect for Mahdoo Rao to which he was entitled, and without which the ends which he aimed at establishing were obstructed. Until after Rugonath Rao's confinement, Mahdoo Rao was unknown to his subjects: shortly after that event, he privately sent for Sukaram Bappoo, told him "that he found many of his orders disregarded, and that he was but a cipher in the government: whether this proceeded from want of capacity or diligence on his own part, or any other cause, he was himself perhaps an incompetent judge, but he would put the question to his sincerity, and begged of him to explain the reason and suggest the remedy." Sukaram immediately replied—"You can effect nothing until you remove me from office: appoint Moraba Furnuwees your dewan, when you can be your own minister."

Mahdoo Rao respected the penetration which read his intentions, confirmed him in the enjoyment of his jagheer, and followed his advice. He permitted Moraba to do nothing without his orders; he established a system of intelligence, of which the many exaggerated stories now related in the Mahratta country only prove that, in regard to events, both foreign and domestic, he possessed prompt and exact information.

A review of his civil administration, if taken in the abstract, would convey an indifferent idea of his merits: it must therefore be estimated by comparison, by the state of the society in which he was chief magistrate,

* Mahdoo Rao was born in August 1744.

and by the conduct pursued in the interior management and protection of his country, whilst harassed by the machinations of his uncle's party, and constantly engaged in foreign war. The brief summary which it is here proposed to give, will scarcely allude to the administration of his predecessors, but may convey some idea of the best government the Mahratta country enjoyed under the Hindoo dynasty of modern times.

The root of all the Mahratta systems, even now in existence, however much disfigured or amended, whether on the banks of the Myhie and Chumbul, or the Kistna and Toongbuddra, is found in the institutions of Sivajee.

We have seen that Sivajee had eight officers of state; of them it need only be observed that the supremacy and gradual usurpation of the raja's authority had also superseded that of the other Purdhans, as well as of the Pritee Needhee. Forms of respect instituted with their rank were maintained; but they were only of importance in the state according to the strength and resources of their hereditary jagheers, and of a superior description of soldiery, who, on pay much inferior to what they might elsewhere have obtained, still adhered to some of them, with that pride of servitude to their chief which, by its enthusiastic delusion, has caught the fancies of men in all uncivilized countries, and dignified military vassalage. Of all these personages at the period of Mahdoo Rao's death, Bhowan Rao, the Pritee Needhee, was the most considerable, both for the reasons mentioned, and from his warlike character.

In the different departments of the state under Sivajee, every separate establishment, when complete, had eight principal officers; all such officers, as well as their superiors, were styled durrukdars, and although declared not hereditary at the time of their institution, they generally descended in the usual routine of everything Hindoo. Precedent, however—that grand rule of sanction to Mahratta usurpation—soon became, whilst anarchy prevailed, a mere name for the right of the strong, and the title of durrukdars, like every other claim, was only regarded according to circumstances.

The general distribution of revenue planned by Ballajee Wishwanath was a measure wholly political, but it was ingrafted on the revenue accounts of every village, the ordinary forms of which have been explained in the preliminary part of this work; upon the balance of assessment, or government share, the artificial distribution alluded to invariably followed, although seldom in the uniform manner laid down upon its first establishment in the year 1720. Separate collectors did not always realize those specific shares; but, even up to this day, distinct claims, such as surdesh-mookhee, mokassa, &c., are frequently paid to different owners, and tend to render the accounts extremely intricate. A fixed district establishment founded on that of Sivajee, but more or less complete, was preserved until a very late period. Unless in the old jagheer districts, the appointment of durrukdars, during the life of Shao, remained in the gift of the raja. The patronage, however, of one office or durruk was bestowed by the Raja Shao either on Bajee Rao or on Ballajee Rao immediately after his father's death; the patronage so conferred was that of the Furnuwees; hence, in the old accounts of the Peishwa's districts, after the death of Shao, all those holding the office of Furnuwees superseded their superiors, the muzzimdars; and thus the Peishwa's Furnuwees became, under the Peishwa's government, precisely what the Punt Amat was under that of the raja. These two, the Furnuwees and muzzimdar, were invariably kept up, as were the dufturdars and chitnees; but the appointment of dewan was

not general, nor of the karkanees, potnees, and jamdar. Durrukdars were only removeable by government, but a number of carcoons, in addition to the ordinary establishments, were introduced by Ballajee Rao, who were displaced at the pleasure of the immediate chief officer of the district. The useful situation of turufdar, or talookdar, was always preserved, but generally under the appellation of shaikdar.

These details are enumerated, because the arrangement for the land revenue in Maharashtra is the basis of civil government; and, indeed, the good or bad revenue management of the districts of any country in India is the surest indication of the conduct of the administration.

Under Mahdoo Rao the same heads of districts were continued as had been established by his uncle, Sewdasheo Rao Bhow; except that, upon the death of the sur-soobehdar Balloba Manduwagunnee, who effected the great reforms between the Neera and Godavery, he did not appoint a successor to that situation; but the sur-soobehdars in the Concan, Carnatic, Candeish, and Guzerat,* were always continued. The appointment of a mamlitdar was declaredly for the year, but he was not removed during good behaviour: the amount of his collections varied; generally, however, they were not above five lakhs of rupees annually. At the commencement of the season he was furnished by government with a general statement, which contained his instructions, and included the expected receipts, the alienations, and expenses; which last he was not to exceed but upon the most satisfactory grounds. In the detail of the expenses were the salaries, including not only food, clothes, and every necessary, but the adequate establishment and attendants for each of the government servants, according to their rank and respectability. Besides these authorized advantages, there was a private assessment over and above the regular revenue, at which the government connived, provided the mamlitdar's share did not amount to more than five per cent. upon the actual collections. This hidden personal emolument was exactly suited to the genius and habits of Bramins, who, by a strange, though perhaps not a peculiar, perversion, prefer obtaining an emolument in this underhand manner, to honestly earning four times as much.

The private assessment was supposed to be favourable to the cultivator, as well as pleasing to the mamlitdar and district officers. Mahdoo Rao prevented the excess of the abuse by vigilant supervision, and by readily listening to the complaints of the common cultivators; as to the village officers, they all participated, and from them information could only be obtained through some of the discontented hereditary claimants, whose statements were often fabricated, and so difficult to substantiate, that the government, much occupied by its great political transactions, generally made it a rule only to prosecute the chief authorities on great occasions, to take security from interested informants before examining the proofs, and to leave minor delinquency to the investigation of mamlitdars. It might be supposed that a system so defective, with the door of corruption left open by the connivance of government, would be followed by every act of injustice, oppression, and violence; but the evils fell more on the state than on individuals; and at that time the Mahratta country, in proportion to its fertility, was probably more thriving than any other part of India.

The mamlitdar on his appointment opened an account-current with the government, and was obliged to advance a part of the expected revenue,

* There also was a sur-soobehdar sometimes in Buglana.

for which he received a premium of two per cent., and one per cent. monthly interest, until the periods at which the collection was expected, when the interest ceased. This advance, which was both a security and convenience to government, and all revenue transactions whatever, were managed by the agency of the soucars, or Indian bankers ; but many persons employed their private property in the prosecution of such agency, in which there was often a great deal of speculation, but, with ordinary caution, large returns were obtained with very little risk. Thus the advance of money on the land-revenue became something like national funds, partaking of the benefits of prompt supply, and the evils of fictitious credit.

At the end of the season, when the mamlitdar's accounts were closed, they were carried by the district Furnuwees to Poona, and most carefully examined before they were passed.

Mahdoo Rao encouraged the mamlitdars to reside in the districts, keeping the wukeels at Poona ; but when that was impracticable, the affairs of the district were more scrupulously investigated.

The management of the police, and the administration of civil and criminal justice, were in a great degree intrusted to the mamlitdars. The police magistrates were the patell, the mamlitdar, and, where the office existed, the sur-soobehdar. The deshmoooks and deshbandyas were left in the enjoyment of their hereditary rights, but their ancient power was suspended, and, though permitted to collect their own dues, they were seldom referred to, except in ascertaining local usages, and occasionally in arbitrating differences. The police, except in the city of Poona, was very imperfect ; but considering the defective state of the executive authority, even in the best times of the Mahratta government, and the unsettled predatory habits of so large a portion of undisciplined soldiery accustomed to violence and rapine, it is, at first view, surprising that the lives and properties of the peaceable part of society were so secure. But the military were pretty equally dispersed ; every village could defend its inhabitants or avenge aggression ; and members who disgraced the community were too much bound by the opinion of their family connections, their own interests, and the power of the village officers to become entirely lawless. The Mahratta usage of generally returning during the rains preserved all those ties ; and though it might prove inconvenient to an ambitious sovereign, it greatly tended to domestic order and tranquillity. The great use which the Peishwas made of attachment to *watun*, and the preference in promoting an officer shown to those who could boast of hereditary rights, was in many respects a most politic and judicious mode of encouraging a species of patriotism, and applying national feelings to purposes of good government.

In the Mahratta country the most common crimes were thieving and gang robbery, murder and arson. The two first were more common to Ramoossees and Bheels than to Mahrattas, and were punished by the loss of life or limb ; murder for revenge was rarely considered a capital offence, and very often, in hereditary disputes, a murder, where risk attended it, was considered rather a creditable action. The ordinary compromise with government, if the accused was not a rich man, was 350 rupees. The facility of eluding justice by flying into the territory of some other authority was the greatest obstruction to police efficiency.

For great crimes the sur-soobehdars had the power of punishing capitally ; mamlitdars in such cases required the Peishwa's authority. The great jagheerdars had power of life and death within their respective territories. Bramins could not be executed ; but state prisoners were

poisoned or destroyed by deleterious food, such as equal parts of flour and salt. Women were mutilated, but rarely put to death. There was no prescribed form of trial; torture to extort confession was very common; and confession was generally thought necessary to capital punishment. The chief authority, in doubtful cases, commonly took the opinion of his officers; and some mamlildars in the Satara country, under both the Pritee Needhee and Peishwa, employed punchayets to pronounce on the innocence or guilt of the accused; but this system can only be traced to the time of Shao, and, though so well worthy of imitation, was by no means general, nor are its benefits understood or appreciated in the present day.

In civil cases the punchayets were the ordinary tribunals, and the example of Ram Shastree tended greatly to their improvement. Excepting where Ram Shastree superintended, they were a known, though unauthorized, source of emolument to the members; no doubt frequently corrupt and unjust in their decisions: but punchayets were popular, and their defects less in the system itself than in the habits of the people.

The nominal revenue of the whole Mahratta empire at the period of Mahdoo Rao's death was ten crores, or 100 millions of rupees; but the amount actually realized, including the jagheers of Holkar, Sindia, Janojee Bhonslay, and Dummajee Gaekwar, together with tribute, fees, fines, contributions, customary offerings, and all those sources independent of regular collections, which in the state accounts come under the head of extra revenue,* may be estimated at about 72 millions of rupees, or about seven millions of pounds sterling annually.† Of this sum the revenue under the direct control of the Peishwa was about 28 millions of rupees; in which estimate is included Mahdoo Rao's personal estate, kept distinct from the public accounts, but which seldom amounted to above three lakhs of rupees, or 30,000 pounds sterling a year; he was, however, possessed of 24 lakhs of personal property at his death, which he bequeathed to the state.

From the vast acquisitions of Ballajee Rao, his lavish expenditure, and the numerous jagheers and enam lands which he conferred, it is a common opinion in the Mahratta country that he had a greater revenue than any other Peishwa: but he never had time to collect the revenues in many parts of India temporarily subjugated by his armies. The average collections in any equal number of years were greater in the time of Mahdoo Rao than in that of his father; although in the season 1751-52 Ballajee Rao realized 36½ millions of rupees, which exceeded the highest collection ever made by Mahdoo Rao by upwards of two millions. The state was much in debt at Mahdoo Rao's accession; and although, at his death, by reckoning the outstanding balances, and by bringing to account the value of stores and other property, there was a nominal sum in its favour of 65 millions of rupees, yet the treasury was exhausted, no part of this amount

* The extra revenue, in the *village* accounts, is properly all revenue over and above the land assessment; for example, the tax on merchants, manufacturers, &c. (called *moh-turfa*); a tax on houses; enam *tijacs*, or one-third of certain enam lands; a tax on pasturage and profits of grass lands; the offerings of pilgrims at religious fairs (or *Juttra*), and a great many other items, which are far more numerous, and apparently vexatious, than they are important to the state or grievous to the subject. In the village settlement they were enumerated, but brought to account under one head, *Nukta-bab*. The revenue derived from the customs on the exports and imports of a village is frequently included in the village accounts, but of the country generally it is a distinct branch of revenue, as has already been explained.

† The Poona rupee is 12 per cent inferior to the Bengal sicca.

being available. On a complete examination* of the accounts, the government of the Peishwa seems always to have been in debt, or embarrassed from want of funds, till after the period of Bajee Rao's connection with the English.

The ordinary army of the Peishwa, without including the troops of Bhonslay, Gaekwar, Sindia, or Holkar, amounted to 50,000 good horse. Neither his infantry nor artillery were considerable; and after providing for his garrisons, the ordinary number in the time of Mahdoo Rao was about 10,000, of whom one-third were Arabs, and the greater part Mahomedans. It was usual, however, to entertain large bodies of infantry when the Peishwa took the field, but they were always discharged on returning to Poona. The Hetkurees, or Concan infantry, are said to have been preferred to the Mawulees, perhaps on account of the attachment of the latter to the house of Sivajee.†

Calculating the contingent which Gaekwar and Bhonslay were bound to furnish, at from 10,000 to 15,000, taking the lowest estimate of Holkar's and Sindia's army at 30,000, and allowing 3,000 from the Powers of Dhar, the Peishwa could command about 100,000 good horse, exclusive of Pindharees.

* The late Lieutenant John M'Leod was employed for several months, assisted by a great many of the most experienced Bramin revenue officers and accountants, in arranging and examining the accounts of the Peishwa's government; and I am much indebted to him, and to the Bramins who were in his office, for their opinions, and for the valuable abstracts which they from time to time prepared for me.

† By an official list, it appears that, of 449 officers in Mahdoo Rao's army, 93 were Bramins, 8 Rajpoots, 308 Mahrattas, and 40 Mahomedans.

CHAP. XXIV.

FROM A. D. 1772 TO A. D. 1774.

State of parties upon the death of Mahdoo Rao—previous release of Rugonath Rao.—Reduction of Raigurh.—Rugonath Rao is again placed in confinement.—Narain Rao projects an expedition into the Carnatic, and recalls the army from Hindostan—probability of a rupture with the Berar government upon the death of Jancjee Bhonslay.—Murder of Narain Rao—particulars.—Rugonath Rao is invested as Peishwa.—Character of Narain Rao.—Return of the army from Hindostan—Summary of their proceedings during the campaign.—Rughoojee Bhonslay is nominated Sena Sahib Soobeh.—War with Nizam Ally.—Plans of Rugonath Rao.—State of the ministry.—Nizam Ally is compelled to cede a large portion of territory, which is restored to him.—Rugonath Rao proceeds to the Carnatic—the ministers conspire against him—he concludes an arrangement with Hyder—State of his army—returns to the northward.—Confederacy against him—defeats Trimbuck Rao Mama—advances on Poona—retreats towards Hindostan—negotiates with Holkar, Sindia, and the English.—Birth of Mahdoo Rao Narain.—Rugonath Rao crosses the Nerbuddah, and is deserted by Moodajee Bhonslay.—Dissension amongst the ministers—party in favour of Rugoba—suppressed.—Hyder Ally takes Sera and Gurumconda.—Busalut Jung makes an incursion.—Preparations at Poona.—Rugoba renews negotiations with the English.

CONSIDERABLE relaxation in the confinement of Rugonath Rao had taken place for some time prior to Mahdoo Rao's death. As the health of his nephew declined, Rugonath Rao began intrigues with Hyder Ally and the Nizam, in order to obtain complete enlargement, and secure his succession as Peishwa.

The correspondence was intercepted by the ministers during the Peishwa's extreme illness; 19 persons implicated were sent into hill forts, and the confinement of Rugonath Rao would have become more rigid than ever, but Mahdoo Rao, perceiving his death was near, interposed, and observed that it was natural for his uncle to desire his liberty. With his usual sound discrimination, he foresaw that his brother would not be able to conduct the administration, if Rugonath Rao were not effectually restrained or conciliated; judging on the whole, therefore, that the latter course was the more advisable, and that, in case of dissension, the government must fall to pieces, he, in the first place, sent for Sukaram Bappoo, and reinstated him as dewan. It should be premised that Sukaram was more favourably disposed towards Rugonath Rao than any of the other ministers: he had acted as his dewan in different campaigns; he respected Rugonath Rao as a good soldier, and had hitherto retained his confidence. Nana Furnuwees had as yet only acted in a secondary situation under Mahdoo Rao, his abilities had not fully developed themselves, and Sukaram Bappoo was accounted the most capable man in the empire. It had been previously settled, before Mahdoo Rao's present arrangements

were contemplated, that Nana was to act as Furnuwees in the civil, and Moraba, his cousin, in the military, department.

Rugonath Rao was sent for to Theur, a reconciliation took place, and Mahdoo Rao, in presence of Sukaram Bappoo, recommended his brother, in an impressive manner, to the care and protection of his uncle. He also, on several occasions before his final dissolution, in conversation with his brother and uncle, calmly entered upon the discussion of their state affairs, and represented the necessity of concord for their mutual safety and the preservation of the government.

After the usual time spent in the performance of his brother's funeral obsequies, Narain Rao,* early in December, repaired to Satara, where he was invested as Peishwa by the raja. Sukaram Bappoo received the clothes of prime minister, under the name of Karbaree, whilst Bujaba Poorundhuree was appointed dewan, and Nana Furnuwees was recognized in the hereditary situation of his family. The first object of the new ad-

- A. D. 1773. ministration was the reduction of Raigurh, the havildar of which had been in rebellion against the Peishwa for some months before Mahdoo Rao's death. It was apprehended that he had designs of giving it up to the Seedee, and, when required to surrender, he replied that he held the fort for the raja of Satara, and would maintain it against the Peishwa until the raja was released; but on an order from Ram Raja, and the payment of 40,000 rupees, Narain Rao, in the month of March, obtained possession of the ancient capital of Sivajee.

The new Peishwa and Rugonath Rao continued for some time in apparent amity: but the mother of the one, the wife of the other, and the jealousy of the Bramin ministers, would probably have created discord between men of better temper and stronger judgment. Rugonath Rao, with the consent of all, except Sukaram Bappoo, who objected to the

violence of the measure, was again made prisoner on the April 11. 11th of April, and confined in an apartment of the same palace in which Narain Rao, when at Poona, usually resided.†

Nana Furnuwees stood high in the young Peishwa's estimation, but Bujaba Poorundhuree and Hurry Punt Phurkay were his chief confidants. The principal state affairs continued ostensibly to be transacted by Sukaram Bappoo, but the favourites were inimical to his administration. Narain Rao was particularly ambitious of military fame, and looked forward with eagerness to the ensuing season, when he proposed to make a campaign in the Carnatic. For this purpose troops were directed to be in readiness, and orders were despatched to recal the armies from Hindostan. But circumstances occurred which occasioned the probability of employment in the Mahratta territories.

Janojee Bhonslay was at Theur at the period of Mahdoo Rao's death; but prior to that event he had obtained his sanction to adopt Rughoojee, the eldest son of Moodajee, who was the only one of all the brothers that had issue; and Janojee not only made the adoption, but was said to have appointed Moodajee the guardian of his heir. Janojee died in the month of May near Tooljapoor: Moodajee and Sabajee each claimed the right of guardianship; but Durya Bye, the widow of Janojee, resisted the pretensions of both, assumed the government, and appointed Sabajee her general and dewan. Moodajee, unfortunately for himself and his son, had hitherto

* Narain Rao was the youngest of the three sons of Ballajee Bajee Rao. Wiswas Rao, the eldest, fell, as may be remembered, at Panniput.

† Mahratta MSS., and Bombay Records.

maintained a connection with Rugonath Rao, and his pretensions not being supported by Narain Rao* or his ministers, he could only levy troops and assert his cause by force of arms. The Peishwa in vain interposed his advice; Moodajee's party were much discouraged by the defection of a considerable number of the choice troops, who carried with them the Juree Putka of the Sena Sahib Soobeh; but notwithstanding the evil presage which this created amongst his men, he attacked his brother at Koombaree near Ankolah, where he was defeated with severe loss, and compelled to flee with precipitation. The Peishwa's agent at last procured a cessation of hostilities, but the brothers had scarcely met, when Durya Bye, quitting Sabajee,† joined Moodajee. The latter again took the field, obtained the aid of Ismaal Khan Patan, governor of Elichpoor, and renewed hostilities. Sabajee applied to the Nizam, and solicited the Peishwa's assistance; Rugonath Rao exhorted Moodajee to persevere; the Nizam joined Sabajee;‡ but the attention of all India was arrested, and there was a momentary pause in the bustle of political affairs, by reports, which proved correct, of the murder of Narain Rao Peishwa on the 30th of August.§

It appeared that, on the morning of that day, there had been considerable commotion amongst the regular infantry in the Peishwa's service, and it increased so much towards noon that, after an interview with Rughoojee Angria, who had just arrived from Kolabah to pay his respects, Narain Rao, before he went to dinner, told Hurry Punt Phurkay to take some precautions in case of disturbance, meaning that he should secure the palace. Hurry Punt, however, thoughtlessly neglected these orders, and went to dine with a friend in the neighbourhood.|| The Peishwa, in the afternoon, had retired to repose in his private apartments, when he was awoke by a great tumult in the palace, caused by a large body of infantry, who, having continued their clamours for pay throughout the day, were at last, about two o'clock, led to the palace by Somer Sing and Mohummud Yeesoof, on pretence of demanding their arrears. Khurruk Sing, one of their number, who commanded at the palace guard, joined them; but instead of entering at the large gate on the north side, to which there was no impediment, they made their way by an unfinished doorway on the east side, which, together with the wall surrounding the palace, had been pulled down a short time before, to make an entrance distinct from that of the quarter inhabited by Rugonath Rao. Narain Rao, on starting from sleep, neither resolved on concealment nor defence, but ran to his uncle's apartments, and, being closely pursued by Somer Sing, he threw himself into his uncle's arms, and called on him to save him. Rugonath Rao did interfere, and begged of them to spare him. "I have not gone thus far to insure my own destruction," replied Somer Sing: "let him go, or you shall die with him." Rugonath Rao disengaged himself, and got out upon the terrace; Narain Rao attempted to follow him, but Truleea Powar, one of the Mahratta domestics of Rugonath Rao, who was armed, seized him by

* The Peishwa's government acknowledged Sabajee as Sena Sahib Soobeh, as he is so styled in an original agreement of four articles, by which he becomes bound to fulfil the conditions of the agreement entered into by Janojee.

† Durya Bye was probably actuated by Sabajee's having been acknowledged as Sena Sahib Soobeh, which, if admitted, at once set aside her pretensions as guardian.

‡ Mahratta MSS.

§ Mr. Mostyn's Report.

|| In consequence probably of this neglect, Hurry Punt, it would seem, was accused of being one of the partizans of Rugoba, which decidedly was not the case.

the legs, and pulled him down, at which instant another domestic, named Chapajee Teleekur, in the service of Narain Rao, entered the apartment, and, although unarmed, ran forward to his master who clasped his arms about his neck, when Somer Sing and Trulee Powar despatched them both with their swords. Whilst this was passing in the interior, the whole of the outer wall of the palace was secured by the conspirators; the people in the city heard of a tumult, armed men thronged in the streets, the shops were shut, and the inhabitants ran to and fro in consternation, asking what had happened. Sukaram Bappoo repaired to the Kotwal's chowree, or office of the police magistrate, where word being brought to him that Rugonath Rao was not only alive, but had sent out assurances to the people that all was quiet, and had even invited some of them to go inside, Sukaram directed Hurry Punt Phurkay to write a note to Rugonath Rao in his name, which Rugonath Rao answered in his own hand-writing, informing him of the murder of his nephew by some of the Gardees (regular infantry). Hurry Punt Phurkay then declared that suspicions, which he had entertained of Rugonath Rao, were confirmed; and, alarmed for his personal safety, he instantly fled to Baramuttee. Sukaram Bappoo tranquillized the minds of the people by recommending them to go to their homes, and to remain quiet, when nothing should molest them. Bujaba Poorundhuree and Mallojee Ghorepuray had an interview with Rugonath Rao that night; and Trimbuck Rao Mama, repairing to the palace, bore off the body of the unfortunate Peishwa, and performed the funeral obsequies.

Visitors were admitted to the palace; Mr. Mostyn, the English envoy, and the different wukeels, paid their respects, but Rugonath Rao remained in confinement—detained, as was pretended, by the conspirators, as a security for the payment of their arrears. Rugonath Rao was suspected, but there was no proof of his being the author of the outrage. It was well known that he had an affection for his nephew, and the ministers, considering the extreme jealousy with which many of them viewed each other, are entitled to some praise for having adopted a resolution on the occasion equally sound and politic. They were generally of opinion that, whilst there remained a shadow of doubt, it was on every account advisable to support Rugoba's right to the succession; to this Ram Shastree, who was consulted, made no objections, but diligently instituted a search into the whole transaction. About six weeks after the event, having obtained proofs against Rugonath Rao, the Shastree waited upon him, and accused him of having given an authority to Somer Sing and Mohummud Yeesoof to commit the deed. Rugonath Rao is said to have acknowledged to Ram Shastree that he had written an order to those men, authorising them to seize Narain Rao, but that he never had given the order to kill him. This admission is generally supposed to have been literally true; for by the original paper, afterwards recovered by Ram Shastree, it was found that the word *dhurawe*, to seize, was altered to *marawe*, to kill. It is universally believed that the alteration was made by the infamous Anundee Bye; and although Rugonath Rao's own conduct in subsequently withholding protection, even at the hazard of his life, sufficiently justifies the suspicion of his being fully aware of it, the moderate and general opinion in the Mahratta country is that he did not intend to murder his nephew; that he was exasperated by his confinement, and excited by the desperate counsels of his wife, to whom is also attributed

the activity of the domestic Truleea Powar,* who was set on by the vindictive malice of that bad woman.

After Rugonath Rao had avowed his having so far participated in the fall of his nephew, he asked Ram Shastree what atonement he could make. "The sacrifice of your own life," replied the undaunted and virtuous Shastree; "for your future life cannot be passed in amendment; neither you nor your government can prosper; and, for my own part, I will neither accept of employment, nor enter Poona, whilst you preside in the administration." He kept his word, and retired to a sequestered village near Waee.

In the meantime the arrears were discharged, Rugonath Rao was released, and his adopted son, Amrut Rao, attended by Bujaba Poorundhuree, was despatched to Satara for the clothes of investiture, which were brought back accordingly, and Rugonath Rao was proclaimed Peishwa. Sukaram Bappoo was confirmed as Karbaree; but Chintoo Wittul, and Sewdasheo Ramchundur, the son of Ramchundur Baba Shenwee, were the most confidential of the new Peishwa's ministers.†

Of Narain Rao little need be said, except to contradict unjust calumny. He was murdered in the eighteenth year of his age; his follies were those of a boy, but the feelings and interest of a party blackened them into crimes. He was affectionate to his relations,‡ kind to his domestics, and all but his enemies loved him.

There is a well-known Poona anecdote, which, though oftener told of Mahdoo Rao, was one from which the latter used to say his brother would become an enterprising officer. While spectators of an elephant fight at the Gooltekree, a small hill in the environs of the city, one of the animals, when enraged, came full speed towards the spot where they sat. Most of the attendants, and all the principal people, whose fears overcame their politeness for the Peishwa, hurried off, and Narain Rao jumped up to run with the rest. Mahdoo Rao caught his arm—"Brother," said he, "what will the Ukhbars§ say of you?" He instantly sat down with composure, and the danger, which became imminent, was averted by the extraordinary bravery of a Mahratta sildidar named Appajee Rao Pahtunkur, who, drawing his dagger, sprung in front of the Peishwa; and turned the animal aside, by wounding him in the trunk.

The Peishwa's army under Visajee Kishen returned from Hindostan after the accession of Rugonath Rao. He left the emperor preparing to resist their usurpation of his authority. As Mahadajee Sindia could not disguise his enmity to Zabita Khan, and disapproved of the Mahratta alliance with the Rohillahs, he was employed to the westward collecting tribute from the Jath and Rajpoot states; but Visajee Kishen and Tookajee Holkar continued in the Rohillah country with upwards of 30,000 horse. Their absence from the capital gave the emperor full time to prepare for resisting them, and his preparations were much more formidable than the Mahrattas had anticipated. Visajee, therefore, endeavoured by every means to soothe or intimidate

* It was given out that this domestic was actuated by motives of personal revenge, in consequence of having been publicly flogged by Narain Rao's orders. He was executed for the murder of Narain Rao several years afterwards by Nana Furnuwees.

† Mahratta MSS., Mr. Mostyn's despatches.

‡ A few of his original letters, generally written to Parwuttee Bye, the widow of Sewdasheo Rao, found amongst the Poona Records, bear testimony to that trait.

§ "Native newspapers." Narain Rao had indeed "a gazette to himself," but far different from his brother's anticipation.

him into terms, and would probably have succeeded but for the more firm counsel of Nujeef Khan. A battle took place in the environs of Delhi on the 19th December 1772, in which the Mahrattas were victorious after an obstinate conflict. The Moghul horse, although bravely led by Nujeef Khan, behaved ill; but the emperor's regular infantry acted with spirit, particularly two battalions of sepoys, originally disciplined by the English, which fought under the command of a Frenchman named Madoc,* and retired in order. The terms required by the Mahrattas on this occasion from the emperor were far from immoderate; they obliged him to nominate the Peishwa his Bukshee, or commander-in-chief, and to appoint Zabita Khan the Peishwa's deputy; to confirm all the promises he had first made to them; to cede Serampore, lately taken from the Jaths, and to give them a grant of Korah and Kurrah—two provinces east of the Jumna, adjoining their frontier in Bundelcund, which the English government of Bengal had obliged Shujah-ud-Dowlah to cede for the emperor's support, as long as he chose to continue under the British protection; but as he had voluntarily relinquished all the benefits of their alliance, they claimed the right of disposing of the reversion, and determined to repel any attempt the Mahrattas might make for their occupation. They resolved, however, to act strictly on the defensive, and to assist their ally, Shujah-ud-Dowlah, in resisting an invasion of the province of Oude, which, it was supposed, the Mahrattas meditated; but, after an inactive campaign, they quitted Hindostan in the end of May,† in consequence of a positive recal by Narain Rao, for the purpose to which we have alluded. Visajee Kishen, however, did not reach Poona till the rains were nearly over.

As Hyder Ally had most reason to apprehend the approach of the Mahrattas, so was he most ready to take advantage of the confusion likely to ensue from the late violent change in the state. A strong detachment was sent, under his son Tippoo, for the recovery of the districts conquered by the Mahrattas in the late war; and Nizam Ally was likewise preparing, with the hope of profiting by Bramin dissensions, in the same manner that they had encroached during the intestine broils of his own family.

Moodajee Bhonslay, with his son and the widow of Janojee, joined Rugonath Rao, and on that occasion Rughoojee Bhonslay, as the adopted son of Janojee, was invested as Sena Sahib Soobeh. Sabajee continuing the stronger party, Moodajee remained with the Peishwa, but Rughoojee and Durya Bye returned towards Berar. Rugonath Rao resolved, in the first instance, to oppose Nizam Ally, and to endeavour to cripple his power; otherwise, by crossing the Kistna, he must have left his own territory exposed to the ravages of the Nizam and Sabajee Bhonslay.

At this critical period, when the army had marched, and Rugonath Rao was on the eve of departure from Poona, Ram Shastree waited upon him in the manner which has been mentioned. The other ministers were less sincere, but as Rugonath Rao showed himself suspicious and distrustful of all the experienced men who were capable of supporting his govern-

* Madoc was one of the earliest of those European adventurers who rose to consequence in the immediate service of the native states. He was considered by the natives a brave soldier but an indifferent officer, incapable of acting as a chief-in-command, and of a faithless character.

† Appendix to the Fifth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, Bombay Records, and Mahratta MSS. The Seyr Mutuakhereen gives a very confused account of these transactions at Delhi, which does not agree with any of the authorities above quoted.

ment, they soon became entirely estranged from his councils. Sewdasheo Ramchundur, Chintoo Wittul, Abbajee Mahdeo, and Sukaram Hurry, the persons of whom he made choice, were ill-qualified to supply their place. In the month of November the Peishwa's army approached that of Nizam Ally, before the latter was prepared, and he was compelled to seek shelter under the walls of Beder. For three weeks there were daily skirmishes, in which the Mahrattas were generally successful; the Moghuls, when pressed, retired under cover of the cannon on the works, and the Mahrattas, although they occasionally brought up guns to cannonade,* were obliged to retire daily to their camp on the bank of the Manjera, as most of the wells† in the immediate vicinity of Beder were within gun-shot of the walls of the fort.

From the reports of these partial actions, the unpopularity of Rugoba might be read in repeated accounts of his being defeated, wounded, or at the point of death.‡ The Moghul army, however, soon became straitened, and Nizam Ally could only bring on his supplies and reinforcements by risking an action with the Mahrattas at a great disadvantage. He there-

fore proposed to treat, and it was agreed on the 9th December 9. December that he should give up territory yielding an annual sum of 20 lakhs of rupees. This cession, if judiciously distributed amongst the Mahratta chiefs, would probably have enabled Rugonath Rao to maintain an ascendancy in the state; but after all was settled, Nizam Ally, with a show of the greatest frankness, paid him a visit, brought to his recollection their former alliance, and being well acquainted with the circumstances in which Rugonath Rao stood, assured him of his perpetual friendship on all future occasions; he praised the wisdom of his administration, affected even to be proud of his submission to the great Rugonath Rao, and manifested entire confidence in

* Rugonath Rao used a large brass gun on this occasion, called *Maha Kalee* (the goddess of destruction), which is now at Poona, and which throws a ball a long way, as I fancy some of my readers could testify.

† Besides, all Hindoos are very particular in regard to water, and always prefer drinking from a running stream.

‡ The following extract from one of Mr. Mostyn's despatches is a specimen of the invention of the day:—"Since closing my address to the committee" (the select committee of the Bombay government is meant), "I have learnt that a party of the Nizam's foot approached quite close to Rugoba's tent undiscovered, and were taken for his own guard, who by some means were absent that night. On their endeavouring to enter the tent, some of the servants found them out, and alarmed the camp. They were then obliged to fly as fast as possible; however, one cut through the tent walls, and made a blow at Rugoba, which took just below his right shoulder, cut four inches down the arm, and half through the bone. Afterwards a firing commenced, when a musquet-ball grazed along his left arm, so that he is now lame of both arms, has a fever, and several ulcers about his knee. The elephant with the gold standard" (my readers will recognise the Juree Putka) "the Moghuls carried off; this is looked upon with these people as a most unlucky omen." Mr. Mostyn, who had not then much experience in Mahratta politics, writes all the above as intelligence which he fully credited: he might have stopped his evidence when he came to such particulars as *the four inches*, which a good member of a punchayet would have done, and extracted valuable evidence, not from the falsehoods spoken, but from what his judgment could clearly interpret as the object of the speaker. Strange as it may appear, it was upon the receipt of the despatch of which the above is an extract, that the Bombay government came to the resolution, in case of the death or deposition of Rugoba, to take possession of Salsette, &c., by force of arms; and I may remark that Mr. Tayler's able letter to the Bengal government, 9th October 1775, founded on Mr. Mostyn's intelligence, is incorrect. Colonel Wilks and Mr. Mill have been led into error from the same circumstance. Rugonath Rao was not defeated.

his generosity, by placing before him his seal of state, and desiring him to add as much more to the cession as he thought fit.

Rugonath Rao, to the great joy of his domestic enemies, in an effusion of misplaced generosity, immediately restored the whole; and although little can be said in excuse for his being thus openly cajoled by the well-known Nizam Ally, it is one of many proofs that he was still more weak than wicked.

Rugonath Rao, after peace was concluded with the Moghuls, encamped for some time at Kulbarga, and detached Trimluck Rao Mama to watch the motions of Sabajee Bhonslay, who occupied a threatening position in the neighbourhood of Aurungabad. This arrangement was precisely that which Rugoba's enemies desired, and they perceived with secret pleasure that his mind was completely occupied in planning an expedition into the Carnatic, where he projected not only the expulsion of Hyder from the Mahratta districts, of which he had possessed himself, but the punishment of Mohummud Ally and the English for having reduced Tanjore.* In prosecution of these designs, he proceeded towards the Kistna; but in the meantime a cabal was forming against him, which soon obstructed his progress.

Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees had, on different pretences, withdrawn themselves from the army, and returned to Poona. They were soon followed by Gunput Rao Rastia, Babajee Naik† Baramut-teekur, and several other persons of consequence. Moraba Furnuwees was the last of his old ministers that quitted his camp, except Bujaba Poorundhuree.

It was evident to all but Rugoba and his immediate dependents that there was some scheme in agitation. The principal persons of the Poona ministry at this time, of whom so much has been written, were Sukaram Bappoo, Trimluck Rao Mama, the two Furnuweeses, Nana and Moraba, Bujaba Poorundhuree, Anund Rao Jewajee,‡ and Hurry Punt Phurkay §—all men raised by the present family of Peishwas, and totally, as the reader will perceive, distinct from the eight Purdhans of Sivajee and Shao.

There were a variety of conjectures in the Mahratta country as to the revolution meditated; some said the ministers intended to release the raja; others, that a person assuming the name of Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, and now a prisoner in the fort of Ahmednugur, was to be set up as Peishwa in the room of Rugonath Rao. This Sewdasheo Rao, or Suddaba, according to the familiar name by which the person alluded to was known, was a Kanoja Bramin from Hindostan, who personated the Bhow, and raised an insurrection, which had been suppressed by his capture and the dispersion of his followers. But impostors of this description obtain surprising credence in the Deccan; and it was still a popular belief that the real Bhow Sahib, confined for state reasons, was about to be released and opposed to the unpopular Dada Sahib.||

* It was carried by storm 17th September 1778. (Madras Records.)

† The nephew or grandson of Bappoojee Naik Baramut-teekur, who was married to the aunt of Ballajee Bajee Rao, and who endeavoured, with the support of Rughojee Bhonslay, to purchase the office of Peishwa in 1740.

‡ Anund Rao Jewajee, commonly called the *Khasgeewala*, from having the charge of all the Peishwa's personal affairs. He was the son of Govind Sew Ram, already repeatedly mentioned.

§ Hurry Punt Phurkay was of very low origin, having been a common domestic in the family of Trimluck Rao Dixit, a banker in Poona.

|| Rugoba and Dada Sahib were familiar or domestic names for Rugonath Rao, as Suddaba and Bhow Sahib were for Sewdasheo Rao Chinnajee. Mr. Montyn mentions

The development, however, of their real plans soon put an end to surmises. It having been discovered that Gunga Bye, A. D. 1774. the widow of Narain Rao, was pregnant, it was resolved, on pretence of carrying her to a place of safety, to convey her to the fort of Poorundhur. But it is generally believed that the real motive was to disguise an intention they had formed, of eventually exchanging the infant of Gunga Bye, in case of its proving a female, by substituting a male child. For this purpose several Bramin women, in a state of pregnancy, are said to have been conveyed into the fort at the same time. Gunga Bye herself was carried off from Poona by Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay, on the morning of the 30th January; but the reason of her removal was publicly announced. Parwuttee Bye, the widow of Sewdasheo Rao, a lady very much respected, accompanied her. The ministers, forming themselves into a sort of regency under Gunga Bye, began to govern the country in her name. All the adherents of Rugonath Rao were thrown into confinement. Negotiations were opened with Nizam Ally and Sabajee Bhonslay, both of whom agreed to support the widow's pretensions; and intrigues, managed by Krist Rao Bulwunt in the camp of Rugonath Rao, were ready to burst forth in general revolt, the moment that a signal was received from the confederates at Poona.*

In the meantime Rugonath Rao had advanced beyond Bellary, and had admitted an arrangement with Hyder Ally. His pecuniary distress was so urgent that, upon Hyder's paying a few lakhs of rupees, and promising to make up the sum to 25 lakhs, Rugoba relinquished all claim to three of the Mahratta districts, and Hyder probably then foresaw that the rest must, in the course of a very short time, fall into his hands. In a few days, on hearing of the events that had happened at Poona, Rugonath Rao was compelled to abandon his designs of levying a tribute from the province of Arcot, and concluded a treaty at Calliandroog, by which Hyder recognised his right of succession as Peishwa, and agreed to pay him, and only to him, an annual tribute of six lakhs of rupees.†

Rugonath Rao had information of the revolution before any person in his camp, and was warned to be on his guard against several of his surdars, but especially Bhowan Rao, Pritee Needhee. Uncertain what to do where wisdom would probably have done nothing, he called upon Bhowan Rao to account for his being at the head of 4,000 horse, when 300 was the complement required to be furnished by the tenure of his jagheer lands. The Pritee Needhee would not condescend to answer an enquiry so abrupt. Rugonath Rao threatened to attack him, and ordered Moorar Rao Ghorepuray Senaputtee "to plunder his troops." Ghorepuray replied that he was ready to fight any enemy of the state, but this being a domestic quarrel, he begged to be excused. A similar answer was returned by Wamun Rao Govind Putwurdhun, and several other commanders. He then ordered out his household troops, and guns were brought, ready to open in case he should still refuse an explanation; but finding the Pritee Needhee resolute, and his followers, mostly all from the banks of the Maun and the Yairla, declaring to a man that they would

that the impostor was confined in Doulutabad, which is a mistake; he was afterwards removed from Ahmednugur to Rutnagui, which I shall have occasion to notice presently.

* Mahratta MSS., and Mr. Mostyn's despatches.

† Wilks. I follow the Mahratta MSS., and what can be gathered from Mr. Mostyn's despatches, in stating the payment by Hyder to have been prior to receiving the news of the revolution.

die with him, Rugonath Rao went himself to Bhowan Rao, and demanded an interview. He was received respectfully; but, when sitting down, the latter laid his sword between them, and, on being asked by the Peishwa why he took such a precaution,—“It is,” said Bhowan Rao, “lest the Punt Purdhan should forget that he is about to confer with the Pritee Needhee.” After some general assurances on both sides, the visit terminated by Rugonath Rao’s agreeing to advance him a sum of money; and all resort to coercion ceased.*

The Pritee Needhee and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray continued with Rugonath Rao, who now commenced his march towards Poona. Wamun Rao, with all who openly declared for the ministerial party, separated from his army, but they always encamped a march on his left flank, with every precaution to prevent surprise, reserving attack until the approach of some of the three divisions which were moving to co-operate with them. Trimluck Rao Mama and Sabajee Bhonslay were advancing from Purinda, Hurry Punt Phurkay was on his route at the head of a division from Poona, whilst Nizam Ally was marching across the country from Kulburga, to co-operate with either of these armies that might first appear—still, however, pretending to be the friend of Rugonath Rao. Trimluck Rao Mama, jealous of Rugonath Rao’s reputation as a soldier,† and ambitious of the honor of reducing him, finding that Sabajee, who had views of his own to answer, was very tardy in his advance, pushed on in front of his division, crossed the Beema at Punderpoor on the 4th

March. March, when Rugonath Rao, who was close in his neighbourhood, made a sudden attack upon him, on a fine plain between Kasseegum and Punderpoor, where, in less than 20 minutes, with a force considerably inferior to that of his opponent, Rugonath Rao obtained a complete victory, mortally wounded Trimluck Rao Mama, and took him prisoner.

Rugonath Rao was one of the foremost in a charge which he made, supported only by his own division, amounting to about 10,000 horse. Gungadhur Rao Rastia, second-in-command of Trimluck Rao’s army, was wounded, but escaped.‡ Neither the Pritee Needhee nor Moorar Rao Ghorepuray, although both in Rugonath Rao’s army, were engaged; the former withdrew, and after a short time joined Hurry Punt Phurkay, and the latter took the opportunity of the confusion to retire towards his principality at Gooty, and never more recrossed the Kistna. Hurry Punt Phurkay immediately effected a junction with Sabajee Bhonslay and the Nizam, but neither of them were in haste to bring the war to a conclusion.

The success thus obtained by Rugoba gave momentary life to his drooping cause. He was enabled to raise a large sum of money in Punderpoor, partly by contribution, and partly by pawning a portion of some prize jewels, which were brought back by Visajee Kishen from Hindostan, and on his return, agreeably to old Mahratta usage, presented to Rugonath Rao as the head of the government.

* I have this anecdote from Appajee Gonedeo, who was present.

† Trimluck Rao Mama was, as will be recollected, the officer who defeated Hyder three years before.

‡ Mr. Mostyn’s despatches describe a stratagem practised by Rugoba on this occasion, but it is not mentioned in any Mahratta account, and besides, from the nature of the ground where it happened, which is a very extensive bare plain, not apparently favourable to the growth of jungle, I doubt the possibility of an ambuscade, such as Rugoba is said to have contrived.

The greatest consternation prevailed in Poona, and according to the invariable practice of the inhabitants on such occasions, dreading alike their friends and foes, all began to pack up their property, and fly to forts or retired villages, where they esteemed themselves secure. Troops flocked to Rugoba's standard, and he advanced for a few days towards the capital; but having no funds to support his army, which soon amounted to 30,000 or 40,000 men, becoming suspicious of their fidelity, and indulging hopes of more effectual support from Sindia, Holkar, or eventually the English, with all of whom he was negotiating, he suddenly shaped his course towards Burhanpoor. This resolution he adopted at a time when the ministers, jealous of each other, dreading the resentment of Rugoba, and doubting the intentions of Sabajee Bhonslay, as well as of the Nizam, were on the point of releasing the raja of Satara, as a measure calculated to have insured them the aid of many of the Mahratta soldiery who were discontented or neutral. But the retreat of Rugoba at once turned the scale of opinion in their favor, and the design was abandoned. He was followed by the combined armies of Hurry Punt Phurkay, the Nizam, and Sabajee Bhonslay, which together amounted to 50,000 men; but the pursuit was purposely retarded by Nizam Ally, in order to obtain possession of some territory promised by the ministers for his treachery to Rugoba; and thus the fugitive Peishwa had leisure to levy contributions from the country as he went along. The crisis, however, was passed; he had lost an opportunity of retrieving his affairs, and the birth of Mahdoo Rao Narain, on the 18th

April 18.

April, gave a finishing blow to his ever being recognised as Peishwa. Notwithstanding the suspicions created by the scheme which was adopted for eventually imposing upon the country, there is very little doubt but that the child was the son of the murdered Narain Rao.

Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees were deputed by Gunga Bye to receive the clothes of investiture for her son, which were sent from Satara by the raja in charge of Mahdoo Rao Neelkunt Poorundhuree, and the infant was formally installed as Peishwa when he was 40 days old. One of the first acts of the ministers under his government was to remove Rughojee, the adopted son of Janojee Bhonslay, from the office of Sena Sahib Soobeh, by conferring that dignity on Sabajee, their ally.

Rugonath Rao remained a short time at Burhanpoor in hopes of being joined by Holkar and Sindia; but at last, contrary to the advice of his friends, he crossed the Nerbuddah, when Moodajee Bhonslay and all his followers, except about 7,000 horse, deserted him. On his arrival at Indore he was met by Mahadajee Sindia and Tookajee Holkar, received with the greatest respect, and it was generally reported that these two chiefs would espouse his cause; it was also stated that the two brothers, Govind Rao and Futih Sing Gaekwar, then contending for the possession of Guzerat, as will be hereafter explained, had agreed to submit their dispute to the arbitration of Holkar and Sindia, and to unite with them in supporting Rugonath Rao. Nizam Ally, staggered by these rumours, disappointed at not having received the promised cessions, and willing to sell his aid to either party the more likely to have the power of granting his demands, cantoned for the rains at Basum; Hurry Punt Phurkay occupied a position in the neighbourhood of Burhanpoor.

The ministers very soon became jealous of each other; Nana Furnuwees was too cautious to take the lead in an infant government; but, like the generality of men who have risen by revolution, and who seldom

appear in the foreground, he supported Sukaram Bappoo as the person likely to have most weight and consideration with the public. This conduct in him proceeded as much from timidity as design. Sukaram was an old, cautious, time-serving courtier, but he was a man of much more courage than Nana Furnuwees, and, in the humble and assiduous attention of his colleague and adherent, he did not foresee a future rival and a powerful foe. Such, indeed, was the influence of Sukaram Bappoo, that his secession from the cause of the ministers, which Nana often apprehended, would have ruined them. One circumstance, not generally known, which was used by Nana as an instrument of ambition, was the power he had acquired over the mind of the regent Gunga Bye; for, although a profound secret at the time, the young widow was deeply enamoured of Nana Furnuwees, and was taught by him the best means of governing the old minister.

Moraba, the cousin of Nana, who had been the ostensible prime minister of Mahdoo Rao, was dissatisfied on finding little deference paid to his counsel, and would readily have returned to Rugonath Rao if he could have effected it with safety, and insured his future power. Such of the other ministers as would not submit to Sukaram and Nana were soon united in common discontent. The cabal, in short, divided into two parties, and their disagreement became generally known by the discovery of a correspondence on the part of Moraba, Bujaba, and Babajee Naik with the ex-Peishwa. It appeared, from letters intercepted by Hurry Punt, that these three had formed a plan for securing the persons of Sukaram Bappoo, Nana Furnuwees, Gunga Bye, and her son—all of whom, on account of the chilling cold frequently experienced in hill-forts during the rains, had come down from Poorundhur to reside in the neighbouring village of Sassoor; but receiving intelligence, on the 30th June, of this conspiracy, they instantly, with undissembled panic, betook themselves to the fort.

Hurry Punt Phurkay, leaving a detachment at Burhanpoor, counter-marched on Poorundhur; and Krist Rao Bulwunt, the ministerial agent with Nizam Ally, by stipulating for the immediate cession of upwards of 13 lakhs* of jagheer territory, and promising more, induced him to move to Aurungabad to give countenance to their cause; but the discovery of their conspiracy at once defeated the designs of the feeble triumvirate, and Hurry Punt was directed to halt at the Ajunta Ghaut.

Hyder Ally, immediately on perceiving these commotions, seized the opportunity in order to complete his conquests of the whole of the Mahratta districts south of the Toongbuddra. He attacked Sera in person, whilst his son Tippoo besieged Gurumconda.† At the same time Busalut Jung from Adonee entered the Mahratta country, and levied contributions as far as Hutnee and Merich. No effort could be made to save Sera and Gurumconda; they therefore soon fell; but Wamun Rao Govind Putwurdhun and Anund Rao Rastia were detached for the protection of their own districts, and soon compelled Busalut Jung to retire. These chiefs received instructions to return to the capital as soon as possible; and Bhew Rao Yeswunt Pansia, Rumchundur Gunnessh, Visajee Kishen, and Bhowan Rao Pritee Needhee were employed in raising men in the districts, who were all to be at Poona on the Dussera. Agents were employed through-

* The amount actually ceded, as appears by the state accounts, was rupees 18,28,839-6-1, of which Rookun-ud-Dowlah, the minister, received rupees 1,88,269-10-1.

† Mr. Mostyn's despatch, 17th April 1774.

out the country to blacken the crimes of Rugoba, and hold forth the justice of their cause. The ministers at the same time breathed nothing but a spirit of union and concord: they determined on obtaining the absolute submission of Rugoba; and their active and judicious preparations for hostility showed that they understood the best means of ensuring pacification.

Rugonath Rao, in the meantime, with a force of about 30,000 men, chiefly composed of the troops of Sindia and Holkar, advanced from Indore to the banks of the Taptee, where he expected to be joined by Moodajee Bhonslay and Govind Rao Gaskwar. In this situation he renewed his negotiations with the English government at Bombay.

CHAP. XXV.

FROM A. D. 1772 TO A. D. 1775.

The Court of Directors appoint a resident envoy to Poona—intention of that mission.—Capture of Baroach.—Resolution of the Bombay government upon the receipt of intelligence from Poona during the campaign of Rugonath Rao against Nizam Ally.—Negotiations with Rugonath Rao—resolution to support him—he refuses to accede to the terms.—Capture of Tannah.—Rugoba, deserted by Sindia and Holkar, renews the negotiation with Bombay.—State of the Gaekwar family after the death of Dummajee.—Treaty between Rugoba and the English.

THE Court of Directors, in a despatch to the presidency of Bombay, of A. D. 1772. the 1st of April 1772, directed that a resident envoy should be appointed to the Peishwa's court; and Mr. Thomas Mostyn, of the Bombay civil service, who had formerly been at Poona in the situation of assistant to Mr. Price's mission, was selected by the Court of Directors for this important duty.

The declared intention of the East India Company in appointing an envoy was for the purpose of acquiring, from time to time, upon safe and honorable terms, such privileges and rights as might be beneficial to their commerce, and of security to their possessions, by maintaining a friendly intercourse with all the native powers; but carefully abstaining from active alliance with any. The resident was instructed to communicate to Madras and Bengal direct all intelligence he could procure relative to the designs of the Mahrattas, of a nature likely to affect those presidencies; but the principal objects of the mission were to obtain possession of the island of Salsette, the port of Bassein, and the small islands of Kennery, Hog Island, Elephanta, and Caranja. The advantage of these islands was justly considered of great importance, in order to preclude other nations from having access to the spacious and excellent harbour of Bombay, by far the most commodious port in India. It was already celebrated for its dockyard, and was well adapted to become the mart, not only for the supply of the interior of Western India, but the emporium of the trade with China, the coasts of Persia, Arabia, and the Red Sea. The occupation of Salsette likewise secured the principal inlet to the Mahratta country, for woollens and other staples of England, which are said to have been at that time supplied, to the amount of 14 lakhs of rupees annually. The expenses of the Bombay establishment far exceeded the receipts, and it was hoped that, by the possession of those places, and the Mahratta share of the revenue of Surat, the balance would be nearly equal.

Permission for the envoy to reside at Poona was granted by Mahdoo Rao; and Mr. Mostyn arrived there a few days prior to that Peishwa's death; otherwise, it was Mr. Mostyn's opinion, the succeeding administration would not have allowed him to remain.

Some time elapsed before any event favourable to the views of the company occurred. The Bombay presidency, in consequence of certain claims

on the nabob of Baroach, due by right of sovereignty to the government of Surat, sent a force, just before the rains of the year 1771, to enforce their demands; but, as the expedition failed, preparations were made for the renewal of hostilities after the monsoon. This armament was countermanded in consequence of the arrival of the nabob at Bombay, whose object appears to have been merely to obtain a cessation of arms by trusting to the generosity of the English, in hopes that the confidence he had shown might operate in his favour, either by inducing the Bombay government to relinquish their claims, or by affording him time to cement an alliance with the family of Gaekwar. A treaty was concluded on the 30th November at Bombay; but as the terms did not come up to the full extent of the nabob's hopes, the English chief at the Baroach factory was in a short time treated with great disrespect, on which he was desired to retire to Surat. The expedition, as before projected, was carried into effect; and Baroach, with the loss of the gallant and accomplished General David Wedderburn, was taken by storm on the 18th November 1772—the same day on which Mahdoo Rao died.

When the resident at Poona was first sent for on business by the new Peishwa, the exchange, or an equivalent for Baroach, was one of the few things discussed; but no offer was made which could lead to the subject most important to his mission.

After the murder of Narain Rao, during the progress of Rugonath Rao's

A. D. 1773. warfare with the Nizam in the neighbourhood of Beder, the reports circulated by his enemies of his probable death or deposition induced the Bombay government to deliberate on what would then be the state of their relations with the Mahrattas. They concluded that the family of the Peishwa, with whom only they had existing treaties, must become extinct by the demise of Rugoba; and they conceived that their engagements with the Poona government only existed whilst that family continued at the head of the administration. Accordingly, without further scruple, they determined that, should either of the events alluded to take place, they would possess themselves of Salsette by force of arms.* The ready credit given to those unfavourable rumours at Bombay, and a subsequent hasty belief in the rising fortunes of Rugoba, are attributable to the same bias—a desire of the president and council to fulfil the object of their employers, and court their favour by possessing themselves, and that too at all events, of the long-coveted islands.

When Rugonath Rao, instead of marching with bold confidence to Poona, shaped his course to the northward, he clearly exposed his situation to men less under the influence of interested hopes than the members of the Bombay government, and betrayed his alarm to the resident at Poona by sending an agent with hurried and indefinite applications for a great deal of money and a great many troops;† which only showed that he stood in much need of aid, but had a very confused idea of what plan he should follow to obtain it, or how to extricate himself from difficulty.

The Bombay government were willing to assist him with some men, conditionally: but further negotiation through Mr. Mostyn at Poona could not be prosecuted, owing to the distant retreat of Rugoba, who continued his march as far as Malwa. There, after he had recruited

* Bombay Secret Consultations.

† Mr. Mostyn's letters. (Bombay Records.)

his forces, he determined to recross the Nerbuddah, and accordingly advanced to a position on the Taptee, where, as already alluded to, he renewed his overtures to the English through Mr. Robert Gambier, the acting chief or civil governor of Surat. His agent informed Mr. Gambier that Rugoba was desirous of entering on a treaty for the purpose of being furnished with a sufficient force "to carry him to Poona, and establish him in the government; for which he would defray the charges of the expedition, make very considerable grants to the company, and enter into any terms of friendship and alliance the president and council at Bombay might choose."*

September 6. This acceptable proposal was received at Bombay on the 6th September, when the president and council agreed to assist Rugoba with all the troops they could spare, which, including a portion of artillery, amounted to about 2,500 men, on condition that he should advance 15 or 20 lakhs of rupees; and, on being established in the government at Poona, cede to the honorable company, in perpetuity, Salsette, the small islands contiguous to Bombay, and Bassein with its dependencies. The Mahratta share of revenue in Surat and Baroach was, if possible, to be obtained; and also protection from Mahratta inroads into the Bengal provinces, and the possessions of the nabob of the Carnatic.

The original of the above resolution is signed by Mr. William Hornby, governor and president, Mr. Daniel Draper, Mr. William Tayler, of the civil service, and Mr. John Watson, commodore of the Bombay marine, who were the counsellors present on that memorable occasion. In the course of the consultation a doubt arose whether the president and members had a legal right to enter on any treaty without the concurrence of the governor-general in council, as the operation of the Act of Parliament of 1773, which rendered the presidencies of Madras and Bombay subordinate to Bengal, was to have effect in India from the 1st of August; but as intimation had not been received of the arrival of the members appointed from Europe, without whom the supreme parliamentary council could not be constituted, their proceeding, on mature deliberation, was deemed unobjectionable.

The offers of Rugoba, however, in answer to the proposals of the Bombay government, fell very far short of what was expected. He positively refused to cede Salsette—a condition so indispensable, that Mr. Gambier, without delay, replied to his proposals in such terms as he conceived himself authorized to offer, without wasting the time necessary for a reference to Bombay—of which the president and council approved. Rugoba adhered to his original declaration of not relinquishing Bassein and Salsette; he also stated his inability to raise the large advance of cash, but offered to cede districts and claims of much greater value in Guzerat, amounting, in all, to eleven lakhs annually; to pay six lakhs of rupees in advance, and one lakh and a half monthly, for the expense of 1,000 Europeans, 2,000 sepoy, and 15 guns. The government agreed to part of these propositions; and, on condition of his making the cession up to 18½ lakhs, they even consented to waive the grand acquisition of Salsette; but at this stage of the negotiation they were alarmed by the receipt of intelligence from their envoy at Goa, that the Portuguese government had sent a formidable armament from Europe, for the avowed purpose of recovering their lost possessions, including Salsette and Bassein.

Offers to surrender the fort of Tannah, by the Mahratta officer in charge,

* Mr. Gambier's letters. (Bombay Records.)

for the sum of 2,60,000 rupees, had been made to Mr. Hornby, as early as the preceding months of February or March, at a time when the greatest confusion prevailed at Poona, and, with the consent of his council, Mr. Hornby offered one lakh. The Mahratta authorities were disposed to betray their trust for 1,20,000 rupees, which would have been complied with, but, on considering the state of the Mahratta government, and the probability of obtaining possession by other means, the negotiation with the killidar was suspended. On receipt, however, of the intelligence from Goa, the scheme was renewed, and Mr. Mostyn was instructed, in case of their obtaining possession, to use every possible endeavour to reconcile it to the ministerial party, as a measure of precaution to prevent the island from falling into the hands of the Portuguese; and to Rugobá similar assurances were to be given. In the meantime, information of the preparations at Goa had been received at Poona, and had induced the ministers to reinforce the garrison of Tannah with 500 men; which circumstance, and the strict watch kept up, effectually obstructed the designs of the Mahratta party disposed to make it over.

In consequence of this disappointment, and the additional obstacles with

December 9. which they should have to contend in attempting to reduce it by force, the matter was again deliberated on the 9th December, when the president in council determined, at all events, that they ought to anticipate the Portuguese. An expedition, consisting of 620 Europeans, including artillery, 1,000 sepoys, and 200 gun-lascars, was accordingly prepared under the command of Brigadier-General Robert Gordon; and although the situation of Tannah was such as to preclude the employment of the larger vessels of the company's marine, as the governor expressed a wish that Commodore Watson should superintend the naval part of the enterprize, and have joint authority with General Gordon, the commodore, on the general's acquiescence in the arrange-

December 12. ment, cheerfully complied. The troops proceeded on the 12th of December, and on the ensuing day a part of the Portuguese fleet anchored in the mouth of the harbour of Bombay, and formally protested against their proceedings. The president and council used many arguments in justification of their measures; they de-

December 20. clared they would issue no countermand, and batteries were opened against Tannah on the 20th December. On the eighth day the breach was considered practicable, but it was necessary to fill up the ditch before they could advance to the assault. They at-

December 27. tempted this operation on the night of the 27th December, when they were forced to retire with the loss of 100 Europeans, including officers killed and wounded; but next evening the fort was carried by assault, when the soldiers, exasperated by their loss, put the greater part of the garrison to the sword. Among the sufferers at Tannah was Commodore John Watson, a brave and experienced officer, who was mortally wounded* on the third day of the siege.

A separate detachment under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Keating was sent to take possession of the fort of Versovah, on the northern extremity of Salsette. The island of Caranja (or Oorun, according to the Mahrattas) was also occupied, and the whole of Salsette reduced, before New Year's Day.†

* His wounds were most painful, but rather singular to occasion death. A cannon-shot struck the sand close to him, and drove the particles into his body.

† Bombay Records.

- In the meantime the negotiations with Rugoba were continued, but the ministers having secretly engaged Sindia and Holkar in their interests, and collected an army of about 30,000 men, quitted Poorundhur on the 27th November, and advanced towards the Taptee. Rugonath Rao was apprized of the secession of Holkar and Sindia in sufficient time to escape from being surrounded, and, having thrown a strong garrison into Talneir, he retired towards Guzerat; but, in consequence of the advanced state of the pregnancy of his wife Anundee Bye, he left her in the fort of Dhar, where she was shortly after delivered of Bajee Rao Rugonath,^a destined to become the last of the Peishwas.

Rugoba continued his retreat towards Baroda, at which place he arrived on the 3rd January, with about 10,000 horse and 400 infantry. Hurry Punt Phurkay, after reducing Talneir, was sent in pursuit of him; but Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees returned to the fort of Poorundhur, where all affairs continued to be transacted.

Rugoba's design in retiring to Guzerat was obviously to conclude his negotiation with the English, and to obtain the aid of Govind Rao Gaekwar. The latter, at the period of Rugoba's arrival, was besieging his brother Futih Sing in Baroda, assisted by his uncle Khundee Rao Gaekwar, jagheerdar of Neriad.

The reader may recollect that Govind Rao Gaekwar was sent by his father Dummajee to support Rugonath Rao against Mahdoo Rao in the rebellion of 1768. Shortly after its suppression, Dummajee died, leaving four sons—Syajee, Govind Rao, Manikjee, and Futih Sing. The two last were the youngest and full brothers by the third wife. Syajee was the eldest son, but by Dummajee's second wife. Govind Rao was his second son, but by the first married wife. Such a claim to succession as that of Syajee and Govind Rao always occasions disputes among Mahrattas, as there are precedents for the superiority of either party. Govind Rao was at Poona at the time of his father's death, a prisoner at large, in consequence of having supported Rugonath Rao. His claim to the succession and to his father's rank of Sena Khas Kheyl does not, in the first instance, appear to have been disputed. Upon his paying a fine of upwards of 23 lakhs of rupees for his late delinquency, a nuzur of 21 lakhs, and other exactions amounting in all to upwards of 50½ lakhs;† and having also agreed to pay a tribute of 7,79,000 rupees annually, to keep 3,000 horse constantly in the service at Poona, and 4,000 when the Peishwa was at war, the title and possessions of his father were conferred upon Govind Rao.

* Mr. Mostyn's letters, Mahratta MSS., and oral information.

† The following is the exact account, as extracted from the Poona state papers :—

	Rs.	
Tribute of last year... ..	5,25,000	
Fine for non-attendance in 1768	23,25,000	
Nazur, for confirmation in the title of Sena Khas Kheyl, with the districts and jagheer, according to ancient custom	21,00,000	
Babey babut ¹	1,00,000	
On account of the amount levied, in addition to the assignment given to Mokhund Kassee	2,630	
	<hr/>	50,52,630 0
On account of gold received in part		8,715 2
		<hr/>
	Rupees	50,48,914 14

¹ Probably on account of the districts conquered from Juwan Murd Khan Babey by Dummajee, of which Rugonath Rao promised to exact no share.

Syajee Gaekwar, the eldest son, was an idiot, but his youngest brother, Futih Sing, urged the claim of Syajee to the succession ; and in the year 1771 Futih Sing came to the Peishwa's court, where he prosecuted Syajee's pretensions, and at last succeeded. Ram Shastree is said to have decided the suit in favour of Syajee ; and as Mahdoo Rao's policy was directed to circumscribe the power of the Gaekwar family, he could not have taken a more effectual means, short of absolute reduction, than that which he adopted by acceding to the views of Futih Sing in appointing him mootaliq to his brother Syajee, now Sena Khas Kheyl, which, of course, occasioned an irreconcilable difference between Futih Sing and Govind Rao. On representations, probably, of the necessity of keeping his whole force in Guzerat, to enable him to resist any insurrection caused by the partizans of his brother Govind Rao, Futih Sing was permitted to withdraw the contingent of horse, on agreeing to pay at the rate of rupees 6,75,000 a year during their non-attendance. But Futih Sing had other views. In his own schemes for supporting Syajee, he did not overlook the motives which induced Mahdoo Rao to give him the preference as mootaliq, and he returned to Baroda, determined to strengthen himself against any designs the Peishwa might meditate. For this purpose he made overtures to the Bombay government early in the year 1772, offering to enter on an offensive and defensive alliance, on terms advantageous to the company ; but his proposal was rejected as at variance with the orders of the Court of Directors. Except a short contract, concluded with Futih Sing by Mr. Price, on the 12th January 1773, respecting the Gaekwar's dividend of the revenues of Baroach, which was to continue on the same footing as when under the government of the nabob, no other agreement of any sort existed between him and the East India Company.

After Narain Rao's murder, and Rugoba's accession to the office of Peishwa, Govind Rao's claim was again recognised, and, prior to Rugoba's departure for the Carnatic, whilst his army was encamped at Kulbarga, Govind Rao was invested as Sena Khas Kheyl, and immediately set off for Guzerat in order to endeavour to wrest the government from Futih Sing. From that time the two brothers had been in a state of constant warfare until Rugonath Rao's arrival, who, as already noticed, found Govind Rao engaged in the siege of Baroda.

As soon as Rugoba came into Guzerat, he renewed the negotiation with Mr. Gambier, but it was temporarily impeded, owing to a misfortune which befel his accredited agent, Nowruttundass, who was taken prisoner by Futih Sing's troops, when employed with a party of Govind Rao's horse in raising revenues from the districts south of Surat. Various drafts for a treaty had been tendered on both sides, and much time lost by the dilatory preciseness, rather than the indecision, of the Bombay

government. The treaty when finally concluded, on the 6th March, consisted of 16 articles, by which all former treaties between the two governments were confirmed, and neither party was to assist the enemies of the other. The Bombay government engaged to send immediately 500 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys, with a due proportion of artillery, to assist Rugoba, and pledged themselves to make up the number to 700 or 800 Europeans and 1,700 sepoys, with gun-lascars, artificers, and pioneers, the whole amounting to 3,000 men. Rugoba engaged to pay, on account of 2,500 men, one lakh and a half of rupees monthly, with a proportionate increase or decrease according to the number of men ; and, as a security for the payment, he made over tempora-

rily the districts of Amod, Hansot, Versaul, and a part of Oklaseer. He ceded in perpetuity Bassein with its dependencies, the island of Salsette and the other islands, the districts of Jumbooseer, Oolpar, and an assignment of 75,000 rupees annually upon Oklaseer, the whole amounting to 19,25,000 rupees. He engaged to procure the cession of the Gaekwar's share of the Baroach revenue, and to pay all expenses the company might incur in obtaining possession of the specified cessions, which were to be considered as belonging to them from the date of the treaty. As Rugonath Rao was destitute of other funds, he deposited jewels, valued at upwards of six lakhs,* as a security for the promised advance, pledging himself to redeem them. The protection of the company's possessions in Bengal, and those of their ally the nabob of Arcot, as long as the latter adhered to the existing engagement with the Mahrattas, was also provided for; and all British ships, or vessels sailing under the protection of the British flag, which might have the misfortune to be wrecked on the Mahratta coast, were, as far as practicable, to be restored to the owners, together with such cargoes and stores as might be saved.

Such was the substance of a treaty between the Bombay government and Rugoba, which occasioned infinite discussions amongst the English in India and in Europe, and led to what is generally termed the first Mahratta war.

* About 28 years afterwards, on Bajee Rao's restoration in 1803, these jewels were delivered to him as a free gift from the honorable company.

CHAP. XXVI.

A. D. 1775.

Expedition, under Colonel Keating, sails for Guzerat.—Dèfeat of Rugonath Rao—flees to Surat—is joined by Colonel Keating—lands at Cambay—approbation of the Bombay government—dissent of Mr. Draper.—Instructions to Colonel Keating—he forms a junction with Rugoba's troops—march to Neriad—detail of operations.—Colonel Keating negotiates—his envoy derided and insulted—Rugonath Rao is persuaded to move towards the Deccan.—Battle of Arass.—Surprise at Bowpeer.—Treaty with Futih Sing.—Prospects of the belligerents at the close of the season.

THE Bombay government, before the treaty was finally settled, had prepared a force of 80 European artillery, 350 European infantry, 800 sepoy, and 160 gun-lascars, which, with their complement of officers and non-commissioned officers, made up the 1,500 men for immediate service. A reinforcement was to follow on the arrival of the troops expected from Madras.

Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Keating, commandant of the artillery and engineers under the Bombay presidency, was selected for the command in preference to Colonel Egerton, who was the next senior officer to General Gordon, but whose health was supposed to disqualify him for active service.

Lieutenant-Colonel Keating's detachment sailed from Bombay in the end of February, but in the meantime the army under

February. Hurry Punt Phurkay, accompanied by a part of the troops of Holkar and Sindia, amounting in all to about 30,000 men, had entered Guzerat in pursuit of Rugonath Rao, which obliged him and Govind Rao to raise the siege of Baroda, and retire beyond the Myhie, near to which,

February 17. at the village of Wassud, he was encamped, when, on the 17th February, the ministerial army arrived in his neighbourhood.

According to a plan suggested by the local knowledge of Futih Sing, the ministerial army, on the afternoon of the same day, suddenly crossed the river in three divisions at separate fords; and whilst Rugonath Rao's army was preparing to repel the centre attack, before Govind Rao and Khundee Rao Gaekwar, who were encamped on the plain at a short distance in the rear, could come to his assistance, the other divisions took him in both flanks; a body of Arabs, whom he had lately entertained, refused to fight without pay; Mannajee Phakray* and Sukaram Hurry, two of his best officers, were wounded in the commencement; the ground was confined, the confusion universal, and Rugoba,

* Mannajee Phakray was one of the legitimate Sindias of Kunneirkheir, and in consequence was more respected among the old Mahratta families than the great Mahadajee Sindia. We shall have frequent occasion to mention Mannajee Sindia, surnamed Phakray, or the heroic.

fancying that he was about to be seized by his own troops, suddenly set off from the field of battle, and fled with about 1,000 horse to Cambay. The nabob of that place, who had before intended to unite with him, was now apprehensive of the consequences of affording protection to a fugitive. Rugoba, therefore, applied to Mr. Charles Malet, at that time chief of the English factory, who had only heard by common report of the pending negotiation between Rugonath Rao and the Bombay government, but readily assisted to get him conveyed to Bhownuggur, whence he embarked for Surat, and had been four days at that place, when the vessels, on board of which were Lieutenant-Colonel Keating's detachment, anchored at Surat bar on the 27th February. In the meantime the defeated army

February 27. of Rugoba, under Govind Rao and Khundee Rao Gaekwar, Sewdasheo Ramchundur, Mannajee Phakray, and Sukaram Hurry, retired to Kupperwunj, and thence to Pulhanpoor. For the purpose of forming a junction with those chiefs, it was proposed to disembark the British troops at Cambay. The members of the Bombay government approved of that plan, with the exception of Mr. Daniel Draper, one of the members of council, who, at a consultation on the 7th March, dissented, because,

March 7. as no formal change or ratification of the treaty had taken place, he conceived the circumstances to be so much altered, and their means so inadequate to the end proposed, that delay was both justifiable and advisable, at least until it could be ascertained what number of Rugoba's party was likely to re-assemble, and what resources of money and of troops could be afforded from the other presidencies. Mr. Draper recommended that the detachment should remain with Rugoba at Surat to protect that place and Baroach, to give confidence to his cause, and, with Rugoba's concurrence, to secure the revenues of the districts to be ceded.

It so happened that the treaty was signed at Surat by Rugoba on the 6th March—the day before this dissent was made; but the president and the other members at once decided that it was more advisable to proceed; in short, that inaction would be tantamount to desertion of the cause, and equally impolitic and spiritless. Governor Hornby seems to have had an idea that his 1,500 men might overcome the whole Mahratta army; nor is the confidence and inexperience of Colonel Keating less apparent, for, on meeting the forlorn Rugoba at Surat, he congratulates the Bombay government on their good fortune at finding the ex-Peishwa so entirely dependent on them for his future success. The British detachment, accompanied by Rugoba, proceeded to Cambay, where they landed on the 17th

March 17. March; Colonel Keating, however, before he quitted Surat, probably in order to show their new ally his alacrity—for it could be attended with no other advantage—commenced the war by attacking a party of horse belonging to the ministerial army, which appeared in the neighbourhood. The Mahrattas withdrew and awaited his embarkation, when they took ample revenge, by plundering all within their reach who acknowledged the English authority.

Colonel Keating's instructions were far from precise, but almost exclusively of a military nature. The object of the expedition which he was appointed to command was briefly stated; he was sent, according to the words, "for the assistance of Rugoba against all his enemies, the ministerial party and their adherents; to move with his army, and to do everything for bringing the war to a speedy and happy issue, that he (Rugoba) may desire, and which he (Colonel Keating) may think the force under his command able to effect." Strict discipline among his troops, and particular attention to the prejudices of the natives; regular

and constant information, both of his own proceedings, and of the views, expectations, and designs of their ally, were the leading points particularly enjoined by government.

Colonel Keating was not authorized to act in any political capacity beyond the tenor of these orders; but, from an injudicious and excessive zeal, often as prejudicial to the public service as its opposite defect, he was ambitious of distinguishing himself as a politician, and entered into a correspondence with Futi Singh, shortly after he landed at Cambay, for the purpose of detaching him from the ministerial party, by persuading him that it was for his benefit. But those who do not perceive their real interest before it is pointed out by an enemy, are not likely to be convinced by mere reasoning. Colonel Keating had no personal knowledge of Futi Singh, no direct overtures had been made, and the British detachment had as yet gained neither advantage nor reputation. Nothing under these circumstances was to be expected from negotiating, especially with a Mahratta, but humiliation and disappointment. Before quitting Cambay, Colonel Keating's detachment was reinforced by the arrival of two companies of European grenadiers, and one battalion of sepoys, from Madras, which made up the stipulated complement of 2,500 men. On the

April 19. 19th of April the detachment formed a junction with the fugitive army of Rugoba at the village of Durmuj, eleven miles north-east from Cambay, where Rugoba's late followers assembled, principally, it would appear, in hopes of receiving their arrears. Mannajee Phakray and Sukaram Hurry were officers of reputation, and faithful to Rugoba's cause; but their own followers, amounting to 6,000 or 8,000, were without pay, mutinous and clamorous: the whole multitude which assembled in their camp, estimated at upwards of 20,000 men, were worse than useless. Colonel Keating, pleased with the formidable spectacle which the tents, and flags, and crowd of a Mahratta camp present, congratulated himself and the presidency on their prospects, but in the same despatch earnestly solicits a supply of treasure, and informs the government of his having advanced what he could from his military chest, that the spirit of *such* an army might not be damped.

The ministerial party had succeeded in detaching Khundee Rao Gaekwar from the cause of Rugoba, but were considerably weakened by the return of Holkar and Sindia, with about 12,000 horse, to Malwa, for reasons which are nowhere satisfactorily shown. Rugoba's party interpreted their departure as a secession in his favour, and it probably did proceed, on the part of Sindia, from his being called upon by Sukaram Bappoo to account for arrears due to the Peishwa—a circumstance to which may be attributed the enmity which subsisted between Mahadajee Sindia and Sukaram ever after this period, but could have occasioned no material alteration in Sindia's policy, as both Sindia and Holkar were at Poona a few months afterwards.

It was, however, confidently asserted by Rugoba's party that Sindia intended to join them, and that Holkar would never act against Mahadajee Sindia. The whole army under Hurry Punt, when joined by Futi Singh, amounted to about 25,000 men, of which 5,000 were infantry. Hurry Punt, in permitting the crowd to assemble about Rugoba at such a distance from the capital, after the season when the revenues were collected, and when the rains might be expected in the course of six weeks, acted more judiciously than if he had harassed his own troops to prevent the junction of his enemies.

On the 23rd of April, the army of Rugoba, the strength of which lay in the British detachment, moved from Durmuji to Wursura, and from thence to the Saburmattee. They then moved northward towards Kaira, but did not reach Mahtur, a village 30 miles north of Cambay, until the 3rd May. This inactivity, in the first instance, was unavoidable; the reinforcements had not arrived, and the commissariat of the Bombay troops was extremely defective; the delay in advancing was attributed to the numerous carts, baggage, and bazar; but, no doubt, was partly owing to the want of arrangement on the part of the commanding officer; and, above all, to the indecision of Rugoba, who was inclined to proceed to Ahmedabad and remain in Guzerat during the monsoon; but the Bombay government disapproved of this intention, and strongly recommended him to push on to Poona at once.

Before the army arrived at Mahtur, they had two partial actions with Hurry Punt; the first took place on the 28th April, at the village of Us-saumlee, and was entirely maintained by the English detachment, with very trifling loss; the second was four days afterwards, when 50 or 60 of Rugoba's army were killed or wounded—a loss which dispirited them ever after; but the enemy experienced a much greater, having made an attempt on the left of the English line, where they met with a severe repulse.

Colonel Keating, at length, by positive orders from Bombay, prevailed on Rugoba to change the direction of his route, and proceed towards Poona. They accordingly moved on the 5th; and before they reached Neriad, on the 8th, were again twice opposed—once in the mode usual for Mahratta horse, and a second time in the same manner, but supported by some pieces of cannon. As Neriad was a considerable town in possession of Khundee Rao Gaekwar, Rugoba, to punish his defection, and administer to his own necessities, imposed a contribution of 60,000 rupees; but, after wasting one week, he could only collect 40,000. On the 14th the army crept forward three miles further to the westward, and expected to have a decisive action at the Myhie; as it was known in the Mahratta camp that Hurry Punt Phurkay had received orders from Poona to attack Rugoba in case he should attempt to pass that river.

Colonel Keating, in the meantime, had continued his correspondence with Futih Sing Gaekwar; and although aware that it had been discovered by Hurry Punt Phurkay from the first, he still persuaded himself that he should be able to bring over Futih Sing. He even entered into a treaty on the 22nd April, secret as he supposed, and as Futih Sing pretended; and Colonel Keating was so credulous as to send an agent, Lieutenant George Lovibond, to the camp of Futih Sing, for the purpose of having it ratified. The agent was very grossly insulted, and the mission must have furnished a subject for ridicule in every Mahratta Kutha and Ukhbar* of the day. But Colonel Keating knew so little of the people as to be insensible of the derision to which his notable diplomacy exposed him. The circumstances of the mission are too characteristic to be passed over. The agent, attended by the wukeel of Futih Sing, was carried to the camp of Hurry Punt; and, on expressing his surprise at being brought there, was merely told by the wukeel that his master had

* Ukhbars are native newspapers; for an explanation of Kuthas, the reader may refer to page 10.

joined. During the evening some inferior people about Hurry Punt and Futih Sing were sent to visit the British envoy. Early next morning the wukeel told Mr. Lovibond that a tent was pitched for his reception, where he must meet Futih Sing and his dewan to execute the treaty. In this tent he was kept the whole day, not without expressing his impatience; but Mr. Lovibond, by not bursting into a passion, which would be expected in a European, probably disappointed them of half their mirth. At last, at 5 o'clock in the evening, a single horseman rode up to the door of the tent, and desired the gentleman to follow the army to Dubhaun. On his complying, the palanquin in which he travelled was surrounded by a party of Hurry Punt's horse, and he was thus exposed as a prisoner to their whole army. At this time the wukeel coming up, with much seeming concern, confirmed the truth of his being a prisoner, and earnestly begged of him to save his master by destroying the treaty and his other credentials. The good-natured Englishman contrived to do this most effectually, and, after the horsemen had brought him to the middle of Futih Sing's camp bazar, they rode off, and there left him. The wukeel immediately urged him not to lose an opportunity so favourable, but to follow him. He was then carried to the tent of the dewan, where, after one hour, came Futih Sing himself. He expressed great gratitude for the precaution Mr. Lovibond had taken in his favour by destroying the treaty, which he begged to excuse himself from renewing at that time, owing to the vigilance of Hurry Punt and the other great officers, but that he would soon be able to elude their jealousy, and make his escape to Baroda.* The envoy of Colonel Keating, after having thus furnished subject for what would, if well told, occasion as much laughter to Mahrattas as the story of the sleeper awakened among Arabs, was escorted back to the British camp. There are certain kinds of ridicule which are peculiarly national, and the full force of this imposture, practised by two personages in such high authority as Futih Sing and Hurry Punt Phurkay, would probably, from its seeming puerility, be at that time little understood, except by Mahrattas; but the Bombay government, in their judgment, disapproved of Colonel Keating's proceedings, and ordered Mr. Mostyn to join his army for the purpose of transacting its political affairs. The troops, however, had advanced too far from Cambay, through a hostile country, to enable Mr. Mostyn to overtake them.

The army, after passing Neriad, continued their march towards the Myhie, and arrived at Nappar on the 17th. From Neriad
 May 17. their route lay through a highly cultivated country, along a narrow, deep, sandy road, which only admits one cart abreast, being enclosed on both sides by high milk-bush hedges. Numerous topes, or groves, appear in every direction; the country on both sides is generally a succession of enclosed fields, the borders of which are lined by stately trees, such as the mountain neem, the tamarind, the moura, and the mango. Guzerat, from Barreah and Godra, to Kattywar, is in general a perfect flat; between Neriad and Myhie there are a few undulations, which add considerably to the beauty of the country, but tend to obstruct the progress of an army by confining the line of wheeled carriage to the narrow road just described. After passing Nappar about a mile and a half, the country opens on a fine plain, interspersed with trees, extending from Arass to near the banks of the river, which are full of extensive and deep ravines.

Bugoba's horse, after their first skirmish on leaving Cambay, instead of

* Mr. Lovibond's letter to Colonel Keating is on the Bombay Records.

acting on the flanks, and guarding the baggage, used constantly to inter-mix with it, and, with the characteristic feeling of Mahrattas depressed by previous discomfiture, on occasions of the smallest danger crowded for safety towards the British detachment. Colonel Keating, at Rugoba's request, in order to give them a little confidence, had formed two guards, consisting each of 200 rank and file, 100 Europeans, and 100 native infantry, supported by two guns. One of these guards was posted in the rear, and one on the reverse flank of the whole army; the front and rear of the British detachment were composed of European grenadiers; and the orders were, that in case of an attack on the flank, the rear-guard should move to its support, whilst the division of grenadiers occupied their place; but in case the attack should be made on the rear-guard, the division of grenadiers should fall back and join it.

On the morning of the 18th May, when marching in this order towards the Myhie, about a mile and a half from Nappar, a smart cannonade from six guns suddenly opened on their rear from behind a grove on the left side of the road, where a large body of the enemy were advancing. Colonel Keating immediately halted the line, rode back, found Captain Myers, who commanded the division of grenadiers, moving according to the instructions, and having ordered down another gun and a howitzer, soon silenced the artillery of the enemy, and drove back the advancing body. Two of the enemy's cannon were not withdrawn with the rest, and Captain Myers, with some of the other officers, proposed "having a dash at their guns;" to which Colonel Keating assented, and sent for the other company of grenadiers. The object of attack was in an enclosed field, the road to which was of the same kind as that already described, between two high milk-bush hedges. As soon as both companies of grenadiers were formed with the rear-guard, they were directed to advance with order and regularity—an injunction which Colonel Keating found it necessary to repeat; Captain Myers, however, again quickened his pace, until he got near the guns. He then halted, and had just formed for the attack, when a body of the enemy's horse charged him; but being supported by the artillery, which Colonel Keating directed in person, they were driven back with great slaughter. The division had re-formed to prosecute their object, when another charge, more desperate than the first, was again made and repulsed, though many of the grenadiers were cut down, and, among the rest, the gallant captains, Myers and Serle. This was certainly the crisis which generally gains or loses an action; Colonel Keating performed the duty of a good captain of artillery, but, as a commander, he neglected to support his exhausted men with fresh troops. The Mahrattas took advantage of the oversight, placed two elephants to block up the narrow road, and, being encouraged by a treacherous carcoon in Rugoba's army, charged the rear of the division, thus completely cut off from the main body. But the troops, as yet undismayed, facing about, attacked and routed them. By this time a body of Arabs and Sindians in Rugoba's army were advancing in their irregular manner, and Rugoba's horse, by careering about between the advanced body and the British line, occasioned infinite confusion, and could scarcely be distinguished from the enemy, who, for a moment, seemed to have relinquished the attack; when, suddenly, one of the companies of European grenadiers, without any apparent reason, went to the right-about, and retreated at a quick pace; this retrograde movement, as was afterwards discovered by a court of inquiry, was partly the fault of their officer, whose word of command

to face to the right, for the purpose of retiring, was mistaken for "right-about face." Without orders from Colonel Keating, the retreat was, at all events, inexcusable, and, as might have been expected, was attended with disastrous consequences. The sepoys immediately fancied themselves defeated, they also turned, and the rest of the Europeans followed their example. Some order was preserved until they gained the milk-bush hedges, when, in spite of all the exertions of their officers, they broke their ranks, and ran towards the line in the greatest confusion, whilst the enemy came amongst them, sword in hand, and made a great slaughter. Colonel Keating in vain attempted to rally the grenadiers; those men who had a few minutes before fought with all the ardour and constancy of British troops, now fled disgracefully; but the support of the line, and the fire of the whole artillery, within 40 yards, again drove back the Mahrattas, who finally sustained a severe defeat. Such was the battle of Arass; and, notwithstanding the circumstances attending it, which are related principally from the candid narrative of Colonel Keating, it is a victory recorded by the best of testimony, the enemy, in terms highly creditable.* But it was dearly purchased. The loss on the part of Colonel Keating's detachment amounted to 222 men, of whom 86 were Europeans, and 11 of them officers.†

Colonel Keating arrived at Baroach on the 29th May, where he deposited his wounded. On the 8th June he again marched, intending to cross the Nerbuddah; but as the proposed ford was found impracticable, the army on the 10th moved up the river towards Bowpeer. After a march of about 20 miles, at five o'clock in the evening, Colonel Keating received intelligence that Hurry Punt was still on the north side of the river, about eight or ten miles further on. Having now less respect for his enemy, and having found the simple secret in Mahratta warfare of always being the first to attack, Colonel Keating resolved on moving forward, as soon as he had allowed his men some refreshment. Accordingly, he was again in motion before one o'clock in the morning; but the troops of Rugoba, like their ill-omened master, whose presence seemed to blight the fairest prospect in every affair in which he was engaged, on this occasion, for the first time since their former slight check, stimulated by the hope of plunder, and elated by having received a little pay, part of a lakh of rupees advanced to Rugoba by the Baroach factory, showed an inclination to advance, crowded the road, broke through Colonel Keating's line of march in several places, and at last obliged him to halt till daylight. The enemy, therefore, saw him long before he could get near, struck their camp in the greatest confusion, threw their guns into the river, sent their heavy baggage across the Nerbuddah, and retreated along the north bank with the loss of an elephant and a few camels, which were plundered by Rugoba's horse.

Colonel Keating's intention of proceeding to the southward, according to repeated orders from Bombay, was now set aside, for many judicious military reasons urged by Rugoba, of which the presidency afterwards

* Mahratta MSS.

† The officers killed were Captains Myers and Serle; Lieutenants Morris, Henry, Prosser, Anderson, and Young.

The officers wounded were Captain Frith, Lieutenant Dawson, and Ensigns Danon and Torin. Rugoba's Arabs were also severe sufferers, but they wreaked their vengeance on the treacherous carcoon, whom they seized, and, contrary to Rugoba's express orders, put him to instant death, by literally cutting him in pieces with their swords.

approved; and it was therefore determined to retire to Dubhoy, 19 miles south-east of Baroda, whilst Rugoba's troops were encamped at Bheelapoor, a village on the Dadhur, between these places.

Colonel Keating then proposed to the Bombay government, at the repeated solicitation of Govind Rao Gaekwar, to reduce Baroda as soon as the violence of the monsoon abated, to which they assented. In the meantime preparations were in progress at the presidency for the purpose of reinforcing Colonel Keating's detachment, replenishing their ammunition, and completing their stores.

Futih Sing was now in earnest in his desire to enter into a treaty; and Colonel Keating, foreseeing more advantage to the cause by admitting his overtures than by reducing him, recommended to Rugoba the conclusion of such an agreement as might reconcile Govind Rao to the measure, secure the alliance of Futih Sing, and insure relief to Rugoba's urgent necessities by a supply of treasure.

Futih Sing agreed to furnish 3,000 horse, to be at all times kept at Rugoba's service; but, if required, 2,000 more were to be provided, for which pay was to be allowed: a jagheer of three lakhs, which Futih Sing, by his agreement with Mahdoo Rao Bullal, was bound to reserve in Guzerat for his brother Govind Rao, was no longer to be required; but, in lieu of it, Rugonath Rao agreed to bestow a jagheer of ten lakhs on Govind Rao Gaekwar in the Deccan. Twenty-six lakhs of rupees were to be paid to Rugoba in 61 days; and the East India Company, as guaranties and negotiators between the parties, were to receive the Gaekwar's share of the revenue in Baroach, and several villages in perpetuity, estimated at (2,13,000) two lakhs and thirteen thousand rupees.

This pacification, effected through Colonel Keating's management, was, as circumstances then stood, politic; for, although Govind Rao afterwards seceded from the agreement, he declared himself satisfied at the time.*

* From Colonel Keating's reports to the Bombay government, which are my chief authority for the above, it is evident that there must have been considerable modifications in the treaty of which the following production is the only copy that I have found either in English or Mahratta. It is, however, from very high authority, being an enclosure of a letter of 30th January 1802 from Mr. Jonathan Duncan, when governor of Bombay, to Sir Barry Close, resident at Poona.

"Translate of the copy of the treaty between Rugonath Bajeerao Pundit Purdan on one part, and Futty Sing and Seajee Rao Shumsher Buhadur on the other part.

That Seajee and Futty Sing Shumsher Buhadur had disobeyed and joined with the rebels, but now by the means of Colonel Thomas Keating, for and in behalf of the united English East India Company, have, by promising presents, accommodated matters with Pundit Purdan, the following are the articles of the Gaekwar's proposals.

Article I.—That Seajee, and Futty Sing Gaekwar Shumsher Buhadur, do hereby agree to pay the sum of eight lakhs of rupees every year to the Sircar.

II. That they are to attend, as usual, with a troop of 3,000 good horse and men, which number is not to be lessened.

III. In the late Madoo Rao's time they used to pay every year three lakhs of rupees to Govind Rao Gaekwar Sena Keskel Shumsher Buhadur, which sum is settled not to be paid him in future, about which Govind Rao is to make no claim against Seajee and Futty Sing.

IV. Conde Rao Gaekwar Hemut Buhadur is to be continued on the same footing, and agreeable to the agreement made in the time of the late Damajee, deceased.

V. That the government and revenue of the purgunnahs of Baroach have been wholly ceded to the company, agreeable to the agreement made between them and Sreemunt Pundit Purdan, about which Seajee and Futty Sing are not to make any dispute.

VI. The purgunnahs Chickaly Veriow, near Surat, and Coral, near the Nerbuddah river, and about 15 coss distant from Baroach, which together make three purgunnahs,

The war, thus waged in Guzerat, was also prosecuted by sea. The Mahratta navy in the ministerial interest, at the commencement of the war, consisted of six ships—one of 46 guns, one of 38, one of 32, and two of 26 guns, with 10 armed vessels, mounting each from two to nine guns, besides swivels. This fleet was met at sea by Commodore John Moor in the *Revenge*, frigate, and the *Bombay*, grab. Though the Mahrattas were formidable in appearance, the commodore stood down to attack them, when they bore away with all sail set; but having singled out their largest ship, the *Shumsher Jung*, of 46 guns, both the English vessels gave her chase, and at last the grab, being an excellent sailer, brought her to action. The *Revenge* came up to the assistance of the *Bombay*, and, after an engagement of three hours, the *Shumsher Jung* blew up, her commander, with most of the crew, perished, and the ship was totally destroyed.

On the side of Rugoba everything seemed favourable; elated by the successful exertions of his allies, he presented the company with the permanent cession of the valuable districts of Hansot and Amod, then estimated at 2,77,000 rupees of annual revenue. The whole amount acquired by the war, including cessions by Futih Sing, was valued at 24,15,000 rupees, of all which the Bombay government had obtained possession, excepting Bassein and its dependencies.

The state of the young Peishwa's affairs wore an aspect proportionally unpromising. Hurry Punt Phurkay, after the surprise at Bowpeer, left Gunnessh Punt Beeray in command of a detachment for the protection of Ahmedabad, and returned to the Deccan by a ford about 100 miles above where his heavy baggage had crossed. Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees were much disheartened in consequence of his defeat, and dreaded the consequences which generally follow disaster in India, by the defection of allies. Moodajee Bhonslay had, a few months before, prevailed over his brother Sabajee; and although, whilst Rugonath Rao was a fugitive in Guzerat, the former had solicited and obtained, through Nana Furnuwees, from the young Peishwa, a confirmation of the rights and honors of Sena Sahib Soobeh for his son Rughoojee, together with such privileges for himself as pertained to the guardianship, yet the ministers were apprehensive that the rising fortunes of Rugoba would ensure him the support of the raja of Berar. Several men of consequence already began to turn their eyes on Rugoba; and Nizam Ally, in hopes of being able to exact something additional from the one party or the other, or at least to retain what he had already recovered, opened a negotiation with Rugoba, which greatly alarmed the ministers, especially as the death of Rookun-ud-Dowlah, happening about this period, obstructed their former correct intelligence of his master's real designs. Nizam Ally augmented their uncertainty by pretending to disbelieve the truth of Mahdoo Rao Narain's legitimacy, and by proposing, as a conciliatory measure to all parties, that Amrut Rao, the adopted son of Rugonath Rao, should be made Peishwa. By this means Nizam Ally exacted a further

the Gaekwar has ceded to the honorable company for ever, on account of the peace they have made between the Gaekwar and Sreemunt Punt Purdan.

VII. That in the court of Sreemunt Punt Purdan the Gaekwar must pay a due attention to everything that is reasonable, without having any communication with its enemies.

VIII. That for the confirmation and compliance of the above articles, the honorable company stand security; and should the Gaekwars appear any way false, the honorable company is not to protect them. Rugoba is also to fulfil the above articles without any difference.

cession from the ministers of nearly 18 lakhs of rupees* of annual revenue. Great promises were also made to Sindia and Holkar; nor did any sacrifice that could ensure the exclusion of Rugoba appear too great to the ruling Bramins at Poona. The cause of Rugoba was extremely unpopular; of the generality of the Bramins in Poona, even those who were disposed to acquit him of the atrocity of having conspired against the life of his nephew, remembered with indignation the criminal opposition he had always shown to the wise and virtuous Mahdoo Rao; they reflected with regret on his losses to the state, and on the unfortunate issue of all his measures; the weakness and folly of his whole conduct they viewed with contempt; and his present connection with the usurping and impure Europeans they regarded with jealousy and detestation. Others, and such were probably the majority of the Mahratta nation, true to no party, and guided by no principle, hitherto considered Rugoba as an unfortunate person, with whom it was unwise to be connected; but the defeat of Hurry Punt, the subsequent discomfiture of his deputy Gunnessh Punt by Ameen Khan, an officer of Rugoba, the siege of Ahmedabad carried on by the same officer, the preparations of the English, the doubts of the young Peishwa's legitimacy, and the desire of many of the Mahratta chiefs to become independent of the Bramin ministry, occasioned a revolution in the opinions of many, and an anxiety in the minds of all. In short, such was at this period the state of the Mahratta country, that it is generally believed that any success of equal importance to that at Arras, on the opening of the expected campaign, would have brought the ministry into the terms of Rugonath Rao; and as the fact of Mahdoo Rao Narain's legitimacy would have been proved to the satisfaction of the English, Rugoba appeared certain of being established as regent. But fortune was preparing a change far different from such a prospect.

* He obtained rupees 17,84,576-8-0. (State accounts, Poona Records.)

CHAP. XXVII.

FROM A. D. 1774 TO A. D. 1778.

The supreme council in Bengal assume the powers of general administration.—Correspondence with Bombay relative to their late proceedings—disapprove of the connection with Rugoba.—Death of Sabajee Bhonslay.—Violent condemnation of the Bombay measures—peremptory orders in consequence.—Lieutenant-Colonel Upton despatched to Poona as envoy plenipotentiary.—Remonstrances of the Bombay government—they vindicate their conduct—their belief in Rugoba's innocence accounted for.—Reflections on the precipitate interference of the supreme government—evils of which it was the cause.—Mr. Hastings' opinion—letter to Sukaram Bappoo.—Colonel Upton's negotiation broken off—proceedings at Bengal on receipt of this intelligence.—The ministers in the meantime sign the treaty of Poorundhur—its conditions—disappointment and indignation of the Bombay government.—Offers of Rugoba—reprehensible conduct of the Bombay government.—Insurrection of the impostor Suddaba.—The Bombay measures approved by the Court of Directors—resolution in consequence—dissent of Mr. Draper—motives which appear to have actuated the Directors.—Progress of Suddaba—defeat—seizure and execution.—Colonel Upton recalled.—Mr. Mostyn re-appointed resident.—Evasive conduct of the ministry.—An agent of the French government is received with distinction at Poona.—The Concan restored to order.—Conquests of Hyder.—Retrospective view of the history of Kolapoor—depredations and piracies.—Progress of Hyder.—Successful artifice of Hurry Punt Phurkay.—Death of Ram Raja, and of the Pritee Needhee.—Affairs of Moodajee Bhonslay—and of Futih Sing Gaekwar.—The son of Trimbuckjee Raja Bhonslay is selected as raja of Satara.—Curious artifice of the Bramins with regard to the intermarriage of the imprisoned rajas.

THE supreme council in Bengal assumed the powers of general administration in the affairs of British India on the 20th October A. D. 1774. 1774 ; and during the ensuing month addressed a letter to the Bombay government, requiring an account of the state of that presidency. This letter was received at Bombay on the 7th December ; but as the president and members were then in the midst of preparations for the expedition to Salsette, they deferred the consideration of the Bengal letter until after the troops had proceeded on their destination, and sent no reply until the last day of the year.

Three months afterwards, or on the 31st March, the Bombay government further reported to Bengal their proceedings up to that date. But early in February intelligence of the siege of Tannah reached the governor-general in council, by the way of Tellicherry and Madras, before they received the reply from Bombay of the 31st December. The delay on the part of the Bombay government, certainly, to say the least, wore the semblance

of a premeditated evasion, and, as new authority is generally tenacious, the governor-general and council addressed another letter A. D. 1775. on the 3rd February, censuring the Bombay presidency for having gone to war with the Mahrattas, and peremptorily requiring immediate and special information of the causes and motives of their conduct. On the 21st May the Bombay government received the reply to their first letter of the 31st December, wherein the supreme government offered no opinion respecting the capture of Salsette, but disapproved of the intention of joining Rugoba, not because Rugoba was making war against his lawful prince, and was generally obnoxious in the Mahratta country, or because the Bombay government had unjustly espoused the cause of a man branded with the crime of murder—circumstances of which the Bombay government, it is justice to them to say, were never well informed, and of which the supreme government were ignorant—but they disapproved, because, to use their own words, “it was inconsistent with your negotiations with the ruling powers at Poona, and with the authority of this government.” They also expressed apprehensions that the measure might involve them in hostilities with Sabajee Bhonslay, the enemy of Rugoba, and their neighbour. To which the Bombay government replied that they neither have, nor ever had, any negotiations with the ministry at Poona, and that they need be under no apprehension in regard to Sabajee Bhonslay, as he had been killed in action by Moodajee, the friend of Rugoba, who was now the acknowledged guardian of Rughoojee, and the ruler of Berar; all which was perfectly true,—victory had declared for Sabajee; Moodajee was surrounded by his brother's troops, and on the point of being made prisoner, when Sabajee, in the exultation of the moment, drove his elephant up to that on which Moodajee was riding, and called out to him to submit. Moodajee replied by the discharge of a pistol, which laid his brother dead, and left him undisputed regent and guardian of the young Rughoojee, who, it will be remembered, was his son.*

To the report of their proceedings up to the 31st March, the Bombay government, on the 12th August, received a reply from Bengal dated on the 31st May. Long before that time the minds of the president and members of the supreme government were in a state of strong excitement, caused by those well-known controversies between Warren Hastings and his council, which afterwards occupied so much of the time and attention of the British Parliament. But on the present occasion, president and members united in a violent condemnation of the Bombay measures; they declared the treaty with Rugoba invalid, and the Mahratta war “impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized, and unjust;” they protested against the Bombay government for all consequences, and peremptorily required them “to withdraw their forces to their own garrisons, in whatsoever state their affairs might be, unless their safety should be endangered by an instant retreat.” The governor-general and council also intimated their intention of sending an agent of their own to open a negotiation with the ruling party of the Mahratta state, and desired the Bombay government to retain possession of Salsette and Bassein, but on no account to form any treaty without their previous sanction.

The Bombay government stated, in reply, that the negotiations, which

* Mahratta MSS. Where I do not expressly acknowledge my authorities from A. D. 1774 to 1783, I beg the reader to understand that I write from the records of the Bombay government.

led to the measures thus hastily condemned, had been begun before the controlling administration was formed ; they defended their conduct on the grounds of the necessity of determining with promptitude, and recapitulated their reasons for deciding and acting in the manner they had done ; pointed out the evils prevented by the capture of Salsette, and the fair and honorable advantages secured to their employers and their country by the treaty with Rugonath Rao. They dwelt on the shame and degradation which must be the consequence of retracting a solemn treaty in support of an object equally just and practicable, and pledged themselves, on their own responsibility, to fulfil their engagements. They sent Mr. William Tayler, a member of their council, to Bengal, who advocated their cause with much ability ; and his report on Bombay affairs, dated 9th October 1775, displays, at that early period, a very considerable knowledge of the history and character of the Mahrattas.

The supreme government, however, adhered to their opinion of the expediency of the orders which they had transmitted. Lieutenant-Colonel John Upton, of the Bengal establishment, was selected by Mr. Hastings as envoy plenipotentiary, and instructed to repair to Poona, and conclude a treaty between the Mahratta state and the Bombay government. The president and council of that establishment, being excluded from all participation, strongly remonstrated against this proceeding as a wanton degradation of their authority, and their representations were supported with energy by their deputy at Bengal. " I trust," says Mr. Tayler, " that it will appear to your Honors, &c., that at the time it pleased the wisdom of Parliament to arm you with controlling powers over the presidencies, it was by no means their intention that they should appear so much degraded, and so contemptible in the eyes of the native government, as the presidency of Bombay must be unless you will commit the treaty of peace to their management.

" Our honorable employers, and the whole British nation, may be naturally led to suppose that, in your opinion, the members of that government are devoid, in every degree, of integrity and abilities, which would be the most cruel and unjust of all imputations ; for I can dare to affirm, not a person who concluded that treaty was actuated by any other motive than their obedience and duty to their employers, whose interests appeared to them to be most materially benefited by their engagements."

Such was the language then held by the Bombay government, with apparent sincerity as well as spirit, and, as far as we have yet retailed of their conduct and prospects, certainly with no inconsiderable degree of reason. It must be recollected that the president and members, throughout the whole of the rise and progress of their connection with Rugoba, were strongly impressed with the belief of his being innocent of the murder of his nephew. Many of our countrymen, who, by long residence in the Deccan, have become acquainted with the notoriety of the fact, although perhaps represented with exaggeration, have, from this circumstance alone, entertained strong doubts of the integrity of Mr. Hornby and his council ; and some inveigh, with a feeling far from reprehensible, against Englishmen who could seek by such an instrument to attain their ends and gratify their ambition. But to account for this belief on the part of the Bombay government, it is necessary to state that Sukaram Bappoo was originally concerned in Rugoba's conspiracy against the liberty, though not the life, of Narain Rao. After the murder, as it was deemed by the ministers generally—a measure of prudence to affect a disbelief of Rugonath Rao's participation—of course Sukaram Bappoo had

stronger reasons than any of them for professing that opinion. It was this impression, from the reports first circulated at Poona, which the members of the Bombay government received from their envoy, Mr. Mostyn; and before it was possible for them to ascertain the real circumstances, they were engaged as a party hostile to the ministers, when it was as much the interest of the one to uphold Rugoba's innocence, as it was of the other to aggravate his guilt. Parties so influenced diverge from the truth in all countries, more especially in India, where an evidence is so apt to suit the word to the wish of his auditor. The same reasons operated in creating a belief that the child named Mahdoo Rao Narain was supposititious.

The Bengal presidency, where they had Mahratta connections, received their first information through the government of Sabajee Bhonslay, a partizan of the ministers. They were also, no doubt, irritated at the neglect of their orders, and the apparent contempt of their authority; and as we find men, in all situations, too often influenced by their feelings when they should be guided only by their judgment, we may suppose that they saw, in their full force, the evils of inordinate ambition, and the wisdom of that Parliament which had so opportunely vested them with power to control such an unjustifiable enterprize, by interposing in behalf of justice and moderation. The clause in the Act of Parliament was not sufficiently specific; the intention of establishing a uniform plan of action with respect to peace and war required, at a distance so remote as India from England, the strongest authority in the supreme council; but, as their powers were not clearly defined, the members of government should have perceived that a firm but calm exercise of power for a long period was the best way of establishing an efficient control, unless they could obtain an amendment of the statute. But they violently stretched their power in support of what they deemed propriety, and issued mandates characteristic of an inexperienced and arbitrary government, which, to gratify temporary resentments, or forward its impatient selfish will, weakens much more than it strengthens the efficiency of distant authority.

Mr. Hornby and his council were not blameless, even in what has already been mentioned, and their subsequent conduct accelerated rather than averted the misfortunes which ensued. But the precipitate interference of the governor-general and council was attended by effects pernicious to the interests of their country—effects which, but for the weak government of France, might, together with the loss of the American colonies, have proved a fatal blow to Great Britain. Confining reflections, however, to the boundary of Maharashtra, suffice it to say that it depressed the Bombay presidency, lowered its political importance, and obstructed that advancement and prosperity which, from its situation and maritime advantages, it would otherwise naturally have attained; it immediately tended to strengthen the hands of the ministers at Poorundhur, and it ultimately cemented the tottering confederacy of the Mahrattas, under the administration of Nana Furnuwees.

The president and council of Bombay, on receiving the Bengal order of the 31st May, directed an immediate cessation of hostilities; and as soon as the roads permitted, Colonel Keating, accompanied by Rugoba, returned towards Surat. But instead of strictly retiring within the company's districts, Colonel Keating, on the earnest recommendation of Rugoba, was permitted by the Bombay government to encamp at Karod, a village about 25 miles east of Surat, which, although a deviation from the

orders of the supreme government, was afterwards acknowledged as a useful support in facilitating their negotiations at Poondhurdur, at which place Colonel Upton arrived on the 28th December.

Mr. Hastings was sensible that the condemnation of the Bombay measures was unnecessarily violent, but he had been one of the first to recommend a controlling authority in India, which, in that remote empire, considered of itself, was an object in the highest degree important. The mandate issued was now irrevocable; Sukaram Bappoo had been informed, by a letter from the governor-general, that the conduct of the Bombay government was contrary to the company's order, "because they have directed all their officers not to make any war, nor enter on any dispute. My employer, the king of England," says the governor-general, "has directed that all the company's governors in India should obtain mine and my council's permission, as king's governor and council of Bengal, either to make war or peace." In short, that he had therefore issued orders to desist from hostilities, requested of the ministers to do the same, and intimated his intention of sending an envoy to negotiate a peace. If the governor-general of British India had then said "to dictate a peace," and shown a determination to maintain that ground, however bold the words may sound, he would probably, at that moment, have succeeded with Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees.

After the despatch of the first letters, the supreme government, even for the sake of consistency, would have been obliged to regulate their future measures by the tenor of those orders. Advices having been received of the successes in Guzerat, it seemed not improbable that a revolution might have taken place before Colonel Upton's arrival at Poona. Adopting, therefore, the same equitable principle with which they had professed to set out, that a substantive state has a right to make any change in its internal government which only affects itself, the envoy was instructed to negotiate a peace with either party whom he might find the acknowledged authority in the empire. But the governor-general and council had in effect already become parties; and the members of the Bombay government, who felt and wrote as if the supreme government had ranged themselves on the side of their enemies, remark, with some justice, in one of their despatches to the Court of Directors, "they have acknowledged the legitimacy of the government of the ministers, before they could have any competent knowledge of the justice of their pretensions."

The ministers soon perceived the advantages thus placed in their hands :

A. D. 1776. and as Bramins, in politics, misconstrue moderation, and attribute concession solely to fear, they assumed a high tone of demand and menace, which Colonel Upton, judging by himself, believed to be firm and sincere. The supreme government were under a mistake in imagining that Bassein as well as Salsette was in possession of the Bombay presidency. The envoy was enjoined to require the cession both of these and of the islands in Bombay harbour, and also of the Mahratta shares of revenue in the city of Baroach, with such other advantages for the company as circumstances might enable him to obtain.

Colonel Upton's correspondence bears ample testimony of sincerity and moderation; but he was ill-qualified to conduct a negotiation with Mahratta Bramins. The ministers greatly extolled the just and honorable motives which "had determined the great governor of Calcutta to order peace to be concluded." But when Colonel Upton proposed retaining Salsette, &c., the cession of Bassein, and the revenues of Baroach, they

affected to consider such an application as perfectly unauthorized, and pertinently asked the envoy, "how the Bengal government, who had so justly condemned the war, could yet be so ready to avail themselves of its advantages." The only reply to this was, that Salsette had been taken possession of as a precautionary measure, long deemed necessary to the safety of Bombay, and the prosperity of its commerce; but the ministers persisted in their language, and expressed a wish "that they had not, on a supposed confidence of the power of the governor of Calcutta over the people of Bombay, suspended hostilities, and thereby, at an enormous expense, maintained a vast army inactive, with which they should otherwise long since have settled the business." They demanded the immediate surrender of the delinquent Rugoba, and the entire restoration of the territory occupied by the Bombay government since the commencement of the war, on which they would, as a favour to the governor-general, agree to pay 12 lakhs of rupees, in order to reimburse the East India Company for the expenses incurred by the Bombay government. They seconded their arguments with threats, and mistook the mild remonstrances of the envoy for timidity. Colonel Upton, conceiving the negotiation at an end, expressed this opinion to the governor-general and council in a letter, dated 7th February, when they immediately determined to support the cause of Rugoba with the utmost vigour. They prepared troops for embarkation, ordered a large supply of treasure to be transmitted to Bombay, and directed troops to be sent from Madras. They wrote letters to Rugoba, to Nizam Ally, and Hyder; and endeavoured, in the same manner, to induce Moodajee Bhonslay, Mahadajee Sindia, and Tookajee Holkar to embrace their cause, or at all events to engage their neutrality.

The favourable change in the sentiments of the Bengal government towards himself reached Rugoba almost as soon as it got to Bombay, and raised his spirits and expectations; but the ministers, almost immediately after they had carried their menaces to the highest pitch, acceded at once to the greater part of Colonel Upton's original demands, and, before accounts had time to reach Calcutta that the negotiation was broken off, the treaty of Poorundhur was settled. It was signed on the 1st March, and consisted of 19 articles, but two of them were afterwards erased by mutual consent, and an additional clause signed. The treaty was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Upton on the part of the company's government, and by Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees on that of the Peishwa's; but the titles of Rao Pundit Purdhan are only mentioned in the treaty, the name of the Peishwa having been omitted.

The substance of the articles was a general peace between the English East India Company and the Mahrattas. Salsette to be retained or restored at the pleasure of the governor-general and council; if restored, the Peishwa's government agreed to relinquish territory worth three lakhs of rupees of annual revenue as an equivalent. To this exchange the supreme government could not be expected to accede, although Nana Furnuwees afterwards pretended that it had been referred with perfect confidence as a question of equity, from a reliance upon the justice of Mr. Hastings. All claims on the revenue of the city of Baroach, together with territory in its neighbourhood, producing three lakhs of rupees, was ceded, as the treaty states, "by way of friendship to the English Company." Twelve lakhs of rupees were also yielded in payment of the expenses incurred by the Bombay government. The cessions made by Futhi Sing Gaskwar were to be restored to him, provided it could be proved that he had no authority to make such alienations without the consent of the Peishwa's

government. The treaty between the Bombay government and Rugoba was formally annulled. The English troops to return to their garrisons, and the army of Rugoba to be disbanded within a month. A general amnesty to be proclaimed to all the followers of Rugoba, four only excepted, whom the ministers knew to be particularly implicated in the murder of Narain Rao. If Rugonath Rao should refuse to disband his army, the English agreed not to assist him. On condition of his assenting to the prescribed terms, the Peishwa and his ministers consented to afford him an establishment of 1,000 horse, to allow him 200 domestics, to be chosen by himself, and to pay him 25,000 rupees monthly for his other expenses, but his residence was fixed at Kopergaum on the Godavery. It was particularly specified that no assistance should be afforded to Rugonath Rao, or to any subject or servant of the Peishwa who should excite disturbance or rebellion in the Mahratta dominions. The treaties of 1739 and 1756, and all other agreements not suspended or dissolved by the present articles, were confirmed. It was mutually agreed to assist the crews and restore the wrecks and cargoes of vessels of the respective nations, thrown on each other's coasts.

Nothing could exceed the disappointment of the Bombay government when they learnt the terms of the treaty. They seemed to consider their own interest and dignity sacrificed to a jealous assumption of authority. They had no power to protest, and could therefore only vent their indignation by entering dissents on their own records against almost every article, with the view of ultimately submitting their objections to the Court of Directors. They certainly had cause for irritation in the manner which their conduct had been condemned, and their power in a great degree suspended; but they seem to have been determined to find objections, and even petulantly hinted that Colonel Upton must have been in bodily fear, or he never would have consented to terms so derogatory to the English nation: they, however, with more propriety, ask—"Who is this Rao Pundit Purdhan? Why is his name omitted? If Colonel Upton has had proof of the legitimacy of the child, said to be the son of Narain Rao, why is that circumstance left in doubt? or if not proved, why is Rugonath Rao, the rightful Peishwa, wholly excluded?"*

Rugoba could never entirely comprehend the nature of the interference on the part of the governor-general and council; but under a supposition that it arose from their deeming the advantages he had granted inadequate, he proposed, not only to confirm the treaty of Surat by a new agreement with the Bengal government, but, with the single exception of Viziadroog (Gheriah), to cede the whole Concan, to put the company's troops in possession of one of the passes in the Ghauts, to purchase annually 10 lakhs of rupees' worth of their woollens and metals, at an advance of 15 per cent. on the prime cost, including all charges; he also proposed that they should unite to subdue Nizam Ally; and made several other offers, of which, as none could be accepted, a further enumeration is unnecessary, but one inducement was too remarkable to be passed over, as, with his Mahratta ideas, it must have appeared irresistible. Rugoba offered to cede 10 per cent. of all the jagheers in the Mahratta empire; including, of course, the Mahratta possessions in the Deccan, and

* Although the circumstance is nowhere explained by the Mahrattas, the omission, on the part of the ministers, of the name of Mahdoo Rao Narain, was most likely a precaution, as, in case of the child's death, it probably was their intention to get Gunga Bye to adopt a son.

those of Holkar, Sindia, and Gaekwar in Hindostan and Guzerat; which would have placed the East India Company, with respect to those jagheers, precisely on the footing of surdeshmookh.

Rugoba, on hearing of the terms stipulated for him by the treaty, declared that he would rather maintain the war himself than submit to them. He pretended to have received overtures from Bhowan Rao, Pritoe Needhee, and Dhonsa,* one of the officers of Nizam Ally. Mahadajee Sindia had always sent the most friendly assurances to Rugoba, to which he was induced, partly from enmity to Sukaram Bappoo, but principally in order to preserve his own consequence, and place himself as umpire between the Bramin factions—a situation to which Mahadajee Sindia, with remarkable political sagacity, early aspired. After the terms of the treaty were promulgated, he continued an intercourse with Rugoba, not avowed, but sufficiently known to alarm the ministers. Rugoba, however, whatever he might pretend, was not deceived by these professions; none of his Indian allies afforded him any substantial aid, excepting Hyder, who sent him 80,000 rupees as a present.†

The Bombay government magnified everything that could tend to forward their own views, or verify their predictions. Instead of submitting as became them; instead of using every endeavour to give effect to the spirit of the orders from the supreme government, and to a solemn engagement under the constituted authorities of their country, every symptom of commotion, and every prospect of obstructing the treaty of Poorundhur, was hailed with a satisfaction which they had the caution not to express, but scarcely the decency to conceal.

An impostor, already mentioned, who had assumed the name of Sewdasheo Chimnajee, eight or nine years after the battle of Panniput, was made prisoner during the life-time of Mahdoo Rao, and, after being confined in different places, was finally delivered over to the custody of Ramchundur Naik Paranspey, soobehdar of Rutnaguiry, in the Concan. Paranspey, perceiving the distracted state of affairs at Poona, the dissensions among the heads of the state, and the probability of attaining a sovereignty for himself, released his prisoner, and proclaimed him as Sewdasheo Rao Bhow, unjustly imprisoned by the traitorous ministers. The impostor is known to have been a Kanoja Bramin from Hindostan, a man of some abilities, and of the same caste as the famous Kuvée Kulus of Sumbhajee. His story obtained immediate credence, and the Bombay government, to whom he very soon sent wukeels and addressed letters, received the overtures of *Suddaba*, as they called him, with complacency, and were evidently hopeful that this fresh insurrection would work in their favour.

Rugoba, from the date of the treaty, was allowed the space of one month to disband his army—a period which was afterwards prolonged; but perceiving that there was no immediate chance of inducing the governor-general to assist him, he asked and obtained an asylum from the Bombay government in Surat, where he was admitted with merely his baggage and 200 domestics. From Surat he appealed to the Court of Directors, and,

* The bye-name by which Ibrahim Beg Zufur-ud-Dowlah Sabit Jung was best known. Dhonsa is the Hindostanee name for one of the drums usually carried by parties of horse.

† Large sums are said to have been sent by Hyder Ally to Rugoba, but, except the 80,000 rupees above mentioned, no other money appears by the Bombay records to have been received, and it could hardly have escaped the vigilance of that government, at a time when they had the greatest difficulty in supplying even a pittance to Rugoba.

following the example of his brother Ballajee Rao, addressed a letter to the king of England. Colonel Upton remonstrated against the breach of treaty occasioned by the protection afforded to Rugoba. The Bombay government declared it no breach of the treaty: they justified their conduct on a former letter from Bengal, dated in the preceding October, which permitted them to afford an asylum to Rugoba, in case his personal safety should be endangered; and they declared that nothing but absolute necessity should compel them to give up the unfortunate man to his persecutors; that Colonel Upton must know little of Asiatics in the situation of the ministers, if he was not aware that, until they had rid themselves of so just an object of dread, they would never consider themselves safe, and that common humanity, as well as the law of nations and good policy, dictated the propriety of what they had done, even if unsupported by authority from Bengal.

The army of Rugoba, before it disbanded, encamped, for a short time after the final period allowed had expired, close to Surat, waiting, as they said, for the payment of their arrears. Hurry Punt Phurkay, in a letter to Poona, intimated his intention of attacking them; but, from the position in which they were allowed to remain, he could not but apprehend that the English intended to support them. The Bombay government, on the plea of apprehending danger from the contiguity of the contending Mahratta armies, but in reality to await events, threw their field army into Surat and Baroach.

It was in vain that Colonel Upton complained, or the ministers threatened in consequence of these proceedings; the Bombay government paid little attention to the one, and they treated the other with scorn; they expressed their astonishment and surprise that the envoy of the British nation should suffer the Mahratta ministers to declare that they should be induced to follow the example of Hyder, who had secured a peace on terms very honorable to himself, and that, in case of a renewal of the war, they would carry fire and sword to every part of the company's possessions in India. Such a menace was indeed derogatory to the British character, and highly discreditable, not to Colonel Upton, but to those of his nation, who, by a perverse conduct, provoked the threat, and compelled their envoy to admit that the measures they pursued were not regulated in that spirit of good faith which should certainly have actuated them from the moment a treaty was concluded.

The language used in vindication of the protection afforded to Rugoba was specious. The measure had its supporters in the council at Bengal, but the majority condemned it, as well as the pernicious nature of the opposition which was practised by the Bombay government.

Mr. Hastings, although he ratified the act of his envoy, did not approve of the treaty of Poorundhur, as terms more suitable might have been obtained. Several of the articles were certainly far from specific, and the ministers afterwards took every opportunity, not merely of putting the most constrained interpretations on doubtful passages, but of contravening what they must have known was really intended, in the articles to which they had subscribed. The consequence was that, though hostilities had ceased, peace could not be considered as established.

Whilst affairs were in this unsettled state, a despatch was received at Bombay, on the 20th August, from the Court of Directors, dated 5th April 1776, in which they approved, "under every circumstance," of the treaty of Surat; and recommended that the Bombay government should retain possession of the districts ceded. It being likewise known that,

prior to the date of that despatch, the Court of Directors had received information of Colonel Upton's being deputed to treat with the ministers, the president and council of Bombay at first came to a resolution of keeping possession of all such districts as were not given up. This determination was tantamount to a renewal of the war, and several of the members stating their belief that very great commotions were about to take place, in which their own safety would require them to bear an active part, expressed their satisfaction at having obtained this sanction to their measures, and recommended a vigorous prosecution of their former intentions. But Mr. Draper, who was not present at the first consultation, entered a dissent, which gave a different interpretation to the Court's despatch, and induced the government to alter their resolution. Mr. Draper was of opinion that the Court of Directors only meant that they should retain possession whilst the negotiation by Colonel Upton was pending, but that, after a treaty was concluded, under the sanction of the governor-general and council, it could never be intended that the terms should not be exactly fulfilled.

The Court of Directors could not be insensible to the advantage of a supreme authority in India; but the control over themselves, established by the new Act of Parliament, had not perhaps quite ceased its operation on their minds; their feelings were enlisted against the innovation, and the natural bias, occasioned by a prospect of great advantages on the west of India from the treaty with Rugonath Rao, prevented their fully perceiving the dangerous tendency of supporting men in the situation of the Bombay government. They might have withdrawn censure from them, and condemned the precipitancy of the governor-general and council, but they should have supported constituted authority, and insisted on an adherence to one plan and one interest. The Court, by their approval of the first measures of the Bombay government, encouraged the members to persevere in their covert opposition, when the circumstances, by the conclusion of the treaty of Poorundhur, were entirely changed.

Before the opening of the season the pretended Suddaba was at the head of 20,000 men, and had got possession of upwards of 20 forts in the Concan. A very great proportion of the vulgar among the Mahratta population, with whom impostors of that description are always dangerous, believed that he was the real Sewdasheo Chimnaje, and the Bombay government were equally convinced of the reality. They countenanced his cause in various ways; and, although they did not actually join in the insurrection, they permitted one of their surgeons to attend and accompany this Suddaba, and Mr. Dick, the commercial resident at Fort Victoria, waited upon him to pay his respects. After the impostor had possessed himself of the greater part of the Concan, he ascended the Ghauts in the month of October. He was opposed at the Bhoire Ghaut, and his troops were temporarily checked, when he headed them himself with spirit, and speedily carried the pass.* The fort of Rajmachee shortly after sent him offers of submission. Pretended overtures of accommodation were made to him by the ministers, by which he was for a short time amused, until Ramjee Patell, one of Sindia's officers, and Bhew Rao Phansay, came suddenly upon him in the neighbourhood of Rajmachee, when his whole force fled precipitately into the Concan, closely pursued by Sindia's troops. Some of the insurgents were sheltered under the walls of Tannah, and the impostor, having embarked at Bellapoor, fled to Bombay, where he would

* Letter from Dr. Blakeman, who saw the action.

have been allowed to land, but as Mr. Hornby was absent on Salsette at the time, the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, who probably judged it better to make another effort before finally abandoning his party, excused himself from landing, promised to come back on the return of Mr. Hornby, and repaired to Kolabah. On his arrival at that place, he was seized and confined by Rughojee Angria, to whom the Bombay government made an unsuccessful application for his release; but Angria conveyed him as a prisoner to Poona, where he was bound to the foot of an elephant, and trampled to death.*

The countenance shown to the impostor naturally occasioned complaints from the ministers, but their remonstrances became still more strong when they received information that Rugonath Rao had, on the 11th November, repaired to Bombay, where he had been received, and an allowance settled upon him of 10,000 rupees a month. Rugonath Rao had, in the month of August, refused a fresh offer of five lakhs of rupees annually with permission to reside at Benares, which was made through Colonel Upton; and it appeared that he had quitted Surat as if he had intended to join the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, but, having been obliged to seek shelter in the fort of Tarrapoor, he requested of the commander of one of the company's cruizers to give him a passage to Bombay, which the officer did not consider it proper to refuse.

At last, Colonel Upton having received an order of recall from Bengal, and the Bombay government having been directed to send a resident envoy to Poona, Mr. Mostyn was selected by them for this purpose. The ministers objected to that gentleman's appointment, as they conceived that he was the person who suggested the capture of Salsette, and that he was their enemy; but this objection was overruled.

Mr. Mostyn was of opinion that the Poona ministers were able to maintain themselves in power, and that the object of the British government should therefore be directed to keep well with them whilst they could support an efficient authority. He appears to have had a sincere desire to fulfil the conditions of the treaty, and to settle every point in an equitable manner; but the ministers were prejudiced against him, and he was determined to uphold the dignity of his situation. He repaired to Poona about the middle of March, and immediately entered upon the adjustment of the articles, which remained nearly in the same unsettled state as when the treaty was signed.

It was evident that "a country of three complete lakhs of rupees" as expressed in the treaty, meant territory producing annually a revenue amounting to three lakhs of rupees complete; but the Persian word *kumal*

* The Bramins of Poona have two stories respecting the fate of this criminal, both intended as apologies for the execution of a Bramin under a Bramin government. One is, that the impostor was not a Bramin, but a goldsmith; and the other is, that he was secretly removed and immured in a dungeon at Ahmednugur, where he was starved to death, and a condemned criminal, by trade a goldsmith, substituted to deceive the populace. Starvation, insufficient, unwholesome food, and a damp dungeon, was really the dreadful execution frequently reserved for Bramins, and practised by the Bramin government by way of evading the inextinguishable sin of depriving one of that sacred class of life. Amongst other stories raised by the Peishwas to prejudice the vulgar against the race of Sivajee, it was pretended that the boon of the goddess Bhovane, the truth of which no one could deny, which granted the Mahratta sovereignty to his lineal descendants for 27 generations, had been taken away because Sivajee killed two Bramin spies with his own hand, having shot them with arrows, by means of that unerring aim which was one of the gifts of the goddess, and impiously hit them in the forehead, right through the distinguishing mark of their caste.

or *kamil*, which was employed to express 'complete,' is also a revenue term which, though variously explained, may be said to signify the highest assessment ever known to have been fixed; and to this interpretation the ministry adhered, although the Bombay government offered to accept the cession at an average of a certain number of years.

The article in regard to Futih Sing Gaekwar was artfully designed on the part of the ministers, to induce the Gaekwar to declare not only his dependence on the Peishwa, but his having no right to make any alienation, or to conclude any treaty, without the express approbation of the Mookh Purdhan. Futih Sing readily acknowledged his dependence;* but, as he perceived the design of the ministers, he evaded the other concessions, and claimed restitution from the Bombay government, not as the ministers wished, but because Rugonath Rao had failed to perform the agreement for which the cessions were made; these and some other points continued in dispute; the ministers offered to settle five lakhs of rupees to be paid annually to Rugoba, through the governor-general and council, provided he would retire to Benares. But a new impediment soon presented itself.

The mere suspicion of a French intrigue always awakened the most active vigilance of the English government in India, and an ostensible agent of France, received with distinction by the ministers at Poona—a distinction more pointedly marked by studied neglect towards the British envoy—aroused the attention of the governor-general; and, as a war with France was expected, the circumstance naturally excited very considerable anxiety.

A French merchant ship arrived at Choule in the middle of March, with a cargo consisting of military and marine stores, cloth, and other staples of European exportation. From that ship several Frenchmen landed and proceeded towards Poona. One of the strangers had announced himself as ambassador from the court of France, and in that character he was received by the Mahratta court in the beginning of May.† But before entering on the object or proceedings of this mission, which are interwoven with the progress of the British nation in India, and are reserved for a future chapter, it is requisite to mention a few circumstances relative to Mahratta history, both to account for what may immediately follow, and to preserve a link in the chain of other events, which will be explained at a future period.

The peace of Poorundhur was of the greatest consequence to the ministers, and the suppression of the insurrection, under A. D. 1776. the pretended Sewdasheo Rao, added materially to the stability of their government; they detached Bhow Rao Yeswunt Phansay into the Concan, who speedily reduced the forts garrisoned by the forces of the late insurgent; but their affairs to the southward were in a less prosperous state. Hyder had occupied the whole of the Peishwa's districts south of the Toongbuddra; Bellary, in possession of a chief originally under the authority of Busalut Jung, had been taken by treachery; Gooty, after a respectable defence, was also acquired in a dishonorable mannner, and Moorar Rao Ghorepuray was shamefully

* This acknowledgment on the part of Futih Sing was not an admission that he had no right to alienate the districts; one of the agreements produced by the ministers rather inferred that the Gaekwar's share of Guzerat was at his own disposal.

† Bombay Records, and the Sixth Report of the Committee of Secrecy, from which last, for the ensuing five years, there is very complete information, as far as the British government was concerned.

immured in the noxious atmosphere of an unhealthy hill fort, where he perished. Under a pretended authority from Rugonath Rao,* Hyder advanced for the purpose of taking possession of the whole Mahratta country to the southward of the Kistna; and, before the rains of 1776, he had pushed his conquests as far as the territory of the nabob of Savanoor, but withdrew the greater part of his army to the south of the Toongbuddra during the monsoon. The ministers sent a small force under Konier Punt Putwurdhun to drive Hyder's garrison from Savanoor; but his troops were defeated, and Pandoorung Punt Putwurdhun,† the second-in-command, was taken prisoner by Mohummud Ally and Bajee Punt Burway;‡ the former, one of Hyder's officers, the latter, the agent of Rugoba, in command of a body of auxiliary Mahrattas,§ who acted in concert with Hyder's troops. In the ensuing season, the troops of Nizam Ally under Ibrahim Beg (Dhonsa), and those of the Mahratta ministers under Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, took the field for the purpose of co-operating against Hyder; but the former was bribed, and the latter recrossed the

A. D. 1777. Kistna without risking an action. Hurry Punt Phurkay, after the rains of 1777, was detached into the Carnatic with the greater part of the disposable force; but met with no success. Mannajee Phakray, who had joined the army of the Poona ministry after the troops of his master Rugoba were disbanded at Surat, was induced by Bajee Punt Burway to unite with Hyder, and many of the Mahratta mankurees had engaged to accompany him;¶ but Hurry Punt defeated a part of the scheme for corrupting his army, by an able retreat,|| and shortly after extinguished the treacherous intrigues of his officers by seizing Yeewunt Rao Manay, the deshmookh of Muswar, a powerful chief, and blowing him from a gun.¶ But besides the war with Hyder, other disturbances to the southward demanded the attention of the ministers.

Sumbhajee, raja of Kolapoor, the last of the lineal descendants of the great Sivajee, died in December 1760 without issue. About two years afterwards, his widow Jeejee Bye adopted, as her husband's heir, a boy named Sivajee, the son of Shahjee Bhonslay, patell of the village of Kanwut, in the district of Indapoor; and, having placed him on the musnud, conducted the affairs of the principality in his name. Great irregularities took place during the minority of Sivajee, both by sea and land. Piracy prevailed to an extent before unknown on the coast, which induced the English to send an expedition in 1765, and reduce both Malwan and Rairee, the former belonging to Kolapoor, and the latter to Sawuntwaree. The reigning Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Bullal, was exasperated against Kolapoor, both on account of plundering incursions into his territories, and the hereditary connection which the Kolapoor state maintained with the Nizam. In order to circumscribe its power and punish its aggressions, Mahdoo Rao dispossessed the raja of several districts, and added them to the jagheer of his own relations, the family of Putwurdhun; but during

* Colonel Wilks mentions that Hyder sent Rugonath Rao 16 lakhs of rupees at different periods. I can only find 24,000 pagodas, and, as before remarked, I scarcely think that such receipts could have escaped the notice of the Bombay government.

† Father of the present Chintamun Rao.

‡ He was a near connexion of Rugonath Rao by his first wife, whose surname was Burway. Anundee Bye, his second wife, was of the family of Oak.

§ Mahratta MSS., Wilks.

¶ Mahratta MSS.

|| Wilks. Hyder himself, in a letter to the Bombay government, the known friends of Rugoba, gives Hurry Punt no credit for his retreat, but takes abundance to himself, by representing it as a victory he had gained.

the late disturbances, the Kolapoor state, having embraced the cause of Rugonath Rao, recovered the districts, and one of the ministerial officers, named Ramchundur Hurry, in attempting to re-occupy them, was defeated by Yessajee Sindia, an officer of the raja's. Mahadajee Sindia was therefore sent to support Ramchundur Hurry, and succeeded in restoring order.

In the meantime Hyder reduced Kopaul and Buhadur Benda, and in the end of April formed the siege of Dharwar. Hurry A. D. 1778. Punt proceeded to Merich, apparently with the design of forming a junction with Mahadajee Sindia at Kolapoor, and advancing in concert to attack Hyder. Nothing could be more distant from their real intentions ; but the report was credited by every person, excepting Hurry Punt, Mahadajee Sindia, and Nana Furnuwees. Hyder fully believed it ; and as Hurry Punt's army was now more to be depended upon, the former foresaw that he should be compelled to recross the Toongbuddra as soon as the Mahratta generals advanced. He therefore used every endeavour to bring about an armistice ; but Hurry Punt pretended to be inflexible, until Hyder paid him a large sum of money,* and purchased the return of the Mahrattas to their capital—a measure which on their part had become absolutely necessary ; and on this occasion Hyder was outwitted.

This artifice on the part of Hurry Punt is connected with a stroke of policy which ranks high in Bramin estimation, and which will appear in the course of our narrative ; but in the meantime, that we may not lose sight of the other Mahratta authorities in following more interesting events, it may be mentioned that the pageant prince, Ram Raja, worn out with years and infirmities, died at Satara on the 12th December 1777. Bhowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, also died about the same time, and was succeeded by his son, Pureshram Sree Newass, the present Pritee Needhee, born on the day of his father's death.

In regard to affairs in Berar, it has been already shown that Moodajee, after the fall of Sabajee in 1775, was acknowledged regent. But Ibrahim Beg (Dhonsa), the intimate friend of Sabajee, was sent by Nizam Ally, as was pretended, to avenge his fate, but in fact to take advantage of a strong party against Moodajee, who, conscious of inability to oppose the force sent against him, surrendered the forts of Gawelgurrh, Nurnalla, Manikdroog, and Chunderpoor as the price of peace. Nizam Ally, however, restored those forts shortly afterwards, on the occasion of his coming to Elichpoor, when Moodajee, accompanied by his son, Rughoorjee, Sena Sahib Soobeh, manifested the humblest submission, entered into an agreement of faithful co-operation, and bound himself to suppress the depredations of the Goands,† who were at that time troublesome in the districts of Nizam Ally. A like submissive demeanour towards the Poona durbar, and a bond for the payment of 10 lakhs of rupees, obtained a confirmation of the regency, through the favour of Nana Furnuwees. Sabajee had always kept a wukeel at Calcutta ; and the same custom was observed by Moodajee, as it was convenient on account of his possessions in Kuttack. The governor-general, however, both misunderstood the relative situation of Moodajee in the Mahratta empire, and over-estimated his power.

Futih Sing Gaekwar, in February 1778, after having paid up arrears, 10½ lakhs of rupees of tribute, one lakh as a present to Sukaram Bappoo

* Mahratta MSS. I could not discover the amount in the state accounts, nor is the sum specified in the Mahratta MSS.

† A savage race inhabiting the wilds of Gondwanah.

and Nana Furnuwees, besides an offering to the state of five lakhs of rupees,* was appointed Sena Khas Kheyl.

Ram Raja, a short time before his death, had adopted the son of Trimbuckjee Raja Bhonslay, a patell of the village of Wawee, and a descendant of Wittoojee, the brother of Mallojee and uncle of Shahjee, the father of the great Sivajee. Trimbuckjee Raja commanded a body of 200 horse, with which his son served as a sillidar, when selected as heir to a throne and tenant of a prison. He was styled Shao Maharaj. During the time of Ballajee Bajee Rao, it had been artfully contrived that there were only a few families, old, but of no power, with whom the raja of the Mahrattas could intermarry. To this day the raja of Satara would think himself degraded by a marriage with the daughter of Nimbalkur and of Jadow, although from them Sivajee was descended in the maternal line. This artifice, which may have been managed by bribing the Oopadheeas and Shastrees, explains the reason why it is scarcely known that Shao was married, in Aurungzebe's camp, to a daughter of Sindia of Kunneirkheir.

Records of facts, except receipts and accounts in their own favour, would often have proved inconvenient to faithless, shifting, time-serving Bramins; but it is not improbable that their prejudice against all other historical record may originate in causes of very remote date connected with the foundation of their religious institutions.

* Poona State Accounts.

CHAP. XXVIII.

FROM A. D. 1777 TO A. D. 1779.

Mr. Hornby's minute respecting Mahratta affairs.—French envoy, St. Lubin—account of his proceedings at Poona.—Orders from the Court of Directors in case the Poona ministry should not fulfil the terms of the treaty of Poorundhar.—Dissensions of the ministry.—Application for the restoration of Rugoba from the party of Moraba Furnuwees.—Bengal government assent to that measure.—Six battalions of Bengal sepoys ordered to march overland to Bombay.—Terms on which the Bombay government agree to support Moraba's party.—Consummate artifice of Nana Furnuwees.—Moraba's party decline the restoration of Rugoba.—Return of Mahadajee Sindia and Hurry Punt Phurkay—faction of Moraba crushed—unshaken constancy of Sukaram Hurry.—Observations respecting the march of the Bengal troops.—Further explanation of the motives which actuated the Bombay government—resolve to attempt the restoration of Rugoba.—Preparations of Nana Furnuwees.—The governor-general intimates his intention of forming an alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay.—The Bombay government adhere to their resolution.—Zeal of Mr. Carnac—judicious counsel of Mr. Draper.—Colonel Charles Egerton, account of.—Field committee appointed—dilatory preparations—advanced detachment crosses over to the continent, and occupies the Bhor Ghaut without opposition.—Perverseness of Rugoba.—Embarkation—troops land at Panwell—extraordinary conduct and ignorance of Colonel Egerton—unparalleled dilatoriness of the advance.—Mahratta proceedings—manifest but slight opposition—appear in force at Tullygaom—burn the village—and retire before the British troops.—The English determine on retiring from Tullygaom—are attacked on their retreat to Wurgaom—gallant conduct of the rear-guard under Captain Hartley—disgraceful convention of Wurgaom.—Misconduct of the committee.—Mr. Carnac and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn are dismissed from the service.—Distress of the Bombay government—observations on their late conduct—fortitude and ability of Governor Hornby—his review of their affairs—revert to the proceedings of the Bengal troops.—Colonel Leslie removed from the command—but dies before the order of supersession is received.—Colonel Goddard assumes the command and continues his march—treacherous conduct of the Mahrattas at Sagur—hospitality and kindness of the nabob of Bhopaul.—Negotiation with Moodajee Bhonslay—declines entering on the alliance.—General Goddard, on learning the disaster at Wurgaom, decides on marching straight for Surat—grateful acknowledgments of the Bombay government.—Mr. Hornby submits a plan of operations.—The negotiations with Poona confided to Colonel Goddard.—Conduct of the Bengal government—judicious observations of Mr. Hastings with regard to the members of the Bombay council.—Goddard appointed brigadier-general—remonstrances of the Bombay government.—Goddard instructed to negotiate a peace, or eventually to follow the plan proposed by Mr. Hornby.—Policy of Mahadajee Sindia—he allows Rugoba to escape—

sacrifices Sukaram Bappoo and Chintoo Wittul to the jealousy of Nana Furnuwees.

ON the 10th of October 1777, Mr. Hornby, in a minute of council, entered on a review of the Mahratta affairs, and remarks

A. D. 1777. "that they were fast verging to a period which must compel the English nation either to take some active and decisive part in them, or relinquish, for ever, all hopes of bettering their own situation on the west of India." He laments the control by which the Bombay presidency was fettered, remarks the secret divisions among the Mahratta ministers, the views of Sindia and Holkar to their own aggrandizement, the successes of Hyder, the defection of the Mahratta chiefs, and the demise of Gunga Bye, the young Peishwa's mother, who had been the cause of her own death.*

The French ambassador was discovered to be an adventurer named St. Lubin, who, after imposing on the English government at Madras, went home to France, where he so far succeeded in deceiving the French ministry as to obtain an authority to proceed to Poona, and ascertain what advantages could be gained by an alliance with the Mahrattas. St. Lubin endeavoured to obtain the cession of the port of Choule, with the fort of Rewadunda; and, in order to induce Nana Furnuwees to enter upon an offensive and defensive alliance, he offered to bring 2,500 Europeans to support the ministry, to raise and discipline 10,000 sepoy, and to furnish abundance of military and marine stores. He affected the utmost horror at the conduct of the English in supporting Rugoba; a painting had been executed under his direction in France, to represent the cruel and barbarous murder of Narain Rao; and this picture he exhibited himself, before the durbar, in a burst of grief, which drew tears from some of the spectators, whilst in others it excited ridicule or contempt. A cheat in the character of a European gentleman was new to the Mahrattas, but the discernment of Nana Furnuwees could not have been even temporarily obscured by such superficial artifice. It is probable that, in the great encouragement he affected to give St. Lubin, and in various petty indignities offered to the British envoy, he had no other object than to excite the jealousy of the English, without being aware of the dangerous nature of the experiment on which he ventured. Nana Furnuwees was inimical to all Europeans; but the despicable conduct of St. Lubin must have tended to lower the French nation, both in his estimation and that of the Mahrattas in general. Mr. Bolts, originally in the company's service in Bengal, who was in Poona at the same time as an avowed agent of the house of Austria, received no such civilities. Nana probably perceived that St. Lubin was a fitter tool; and Mr. Bolts, who was early dismissed, might have viewed that circumstance as complimentary to his character. The credulity which prevailed on the continent of Europe respecting India, and an uncommon plausibility of address, had enabled St. Lubin to impose on several young men, one of them an Englishman, and some of them of good family in France, whom he persuaded to embark in his enterprize. But unprincipled men, however superior they may fancy themselves, have generally foibles which speedily discover their true character; and those of St. Lubin seem to have been egregious vanity and excessive irritability of temper.

Most of his companions were estranged from him; suspicion soon

* This event, on which the president expresses some doubt, was really true. Gunga Bye was the cause of her own death, by having taken medicine for the purpose of concealing the consequence of her illicit intercourse with Nana Furnuwees.

brought on altercation, and St. Lubin would have murdered them* to prevent exposure in India, and obstruction to his hopes from France; but they sought and obtained protection from Mr. Mostyn's assistant, Mr. Lewis, during the absence of the former at Bombay.†

The encouragement given to St. Lubin by Nana Farnuwees might have

* The attempt in one instance is clearly proved; he fired a brace of pistols, one after the other, at M. de Corcelle, within a few yards; one ball penetrated his clothes, but missed him.

† Mr. William Gamul Farmer, of the Bombay civil service, happened to be at Poona for the benefit of his health, and took that opportunity of ascertaining the views of the French, which he communicated to the governor, probably for his private information, but, as it contained useful intelligence, it was put upon record; the letter was dated Poona, 11th November 1777. "This St. Lubin is a most perfect adventurer, and I believe has cheated even the ministry of France in this business. He introduced himself to the confidence of Monsieur de Sartine, as to Indian matters, by a memorial he presented relative to this country, which Monsieur de Corcelle assures me he has frequently seen. In this memorial he has not forgot himself. He has made himself the generalissimo at one time of Hyder's army, the very man who framed the treaty between him and the Mahrattas, for which he the next day received two lakhs of rupees; but what chiefly introduced him to this business was his particular intimacy with the raja of the Mahrattas. He was the constant companion of his children, used to learn them to ride—in short, he had not in the world a better friend than the raja. There certainly could not be so fit a man in France to send out to sound the ground here to form an alliance with the Mahratta state, if circumstances should prove favourable. You may perfectly judge from this, of what the character is capable of in the way of representation.

"Drunk and sober, jointly and separately, I have examined all the Frenchmen with whom we have yet had connection, that is—Madjett; Monsieur de Corcelle, who was to have been made engineer by St. Lubin; and Monsieur de Coronet, the captain of the ship, whom I found means to get to eat soup with us. They are all in such a situation with respect to Monsieur St. Lubin, that it is the first wish of their lives that he may prove totally a counterfeit, and not be supported by the ministry of France; for, in fact, their lives may perhaps depend on Lubin's reality, and the justifying his conduct. I have turned the matter every way to persuade them that he was a counterfeit, in order to fish out their arguments to the contrary; but they are all perfectly convinced of the facts mentioned in Madjett's letter. The captain of the ship confirmed to me repeatedly what Madjett had often mentioned, that his owner had given him his orders relative to St. Lubin, in consequence of recommendations from Monsieur de Sartine. They all agree perfectly with regard to the ideas entertained of him at Bordeaux: that it was first talked of sending out a body of men under Monsieur Dumas. The fact of the intelligence the captain and supercargo received at Cochín, of Lubin's destination, the captain confirmed to me. Picot and Briancourt acknowledged him, and Briancourt has gone so far as to request the consulship of Choul. The Count de Mendave, a man of good family in France, who has been seeking his fortunes in this country, and is now with Busalut Jung, heard of him, has offered to join him, and makes interest for a good employment under him; you will observe, Sir, that although it seems de Belcombe disavows him as an ambassador from the king, yet he takes no effectual measures to remove him; and it is a known fact that St. Lubin sent by a Frenchman a despatch to Belcombe in the month of July or August last. They all perfectly agree in the circumstance of the summons given to attend at the Nanah's to witness the treaty. Nanah was sworn by his Bramin, and St. Lubin by his Padre, and Nanah kept the book. The despatch of Monsieur Pascal due Santy to Surat, in order to carry from thence his despatches for France, is certain. We have learnt by a Frenchman, lately arrived here, that he has been seen at Briancourt's; his destination via Suez. This Frenchman says that he wanted to take his passage in an English Snow, I suppose Barrington, but that it was refused, and he is now to go in a vessel belonging to a black man.

"You see, Sir, how much Lubin has at stake by the total defeat of all his schemes, perhaps the loss of life, or imprisonment, if these fellows find that he is an impostor; everything, therefore, with him depends on his being able to persuade the minister to hurry out a body of men instantly on the receipt of his despatches, or order them from the islands. I leave you, Sir, further to judge what he is capable of, when he has

had the effect of alarming the Bombay government, and inducing them, in the subordinate situation they had been taught to consider themselves, to accept the stipulations of the treaty of Poorundhur, under the disadvantages which the ministers would have imposed, had they not been uniformly supported by the Court of Directors. In a letter from that body, of the 16th April 1777, which was received exactly seven months afterwards, and was a counterpart of a despatch previously sent to the Bengal government, a repetition of the approval of their conduct, and of regret at the great and unnecessary sacrifice made by the treaty of Poorundhur, was still more clearly expressed than in the preceding year. The Court, to be sure, repeat their determination to adhere to that treaty; but should its conditions not be fulfilled by the ministers, they authorize an alliance with Rugoba, on the terms of the treaty of Surat, which they considered more for the honor, as well as the advantage, of the company, than that which was concluded by Colonel Upton.

In the meantime, dissensions among the parties at Poona continued to increase. Nana Furnuwees despised the abilities of his cousin, but, with a Bramin's caution, he was at more pains to conceal his contempt than his enmity. Moraba was supported by all the partizans of Rugoba, particularly Buchaba Poorundhuree, Sukaram Hurry, Chintoo Wittul, and Wishnoo Nerher. This faction gained Tookajee Holkar, whose defection from the cause of the ministers became avowed by his excusing himself when ordered to support Hurry Punt Phurkay in the Carnatic. The English envoy attributed the confidence he could perceive in Nana to an assurance of support from France. Immediately after the death of Gunga Bye, Sukaram Bappoo began to be jealous of his hitherto humble colleague, and now united, but cautiously and with no decision, in a plan for the restoration of Rugoba. Moraba made the proposal to Bombay, and requested that the government would immediately bring Rugoba to Poona. Preparations were accordingly begun, and the president and council determined to afford their assistance without delay. Their resolve was approved by the supreme government; and it was determined at Bengal, in consequence of the war in which they were about to engage on the west of India, as well as the apprehended schemes of the French in the same quarter, to support the Bombay presidency with six battalions of sepoy, and a proportionate artillery, from the Bengal establishment, to which some cavalry were afterwards added. This force was directed to assemble on the Jumna opposite to Kalpee; the command was given to Colonel Leslie, and he was directed to march across India towards Bombay, and place himself under the orders of that presidency.

But although the Bombay government agreed to aid the scheme of Moraba, it was with a proviso that Sukaram Bappoo, the principal authority in signing the treaty of Poorundhur, should state in writing that the invitation was made at his desire. This decided declaration, Sukaram, unfortunately for himself, refused, and the plan was in consequence suspended; but it was the deliberate opinion of the Bombay government that their own safety depended on their effecting a change in

wrote that they are in perfect possession of the port and harbour of Choul; and, to make the possession more valuable, he wanted the gentleman who took the draft of it for him, to put seven fathom water where there were only three and a half. The flourishing state of this country, the power of Nana, the certain destruction of the English, the great advantage to France—all these he has dwelt on, as I am well assured, in a manner that cannot fail to make great impressions in France."

the Poona administration. The complex political machine, which Nana Furnuwees managed on this emergency with consummate artifice, was at first a little deranged by a premature attempt to apprehend Moraba, who made his escape from Poona. This exposure would have disconcerted most men; but Nana, through Sukaram Bappoo, persuaded his cousin to return, and it was agreed that a new ministry should be formed, including Moraba and Bujaba Poorundhuree; but Bujaba was not so easily persuaded, and Sukaram Hurry nobly declared that nothing should ever induce him to abjure the cause of a generous master, who had been his protector from youth to manhood; that Rugonath Rao was a soldier; and Nana, a cunning, cowardly courtier.

Moraba's party, by the aid of Holkar's troops, obtained the complete ascendancy; and Nana, who was obliged to retire to Poorundhur, pretended to acquiesce in the plan for conducting Rugoba to Poona, on condition of obtaining security for himself and property. The Bombay government again received notice to prepare; but the weak Moraba imagined that he had attained his object, and fancied himself at the head of the administration. Nana affected his usual deference for Sukaram's opinion, and was scrupulously respectful to his cousin. Consultations took place respecting the restoration of Rugonath Rao, and Moraba began to perceive the force of Nana's objections. He could not but recollect that when he was minister under Mahdoo Rao, the conduct of Rugonath Rao had invariably tended to dissension, loss, or dishonor. He therefore, though still pretending to be desirous of reinstating Rugoba, began to evade the question when pressed by his English friends.

A majority of the council in Bombay, seeing that their hopes from Moraba's party had vanished, soothing themselves with the hope of a continuance of peace with France, and with an idea of being able, through Moraba, to destroy the influence of the French at Poona, came to a resolution, on the 22nd April, of countermanding Colonel Leslie's detachment; but on the 3rd of the ensuing month they reversed this resolution, for reasons which will be explained, and directed Colonel Leslie to advance.

Moraba had given Mr. Mostyn assurances that St. Lubin should be dismissed; but his departure was delayed from day to day; and it was soon discovered that St. Lubin, by Nana's contrivance, had been able to persuade Moraba to enter into his views. But, in effect, notwithstanding appearances, Nana Furnuwees, unless when under the immediate influence of fear, would have been the greatest obstacle to the French views, had they ever attempted an establishment in the Mahratta country. His jealousy of Europeans would never have admitted a French force sufficiently strong even for the expulsion of the English from the small settlement of Bombay, unless he could have been certain of crushing them afterwards. Nana Furnuwees never entirely believed that St. Lubin could bring troops; and one deception, which the impostor adopted to obtain credit, by writing to Goa and Damaun for permission to pass two French regiments through the Portuguese territories, seems only to have succeeded where he least wished it—with the English, by whom his letters were intercepted.

All the events that have just been detailed had occurred by the time Mahadajee Sindia and Hurry Punt united at Merich. Both these officers were in Nana's interests; and the well-concerted plan of threatening Hyder during Nana's danger deceived both Hyder * and

* This circumstance, already noticed, is well known in the Mahratta country, but is not mentioned in any English record, and has escaped the notice of Colonel Wilks.

Moraba ; nor did Moraba awake from his dream of security, until Hurry Punt and Mahadajee Sindia, arriving by different routes, united at Poorundhur on the 8th June. Nana re-assumed his former power, occupied the principal passes in the country with his troops, and, through Sindia's influence, seconded by a bribe of nine lakhs of rupees, detached Holkar from the confederacy. Moraba once more resorted to negotiation with the English (the detail of which will require more particular notice) ; but the opportunity was lost. On the 11th July Moraba

July 11. was seized by a party of horse belonging to Mahadajee Sindia, and shortly after made over to Nana, by whom he was thrown into confinement in the fortress of Ahmednugur. The whole of his party were arrested except Sukaram Bappoo, whose confinement was only reserved, because his being ostensibly at liberty was essential in regard to the treaty with the English. Bujaba Poorundhuree was thrown into the fort of Wundun, and the others into different hill-forts in the Ghauts. The unshaken constancy of Sukaram Hurry to his master Rugoba deserved a better fate. He was chained in irons so heavy, that, although a very powerful man, he could scarcely lift them ; his food and water were insufficient to allay his hunger or to quench his thirst ; but he survived 14 months : and when so emaciated that he could not rise—"My strength is gone, and my life is going," said the dying enthusiast ; "but when voice and breath fail, my fleshless bones shall still shout Rugonath Rao ! Rugonath Rao !"*

The deep artifice of Nana Furnuwees had succeeded in baffling the designs of his own countrymen, but he had still to encounter the intellect and vigour of Englishmen. The national jealousy he had ventured to awake, rose with an aspect which terrified him. The application of the resident at Poona to the ministers, and to Sindia and Holkar, for passports to facilitate the march of a body of British troops from the east to the west of India, for the declared purpose of counteracting the designs of the French, seems at first to have been viewed by the Mahrattas as a threat. They probably considered that, if it had been intended to send troops to Bombay, they would have been embarked from the coast of Malabar or Coromandel, and replaced from Bengal—an opinion in which many competent judges, among our own countrymen, coincided ; but the unfavourable season of the year, the ill-treatment to which the Bengal sepoys had been invariably exposed on board-ship, and perhaps, though never avowed, the grandeur of the enterprize, together with some idea entertained by Mr. Hastings, from the first, of forming an alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, were the motives which influenced the governor-general in choosing the overland route.

Although the choice was more than questionable in regard to the mere military aid they could afford, yet the political effect was very considerable ; and had the Deccan become, as the Coromandel coast had been, the theatre of war with France, this enterprizing march would have proved of much importance in raising friends to the English, and in spreading opinions of their power, essential to their preservation. In England, however, in the language of the day, it was considered one of "the frantic military exploits" of Mr. Hastings ;† but had the English councils in India not been, at various periods, guided by men whose views and

* Sukaram Hurry was a Purvoo, and is not a singular instance of the unshaken fidelity of that class in the history of Maharashtra. His daughter is alive in Satara.

† Mr. Dundas's speech, 1782.

genius went far beyond the ordinary opinions of their contemporaries, the British empire in India might never have existed; nor is it too much to suppose that we should, at this moment, have lamented our errors in the overgrown prosperity of our European rival, the exhaustion of our resources, or perhaps the annihilation of our power.

When the president and council at Bombay accepted the first invitation of Moraba's party, the supreme government approved of their having done so, because the principal person who had signed the treaty of Poorundhur, the articles of which still remained unfulfilled, was one of those who had joined in the application; and the other party, Nana Furnuwees, not only obstructed the fulfilment of the articles of the treaty, but was supposed to be negotiating, if he had not actually concluded, a secret agreement with the French, which threatened the existence of the company's possessions on the west of India. Under these circumstances, in a despatch dated the 23rd March, the governor-general and council authorized the Bombay government "to assist in tranquillizing the dissensions of the Mahratta state;" they directed that, in whatever manner the ruling party should choose to conduct the administration, personal security should be demanded for Rugoba, and the expenses of any military expedition that might be required should be borne by the Mahratta government. Bassein, and some territory in its neighbourhood, were to be demanded in exchange for Baroach, whilst, in order to defeat the designs of the French, it was ordered that there should be an express stipulation, preventing all European settlements within the Mahratta territories, unless sanctioned by the supreme British government in India; and they announced that, lest the French should obstruct these objects, Colonel Leslie's detachment would take the field for the support of the presidency of Bombay.

The first plan, however, having been defeated, as we have seen, by the apparent reconciliation of the ministers, the Bombay government, for the reasons already enumerated, had dropped their intentions; but, upon receiving the orders of the 23rd March, they deemed themselves authorized to call upon the new administration, to know whether or not they held the Mahratta state bound by the treaty of Poorundhur, and to demand explicit answers on the points still in dispute. Instructions to their envoy were addressed to that effect, and they directed him to remonstrate on St. Lubin's being still kept at Poona. Nana Furnuwees perceived that, in regard to the English, he had committed himself farther than he had intended or might be enabled to retract, and his enmity had been too actively exercised against Rugoba, ever to hope for reconciliation with him or his friends. St. Lubin was dismissed early in the month of July before Moraba was placed in confinement; but Nana, on St. Lubin's taking leave, although he entered on no absolute agreement, was at that moment sincere in his assurances, when he declared that, if the envoy could bring a French corps to his aid, he would grant his nation an establishment in the Mahratta territories.

Sindia and Holkar, as Mr. Hastings had foretold, granted passports for Colonel Leslie's detachment, because, as their territories were exposed during their absence, it was their object that the British troops, if they came by that route, should pass as friends. The ministers, however, observed to Mr. Mostyn that, as the detachment was sent on account of the French, by the dismissal of the envoy both their advance and their passports were no longer necessary; Nana at the same time sent secret orders to the Mahratta officers, and to the rajahs in Bundelcund, to oppose Leslie's progress.

It was at this conjuncture that Moraba's party made a specific application to Mr. Mostyn, which that gentleman intended to carry to Bombay himself, but postponed doing so in hopes of receiving answers to the demands which had been formally made on the Mahratta government, agreeably to the authority from Bengal. A part of Moraba's proposals contained satisfactory assurances on every point referred ; but Nana, who was fully apprized of all that was going forward, in order to create delay kept back the replies of the acknowledged and executive authority of the state, until Mr. Mostyn at last set out on the 6th July, when Nana sent them to his assistant, Mr. Lewis, who transmitted them to Bombay.

These replies positively denied having entered on any treaty with the French, but in general they were merely a brief summary of the arguments they had before used in their interpretation of the articles of the treaty of Poorundhur. In regard to the important question of whether or not the new ministry held themselves bound by that treaty, they observed—"The English should keep that treaty faithfully, when they should do the same."

About the time that these evasive answers were received in Bombay, intelligence arrived of the war with France, and the president and council, after deliberating upon the replies, and the proposals from Moraba's party, were of opinion that the former were a violation of the treaty of Poorundhur ; and that they in consequence, under the authority granted by the supreme government in their despatch of the 23rd March, were at liberty to pursue such measures as might be expedient for the subversion of a party in the Mahratta state decidedly hostile to the English nation ; and extremely dangerous to their interest, in the event of any attempt on the part of France against their possessions on the west of India.

They therefore resolved to make equitable stipulations for placing Rugoba in the regency, but with an express proviso that the government should be conducted in the name of the young Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narain, and that the entire powers should be surrendered to him on the expiration of his minority.* The whole was to be kept secret until the opening of the season, when it was intended to carry their plans into effect with the utmost vigour ; and in the meantime they directed Colonel Leslie, who had been before instructed to proceed to Surat, to alter his route and march on Joonere.

But they had scarcely signed their resolution when they received accounts of the seizure of Moraba and his friends, and the defection of Holkar—circumstances which destroyed the party of Rugoba, but made no alteration in their plan, which they determined to prosecute at all hazards.

Nana Farnuwees perceived the gathering storm, and his preparations to meet it were in progress, whilst those of the Bombay government were only resolved. To prevent obstruction from Sukaram Bappoo, he was, on the plea of great age, removed from the administration, and guarded by a body of Sindia's troops, who were placed over his person and house, though Nana Farnuwees and Sindia still occasionally pretended to be guided by his advice. Sillidars were recruited all over the country, and directed to assemble at the Dusserra. Vessels in the different ports were refitted, the forts were provisioned and repaired, fresh instructions were despatched to harass Leslie's march, but positive orders were also sent not to avow that the opposition was made by authority from Poona. An agent was sent to Bombay to amuse the government by making overtures to

* By Hindoo law the age is 16 ; with the Mahrattas the usage is from 16 to 20 years of age.

Rugoba, but the vigilance of Mr. Lewis had apprized them of the intention.

In the end of August, the Bombay government for the first time received some general information from the governor-general and council of their intention of forming an alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, and they were directed to enter on no engagement hostile to the government at Poona, excepting such as was absolutely defensive. But on this the president, and the majority of the members of council, observed that Moodajee was so wholly unconnected with their design of establishing Rugoba in the regency, that this intimation ought not to be allowed to interrupt their proceedings. However, up to the 12th of October, no preparations had been begun at Bombay, and Mr. John Carnac, one of the members of council, and the declared successor of Governor Hornby, in consequence of the delay, submitted a minute, urging the necessity of vigorous preparation, and representing all the evils of procrastination. Mr. Carnac, though best known on the west of India in his civil capacity, was originally a military officer on the Bengal establishment, where he had risen to the rank of brigadier-general, and been distinguished by his services. Mr. Draper, with his usual deliberation, and in this instance with the clearest judgment, dissented from Mr. Carnac's proposal, because it was impossible for them to judge what might be the object of the governor-general and council in treating with Moodajee Bhonslay; he perfectly agreed in the propriety and expediency of removing Nana Furnuwees when it could be effected with certainty, but circumstances had materially altered at Poona since their first resolutions. Their own force, particularly in Europeans, was very weak, and Colonel Leslie's strong reinforcement was still at a great distance; he was therefore of opinion that a delay of about two months ought to be their object. All these suggestions were sound, and apparently too evident to be disputed; but the majority of the members of the Bombay government in regard to Rugoba were precisely as described by Mr. Hastings—"their passions were enlisted in his cause; it was in effect their own." Mr. Carnac, whose peculiar situation in having superseded Mr. Draper ought, on every view, to have ensured delicacy and forbearance, scarcely concealed his contempt of Mr. Draper's caution, and strenuously supported the proposals of Governor Hornby. It was the opinion of the majority that no time should be lost; the French might probably arrive—an incident the truth of which Mr. Draper admitted, and that too, he observed, "with their garrison drained of troops and Bombay at their mercy;" but his voice was overruled, and Mr. Carnac's zeal was rewarded, in the first instance, by being appointed president of a committee to settle the preliminaries with Rugoba.

The Bombay government had lost a respectable counsellor in the death of General Robert Gordon, the commanding officer of their forces. He was succeeded by Colonel Charles Egerton, an officer who had been brought up in the army at home, and had served on the continent of Europe; but a man extremely weak, and totally unacquainted with India, its natives, or its warfare. His health was so infirm as to render him unfit for active service; but as he had been before set aside in favour of Colonel Keating, Mr. Hornby on the present occasion assented to his being appointed to the command. In a regular service, however, it sometimes happens that men whose rank is their only recommendation may be convenient commanders, but if their intended directors prove deficient in ability, or should they happen to fall under an influence contrary to what has been designed, the misfortune and disgrace that may result from such selec-

tions ought in justice to be attributed to those on whom the choice depends.

Many officers of rank, who at that time entered the company's service at an advanced period of life, came to India, less with an idea of attaining rank or honor, than of making fortunes by any means. Their pay was inadequate, and as the manner of regulating the supplies, carriage, and equipment of an army was without system, the shameless corruption and embezzlement which frequently prevailed, excited the jealousy of the governments, without either suggesting efficient checks, or engaging by high confidence those better feelings, which, with the ideas common to their profession, they would perhaps in most instances have retained.

This jealousy was, on the present occasion, one cause of the appointment of two members of council, who, together with the commanding officer, formed a committee, in whom was not only vested the political authority, but every other arrangement for conducting Rugonath Rao to Poona; leaving the mere detail of duty and of march, as the sole occupation, separately entrusted to the senior military officer of their army.

On the first proposal of a committee, Colonel Egerton assented to the measure, conceiving, as he afterwards explained, that it was intended solely for the purpose of settling the preliminary arrangements with Rugoba; but he afterwards made repeated objections, and protested against the measure, as contrary to the orders of the Court of Directors, and derogatory to his situation as commanding officer.

The basis of the new agreement with Rugonath Rao differed little from the treaty of Surat, as far as the company were concerned; but, in regard to Rugoba, it was most expressly stated that the English were to place him at Poona as regent, and in other respects the articles were nearly in conformity with the instructions from Bengal. As the Bombay government had decided contrary to the advice of Mr. Draper, it might have been expected that they would have used despatch in sending off their troops; but their preparations were extremely dilatory. At last an advanced party, consisting of six companies of native grenadiers from different corps, with a small detail of light artillery, embarked from

Nov. 22.

Bombay on the evening of the 22nd November, landed at Aptee, and moved forward under Captain James Stewart, who took possession of the Bhore Ghaut without opposition, and encamped at the village of Kundalla. The advance had embarked before the treaty was signed; and at this moment an unexpected cause of delay arose from the perverse conduct of Rugoba, who, perceiving that the Bombay government had gone too far to retract, and that his concurrence was indispensable, started objections, and pertinaciously adhered to them until a part of his demands were granted. This disposition to take every possible advantage of those friends who had done so much to uphold his cause, occasioned considerable vexation; but for the present this disappointment was forgotten in the animating bustle of expected service, and the brilliant hopes entertained of the result.

The troops embarked at Bombay for Panwell on the 23rd, took possession of the small fort of Bellapoor, and disembarked at Panwell on the 25th of November. Including the advance under Captain Stewart, and a detachment of 60 rank and file left at Bellapoor, the army was composed of 591 Europeans, 2,278 native infantry, and 500 gun-lascars; the whole, officers included, amounted to 3,900 men. Preparations sufficient to have enabled the commanding officer to move from Panwell were not completed for several days; but the delay which afterwards took place in making

roads, and in the observance of various formalities, was equally unnecessary and inexcusable.

A proclamation declaring the objects of the expedition was issued in Rugoba's name, and probably intended to be disseminated through means of his people. When the troops first entered the village of Panwell, the carcoon in charge of it, on the part of the ministers, retired. Colonel Egerton immediately occupied his house : and as he had received two copies of the proclamation, he assembled the inhabitants, whom he describes as well satisfied with the change of government when he had read the proclamation ; and he was, therefore, not a little surprised on finding intelligence had reached Bombay that the inhabitants were retiring from the village, and that a complaint had been made against him for occupying, and of course defiling, a Bramin's house. This accusation Colonel Egerton repelled by declaring that he was actually living in the government-house, it never appearing to enter his mind that the government agent was a Bramin. It may seem frivolous to record such absurdities, or the petty disputes of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, which commenced regarding the military honors to be paid to the former. Unfortunately, Mr. Mostyn, the person best qualified to direct the expedition, was taken ill, and, without once attending the committee, returned to Bombay, where he died on the 1st of January. Mr. Carnac was fully sensible of his loss ; and at an early period expressed apprehensions of the great discouragement his illness might prove to the Mahratta party still inclined to the cause of Rugoba.

Colonel Egerton, on Mr. Mostyn's being taken ill, declared that the powers of the committee were suspended ; but his objections were overruled by an order from Bombay, although by this decision, there being only two members, Mr. Carnac, as president with a casting vote, became virtually commander of the army.

The whole force, accompanied by Rugoba, Amrut Rao (his adopted son), and a few straggling horse that had joined them, ascended the Ghauts by the 23rd of December ; by that time some partial skir-

December 23. mishing had taken place between Captain Stewart and small parties of the enemy, in which the sepoys showed great zeal. Colonel Egerton, at the top of the Ghauts, divided his force into two brigades ; the one commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Cay, the other under Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, still reserving the advance as a separate corps under Captain Stewart. These three divisions advanced alternately at the rate of about three-quarters of a mile daily, the march rarely exceeding two miles, and the one division always occupying the ground which the other had quitted. In this manner, in eleven days they reached Karlee, a village eight miles from the ground which Captain Stewart had first occupied. This extraordinary mode of warfare, which the commanding officer afterwards declared was owing to want of provisions and carriage in the commissariat, and which Mr. Carnac describes as what Colonel Egerton might have seen in Germany, encouraged the enemy, who brought down infantry, rockets, and guns to harass them ; but they were attacked and driven back on every occasion with the greatest spirit. During the march from Kundalla the army lost Lieutenant-Colonel Cay, an excellent officer, who was mortally wounded by a

December 31. rocket on the 31st of December ; but at the village of
1779, Jan. 4. Karlee, on the 4th of January, Captain Stewart, who, on the present and several other occasions, had distinguished himself, was killed by a cannon-ball, to the general regret of the army. "He was,"

says the Bombay government, "a most active, gallant, and judicious officer, and possessed of the true military spirit." It is a remarkable fact that his name is to this day familiar in the Mahratta country by the appellation of *Stewart Phakray*, which expresses something more than the gallant Stewart—a circumstance that marks the strong impression made by his conduct; and what soldier, wherever he may fall, could desire a nobler epitaph, than that such a tradition should be preserved by his enemies?

The dilatory preparations at Bombay afforded Nana Furuwees and Mahadajee Sindia ample time to assemble the army. Sukaram Bappoo's restraint was, at this crisis, deemed impolitic, probably from the same cause as before—on account of the situation in which he stood with the British government as one of the two ministers who concluded the treaty of Poorundhur; a reconciliation had therefore been brought about, and he ostensibly resumed his office as minister. The principal part of the military operations were intrusted to Mahadajee Sindia, Hurry Punt Phurkay, and Tookajee Holkar. But they took care to place Holkar, of whom Nana was justly suspicious, in a situation from which he would have found it extremely hazardous to effect a junction with Rugoba. The whole Mahratta army, on the approach of the English, advanced to Tullygaom. Bhew Rao Yeswunt Phansay, with seven guns, 4,000 infantry, and 5,000 horse, had been sent on some time before, to oppose the Bombay troops; and it was with Phansay's party that the skirmishes had hitherto been maintained. On the 6th of January Colonel

January 6.

Egerton, in consequence of sickness, was obliged to resign the command of the army, which devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn; but Colonel Egerton continued a member of the committee, as a party of the enemy's horse had cut off the communication with Bombay.

On the 9th of January the army reached Tullygaom, where the Mahrattas made a show of resistance; but, when the line advanced in order of battle, they retired. The village had been destroyed by order of Nana Furuwees, and the committee heard that similar orders had been given for burning Chinchore and Poona. On receiving this intelligence, instead of pushing forward 18 miles, the distance between Tullygaom and the capital, the apparent determination of the enemy alarmed them; and Rugoba's assurance, that no person of consequence would declare for him until some advantage had been obtained, had quite a contrary effect from what he had intended, and, instead of being animated to exertion, the committee sank into despondency. With 18 days' provisions for their troops, they in the same breath came to a resolution, first, of negotiating with some of the chiefs, and then of retreating. Mr. Lewis, who had remained at Poona till the last moment, and had made good his way to Bombay, was with the army, and at this moment assured the committee that a party of horse in the interests of Moraba were in the Concan, and might soon be expected to join their army; but this circumstance was disregarded. When Mr. Carnac proposed a retreat to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, Captain Hartley, and Mr. Holmes of the civil service, were present, and both these gentlemen ventured to suggest that it would be better to await the result of the negotiation where they then were. Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, on being called upon for his opinion, said he had no doubt that he could carry the army to Poona, but apprehended the impossibility of protecting the baggage, provisions, and cattle; of which last, of bullocks alone, there were 19,000. The committee, however, determined to adhere to their resolution of retreating. Rugonath Rao, whose advice at such a

moment was of great importance,* earnestly begged of them to defer their resolution ; but the man who had led 50,000 horse from the Nerbuddah to the Attock was equally odious to his countrymen and despicable among his allies ; not one day would the committee delay in deference to his opinion ; and at eleven o'clock on the night of the 11th of January, the heavy guns having been thrown into a large tank, and a quantity of stores burnt, an army of 2,600 British troops began its retreat, secretly as was supposed, before 50,000 Mahrattas.^o

It was vainly imagined that they could make one march before being discovered ; and when the advanced guard, under Captain Gordon, was fired upon by a party of horse at two o'clock in the morning, Colonel Cockburn conceived that the enemy must have obtained the intelligence from Rugonath Rao. The army, as already noticed, was divided into two brigades, besides six companies of grenadier sepoy, which were kept distinct as a reserve. On the present occasion the two brigades were united under Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, having a strong advanced guard at some distance in front, with the six companies of grenadier sepoy and two guns, considerably in the rear.

On the death of Captain Stewart, Captain James Hartley was selected to command the reserve. Captain Hartley was a young man, who had been in the company's service 14 years ; he was well known to the sepoy, who have much discernment in the character of their officers, and are very different under different men ; but in the hour of need, where they have experienced kindness, and seen their commanders worthy of confidence, there probably never was an instance of misconduct. An officer, even in a subordinate rank, has often a charge not only difficult in itself, but of higher national importance when leading the natives of India, than is likely to fall to the lot of a junior officer in any other branch of the British service. He has not merely to do his duty, not only to animate, or, what is often more difficult, to restrain, but to support the minds of his men, and infuse his own spirit, when he may perceive them despondent or discontented.

As soon as Colonel Cockburn heard the firing in front, he ordered Major Frederick with two companies of Europeans to support Captain Gordon ; but the Mahrattas had succeeded in plundering a part of the baggage, and in a very short time the rear was also attacked. The army, however, continued to move on till daylight, when they found themselves completely surrounded, and large bodies of horse coming on as if to charge the main body ; the troops were immediately halted, and the line formed ; but the strength of the attack, as had been the practice in Deccan warfare since the days of Shah Jehan, was made upon the rear. Hartley's sepoy received them with the greatest animation and steadiness, drove them back, and were with difficulty restrained from pursuing them. Shortly after sunrise the attack on the rear was renewed by the main body of the Mahratta army, consisting of both cavalry and infantry ; and their guns, having been brought up, opened on the line, but the heaviest fire, and the brunt of the onset, was still in the rear. The gallant band of sepoy, though now sore pressed, had excellent European officers, and not only stood their ground with spirit, but fought with perfect enthusiasm.

Captain Hartley sent an officer to Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, requesting him to bring up the main body to his support ; to this Colonel Cock-

* Mr. Lewis seems to have estimated them at about 10,000 infantry and 25,000 horse. Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn declares there were above 120,000 men. The Mahrattas themselves say at least a lakh, and I believe there may have been above one-half of that number.

burn^d objected, as a large body of horse threatened to charge his left in case he quitted his position ; but he directed five companies of Europeans and two companies of sepoys to support Captain Hartley. With this reinforcement, Hartley, holding possession of a rising ground, sustained the whole weight of a persevering attack with the steadiest intrepidity. About ten o'clock Colonel Cockburn had sent him peremptory orders to retreat ; but, fortunately, Lieutenant Dawson, who was charged with this message, met, by the way, Lieutenant Rattray, an officer^s in Captain Hartley's confidence, to whom he communicated his errand, when both concurring in the fatal consequence that must attend such an order, Rattray took the risk of stopping the messenger, of explaining to Colonel Cockburn, as if from Captain Hartley, the effects of retiring under such circumstances, and of begging that he would allow Captain Hartley to await a more favourable opportunity. To this proposal Colonel Cockburn consented ; before noon, however, he sent Major Frederick from the advance to the rear, desiring him to take the command, but not to depart from the disposition previously made by Captain Hartley.

During the whole of this time the main body was partially engaged : principally occupied in returning the fire of the Mahratta artillery, or cannonading such of their horses as ventured within range of the guns. The loss hitherto, except at the position occupied by Hartley, was very inconsiderable, and the fire from the enemy had slackened, when, about one o'clock in the afternoon, Major Frederick was ordered to retire to the main body, which he effected in a creditable manner ; and the whole moved towards the advanced guard, which had halted at the village of Wurgaom.

The baggage, bazar, and camp-equipage, so useful to the comfort of an Indian army when successful, becomes quite the contrary in adversity ; and, on the present occasion, the proportion was immoderately great. The followers had quitted the flank and crowded in between the divisions of the troops, so as greatly to impede the retreat ; about three o'clock in the afternoon, when they got sufficiently near the village, the followers ran forward and pressed towards it, to seek shelter from the enemy's rockets, which were now showered upon them. This press created the greatest confusion ; the enemy's horse took advantage of the circumstance, charged through the baggage and the ranks, and, when entering the village of Wurgaom, considerable loss was sustained. The troops, however, soon extricated themselves ; the horse were driven off, the guns placed in commanding situations, and by four o'clock in the afternoon the army had

some respite. Early on the ensuing morning the enemy's guns opened on the village, and a body of infantry advanced to attack it. They were repulsed, but the troops were supposed, by some of the officers, to be dispirited ; doubts of their being able to retreat began to be expressed ; the commanding officer, instead of crushing such dangerous despondency, if whispered in his presence, was himself infected by the spreading contagion. Some desertions had taken place, and alarming reports of many more were circulated. It is under such circumstances that a good officer of sepoys is proved. Captain Hartley addressed his men collectively and individually ; there are times to assume the officer, and moments where the officer must be the acquaintance and friend. Hartley was both respected and beloved ; he spoke to his men ; his officers seconded him ; and the desertions from his corps ceased.

* Lieutenant Rattray, of the Bengal establishment, served as a volunteer with one of Hartley's companies.

On the 13th, the total loss of fighting men in the preceding day was found to amount to 352, of which 56 were killed, 151 were wounded, and 155 were missing ; many of the last were supposed to have deserted. Among the killed and wounded, 15 were European officers, whose presence, even on occasions of success, is of great consequence, but at such a time it is invaluable to native troops.

A further retreat was deemed impracticable, and Mr. Farmer, the secretary of the committee, was sent to negotiate with the ministers. They at first demanded the surrender of Rugonath Rao, which the committee would have complied with, but they were saved from this disgrace by his having entered into a separate agreement with Mahadajee Sindia, to whom he afterwards gave himself up. Sindia was aiming at an ascendancy which Nana Furnuwees was studiously endeavouring to prevent ; yet each was so necessary to the other in the Mahratta empire, that, although their ultimate views were at variance, their present interests were in union.

The ruling party, of which Nana and Sindia were now the real authorities, insisted on the committee's entering on a treaty for the surrender of the whole of the territory the Bombay government had acquired since the death of Mahdoo Rao Bullal, together with the revenue possessed by the company in Baroach and Surat, which the Mahrattas never had possessed. Mr. Farmer, who was compelled to write mysteriously, as his letters to the committee passed through the hands of Nana and Sindia, expressed himself by saying—"They seem to me to feel themselves in that situation with respect to us which the Turkish vizier felt himself in regard to Peter the first, at the time the Empress Catherine sent her jewels to the vizier." Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn was then called upon for his opinion in writing, when he declared that a retreat was impracticable, and that he could not charge himself with such a responsibility. Captain Hartley, who was present when the declaration was made, not only differed from Colonel Cockburn's opinion, but showed him a plan by which it might be insured ; Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, however, adhered to what he had stated. Mr. Carnac, as he afterwards proved, expressed an opinion at the time that he thought the retreat might be accomplished, and that it ought to be attempted rather than submit to the humiliating terms insisted upon ; but he did not choose to press it. As such was Mr. Carnac's opinion, the plea of delicacy, or deference towards the military authorities, unfortunately for him, can little avail ; for, as he ordered the retreat from Tullygaom, he ought to have adhered to that order, which, however injudicious or disastrous, could not have proved disgraceful. The committee replied to Mr. Farmer's communication by desiring him to inform the ministers that they had no power to enter on any treaty without the sanction of the supreme government. "Show us then," said Mahadajee Sindia, when this message was delivered, "the power by which you have taken upon you to break the treaty concluded by Colonel Upton."

But, immediately after the committee had despatched the reply alluded to, which was, at least, dictated in the language of fair dealing, they sent Mr. Holmes to Mahadajee Sindia, invested with full power to conclude a treaty. Mr. Carnac reconciled himself to this measure by the former message through Mr. Farmer, from which he argued that, if the ministers submitted to be duped, it must be their own fault ; and so far from intending the good faith which he pledged, he afterwards declared that he granted the powers to Mr. Holmes under a *mental reservation* that they were of no validity.

The separate negotiation thus opened with Sindia flattered him exceedingly, and accorded most fully with his plans of policy ; but no ebullition of joy prevented his taking every advantage of the English, as far as was consistent with the control he now had, and was determined to preserve, over Nana Furnuwees. Mr. Holmes settled that everything was to be restored to the Mahrattas as held in 1773. The committee were obliged, on the spot, to send an order countermanding the advance of the Bengal troops, and Sindia's favour was purchased by a private promise to bestow on him the English share of Baroach, besides a sum of 41,000 rupees in presents to his servants. The committee were so completely humbled that they viewed with gratitude the kindness of Sindia in suffering the army to depart ; they were obliged to give two hostages, Mr. William Gamul Farmer and Lieutenant Charles Stewart, as a security for the performance of their engagement ; but their first act on descending the Ghauts was to suspend the countermand they had addressed to the officer commanding the Bengal detachment.

On the return of the troops to Bombay, the immediate object of attention was the measure of reward and punishment throughout the army. Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn were suspended from the service by the government ; no opinion as to the personal conduct of Mr. Carnac was then passed, but in anticipation of the order of events, as the characters are in future quite undistinguished, it is merely necessary to observe that, when the whole of the proceedings came before the Court of Directors, after a deliberate investigation, they addressed a despatch to Bombay, in which they enumerated the particular demerits of the parties blamed, passed a just censure on the behaviour of Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton, and dismissed them from the company's service. They also dismissed Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn, the justice of whose sentence was certainly not questionable, and the occasion called for example ; but we may lament the errors of an officer whose reputation was deservedly considerable, until chance raised him to a station above his abilities. Four years before, Colonel Cockburn's character had been recorded by General Gordon in the following words :—"Cool, clear, steady, and determined as an officer ; he has twice within these two years led our troops to assault,* which have been attended with glory and success to him and the troops, and much advantage to our employers. I do not know a better regimental officer."

But, although some were thus punished by the judgment of the Directors in England, others were dismissed at Bombay, and many were applauded and promoted for their conduct on the 12th January. The gallant and judicious behaviour of Hartley was represented in its true colours, and his merit was, at first, universally acknowledged ; but the governor and council having raised him at once to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, although he might have merited the distinction, such promotion being unprecedented in the company's service, was deemed so improper and injurious, that every officer, before senior to Colonel Hartley, represented the injustice and degradation to which he was personally subjected. Some time after, when an answer arrived from the Court of Directors, it proved a source of mortification to Hartley, as, although he was not deprived of his rank, his further promotion and his pay as lieutenant-colonel in the company's service were suspended until the whole of those, formerly his seniors, should, in the usual routine, be promoted over him.

* General Gordon alluded to Baroach and Tannah.

The Bombay government were reduced to a situation of great distress ; their measures had been obviously imprudent and impolitic, ill-concerted and badly executed. Success, that grand apology for statesmen's blunders, had not attended the schemes which they had been labouring to be permitted to attempt. From the time the supreme council exercised their first authority by a precipitate interference, the majority of the members of the Bombay government endeavoured, by argument and artifice, to bring about their own designs ; and, instead of taking an enlarged and dignified view of the national interests and government in India, which would have been an honor to themselves, and a reproach to their opponents, they lost the commanding ground on which they stood, by following a course that brought about its own undoing. The character of their proceedings bears strong marks of personal interest and personal resentment.

In Bengal, whatever their practical errors, the views of men accustomed to think as great statesmen are always apparent in their consultations and transactions ; but in Bombay the spirit of commercial adventurers still lurked at the council table. Their contracted policy was directed merely to carry their point in favour of Rugoba, and to aggrandize their own presidency. In sending off their expedition, it would seem as if they had been actuated by the puerile desire of showing the Bengal government what *Bombay* could do without their assistance. The excuse, subsequently made on this point, of expected assistance from the Bengal detachment, cannot be admitted, as it would appear in their replies to Mr. Draper's dissent, and in the means taken to ascertain the progress of the Bengal detachment ; but the importance of its co-operation seems scarcely to have been considered, until some time after their own army had taken the field. In short, the Bombay government neglected opportunity, they overlooked changes of circumstance, they desperately sent a handful of men against the strength of the Mahratta empire, and committed the conduct of an enterprize, practicable only by celerity, address, and resolution, to men totally unfit for such a charge. Their army had returned defeated, their treasury was exhausted, their credit insignificant, and their reputation sullied. But, under these discouraging circumstances, the merit of fortitude, ability, and vigour is justly due to Governor Hornby. There was no consolation in a retrospect ; the present misfortunes were chiefly to be attributed to misconduct ; and in anticipation there was censure for what was past, and danger in what was to come. Mr. Hornby, in the first place, judiciously recommended to the members of his government to abstain from all recrimination, to allow their motives and their measures as recorded, to await the judgment of their superiors, and that every one should bend his mind to the consideration of the future, for the purpose of preventing, and, if they did come, surmounting, the impending perils they had so much reason to apprehend. He took an unreserved and full view of their situation, and, although evidently humbled, he displayed the strong mind of an English chief, and convinced his council that, whilst they acted with the unanimity and firmness which became their country, they were not only above contempt, but might soon overcome their difficulties, and retrieve their affairs. He disavowed the validity of the disgraceful articles of the Wurgaoon convention ; for, although Mr. Carnac had ostentatiously intimated to Nana Furnuwees, probably to enhance his own consequence, that he was intrusted with the company's seal, and with full powers, he had no authority to conclude a treaty, nor could the Bombay government have delegated such a commission. Mr. Hornby determined, at all hazards, to resist the cessions made by the

committee : but as every point was indispensably referred to Bengal, there appeared no necessity for publishing a defiance to the Mahrattas. The intentions of the Bombay council were, however, sufficiently declared by their preparations, and every effort was made to recruit and improve their army.

On the 19th February Mr. Hornby laid an elaborate minute before his council, in which he took a view of Mahratta politics, and February 19. the line of conduct which he thought the most expedient for the British authorities to pursue. The end he proposed to attain was that of securing a peace, so as to exclude the French from the Mahratta dominions, and to retain the territory then in possession of the English. He assumed, as matter of certainty, that Sindia had indicated, by several parts of his conduct, an aversion to the French, and a desire to form an alliance with the English against Nana Furnuwees. In the supposition thus adopted, Mr. Hornby was not wholly wrong ; for, had Nana, by any means, foreign or domestic, become too powerful, Mahadajee Sindia might have sought assistance from the English ; but whilst Nana Furnuwees held the reins principally by the support of Sindia's power, it was completely the interest of the latter to uphold Nana's administration. The president was of opinion that the sum of 41,000 rupees promised to Sindia's servants ought to be paid ; and that Baroach, or an equivalent, should be given to him for the act of kindness, humiliating as it was, in permitting their army to return. All these suggestions were submitted to the supreme government ; but, in the meantime, the principal hope of retrieving their affairs was in the near approach of the Bengal army, to the progress of which a retrospect is now necessary.

Colonel Leslie crossed the Jumna in May 1778, and, notwithstanding A. D. 1778. professions of friendship made by the Mahratta officers, they manifested an opposition which induced him to take possession of the fort of Kalpee. It was expected by the Bengal government that the army would have crossed the Nerbuddah before the rains ; but some of the Rajpoot chiefs in Bundelcund, instigated by the Mahrattas, attempted to cut off the supplies, murdered an officer, and frequently killed foragers and followers. Colonel Leslie, however, instead of steadily pursuing his route, entered on a war with those chiefs, took part in their feuds, and thus engaged in a task equally endless and unavailing. He attacked and carried with little difficulty their principal post at Mhow, three kos west of Chatterpoor ; he drove a large body of men from a strong position on the banks of the Kane ; and, notwithstanding repeated orders to proceed, he wasted the whole monsoon in this unaccountable manner. In five months he had not advanced more than 120 miles ; and in the fourth month the estimated expense of his army amounted to 12 lakhs of rupees.

Mr. Hastings did not hastily withdraw his confidence from Colonel Leslie, but he was at length compelled to admit that his conduct was indefensible. He was therefore recalled, and Lieutenant-Colonel Goddard was appointed to succeed to the command of the army ; but, prior to the date of the order of recal, Colonel Leslie had died of a fever, on the 3rd October 1778.

Colonel Goddard immediately assumed command of the troops, and a few days afterwards commenced his march from Rajegurh, in Bundelcund, towards the Nerbuddah. His route lay by Mooltan, Khemlassa, Beilsah, Bhopaul, and Hoossingabad ; at the last mentioned place he forded the Nerbuddah on the 2nd December. Before Colonel Goddard had quitted the Bundelcund territory, Ballajee Punt, the Mahratta officer stationed at Sagur,

by whose machinations Leslie's progress was at first arrested, after many professions of friendship made a perfidious attack on the baggage of the army, in which he was completely foiled. The conduct of the nabob of Bhopaul was precisely the reverse of that of the Mahratta officer; he treated the English with the greatest confidence and hospitality, furnished them with every supply and every possible assistance, at the risk of incurring future enmity from the Mahrattas, without the support of his new friends. This generous behaviour on the part of the nabob was never forgotten; and it laid the foundation of a friendship, which, in modern times, has been laudably extended to his descendants by the British government.

After Colonel Goddard had crossed the Nerbuddah, he halted on the south bank of the river to await some communications from Moodajee Bhonslay, particularly connected with his future operations.

The views of the supreme government in contracting an alliance with the ruler of Berar were intimated to Bombay in the month of August, but merely in a general manner. The execution of the plan was intrusted to Mr. Elliot, a gentleman eminently qualified for any embassy; but the design was formed on defective information. It had for its object an alliance with Moodajee against the Poona ministers, for the purpose of attaining permanent peace and complete security to the company's possessions against the attempts of France, by establishing and upholding Moodajee Bhonslay as raja of all the Mahrattas. Mr. Hastings in this plan was precisely adopting the scheme originally suggested by Wittul Sondoor, the minister of Nizam Ally.* He was not aware that Moodajee had no claim to the Mahratta sovereignty; but even had such been the case, as the British government so long acknowledged the Peishwa's supremacy, as the Bombay presidency had concluded an authorized treaty with Rugonath Rao, declaring him regent during the minority of the young Peishwa, the measure was in the one view unjust, in the other inconsistent, and on the whole complicated and injudicious. Had Moodajee really been heir to the throne of Sivajee, it would have been very impolitic to have afforded the means of uniting an empire, hostile to all the world, which was of itself falling to pieces. The scheme was first interrupted by the death of Mr. Elliot, which happened on the 12th September, when on his route towards Nagpoor. The governor-general, in consequence of that event, directed the secret instructions addressed to Mr. Elliot to be made over to Colonel Goddard, whom Mr. Hastings empowered to treat according to their purport; and about the same time, as the new plan required that they should retain the means of carrying it into effect, the governor-general and council suspended the power of the Bombay government over Colonel Goddard's army, on the plea of a failure in the original plan for which the power had been granted. It was also resolved to strengthen Colonel Goddard by a reinforcement of two additional battalions of native infantry, which were directed to assemble on the western frontier of the province of Bengal under Major Jacob Camac.

Moodajee, in the first instance, would have acceded to the governor-general's views, but before any explanation had taken place, he had received intelligence of the designs at Bombay in favour of Rugoba, and of the vigorous preparations of his own countrymen at Poona; both of

* It seems to have been first suggested to Mr. Hastings by Benceeram, the wukeel of Sabajee.—(See letter from the Bengal government to the Court of Directors, 19th December 1774; App. 5, Report from the Committee of Secrecy.)

which, for obvious reasons, tended to deter him from entering on any immediate alliance. The favourite ambition of his family was, however, roused, and, in a conversation with Lieutenant Watherstone, the agent deputed by Colonel Goddard, Moodajee admitted the great desire he entertained of embracing the proposal at a fit time; but, whilst he wished to prolong the negotiation, he declined embarking in any enterprize at that period. Moodajee's plan, which was not disclosed till some time after, differed from that of Mr. Hastings; it was similar to what Rughojee seems to have intended on the death of Bajee Rao in 1740, and was more practicable than the one proposed.* Moodajee foresaw that opposition would be made to pretensions in his own person, but he knew there would be much less difficulty, and a powerful party against the Bramin administration, by his assuming the character of protector at Satara (his authority in Berar was nothing more), and declaring that his sole design was the restoration of the imprisoned raja's authority.

About the same time that Moodajee declined Colonel Goddard's overtures through Lieutenant Watherstone, urgent applications were received from Bombay, dated 6th and 19th December, requesting Goddard to advance with all expedition in order to support their army, which had taken the field in the cause of Rugoba.

Although Colonel Goddard, prior to the receipt of this requisition, was in possession of the order which withdrew him from the authority of the Bombay government, he considered the interest of his country so much at stake, that, without hesitation, he resolved to march straight to the west coast. This decision was extremely creditable, as Colonel Goddard had not merely to fight his way through the Mahratta army, but he incurred the serious responsibility of acting on his own judgment, where failure might be ruin in every sense of the word, and where he personally risked nothing by waiting for orders at Hoossingabad. He commenced his march about the 26th January, and arrived at Burhanpoor on the 30th of that month. The contradictory letters written by the field committee during and subsequent to the convention, though they afforded no information of the state of affairs, and might have perplexed most men, only induced Goddard to quicken his progress. After refreshing his men at Burhanpoor, he resumed his march on the 6th February, and in 20 days reached Surat, a distance of 300 miles, and by the expedition thus used avoided a body of 20,000 horse, which were despatched from Poona to intercept him.

The Bombay government expressed the liveliest gratitude for the honorable and generous motives which had induced him to hasten to their relief; and they showed their sense of it by immediately offering him a seat in their council, and recommending that he should be appointed their commander-in-chief. Colonel Goddard had gained on their esteem by his repairing to Bombay in person, and communicating with all the respect due to them, and to his own situation, joined with the becoming courtesy and frankness of a soldier.

On the 17th March the Bombay government first received a copy of the instructions intended for Mr. Elliot; the first copy had been sent from Bengal in November, but had unfortunately miscarried. The state of the negotiation with Moodajee Bhonslay

* "Let," says Moodajee in his own proposals to Mr. Hastings, "a lineal descendant of Maharaja Chutter Puttee Sivajee Bhonslay continue on the *muenud* of the Satara Raja; but till the power and authority of the Raja (sovereignty) is established, nothing is done."—(See Appendix, No. 191, 5th Report, Committee of Secrecy.)

they now learnt from Colonel Goddard, who seemed still to be of opinion that an alliance would take place. The Bombay government were not sanguine on this subject; and as Mahadajee Sindia had shown none of those favourable intentions towards the English, imputed to him in Mr. Hornby's minute of the 19th of February, they now perceived that they were on the eve of being compelled to engage as principals in a war, to maintain which their absolute want of funds was the first and most alarming consideration.

In this exigency, making allowance for defects in the original information on which some of his calculations were made, Mr. Hornby submitted a very judicious plan of operations, in a minute laid before

his council on the 30th March; he there pointed out a method of at once obtaining resources and distressing their enemies, by entering into a treaty with the Gaekwar family on the terms solicited by Futih Sing in 1772; reconciling the brothers, releasing them from tribute and dependence on the Poona state, and conquering the Peishwa's share of Guzerat for the company. But in all their schemes they soon found themselves more dependent, and more than ever controlled by the governor-general and council.

The Bengal government, before they received intelligence of the disgraceful proceedings at Wurgaom, upon hearing that the Bombay presidency had sent an army into the field, had decided on sending Colonel Goddard to their support; but they would not again relinquish authority over his army. Even before they heard of the convention, they vested Colonel Goddard both with the separate charge of their army, and with distinct powers as their envoy plenipotentiary at the court of Poona. The governor-general, upon receipt of further intelligence, without waiting to learn the result of Goddard's bold and judicious march, sanctioned the proceeding, however it might turn out, by recording his approbation and applause. The whole conduct of the majority of the Bengal government was on this occasion admirable. Their first determination on hearing of the disastrous news was to place their military power, offensive and defensive, in the best possible state, without betraying either a weakness or alarm that might have encouraged other native states to rise against them. A brigade was ordered to the banks of the Jumna, and Sir Eyre Coote, the commander-in-chief, proceeded to inspect and prepare their military resources on the north-western frontier, the quarter most likely to be invaded. Mr. Hastings, whose after conduct made amends for his earlier errors, and whose difficulties had tended to improve and exalt his mind, showed at this trying period all the great qualities of which he was possessed, and prudence and ingenuity, vigour and moderation, are alike conspicuous in the measures which he suggested. Superior to the inveteracy of Mr. Francis, and entirely exempt from the impatience of Sir Eyre Coote, which were displayed in a particular manner in regard to the measures of the Bombay government, Mr. Hastings applied his knowledge of mankind to the art of good government; and fortunately, by the support of Mr. Barwell, and his own casting vote as president, he commanded the majority in council. Become wiser by the past, though his present words were a severe censure on the hasty exercise of authority he had formerly supported, Mr. Hastings observes—"To mark our want of confidence in them (alluding of course to the Bombay council), by any public act, would weaken theirs in us; to load them with harsh and unoperating reproaches would indispose them to our authority, at the same time that it would absolve them from its effects; and to bind their deli-

berations by absolute and indiscretionary orders, might eventually disable them from availing themselves of any fortuitous advantages, which the confusion of the Mahratta government is more likely to offer them than any plan which we could prescribe to them, or which they could form on the letter of our instructions. In a word, such a conduct, by inflaming the passions of men, whom we are not to regard as exempt from the ordinary infirmities of humanity, would prove the surest means of converting the powers which were still left in their hands into the instruments of opposition, and even of the defeat of the measures which require their agency, and cannot be accomplished without it. Let us rather excite them to exert themselves for the retrieval of their past misfortunes, and arm them with means adequate to that end ; restricting their powers where the object is determinate, and permitting a more liberal extension of them in cases which are too variable and uncertain for positive injunctions."

Colonel Goddard was appointed a brigadier-general by the Bengal government during the service on which he was employed ; and a recommendation to the Court of Directors, in support of an application for his being appointed commander-in-chief of the Bombay presidency, was forwarded to England. But the Bombay government, although they highly approved of the distinction conferred on General Goddard, remonstrated against bestowing the rank except through them, or on his being separately appointed to conduct the negotiation with the Poona state. They also objected to having any military force stationed within the limits of the Bombay presidency, independent of their authority, as they deemed such a circumstance an invasion of their rights, and highly unconstitutional ; yet soothed by the respectful consideration shown to them by Mr. Hastings, and the judicious behaviour of General Goddard, they determined that their disapproval in those particulars should not prevent the utmost exertions of their ability and means to forward the views of the supreme government.

On the 15th of April General Goddard was directed to endeavour to negotiate a peace with the Poona state, on the terms of the treaty of Poorundhur, but with an additional article expressly excluding the French from any establishment within the Mahratta dominions. In the end of May, when the supreme government had received and taken into consideration Mr. Hornby's minutes of February and March, they sent more detailed instructions for their envoy's guidance ; and if peace on the terms proposed could not be obtained, he was then, if he thought proper, to adopt Mr. Hornby's plan of an alliance with the Gaekwar, in which case alone the authority of General Goddard as the governor-general's agent was to be blended with, and guided by, the instructions of the Bombay government. The only alteration in the authorized from the proposed plan was a restriction preventing the British authority from being engaged as a party between the brothers Futih Sing and Govind Rao Gaekwar. The alliance was, therefore, to be formed with Futih Sing, the acknowledged head of the Baroda state, and no pledge given for reconciling their domestic differences.

This mode of operations would not have materially interfered with the projected alliance with Moodajee Bhonslay, as the political connection between his father Rughojee and Dummajee Gaekwar might have paved a way to a union of the sons ; but after the convention of Wurgaom, Mr. Hastings immediately perceived, and the result was a proof of his penetra-

tion, that Moodajee could no longer be accounted an ally, though, if judiciously managed, he might safely be reckoned neutral. It was desirable, however, that the British authority should be left unfettered in case Moodajee persisted in procrastinating; and therefore General Goddard was instructed to tender explicit conditions, by a rejection of which he would have it in his power to declare the negotiation at an end.

In regard to an alliance with Sindia, the governor-general was disposed to concur in opinion with Mr. Hornby in supposing that Sindia had some secret design of connecting himself with the English. Mr. Hastings also concurred in the propriety of giving up Baroach, as had been privately promised; but Sindia's conduct had been such as to preclude their deigning to bestow this mark of acknowledgment. General Goddard, however, was instructed to treat separately with Sindia, in case he should at any time find him disposed to espouse the interests of the company; but the dependence of Nana Furnuwees on Mahadajee Sindia was at this time best secured by war, and whilst his wukeel at Bombay was professing his master's regard, an attack, instigated by Sindia, was made on Bancoote, with no other design than to blow the flame, and excite the English to hostilities.

As a further hold on Nana Furnuwees, whom Sindia governed by his fears, he caused the settlement of a jagheer in Bundelcund to be made on Rugonath Rao of 12 lakhs of rupees, of which he became the guarantee in behalf of Rugoba, and at the same time security to Nana for Rugoba's never molesting the government. He had thus got the latter into his power; but the unpopularity of Rugoba made the custody of his person of little consequence as an instrument of aggrandizement: Nana Furnuwees was perhaps secretly pleased to observe Sindia connecting himself with a man more likely to be shunned than followed, and only dangerous as a political instrument in foreign hands. Soon after the arrangement was made, Rugoba was sent off towards his jagheer in Bundelcund, for the purpose, as Nana believed, of being confined in the fort of Jhansee, until Sindia might find it convenient to release him; but Rugoba's usual escort, and even his guns, were suffered to accompany him, whilst the troops which were sent as his guard scarcely exceeded the number of his own followers. Just before Rugoba reached the Nerbuddah, in the latter end of the month of May, he was secretly warned of Sindia's intention to confine him in Jhansee, on which, having watched an opportunity, which presented itself at the ford of Cholee Mheyswur, he attacked and dispersed his guard, mortally wounded the commander, and fled towards Baroach with all speed, to throw himself at the feet of his friends the English, for he could scarcely expect that they would open their arms to receive him.

Although no explanation took place between Sindia and Rugoba, there is little doubt but the whole was Mahadajee's contrivance. It widened the breach between Nana and the English, but with either party it gave Sindia an advantage; it roused the fear and jealousy of the one, and made him more dependent; whilst broken, inexplicable hints of friendship,

* As one of several instances of these hints, just after the convention at Wurgaom, when Mr. Farmer, Mr. Holmes, and Mr. Sibbald were present, Sindia was loudly extolling the conduct of their rear-guard, which he compared to a red wall, "and no sooner beat down, than it was instantly built up again" ("each stepping where his comrade stood, the instant that he fell"). "I hope," said Mahadajee, whispering in Mr. Sibbald's ear, "to see these fine fellows co-operating with my own troops, by and bye."

which he occasionally dropped to the English, might be interpreted hereafter as alluding to some scheme of co-operation connected with this design of releasing their mutual friend.

When Nana Furnuwees required and obtained the sacrifice of his rival Sukaram Bappoo, and of Chintoo Wittul, once the minister of Rugoba, it was no test of Sindia's fidelity to him ; on the contrary, his having given them up to satisfy Nana at that time is perhaps, from the artifice of his character, rather in evidence of his having been accessory to Rugoba's flight. Sukaram Bappoo was hurried to Singurh, and thence he was removed and thrown into the fort of Pertabgurh—a circumstance which leads to the remarkable reflection that this venerable old man, after sharing every vicissitude of privation and of grandeur, of toil and of triumph, which a leader in the camps and courts of a great empire must experience, now looked down on a scene far more awful to a mind in his situation, than the tremendous abyss of 4,000 feet of black rugged rock, which formed the western wall of his prison : for, from Pertabgurh, on the eastern side, he saw the spot where, 120 years before, his ancestor, Puntajee Gopinat Bhokeel, pledged to Sivajee the treacherous oath which betrayed his master Afzool Khan to the stab of the murderer. But Sukaram's death scene was not closed in Pertabgurh ; the cautious jealousy of Nana Furnuwees removed him secretly from one place to another, to prevent rescue or insurrection ; and the once great Sukaram Bappoo perished miserably in Raigurh. Chintoo Wittul's life was also shortened ; he died in some hill fort, from the effects of unwholesome food and harsh treatment.

CHAP. XXIX.

FROM A. D. 1779 TO A. D. 1782.

Hyder makes himself master of the Mahratta territory south of the Kistna—his jealousy of the English—his connection with the French.—The English expect to be attacked by the French on the west coast of India.—Rugoba received by the English.—Report of a general confederacy against the English.—The British government acts as a principal in the negotiation with the Poona state, not as the auxiliary of Rugoba.—War declared.—Capture of Dubhoy.—Alliance with Futih Sing Gaekwar—terms.—Siege and storm of Ahmedabad.—Sindia and Holkar advance against Goddard.—Policy of Sindia.—Negotiation.—Goddard partially surprises Sindia's camp.—Operations prolonged in Guzerat—reasons.—Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley sent down to assist the troops in the Concan.—Operations in that quarter.—Capture and defence of Kallian—relieved by Colonel Hartley.—Operations of Captain Popham's detachment.—Capture of Lahar.—Surprise of Gwalior.—Unsuccessful attempt on Mullungurh.—Distress of the Bombay government.—War with Hyder Ally.—Admirable conduct of Governor Hornby.—Hartley opens the campaign with great spirit.—Siege of Bassein.—The covering army is attacked by the Mahrattas.—Battle of Doogaar.—Reduction of Bassein.—Memoir of Colonel Hartley.—Extensive confederacy against the British government.—Peace proposed to the Peishwa's government through Moodajee—who declines the mediation in consequence of the success of Hyder.—Proceedings at Bombay.—Goddard injudiciously takes post at the Bhoze Ghaut.—Preparations of the Mahrattas—they act vigorously on Goddard's supplies.—Goddard retreats to Panwell with heavy loss.—Proceedings of the Bengal government.—Operations of Lieutenant-Colonel Camac's detachment—Camac is surrounded by Sindia—retreats—surprises Sindia's camp—is joined by Colonel Muir.—Negotiation opened by Sindia through Colonel Muir.—Moodajee Bhonslay sends an army into Kut'ack.—Warren Hastings purchases its retreat, and detaches Moodajee from the confederacy.—Instructions to General Goddard for negotiating at Poona.—Extensive plan proposed by Goddard for carrying on the war.—Peace with Sindia.—A general treaty of peace with the Mahrattas concluded at Salbye through Mahadajee Sindia.—Delay in its ratification.—Baroach conferred on Sindia.

HYDER ALLY, though mulcted and duped by Mahadajee Sindia and A. D. 1779. Hurry Punt Phurkay, was amply compensated by the opportunity afforded when they were called away, in the end of May 1778. Dharwar was taken, and the whole tract, as far north as the Gutpurba and Kistna, submitted to his arms. He also took Chittledroog, and extended his territories to the eastward by the reduction of Kurpa. During his stay in that neighbourhood, he was joined by Monsieur Lally, a military adventurer, who had been for some time in the service of Busalut Jung at Adonee, and afterwards with Nizam Ally, but he now came over to Hyder with his corps.

Prior to this event, Hyder had become thoroughly jealous of the English ; and had he not been deterred by fears of a Mahratta invasion, he would, probably, at an early period have gone to war with them, and declared himself an ally of the French. He had for some time encouraged a close intercourse with that nation, and was supplied with arms, warlike stores, and occasionally with men, from the island of Mauritius. The capture of

Pondicherry, on the 18th October 1778, could not fail of occasioning regret to Hyder ; and when the governor of Madras intimated the intended reduction of the French settlement of Mahé, the port through which Hyder drew his supplies, he formally protested against the attack of a settlement which, being situated in his territory, was, he pretended, under his protection. The expedition, however, went forward ; Hyder, during the siege, hoisted his colours on the works by the side of the French ; but the fort fell to a detachment of

Madras troops under Colonel Braithwaite in the month of March. The governor-general and council, in consequence of having received intelligence that the French meditated an attack on the English settlements on the west coast, made an application to Madras for the assistance of some troops to reinforce Bombay, including Colonel Braithwaite's detachment ; and accordingly, after demolishing the works of Mahé, these troops were held at the disposal of the Bombay government, and intended, if necessary, to join General Goddard after the monsoon.

The fugitive Rugoba was received, though at first scarcely welcomed, by the English ; and, on the 12th June, accompanied by his sons Amrut Rao and Bajee Rao, the latter a child of four years old, visited General Goddard in his camp, from whom he received an allowance of 50,000 rupees a month, which the governor-general and council totally disapproved, and condemned as a lavish and unnecessary expenditure. General Goddard had been sufficiently prudent to avoid entering on any terms of alliance with Rugoba : it was considered very impolitic to attempt forcing a person into the Mahratta government, to whom the whole nation had manifested indifference or aversion ; and therefore, acting upon the terms of the Poorundhur treaty, if all accommodation were rejected, the English, in support of their national honor, could do no less than engage in the war as principals. The negotiation between General Goddard and Nana Furnuwees continued for several months ; but towards the end of the monsoon, Goddard communicated to the Bombay government some intelligence he had received of a general confederacy of the Mahrattas, Hyder, and Nizam Ally against the English, on whom, it was said, they meditated an attack at all the three presidencies. General Goddard, prior to the receipt of this information, had sent to demand explicit answers from Nana Furnuwees, which were obtained sooner than was expected, by his declaring that the surrender of Salsette and the person of Rugoba were

preliminaries to any treaty which the English might wish to conclude with the Mahratta state. An immediate requisition was made for Colonel Braithwaite's detachment on the first intelligence of a confederacy ; but, in consequence of an attack of the Nairs,* secretly instigated by Hyder, against both Mahé and Tellicherry, the services of the detachment could not be immediately spared ; the Madras

* There were two chiefs in Malabar known by the appellations of prince of Cherika and king of Cartinadee, who were leaders in the hostilities alluded to.

government, therefore, who then foresaw no impending danger to their own presidency, prepared another detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, of 100 artillery, a regiment of 500 Europeans, and a battalion of sepoys; but, before they joined Goddard, the campaign of the ensuing season was nearly at an end.

When General Goddard obtained the answer from Nana Furnuwees, he evaded giving an immediate reply, embarked for Bombay, where he arrived on the 1st November, and immediately consulted with the government respecting the plan of operations, particularly in regard to the proposed alliance with Futih Sing. His principal motive, however, for repairing thus promptly to Bombay was to urge despatch in preparing and sending off a reinforcement. Accordingly, although the Bombay government recommended delay, they acceded to his desire, and a detachment, under Colonel Hartley, of 100 European artillery, 200 European infantry, two battalions of native infantry, one of them a battalion of grenadier sepoys volunteer drafts from different corps, principally those who had before served under Hartley on the rear-guard at Tullygaom, were speedily embarked for Guzerat.

On the side of Bengal a detachment of 2,000 sepoys were in readiness to follow General Goddard's route; but, on hearing that the war was inevitable, and might have broken out before they could have reached their destination, their march to Surat was countermanded. Mr. Hastings, desirous, it would seem, of embracing any proposal for effecting a diversion, and perhaps of giving the country a rallying-point of insurrection against the Mahrattas, entered into an alliance with their turbulent tributary, the rana of Gohud.

Meanwhile General Goddard, on his return to Surat, dismissed the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees, put his army in a state of readiness, and opened the negotiation with Futih Sing. A treacherous correspondence was about this period intercepted by General Goddard between the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees and Mr. Vandegraaf, the Dutch chief and director at Surat, from which it appeared that the Dutch had engaged in a plot for assisting the Mahrattas to surprise Surat castle; but Mr. Boddam, the English chief, took effectual precautions to prevent the perfidious design.

Futih Sing, on the receipt of the proposals, attempted to procrastinate, and showed every disposition to evade a definite engagement with the

English. General Goddard, therefore, put his army in

Jan. 1, 1780. motion, crossed the Taptee on the 1st January, but advanced very slowly to the northward, until his battering train and stores had joined him from Baroach, when he marched to attack the fort of Dubhoy, which was in possession of the Peishwa, and garrisoned by about 2,000 men. Whilst General Goddard moved forward, Mr. Boddam occupied the Peishwa's districts near Surat. Mr. Robert Gambier, and the gentlemen of the civil service at Baroach, having enlisted irregulars, also took advantage of General Goddard's being in their neighbourhood, drove out the Peishwa's thannas, and took possession of Oklaseer, Hansot, Desborah, and Ahmod. Jumbooseer had not been restored by the Bombay government.

The army arrived before Dubhoy on the 18th January. The Bramin commandant, on being summoned to surrender, answered
January 18. by a vaunting discharge of matchlocks, and kept up a continued fire during the ensuing day, which did no other mischief than that of wounding one subaltern of the Bombay army, Lieutenant Charles Reynolds, the same person who was afterwards surveyor-general.

By day-break of the 20th, a battery of three 18-pounders was ready to open within 200 yards; but the garrison had evacuated the place in the night, and Mr. James Forbes* of the civil service, with a company of sepoys and a few irregulars, were placed in charge of the new acquisition. Futih Sing now began to negotiate in earnest; met General Goddard, seemingly with as much cordiality as alacrity, and concluded a treaty of offensive and defensive alliance, which was signed on the 26th, on the terms proposed by Governor Hornby, and approved by the supreme government.

The Peishwa's share of territory north of the Myhie was to be given up to Futih Sing, in lieu of which he agreed to cede his share of revenue south of the Taptee, or those districts known by the appellation of Uthawees Mahal (or Attaweese), his share of the revenues of Baroach, the district of Sinnore on the Nerbuddah, and his villages in the Baroach district. The usual tribute to the Peishwa was to be remitted at all events during the war, but 3,000 horse were to join Goddard's army. The company were to be put in possession of the districts ceded, from the day that Futih Sing's troops were put in possession of Ahmedabad. For that

February 10. place General Goddard marched with expedition, and arrived before it on the 10th February. The walls of Ahmedabad are of immense extent, and, for so vast a city, were remarkably strong. Though this ancient capital was considered in a comparatively deserted condition, even at this period it was supposed to contain upwards of 100,000 inhabitants. The Bramin in charge on the part of the Poona government, being summoned to surrender, expressed his willingness to give up the place, but desired a little time to persuade his garrison, composed of 6,000 Arab and Sindhee infantry, and 2,000 Mahratta horse, to comply with the general's desire. This is the ordinary language of Mahrattas when they intend a firm resistance; but General Goddard had afterwards reason to believe there was truth in what the Bramin asserted.

Next day, some of the troops, having ventured too near the wall, suffered for their temerity, and, amongst the rest, an officer, the second-in-command, Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, was wounded. On the 12th, however, General Goddard opened a battery, by which a breach was effected, and reported practicable by the evening of the 13th. From motives of humanity, and the fear of excesses in the city, the assault was next day delayed, in hopes that the garrison might be induced to surrender; but the endeavour was unavailing, and the storming party was formed on the morning of the 15th February, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley. The advance was composed of volunteers from the Bombay division. Two unfortunate individuals,† of those who had been dismissed for misbehaviour in the pre-

* The author of the Oriental Memoirs.

† Their names were Fraser and Clancey. Fraser was dismissed for abandoning his post at the Bhore Ghaut on hearing of the defeat at Wurzaom. But the infamy was rendered particularly striking and ridiculous, as it was from him that the first intelligence was received in Bombay of the disaster; and, writing from recollection, his note is on the Bombay records in these words:—"Dear Sir,—Our army is cut to pieces; I can effect my retreat, but I scorn it, at the risk of my honour. This is the last you shall hear from, yours truly, W. Fraser." Fraser, however, lived not only to retrieve his honor, but to distinguish himself on several occasions, and to be much esteemed throughout the army. This last I mention on the authority of Major-General Baillie, who knew him intimately.

ceding campaign, came forward to General Goddard, and earnestly solicited permission to accompany the forlorn hope, which was humanely granted, and both survived, after proving themselves worthy of being restored to the service. The command of the party, however, was intrusted to Sergeant Fridge of the Bombay European regiment, a corps always celebrated for gallant volunteers on such occasions. The grenadiers of the Bombay division followed the forlorn hope, with a strong reserve of chosen men from the army. On the preconcerted signal, the whole moved off at a brisk pace, rushed up the breach, where the garrison stood ready to receive them, and for a short time made a very determined stand, until 300 of them lay dead, when resistance ceased. The most honorable part of this gallant assault was the subsequent steadiness and good conduct of the troops. No excesses were committed, and two only of the inhabitants not composing the garrison lost their lives. Of the British troops, 106 were killed and wounded; among the latter were 10 European officers and four gentlemen volunteers, three of whom died of their wounds.*

The capital of Guzerat was scarcely reduced when General Goddard heard of the approach of Mahadajee Sindia and Tookajee Holkar with a body of 15,000 horse, to which were to be united 7,000 horse, then engaged in plundering the villages about Baroach.

After the escape of Rugoba, there was some coolness between Sindia and the minister, but they were speedily reconciled; and although Mahadajee did not wish to quit the capital at that time, yet as he had Nana under command by causing him to apprehend an alliance with the English, he at last consented to oppose Goddard in Guzerat; and it is necessary to apprise the reader that Nana Furnuwees was without reserve informed of all the subsequent proceedings of Sindia: a report, however, was spread of Sindia's being on the eve of a rupture with Nana, which was speedily followed by another report of his intention to make a desperate effort to recover possession of Rugoba's person by assaulting Surat.

Rugonath Rao had been persuaded by General Goddard to remain in that city when the army took the field—a circumstance which Mahadajee, from not exactly comprehending that the English were at war as principals, did not expect, and which may have disconcerted the scheme he was hatching. The momentary alarm, however, occasioned by his threat, was dissipated on the arrival of the European part of the Madras detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, which had disembarked at Surat before the Mahratta army had passed Candeish.

Sindia and Holkar forded the Nerbuddah on the 29th February with

February 29. upwards of 20,000 horse, and proceeded to the neighbourhood of Baroda, where they halted. Goddard crossed the

March 6. Myhie on the 6th March at Fazilpoor, to give them battle; but, on his advancing towards Baroda, they retired in the

direction of Pawungurh. Sindia, so far from evincing hostile intentions, professed the greatest friendship for the English. The two hostages, Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart, who were still in his camp, and whom he had treated with much hospitality, were restored to liberty, and

March 9. joined General Goddard on the evening of the 9th. This act of kindness was followed by the appearance of a wukeel, Abajee Shabajee, who gave assurances of his master's friendship for the English, and enmity to Nana Furnuwees, declaring that his master

* Major Spaitb, Bombay Engineers; Captain Gough, Bengal Native Infantry; Volunteer Wright.

had experienced from the latter the greatest ingratitude and treachery. But Goddard, without being drawn in to make proposals for an alliance, which, allowing Sindia to have been sincere, would have afforded him a grand advantage, made suitable answers by assurances of a reciprocal regard on the part of the English; but, with respect to the terms of a treaty, he left Sindia to be the judge of what would prove mutually advantageous, as the British governments in India had no other view than a permanent peace, which they were determined to obtain on terms honorable, defined, and secure.

Sindia's object was to waste the time in negotiation, and keep Goddard inactive during the fair season; but Indian chicane is no match for European honesty. General Goddard was sincere in assuring Sindia of his desire for peace, but he limited the negotiation to a certain time, and allowed Sindia three days from the time his wukeel quitted the British

camp to offer his proposals. Accordingly, on the 16th March 16. March, the wukeel returned, and submitted the following terms from his master:—"That formerly, when Rugoba was at Tullygaon, after the return of the English army to Bombay, an agreement had been entered into between him and Sindia, and written engagements mutually exchanged for its performance, when the former consented to relinquish all claims to any share in the administration at Poona, and to retire towards Jhansee, where he should receive an allowance of 12 lakhs of rupees per annum; that the sicca should continue in the name of the young Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narain, and that Bajee Rao, the son of Rugoba, should be appointed the Peishwa's dewan, but as he was too young to transact the business of the office himself, being only four years of age, the care and management of it should be left entirely to Sindia. He now, therefore, proposed that Rugoba should retire to Jhansee, and that the young Bajee Rao should accompany him to Poona."

Such were his proposals, without declaring himself further respecting the English, whose part he still reserved for Goddard to propose; but General Goddard merely objected to what was wrong, declared that no force should be put on Rugoba's inclination, that he had sought the protection of the English, and that his quitting it should be voluntary; that even allowing the English did assist Sindia to acquire the entire powers of the state—for the sum of his proposals amounted to nothing less—Sindia, on his part, in the name of the Peishwa, should previously consent to certain conditions favourable to the British interests, as well in consideration of the benefits he was to derive, as in compensation for the wars of the Mahratta state in which they had been compelled to engage. The negotiation was thus brought to a point within seven days, which Sindia probably intended to have spun out into as many months, when it would have been his study to balance Bramin fears and jealousy against the policy of the English, and that sanguine temperament of Europeans which is usually accompanied by credulity.

Mahadajee Sindia continued to profess his friendly regard, but, perceiving that Goddard was not to be duped, he opened a negotiation with Govind Rao Gaekwar for putting him in possession of Guzerat; and Goddard had now no other desire than to bring on an action, which the Mahrattas as carefully avoided. Sindia, apprehending a surprise, sent his heavy baggage under the protection of the hill-fort of Pawungurh, which was in his own possession, and threw out a number of small parties of horse to retire on the first alarm, and enable him to avoid any sudden attack that might be meditated.

In this manner, fancying himself secure, he allowed the British army to encamp, on the 27th March, within six miles of his main body, in which situation they lay watching each other for a week; but Goddard, on the night of the 2nd April, prepared a detachment of 10 companies of grenadier

sepoys, headed by the two European grenadier companies of the Bombay regiment, two battalions of Bengal and one of Bombay native infantry, with the regiment of Bengal cavalry, and a small body of horse belonging to the nabob of Oude, the whole being supported by 12 pieces of artillery. This force he disposed in two lines; the first line was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel W. A. Baillie, the second by Major Hopkins; and at

two o'clock on the morning of the 3rd, the time when the guards of irregulars begin to be overpowered by drowsiness, they moved off silently under General Goddard's personal command: Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley remained in camp in command of the rest of the army. The detachment passed the Mahratta out-parties without being discovered,—came upon their grand guard of several thousand men,—pushed on for their camp, still a mile and a half in front, without firing a shot; but the day dawned, the alarm had been communicated, and the main body were ready mounted. They stood for a short time, and even advanced, as if to charge, but they were received with a heavy fire, on which they turned their horses until they were beyond reach of the guns; a spirited charge by the body of cavalry belonging to the nabob of Oude, distinguished from the regiment of Bengal cavalry by the name of the *Candahar horse*, on a body of the Mahrattas, completed the rout, and drove them beyond the reach of pursuit.

Of the regular troops not a man was touched, but 15 of the Candahar horse fell in the charge. The loss of the Mahrattas was supposed to be considerable; and General Goddard imagined he had gained a victory; but as soon as he had encamped, Sindia took up the same distance as before, observing a greater vigilance in guarding against surprise. On

the 14th, Colonel Browne, with the Madras troops, joined, and General Goddard on the 19th made another attempt on Sindia's camp; but the Mahrattas only waited until he came within sufficient distance, when they let off a flight of rockets, and retired as before.

The Bombay government expressed some impatience at General Goddard's allowing himself to be thus amused, as they imagined that his army might have been better employed in reducing the fort of Bassein, which they considered of value as a permanent acquisition: but General Goddard was constrained to this mode of operations; the time would not have admitted of his forming a regular seige, and to quit Guzerat at that period was to leave their ally Futih Sing at the mercy of the enemy. It was evident that Sindia wished to draw him into a long pursuit; and, although no decisive advantage was gained, the mere circumstance of forcing Sindia and Holkar to decline a battle, and retire before his army, was of importance in the neighbourhood of the new acquisitions. At the request of the presidency, however, Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley was ordered

down to Bombay, and quitted the army near Baroda on the 8th May. The presence of this reinforcement in the Concan was very necessary.

The greater part of the provisions for the consumption of the inhabitants of Bombay being drawn from the neighbouring continent, in order to prevent the Mahrattas from cutting off the supplies, in which they

partly succeeded, detachments were sent from Salsette and Bombay, which had seized and occupied several posts, and one party, consisting of two companies of sepoys, headed by four European subalterns, pushed on to the Ghauts, occupied one of the passes, where they established a post, got up three pieces of cannon, and were reinforced by a small detail of European artillery. But the principal acquisition was the town of Kallian, where a captain's post was established under Captain Richard Campbell. Nana Furnuwees, who set a high value upon that place, assembled a large force for the purpose of recovering it, and driving the English from the continent: the post at the Ghauts was attacked before it could be withdrawn; the party was cut off or dispersed, and the guns were taken. Three of the officers were killed, and one of them was made prisoner. The Mahrattas, elated with this success, advanced towards Kallian, threatened to exterminate the garrison if they dared to resist, and forced their prisoner, Eusign Fyfe, to write* to the commanding officer, Captain Richard Campbell, to demand the surrender of the town. To all which Campbell replied "that they were welcome to it if they could take it," and made a most spirited defence. Colonel Hartley fortunately arrived from Guzerat just in time to prevent the assault, which was to have taken place on the morning of the 25th May; but, on the night of the 24th, Hartley surprised the Mahratta camp, followed them up for several miles, killed a great number, but could not succeed in taking the guns. They retired, however, from the Concan, and left the British troops unmolested during the remainder of the fair season.

General Goddard, in the meantime, being incommoded for want of forage, was obliged to send to a distance to procure it; a covering party was briskly attacked, but repulsed the enemy; and shortly after this event, Goddard moved to the Nerbuddah, in order to place his troops in convenient stations during the approaching rains.

He received a pressing application from the Bombay government to endeavour to seize Parneira, a hill 15 miles north of Damaun, fortified by Moro Punt Pingley in the time of Sivajee; but their wishes had been anticipated. Gunnessh Punt, a Mahratta officer, who had been stationed in the Concan, quitted that quarter, plundered such parts of the Attaveesay as did not acknowledge the ministerial party, and advanced close to Surat, where he had committed great devastations.

* The following is a copy of the letter:—

"DEAR SIR,—I am now a prisoner in the Mahratta camp, with seven European artillerymen, one subedar, two Jimmadars, and 15 sepoys. They are encamped within a very little distance of Callian, and are about 16,000 or 18,000 fighting men. They have eight guns and one howitzer. This is the best account I can give you. I write this at their desire, to demand that you will immediately deliver up Callian and Ballapore, otherwise they threaten to kill every one of us, to storm both those places, and put every man to the sword. You may act as you think proper, but I beg you will return the bearer, as I have pledged my head you will not hurt the messenger; so be sure to return an answer soon. Our situation is none of the most agreeable. I should be obliged to M'Lean for a few clothes, as I have none.

"I am, Dear Sir,

"Your most obedient humble Servant,

(Signed) "THOMAS FYFE.

"Camp, near Callian, 12th May 1780.

"TO CAPTAIN CAMPBELL.

"P. S.—This does not please Mr. Bappoojee, the Bura Surdar; he also demands he may be paid for all the batty (rice) that has been taken, and a tribute for the expense of his army. He also says that General Goddard, with the grand army, is at present surrounded in the Guzerat, and if you will peaceably comply with the above terms, he will get the grand army released, and further threatens us on refusal."

Lieutenant Welsh, an officer of the Bengal cavalry, having been sent forward by Goddard, at the requisition of the civil authorities in Surat, with the regiment of cavalry, the Candahar horse, and a body of infantry, surprised the camp of Gunness Punt at four o'clock on the morning of the 23rd April, killed upwards of a hundred of the Mahrattas, mortally wounded Gunness Punt, the commander, took his guns, three in number, and the whole of his baggage.* Lieutenant Welsh went on to the southward, and greatly distinguished himself by reducing Parneira, Bugwara, and Indergurrh—three forts in the neighbourhood of Damawn, of which the Bombay government were very anxious to obtain possession. A detachment of the Bengal sepoy, under Major Forbes, also distinguished themselves by attacking and routing one of Sindia's detachments near Sinnore, on the banks of the Nerbuddah, which insured tranquillity to the newly-acquired districts in Guzerat during the approaching monsoon.

In the Concan, after the rain fell, the Mahrattas in small parties returned to molest the different posts; but Major Hopkins and Captain Abington, who were stationed with the 8th† and 9th battalions at Kallian, prevented any attempt upon that place.

In regard to the affairs of Bengal, the treaty on the part of Mr. Hastings with the rana of Gohud was opposed by some of the members of the Bengal government with more reason than is always to be found in their objections; such an insignificant ally, without troops, resources, or extensive popularity, was more likely to embarrass than to aid a regular army, unless in regard to supplies whilst actually within the Gohud territory. A diversion, by attacking the Mahrattas on the north-east part

* Lieutenant Welsh's despatch to the chief of Surat, Mahratta letters.

Lieutenant W. does not seem to have been aware that Gunness Punt was mortally wounded, which the Mahratta letters mention. The following is a copy of the despatch:—

"DEAR SIR,—I have the pleasure to acquaint you that I rode on at the head of the regiment and Candahars, and reached Gunness Punt's camp at four o'clock this morning, when I took his camp standing, bazar, and three guns, killed 90, and wounded 15. I have only lost one duffedar, and two troopers wounded, one Candahar killed. In short, there was nothing wanting to complete this matter, but sending you in Gunness Punt's head. I don't think he has much to brag of now. The inhabitants of the villages seem exceeding happy, and are coming in from all quarters.

"I am, Dear Sir,

"Your very obedient humble Servant,

(Signed) "THOMAS WELSH."

† The grenadier sepoy, who accompanied Hartley to Ahmedabad, were formed into a separate corps, but on their return lost their name of the grenadier battalion, and were called the 8th battalion—a circumstance which nearly created a mutiny in the corps. To restore the name to men who remonstrated in a manner so unsoldierlike was deemed improper; but they afterwards behaved with such extraordinary valour, that their name of grenadier battalion was restored in 1788. They distinguished themselves during the arduous campaign in the Concan, which will be presently detailed. For their conduct in the battle of Panany by the side of the 42nd regiment, they received the highest compliment ever paid to a sepoy regiment. "The Royal Highlanders," says Colonel M'Leod, in his despatch of the 29th of November 1782, "evinced the ardour which always inspires their countrymen in battle. The 8th battalion of sepoy showed themselves equal to any troops in courage, coolness, and discipline." They then petitioned, through Colonel M'Leod, to have their name restored: but it was refused. In the following year, however, the 8th battalion formed part of the garrison which maintained the heroic defence of Mangalore, and their name was restored, as the only reward which the sickly, famished men, on their return to Bombay, solicited. They were long fortunate in a succession of excellent commanding officers; and on every occasion of service the spirit of Stewart and of Hartley has lived in their ranks.

of Malwa, by passing through Gohud, was strongly recommended by Goddard, and supported by Sir Eyre Coote. The latter, however, disapproved of sending a small force ; and when, at the requisition of the rana, Captain Popham was ordered to cross the Jumna, Sir Eyre Coote deemed the measure extremely injudicious.

The detachment under Captain William Popham was composed of drafts intended to recruit the Bengal battalions serving with General Goddard ; but, in consequence of the renewal of the war, they were not allowed to march across India, as had been originally ordered, and were now selected for this service. The whole amounted to 2,400 men ; they were formed into three battalions of equal strength : a small body of cavalry, and a detail of European artillery, with a howitzer and a few field-pieces, accompanied them. Captain Popham crossed the Jumna in the month of February ; he immediately attacked a body of Mahrattas, who were plundering in the neighbourhood of Gohud, drove them from the country, and, at the request of the rana, marched against Lahar, a fortified place 60 miles west of Kalpee, in possession of the Mahrattas. Having summoned the fort, which refused to surrender, he was obliged to commence an attack, although he found it much stronger than had been represented, and that battering guns were necessary to insure its capture. But the determined bravery of the troops overcame every difficulty ; long before the breach was, in the ordinary sense of the word, practicable, Captain Popham, foreseeing that field-pieces might never effect the purpose, determined to storm. Lieutenant Logan and Cornet Gardiner led on the advance ; both fell in the breach ; but Mr. O'Dell, a volunteer, rushed forward to supply their place, mounted the works, gallantly followed by the party, and, after a persevering assault, the place was carried, although with the heavy loss of 125 men of the storming party. This success was entirely unexpected by Sir Eyre Coote, who, on hearing of the attack without battering cannon, only anticipated disaster ; and, in consequence of his representations, another detachment of four regular battalions, with a battering train, was held in readiness to cross the Jumna, under Major Jacob Camac. But if the successful assault of Lahar was unexpected, the capture of the strong hill fort of Gwalior without the loss of a man excited the utmost admiration. Captain Popham, after his return from Lahar, was encamped during the rains within five kos of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior, expecting to be relieved as soon as the season permitted. Gwalior was in possession of Mahadajee Sindia, and in Hindostan, where the stupendous fastnesses of the west of India were little known, it was accounted one of the strongest forts in Asia.

Captain Popham, with equal enterprize and prudence, was employed for about two months in laying his scheme ; and at last, assisted by spies, furnished through the rana of Gohud, he determined to carry his plan into execution. Every preparation had been made with the utmost secrecy, and on the night of the 3rd August he formed his party. The command of the advance was conferred on Captain Bruce, who had before distinguished himself in the attack of the Mahratta horse, upon the first arrival of the detachment in the Gohud territory. The advance on this occasion consisted of two companies of sepoy, chosen grenadiers, and light infantry. They were led by four lieutenants—Wilson, Scott, Allen, and Paterson ; and, as the surprise of natives was intended, 20 Europeans followed the sepoy—a judicious disposition, as they were near enough to gain the head of the column if necessary, and where they were placed, less likely to lead to discovery ; two battalions of sepoy followed :

scaling-ladders applied to the foot of the scarped rock, which was 16 feet high, enabled them to mount with ease. Thence they had to climb a steep ascent of about 40 yards to the foot of the second wall, which was 30 feet high. The spies ascended, made fast ladders of ropes, by which the sepoys mounted with alacrity, and each man as he got inside squatted down. Twenty of the sepoys, with Captain Bruce, had entered the fort, when three of them so far forgot themselves as to shoot some of the garrison who lay asleep near them. This indiscretion occasioned an immediate alarm; but the sepoys stood their ground, their comrades mounted to their support, the garrison became intimidated, and the sun had scarcely risen on the 4th August when the assailants had obtained possession, almost without resistance, of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior.

On that very night a similar attempt was made with different success on the western side of India. Captain Abington, afterwards so well known from his gallant defence of Tellicherry, made an attempt to surprise the strong fortress of Mullungurh, or, as it is frequently termed, Bhov Mullun, one of the most conspicuous objects of the beautiful view to the eastward of the island of Bombay. Captain Abington succeeded in possessing himself of the lower hill; but the garrison, before his men could get sufficiently near to mingle with them, took the alarm, and made good their retreat to the upper fort—an enormous mass of perpendicular rock that defied all attempts at an assault.

During the rains the Bombay government had full leisure to contemplate the state of their affairs. Their greatest distress was their total want of funds. They looked to Bengal for a supply of treasure; but the hostility of Hyder, which the supreme government had doubted, and which the majority of the Madras rulers disbelieved, burst with appalling certainty on the province of Arcot, which was invaded in the month of July with the most formidable army that had ever opposed the British power in India. This new difficulty, superadded to their own distress, induced the supreme government to declare that they could afford no assistance to the Bombay presidency. "We have no resource," says Governor Hornby in his admirable minute of the 1st August, "but such as we may find in our own efforts;" and in this strait his measures showed much judgment and vigour. To raise funds was the subject of immediate deliberation, and the difficulties are best expressed in the means taken to obviate them. A quantity of copper in the company's warehouses, valued at 10 or 12 lakhs of rupees, was disposed of to the highest bidder; loans in Bengal, on the credit of the Bombay government, were proposed to be negotiated, and a plan laid of seizing as much as possible of the enemy's resources, by anticipating them in the collection of their revenue.

General Goddard was to besiege Bassein as soon as the season permitted: the European part of his army was sent down to Salsette by sea, the battering train was prepared in Bombay, and the sepoys were to march by land. Early in October the whole of the disposable force at Bombay and in the neighbourhood, consisting of five battalions, were placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hartley, who was instructed to drive out the enemy's posts, and cover as much of the Concan as possible, so as to enable the agents of the Bombay government to collect a part of the revenues, and secure the rice harvest, which is gathered at the close of the rains. There is perhaps no part of Mr. Hornby's minute more expressive of the distress under which that government laboured, than that where, alluding to the field force they were preparing, he observes—"Our troops will better bear running in arrears when employed on active service,

and subsisting in the enemy's country ;" for it is a principle with the British government and its officers, in India, than which nothing has more tended to the national success, always to consider the peasantry under their strictest protection. As General Goddard advanced to invest Bassein, it was intended that Colonel Hartley should then take up a position a little to the east of that fortress, and prevent the Mahratta army from attempting to raise the siege.

Hartley, however, in the first place was required to march to the relief of Captain Abington, who still occupied the lower part of the fort of Mullungurh ; but a large body of upwards of 3,000 of the enemy, principally infantry, had cut off his communication with Kallian, so that he was attacked by the garrison from the works above him, and surrounded

October 1. by the body in question. This service Colonel Hartley effected on the 1st of October without loss ; and another

corps under Captain Jameson joined the party at Mullungurh, which now consisted of the 2nd and 8th battalions under Major Hopkins. The enemy, however, were also reinforced, and pitched their camp next day on the south-east side of the hill, where they began to lay waste the country. Colonel Hartley immediately prepared to attack them, and for this purpose marched from Kallian with the Bombay European regiment and the 1st battalion of sepoy, directing Major Hopkins to send down the 8th battalion, under Captain Jameson, to assist in the attack. The Mahrattas were apprized of Colonel Hartley's advance, and met him at the foot of the hill. Thence they gradually retired towards their camp, which was left standing in the confidence of perfect security, and maintained a running fight, as if they had intended to draw the troops into an ambuscade ; but all at once, Captain Jameson's corps, advancing from the hill, came upon the whole body, and, without waiting for the rest of the troops, instantly attacked them ; to use the words of Colonel Hartley, "with the utmost eagerness and spirit pursued them to their camp (of which they took possession), and were shortly afterwards joined by the rest of the troops." This spirited success, which was effected with the loss of only a few men of the 8th battalion, put the troops into high spirits, of which Hartley took immediate advantage, followed up the enemy's parties with alacrity, drove them out of the Concan, occupied a position not far from the Bhore Ghaut, and thus for a short time enabled the Bombay government to carry their plan of collecting the revenue into effect.

General Goddard, having before sent down the Europeans by sea, commenced his march from Surat on the 16th of October. For the protection of Guzerat six companies from the Bengal and two of the Bombay detachment had been left with Futih Sing Gaekwar to strengthen his garrison at Ahmedabad ; that party was accordingly directed to remain there for the present. In Baroda Futih Sing had a considerable force of his own, and Dubhoy was guarded against all but a regular siege. Two Bengal battalions were stationed on the Nerbuddah at Sinnore ; two battalions of Bombay sepoy, one of which was held ready at Surat, and the other at Baroach, to act conjointly or separately, were placed under the orders of Major Forbes, a Bengal officer of approved merit, to whom the charge of the general defence of the Guzerat province was assigned, and Futih Sing Gaekwar's quota of 3,000 horse were to join Major Forbes if necessary.

General Goddard arrived before Bassein on the 13th of November, and, having carefully reconnoitred it, he found the north face the only site on which it could be attacked by regular approaches—a mode which, owing to

the great strength of the place, although it might require more time, he determined to adopt.

He accordingly opened trenches, and completed his first battery on the 28th of November at the distance of 900 yards; other batteries were opened at the distance of 800 and 500 yards successively. He had a very powerful artillery, principally 24-pounders, and one battery of 20 mortars, at the distance of 500 yards, which did great execution.

In the meantime Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay were making every preparation to recover the Concan, and raised the siege of Bassein. The horse did not arrive until the Dussera, and the guns and equipments which had been before furnished, principally by Mahadajee Sindia, were not in sufficient readiness to enable them to take the field. Ramchundur Gunnessh, Pureshram Bhow, Anund Rao Rastia, and several other officers were sent forward, and as fast as the Mahratta troops were assembled, they were sent down to join them in the Concan.

The division under Colonel Hartley were for upwards of a month engaged in daily skirmishes; a great deal of their ammunition was expended, and the sick, many of whom were wounded, amounted to 600, which, with his detachments, reduced his number to little more than 2,000 effective men. Having heard that the enemy intended to throw succours into Bassein, and cut off his communication with that place, it being no longer possible to

December 8. cover the country, Colonel Hartley judiciously moved to Titwalla on the 8th of December; from thence he continued his march towards Doogaur, nine miles east of Bassein. The Bombay government, over-anxious to recover the revenue, disapproved of his quitting the neighbourhood of the Bhor Ghaut; but they were not fully aware of the strength of the Mahratta army, or the experience and enterprize of the principal commander, Ramchundur Gunnessh. Finding that the precautions of Goddard had effectually prevented an attempt to succour Bassein, the Mahrattas had determined to make amends for its loss by the destruction of the covering army. On the 10th December their united force, amounting in horse and foot to upwards of 20,000 men, thrice attacked the Bombay division in front and rear, but were each time steadily repulsed; 5,000 of their horse made a spirited charge on the left of Hartley's line, but they were so well received that no impression was made, and the troops sustained but little loss, having only 18 killed and wounded; two, however, were officers—Lieutenants Drew and Cooper. On the ensuing day the attack was renewed, the horse did

December 11. not charge, but the Mahratta guns did considerable execution, and the division lost Lieutenants Cowan and Peirson, with upwards of 100 men; the troops, however, though weakened and harassed during a period of nearly six weeks' constant fighting, behaved most gallantly, and "their conduct," says Colonel Hartley, in his spirited but modest despatches, "only confirms me in the high opinion I shall ever have of them."

On the right and left of Colonel Hartley's line there were two eminences, which, when well secured, completely covered his flanks. These heights were guarded by strong pickets, and Colonel Hartley, having observed that the enemy's skirmishers came very close to the right in the action of the 11th, with that judicious anticipation which always gave the Bombay sepoys so much confidence in Hartley, he strengthened those points by directing the field engineer to throw up a small breastwork, and a gun was sent to each eminence during the night, both to the right and left. Ramchundur Gunnessh perceived the advantage of carrying one of these

points, and next day intended to direct his principal attack on the right flank, as Hartley had foreseen. Orders were given to the Mahratta officers to advance in front and rear; Ramchundur in person, by a circuitous route for the purpose of storming the height, led on a body of Arab foot, and 1,000 regular infantry under Signior Noronha,* a Portuguese officer in the Peishwa's service. A body of the best horse supported the infantry, and Ramchundur was determined to carry this post or perish. Taking advantage of a thick fog, by nine o'clock in the morning they had approached close to the picket, but the mist suddenly cleared away,

December 12. the sun shone forth, and both parties, having now a near and full view of each other, paused for a moment, when a brisk fire opened at once, and the guns did surprising execution; the storming party advanced with great ardour; guns from the right of the line were brought to bear upon the assailants, and committed great havoc among the horse; but the Mahrattas still persevered, when suddenly their fire slackened, and a body was seen borne off towards the rear; it was Ramchundur Gunnesh, who fell with the well-earned reputation of a gallant and skilful officer. Signior Noronha was wounded, when the enemy, dispirited by the loss of their leaders, retired precipitately and with heavy loss. In the action of the 12th the Bombay troops suffered very little, and their whole conduct appears to have been much more justly appreciated by the Mahrattas than by their own government;† the fact is, that military service in India seems always to have been commended rather in proportion to the result than to the duty performed, and this trying and well-fought campaign is scarcely known even to the gallant army by whom it was maintained.

as Bassein surrendered on the 11th December, and General Goddard, hearing on that the whole army had attacked the Bombay division, set off in person with the head of the cavalry, and the assembled grenadiers of the Bengal and Madras troops, with whom he reached Colonel Hartley's camp on the evening. He expressed his admiration of the judicious position which had been chosen, and of the fortitude shown by the troops on that and on every other occasion, where harassing service and great privation, from want of their pay, had been borne not only without a murmur, but with the greatest cheerfulness. The whole army was now united under General Goddard; and it unfortunately happened that the orders from the Court of Directors, before alluded to, which made Hartley the junior lieutenant-colonel on the Bombay establishment until all those formerly his seniors should be promoted, was at this time promulgated. Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, of the Madras establishment, though just promoted to that rank, immediately claimed his right, and of course superseded him. Hartley represented the peculiar mortification to which he was subjected; but the order was irrevocable. He quitted the army, repaired to England, and laid his case before the Court of Directors, who, sensible of his merit, although they could not alter the constitution of their service, recommended him to his majesty, by whom he was appointed lieutenant-colonel of the 73rd regi-

* I find this Portuguese officer mentioned in very high terms by Captain Bonnevaux, of the Madras establishment, in a letter dated Prison in Poona, 25th February 1781. Captain Bonnevaux, intrusted with an overland despatch from the Court of Directors, was taken near the coast of India, carried into Viziadroog, and thrown into the fort of Russalgurh. After enduring great hardship, he was conveyed to Poona, where his sufferings were humanely relieved by Signior Noronha.

† Mahratta MSS. and letters. The Mahrattas never mention Colonel Hartley's name, and always attribute the defeat of their army and the capture of Bassein to the same person—Goddard.

ment. Although no longer engaged in Mahratta warfare, he was afterwards distinguished on many occasions in India;* and though hitherto best known as Major-General Hartley, his real merit is not less conspicuous in the military annals of our country when holding the rank of captain of sepöys.

The reduction of Bassein, and the defeat of the army in the Concan, were severely felt by Nana Furnuwees.† The judicious operations of Goddard had secured that important fortress, with an inconsiderable loss of 13 men, of whom was one officer, Lieutenant Sir John Gordon, who died of his wounds. On the same day that General Goddard joined Colonel Hartley, the Bombay government received a letter from Bengal, dated 9th October, informing them of their intention to make peace with the Mahrattas: ordering that, upon the Peishwa's intimating that he had commanded a cessation of hostilities, that they were immediately to desist in like manner; but, until such an intimation was received, they were urged to prosecute the war with vigour.‡ Similar instructions were transmitted to General Goddard.

To account for these orders, it is necessary to explain that the supreme government had received information that all the Mahrattas, except Futih Sing Gaekwar (whose communication was in a manner cut off from his countrymen by the British troops, and whose interests strongly bound him to the company), were combined with Hyder and the Nizam against the English, and that Nizam Ally, although he had not commenced hostilities, was the contriver of the whole confederacy. The immediate cause of the enmity of Nizam Ally towards the English originated in a treaty concluded by the Madras government, in April 1779, with his brother Busalut Jung, jagheerdar of Adonee, by which they received him under their protection, on condition of their being allowed to rent the district of Guntoor, which was, at all events, to come into their possession after the death of Busalut Jung. The alliance alarmed Nizam Ally, whose jealousy of Busalut Jung was extreme; and Hyder, some of whose late acquisitions would have been cut off from the rest of his territory, would not suffer the British troops to take possession of Guntoor, and opposed their march even before the war broke out. The treaty of the Madras government with Busalut Jung was illegal, because it never received the sanction or ratification of the governor-general and council, who, therefore, when it came to their knowledge, in February 1780, disavowed and annulled it—a measure which tended considerably to appease the resentment of Nizam Ally; but, from the time of the Wurgaom convention, he had adopted a tone of overbearing insolence, which, towards the British authorities, he had not before ventured to assume. Hyder, in addition to those motives of jealousy already described, had a very strong inducement for engaging in the confederacy. The conquests he had made as far north as the Kistna had been ceded to him by Rugonath Rao, whom he affected to consider the legitimate Peishwa; and the confirmation of this cession on the part of the Poona ministers was preliminary to his becoming a party in the alliance; his right to the Mahratta territories south of the Kistna was admitted, and the future tribute for the whole of his possessions was fixed at the inconsiderable sum of 11 lakhs of rupees.

Mr. Hastings, although Moodajee Bhonslay had acquiesced in the

* Bombay Records.

† Mahratta MSS. and letters.

‡ Bombay Records, 6th Report.

scheme of a general confederacy against the English, perceived that he might still ultimately indulge the hope of an alliance with them at some favourable period ; but, from the crisis to which events were hastening, he began to doubt whether the neutrality privately professed by Moodajee could be lasting. The governor-general was sensible of an influence, which Nizam Ally, although in reality an enemy, possessed over the ruler of Berar, through his (Moodajee's) dewan, Dewakur Punt, without whose counsel Moodajee decided on no political measure. The power of Hyder Ally was such that peace with the Mahrattas seemed necessary to the safety of the British in India ; but, in the adversity which threatened them, it seemed less difficult to engage Moodajee as a mediator than as an ally. Under these circumstances, Mr. Hastings offered peace to the Peishwa's government through Moodajee, early in the month of October, on the following terms :—Ahmedabad to be retained for Futih Sing ; Gwalior for the rana of Gohud ; and Bassein, if in possession of the company at the time, to be kept by them ; but the whole of the other acquisitions made since the 1st January 1779 to be restored ; a provision to be made for Rugonath Rao during his life, and a place of residence fixed wherever he might desire, except in the neighbourhood of Bombay ; at all events, no assistance to be afforded by the British government in re-asserting his pretensions. Such were the conditions offered, provided the Peishwa's government agreed to enter on an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the company against Hyder Ally and the French nation ; but if the alliance thus tendered should not be accepted, a peace was proposed by each party, retaining its respective conquests. Moodajee Bhonslay was to be the declared mediator and guarantee ; the subordinate governments in India, and all officers commanding divisions of British troops, were to desist from hostilities upon the Peishwa's intimating that he had sent like orders to the commanders of his armies. But before these proposals reached Nagpoor, news had arrived of the disastrous affair where Colonel Baillie's detachment was destroyed by Hyder Ally, near Conjeveram, on the 10th September,* on which Moodajee, concluding that the company's affairs were desperate, hesitated in becoming mediator, unless on terms to which the governor-general and council would not accede.

Moodajee did not send answers to the proposals from Bengal for upwards of two months, but the offers made to him account for the orders already mentioned, which were received on the west of India in December. Although the wants of the Bombay presidency had been partially relieved by an unexpected supply of money from Bengal, the prospect of peace, notwithstanding the sacrifices they must make, was hailed by the members of that government with satisfaction ; but as no intimation from the Peishwa arrived, they proposed to secure the Concan, reduce the forts, and then act only on the defensive.

General Goddard was detained for some time by the fort of Arnaul, situated on a small island 10 miles north of Bassein, the killidar of which refused to give it up until a force appeared before it ; he then surrendered on the 18th January. It appeared to General Goddard that an advanced movement, so as to threaten Poona, was more likely to facilitate the negotiations of the governor-general with the Peishwa, than wasting time in attempting to reduce hill-forts, the greater part of which seemed

* See Wilks, vol. ii.

totally impregnable. Although General Goddard, by order from the Court of Directors, was now commander-in-chief of the Bombay army, he was still intrusted with his former powers from Bengal, and at liberty, in a great degree, to follow his own plans. The orders from Bengal, although they desired that the war should be vigorously prosecuted in the event of receiving no intimation from the Peishwa, were yet of a nature to unsettle any steady plan of the authorities acting in subordinate co-operation ; and from Madras, where all their evils were attributed, with some justice, "*to Rugoba Dada and the Mahratta war*," every despatch to Bombay teemed with regrets on this subject, pressed the necessity of peace with the Mahrattas, and an attack on Hyder's possessions on the Malabar coast.

Under these circumstances Goddard adopted the half-measure of threatening, without being prepared to carry his threat into execution ; and this excellent officer committed his first error by a departure from a rule which common observation inculcates even in ordinary life. He advanced towards the passes of the mountains ; Hurry Punt, then in the Concan, retired to Poona, but left the Bhore Ghaut guarded. It was gallantly attacked by Colonel Parker, at the head of the advanced party of Bengal troops, on the night of the 8th of February. He forced the pass with ease, and the troops were encamped at Kuudalla, on the same spot which Captain Stewart had occupied about three years before, where they were soon joined by the greater part of the force ; although Goddard,* with the head-quarters, remained at the village of Campoly, at the bottom of the Ghauts.

Their appearance gave Nana Furnuwees no alarm, for his political boldness was contrasted in an extraordinary, but amongst Bramins by no means a singular, manner with his personal timidity, and the only effects produced on him by the advance to the Ghauts were additional efforts to increase the army, and the most vigorous preparations for rendering the country a desert and Poona a ruin. He, however, tried to amuse General Goddard by sending an unauthorized agent to treat with him, which induced Goddard to make overtures on the terms proposed through Moodajee Bhonslay. Of these Nana affected ignorance ; Goddard sent him a copy of the terms, and thus subjected them to positive rejection ; for Nana Furnuwees observed that proposals had been tendered by the governor-general, but that Moodajee had refused to forward them ; that these now sent could not be listened to, nor at that time would any terms whatever be admitted in which Hyder,

* Nana Furnuwees, as appears by his letters, had very exact intelligence of everything ; but in stating Goddard's force at 10,000 fighting men, he greatly over-estimates it.

The following is the exact number, exclusive of European officers :—
Present for duty.

Madras Artillery	67	} <i>Europeans.</i>
Bombay Artillery.....	57	
Bombay Regiment	170	
Madras Regiment.....	346	
Bengal Golundauz, or Native Artillery	97	} <i>Natives.</i>
Bengal Sepoys	2,542	
Bombay Sepoys	1,446	
Madras Sepoys	527	
Cavalry	700	
Lascars and Pioneers	200	
Total...	<u>6,152</u>	

the ally of the Mahratta state, was not included.* It is probable that General Goddard's own judgment disapproved of such unavailing concession, but he was urged to it by letters from Sir Eyre Coote at Madras, who, in the month of October 1780, had been solicited by the governor-general to repair to the coast and retrieve the fortunes and honor of his country—a call which was as gratifying to the feelings of the general as to the army of Fort St. George.

Nana Furnuwees had sent the Peishwa, now in his seventh year, to Poorundhur; Hurry Punt Phurkay and Tookajee Holkar commanded the main body of his army, with which Nana himself advanced towards the Ghauts, and Pureshrum Bhow Putwurdhun was sent down into the Concan with a force of 12,000 men to harass Goddard's detachments, and obstruct the communication with Bombay.† An opportunity soon presented itself; a detachment of two corps, the 1st Bombay and 5th Bengal battalions, under Captain Mackay, when returning from Panwell as an escort to a convoy of grain for the army, were very briskly attacked by

March 15. Pureshrum Bhow. On the night of the 15th March, Captain Mackay had brought up his convoy a distance of 12 miles, to the village of Chouke, when, early on the morning

March 16. of the 16th March, he was suddenly assailed by the whole force of Pureshrum Bhow, which he repulsed, though not without difficulty; but Pureshrum Bhow's loss was comparatively very severe. Both battalions behaved well, and the Bengal sepoys, who had never before been so closely engaged, showed very great spirit. One company, however, in charging a body of horse with the bayonet, after having routed them, were drawn forward in the eagerness of pursuit, when the Mahrattas, than whom, if no troops sooner fly, none are so speedily rallied, wheeled about, charged, and overpowered them; but the contiguity of the line saved them from total destruction. Captain Mackay had still 12 long miles to march before he could reach the bottom of the Ghaut: the face of the country in the Concan has already been described, and although the road was the best in the country, it was a mere pathway, through a tract exceedingly rugged, full of deep ravines and dells, strong jungles on his right and left, and frequently high rocks and precipices within musket-shot on both sides. Captain Mackay renewed his march as soon as it was dark, and advanced before morning to within a few miles of Campoly, whence General Goddard sent out a reinforcement, with carriage for his wounded, and enabled him to bring in his men and the whole convoy without further molestation.

The movement towards the Ghauts, from which Goddard calculated ad-

* The reply which I have expressed, as above, is couched in the following smooth terms. After explaining that Moodajee had refused to forward the terms, Nana observes—"The copy of the proposals which you have sent has been read from beginning to end by your friend; and it is certain that the contents therein written are not proper or fit for the approbation of this government. If you be sincere in your desire of friendship, it is incumbent on you to make proposals, which shall include those persons who at this time are allied to, and connected with, the councils of this state." (Extract of a letter from Nana Furnuwees to General Goddard, 5th March 1781.)

† Letter from Nana Furnuwees to the Peishwa at Poorundhur. The letters which I shall from this time have occasion to refer to, both from Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay, are all translated from originals in their own handwriting. They were found amongst the records in the Peishwa's palace, recovered by Captain Henry Robertson, collector of Poona, and the late Lieutenant John M'Leod, resident at Bushire, when assistant to Mr. Chaplin, commissioner; and by those gentlemen they were made over to me by special authority from the Hon'ble M. Elphinstone.

vantageous political results, had completely failed, and the Bombay government, in the prospect of keeping Guzerat and the Concan, did not regret that an end was put to the negotiation; even Mr. Hastings in that view considered the rejection of his proposals as a circumstance by no means unfortunate. The opinion of the Bombay government in regard to a system of defence, and sending back the Madras troops to the assistance of their own presidency, was now adopted by Goddard; but, as the season for taking forts was nearly at an end, he proposed raising a work, and establishing a strong garrison at the Bhore Ghaut, of which Mr. Hornby disapproved, and judiciously observed that a large garrison left at the Bhore Ghaut—a pass which experience had shown they could at any time carry with ease—would be but a waste of money and of men. The capture, as Mr. Hornby observed, of Rajmachee, a fort a little to the north of the Bhore Ghaut, which might have been easily reduced, would, with a very small garrison, have served both to form a dépôt and to distress the enemy.

After some deliberation, it was resolved in council that the army should return to canton for the rains at Bombay and Kallian; that the Madras troops should be sent back to their own presidency, and two of their own battalions sent down to assist in the defence of Tellicherry, which they had intended to abandon until they received some treasure from Bengal; but this ancient possession they now determined to defend. After all had been thus settled, General Goddard found it impracticable to march without sacrificing a great part of his stores and equipments.

April 1. About the 1st of April he had sent down to Panwell a strong escort of three battalions of sepoys, 10 guns, and the whole of the cavalry, for the purpose of bringing on another convoy of grain and stores. On the road to Panwell, this escort, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Browne, was attacked by Pureshram Bhow, and, although every exertion was made to save the cattle, the Mahrattas, whose dexterity in driving off unloaded bullocks is remarkable,* carried away a considerable number of them. The escort would have been sufficient to bring on the convoy through the whole force of Pureshram Bhow, but Holkar was sent down the Ghauts by Nana Furnuwees to strengthen him; when Colonel Browne, on hearing of the great army which lay in his route, deemed it impracticable to advance without a reinforcement, in which opinion General Goddard coincided. Unfortunately the greater part of the cattle of the army had been sent down to assist in transporting the supplies, so that Goddard could not march with his whole force without sacrificing a great deal of public property, and with a part he was sure of being cut off by the enemy; he therefore represented his situation to Bombay, and entreated the government to send every disposable man of their garrison to reinforce Colonel Browne—a request with which they instantly complied, and the escort advanced without delay. The Mahratta force amounted to upwards

* The usual way is, for two or three horsemen to steal forward quietly, get the bullocks' heads turned to a flank, when a few on each side gallop at them with their spears; two or three goad them from behind, and off they go at full speed, guided in any direction with great facility. The Madras followers, who are by far the most active of all camp people (though the practice is not confined to them), tie the bullock's load to his head, so that, when the animal throws his load in any way, he is, as it were, anchored; and whilst the rope holds, he cannot get away; but when unloaded, or let loose to graze, they are very apt to be carried off, even from within the camp guards.

of 25,000* horse, besides several bodies of rocket men, and infantry ; they attacked the escort during their march for three days, but were constantly baffled and repulsed by the skill of Colonel Browne, whose conduct was the theme of very great praise.

He brought in his convoy safe,† but with the loss of 106 men killed‡ and wounded during the three days on which he marched.

The junction of this detachment on the 15th April enabled General Goddard to prepare for his retreat. By the 19th he had sent down his guns and baggage to the bottom of the Ghauts, unobserved, as he supposed, by the enemy ; but the Mahrattas had correct information of the least stir in his camp, and were silently but anxiously watching the result. Tookajee Holkar, with 15,000 men, without any baggage, was at the bottom of the Kussoor Ghaut, and Pureshram Bhow, with 12,000, was also below the Ghauts near Bheema Shunkur. Hurry Punt Phurkay was above the Ghauts between Kundalla and Karlee, with above 25,000 horse, 4,000 foot, and several light field-pieces. General Goddard's information represented Holkar and Pureshram Bhow as about to ascend the Ghauts, but on

the 20th, the moment that Goddard marched, Hurry Punt's force poured down into the Concan,§ took a considerable quantity of baggage, consisting of tents, boxes of musket ammunition, and 2,000 cannon shot.¶ On the 20th Goddard halted at Kalapoor, and renewed his march on the 21st. His rear had scarcely

April 21. cleared the ground of encampment, when the first shot from Hurry Punt's guns struck a tumbril full of ammunition, which instantly exploded, and, although it did very little mischief, the Mahrattas were greatly encouraged by the circumstance, and harassed the troops during the whole of their march to Chouke. The nature of the ground gave their irregular infantry every advantage, as they were enabled, from the cover of rocks, bushes, and ravines, to take deliberate aim, and Holkar and Pureshram Bhow made their appearance in front about nine o'clock in the morning. At one o'clock in the afternoon, when Goddard pitched his camp, the enemy retired—Hurry Punt to Kolapoor, and the others to some distance in the rear of the right flank of the British army. The loss of the 21st, which was severe, fell principally upon the Bengal sepoys, who were stationed in the rear, and behaved with much gallantry. On the 22nd General Goddard halted, and again marched on the 23rd, when the attack was renewed ; but the baggage having been sent forward at two o'clock in the morning, he was thus enabled to get on a considerable distance before the enemy came up. The attack on the rear was at one time very determined, and the 6th Bengal and 13th¶ Bombay battalions particularly distinguished themselves under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Parker, of the Bengal establishment, an excellent officer, who fell whilst bravely exerting himself at head of the

* Letter from Nana Furuwees. Colonel Browne reported them only 20,000.

† Nana Furuwees states that they took from 100 to 150 bullocks, chiefly laden with sugar.

‡ Of this number there were five officers, namely, Captain Bowles, Lieutenants Wheldon and Tindall, of the Bombay infantry ; Ensigns Gibbings and Richardson, the former of the Madras, and the latter of the Bengal, establishment.

§ General Goddard's and Hurry Punt's despatches.

¶ Hurry Punt.

¶ The present 6th regiment, and lately the 2nd battalion 3rd regiment, was formerly the 13th battalion.

rear-guard. General Goddard, observing that the enemy always retired when they saw him established in his camp, made a show of pitching his tents; the manœuvre succeeded, and, being the last march, was judicious.

April 23.

The army arrived at Panwell on the evening of the 23rd April without further molestation. On this retreat, which the Mahrattas consider one of their most signal victories, General Goddard's army sustained a heavy loss of 466 in killed and wounded, of whom 18 were European officers.*

Although the Mahratta troops, particularly the infantry, and that part of the horse under Pureshram Bhaw Putwurdhun, behaved well, it may be here remarked, as a symptom of the decline of military spirit, that the despatches of Hurry Punt are written in a style of the most vaunting gasconade, in which Bramin commanders before this period were less apt to indulge than either Mahratta or Mahomedan officers. The loss of the English was estimated by the Mahrattas at 1,500 men, one gun, several tumbrils, and a great part of their baggage; both Hurry Punt and Nana Furnuwees acknowledged that they too have sustained a heavy loss, both in men and horses.†

The reinforcement for Tellicherry and the Madras troops were embarked and sent off as predetermined; but the European privates were drafted into the Bombay regiment—a measure against which the Madras government bitterly inveighed. The remainder of the army, after they had remained encamped for some weeks at Panwell, marched to Kallian, where they were cantoned for the monsoon under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie.‡ Ten thousand Mahrattas were sent towards Guzerat under Mahdoo Rao Ramchundur, the garrisons in the Concan were strengthened, and the main body of the Peishwa's army returned, as usual, to their homes.†

Whilst these events were passing on the west of India, the governor-general and council in Bengal having disapproved of the Bombay defensive system, were endeavouring to create a powerful diversion, by carrying hostilities into the heart of Sindia's territory; that he, the principal promoter, should become the greatest sufferer by the war; and Mr. Hastings was at the same time engaged in an intricate negotiation, for the purpose of detaching Moodajee Bhonslay from the confederacy.

It has been already mentioned that a division of troops under Major (now by regular promotion Lieutenant-Colonel) Camac had been prepared to assist the rana of Gohud; and as the brilliant successes of Captain Popham, who was appointed a major for his gallant enterprize on Gwalior, had cleared the Gohud territory of the enemy, Colonel Camac invaded Malwa, reduced Sippree, and advanced to Seronje, where he arrived on the 16th of February. Mahadajee Sindia, who was marching from the

* Killed.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Neville Parker, Bengal Native Infantry.

Captain Sambers, Bombay Native Infantry.

Lieutenant Gibson, and Surgeon Penny, Madras Artillery.

Wounded.

Lieutenant William Rattray, Bengal Artillery.

Lieutenant F. W. Rutledge, Madras Artillery.

Lieutenant Duncan, Major of Brigade, Madras Native Infantry.

Lieutenants Hall, Taylor, More, and Smith, Bengal Native Infantry.

Captain Bannatyne; Lieutenants Taylor, Mills, and Reynolds; Ensigns Read and King, of the Bombay Native Infantry; and Mr. Fleming, Surgeon-General of the army.

† Original letters.

‡ Bombay Records.

westward to oppose him, came up with his division at the latter place, and Colonel Camac, having taken post, allowed himself to be surrounded. The want of provisions and forage soon reduced him to great distress. Perceiving the mistake he had made, and the great danger to be incurred by retiring, he sent off the most pressing letters to Colonel Morgan, commanding in the Oude territory, to send on a reinforcement to his relief. Lieutenant-Colonel Muir was detached accordingly with three battalions of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a company of artillery. But in the meantime Lieutenant-Colonel Camac was attacked by Sindia, and cannonaded in his camp for seven days successively, when he determined to attempt a retreat at all hazards. At midnight on the 7th March, with

March 7, 8, 9. great skill, he commenced his march, and was not discovered till day-break; but on the 8th and 9th he was constantly harassed, until his arrival at the town of Mahautpoor, where he forced the inhabitants to supply him with provisions, and then turned and fronted his pursuers. Sindia encamped every night at the distance of five or six miles from the British troops, in a state of instant readiness, having his heavy baggage at an equal distance in his rear. This disposition to guard against surprise continued for several nights, until Colonel Camac, by his seeming want of enterprize, had thrown the wily Mahratta off his guard, when, on the night of the 24th of March, he entered Sindia's camp, attacked and routed his force, killed numbers of his men, took 13 of his guns, 3 elephants, his principal standard, 21 camels, and many horses. This achievement, which deservedly ranks very high, and marks a military genius, was suggested by Captain Bruce, the same officer who led the escalade at Gwalior. It was of the utmost importance, not only in raising the fame of the British arms, but in particularly affecting Sindia, whose reputation had suffered, whilst that of the Bramin party supported by Holkar was greatly increased, by the supposed victory over General Goddard. Colonel Muir's detachment did not join that of Colonel Camac until the 4th of April, when the former assumed the command; but although their united forces kept the field, and encamped during the rains within the territory of Sindia, they obtained no further advantage, and were frequently straitened for supplies by numerous bodies of horse from Sindia's camp, which continued in the neighbourhood of their own. Endeavours were ineffectually used by the English to excite active co-operation on the part of the Rajpoot princes in the neighbourhood against the Mahrattas; and Gwalior was restored to the rana of Gohud, in hopes, by this act of good faith, to wean him from a disposition he had evinced of making terms for himself with Mahadajee Sindia; but the rana was not inclined to bring forward the slender resources which he possessed; and matters remained in this situation until the commencement of a negotiation on the part of Sindia with Colonel Muir, in the month of August. But although the governor-general's scheme of stirring up those petty princes against their Mahratta superiors failed, his negotiations with the raja of Berar were productive of more beneficial consequences.

Moodajee, to support appearances with the confederates, had sent forward an army of 30,000 horse towards Kuttack, in the month of October 1779, under his second son, Chimnajee; but in order to convince Mr. Hastings that his real design was not hostile to the English, they were seven months in reaching their destination; this favourable symptom, however, did not induce the Bengal government to relax in their vigilance, or to circumscribe their efforts. It had been determined at Calcutta, on the news of Hyder's invasion of Arcot, to send a division of

six battalions of sepoys to assist in the war against him, as soon as the season permitted of their marching along the coast towards the Carnatic Payeen Ghaut. This force was to have been assembled in the month of October, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Pearse; and it was hoped that Moodajee might be induced to aid them with a body of cavalry, but as Chimnajee's army lay in the route, it was deemed advisable to suspend Colonel Pearse's march until Moodajee's answer was received.

When the replies did arrive, on the 9th January, it was determined to send on the detachment, and Colonel Pearse, on entering the territory of Moodajee, was instructed to observe an exact discipline, to protect the country, and to consider the raja of Berar as a friend, until any attempt was made to obstruct his march, when he was commanded to force his way against all opposition. To reconcile Moodajee, however, to this measure, the governor-general deputed an agent, Mr. David Anderson, to Kuttack, for the purpose of explaining the reasons, and obtaining, if possible, a body of 2,000 horse to co-operate with Colonel Pearse. Before Mr. Anderson reached Ballasore, Chimnajee had proceeded with his army to attack the fort of Dhikanall, the raja of which had neglected to remit the tribute, and refused to pay the arrears. Mr. Anderson, however, proceeded to Kuttack, and thence returned to Calcutta. Chimnajee, in the meantime, had quitted the hills, and come down with his army to the open country. Colonel Pearse had not only been allowed to pass without molestation, but assistance was afforded in procuring supplies through the province of Orissa; and the most friendly assurances were continued on the part of Chimnajee. The position of this Mahratta army was threatening: the government of Berar had behaved liberally to General Goddard, and civilly to Colonel Pearse: Moodajee had been so situated as to be compelled to join the confederacy, or at once declare his alliance with the English—the last a daring, a doubtful, and a generous policy, too great for any Mahratta to adventure. The governor-general had secretly promised to advance Moodajee the sum of 16 lakhs of rupees, in order to engage his aid either in the alliance or mediation proposed; for it is not very clear how this bribe was originally tendered. Twelve lakhs were now offered to Chimnajee if he would withdraw his troops and return to Nagpoor; at the same time it was carefully expressed that the money was not given in a manner to enable them hereafter to demand it as a right, or to expect it in future, but merely to bespeak their friendship, and engage them against Hyder, who was represented to have at this period received sunnuds from the emperor for the whole Deccan, at the subjugation of which, including the complete peninsula of India, he was said to be aiming. The son of Moodajee observed that, on payment of 50 lakhs, he would be happy to afford the British government a proof of his friendship, by retiring to Nagpoor, and uniting against Hyder, especially if it should appear that he had procured sunnuds for the Deccan. This fictitious report obtained credence, especially with Nizam Ally, and it tended greatly, once more, to turn his versatile and treacherous mind against Hyder, whom, as a rival Mussulman and an upstart eclipsing him, he hated and feared.

After some discussion, conducted with much ability on the part of Mr. Anderson, Chimnajee at last observed that, of the 16 lakhs originally promised, three lakhs had been paid; but if the balance of 13 lakhs were now tendered, he would withdraw; that 2,000 horse, at 50,000 rupees a month, should be sent to join Colonel Pearse against Hyder, provided the governor-general and council would assist the Berar state in raising a loan of 10 lakhs of rupees, and aid Moodajee in reducing Gurrah Mundelah—dis-

tricts which, the reader may recollect, had been taken by Ballajee Bajee Rao during his first campaign in 1742, before the return of Rughojee from the Carnatic, and which, from their vicinity to their northern frontier, had ever since been an object of the greatest jealousy to the Bhonslays of Berar. The tenders were accepted, and thus, by an objectionable policy, justifiable only by the peculiarity of the circumstances, Mr. Hastings temporarily detached the eastern Mahrattas from the confederacy, and turned them against both Hyder and the Peishwa, at a moment when, with 30,000 horse, it is scarcely to be doubted that they might have pillaged Bengal, and burnt the towns from Burdwan to Point Palmyras. But, in this negotiation, no credentials from Moodajee were given or demanded; and shortly afterwards copies of letters from Nana Furnuwees to Moodajee were transmitted to Bengal, representing the retreat of General Goddard as a great victory, and threatening Moodajee with the utmost vengeance of the Peishwa's government for seceding from the confederacy and his allegiance to his prince. In consequence of these letters, it was not altogether convenient for Moodajee to avow the agreement to its full extent; he wished, however, to mediate a peace, and to engage with the English in a general confederacy against Hyder. For this purpose he intended sending Dewakur Punt to Poona; but many circumstances rendered it desirable that this minister should first meet Mr. Hastings. An interview was to take place at Benares; but in the meantime orders by the supreme government were despatched to General Goddard to negotiate a peace nearly on the terms formerly proposed; retaining the fort of Bassein if possible, but if not, to give it up, if he could thereby ensure an honorable pacification, which was now the sole end in view.

These instructions were not received by General Goddard until the month of August; various plans were in the meantime proposed at Bombay: that by General Goddard—of making an increase of eight battalions of native infantry, drawing out the old, and leaving the new, levies in garrison; calling on Futih Sing Gackwar, the nabobs of Surat and Cambay, to assist with their utmost means; permitting Bugonath Rao to assemble horse; bringing down Colonel Muir's force from Malwa, forming a junction with his (Goddard's) army; and carrying the war, first, into the heart of the Deccan, and then into Mysore—was very extensive, and with funds it would have been practicable; but the lowest estimate of the required monthly disbursement was seven lakhs of rupees—an expense which, to the members of the Bombay government, was quite appalling at this season of unprecedented distress. Goddard, however, in hopes of aid from Beugal, proceeded to Guzerat, for the purpose of conferring with Futih Sing and Bugoba. Several schemes were proposed for the ensuing season; but one, which was suggested to the Bombay government, is too remarkable to be omitted. Certain dispossessed Mahratta deshmookhs,* and men whose ancestors had held jagheer lands under the Mahomedan governments, came forward, and offered, on certain conditions, to put the English in possession of the Concan, and of the whole of the forts in the Syhadree range, provided the British government would, on obtaining possession of the country, recognise their ancient rights; grant them, on the delivery of each fort, 50,000 rupees for each of the larger fortresses, and 10,000 for the smaller; allowing them to retain whatever plunder in money, jewels, gold and silver ornaments, and manes, they might acquire;

* Arjoonjee, and Jeewajee Bamlay, and Santajee Naik Surkunday, seem to have been three of the chiefs who came forward; but their native villages are not recorded.

but everything else, of whatever description, they agreed to relinquish. Their proposals were fully considered,⁶ but finally rejected.

On the opening of the season, Goddard returned from Guzerat, after some satisfactory explanations with Futih Sing, and obtaining a positive promise of being assisted by 5,000 good horse. If recovering the revenue had been the only object, General Goddard observed that the defence of Guzerat should have rather been secured than that of the Concan; but until it could be ascertained whether the force in Malwa would be sent to join him, it was agreed to maintain defensive operations in the Concan, preserving as much as possible an appearance of action. Early in November accounts reached Bombay of a separate treaty between Mahadajee Sindia and

October 13. Colonel Muir, concluded 13th October 1781, by which Sindia agreed to return to Oojein, and Colonel Muir to recross the Jumna; and that Sindia had further agreed to negotiate a treaty between the other belligerents and the British government, but he, at all events, bound himself to stand neutral. His territory, west of the Jumna, was restored; but the rana of Gohud was not to be molested in the possession of Gwalior, as long as he conducted himself properly. The first overtures, as already mentioned, were made by Mahadajee Sindia, who, after his defeat by Colonel Camac, perceived that he had everything to lose by maintaining a contest in the heart of his own dominions, which would probably end in his being driven a fugitive across the Nerbuddah, without lands or friends, and probably to the secret satisfaction of his rivals at Poona.

Mr. Hastings was particularly pleased at the opening of this channel to a general pacification, as the plan of a mediation through Moodajee was obstructed by the death of Dewakur Punt, who did not live to meet the governor-general at Benares, as had been agreed upon; Moodajee, however, afterwards wrote to General Goddard, assuring him of his readiness to interpose his best endeavours for the attainment of peace, and even to repair in person to Poona for that purpose. About the same time, on the arrival of Mr. John M'Pherson at Madras, a letter was addressed to the Peishwa, dated 11th September 1781, in the joint names of Lord Macartney, Sir Eyre Coote, Sir Edward Hughes, and Mr. M'Pherson, forwarded to the wukeel of Mohummud Ally at Poona, stating their wish for peace, the moderation of the company's views, the desire of the British nation to conclude a firm and lasting treaty, which no servant of the company should have power to break; and assuring the Peishwa, upon their own honor, and that of the king, the company, and the nation, that just satisfaction should be given in a sincere and irrevocable treaty.

Amid all these authorized pacificators, General Goddard, who as yet considered himself the accredited agent on the part of the supreme government, also opened a negotiation, and assumed what was privately agreed, though not expressed in the treaty between Colonel Muir and Sindia, that the latter should use his endeavour to obtain a cessation of hostilities between the Peishwa and the English, until the terms of a general peace could be adjusted.

Captain Watherstone was deputed to Poona in January, but shortly after his arrival there, official intelligence was received
A. D. 1782. of the appointment of Mr. David Anderson as agent of the governor-general, with full powers to negotiate and conclude a treaty with the Mahrattas; for which purpose Mr. Anderson was deputed to the

* Bombay Consultations, 29th June 1781.

camp of Mahadajee Sindia. Upon this news, Captain Watherstone was recalled—a circumstance which both Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt regretted; for, although they were not fully prepared to treat, they could have wished to conclude the pacification without the mediation of Sindia. The terms to which Mr. Anderson was authorized to accede, differed little from the conditions before tendered, except that, as the rana of Gohud had, by his conduct, forfeited all claims to the benefits of the alliance, and had besides secretly endeavoured to conclude separate terms for himself with Sindia, it was deemed unnecessary to include him as a party in Mr. Anderson's negotiation. A principal obstacle to the conclusion of a treaty was the restoration of the Peishwa's share of Ahmedabad, which had been apportioned to Futih Sing. This point, however, was at last conceded, and a treaty was concluded at Salbye, on the 17th May, by Mr. David Anderson on the part of the East India Company, and by Mahadajee Sindia on that of the Peishwa, Nana Furnuwees, and the whole of the chiefs of the Mahratta nation; Mahadajee Sindia being, at the same time, plenipotentiary of the Peishwa, and the mutual guarantee of both parties for the due performance of the conditions. The treaty consisted of 17 articles: the whole of the territory conquered since the treaty of Poorundhur was restored, together with the three lakhs promised near Baroach. The territory of the Gackwar, and the whole of Guzerat, were to remain precisely on the same footing as they had been prior to the war of 1775; so that the Baroda state was thus secured from dismemberment, and no claim of tribute was to be preferred by the Peishwa against Futih Sing during the period of the late hostilities. Rugonath Rao was to be allowed 25,000 rupees a month, and to be permitted to choose a place of residence.

It was settled that Hyder should be obliged to relinquish the territories lately conquered from the English and the nabob of Arcot; and the Peishwa on the one part, and the English on the other, agreed that their allies respectively should maintain peace towards each other. A free trade, the restoration of wrecks, and the exclusion of all European establishments, except those of the Portuguese, within the Mahratta dominions, also form part of the substance of the treaty of Salbye, which was ratified at Calcutta on the 6th June following; but the adjustment on the part of the Peishwa was delayed by Nana Furnuwees, for reasons which will be hereafter explained, until the 20th December, nor was it finally exchanged until the 24th February 1783.

During the period when the ratification was in suspense, the governor-general in council agreed to fulfil the former intention in regard to the cession of Baroach; and that valuable district was bestowed on Mahadajee Sindia in testimony of the sense entertained of the conduct manifested by him to the Bombay army at Wurgaom, and of his humane treatment and release of the English gentlemen who had been delivered as hostages on that occasion.

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CHAP XXX.

FROM A. D. 1773 TO A. D. 1784.

Affairs at the imperial court.—Nujeef Khan.—Shujah-ud-Dowlah—dies—is succeeded by his son Asoph-ud-Dowlah.—Mujd-ud-Dowlah—his intrigues against Nujeef Khan frustrated.—Nujeef Khan establishes a paramount authority, which he upholds till his death.—His adopted son, Afrasiab Khan, obliged to relinquish the succession to Mirza Shuffee—disputed by Mohommud Beg Humadane.—Mirza Shuffee assassinated.—Afrasiab Khan resumes his situation, and contests the succession with Mohommud Beg.—Treaty of Salbye—Reasons for the delay in its ratification explained.—Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees—their respective views.—Hyder Ally.—Proposal for invading Bengal.—Sindia's reasons for desiring the friendship of the English.—Policy of Nana Furnuwees.—Death of Hyder Ally.—Ratification of the treaty.—Outrage committed by the Peishwa's admiral—capture of the English ship Ranger.—Tippoo professes to acquiesce in the terms of the treaty, but continues the war against the English—Mahadajee Sindia threatens him in consequence.—A separate treaty concluded between the English and Tippoo—disapproved but confirmed by the governor-general.—The court of Poona affect to consider the separate pacification a violation of the treaty of Salbye.—Views of the Poona and Hyderabad courts.—A conference—claims discussed.—Offensive alliance against Tippoo proposed.—Seedee of Jinjeera.—Tippoo insults Nizam Ally.—Probability of a rupture.—Hostilities postponed.—Death of Rugonath Rao.—Intrigues in favour of his son Bajee Rao.—Mahadajee Sindia—his proceedings.

FOR some years, whilst the Mahrattas were engaged in domestic dissensions, or in war with the English, the imperial court A. D. 1782. was not subjected to their busy and rapacious intrusion; but, as the affairs of Delhi soon resume a considerable influence on their politics, we must not lose sight of the principal events that had occurred in that quarter.

On the retreat of the Mahrattas in 1773, Nujeef Khan regained his lost authority at the imperial court, and A. D. 1773. immediately directed his arms against their garrisons. Husham-ud-Dowlah, the rival of Nujeef Khan, who had been secretly subservient to the Mahrattas, was removed from the administration. Shujah-ud-Dowlah likewise took advantage of the retreat of the Mahratta army to expel their garrisons from his neighbourhood; and, after possessing himself of Etawah, advanced towards Agra, for the purpose of assisting Nujeef Khan, who was besieging it; but the fortress having surrendered, Nujeef Khan placed Mohommud Beg Humadane, one of his own dependents, in command of the garrison. The nabob vizier, to conciliate Nujeef Khan, appointed him his deputy at the imperial court; and these two might have become formidable enemies to the Mahrattas north of the Nerbuddah, had not the vizier's attention

been for a time fully engaged in prosecuting the Rohillah war ; and, shortly after its termination, death put an end to all his schemes.

A. D. 1775. His demise occurred in January 1775, and his son, Asoph-ud-Dowlah, after some delay on the part of the emperor, was confirmed in his father's title and possessions.*

Nujeef Khan carried on various military expeditions with success. Although the emperor did not sanction the measure by remaining in the field himself, Nujeef Khan took part with the English and Shrujah-ud-Dowlah in the war against the Rohillahs ; he was afterwards successful against the Jaths ; the imperial arms were again respected, and his own authority acknowledged throughout the province of Agra. But whilst thus employed at a distance, he found a domestic enemy in the person of one from whom he had a right to expect fidelity and friendship. As his own deputy in the imperial presence, he had chosen Abdool Ahud Khan,

A. D. 1776. to whom he confided the care of the court and capital, together with the general administration of civil affairs.

The new dewan was shortly afterwards honored with the title of Muid-ud-Dowlah ; but the first use he made of his power was to establish his own influence over the imbecile mind of the emperor, to the prejudice of his patron. Nujeef Khan did not remain ignorant of the progress of the intrigues against him, but he continued in the field, and vigorously prosecuted the measures he had undertaken.† Much of his success, it may be observed, was owing to some regular infantry, the better part of which were originally disciplined by the English, when the emperor resided under their protection ; but there were now two distinct bodies in the service of Nujeef Khan—the one under Sumroo, a German,‡ and the other commanded by Madoc, a Frenchman.

Muid-ud-Dowlah was unsuccessful in military expeditions. Foiled by Zabital Khan, and harassed by plundering irruptions of the Seiks, who laid waste the country, but still more alarmed at the rapid power which his rival's successes had gained him in the provinces, he sought to crush him, by involving the emperor in a war with the Rajpoots, which he hoped might prove fatal to his progress ; but the result was contrary to his anticipations, for, although the war was brought on, and Nujeef Khan actively employed, it terminated advantageously for the emperor, and creditably for his general.§ In this situation Muid-ud-Dowlah began a negotiation with Mahadajee Sindia, from which he hoped to free himself from all difficulties, and attain the entire control in the state, by the ruin of Nujeef Khan ; after which, in hopes of freeing himself from the Mahrattas, he intended to accede to a scheme, proposed by Sindia, for invading the English provinces in Bengal ; and promised, as soon as they could be spared, to lend both the authority and the army of the emperor in aid of Sindia's design.|| But these schemes were at once

* Franklin's Life of Shah Alum.

† Scott's History, and Bengal Records.

‡ The history and character of the infamous Walter Reignard, generally known by the name of Sumroo, the instrument of the barbarous massacre at Patna in 1763, is sufficiently public. He entered the imperial service after that event, having in the interval served principally with the Jaths.

§ Scott's History, letters of Nujeef Khan, English Records.

|| Original Mahratta letters from Sindia's camp, written by Ramajee Anunt, the Peishwa's dewan, with Mahadajee Sindia. His letters and papers were brought to me by his great-grandson, who now resides at Poona. Conjoined with other materials, those letters throw considerable light on the Mahratta views and transactions of the period.

overturned by his removal from the administration, which Nujeef Khan, with the emperor's concurrence, at last effected. No obstacle now interfered with that paramount authority which Nujeef Khan established. He became *Umeer-ool-Oomrah*, with the title of *Zoolfikar*

A. D. 1782. Khan, and continued, till his death, which happened on the 22nd April 1782, to rule both the emperor and his territory with judgment and firmness.^c His adopted son, *Afrasiab Khan*, was at first acknowledged his successor, but he was for a time obliged to relinquish his new dignity in favour of his relation, *Mirza Shuffee*, who was himself opposed by a powerful faction, headed by *Mohummud Beg Humadane*, the governor of the province of *Agra*.

An opportunity seemed thus afforded to the emperor for ridding himself of all parties, by a vigorous effort, which he at first seemed disposed to make; but he suffered the opportunity to pass, and his friends became the victims of his imbecility. A scene of contention and treachery soon took place amongst the competitors; *Mirza Shuffee* was assassinated by *Ismael*, the nephew of *Mohummud Beg Humadane*, so that *Afrasiab Khan* only remained to contest the supremacy.[†]

Such was the state of affairs at *Delhi* when the treaty of *Salbye* was pending; and now, to account for the long period which elapsed between its conclusion by *Sindia*, and its ratification by the *Peishwa*, it is necessary to unfold the motives which then actuated the leading parties in the *Mahratta* state.

Notwithstanding the increasing jealousy between *Mahadajee Sindia* and *Nana Farnuwees*, though the former sought to establish a kingdom virtually independent, and though each was desirous of extending his control over the whole *Mahratta* nation, both continued sensible of the necessity of preserving the strength of the empire undivided. By the progress of the war with the British government, *Nana's* influence and reputation had increased, whilst those of *Sindia* had diminished. Yet, by the treaty of *Salbye*, *Sindia*, whilst his fortunes seemed on the decline, had attained one main object of his policy—a sovereignty virtually independent, without any apparent break in the great link of interest which bound the *Mahratta* confederacy. Although both *Mahadajee Sindia* and *Nana Farnuwees* were desirous of a general peace, yet each of them had secret intentions of soon breaking it, in such partial instances as suited their respective schemes of aggrandizement. *Nana* aspired to the recovery of all the territories south of the *Nerbuddah* that had ever belonged to the *Mahrattas*, whilst *Sindia* projected the re-establishment of their power in the provinces of *Hindustan*. Although the terms of the treaty of *Salbye* were so much more favourable to the *Mahrattas* than any that could have been anticipated before the war between the English and *Hyder* broke out, yet *Nana*, being jealous of the prominent part which *Sindia* acted in the negotiation, and hoping that he might, by temporizing, recover *Salsette* from the English, maintained, in all communications with the British authorities, an appearance of steadfast alliance with *Hyder*,[‡] whilst to the envoys of the latter he affected to be satisfied with the treaty of *Salbye*, and declared that its immediate ratification by the *Peishwa* could only be prevented by *Hyder's* restoring the *Mahratta* possessions south of the *Kistna*, which would ensure their co-operation; but, if not restored, the *Mahrattas* would

* Scott, Francklin, and English Records.

† Francklin's Life of *Shah Alum*.

‡ Original letters, records, oral information, and *Mahratta MSS.*

unite with the English against him.* Nana's ulterior views, in case the pending treaty should be ratified, were hostile towards Hyder, as he, in that event, projected an offensive alliance with Nizam Ally against the usurper of Mysore, from which the English were to be carefully excluded.†

With regard to Sindia's particular views of aggrandizement, in order fully to understand the reasons which operated in inducing the British government passively to view the growth of such a power as he acquired in Hindostan, it may be requisite to explain that Mahadajee Sindia, even before his campaign against Goddard in Guzerat, had suggested a plan of attacking the English in Bengal, and, when his own territory was invaded, he renewed the proposal to the Peishwa, requesting that Tookajee Holkar might be sent to support the design.‡ To the whole of this scheme Nana Farnuwees at first objected, until he saw a probability of its recalling Goddard; but he was afraid to detach Holkar from the Peishwa, not only from being apprehensive that Goddard might not be withdrawn, but lest Sindia should allay the existing jealousy on the part of Holkar towards himself, which Nana, for his own security, was solicitous to foment. In giving, therefore, a tardy acquiescence to Sindia's plan, he proposed, instead of Holkar's quitting Poona, that Sindia should augment his army by a body of sillidars from the Mahratta country, whom he offered to assist in raising. Sindia gave various reasons for declining this suggestion; but the most important one was the removal, just at that period, of Mujaud-Dowlah from the administration, and that Nujeef Khan would not lend his support.§ Hyder Ally, who had been apprized that such a design was at one time in agitation, endeavoured, when he broke with the English, to engage Sindia to prosecute the enterprise;|| but the negotiations which Sindia was carrying on with Mr. Hastings, the death of Nujeef Khan, and the subsequent contentions amongst the Mahomedan factions at Delhi, opened a prospect to Sindia of realising those schemes which he had long cherished, and made it of more consequence to him to court the favour of the English, than to excite their hostility. Mr. Hastings, if supported by his council, would probably, on the death of Nujeef Khan, have anticipated Sindia by interposing the British influence at the imperial court; but instead of that course, the policy of which might certainly have been questionable at such a crisis, Mr. Hastings turned the circumstance to advantage, by giving Sindia to understand that he would not interfere with his views at Delhi,¶ and thus not only engaged his interest in obtaining the ratification of the treaty, but secured him against the gold of Hyder, which was liberally proffered in support of the scheme for invading Bengal.** After the treaty of Salbye was signed, an envoy from Hyder was permitted by the court of Poona to proceed to Sindia's camp; and Nana Farnuwees, in prosecution of his own views on Salsette, which he hoped the British government might be induced to cede, in order to propitiate his favour, gave out that the Peishwa had engaged in a new treaty with Hyder, to which the French were parties. But the death of Hyder, which happened on the 7th of December

* Wilks.

† Mahratta MSS. and letters.

‡ Original letter from Mahadajee Sindia.

§ Copy of an original letter from the Peishwa's dewan with Sindia to Nana Farnuwees.

|| Original letters from Sindia's camp.

¶ English Records.

** Mahratta MSS. and letters. I am not certain if it be 20 lakhs of rupees, or pagodas, that are mentioned in an original Mahratta letter from Sindia's camp, which is my principal authority for this fact.

1782, had a speedy effect in deciding the measures of the Mahratta minister, and the ratification of the treaty of Salbye was the immediate result. As already noticed, the treaty was ratified by the Peishwa

A. D. 1783. on the 20th December 1782, formally exchanged on the 24th February 1783, and the term for restoring the districts on the Bombay side limited to the 24th April. Before that date an outrage was committed, which, had it happened at a time when peace was less essential to the British government, might have occasioned a renewal of the war. The *Ranger*, a small ship of the Bombay marine, on her voyage from Bombay to Calicut, with

several military officers of distinction as passengers on April 8. board, was unexpectedly attacked by the fleet of Anund Rao Dhoolup, the Peishwa's admiral, consisting of two ships, one ketch, and eight gallivats; and after a very gallant defence, in which most of the crew and passengers were killed or wounded, she was at last overpowered and carried as a prize into Viziadroog. Colonel Humberston and Major Shaw were killed, and besides Lieutenant Pruett, the commander of the vessel, three of the passengers were desperately wounded. Of this number was Colonel Norman M'Leod, who, being disabled in one arm, continued to fight on, hand to hand, with the other, until shot through the body, when he fell, as was supposed, mortally wounded; but though carried into confinement at Viziadroog, where the prisoners had neither medical attendance nor ordinary necessities, all the wounded officers recovered. This violation of the treaty produced a strong remonstrance from the British government, and the surrender of the Peishwa's districts was suspended; but, upon an apology for the outrage, and the restoration of the vessel, the terms of the pacification were carried into effect.

The war, however, was not at an end with the successor of Hyder Ally. Tippoo, although to the Mahrattas he professed his acquiescence in the terms of the treaty of Salbye, continued hostilities against the English. Mahadajee Sindia called upon him to desist, threatening him, in case of refusal, with an immediate attack from the united armies of the English and the Mahrattas. Tippoo, however, persisted; and, in consequence, Sindia, on the 28th October, concluded a new treaty with the English, for the purpose of enforcing compliance. It was as much the wish of Nana Furnuwees as of Sindia to oblige Tippoo to conform to the terms of the treaty of Salbye, in order that he might appear to the other powers of India a Mahratta dependent as well as a tributary; but Nana's jealousy of Sindia's assumption of authority, and his own projected alliance with Nizam Ally, impeded the scheme of this league, in which Sindia and the English would have borne parts so prominent. In the meantime

A. D. 1784. a separate treaty was concluded by Tippoo and the English presidency at Fort St. George. Mr. Hastings had authorized the Madras government to negotiate a treaty, of which that of Salbye was to be the basis. But instead of following his instructions, from an over-anxiety to terminate the troubles and distresses in which they found themselves involved, they were led into a train of most injudicious proceedings, in the course of which they were systematically insulted by Tippoo, their representatives treated with indignity, the

British nation held up as supplicants for peace, and finally, March 11. on the 11th March, the treaty of Mangalore was signed, in which even allusion to the treaty of Salbye was omitted—a circumstance than which nothing could have been more gratifying to Tippoo or more offensive to the Mahrattas. The strongest disapprobation of this omission,

and of many other points of that humiliating pacification, was expressed by the governor-general, and he was only prevented from disavowing and annulling it, by the confusion which must have resulted to the company's affairs, in consequence of the fulfilment of a part of the terms, before it could have been possible to obtain their ratification. The Poona government affected to disbelieve that any treaty could be settled without their concurrence, and declared that such an agreement would be a violation of the treaty of Salbye. But Mr. Hastings had previously apprized Mahadajee Sindia, through Mr. Anderson, of the instructions sent to the Madras government, and he now explained the departure from his orders of which that government had been guilty, stating likewise some part of the motives which had operated to induce him to ratify their proceedings; in consequence of which, as the leading parties in the Mahratta state were anxious to prosecute their respective views, there was little difficulty in reconciling them to a measure which had become irrevocable.* The first proceeding of Nana Furnuwees in his designs on Tippoo was a formal demand on that prince for arrears of tribute; Tippoo admitted the justice of the demand, but offered various excuses for not immediately complying with it. At the same time that the demand was made on Tippoo, a like formal application was preferred to Nizam Ally for the outstanding Mahratta claims to chouth and surdeshmookhee within his territory. But a secret understanding existed between the courts of Poona and Hyderabad. They were on the best terms, in so much that, a short time previous to making this demand, Nana Furnuwees had assisted the latter state to suppress a formidable rebellion, which was headed by Itisham Jung, the jagheer-dar of Neernul. Nizam Ally, in reply to the application, proposed, as had been secretly agreed in order to cover their designs on Tippoo, to hold a conference with the Poona minister on the frontier. Accordingly each of the parties, attended by a large army,† set out from their capitals, and in the month of June had a meeting at Eedgeer, near the junction of the Beema and Kistna. Many points of importance regarding their mutual claims were discussed, some of which had existed for a long period, but it was agreed that such of the Mahratta thannas as had been displaced by Nizam Ally since 1774 should be re-established in the Moghul territory; and that the claims for chouth and surdeshmookhee of the two past seasons should be put into an immediate train of payment, adopting, as a rule in all cases, the practice usual in the time of Mahdoo Rao Bullal. Where any considerable doubt existed, the demands were to lie over until a general settlement could be made upon the admitted claims in the time of Nizam-ool-Moolk, according to which Nizam Ally bound himself to pay up all arrears. Thus far the result of this conference was publicly known, but the principal object, as already alluded to, was an offensive alliance against Tippoo, for the recovery of the districts which both states had lost by the encroachments of Mysore. Nizam Ally, who over-estimated the value of his own alliance, demanded, as a preliminary article of the agreement, the restoration of Ahmednugur and Beejapoor. Nana Furnuwees promised to give up Beejapoor after they should recover the territory north of the Toongbuddra; but after a prolonged discussion, neither party being very well satisfied, nor as yet by any means prepared to prosecute their scheme, the conference terminated in a general treaty of alliance, the particulars of which were to be specified as soon as they found themselves prepared to

* English Records, Mahratta MSS. and letters.

† Nizam Ally had 16,000 horse, 20,000 infantry, and 75 guns. The Mahrattas, 8,000 infantry, 50,000 horse, and 40 guns. (Official reports from Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt to the Peishwa.)

enter upon its execution.* After levying the tribute due by the Naik of Sorapoor,† both parties returned to their respective capitals in July, and Nana Furnuwees took this opportunity of endeavouring to possess himself of the ever-coveted island of Jinjeera, but the mediation of the British government prevented the attack, until events of greater moment diverted all immediate designs from the Seedee.‡

Nizam Ally had scarcely reached his capital, when Tippoo, probably apprized of what had taken place, with premeditated insult, set up some absurd pretensions to the sovereignty of Beejapoor, and called on Nizam Ally, in consequence, to adopt his standard of weights and measures.§ Nizam Ally took little pains to obtain an explanation, until, in the month of October, Tippoo was said to have taken the field for the purpose of invading that part of the Moghul territory which lay south of the Kistna. An envoy from Hyderabad was immediately despatched to Tippoo's camp, for the purpose of temporising, and another to Poona, in order to hasten the projected operations of the alliance. Nana Furnuwees, however, was not only unprepared, but various affairs of internal government prevented him at that moment from supporting his ally. Nizam Ally, therefore, was glad to prevent hostilities through his envoy at Seringapatam, which he effected, not so much by any forbearance of Tippoo, as by his want of preparation for war.

The principal reason which induced Nana Furnuwees to suspend the design he had so long contemplated, was the reported progress of a conspiracy, said to have for its object the deposition of Mahdoo Rao Narain and the elevation of Bajee Rao, the son of the late Rugonath Rao, to the Peishwa's musnud. Rugonath Rao, after the treaty of Salbye was ratified, seeing no other alternative, accepted the terms there specified, and fixed on Kopergaom, on the banks of the Godavery, as his place of residence. He only survived this last humiliation a few months. His widow, Anundee Bye, was pregnant at the time, and shortly after, in April 1784, gave birth to a son, Chimnajee Appa. Bajee Rao, at the period of his father's death, had scarcely completed his ninth year; but the partizans of Rugonath Rao, and many who were dissatisfied with the existing government, began to stir up a faction in his favour. It is creditable to Nana Furnuwees that, in adopting measures for smothering these indications, which were soon accomplished, he placed no additional restraint on the family at Kopergaom, but they naturally became objects of his suspicion; mutual distrust was the consequence, and hatred grew up between Nana Furnuwees and the sons of Rugonath Rao.¶ Mahadajee Sindia was said to have been the secret fomentor of the intrigues to which we have alluded; and, from his usual policy of keeping Nana in perpetual alarm, there is ground to suspect his connivance; but he could have had no design of supporting such a faction, as he was at this time fully occupied in the accomplishment of those views on the imperial territory we have before seen him projecting; and events took place which suddenly elevated him to the pinnacle of his ambition.

* Poona Records.

† Official letter from Nana Furnuwees. The Naik of Sorapoor is the descendant of the Berud Naik of Wakinkerah. ‡ Bombay Records.

§ Bombay Records, Tareekh-dil-Ufroz, &c. It is scarcely worth enquiry how Tippoo arrogated to himself this right; but as Hyder, it was once reported, had obtained from the emperor the sovereignty of that portion of the Deccan comprized in the space allotted by Aurungzebe to his son Kaum Bukshah, the insult may have been suggested by that circumstance.

¶ Mahatta letters and MSS.

CHAP. XXXI.

A. D. 1784 AND A. D. 1785.

Factions at the imperial court.—Escape of Mirza Jewan Bukht.—Afrasiab Khan negotiates with the English.—The governor-general declines all interference.—Afrasiab Khan has recourse to Mahadajee Sindia.—Sindia's progress since the treaty of Salbye.—Benoit de Boigne.—Sindia accepts the invitation of Afrasiab Khan—marches to Agra.—Afrasiab Khan assassinated.—The whole power falls into the hands of Sindia—his policy in regard to the Peishwa.—The emperor confers on him the command of the army, &c.—Mahomedan chiefs submit.—The Doab taken possession of.—Agra and Aligurh taken.—Effect of the news of these events at the Poona court.—Sindia, intoxicated by his success, prefers a demand on the British government for the chowth of Bengal—effect.—Determination of the acting governor-general to send an envoy to the Peishwa's court.—Sindia's objections.—Affairs in the Deccan.

AT the imperial court we left Afrasiab Khan and Mohummud Beg Humadancee struggling for the superiority. The former
A. D. 1784. At first obtained the advantage, owing principally to his having the control of the emperor's person; but foreseeing no probability of reducing his rival with the means at his disposal, he contemplated an alliance with some of the neighbouring states, and cast his eyes successively towards the nabob vizier, the English, and the Mahrattas. Whilst hesitating in his choice, the emperor's son, prince Mirza Jewan Bukht, made his escape from Delhi, fled to Lucknow, where the governor-general then was, and threw himself on his protection and that of the nabob vizier. He was promised an asylum; but although he entreated assistance in his father's name, Mr. Hastings declined affording it. The prince's flight, however, alarmed Afrasiab Khan, and he voluntarily offered to make any arrangement for the emperor, which the governor-general and the nabob vizier might suggest, provided they would support him with a sufficient force to suppress the rebellion of Mohummud Beg. But these overtures being also rejected, Afrasiab Khan had recourse to Mahadajee Sindia.*

Since the ratification of the treaty of Salbye, Sindia had obtained considerable advantages. Several of the minor Rajpoot chieftains, contiguous to Malwa, had returned to their former allegiance as Mahratta tributaries. The fortress of Gwalior, after a protracted siege, was restored by the rana of Gohud, who was constrained to surrender himself a prisoner on a verbal promise of maintenance and protection.* A body of troops was sent into Bundelcund for the purpose of endeavouring to reduce that province. These troops were under the command of Appa Khunde Rao, who was attended by a body of regulars, raised by a

* Scott.

European gentleman named Benoit de Boigne.* But Sindia, whilst

* As M. de Boigne's progress in the Mahratta service will be found conspicuous, his previous history becomes interesting. M. de Boigne was born at Chamberri, in Savoy, in the territory of the king of Sardinia. He began his career as an ensign in the regiment of Clare, in the Irish brigade, in the service of France—a corps then famous for its discipline. Seeing little prospect of advancement, and hearing that Russia, then at war with Turkey, was much in want of officers in the Grecian Archipelago, he resigned his commission, and repaired to Turin, where, having obtained letters of recommendation from the Sardinian minister, he proceeded to Greece. Soon after his arrival, he was promoted to the rank of captain in a Greek regiment in the Russian service. Being employed on an injudicious descent made upon the island of Tenedos, he was taken prisoner by a sally from the Turkish garrison, and conveyed to Scio, where he was kept until the peace, which was soon after concluded. On being released, he embarked for Smyrna, at which place, happening to meet some Englishmen from India, he was so struck with their account of the country, that he resolved on trying his fortune there. He proceeded to Constantinople, and thence to Aleppo, where he joined a caravan for Bagdad; but in consequence of the successes of the Persians against the Turks, the caravan, after they had arrived near Bagdad, being under an apprehension of falling into the hands of the victors, retraced their steps to Aleppo. De Boigne, balked in his endeavours of getting to India by that route, repaired to Grand Cairo, where he became acquainted with Mr. Baldwin, the British consul-general, and through his influence and kindness, not only obtained a passage to India, but a letter from that gentleman to Major Sydenham, town-major of Fort St. George. M. de Boigne, soon after his arrival at Madras, was recommended to Mr. Rumbold, the governor, and appointed an ensign in the 6th native battalion under that presidency. M. de Boigne's corps was, with Baillie's detachment, destroyed by Tippoo; but De B. being at the time detached on escort duty, to convey grain from Madras, escaped. A short time after this event, in consequence of an act of injustice, which he conceived he had experienced from the governor, Lord Macartney, respecting the adjutancy of a detachment, he resigned his commission in the company's service, with an intention of proceeding to Calcutta, and thence overland to Russia. Lord Macartney, when he became sensible of the injustice, would have repaired it, but M. de Boigne appearing determined in his purpose, Lord M. gave him letters of recommendation to the governor-general, Mr. Hastings, by whom, on his arrival at Calcutta, he was kindly received, and by him furnished with letters, not only to the British authorities in the upper provinces, but to the native princes in alliance with the English government, which, owing to the presents an individual so recommended would have thus received, ensured civility, together with considerable pecuniary advantage. De Boigne experienced this advantage in a peculiar degree on his arrival at Lucknow, where the nabob made him rich presents, and furnished him with letters of credit on Cabul and Candahar for 12,000 rupees. He set forward on his journey, in company with Major Brown, at that time deputed on a mission to the emperor; but Major Brown's progress having been interrupted by the jealousy of the emperor's ministers, M. de Boigne, in consequence of being supposed one of his suite, was also detained, and took this opportunity of inaction to visit Sindia's camp, on the invitation of Mr. Anderson, the resident. Sindia being suspicious of De Boigne, and desirous of ascertaining his real character, which he expected to discover from the letters in his possession, caused all his baggage to be stolen by some dexterous thieves, whom he employed for the purpose; and although, on Mr. Anderson's application, the greater part of the baggage was restored, the letters and credits were not given up—a circumstance, as M. de Boigne conceived, equally ruinous to his fortune and his journey. It was then he first thought of endeavouring to get employed in the service of some native prince; and Gwalior being at this period besieged by Sindia, De Boigne formed a scheme for its relief, which he communicated to the rana of Gohud, through an officer named Sangster, a Scotchman, who commanded 1,000 well-disciplined sepoys, and a very respectable train of artillery, in the rana's service. De Boigne proposed, on receiving an advance of one lakh of rupees, to raise two battalions within the emperor's territory, east of the Jumna, in such a manner as to prevent suspicion, and, in conjunction with Sangster from Gohud, to fall on Sindia's camp by surprise. There was little doubt but the plan would have succeeded, had not the rana been afraid to trust De Boigne with the requisite advance of money; but, in order to intimidate Sindia, he published the proposed scheme in all his ukhbars as about to take place. The knowledge of the circumstance excited

prosecuting those objects, was anxiously watching the confusion and contentions in the imperial territory. He had been invited to take a part both by Mohummud Beg and Afrasiab Khan, but as the invitation sent by the latter was ostensibly from the emperor, Sindia preferred accepting it, and set out for Agra, towards which the imperial court was advancing. A meeting took place on the 22nd October; but immediately afterwards Afrasiab Khan was assassinated by the brother of the late Mirza Shuffee, in whose murder Afrasiab Khan secretly participated.^o As Sindia derived most advantage from the death of Afrasiab Khan, and as the assassin sought and found an asylum in his camp, he did not escape suspicion of being accessory to the murder; but those who knew Mahadajee best never accused him of a deed so atrocious. The event, however, vested Sindia with complete authority at Delhi, and placed him in a situation which he had only hoped to attain at some remote period. He refused the office of Umeer-ool-Oomrah, but, with his usual sagacity, obtained for the Peishwa that of wukeel-i-mootlug, or supreme deputy—a dignity first conferred on the great Nizam-ool-Moolk by Mohummud Shah; and Sindia, reversing the domestic policy of the Bramins, who always endeavour to be first in power but second in name, secured for himself the appointment of deputy to the Peishwa, so that he thus held by authority the executive power in Hindostan, and a rank which, if he ever should be able and desirous of asserting it, would supersede that of all other ministers in the court of the Peishwa. The emperor also conferred on him the command of his army, and gave up the provinces of Delhi and Agra to his management. For all which Sindia engaged to pay 65,000 rupees monthly, in order to defray the expenses of the imperial household, and to that sum additions were gradually to be made, according to the increasing prosperity of the provinces.†

the enmity of Sindia towards De Boigne, although he saw the merit of the suggestion.

De Boigne next made overtures to the raja of Jeypoor, and was commissioned by him to raise two battalions; but having inadvertently communicated this circumstance to the governor-general in an official form, Mr. Hastings, who had no objections to tolerate, although he could not sanction, his being so employed, ordered him to Calcutta—a summons with which M. de Boigne immediately complied. Mr. Hastings was so pleased by the prompt obediences shown to his commands, that he permitted him to return; but before he could reach the upper provinces, events had occurred which induced the raja of Jeypoor to alter his intentions. This change was a severe disappointment to De Boigne; but the raja made him a present of 10,000 rupees. At this juncture De Boigne heard of Sindia's intended expedition to Bundelcund, and proposed to raise two battalions, of 850 men each, for that service, to which, after some negotiation, Sindia agreed. No advance of money was granted, but De Boigne was allowed for himself 1,000 rupees, and for each man indiscriminately eight rupees a month. To the privates M. de Boigne gave five and a half rupees monthly, and paid the officers proportionally from the balance. The battalions were formed, as nearly as possible, on the plan of those in the English service, and armed, disciplined, and clothed after that manner; the labour which this imposed on an individual may be easily conceived by any person acquainted with military affairs. De Boigne gradually got European officers of all nations into his corps. Sangster, from the service of the rana of Gohud, joined him, and became superintendent of his cannon foundry.

The continuation of his memoirs will appear in the progress of the Mahratta history. What I have here stated is on the authority of General Count de Boigne himself, from notes taken in his presence.

I avail myself of this opportunity to express my acknowledgments to General Count de Boigne for the obliging manner in which he communicated various points of information during my visit to his hospitable mansion at Chamberri.

* Francklin's Life of Shah Alum.

† Bengal Records.

As Sindia appeared at the head of a powerful army, many of the officers serving with Mohummud Beg Humadane^e withdrew from his party, and paid their respects to the emperor. Mohummud Beg likewise acknowledged Sindia's authority, accepted a command, and was sent to reduce Raghoogurh, in the province of Kichwara, which he effected, and remained in that country for a considerable period. The imperial districts in the Dooab were speedily taken possession of, and Ryajee Patell was sent by Sindia to besiege Agra, the governor of which

at first refused to give it up; but on the 27th March it surrendered, when the emperor's second son, Akber, was appointed nominal governor of the province, and Ryajee^{*} Patell real governor of the fortress. The widow and brother of Afrasiab Khan resided in the fort of Aligurh, but refused to admit Sindia's garrison, and sustained a siege until the middle of November, when they also surrendered.

The news of Sindia's success was received by the people at Poona with surprise and joy; a small body of the Peishwa's troops was sent off to join him, as a measure of state policy to preserve the appearance of the Peishwa's co-operation and supremacy; but Holkar and Nana Furnuwees were jealous of his elevation, and Sindia at no period of his life was so little on his guard to prevent that jealousy from being turned against him. In the first intoxication of success, he so far lost sight of his usual prudence as to make a demand, under the emperor's authority, for the chouth of the British provinces in Bengal. To this arrogance he was probably encouraged by the departure of Mr. Hastings on the 8th February for England; but Mr. Macpherson, who had succeeded to the temporary charge of the supreme government, not only denied the existence of such a claim, but insisted on its being disavowed; and Sindia, perceiving that the acting governor-general would not submit even to temporize with encroachment, acknowledged its impropriety. Mr. Macpherson conceived that the ambitious nature of Sindia's policy was very dangerous, and endeavoured to raise some counterpoise to his progress by exciting the jealousy and rivalry already entertained towards him among the other Mahratta chiefs. Moodajee Bhonslay being at Poona when the demand for the chouth of Bengal was made, the Bombay government, by Mr. Macpherson's desire, paid him extraordinary attention, which had the effect of gratifying Moodajee and alarming Sindia. Nana Furnuwees was encouraged in a desire he had frequently expressed of having a British resident at the Peishwa's court, and Mr. Charles Malet was chosen for that important mission. Although no part of the treaty of Salbye precluded the British government from sending an envoy to Poona, yet as considerable delicacy was due towards Sindia, it was desirable that he should give his assent to the appointment; and it was supposed that this could be best obtained by Mr. Malet's proceeding in person to Sindia's camp; but the latter was too sagacious not to perceive the loss of influence which Mr. Malet's mission would occasion him. He observed that, after having been entrusted for three years with the management of the English affairs at the court of Poona, the appointment of a political agent of their own would naturally impress the chiefs of the Deccan with an idea that the British government

* Ryajee's surname was Sindia. He was a favourite commander of Mahadajee Sindia, and a Patell of Panoura, a village near Assee Oomra. Ryajee Patell must not be confounded with another eminent person, Ramjee Patell, whose surname was Jadow. Ramjee commenced his career in the humble capacity of Bargee in the service of Ryajee.

was dissatisfied with his conduct, and had revoked the confidence it had previously reposed. But these objections, however plausible, were not of sufficient weight to dissuade Mr. Macpherson from the measure which he deemed it necessary to adopt. It was determined that Mr. Malet should proceed as envoy to the court of Poona; but, before the arrangement was finally settled, events had taken place to the southward which rendered the appointment still more essential to the interests of the British government.

CHAP. XXXII.

FROM A. D. 1784 TO A. D. 1787.

Tippoo.—Nurgoond—Origin and progress of the dispute respecting it.—Tippoo's treachery—takes Nurgoond—seizes Kittoor—forcibly converts many Hindoos.—Nana Furnuwees proposes an alliance with the English.—The latter less solicitous to co-operate than Nana expected.—Nana applies to the Portuguese.—French said to be in alliance with Tippoo.—Reported alliance between the Mahrattas and the French.—British resident instructed to proceed to Poona.—Mr. Macpherson's offer of assisting in the defence of the Mahratta territory—rejected by Nana Furnuwees.—Mahratta army advances to form a junction with Nizam Ally and Moodajee Bhonslay.—Moodajee in close alliance with the Poona court.—Mahratta and Moghul armies unite—Plan of operations.—Badamee taken.—Nana Furnuwees returns to Poona, and Moodajee Bhonslay to Nagpoor.—Holkar's proceedings.—Tippoo attacks Adonee—Gallant defence till relieved by the confederates.—Adonee abandoned.—Gujendergurh given up to Hurry Punt.—Holkar makes a sudden march to Savanoor—his object—Burhan-ud-deen attacks him—is repulsed by Holkar, who is joined by the nabob of Savanoor.—Hurry Punt's operations.—Tippoo unexpectedly passes the Toongbuddra.—Operations of the armies.—Savanoor abandoned by the Mahrattas—Tippoo takes possession—proceeds to Benkapoor.—Hurry Punt takes Seerhutti.—Feeble operations on both sides.—Tippoo suddenly tenders proposals of peace.—Peace concluded.—Motives elucidated.—Sindia.

TIPPOO, in assuming a right to the province of Beejapoor, and in

A. D. 1784. threatening to attack the territory of Nizam Ally, had probably no other intention than to show the members of the confederacy, which he suspected was formed against him, that he was as well prepared to resist, as they to prosecute, the hostility meditated. At the subsequent accommodation with Nizam Ally, both parties understood that the adjustment was merely temporary. Tippoo continued to

A. D. 1785. discipline his army and to prepare his forts with increased exertion; and as the crisis approached, the security of the frontier garrisons became a principal object of his attention.

The fort and district of Nurgoond, situated about 12 miles south of the Malpurba, belonged to a Bramin dessaye, and had fallen under Hyder, with the other Mahratta possessions south of the Kistna, in 1778. This district had only been subject to the payment of a moderate tribute, and Hyder, satisfied with the dessaye's submission, exacted nothing more than what had been usually paid to the Mahrattas. Tippoo, however, soon after his father's death, had increased the demand, with which the dessaye refused compliance; but, concluding it would eventually be enforced, he secretly claimed protection from the Peishwa, whose subject he declared himself; and as secretly, through the agency of an Englishman in his

service, named Yoon, applied to the Bombay government for the aid of some regular troops, representing that he was an independent raja, willing to co-operate in the invasion of Tippoo's dominions. This application to Bombay was made before the treaty of Mangalore; but as no notice was taken of his overtures, the *dessaye* continued to court the protection of the minister at Poona, and the friendship of the powerful Bramin family of Putwurdhun, with whom he is said to have been connected. When Tippoo, therefore, pressed his demand, Nana Furnuwees interposed, and declared that he had no right to exact more than the ordinary tribute,—“that jagheerdars, on the transfer of districts, were liable to no additional payments: and that the rights of *suwusthanees*,* who had been guilty of no treason against the state to which they owed allegiance, had been invariably respected.”† Tippoo replied that he had a right to levy what he chose from his own subjects; and soon after detached two separate bodies of his troops to enforce demands beyond the *dessaye*'s ability to pay, which was, in other words, an order to reduce his fort. The siege commenced in the month of March; and a body of Mahrattas, under Gunnesh Punt Behree and Pureshrum Bhow Putwurdhun, advanced to its relief. Tippoo's wukeels still remained at Poona, and Nana Furnuwees had sent orders to the Mahratta commanders not to precipitate hostilities; but by the time they arrived in the neighbourhood of Nurgood, Tippoo's officers had been compelled, from want of water, to raise the siege and encamp at some distance. They, however, sent, in derision, a message to the Bramin commanders, intimating that they had withdrawn their troops from respect to their master the Peishwa. Fired at the insult, the Mahrattas rode on to their camp, drove in their outposts, and pressed forward, until repulsed by two of Tippoo's regular battalions supported by the cavalry, when they retired with the loss of 20 men and an elephant. This premature attack was contrary to the orders of Nana Furnuwees; but as it had been made, he immediately directed Tookajee Holkar, with a considerable force, to support Gunnesh Punt and Pureshrum Bhow, though he at the same time intimated to Tippoo his concern for the quarrel, and his desire for an accommodation. Tippoo, whose motives will become apparent, expressed an equal readiness to meet his wishes, and even offered to pay two years' tribute, provided his right of sovereignty was recognised in regard to Nurgood. Nana Furnuwees, by the advice of Nizam Ally, and on assurance that submission only was required from the *dessaye*, acceded to what Tippoo proposed, and everything appeared to be settled except the mode of payment, for which a period of 27 days was allowed, and the Mahratta army recrossed the Kistna. But Tippoo had practised a gross deception; Nurgood, left to its fate, submitted, and the terms promised to the unfortunate *dessaye* were not observed. After evacuating the fort, he and his family were treacherously seized; his daughter was reserved for the Sultan's seraglio, and the rest were immured in Cabuldroog, where they perished. The fort of Kittoor, which also belonged to a tributary *dessaye*, had likewise been seized, and both that place and Nurgood, before the opening of the fair season, were occupied by strong garrisons of the Sultan's troops.

To crown these acts, as if he designed to render himself as odious as possible to the Mahrattas, Tippoo forcibly circumcised many of the Hindoo inhabitants of the territory south of the Kistna; and 2,000 Bramins,

* Bramins who possess old hereditary jagheers are so styled.

† Mahratta MSS.

disciples of Shunkeracharya,* destroyed themselves to avoid the detested violation.

Nana Furnuwees very soon found that he had been duped by Tippoo, and he even began to doubt how far he might rely upon the co-operation of Nizam Ally : the inefficient state of the Moghul army had not escaped his observation when they met at Eedgeer, and he was alarmed by accounts of the excellent state of discipline to which Tippoo's battalions had attained. These circumstances, combined with a report of Tippoo's having entered into a new and closer alliance with the French, had the effect of overcoming his reluctance to calling in the aid of British troops. But as Nana imagined the English would join in an offensive alliance against Tippoo on almost any terms, and being solicitous not to pledge himself so far as to prevent his eventually receding, the overtures to Mr. Boddam, governor of Bombay, were made with much caution. In the month of July he sent an agent to that presidency, offering, on the part of the Peishwa, to give up to the company any two of Tippoo's seaports on the Malabar coast, on condition of being assisted with a body of troops to co-operate in the reduction of his territory. Mr. Boddam received the proposal without expressing the least surprise at the inadequacy of the terms, and referred Nana Furnuwees to the supreme government, with an unfeigned indifference which did not escape the quick-sighted envoy, and from which Nana began to change his opinion of the English policy. Although Nana Furnuwees sent a private agent of his own to Calcutta, it was necessary to prosecute the negotiation through Mahadajee Sindia whilst there was no British resident at the Peishwa's court. Sindia immediately applied to the governor-general through Lieutenant James Anderson, then resident envoy in his camp, informed him of the probability of a rupture between the Peishwa and Tippoo, and artfully assumed, as a matter of course, that the English would afford every assistance, "as by the treaty of Salbye the friends and enemies of the Mahrattas and English were mutual." He added that the Peishwa was sure of the co-operation of Nizam Ally ; that the terms of their alliance were that each state should recover its lost territory, and, of any new acquisitions, there should be an equal participation. Mr. Macpherson, in reply, observed that the treaty of Salbye did not stipulate that the friends and enemies of the two states should be mutual, but that neither party should afford assistance to the enemies of the other, and that by the treaty of Mangalore the English were bound not to assist the enemies of Tippoo. Mr. Macpherson, in declining the alliance, made strong general professions of friendship towards the Mahrattas, hinted at some reasons for dissatisfaction with Tippoo on the part of the British government, in consequence of his not having fulfilled all the stipulations of the treaty of Mangalore, and concluded by assuring Sindia that, in case of any reverse, the British government would not suffer the Mahrattas to be overpowered.

Nana Furnuwees, the less solicitous the governor-general appeared, became the more anxious to obtain the co-operation of the English, and he urged it the more in consequence of a new treaty supposed to have been concluded between Tippoo and the French. At last, either in despair of obtaining the aid of the English, or in order to quicken their decision, he made overtures to the Portuguese, by whom he was promised assistance. It is certain that Nana believed in the existence of this new treaty between Tippoo and the French, as the Mahratta envoy at Pondicherry publicly re-

* A famous Gooroo of the southern Mahratta country.

monstrated with the French governor, and accused him of having thereby violated the promises of the king of France to the Peishwa. The French governor denied the existence of such a treaty, and, as a proof of what he alleged, proposed a closer connection with the Peishwa—a circumstance which is said to have greatly offended Tippoo, who was already jealous of the high and independent tone assumed by his French friends. The French envoy at Poona was treated with much attention, and it was believed that the Peishwa's government had agreed to cede Rewadunda to that nation, on condition of their not assisting Tippoo.

These negotiations showed more than ever the necessity of appointing a British resident at the Poona court, and Mr. Malet, then in Calcutta, was instructed to repair to Bombay, and there await an invitation from the Peishwa to proceed to his capital.

In the meantime the army was assembling at Poona for the purpose of invading Tippoo's territory, and Mr. Macpherson offered to send three battalions to assist in the defence of the Mahratta country, provided they were not employed within Tippoo's boundary; but as Nana's views extended to conquest, he did not contemplate defence, and therefore rejected the proposal.*

The periodical rains were this year of unusual duration, and the Mahratta army, under Hurry Punt Phurkay, did not quit Poona until about the 1st December. The troops advanced towards the eastern frontier for the purpose of forming a junction with Moodajee Bhonslay and Nizam Ally.

Moodajee, as we have had occasion to observe, had visited Poona during the preceding season; he showed a sincere desire to connect himself with the head of the state, and, in the name of his son Rughojee, entered on a new agreement, promising to adhere strictly to that which had been framed by Mahdoo Rao and Janojee in 1769. He pledged himself particularly never to assist the English against the Peishwa's government, and promised to co-operate in the expected war with Tippoo, for which purpose he was now advancing.

Nana Furnuwees followed the army for the purpose of conferring with Nizam Ally, and overtook Hurry Punt at Punderpoor, A. D. 1786. whence they moved down the right bank of the Beema, and were joined by the Moghul troops near the spot where the interview took place during the preceding season. It was now resolved to reduce the whole of Tippoo's territories, and to divide the conquests into six equal parts, of which Nizam Ally should receive two shares, the Peishwa two, and Sindia and Holkar two shares between them, or one-sixth each. It was further agreed that their first efforts should be directed to the recovery of the Mahratta districts between the Kistna and Toongbuddra. Tookajee Holkar and Gunness Punt Behree were detached with 25,000 troops, chiefly horse, to attack a body of Tippoo's, under Burhan-ud-deen, near Kittoor, and to expel his garrisons from that district, whilst the main army of the confederates advanced towards Badamee. As they approached that place, reports were received of Tippoo's having marched with his whole army; and it was agreed, in case this intelligence should prove correct, to postpone the siege, but to encamp in the neighbourhood of Badamee until the rains had fallen, when the swelling of the rivers would, in all probability, secure them from interruption.

The prospect of a monsoon campaign was so little relished by Nizam Ally, that, in giving his assent to this plan of operations, he intimated his

* Bengal and Bombay Records.

desire of returning to Hyderabad, and of leaving his general, Tuhuwur Jung, with 25,000 men under the orders of Hurry Punt—a measure entirely conformable to the wishes of the Mahrattas, who felt themselves encumbered by the form and ceremony necessarily observed to the Soobeh of the Deccan.

Soon after the departure of Nizam Ally, it was ascertained that Tippoo had sent forward some troops from Bangalore, but had himself returned to Seringapatam, on which it was immediately resolved to commence the projected siege. Operations began on the 1st May.* The fortified town of Badamee is built on the plain, with a small gurhee or citadel in the body of the place; but it is further protected by two hill-forts, one on each flank.† After battering the walls of the town for three weeks, they were very little injured; but it was determined to try the effect of an escalade. On the morning of the 20th May, 20,000 infantry of the confederate armies were drawn up for that service. The garrison, consisting of upwards of 3,500 troops, manned the works to oppose them; and when the assailants advanced, which they did with great resolution, they found the ditch and covert way full of small mines, constructed by digging pits, and placing in them large dubbers‡ filled with gunpowder; these were fired, and proved exceedingly destructive; but the Mahrattas and Moghuls, vying with each other, rushed forward in a most impetuous, though tumultuous, manner, applied ladders, mounted the walls in various places, and, except a slight check sustained at the gurhee, carried all before them within the town. The garrison fled to the forts above, closely followed by the assailants; but the pursuers did not succeed in entering with the fugitives. They, however, continued to crowd up the face of the hills, though huge stones were rolled down, and a heavy fire of musketry opened upon them. Their casualties were numerous; but the garrison becoming intimidated at their furious and persevering attack, offered to surrender if their lives were spared—a condition which was immediately granted.§

After the fall of Badamee, Nana Furnuwees returned to Poona, and Hurry Punt was left to prosecute the war. Moodajee Bhonslay went back to Nagpoor, but left the greater part of his troops with Hurry Punt, under his second son Khundoojee, promising to return with a reinforcement after the Dussera.

While these operations were prosecuted by the grand army, the detachment which proceeded to the westward, under Holkar, had expelled Tippoo's troops from every part of the Kittoor district, except the fort of the same name, which they invested, but could not hope to reduce.

Hurry Punt's first care was to send back all his wounded from Badamee; he then moved towards Gudjendergurb, but as the small fort of Seertee lay in his route,|| he breached and stormed it; but scarcely had he ac-

* Poona Records, Mahratta MSS.

† Sir C. Malet's despatches.

‡ Dubbers are large vessels, which, in appearance, resemble immense blown bladders; they are extremely useful for many purposes, but principally for preserving oil and ghee. They are made of hides, which are first beaten into a pulp, and then spread in thin coats over shapes composed of clay, and as each coat dries, a new one is added, until the requisite thickness has been attained. When the whole of the coats become solid and dry, the clay is broken to dust and shaken out. Dubbers are sometimes made larger than a wine-pipe, and will last upwards of a century.

§ Poona Records and Malet's despatches.

|| Hurry Punt's official report to the Peishwa. I do not know the exact situation of Seertee; the Hindoo names frequently differ from the Mahomedan. The propagators of the Koran have always been prone to bestowing new, and the Hindoos to retaining old, appellations.

complished that object, when he was informed that Tippoo was marching to give him battle; and such was the vigilance of a corps of Beruds^{*} in Tippoo's service, consisting of both horse and foot, that the address and dexterity of Mahratta spies, famous only where their own language is spoken, could obtain no correct intelligence of his motions, and the first certain accounts which Hurry Punt received, assured him that Tippoo was in full march to attack Adonee. That fortress was then held by Mohubut Jung, son of the late Busalut Jung, and nephew of Nizam Ally, who was totally unprepared for a siege. The families and seraglio of the late Busalut Jung, as well as those of his sons, were then in the fort, and Mohubut Jung's first application was to Nizam Ally, calling upon him to save the honor of his house. A pressing requisition was also sent to Hurry Punt, who immediately sent forward Tuhuwur Jung, with the whole of the Moghul troops, and 20,000 Mahrattas under Krist Rao Bulwunt and Rugonath Rao Neelkunt. These troops were on their march towards Adonee, when they received intelligence of the advance towards Raichore of the whole of the disposable force from Hyderabad under Moghul Ally. A junction was formed at Bunnoor, when they moved towards Adonee, with an army of nearly 60,000 men. Tippoo endeavoured to carry the place before the arrival of the approaching succour; his desperate but premature attempts were most gallantly repulsed by Mohubut Jung, and as the allies drew near, he was compelled to raise the siege, and retire some miles to the southward. The confederates had forded the Toongbuddra with difficulty; and, as the country to the southward of that river was entirely at Tippoo's command, whilst they could place no dependence on the resources of the tract between the Kistna and Toongbuddra, much of which still remained to be reduced, they prudently resolved to withdraw the garrison from Adonee, and recross the latter river. The retreat was judiciously executed; but the unpardonable oversight of leaving the fort, guns, ammunition, and stores, without an attempt to render them unserviceable to their enemy, cancelled any merit the commanders might otherwise have claimed.†

The troops from Hyderabad returned to that capital, and the main body rejoined Hurry Punt at Gudjendergurh, of which place he had obtained possession by bribing the killidar.

Holkar still lay before Kittoor, apparently in careless inactivity, when, decamping suddenly, he made one march of upwards of 60 miles to Savanoor, with the nabob of which he had been some time in correspondence. The immediate object of Holkar's movement was an attempt to seize the person of Ragwundur Naik, one of Tippoo's principal bankers; but he had just time to escape across the Toongbuddra, and only two or three inferior soucars fell into Holkar's hands, from whom he exacted a ransom of two lakhs of rupees. Burhan-ud-deen, with a body of Tippoo's troops, attacked Holkar: but the Mahrattas, joined by the nabob of Savanoor, repulsed them; and on the ensuing night Burhan-ud-deen retired to Jereeanwutty on the Wurdah, 30 miles above Savanoor.

About the year 1779 the nabob of Savanoor had married the sister of Tippoo, and on that occasion Hyder restored the whole of the 12 districts originally dependent on his principality, on condition that he should keep up 2,000 Patan horse for the service of the state. Tippoo entertained a

* The class of people already described, resembling the Ramoossees of Maharashtra, and improperly called Beders.

† Hurry Punt's despatches, Bombay Records, Wilks.

personal enmity against the nabob, and, on his accession to power, found a pretext for indulging it, owing to the nabob's having omitted to keep up the stipulated number of horse. Following a systematic plan, Tippoo mulcted and plundered both the nabob and his subjects, so that it was not surprising the nabob should seek the first opportunity of throwing off his allegiance, and declaring, as he now did, for the Mahrattas.

Hurry Punt's operations, after obtaining possession of Gudjendergurrh, were directed against Buhadur Benda and Kopaul; the former had been delivered up, and he was in treaty for the latter, when he was astonished by information of Tippoo's having actually crossed the Toongbuddra at Gurhghaut,* with the greater part of his army, in basket boats. Hurry Punt advanced towards him: but finding the ground very unfavourable for the operations of his cavalry, he encamped at the distance of 10 miles, where Tippoo made two unsuccessful attempts to surprise him. Grain and forage being extremely scarce, in order to procure supplies as well as to draw Tippoo into the plain, Hurry Punt proceeded to Savanoor. Tippoo, marching along the bank of the Kistna, followed him, and encamped in a strong position within six miles of the confederates, keeping the town of Savanoor between the camps. In this situation both parties continued for 15 days, until on the 1st of October, two hours before dawn, the Mahratta camp was alarmed by a sudden firing, which was speedily answered by the Mahratta artillery. Tippoo, who had headed the attack in person, on discovering where their guns were posted, directed his principal effort to that spot, which induced Hurry Punt to draw them off until daylight, when they again opened on the assailants. The position occupied by the Mahrattas was still very unfavourable; their horse were prevented from charging by the steep banks of a rivulet, which Tippoo cautiously refrained from crossing, and, after cannonading for several hours, he withdrew to his encampment.

There was a scarcity of forage in the Mahratta camp, and their own situation and that of their enemy precluded all hope of being able to gain any advantage by continuing at Savanoor. Hurry Punt, therefore, deemed it necessary to retire, although he thereby sacrificed the capital of his new ally. The nabob of Savanoor reluctantly fell back with him 10 miles, where the confederates took up a new position. Tippoo possessed himself of the town, but declined advancing upon them: he lay inactive at Savanoor until the Mohurrum, when he retired to celebrate that festival at Benkapoor, leaving Hurry Punt to breach, storm, and take Seerhutti, a fortified town 20 miles N. E. of Savanoor, without interruption. Tippoo having deposited his heavy baggage in Benkapoor, moved from that place; but aware of his enemy's superiority in cavalry, he did not quit the broken ground on the banks of the Wurdah and Toongbuddra. Proceeding down the left bank, he encamped between Kopaul and Buhadur Benda, and again obtained possession of the latter place. The confederates followed him, and endeavoured to cut off his supplies; but their own forage being brought from a great distance, whilst Tippoo drew his with facility from the south bank of the Toongbuddra, they soon abandoned the attempt. Tippoo renewed his endeavours to surprise the camp of the confederates, and on one occasion took some baggage belonging to the Moghuls.†

* Colonel Wilks calls this place Kurrucknaut. It is not marked in any map that I have seen, nor do I know its precise situation.

† Just at this period the following letter appears in the official correspondence of Hurry Punt, and in his own hand-writing:—"The loss sustained by the army in

In these feeble operations neither party could boast of much advantage, and the confederates were at a loss to account A. D. 1787. for Tippoo's motives in suddenly tendering proposals of peace. Even after the arrival of two envoys of high rank, Budr-ul-Zeman Khan and Ally Reza Khan, who negotiated through Tookajee Holkar and Gungadur Rastia, Hurry Punt for a time imagined that Tippoo's professions were only a prelude to some stratagem. His suspicions contributed to prolong the negotiation; for, although an armistice took place on the 10th February, the peace was not concluded till April. The Mahrattas obtained the cession of Badamee, Kittoor, and Nurgoon; the other towns and districts reduced by them were restored to Tippoo. Tippoo also agreed to pay 45 lakhs of tribute, 30 of which were immediately produced, and the remainder promised at the expiration of a year. Adonee was restored to the nephew of Nizam Ally; but Tippoo had destroyed the works and carried off the guns. The nabob of Savanoor obtained a promise of the restoration of that portion of his territory which he possessed prior to his marriage with Hyder's daughter; but, dreading Tippoo's treachery, he did not venture to return to Savanoor at this period, but continued with his Mahratta friends at Poona.*

Tippoo's motives for acceding to a pacification so disadvantageous have been imputed,† it would appear justly, to his apprehending that the English were about to take part against him. Mr. Malet had not only been invited to Poona as resident, but, at the request of Nana Furnuwees, he had joined him at Badamee—a circumstance which, Tippoo conceived, bespoke a very intimate connection; but the acting governor-general was studious to allay any alarm it might create, and had partly succeeded. Shortly afterwards, however, in September 1786, Lord Cornwallis, having assumed charge of the supreme government, addressed letters to the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, in which, although he expressly intimated his determination to take no part in the war between the confederates and Tippoo Sultan, yet the state of military efficiency in which it became the immediate care of the new governor-general to place all the presidencies, occasioned a bustle and apparent preparation, which seem to have convinced Tippoo that the designs of the English were decidedly hostile; and may not merely account for his earnestness to terminate the war with the confederates, but afford some reason for that rancorous hostility which led him to persevere in schemes for annihilating the power of the British nation in India.

The appointment of a resident at the Peishwa's court was not more a cause of alarm to Tippoo than of jealousy to Mahadajee Sindia. A tardy acquiescence was obtained from Sindia to the measure, and, in order to reconcile him to it as much as possible, Mr. Malet was instructed to send his despatches to the supreme government through the resident, for the purpose of being submitted for Sindia's information and obtaining his opinions. But Sindia was at this period, and for several years afterwards, too much occupied by his own vast projects in Hindostan to be able either to prevent the English from establishing their influence at Poona, or to direct much of his attention to the affairs of the Deccan. The history of his progress will be found in the ensuing chapter.

consequence of the cholera morbus is very great; medicines are liberally supplied; some do recover, but by far the greater part die."

* Poona Records, Mr. Chaplin's report.

† Wilks.

CHAP. XXXIII.

FROM A. D. 1785 TO A. D. 1790.

Sindia's embarrassments—His impolitic conduct—Sequesters many of the jagheers—consequent enmity of the Mahomedan chiefs.—Mohummud Beg Humadane.—Sindia levies tribute from the Rajpoots—The Rajpoots revolt—attack and rout Sindia's troops under Ryajee Patell.—Sindia takes the field—difficulties of the crisis—endeavours to negotiate with the Rajpoots without success.—Mohammed Beg and his nephew join the Rajpoots—Battle in which Mohummud Beg is killed, but victory declares for the Rajpoots.—The emperor's regular infantry, with 80 pieces of cannon, desert Sindia in a body, and join the Rajpoots—Sindia evinces great fortitude and conduct—retreats unmolested by the Rajpoots—followed by Ismael Beg—continues his retreat to Gwalior—applies to Poona for aid.—Views of Nana Furnuwees.—Sindia's exertions.—Able defence of Agra by his general, Lucknow Dada.—Gholam Kawdir—takes Aligurh—joins Ismael Beg before Agra.—Jaths obstruct the operations of the siege—Sindia reinforces the Jaths.—Battle near Bhurtpoor, in which the Mahrattas and Jaths are worsted.—Successful diversion planned by Rannay Khan.—The battle of Agra in which Ismael Beg is totally defeated.—Ismael Beg joins Gholam Kawdir—They repair to Delhi.—Barbarities perpetrated by Gholam Kawdir.—Mahrattas at last advance—Gholam Kawdir flies—is pursued—taken—suffers mutilation, under which he dies.—Shah Alum restored to his throne, and Sindia recovers his ascendancy—His situation—Changes introduced in the constitution of his army—Gosaens.—Himmud Buhadur.—Regular infantry.—Sindia's views.—Transition to Deccan affairs.

THE resources of the provinces which Sindia had acquired in Hindostan A. D. 1785. were, from their exhausted state, totally inadequate to meet the great additional disbursements which his late success, more brilliant than lucrative, had entailed. Pressed by pecuniary embarrassments, he was driven to acts equally impolitic and unjust. Against foreign adversaries he might have prevailed, but domestic enemies soon became too strong for his newly-established power. The principal cause of discontent arose from his sequestering the jagheers of many of the Mahomedan chiefs, and from being suspected of entertaining like designs towards all of them. The most considerable of these chiefs, whom he had not yet dispossessed, was Mohummud Beg Humadane, whom Sindia had recalled from Raghoogurh to Delhi, and endeavoured, without success, to prevail upon him to disband a portion of his troops. Mohummud Beg, suspecting that Sindia intended to enforce compliance, ever after harboured a secret enmity against him, which the course of events soon afforded an opportunity of declaring.

Under the sanction of the emperor's name, Sindia had not only preferred

A. D. 1786. a claim for tribute on the Rajpoots, but at the head of his army at the gates of Jeypoor had fixed the first payment at 60 lakhs of rupees, of which a part was received, and the balance promised in a given time. When the period expired, Sindia sent Ryajee Patell to recover the remainder; but the Rajpoots having prepared for resistance, and being secretly assured of support from Mohummud Beg and the disaffected Mahomedan nobles, refused to pay the amount, derided the authority of Ryajee Patell, attacked his troops, and routed them. The faction at Delhi opposed to Sindia was much strengthened by this revolt; even the imbecile monarch, whose stipend was irregularly paid, and who readily became the tool of any new party, joined in the increasing murmurs, complained of the invaded rights of imperial dignity, and of the arbitrary acts and uncourteous manner of the Mahratta chiefs. Sindia, though sensible of these discontents, though his funds were exhausted, his own and the imperial troops in arrears, and his fortunes depending on the issue of a very doubtful campaign, was obliged to take the field against the Rajpoots. He ordered the troops under Appa Khunde Rao, with the two battalions of De Boigne, lately returned from Bundelcund, to join him; but, to add to his difficulties, he was obliged to detach two separate bodies of troops to the northward of Delhi, under two of his own officers, Hybut Rao Phalkay and Ambajee Inglia, to repel an incursion of the Seiks.

On approaching Jeypoor, Sindia endeavoured to negotiate, but his overtures were disregarded. The raja of Joudpoor, with A. D. 1787. several Rajpoot chiefs of less note, united with Pertaub Sing, the raja of Jeypoor, who had succeeded his father Jey Sing, and their army was already very formidable. The greater part of Sindia's troops being very different from those of an army wholly Mahratta, the Rajpoots, by acting on the supplies and cutting off the foragers, soon rendered their situation critical. Both Mahrattas and Moghuls, irritated by privation, became dissatisfied; and Mohummud Beg Humadane, together with his nephew Ismael Beg, chose this moment for deserting Sindia, and joining the Rajpoots. Lest the disaffection should spread to the whole of the emperor's troops, Sindia took the earliest opportunity of leading them into action. An obstinate battle took place; Mohummud Beg fell by a cannon-shot, and his troops were on the point of flying, when they were rallied by Ismael Beg, who retrieved the day, and forced the Mahrattas to retire. Sindia was preparing to renew the contest, when, on the third day after the battle, the whole of the emperor's regular infantry, with 80 pieces of cannon, went off in a body to join Ismael Beg.*

At no period of his life did Sindia evince greater fortitude and conduct than at this alarming crisis.† He immediately sent off his heavy baggage and many of his followers to Gwalior, by the route of Kooshalgurh; he then made a rapid retreat to Deeg, recalled his detachments, and restored Deeg, with several other places, to the Jaths, in order to preserve an interest with that people. He also deposited his heavy guns in their fort of Bhurtpoor, and strengthened his garrisons in Aligurh and Agra.‡

To effect these and other contingent arrangements required some time, and, had the Rajpoots pressed the war with vigour, they might

* Mahratta MSS. and letters, Bengal Records, &c.

† From the oral information of General De Boigne.

‡ Sindia's letters to the Peishwa, confirmed by General De Boigne.

probably have confined the Mahrattas to the southern bank of the Chumbul; but they only sought to suppress the ambitious pretensions of Sindia, not to annihilate the Mahratta ascendancy in Hindostan. They therefore returned to their respective capitals when Sindia retreated, and left Ismael Beg to recover the imperial districts.* Ismael first proceeded towards Agra, in the neighbourhood of which Sindia was still hovering, but he was determined to avoid another general action. At that time, however, skirmishes took place for eight successive days, and one village was repeatedly taken and re-taken; but it being reported that Gholam Kawdir, the son of Zabita Khan Rohillah, was on his march to assist Ismael Beg, Sindia made a rapid retreat towards Gwalior, on which occasion many of his men perished, by losing themselves in the ravines contiguous to the Jumna.† Sindia had made repeated applications to the Peishwa for troops, and now wrote to Nana Furnuwees, representing that, although he by no means considered his own affairs desperate, yet as he had reason to believe the English were about to form an alliance with the emperor and the Rajpoots, he submitted to his consideration the danger that must ensue to the whole Mahratta empire, by allowing the English to establish their sway over the provinces of Hindostan, and to gain such an influence as they must acquire, if assisted by the weight of the imperial name. He strongly disavowed every feeling of jealousy, and called on Nana, if such did exist towards himself, to erase it from his mind; to ask Holkar, Hurry Punt, and Pureshram Bhow if he (Sindia) had ever interfered with their views, and if they had not seen that all his endeavours tended to the aggrandizement of the empire: "we serve," continued Sindia, "a common master; let our exertions be directed to the common cause: if you personally entertain jealousy of me, ask yourself who supported you against the faction of Moraba, and put your rival Sukaram Bappoo into your power; who suppressed the insurrection of the pretended Sewdashcoo Rao Bhow, beat the English at Tullygaom, maintained a great share of the war against them, and concluded an advantageous peace? Think of these services, banish suspicion, and silence calumniators, who are our mutual enemies; let the cause of the Mahratta nation be upheld in Hindostan, and prevent our empire from being disunited and overthrown."‡

These observations, though incorrect with regard to any alliance then meditated by the English, carried much of truth in them; but the grand aim of Nana Furnuwees was to cement the Mahratta confederacy under the authority of the Peishwa, and the whole conduct of Sindia had so fully proved that his views were directed to independence, if not to supremacy, in the empire, that Nana, however unwilling to relinquish Mahratta claims in Hindostan, hesitated as to the extent and mode of reinforcing Sindia's army.

A body of troops had been held in readiness under Ali Buhadur§ even prior to Sindia's retreat; but Nana wished to employ them in making a distinct settlement with the Rajpoot states, in the name of the Peishwa, for the purpose of extending the Mahratta influence, without confirming the power of a rival of such inordinate ambition. It is supposed by some of his countrymen that Nana had some communications with the

* Scott's History, Mahratta MSS., original letters, and English Records.

† General De Boigne.

‡ Original letter from Mahadajee Sindia to Nana Furnuwees.

§ The son of Shumsher Buhadur, and grandson of the great Bajee Rao.

raja of Jeypoor for the purpose of preserving the Hindoo power, but with a view also of controlling Sindia; the moderation shown by the Rajpoots in not molesting Sindia's retreat is adduced as a proof of this conjecture; but without an absolute rupture with Sindia, which was justly considered ruinous to the empire. Nana saw no means of attaining the ascendancy he desired. Besides the difficulties arising from these considerations, some fresh acts of hostility on the part of Tippoo rendered him averse to detach troops from the Deccan. Sindia, however, whilst he urged these applications at Poona, was using every exertion to retrieve his affairs by his own resources. His most active enemy was Ismael Beg, who, after the retreat of the Mahratta army, invested Agra, which was vigorously defended by Luckwa Dada—a Mahratta Bramin of the Shenwee tribe. At this time appeared Gholam Kawdir, who, on the death of his father Zabita Khan, which happened in January 1785, succeeded to the jagheer. His disposition, equally cruel and turbulent, was kept in check whilst the power of Sindia, his hereditary enemy, was predominant; but no sooner did he see a field open to his view, by the reverses which befel that chief, than he collected troops, and rushed on a scene which promised ample gratification to his inclinations. Instead of proceeding to join Ismael Beg, as was reported to be his intention, he, in the first instance, drove the Mahratta garrison from the city of Delhi, where he placed his own troops, but left the emperor unmolested in the citadel. He next besieged Aligurh, which he reduced,

A. D. 1788. and then proceeded to assist Ismael Beg, who was still engaged in the siege of Agra. The Jaths, whom Ismael Beg might have conciliated by confirming the cessions made to them by Sindia, took every opportunity of obstructing his operations, and encouraging the besieged in the fort, till at last Sindia determined to support them. For this purpose he sent forward Rannay Khan* and Appa Khunde Rao with a body of horse, supported by the two regular battalions of De Boigne and some other infantry. As the junction of Gholam Kawdir with Ismael Beg was known at Gwalior before the march of these troops, it was deemed an imprudent measure on the part of Sindia. Rannay Khan, however, united his forces with those of the Jaths at Bhurtpoor, when the whole marched towards Agra; but they had only proceeded 16 miles when they met Ismael Beg and Gholam Kawdir, who had raised the siege in order to give them battle.

The cavalry of the Jaths was commanded by Sew Sing Foujdar: their infantry, chiefly regulars, was under M. Listeneaux, a Frenchman, and two Mahomedan officers, each commanding separate bodies; but one of these Mahomedan officers, named Jehangeer Khan, with his three battalions, deserted to Ismael Beg without firing a shot. The action commenced by a

April 24. cannonade from the guns of Ismael Beg. The Jaths were on the right, the Mahrattas on the left: Gholam Kawdir made a furious attack upon the infantry of the right wing, which soon put them all to the rout, excepting those under M. Listeneaux, who for some time maintained his ground. Ismael Beg, opposed to the infantry on the left, advanced with all the energy of his character, but

* Rannay Khan, says Sir John Malcolm, was originally a Bihishtee, or water-carrier, who saved Mahadajee Sindia's life, by carrying him off when wounded at Panniput, and, in gratitude for this service, Sindia raised him to high command. Whatever may have been Rannay Khan's origin, his conduct proved that he was worthy of his master's confidence. The escape of Mahadajee Sindia, however, is generally attributed, with more probability, to Trimbukjee Inglia, one of his aildars, who is said to have carried him off behind him on his horse.

found himself received with remarkable steadiness and intrepidity by the infantry of De Boigne. All parties admitted that, had De Boigne and Listeneaux been properly supported by the cavalry, the issue of the day might have been very different; but, after a heavy loss, the regular troops at last gave way, and the whole, favoured by the night, effected their retreat to Bhurtpoor. Ismael Beg and Gholam Kawdir called upon Runjeet Sing, the Jath chief, to renounce his connexion with the Mahrattas, otherwise they would, after the reduction of Agra, besiege him in his capital. But their triumph was of short duration; Luckwa Dada, the killidar of the fort of Agra, persevered in his gallant and successful defence; the Mahomedan chiefs soon evinced a distrust of each other, and Rannay Khan, hearing of an incursion of the Seiks, sent a body of Mahrattas and Jaths to join and encourage them to fall on the jagheer of Gholam Kawdir. This diversion had the desired effect; Gholam Kawdir immediately set off to repel the invaders, and Sindia, having reinforced the division of Rannay Khan, the Mahrattas and Jaths once more advanced towards

June 18. Agra, at which place an obstinate battle was fought, in which De Boigne and his battalions greatly signalized themselves. The army of Ismael Beg was defeated and dispersed; that chief himself, after receiving two severe wounds, escaped from the field by the swiftness of his horse, plunged into the Jumna, gained the opposite bank, and with a few followers reached the camp of Gholam Kawdir, by whom he was courteously received. His dispersed army flocked to Delhi, wither, in hopes of again collecting them, he immediately repaired. Gholam Kawdir followed him to the capital. The emperor refused to admit either the one or the other into the citadel; but Gholam Kawdir, having corrupted one of the confidential servants, not only gained admittance, but seized the gates, occupied every part of the palace and citadel with his own troops, and commenced a systematic train of violence, rapine, and barbarity, almost without example in the annals of the world. These enormities continued for two months; at the end of that time, when the unhappy monarch had been plundered, insulted, and dethroned, his eyes destroyed in their sockets by the point of a dagger in the hand of the merciless Gholam Kawdir; when his wives, daughters, sons, and relatives had been exposed, dishonored, degraded, and some of them starved to death, the Mahratta army at last marched to his relief. Ismael Beg, who at first had so far concurred in the views of Gholam Kawdir as to agree to plunder the imperial palace, for the purpose of procuring the means of subsistence to their troops, turned with abhorrence from the commission of the cruelties exercised by his colleague, and, on the promise of a jagheer from Sindia, joined with the Mahrattas against him. Gholam Kawdir retired from Delhi upon their approach, carrying with him Bedar Bukht, the son of Ahmed Shah, whom, on the dethronement of Shah Alum, he had proclaimed emperor of the Moghuls.

Mahadajee Sindia was severely censured for not immediately proceeding to the capital, but he probably foresaw that Gholam Kawdir and Ismael Beg, if left for a time to themselves, could not remain united, and, as the result proved, that he should soon be able to secure one party in his interests. Besides these reasons, he was assured that reinforcements under Ali Buhadur, followed by Tookajee Holkar, were on their march from Poona to join him. These troops were granted by Nana Furnuwees on condition that all territory acquired north of the Chumbul should be equally shared by the Peishwa, Sindia, and Holkar.

The Mahratta army, which advanced from Agra, was under three

principal officers—Rannay Khan, Ali Buhadur, and Appa Khunde Rao—accompanied by the two battalions of De Boigne. Rannay Khan, who was chief-in-command, on taking possession of Delhi, did everything which humanity dictated for the relief of the unfortunate emperor. The arrival of the Mahrattas in the Moghul capital was, on this occasion, hailed with the greatest joy. A large body immediately pursued Gholam Kawdir, and forced him to take shelter in the fort of Meerut, where he defended himself vigorously; but the place being destitute of provisions, and his capture, if he continued, inevitable, he mounted a swift horse, and fled alone. But after he had proceeded some distance, the horse fell, and his rider, being completely stunned, lay senseless on the ground. In this situation he was at daylight discovered and recognised by some of the peasantry, and by them carried to the Mahratta camp, where he was closely guarded, and shortly after, by Sindia's orders, he suffered a dreadful mutilation which he did not survive. The prince Bedar Bukht was retaken at Meerut: and at first, without any harshness, was remanded into confinement, but he was afterwards put to death by order of Shah Alum.*

Mahadajee Sindia arrived in Delhi a short time after the success of Rannay Khan. Shah Alum was re-seated on his throne with much pomp, and the honors of wukeel-i-mootlug, formerly conferred on the Peishwa, and those of his deputy on Sindia, were renewed with formal solemnity.

Meanwhile the jagheer of Gholam Kawdir was reduced, and the greater part of the Doab, with the provinces of Delhi and Agra, were annexed to the Mahratta dominions. The situation of Sindia, however, was by no means secure; he for some time dreaded an invasion of the Abdallee, who, under their king Timoor Shah, were in the field in great force, and he well knew, although the Moghul faction was broken, and Ismael Beg had received his stipulated jagheer in the province of Maywat, that, in the event of the appearance of the Afghans, the Mahomedans would unite against him. He had also powerful enemies in the Rajpoots; and his coadjutors, Holkar and Ali Buhadur, were more solicitous to share his acquisitions and obstruct his measures, than to unite in upholding his cause. He at the same time experienced some inquietude from the escape of one of the sons of the emperor, who fled to the court of Nizam Ally at Hyderabad. Little notice being taken of him, he repaired to Poona, where he was received with attention, but more to excite Sindia's jealousy than with any intention of affording to the fugitive assistance or relief.

These obstacles did not deter Mahadajee Sindia from pursuing his plans of independence. In detailing his political schemes and the progress of his conquests, we must not omit to notice the changes which he introduced in the constitution of his army. Amongst the minor innovations of Sindia may be enumerated the great proportion of Rajpoots and Mahomedans whom he enlisted; the alteration of the dress of his horsemen, who, from the short breeches worn by the Mahrattas, adopted the long trousers covering the heel,† and lastly, the large bodies of Gosacens whom he entertained, and who, until introduced by Sindia, had rarely appeared as

* Bengal Records, Francklin, Scott, and Mahratta MSS.

† This, to the mere European reader, may appear unimportant, but though not quite common among all Mahrattas, it tended, at that time, to make a difference between Sindia's horse and those of the Deccan; and, as the act of a Hindoo prince, was an important innovation.

soldiers in the Mahratta armies.* The Gosaeens were kept distinct by Sindia from his other troops, and were attached to the division of Ambajee Inglia, principally under a leader named Himmud Buhadur, who was both their military commander and their spiritual director, and whose history merits some digression.

Himmud Buhadur accompanied Sindia on his first advance to Delhi in 1784: he was left in charge of Muttra when Sindia retreated to Gwalior, and by means of a secret understanding, which he contrived to establish with Ismael Beg and Gholam Kawdir, he continued unmolested. Sindia, who knew that the sole object of Himmud Buhadur was to obtain a jagheer for himself from either of the contending parties, had, on a former occasion, in consequence of the Gosaeen's misconduct, resumed, and afterwards, on promised amendment, restored, the lands granted for the support of his followers; and although he pretended on his return to be highly satisfied with the Gosaeen for retaining possession of the jagheer, he determined to deprive him of it on the first opportunity. Sindia's chief causes of displeasure arose from finding that he was engaged in secret intrigues with Holkar and Ali Buhadur, the partizans of Nana Farnuwees; and that he persisted in an intercourse he had long kept up with the nabob vizier, in whose dominions he had at a former period sought refuge, when apprehensive of Sindia's enmity. At length, on pretence that the Gosaeen was employed in magical arts to take away his life, Sindia sent a party of troops who seized Himmud Buhadur at Muttra, and were conveying him to their master; but the camp of Ali Buhadur being contiguous to the road by which the prisoner was brought, he contrived to elude his guards, and gain the tent of Ali Buhadur before they could secure him. It was in vain that Sindia remonstrated; Ali Buhadur declared he could not surrender the person of Himmud Buhadur without an order from the Peishwa; and in the meantime, before any answer could be obtained from Poona, he connived at his escape to Lucknow.

The departure of the leader did not affect the great body of Gosaeens, as might have been the case at an earlier period; they remained with Sindia, and, being attached to his service by habit, became intermingled with the rest of his irregular infantry.

But the most important of all the changes introduced by Sindia was the well-organized regular force, which he about this time raised, by augmenting the two battalions of De Boigne into a brigade, which was subsequently, at different periods, increased to three brigades. A brigade consisted of eight battalions of 700 men each. Attached to every brigade there were 500 horse; and to each battalion five pieces of artillery, two six-pounders, two three-pounders, and a howitzer. To provide for the regular payment of these troops he made over assignments of land to the charge and management of De Boigne; to whom he allowed two per cent. upon the net revenue, independent of his regular pay, which was 10,000 rupees a month. A select body of irregular infantry was attached to De Boigne's force, to whose efficiency that officer greatly contributed by adding a bayonet to their matchlocks. The augmentation of De Boigne's army was gradual, as was his train of artillery, which consisted at last of upwards of 200 pieces of cannon of different calibres. Sixty of his best guns were cast by Mr. Sangster, the officer already mentioned, who quitted the service of the

* For some account of the Gosaeens, the reader may revert to the Preliminary Observations.

rana of Gohud, and entered that of Sindia, under De Boigne. His officers were Europeans of all nations; many of them British, and men very respectable by birth, education, and character.*

At the present conjuncture, in the commencement of the year 1790, Sindia had only raised one regular brigade. His immediate views were directed to conciliate Holkar and Ali Buhadur, with the hope of obtaining their assistance in checking the incursions of the Seiks; in humbling the Rajpoots, who continued in opposition to his authority; and in securing the dependence of Ismael Beg, who, it was apprehended, had serious intentions of joining the Rajpoots. His reasons for contemplating this fresh desertion are partly ascribable to the artifice of Holkar, who, in order to occasion a rupture between him and Sindia, plundered some of the villages in his new jagheer, which, though expressly contrary to Sindia's wishes and injunctions, was attributed by Ismael Beg to some inimical design on the part of that chief.† We shall, for the present, however, leave Mahratta affairs in Hindostan, and return to those of the Deccan.

* Palmer's despatches, General De Boigne.

† Sindia's letters.

CHAP. XXXIV.

FROM A. D. 1787 TO A. D. 1792.

Tippoo breaks the treaty with the Peishwa.—His great preparations—supposed by the English to be intended against them.—Nana Furnuwees proposes a defensive alliance, which is declined by Lord Cornwallis.—Transactions between the British authorities and Nizam Ally.—Guntoor given up.—Nizam Ally negotiates with the English and with Tippoo—results.—Lord Cornwallis's letter to Nizam Ally.—Tippoo considers that letter tantamount to an offensive alliance against him—His unsuccessful attack on the lines of Travancore.—Alliance of the English, the Peishwa, and Nizam Ally against Tippoo—its terms.—First campaign of the English in this war against Tippoo.—Dilatory proceedings of the allies.—A British detachment joins Pureshrum Bhow.—The Mahrattas cross the Kistna.—The Moghuls advance to lay siege to Kopauland Buhadur Benda.—The Mahrattas lay siege to Dharwar—operations—Dharwar capitulates after a protracted siege—Capitulation infringed.—Lord Cornwallis assumes command of the British army.—Capture of Bangalore.—Mahratta army marches from Poona under Hurry Punt Phurkay.—Sera surrendered.—The Mahratta armies advance to join the British and Moghuls before Seringapatam.—Lord Cornwallis defeats Tippoo at Arikeri, but is compelled to abandon his design of besieging Seringapatam.—Distress of his army—relieved by the unexpected junction of the Mahrattas.—Various operations.—A party of Mahrattas surprised and cut off by Kummur-ud-deen.—Lord Cornwallis reduces the forts between Bangalore and Gurumcondah.—The Moghuls, unable to reduce Gurumcondah, leave a party to mask it, which is surprised.—Pureshrum Bhow's scheme of reducing Bednore.—Battle of Simoga.—Admirable conduct of Captain Little.—Simoga capitulates.—Pureshrum Bhow advances towards Bednore, but retires with precipitation.—Operations at Seringapatam.—Peace concluded with Tippoo.—Cause of Pureshrum Bhow's retreat explained.—The armies return to their respective territories.—Distress of Pureshrum Bhow's army.

At the period when Sindia retreated to Gwalior, we have observed that
 A. D. 1787. one reason which prevented Nana Furnuwees from supporting him with troops from the Deccan proceeded from fresh aggressions on the part of Tippoo; in fact, the latter scarcely permitted Hurry Punt to recross the Kistna, when he retook Kittoor; and an army, assembled at Bednore, threatened a descent on the Mahratta territories in the Concan. As often happens with respect to the capricious conduct of the native princes of India, it is difficult to reconcile this procedure with the reasons which had so recently induced Tippoo to tender hasty proposals of peace. Some of the English, from the various rumours in circulation, concluded that it was a deception, contrived with the consent of Nana Furnuwees, preparatory to a general confederacy against

the British, in which the Mahrattas, Nizam Ally, Tippoo, and the French had become parties. In regard to the Mahrattas, there was no foundation for this supposition, but there was reason to believe that Tippoo had renewed his engagements with the French, and that his designs were more hostile to the British than to the Mahrattas; but he wished to conceal his real object until he could prepare his army, and obtain effectual assistance from France. Nana Furnuwees believed that the invasion of the Mahratta territories was his chief object; and, in the end of the year 1787, proposed to the governor-general, Lord Cornwallis, through Mr. Malet, to form, on the part of the Peishwa, a defensive alliance with the English, in order to control the overbearing and ambitious spirit of Tippoo. Lord Cornwallis, though impressed with a belief of the great importance of this offer, as essential to the safety of British India, was prohibited, by act of parliament, from accepting it, until Tippoo should break through his engagements by some unequivocal act or declaration of hostility. In declining it, therefore, he instructed Mr. Malet to offer general assurances of the sincere desire of the governor-general to cultivate the friendship of the Peishwa's government.

The reports of Tippoo's hostile intentions became less prevalent during the early part of 1788; and this apparent tranquillity afforded a favourable opportunity of carrying into effect the intentions of the governor-general respecting the district of Guntoor, which, by the treaty concluded with Nizam Ally in 1768, ought to have been ceded to the English upon the death of Busalut Jung in 1782. Captain Kennaway was the agent deputed for the purpose of obtaining its surrender; but the motive of his mission was kept secret until he could reach Hyderabad, and preparations be completed at Madras for supporting the demand. Soon after Captain Kennaway's departure from Calcutta, it was again confidently reported that Tippoo was engaged in hostile machinations; that an attack made upon Tellicherry, by the raja of Cherika, was at his instigation; and that he meditated the subjugation of the territories of the raja of Travancore, the ally of the English, which formed an important preliminary to the conquest of the British settlements in the south of India. Captain Kennaway, in consequence of these reports, was instructed to confine his immediate communications to general expressions of the great desire of the governor-general to maintain the most amicable understanding with the Soobeh of the Deccan in all affairs that might arise requiring adjustment. But soon after, as appearances bespoke no immediate hostility on the part of Tippoo, and Nizam Ally seemed disposed to settle everything with the British government in an equitable manner, the demand for Guntoor was made, and the district given over without impediment, and almost without hesitation, in September 1788. Notwithstanding his apparent readiness, Nizam Ally was greatly mortified at finding himself compelled to surrender Guntoor; but he was by this time sensible that, of the four great powers in India, his own was the weakest; and that, without a steadfast alliance with some one of the other three, his sovereignty must be swallowed up. The Mahrattas, from contiguity, and from their claims and peculiar policy, he most dreaded; personally, he was inclined to form an alliance with the Mahomedan ruler of Mysore; but some of his ministers, particularly Meer Abdool Kassim, in whom he had great confidence, strongly advised him to prefer a connection with the English, and endeavoured to show by what means the late concession might be made instrumental in effecting the

desired object. He proposed that, as the English had obtained possession of Guntoor, they should be called upon to fulfil those articles of the treaty of 1768, by which they had agreed to furnish the Hyderabad state with two battalions and six pieces of cannon, to reduce the territories of Tippoo, and to pay the Soobeh of the Deccan a certain annual tribute. Nizam Ally, acceding to these suggestions, despatched Meer Abdool Kassim to Calcutta, for the purpose of obtaining the concurrence of the governor-general. With his habitual duplicity, however, Nizam Ally at the same time sent another envoy* to Tippoo, proposing a strict and indissoluble union between the Mahomedan states, to which Tippoo declared his readiness to subscribe, on condition of an intermarriage in their families : but the Moghul haughtily rejected such a connection, and the negotiation terminated.

When the envoy deputed to Calcutta submitted his proposals, the governor-general found himself under considerable
A. D. 1789. embarrassment. No specific revisal of the political relations between the English and Nizam Ally had taken place since the treaty of 1768 ; but the treaty of Madras, between the English and Hyder in 1769, and that of Mangalore with Tippoo in 1784, had each recognised both father and son as lawful sovereigns of that territory ; of which, by the treaty with Nizam Ally in 1768, Hyder was declared usurper, and of which the English had then arrogated to themselves the certainty of a speedy reduction. The governor-general was, as already mentioned, prohibited by act of parliament from entering on any new treaty without express authority from the Court of Directors ; but he was particularly desirous of securing the alliance both of Nizam Ally and the Mahrattas, in consequence of his belief in Tippoo's hostile proceedings, already commencing by an attempt to subjugate Travancore, without appearing as a party in the aggression. The proposed alliance of the Mahrattas Lord Cornwallis had been constrained to decline ; but the danger which now more distinctly threatened, and the covert nature of Tippoo's operations, which precluded proofs wholly sufficient for legal justification, induced Lord Cornwallis to adopt a line of conduct more objectionable than an avowed defensive alliance. In reply to Meer Abdool Kassim's application, Lord Cornwallis explained the reason of his inability to perform that part of the treaty of 1768 which related to the conquest of the Carnatic Bala Ghaut ; but by a letter which he now wrote to Nizam Ally, which letter he declared equally binding as a treaty, he promised that should the English, at any future period, obtain possession of the territory in question, they would then perform their engagements to him, and to the Mahrattas. This promise certainly implied at least an eventual intention of subduing Tippoo, and that inference was strengthened by an explanation of a part of the treaty, relative to the two battalions, which was before equivocal. Instead of being furnished with these battalions, as before expressed, when they could be spared, they were now to be sent when required, and to be paid for, at the same rate as they cost the company, merely on condition that they were never to be employed against the allies of the British government. These allies were at the same time expressly named ; the Mahrattas were included, but Tippoo was omitted.

Tippoo considered this letter as a treaty of offensive alliance against him. He was now at less pains to conceal his intended invasion of

* His name was Hafiz Fureed-ud-deen Khan.

Travancore, and his unsuccessful attack on the lines, which he headed in person, was of course considered to be a declaration of war. Nana Furnuwees no sooner heard of it, than he made specific proposals to the governor-general, through

A. D. 1790. Mr. Malet, in name both of his own master and of Nizam Ally, which, with slight modifications, were accepted. A preliminary agreement was settled on the 29th March, and a treaty, offensive and defensive, was concluded at Poona, on the 1st June,

June 1. between Mr. Malet on the part of the company, and Nana Furnuwees on the part both of the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, by which these native powers stipulated that an army of 25,000 horse should attack Tippoo's northern possessions before and during the rains, and reduce as much as possible of his territory. That, after the rains, they should act against Tippoo with their utmost means, and, in case the governor-general should require the aid of 10,000 horse to co-operate with the English army, that number was also to be furnished within one month from the time of their being demanded, but maintained at the expense of the company's government. Both states were to be allowed two battalions, and their expense was to be defrayed by the Peishwa and Nizam Ally respectively, at the same rate as they cost the company. All conquests were to be equally shared, unless the English, by being first in the field, had reduced any part of the enemy's territory before the allied forces entered on the campaign, in which case the allies were to have no claim to any part of such acquisition. The polygars and zumeendars formerly dependent on the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, or those who had been unjustly deprived of their lands by Hyder and Tippoo, were to be reinstated in their territory on paying a *nuzur* at the time of their re-establishment, which should be equally divided among the confederates, but afterwards they were to be tributary to Nizam Ally and the Peishwa respectively. It was also stipulated that if, after the conclusion of peace, Tippoo should attack any of the contracting parties, the others became bound to unite against him.

The treaty was not finally concluded by Nizam Ally until the 4th July, as he hoped, by procrastination, to obtain the guarantee of the British government, not simply, as he pretended, to ensure protection to his territories from the Mahrattas during the absence of his troops on service, but to procure the interposition of the English in the settlement of the Mahratta claims, which even, where just, he had neither disposition nor ability to pay; and he foresaw that a day of reckoning was at no great distance. Lord Cornwallis, viewing the proposal simply as stated, could not accede to it without giving umbrage to the Mahrattas; but he assured Nizam Ally of his disposition to strengthen the connection between the two governments, when it could be effected consistently with good faith, and a due regard to subsisting engagements with other allies.

The first campaign of the English against Tippoo in this war was conducted by General Medows. It commenced on the 26th May 1790, and terminated by the return of the army to Madras on the 27th January 1791. The advantages obtained were by no means inconsiderable, but not so great as had been anticipated. General Medows, with the Madras army, invaded Tippoo's territory from the south, and reduced Caroor, Dindigul, Coimbatore, and Palghat; whilst Colonel Hartley,* with a

* This is the same officer with whom the reader is already well acquainted.

detachment of the Bombay army, assailed it from the west, gallantly attacked and routed a strong corps in the neighbourhood of Calicut, and, a reinforcement being brought from Bombay by General Sir Robert Abercromby, who assumed the command, the province of Malabar was soon cleared of Tippoo's troops.*

The Mahratta and Moghul armies had been declared ready to take the field before the march of General Medows in May; but Nizam Ally, as we have seen, did not finally sign the treaty till July, and Pureshrum Bhow Putwurdhun, the officer appointed to command the Mahratta

May 5. army, did not receive his commission to raise and equip his troops until 5th May, on which day he had his audience of leave from the Peishwa, and immediately set out for his own jagheer at Tasgaom, to make the necessary arrangements. The two battalions with their artillery,† which by the treaty the English had engaged to furnish, sailed from Bombay about the 20th May, disembark-

May 20—29. ed on the 29th at Sungumeshwur (the same place where Sumbhaje was made prisoner by the Moghuls upwards of a century before), and ascended the Ambah Ghaut by the 10th June, although the natural difficulties of that stupendous pass were much

June 10—18. increased by the setting in of the monsoon. On the 18th the detachment arrived at Koompta, a village within a few miles of Tasgaom, when the commander, Captain Little, found that not above 2,000 horse had as yet assembled. Two carcoons had been sent to meet and accompany the British detachment on its march from the coast, and the many artificial delays and difficulties raised by these Bramin conductors, to prolong the march, and conceal their want of preparation, were now explained. The dilatoriness of the Mahrattas appeared ambiguous to the English, especially as it was found that Tippoo's wukeels were still at Poona, where they were allowed to remain, as subsequently avowed by that court, in the vain hope that Tippoo would endeavour to purchase their neutrality; for, although the Mahrattas had really no intention of breaking their engagements with the English, this mode of obtaining a supply of money from a tributary who owed so much was by them considered wholly justifiable. On the 5th of August, how-

August 5—11. ever, the wukeels were finally dismissed, but Pureshrum Bhow did not cross the Kistna until the 11th; at which time, in addition to the British detachment, he had only 5,000 horse, and about one-third of that number of infantry. In the course of a few days he was joined by a body of horse belonging to the Pritee Needhee; and a separate body of 1,000 horse, whom it was at first proposed to attach exclusively to the British detachment, also joined, under a partizan officer named Dhondoo Punt Gokla, originally an agent superintending a part of the marine establishment at Vizidroog. His horse were not continued with the detachment as proposed; but the intention of thus employing them was the commencement of a connection between Gokla's family and the English, by whose influence Bappoo Gokla, the nephew of Dhondoo Punt, was raised to high rank at the Peishwa's court, where we shall ultimately see him, by no uncommon revolution, an active enemy of the British government.

* Bombay and Bengal Records, Colonel Wilks, &c.

† The 8th and 11th battalions of native infantry, one company of European artillery, and two companies of gun-lascars, with six field-pieces.

Hostilities on the part of the Mahrattas against Tippoo commenced on

August 25. the 25th August by an attack upon a fortified village, from which the Mahrattas expelled the garrison with trifling loss. As they advanced, the country was rapidly occupied. The inhabitants assisted to expel Tippoo's sebandees, but the latter were easily reconciled to a change of masters, enlisted with Pureshrum Bhow, and aided him in collecting the outstanding revenue. The Mahratta force, daily joined by small parties, soon amounted to 10,000 horse and 3,000 infantry, exclusive of Captain Little's detachment. With this army Pureshrum

September 18. Bhow arrived before Dharwar on the 18th September, and after much unnecessary exposure, and considerable loss in reconnoitring, commenced the siege by firing cannon from a great distance during the day, and withdrawing them at night—an absurd practice not unusual with Mahrattas.

In the Carnatic, south of the Toongbuddra, Tippoo had stationed two officers, Budr-ul-Zeman Khan and Kootub-ud-deen, at the head of about 5,000 men, a few of whom were cavalry, but the greater part regular infantry. The Moghuls, as the Mahrattas were proceeding towards Dharwar, moved from Pangul to cross the Kistna in order to besiege Kopaul and Buhadur Benda, on which Kootub-ud-deen, with the whole of the horse and a part of the infantry, advanced to observe their motions, whilst Budr-ul-Zeman threw himself into Dharwar. The defences of this fortress are principally of mud, and though irregular, and now greatly decayed, were then very strong. It is situated in a plain having an outer and an inner ditch from 25 to 30 feet wide, and nearly as many feet deep. Adjoining to the fort, on the south side, and outflanking it to the eastward, is a town or pettah, defended by a low mud wall, and a ditch of no strength. The garrison, on being reinforced, consisted of 7,000 regular and 3,000

October 30. irregular infantry. The first operation of any consequence was an attack on a party of the enemy who had advanced outside of the town, but were driven back with the loss of three guns and a considerable proportion of killed and wounded, principally from the fire of the British troops. By their exertions also the pettah was stormed and taken; Captain Little, the commander, and Lieutenant Forster were the first who mounted the wall, and both were wounded, the former severely, the latter mortally. This acquisition, which cost the British detachment 62 men in killed and wounded, was made over to a body of Mahrattas under Appa Sahib, the son of Pureshrum Bhow; but no sooner had the British returned to their camp, than the garrison sallied, and a very severe conflict ensued in the pettah; 500 Mahrattas were killed, and a still greater number of the garrison. Although the advantage was rather on the side of the Mahrattas, Appa Sahib withdrew his troops to camp, and permitted the garrison to re-occupy the town. After a truce, in order to allow each party to burn and bury their dead, the Mahrattas, who were ashamed again to call in the aid of the British detachment,

December 18. attacked and retook the pettah themselves. The feeble and absurd operations, however, which generally distinguish Mahratta sieges, were never more conspicuous than on the present occasion. It must ever be a reflection upon those under whose orders the auxiliary force from Bombay was equipped, that there was no efficient battering train to assist the operations of the Mahrattas, whose aid, if so supplied, might have contributed much more to the success of the war. In the first instance it was excusable, because it might have been expected that the Mahrattas, if unprepared with battering cannon, would not

employ themselves in sieges; but Captain Little had early represented how necessary it became to send some heavy guns, ammunition, and stores, not merely to save the credit of the British arms, but to ensure some useful co-operation on the part of their Mahratta allies. No battering train was sent, but a battalion of Europeans and another native corps were despatched under Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick; who arrived in camp, before Dharwar, on the 28th December, and assumed command of the British force.

Every possible exertion was made by Colonel Frederick. Pureshram Bhow's artillery was manned by Europeans, but the guns were old, clumsy, and nearly unserviceable; so scanty was the supply of ammunition, that they were frequently silent for days together, and the garrison, on these occasions, never failed to make a complete repair in the intended breach. A considerable quantity of powder was at length obtained, but a prospect of its being again wholly

February 7. expended, induced Colonel Frederick to attempt the assault before the breach was entirely practicable. He would probably have succeeded; but at the moment when the troops were to pass the ditch, the fascines, which they had thrown into it, were set on fire, and so rapidly consumed, that it became necessary to retire to the trenches. In this attempt the British detachment lost 85 men. The chagrin occasioned by failure, followed by a series of harassing delays, operating on an ardent mind and a debilitated constitution, proved fatal

March 18. to Colonel Frederick, who died on the 13th March, and was succeeded in the command of the detachment by Major Sartorius. Materials were furnished so sparingly that little impression was made by the batteries; but the Mahrattas carried on the approaches after their own manner, by running trenches and digging mines under the glacis. Frequent sallies, with various success, were made by the garrison; at length, after a protracted siege of 29 weeks, a lodgment having been effected by the Mahrattas and the English on the crest of the glacis, the brave veteran Budr-ul-Zeman Khan capitulated. The troops, with all the honors of war, were allowed to march out of the fortress, which was taken

April 4. possession of by the confederates on the 4th of April. But the late garrison had only moved a short distance, when they were attacked by the Mahrattas, the greater part of them dispersed, and their commandant wounded, overpowered, and, with several others, made prisoner. It appears that Budr-ul-Zeman Khan had stipulated to surrender the fort, ammunition, and stores in their actual condition; but the Mahrattas, having discovered that he had destroyed them after the capitulation was made, upbraided him with his want of faith, and accused Hyder, Tippoo, and himself of habitual violation of their engagements, particularly in regard to Gooty and Nurgoond. Their accusations were just; but Budr-ul-Zeman Khan, enraged at the insult, drew his sword, and his troops followed his example; the result of the fray proved as above related. Though the circumstances may induce us to believe that there was no premeditated treachery, the subsequent confinement of Budr-ul-Zeman Khan and several other prisoners reflects discredit on the conduct of Pureshram Bhow.*

Before the fall of Dharwar, the British army had been some time in the field. Its first campaign against Tippoo in this war terminated, as we have

* Narrative of Captain Little's detachment, Wilks, Moor, Bombay Records, Mahratta MSS. and letters.

already briefly mentioned, on the 27th January. On the 29th of the same month Lord Cornwallis assumed the command of the army, and marched, on the 5th February, towards Nellore, where he concentrated his forces, and advanced to Bangalore, which he invested on the 5th March, and carried it by assault on the night of the 21st of that month. This success tended to discourage the enemy, and stimulate the allies to exertion. The fall of Bangalore had some share in influencing the surrender of Dharwar, and also of Kopaul, besieged by the Moghuls, which was shortly afterwards given up, as was Buhadur Benda. The Moghuls, according to the treaty, were supported by two battalions of Madras native infantry, in the same manner as the Mahrattas were aided from Bombay. An army of 30,000 Mahrattas,

A. D. 1791. of which 25,000 were horse, marched from Poona, on the 1st January, under the command of Hurry Punt Phurkay ; advanced by Punderpoor and Sorapoor, forded the Kistna where it is joined by the Beema, and proceeded to Geddawal, whence Hurry Punt directed the main body of his army to continue its route to Kurnoul, whilst he proceeded to Paungul, with an escort of 2,000 cavalry, for the purpose of conferring personally with Nizam Ally, whose court was then held at that frontier position, whence he affected to direct the operations of his field army. At this conference it was agreed by Nizam Ally, and by Hurry Punt on the part of his master the Peishwa, that they should abide by the terms of the treaty with the English, but only so far as might humble Tippoo, without absolutely annihilating his power. After the interview, Hurry Punt joined his army at Kurnoul, where he remained some time, until, hearing of the capture of Bangalore, he sent forward 10,000 horse with orders to endeavour to join Lord Cornwallis, in which he had been anticipated by the Moghuls, a body of that strength having effected a junction with the English army on the 13th of April, after routing the party of Kootub-ud-deen, which we had occasion to mention before the siege of Dharwar. But the Mahrattas, on arriving some days afterwards at Anuntpoor, found that Lord Cornwallis had advanced towards Seringapatam. They therefore halted until joined by Hurry Punt with the main army, when the whole moved on to Sera. It having occurred to the Mahratta commander to try the effect of summoning the place, Sera was most unexpectedly surrendered, and found full of stores and in high order. This success induced Hurry Punt to detach a party under Bulwunt Soob Rao to besiege Mudgeery, situated 20 miles to the east of Sera ; after which, leaving a strong garrison in his new acquisition, he proceeded to join the army at Seringapatam.* The other Mahratta army, acting on the north-western quarter of Tippoo's territory, whose operations before Dharwar have been detailed, was now also advancing by orders from Hurry Punt towards Seringapatam. After the termination of the siege of Dharwar, a part of the British detachment was recalled to Bombay, and Captain Little, with three native battalions, the two with which he entered on the campaign having been much weakened by casualties, continued with Pureshram Bhow. The possession of Dharwar, and the forts taken by the Moghuls, gave the allies a strong hold on the country situated between the Kistna and Toongbuddra ; Kooshgul, and several other places of less note, surrendered to Pureshram Bhow at the first summons ; and the occupation of the country, with the consequent realization of revenue, became so inviting to the Mahratta general, that he soon evinced a greater care of his own interests than those

* Hurry Punt's despatches.

of the confederacy. It was recommended that he should join the Bombay army under General Abercromby, then on its march from Malabar towards the capital of Mysore, through the territory of a friendly chieftain, the raja of Koorg. The Mahratta army, under Pureshram Bhow, had been greatly increased during the siege of Dharwar; he crossed the Toong-buddra on the 22nd April, and arrived within 24 miles of Chittledroog on the 29th of that month. Several fortified towns surrendered without resistance, and Mycondah was besieged by a detachment from his army; but when urged by Captain Little to advance in the direction by which General Abercromby was expected, or send on a part of his troops, he objected to it as unsafe, and continued his system of collecting from the surrounding country, until summoned by Hurry Punt to accompany him to Seringapatam.* Whilst Hurry Punt marched south-west, Pureshram Bhow moved south-east. Their armies were united at Nagmungulum on the 24th of May, and on the ensuing day they advanced to Mailcotta. But although thus near the capital, where they knew their allies were encamped, they had not been able to convey any intimation of their approach to Lord Cornwallis, as every letter was intercepted by the admirable activity of Tippoo's mounted Beruds. This circumstance is considered very discreditable to Hurry Punt and Pureshram Bhow by their own countrymen; and it was matter of most serious regret to Lord Cornwallis that he had remained ignorant of their approach.

After the Moghul cavalry joined him, as already noticed, Lord Cornwallis resolved to undertake the siege of Seringapatam, and directed General Abercromby to move forward from the westward, for the purpose of joining him at that capital. As the grand army advanced from the northward, Tippoo burnt the villages, destroyed the forage, and drove off both the inhabitants and their cattle, so that the space on which the army moved was a desert, and the condition of its cattle and horses soon

proved the efficacy of this mode of defence. On the 15th May, Tippoo made a stand at Arikera, but was defeated; and on the 19th Lord Cornwallis encamped at Caniambaddy, to the west of Seringapatam. But the battle he had gained on the 15th, and his position at the gates of the capital, were advantages more than counterbalanced by the state of his cattle, and the alarming scarcity which prevailed in his camp. The want of forage and provisions, aggravated by the presence of the useless and wasteful Moghul horse, soon became so much felt, that, combined with the lateness of the season, Lord Cornwallis abandoned all hope of being able to reduce Seringapatam before the monsoon; he therefore sent orders to General Abercromby to return to Malabar, destroyed his own battering guns and heavy stores, raised the siege, and on the 26th May marched towards Mailcotta, from which place the Mahrattas had also moved that morning. Great was the surprise of the English army when large bodies of horse were seen advancing, of whose approach they had no intimation. Conceiving them to be enemies, preparations were at first made to treat them as such; but their real character was soon discovered, and, though not unclouded with regret and disappointment, their arrival was hailed with great joy, as the ample supplies of the Mahratta bazars afforded immediate relief to the famished camp. That we may not unjustly detract from the merit of the Mahratta commanders, as they have been accused of self-interested

* Mahratta MSS. and letters, Captain Little's despatches, &c.

motives in the readiness with which they permitted their bazar followers to sell to all comers, it is proper to mention that, though their followers took advantage of the period to raise the price of grain, their own troops suffered by the scarcity which for a few days ensued. Hurry Punt's despatches evince a very humane and laudable anxiety to alleviate the distress of his allies. The junction of the Mahrattas near the spot where Trimbuck Rao Mama had gained the victory over Hyder in 1771, was considered by them an omen particularly propitious.

The confederate armies remained for ten days in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, in order to allow time for the convoys of grain, expected by the Mahrattas, to join the camp, after which the whole moved to Nagmungulum. Hurry Punt proposed that they should proceed to Sera, and take possession of the whole country between that place and the Kistna. Lord Cornwallis, however, considered it of prior importance to reduce the Baramahal, and country in the neighbourhood of Bangalore, in order to facilitate the approach of the necessary supplies from Madras. Hurry Punt urged similar reasons in support of his own proposal, and was naturally seconded by the Moghuls; but as both depended on the English artillery and military stores, they yielded to the wishes of the governor-general. The army moved forward by very slow marches, necessary to the English from the exhausted state of their cattle, and the motions of the confederates were regulated accordingly. The fort of Oosoor was evacuated on the approach of the grand army. Pureshrum Bhow, accompanied by Captain Little's battalions, was detached towards Sera, for the purpose of keeping open the northern communication, and overaweing the country which had already submitted. Nidjigul surrendered to Pureshrum Bhow, and the killidar of Davaraydroog promised to give it up, provided a part of the British detachment was sent to take possession; but, on approaching the fort, they were fired upon, and as Pureshrum Bhow had not the means of reducing it, he burnt the pettah in revenge, and proceeded to Sera. Being desirous of returning to the north-west, he assigned want of forage as a reason for hastily withdrawing to Chittledroog, where he surprised and cut off 300 of its garrison, who happened to be outside, and neglected to seek timely protection in the fort. Pureshrum Bhow long indulged hopes of obtaining possession of this stronghold by seducing the garrison; but all his attempts proved abortive; he, however, took several fortified places in its vicinity.

With regard to the operations of the other troops at a distance from the grand army, Bulwunt Soob Rao, the officer sent by Hurry Punt to besiege Mudgeery, did not succeed in gaining possession of it, but he left a detachment in the pettah, and went on to Makeledroog, Bhusmag, and Ruttengerry, of all which he took possession.* The army of Nizam Ally, with the two Madras battalions which continued to the northward, took Gandicottah on the Pennar, and laid siege to Gurrumcondah.

The operations of Lord Cornwallis, after his retreat from Seringapatam, until the season should admit of his renewing the siege, were chiefly in the Baramahal, the whole of which he reduced, except the strong hill-fort of Kistnagheery, which he intended to blockade, but previous to this arrangement, one of Tippoo's detachments, under Kummur-ud-deen, having surprised and cut off the party of Mahrattas left by Bulwunt Soob Rao at Mudgeery, the report of this circumstance was magnified into the total defeat and dispersion of Pureshrum Bhow's army, and induced Lord

* Hurry Punt's despatches.

Cornwallis to proceed to Bangalore without forming the intended blockade. After hearing the true state of the case, he resolved on reducing the forts between Bangalore and Gurrumcondah, in the siege of which last the Moghul troops were still occupied. The whole tract soon fell, and, amongst other places of strength, the hill-fort of Nundidroog, when a part of the battering train used in its reduction was sent off to assist the Moghuls at Gurrumcondah, whither also most of their horse repaired.

By the beginning of December Lord Cornwallis's army had assembled at Bangalore, and might have advanced to Seringapatam, but the Bombay troops had a difficult march to perform before they could join; and Pureshrum Bhow, though directed to be prepared to support their advance, remained on pretence of sickness near Chittledroog. The Moghuls loitered with the camp at Gurrumcondah; and although Hurry Punt continued with Lord Cornwallis, the greater part of his troops were dispersed on various pretexts, but in reality to occupy the districts, and to collect as much money as they could. As circumstances thus detained Lord Cornwallis from the main object of reducing the capital, he in the meantime laid siege to the forts in his route. Savendroog and Outradroog were taken; Ramgheery, Shevingheery, and Hooliandroog surrendered.

The Moghul army, after months spent before Gurrumcondah in a series of operations still more feeble than those of the Mahrattas before Dharwar, were at length put in possession of the lower fort by the exertions of Captain Read, the officer who had succeeded to the command of the English detachment.* The Moghuls having resigned all hope of reducing the upper fort, being anxious to join in the siege of Seringapatam, determined to mask it, and for that purpose a considerable body of troops was left under Hafiz Fureed-ud-deen Khan, a part of whom, under his personal command, he kept in the lower fort, and a small body was encamped at a little distance on the south side, under the orders of Azim Khan, the son of the nabob of Kurnoul, and a Frenchman who had assumed the name of Smith. These arrangements being completed, the main body moved on with the intention of joining Lord Cornwallis, but they were speedily recalled in consequence of an unexpected attack on the blockading party, many of whom were killed, and Hafiz Fureed-ud-deen having been made prisoner, was basely murdered from motives of revenge, he having been the envoy through whom the proffer of marriage on the part of Tippoo was sent, which was indignantly refused by Nizam Ally. The Frenchman Smith was also taken and put to death. On the return of the main body of the Moghuls, Tippoo's troops, who were headed by his eldest son Futih Hyder, retired and left the Moghuls to strengthen their party in the lower fort.† This arrangement being again completed, the Moghul army moved on, and joined Lord Cornwallis at Outradroog on the 25th January 1792.

We have noticed the delay of the Mahratta commanders in collecting their detachments, and in engaging actively with the English in the operations against the capital. The object of Hurry Punt was obviously plunder, but that of Pureshrum Bhow extended to the long-meditated Mahratta scheme of obtaining possession of the district of Bednore. Pureshrum Bhow conceived that the present opportunity, whilst aided by a body of British troops at his absolute disposal, was too favourable to be

* Bombay Records, Colonel Wilks.

† Letter from Lieutenant Stewart, 1st assistant to the resident at Hyderabad.

omitted. Though fully informed by Lord Cornwallis of the general plan of operations, in which he was requested to co-operate, he no sooner saw the English army engaged in besieging the fortresses already mentioned, on its route towards Seringapatam, than he directed his march straight towards Bednore. Hooley Onore having been assaulted and taken by the

December 21. British detachment, the Mahratta general continued his advance along the left bank of the Toong, intending to reduce the fort of Simoga. But at that place, besides the regular garrison, there was a force consisting of 7,000 infantry, 800 horse, and 10 guns, under the command of Reza Sahib, one of Tippoo's relations, who, on the approach of the Mahrattas, either from not deeming his position advantageous, or with a view to attack Pureshram Bhow when engaged in the siege, quitted his entrenchments close to the walls of the fort, and took post in a thick jungle a few miles to the south-west of it. His position was uncommonly strong, having the river Toong on his right, a steep hill covered with impenetrable underwood on his left, and his front protected and concealed both by underwood and a deep ravine, full of tall and close bamboos, than which no trees form a stronger defence. One road only ran through this position, but it was more clear and open to the rear.

December 29. Pureshram Bhow came in sight of the fort on the morning of the 29th December; but, instead of attacking, made a considerable circuit to avoid it, and continued his route towards the position occupied by Reza Sahib. Having arrived in its neighbourhood, the main army took up its ground of encampment; but Appa Sahib advanced towards the enemy with a body of cavalry. Pureshram Bhow requested of Captain Little to leave eight companies for the protection of the camp, and move on with the rest of the battalions to support his son, which he immediately did. The closeness of the country rendered the attack of cavalry impracticable; and Captain Little's three battalions on this memorable occasion mustered about 800 bayonets! Notwithstanding the comparative insignificance of his numbers, he did not hesitate in moving down on the enemy's position, the irregular infantry of the Mahrattas following in his rear. Captain Little, for the purpose of ascertaining the manner in which the enemy was posted, and aware of the advantage of keeping his strength in reserve in such a situation, went forward with one battalion; and, as the fire opened, he directed two companies to advance on the enemy's right and two other companies to attack their left, whilst the rest were engaged with the centre. Every attempt to penetrate into the jungle was warmly opposed, but the enemy's right seemed the point most assailable, though defended with obstinacy. Two companies were sent to reinforce the two engaged on the right; but Lieutenants Doolan and Bethune, who led them, were wounded successively. The grenadier company under Lieutenant Moor* was sent to their support; that officer also fell disabled. Six companies of the 11th battalion were then brought forward, and Brigadier Major Ross, who directed them, was killed. The sepoy repeatedly penetrated a short distance into the jungle; but most of their European officers being wounded, they could not keep their ground. The Mahratta infantry, on every advance, rushed forward tumultuously, but were driven back in disorderly flight, which only added to the general slaughter, and contributed to the confusion of the regular infantry; but Captain Little, watching the

* Author of the interesting narrative of the operations of Captain Little's detachment.

opportunities when his men's minds required support, with that admirable judgment and gallantry which have, on so many occasions, distinguished the officers of British sepoys, rallied, cheered, and re-animated them; sent on parts of the reserve, and continued the apparently unequal struggle with steady resolution. At last the whole reserve was ordered up; the action continued with fresh spirit, and a small party got through the jungle into the enemy's camp. Captain Little, who immediately perceived the importance of this advantage, skilfully prepared a strong body to support them. This reinforcement he headed in person, and arrived in time to secure the retreat of the small advanced party which had given way on their officer being wounded, and were completely overpowered and flying; rallying, however, at Captain Little's word, and seeing themselves seconded, they turned on their pursuers with fresh energy. The enemy began to waver. The whole detachment was ordered to press forward. Captain Thomson, of the artillery, and the few European officers that remained, imitating the example of their gallant commander, led on with the greatest animation, drove the enemy from every point, and thus gained this well-fought battle. The Mahrattas rushed forward with their usual avidity to share the plunder, and were useful in the pursuit, which Captain Little continued in the most persevering manner, until he had taken every one of the guns, and rendered his victory as dispiriting and injurious to the enemy, as it was creditable and cheering to his own party.

The whole conduct of Captain Little on this occasion was most exemplary: it reminds us of the generalship of Lawrence or of Clive, and of itself entitles him to a very respectable rank in the military annals of British India. Of the small number of British troops engaged, 60 were killed and wounded, and the loss would have been much greater, but for the judicious conduct of their commander, who exposed them as little as possible until he knew where their strength could be exerted with effect. The Mahrattas, though they contributed but little to the success of the day, lost about 500 men. The fort of Simoga

A. D. 1792. did not long hold out after the defeat of the covering army; it surrendered to Captain Little on the 2nd January, and it was to him a very humiliating circumstance that he was compelled to place the principal officers at the disposal of Pureshrum Bhow, who, contrary to the terms of capitulation, detained them in the same manner as he had kept Budr-ul-Zeman Khan.

Some time was spent in making arrangements for the occupation of the country about Simoga; but, towards the middle of January, Pureshrum Bhow, to complete his design, advanced through the woods in the direction of Bednore, which he reached on the 28th, and was preparing to invest it, when, for reasons which will be hereafter explained, he suddenly retreated, and, after returning to Simoga, took the straight route towards Seringapatam.* Lord Cornwallis, accompanied by Hurry Punt and the son of Nizam Ally, Sikundur Jah, arrived with the combined army before Tippoo's capital on the 5th February. On the following day, the well-concerted and brilliant attack made by the English on his camp within the bound hedge, put the allies in possession of the whole of the outworks, and immediate preparations were made for commencing the siege. General Abercromby's division joined on the 16th, and materially contributed to forward the operations, particularly by the gallant repulse of Tippoo's attack on their advanced position on the 22nd of February.

* Moor, Wilks, Mahratta MSS. and letters.

Tippoo repeatedly endeavoured to open negotiations ; but his first overtures were for various reasons considered inadmissible ; at last, in consequence of the more becoming form and tone of his proposals, together with the intercession of the allies, particularly of Hurry Punt, two wukeels, Gholam Ali and Ali Reza, were admitted to an audience on the 14th February, whilst, in the meantime, the attack and defence were going forward as if no peace had been meditated. The wukeels were met by three agents appointed by the allies respectively—Sir John Kennaway on the part of Lord Cornwallis, Buchajee Rugonath on that of Hurry Punt, and Meer Abdool Kassim, now distinguished by his title of Meer Alum, in behalf of Sikundur Jah. After considerable discussion, and many references by the wukeels to their master, Tippoo on the 23rd February, the day after his unsuccessful attack on General Abercromby's division, consented to cede half the territory which he possessed before the war ; to pay three crores and 30,000 rupees, one-half immediately, and the rest by three equal instalments within a year ; to release all persons made prisoners from the time of Hyder Ally, and to deliver two of his sons as hostages for the due performance of the conditions. An armistice had taken place for two days, the hostages had already arrived in the English camp, upwards of one crore of rupees of the money had been paid, and the definitive treaty on the point of being concluded, when Tippoo, who appears to have at first overlooked the circumstance, finding that the principality of Koorg was included in the list of cessions, loudly remonstrated against yielding what he termed equivalent to the surrender of one of the gates of Seringapatam. Appearances indicated his determination to break the truce, but the prompt measures adopted by Lord Cornwallis for renewing the siege, and his declared resolution to give up none of the advantages already secured, induced Tippoo to reflect on the consequences, and finally to sign the treaty.

Without reference to the condition of the former dependents of the Peishwa and Nizam Ally, or to that clause which secured a greater advantage to the party first in the field, the allies received an equal share of the districts ceded by Tippoo, amounting annually to about 40 lakhs of rupees to each.

The share of the Mahrattas lay principally between the Wurdah and Kistna ; it also included the valley of Sondoor near Bellary, which was still in possession of the Ghorepuray family. The portion allotted to Nizam Ally included Gooty and Kurpa, with the districts between the Kistna and Toongbuddra, of which Moodgul, Kannikgeeree, and Kopaui may be considered the western boundary, with the exception of a small district about Anagoondy, which Tippoo retained. Dindigul, Baramahal, Koorg, and Malabar were assigned to the English.

We now return to explain the cause of Pureshrum Bhow's sudden retreat from Bednore, which was occasioned by his learning that Kummur-ud-deen had marched from Seringapatam with a strong force of infantry, for the purpose of entrapping him in the woods, and, although success would have more than excused his proceedings at the Poona court, his failure, should he be afterwards hemmed in, would have ruined both himself and his army ; for Nana Furnuwees, though he at first took little notice of the Bhow's intention, no sooner found that it was generally understood, than he ordered him to desist, and proceed to Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis, after he laid siege to that fortress, had pressing written to Pureshrum Bhow, describing the manner in which

he had invested it, and pointing out the essential service that might be rendered by his cavalry if posted on the south face of the fortress ; but Pureshrum Bhow disregarded the application, until he received the information already mentioned. By the time, however, that he reached Seringapatam, the armistice was signed ; and although Lord Cornwallis scarcely noticed his faithless conduct, it has been a theme of just censure ; nor can Nana Furnuwees be exempted from a share of blame, for when urged by Mr. Malet to expedite the Bhow's advance to the capital, he started difficulties as to the scarcity which his junction would occasion in the grand army, and would no doubt have been well pleased to effect a conquest which had been a favourite object with his great master, the first Mahdoo Rao.

By the end of march, after the usual interchange of civilities, the commanders of the allied armies had put their troops in motion towards their respective frontiers. Hurry Punt returned by the eastern route to Poona, where he arrived on the 25th May ; but Pureshrum Bhow remained with the heavy baggage and stores, which, together with his own artillery and 17 battering guns presented by Lord Cornwallis to the Peishwa, greatly retarded his progress. The devastation committed by his own troops on their advance rendered grain and forage extremely scarce, and the heat and drought of the season, together with the active annoyance which, notwithstanding the peace, he continued to experience from Tippoo's Beruds and Pindharees, combined to render Pureshrum Bhow's march from Seringapatam to the Toongbuddra one of the most distressing the Mahrattas ever experienced. Captain Little's detachment fortunately escaped the severe privations to which Pureshrum Bhow's army was subjected, by having been directed to join General Abercromby's army, which marched to Malabar, and embarked at Cannanore for Bombay.*

* Mahratta and English Records, Wilks, Moor, &c., &c.

CHAP. XXXV.

FROM A. D. 1792 TO A. D. 1794.

An inquiry into the reasons which induced Lord Cornwallis to refrain from subjugating Tippoo's territory is foreign to the object of this work—Opinion of the Mahratta ministers on this subject.—Mahadajee Sindia's proposals at the time of forming the confederacy against Tippoo, to which Sindia did not become a party.—Sindia's proceedings in Hindostan.—Battle of Patun.—Ismael Beg defeated.—Rajpoots continue the war—battle of Mairta—peace with the Rajpoots.—The regular infantry of De Boigne.—Holkar entertains the Chevalier Dudenec, and raises some regular corps.—Ali Buhadur, assisted by Himmud Buhadur, establishes himself in Bundelcund.—Sindia moves towards Poona.—Surmises with regard to his intentions.—Declares that he is proceeding as bearer of the insignia of office for the wukeel-i-mootlug from the emperor to the Peishwa.—Grand state ceremony on presenting the insignia.—Sindia endeavours by various ways to gain the confidence of the young Peishwa to the prejudice of Nana Furnuwees.—Discussions respecting the affairs of Hindostan.—Ismael Beg again raises disturbances, but is taken prisoner and confined for life in the fort of Agra.—The troops of Sindia and Holkar commit hostilities against each other—obstinate battle of Lukhaires—Sindia's troops victorious.—Consequences at Poona.—Hostilities suspended in Hindostan by orders from the Peishwa and Sindia—the latter all-powerful in Hindostan.—His attempts to render himself popular in the Deccan—perseveres in his endeavours to supersede Nana Furnuwees in the young Peishwa's favour.—Remarkable explanation betwixt the Peishwa and Nana.—Views of Mahadajee Sindia—his death.

AN enquiry into the reasons which induced Lord Cornwallis to refrain from the entire subjugation of Tippoo's territory is foreign to the object of this work ; it is only necessary to observe that even Nana Furnuwees and Pureshrum Bhow, the parties in the Mahratta state most inimical to Tippoo, were averse to the total overthrow of the Mysore state, and Mahadajee Sindia was decidedly hostile to that course of policy. The Mahrattas, who are not sensible of the effect which may operate on British authorities from the influence of public opinion in England, attribute the moderation shown by the governor-general to the representations of Hurry Punt Phurkay.*

At the period when Lord Cornwallis was negotiating the alliance against Tippoo, he instructed Major Palmer, the resident with Sindia, to request, both of Sindia and Holkar, to use their influence at Poona in effecting the desired connection between the Peishwa and the British government. Sindia offered to unite in the confederacy against Tippoo, provided two battalions similar to those granted to Nizam Ally were sent to join the army, with which he proposed to march to the southward ;

* Mahrattas MSS., Hurry Punt's letters.

and that the British government should become bound to protect his territory in Hindostan during his absence. These proposals being considered inadmissible, he refused to become a party to the treaty of Poona.*

We left Mahadajee Sindia, in the early part of 1790, endeavouring to conciliate his coadjutors, intent on humbling the Rajpoots, securing the dependency of Ismael Beg, and preventing the incursions of the Seiks. A temporary adjustment with Holkar and Ali Buhadur enabled him to prepare for opposing Ismael Beg, whose hostile intentions soon became unequivocal, and the Rajpoot rajas of Jeypoor and Joudpoor were pouring succours into his camp. Sindia, before risking a battle, endeavoured, with some success, to corrupt the regular troops with Ismael Beg, and at last

June 20. ordered Gopaul Rao Bhow, Luckwa Dada, and De Boigne to attack his camp near Patun, at a point which was left undefended by a body of troops whom Sindia had secured in his interest; but, notwithstanding this advantage, Sindia's officers being disappointed in the promised aid of Holkar, who stood aloof during the engagement, the utmost exertion was necessary to ensure success. Ismael Beg fought with his usual bravery, and a body of his Patans thrice charged through the regular infantry of the Mahrattas, cutting down the artillerymen at their guns. De Boigne displayed great personal energy on this occasion, and to his gallantry, and the discipline of his battalions, was justly attributed the great victory which ensued. Numbers fell on both sides,† but the army of Ismael Beg was completely routed, and that chieftain fled with a small retinue from the field of battle to the gates of Jeypoor. All his guns were taken, and 10 battalions of infantry grounded their arms and surrendered.

The Rajpoots, however, still maintained the war, and a

A. D. 1791. second battle took place at Mairta, in the Joudpoor territory, where they allowed themselves to be surprised by De Boigne at dawn of day on the 12th September; and although 400

September 12. Rahlure cavalry made desperate efforts to reanimate their friends and allow them to recover themselves, the general confusion was irretrievable. It was supposed that Sindia would have completely subjugated the Rajpoots, but the opposition and dissensions to

A. D. 1792. which he was exposed from his colleagues, Holkar and Ali Buhadur, induced him to grant them peace on their promising to pay a moderate tribute annually.‡

The force of De Boigne was now gradually augmented to 18,000 regular infantry, 6,000 irregulars, Nujeebs and Rohillahs, 2,000 irregular horse, and 600 Persian cavalry. This last body was mounted, clothed, armed, and disciplined by De Boigne, to whom all the horses of it belonged. Districts in the Dooab yielding 22 lakhs of rupees of net revenue were assigned for the support of this force, and the fortress of Agra was given up as a depôt of small arms and cannon; of the latter De Boigne had upwards of 200 serviceable pieces.§ Sindia affected to consider this force as part of the emperor's establishment, and denominated them the imperial army: but such a flimsy veil was not calculated to deceive the watchful eye of his rivals, and Holkar, in particular, saw the

* Bengal Records.

† One translation of a native newspaper in the Bengal Records says 11,000 or 12,000 of the Mahrattas were killed.

‡ Mahratta letters and MSS., Palmer's despatches, Indian newspaper, and General De Boigne.

§ General De Boigne.

growth of his power with rancorous jealousy. He retired across the Chambul, and entertained in his service the Chevalier Durenec, a Frenchman, who raised and disciplined four battalions, the first troops of that description which the family of Holkar had ever used.

Ali Buhadur, at the suggestion of Himmudt Buhadur, undertook the conquest of Bundelcund, in which province, after a long struggle, they succeeded in establishing themselves, but found infinite difficulty in reducing the country, and were perpetually involved in warfare and insurrection.

Whilst Sindia was engaged in contentions with his colleagues, he frequently declared his intention of repairing to Poona for the purpose of obtaining their recal; but Nana's policy in supporting Holkar was well known, and Sindia's situation was deemed too insecure to admit of his venturing on an excursion so distant. When he therefore moved towards Oujein, and actually commenced his march for Poona, various were the conjectures which ensued. Some considered that, jealous of the increasing power of the British, and their influence at Poona and Hyderabad, his views were directed to the establishment of his own authority at Poona, for the purpose of preventing the ascendancy, which it seemed probable they would obtain, especially if Tippoo's dominions were conquered and partitioned. Others supposed that he had views on the territory of Nizam Ally, and some believed that his sole object was to prevent the interference of Holkar in his late acquisitions in Hindostan.

It is probable there was some foundation for all these surmises; certain it is that he had in view the control of the Bramins, and the establishment of his own authority at the Peishwa's capital. After the battle of Patan in June 1790, he obtained from the emperor, for the third time, patents constituting the Peishwa wukeel-i-mootlug, but which was now to descend to him as a hereditary office in unalienable *enam*, on condition, however, of appointing Sindia and his posterity his perpetual deputies. In order, therefore, to exhibit to his countrymen his absolute power over the imperial house of Timour, for which the Mahrattas in the Deccan had long a habitual respect, and to gratify the feelings of all Hindoos, the emperor invested Sindia with the right of selecting his heir from among his sons, and issued an edict forbidding the slaughter of bullocks and cows throughout the Mohul dominions.

Sindia's march to the southward was very slow; and he often appeared as if deliberating whether he might venture so far from his own territory. He gave out that he was proceeding to Poona by the emperor's orders, as bearer of the sunnuds and insignia of the office of wukeel-i-mootlug for the Peishwa. On his arrival at Bheer, near the Godavery, charged with such commissions from the emperor, he made some demands on Nizam Ally, the nature of which is not ascertained; but he endeavoured to induce him to make him a present of the fertile district of Bheer, and bestow Aurungabad on the Peishwa. On being refused, he pretended to be much hurt at his want of courtesy.

Nana Furnuwees long doubted whether Sindia would actually come into the Deccan; but on being assured that he was on his route from Burhanpoor, he applied to Lord Cornwallis, through Hurry Punt Phurkay, for the permanent services of Captain Little's detachment, which in the name of the Peishwa he offered to subsidize; but the governor-general, for various reasons, declined assenting to the proposal.

Sindia was very apprehensive of a connection of that kind; and, to allay Nana's well-founded jealousy of his regular infantry, he only brought

with him a small party, under an Englishman of respectable character, named Hessing, and one complete battalion, commanded by Michael Filozo, by birth a Neapolitan, a low illiterate man of worthless character, but of considerable address and cunning. Sindia arrived at Poona on the 11th June, and pitched his camp near the *sungum*, or junction of the Moota and Moola rivers, the place assigned by the Peishwa for the residence of the British envoy and his suite; and hence the Sungum and the Residency, a spot for many reasons interesting, and well known to most of our countrymen who have visited that quarter, became synonymous. Nana Furnuwees did everything in his power to prevent the Peishwa's acceptance of the titles and insignia brought from the emperor: he represented the impropriety of adopting some of the titles, especially that of Maharaj Adeeraj (the greatest of great rajas), which was inconsistent with the constitution of the existing government of the Mahratta empire. But Sindia persisted; and permission for the Peishwa's acceptance of all the honors was formally obtained from the raja of Satara. Nine days after his arrival, Nana Furnuwees visited Sindia, who received him in the most cordial manner, refused to sit on his musnud in the minister's presence, and treated him with the greatest respect. On the ensuing day Sindia paid his respects to the Peishwa, carrying with him numberless rare productions and curiosities of Hindostan for the young prince. The following morning was appointed for the grand ceremony of investing the Peishwa with the title and dignity of wukeel-i-mootluq, and Sindia spared no pains to render it as imposing as possible. A grand suite of tents was pitched at a distance from his own camp. The Peishwa proceeded towards them with the most pompous form. At the further end of these splendid apartments, a throne, meant to represent that of the emperor of the Moghuls, was erected, on which was displayed the imperial firman, the khillut, or dresses of investiture, and all the principal insignia. The Peishwa, on approaching the throne, made his obeisance thrice, placed 101 gold-mohurs upon it as a *nuzur* or offering, and took his seat on its left. Sindia's Persian secretary then read the imperial firmans, and, amongst others, the edict which prevented the slaughter of bullocks and cows. The Peishwa then received the khillut, consisting of nine articles of dress, five superb ornaments of jewels and feathers, a sword and shield, a pencease, a seal and inkstand, and two royal morchuls, or fans of peacock's tails, accompanied by a nalkee,* a palkee,† a horse, and an elephant; besides six elephants bearing the imperial standard, two crescents, two stars, and the orders of the fish and of the sun. The Peishwa retired to an adjoining tent, and returned clothed in the imperial khillut, when he resumed his seat; and Sindia, followed by Nana Furnuwees and such of the Peishwa's officers as were present, offered nuzurs of congratulation. When the Peishwa arose to return to his palace, he was followed by Sindia and Hurry Punt carrying the morchuls and fanning him. He entered Poona seated in the nalkee; the concourse of people assembled

* A nalkee is a sort of sedan-chair without a top, having four poles, two behind and two before, never used but by the emperor, or persons of the very highest rank.

† A palkee is totally different from the more useful and convenient, though less splendid, conveyance commonly used by Europeans, and termed by them palanquin. The natives, who call them meynas, also use the same conveyance; but the palkee is a sort of short bedstead, over which a pole, very much curved in the middle, is fastened, and above all a scarlet cloth stretched on bamboos, as an awning, and sometimes very highly ornamented, is placed. When used by ladies, there are screens affixed to the upper cloth.

to witness the procession was exceedingly great ; the pomp and grandeur displayed was beyond anything that the inhabitants of Poona had ever seen, whilst the clang of thousands of musical instruments, the shouts of the populace, volleys of musquetry, and salvos of cannon seemed to give all the effect that the projector of this state ceremony could possibly desire.

The investiture of Sindia by the Peishwa, as deputy to the wukeel-i-mootluq, immediately followed on their arrival at the Peishwa's palace ; but on this occasion, and on several others, the pretended humility of Sindia gave disgust, when he insisted on being considered as the hereditary servant of the Peishwa, entitled only to carry his slippers, and addressed by no higher title than that of *patell*. Though this affectation was meant to be in conformity with Mahratta taste, it failed in its effect. No Bramin of education was pleased or deceived by such coarse self-disparagement, and the old Mahrattas, though Mahadajee Sindia had purchased some hereditary privileges in the Deccan, would much more readily have acknowledged his new imperial titles* than have assigned to him the appellation of Patell, a distinction which they considered due only to the legitimate Sindia, Patell of Kunneirkheir. The *mankurees*, and those cavaliers who considered themselves the old officers of the *rajas* of Satara, though some among them could scarcely term the horse he rode his own, refused to enter the imperial tents with the Peishwa, nor would they present *nuzurs* to him as wukeel-i-mootluq. *Nuzurs* were presented to Sindia by his officers on returning to his own camp ; but the feeling among his countrymen, which was too strong to escape his notice, proved to him the necessity of much caution in the prosecution of his designs.

A principal object was to gain the confidence of the young Peishwa, to which the rarities he had brought from Hindostan, and the splendid spectacle with which he had been gratified, paved the way. The frank, unreserved manners of Sindia, who talked to the young prince of hunting and hawking, and carried him out on frequent excursions to see those field sports, were things so very different, and so much more agreeable than the sedate and grave observance of decorum habitual to Nana Furnuwees, that Sindia soon became his constant companion. Parties to the country in the neighbourhood of Poona constantly took place, to which the young prince was invited, and Nana thought it advisable to give his assent, although he clearly saw the design of Sindia, and watched his proceedings so vigilantly that it was difficult for him to find opportunities of conversing with Mahdoo Rao unobserved. When they did occur, Sindia never failed to comment on the manner in which he was treated, and to assure him that he had both the power and the inclination to render him independent of such tutelage. But although Mahdoo Rao readily entered into every scheme of pleasure suggested by Sindia, his natural good disposition and judgment rendered it by no means easy to shake his confidence in Nana Furnuwees ; and at first he combated Sindia's arguments with warmth ; but the customary restraints before unfelt began to be irksome, and Sindia's society proportionally more desirable.

Sindia's public affairs at the *darbar* seemed principally to refer to Hindostan ; he represented the large sums he had spent in extending the

* These were Raja, Maharaj, Mahdoo Rao Sindia, Mudar-ool-Muham, Ali Jah Buhadur.

empire, and procuring such honors and dignity for the Poishwa ; he petitioned for the payment of his expenses, the entire management of affairs in Hindostan, and finally for the recal of Holkar and Ali Buhadur. In reply to these, the minister always demanded, in the first instance, an account of the revenue of those districts which he had subdued so easily, and had enjoyed so long. Many discussions on these subjects took place, and many circumstances occurred, tending to strengthen the mutual jealousy of Sindia and Nana ; but they for some time maintained every form of civility and respect, whilst their respective parties in Hindostan, though engaged in service together in the Rajpoot country, were almost in a state of open rupture.

The restless spirit of Ismael Beg, and his enmity to Sindia, rendered him a fit instrument for disturbing the tranquillity of Hindostan, to which, after Sindia's departure, he was secretly prompted by the intrigues of Tookajee Holkar ; but, after assembling a considerable force, his career was stopped sooner than was anticipated.

The widow of Nujeeff Khan refused to surrender the fort of Canoond to Sindia's officers. A force marched against her under M. Perron, the officer second-in-command to De Boigne. Ismael Beg advanced to her assistance, gave Perron battle outside the walls, and, being defeated, entered the fort. He there assisted in the defence, which was well maintained, until the widow having been killed by a stone shell, the garrison became dispirited by the accident, and began to think of betraying Ismael Beg to ensure themselves favourable terms. This treachery, however, the latter prevented by giving himself up to M. Perron, who promised, on the faith of his commanding officer, De Boigne, that he should not be put to death. The terms were observed, but he was ever after confined in the fort of Agra, where he died in 1799.

Subsequent to the surrender of Canoond, which happened before Sindia reached Poona, Holkar's and Sindia's armies were levying tribute together in the Rajpoot territory ; they had also taken two forts, when, quarrelling about the spoils, their jealousy burst forth into open hostilities, which brought on the battle of Lukhairee, near Ajimere, on which occasion Gopaul Rao Bhow, Luckwa Dada, and De Boigne, with 20,000 horse and 9,000 regular infantry, defeated Holkar's army, consisting of 30,000 horse and the four battalions of Dudrenec. The attack was planned by De Boigne, and the conflict the most obstinate ever witnessed by that officer. By the explosion of 12 tumbrils of ammunition, his brigades were thrown into great confusion, but being posted in a wood, Holkar's cavalry could not take advantage of the disaster. Dudrenec's battalions fought until they were nearly annihilated. Their guns, 38 in number, were all taken ; the shattered remains of the corps retreated precipitately into Malwa, where Holkar, in impotent rage, sacked Oujeir, the capital of his rival.

When accounts of these proceedings reached Poona, the ostensible cordiality of Sindia and the court was for a time obstructed, and precautions were adopted by both parties as if apprehensive of personal violence. Nana Furnuwees called in the aid of Pureshrum Bhow, who arrived with

A. D. 1793.

2,000 horse. This imprudent reinforcement furnished Sindia with a pretext for greatly increasing the parties of Hessing and Filoze who accompanied him, and for bringing down one of his infantry brigades, the command of which was confided by De Boigne to M. Perron. But as neither party was desirous of attaining their end by prosecuting the war, positive instructions were despatched to their

respective officers to refrain from hostilities, and to await the pacific settlement of their disputes by orders from the Peishwa.

The result rendered Sindia all-powerful in Hindostan, but he was conscious of his unpopularity in the Deccan, and strove to overcome it. With this view he had, on his arrival at Poona, espoused the cause of Govind Rao Gaekwar in a manner which will be hereafter explained, and upon one occasion, when Nana Furnuwees, during the minority of the Punt Suchew, assumed charge of his lands, Scindia, who knew that the proceeding met with general disapprobation, interposed, conveyed the Suchew to Poona, in opposition to the orders of the minister, re-established him in his possessions, and dismissed Bajee Rao Moreishwur, the agent whom Nana had placed in charge of the Suchew's territory. This daring interference gave rise to a quarrel, which was with difficulty appeased by the mediation of Hurry Punt Phurkay; but fresh disputes arose in consequence of Sindia's more undisguised attempts to induce the Peishwa to seek his protection. On one occasion, in particular, a conversation took place in a boat at Lohgaom, which, being overheard and repeated, caused an immediate alarm in the mind of Nana, and he took the first opportunity of coming to an explanation with the Peishwa. He addressed himself both to his judgment and feelings, enumerated the services he had performed for him and for the state, described the views of aggrandizement entertained by Sindia, pointed out his foreign troops, his departure from ancient usage, and his want of connection with the Mahratta people, over whom and the Bramin sovereignty he was bent on establishing an absolute power. With these observations he contrasted his own situation, his inability to preserve order or to resist the encroachments of Sindia if unsupported by his prince; and finally, lamenting in tears the probable effects of the evil counsels by which he had been misled, he tendered his resignation, and declared his resolution to proceed to Benares. Mahdoo Rao was greatly affected. In a transport of grief he begged his forgiveness, entreated his stay, and promised to be for ever guarded in his conduct. But notwithstanding this re-establishment of influence, Sindia by his great power would probably have ultimately prevailed over his rival, although the unqualified support of Hurry Punt to all the measures of the minister, the friendship of the powerful Bramin families of Rastia and Putwurdhun, together with that of the old mankurees, some of them great jagheerdars, formed a strong opposition to the views of Mahadajee Sindia. But in the midst of his ambitious schemes he was suddenly seized with a violent fever, which in a few days terminated his existence. He breathed his last at Wunowlee, in the environs of Poona, on the 12th February 1794.

CHAP. XXXVI.

A. D. 1794.

Mahadajee Sindia's death an event of great political importance.—Review of his policy and summary of his character—Is succeeded by his grand-nephew, Doulut Rao.—Sindia's regular infantry.—Opinions of many Mahrattas respecting that force.—Holkar long averse to its introduction.—Rughoojee Bhonslay had no infantry disciplined by European officers.—State of affairs at Nagpoor and at Baroda.—Govind Rao Gaekwar succeeds as regent.—Piracy on the coast of Maharashtra.—The Peishwa's fleet.—Angria of Kolabah.—Seedees of Jinjeera—Revolutions and events in that state.—Mahwan and Sawuntwaree.—Various attempts of the English to suppress their piracies, and those of the raja of Kolapoor—never completely effected until the year 1812.

THE death of Mahadajee Sindia was an event of great political importance, both as it affected the Mahratta empire and the other states of India. His views and his character are perhaps sufficiently elucidated in the history of the 35 years antecedent to the period at which we have arrived ; but that we may hold in mind the state of the different Mahratta powers, and explain the proceedings of the petty princes on the coast of Maharashtra, formerly of so much importance when our establishments in India were in their infancy, we shall devote this chapter to a brief recapitulation of Sindia's policy, a summary of his character, a review of the affairs of some of the other chieftains, and an explanation of minor transactions between the English and the petty princes to whom allusion is made. We shall then be free to enter on the causes which led to a war between the Mahrattas and the Moghuls in the Deccan.

The designs of Sindia, as we have already observed, were early directed to independence, but he was, at the same time, desirous of preserving a coalition, such as would unite the chieftains of the empire against all foreign enemies. He was inimical to the overgrown ascendancy of the Bramins. In his progress he first assisted the one Bramin against the other, and then attempted to overawe and control him whom he had raised. His absence from Poona, his campaign against Goddard in Guzerat, the necessity of his returning to his own jagheer in Malwa, his defeat by Camac, and the successful result of the campaign directed by the Bramins against Goddard, gave an apparent superiority to his rivals, which seemed to foretell the fall of his fortunes. But the treaty of Salbye, the recognition of his independence by the British government, and the commanding station in which he was placed as the mediator and guarantee of a peace, honorable to the Mahrattas, raised him at once from decline to aggrandizement. In his first attempts to extend his power in Hindostan, his contemporaries supposed him unequal to such a task, and that he must be ruined by the consequences of his own ambition. When he surmounted his difficulties, and not only rendered himself independent, but

held in his hands a force which might control the Mahratta empire, he was very much alarmed lest Nana Furnuwees should call in the aid of a subsidiary, both as it interfered with his own views, and sacrificed so much to the English. The power of that nation, at a time when they were supposed to be weak, and their resources exhausted, had appeared in the late war greater than at any former period, and had attained a height which, in Sindia's opinion, threatened the subjugation of all India. He was declaredly averse to the entire conquest of Tippoo's territory, as he conceived that measure dangerous to the Mahratta state; but whilst the war continued, he does not seem to have seriously meditated hostilities against the English; neither did he take any secondary steps to undermine the influence the latter had acquired with the Bramin ministers at the Poona court, because the revolution he contemplated would confine or enlarge the intercourse as he might desire.

But although nothing decidedly inimical appears on the part of Sindia towards the British government, his power and ambition, his march to Poona, and, above all, the general opinion of the country, led the English to suspect him; and we accordingly find in their records various proofs of watchful jealousy. The Bombay government, in consequence of a slight alteration in the style of address from that which was used in the time of Governor Hornby, attributed the change to studied disrespect, and an attempt to mediate between that government and his relation, the dessayee of Sawuntwaree, was deemed a very improper interference; but in the one case the style of address was discovered to be the same as permitted by the governor-general, and in the other the proposed mediation was perfectly justified. There appeared, however, soon after Sindia's arrival in the Deccan, in an *ukhbar*, or native newspaper, from Delhi, a paragraph, which stated that the emperor had written to the Peishwa and Mahadajee Sindia, expressing a hope that, by the exertions of the wukeel-i-mootluq and his deputy, he should obtain some tribute from Bengal. As such paragraphs are frequently written for the purpose of ascertaining the effects of the reports which they promulgate, it was properly noticed by Lord Cornwallis, whose spirited remonstrance prevented its repetition.

As to a summary of the character of Mahadajee Sindia, though much of his success is attributable to a combination of circumstances, he was a man of great political sagacity and of considerable genius, of deep artifice, of restless ambition, and of implacable revenge. With a high opinion of his personal address, he generally failed where he attempted to exercise it; and, in ebullitions of anger, to which he was prone, he frequently exposed what he most wished to conceal. His countenance was expressive of good sense and good humour; but his complexion was dark, his person inclining to corpulency, and he limped from the effects of his wound at Panniput. His habits were simple, his manners kind and frank, but sometimes blustering and coarse. He was beloved by his dependents, liberal to his troops in assignments of land or orders on villages, but quite the reverse in payments from his treasury or in personal donatives—a characteristic not only of Mahadajee Sindia, but of Mahrattas generally. His disposition was not cruel, although his punishments were severe. He could not only write, but, what is rare among the Mahrattas, he was a good accountant, and understood revenue affairs. His districts in Malwa were well managed—a circumstance, however, which must be ascribed to a judicious selection of agents; for Sindia, like most Mahratta chieftains, was too much engaged in politics or war to bestow the time

and attention necessary to a good civil government.* He died without male issue.

Tookajee Sindia, Mahadajee Sindia's full brother, was slain in the fatal field of Panniput, but he left three sons—Kedarjee, Rowlajee, and Anund Rao—all of whom became officers in their uncle's service. Kedarjee died without issue; Rowlajee had two sons; but Mahadajee Sindia had resolved to adopt Doulut Rao, the son of his youngest nephew, Anund Rao. The ceremony of adoption had not actually taken place, but Mahadajee had repeatedly declared Doulut Rao his heir; and although Luximee Bye, the widow of Mahadajee, opposed Doulut Rao's succession, her objections were overruled, as even Nana Furnuwees acceded to it. Tookajee Holkar was one of the first to acknowledge Doulut Rao. All the dependents of Sindia's family and the other Mahratta authorities sent their congratulations; so that this youth, who had scarcely attained his fifteenth year, became undisputed heir to the extensive realms of Mahadajee Sindia.

The great success of Sindia's regular infantry, rendered efficient by the talents and energy of De Boigne, led most of the Mahratta states to introduce regular battalions as a part of their armies. Many Mahrattas, however, were of opinion that this departure from usage would prove their ruin; infantry and guns, as they had once too bitterly experienced, compelled them to fight when flight was more judicious, and some of them predicted that, if they ever attempted to combat Europeans with their own weapons, they would one day experience a defeat still more fatal than that of Panniput.† Tookajee Holkar long resisted the introduction of regular infantry, but he saw that Sindia could have made no progress in reducing the strong forts in Rajpootana without such aid; and although he might have been convinced that it would have been much better for his army to have wanted the four battalions of Dudrenec at Lukhairree, he was so well satisfied with their conduct that he immediately afterwards ordered Dudrenec to raise a like number.

Rughoojee Bhonslay, the raja of Nagpoor, did not, in this respect, follow the example of the generality of the Mahratta chieftains. His father Moodajee died in 1788, and besides Rughoojee, the eldest, he left two other sons—Khundoojee, and Venkajee or Munnya Bappoo. Khundoojee had charge of the northern, and Venkajee of the southern, districts; but Rughoojee, as heir of his uncle Janojee, was Sena Sahib Soobeh of the Mahratta empire, although, until his father's death, he was not considered as ruler of Berar. At the time when the confederacy was formed against Tippoo, Rughoojee, in consequence of a peremptory summons from the Peishwa, was constrained to repair to Poona, where he objected to being ordered upon an expedition where the Peishwa was not to command in person, and offered many other ineffectual excuses, until he at length privately explained to Nana Furnuwees his grounds for apprehending that his brother Khundoojee would usurp the sovereignty in his absence, upon which his presence was dispensed with, on promising to contribute 10 lakhs of rupees to assist in defraying the expenses of the war. Soon after his return to Nagpoor, his brother Khundoojee died, which relieved him from all apprehension of rivalry, and he soon after

* Mahratta MSS. and letters, Bombay Records, the living testimony of many respectable natives, a good portrait in my possession, General Count De Boigne, Sir John Malcolm, &c.

† Mahratta MSS. This was the opinion of Nana Furnuwees, and many Mahrattas of the present day attribute the overthrow of their power solely to the introduction of regular infantry and artillery.

conferred on his brother Venkajee the districts of Chandah and Chutteesgurrh in jagheer. These were the only changes of importance amongst the eastern Mahrattas up to the period of Mahadajee Sindia's death. In the west, several events in regard to the Gaekwar, or Baroda state, require a summary notice.

Futih Sing Gaekwar, the regent at Baroda, died on the 21st December 1789, in consequence of a fall from an upper story in his house. His younger brother, Mannajee Rao, who was then at Baroda, immediately assumed charge of the person and government of his brother Syajee. Govind Rao, the elder brother next to Syajee, with whose history the reader is already acquainted, was then residing in obscurity at a village in the neighbourhood of Poona, and presented a petition to the minister, praying to be acknowledged by the Peishwa as regent of the Gaekwar possessions. His claim was just, but Mannajee Rao, by paying a nuzur of rupees 33,13,001, and agreeing to pay up arrears due by Futih Sing, amounting to upwards of 36 lakhs, was confirmed in his usurpation. Mahadajee Sindia, however, as already alluded to, espoused the cause of Govind Rao, and procured a repeal of Mannajee's appointment; upon which Mannajee applied to the Bombay government, claiming its protection on the terms of the treaty concluded with General Goddard by Futih Sing. As the treaty in question was superseded by that of Salbye, the English declined all interference on that ground; but by the talent of Mannajee's agent, Goolab Raee, and the supposed imbecility of Govind Rao, they were induced to recommend, through Mr. Malet, that some friendly compromise should be adopted, as being for the benefit of the country and of all parties concerned. Nana Furnuwees concurred in this opinion, but Mahadajee Sindia and the partizans of Govind Rao objected to any compromise. The question, however, was at once set at rest by the death of Mannajee, about 1st August 1793. Still Govind Rao found it difficult to obtain permission to quit the Peishwa's capital. The ministers, without any regard to the exorbitant exactions already imposed on himself and his family, obliged Govind Rao to sign an agreement confirming the former stipulations, and ceding to the Peishwa the Gaekwar's share of the districts south of the Taptee, formerly included in the cessions to the company in 1780, together with his proportion of the customs of Surat; but, there being no service performed by the Peishwa towards the Gaekwar beyond the mere confirmation of his rights as regent, the British government objected to the cession as a dismemberment of the Baroda territory, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty of Salbye. The validity of this objection was immediately admitted by Nana Furnuwees, the instrument of cession was restored, and Govind Rao at last set out to assume his office as undisputed regent at Baroda, on the 19th December 1793.

Affairs on the coast of Maharashtra demand notice, chiefly from the system of piracy which continued to prevail between Goa and Bombay.

In 1756 piracy received a considerable check by the subjugation of Toolajee Angria, and, had the Peishwa then united his endeavours with those of the English, it might have been exterminated. But, like predatory incursions on shore, it was profitable; and so far from being suppressed, it was encouraged by the Poona court. The Peishwa had two fleets—the one under his sur-soobehdar at Bassein, the other commanded by Anund Rao Dhoolup, his admiral, who was stationed at Viziadroog. The Peishwa's fleets did not molest vessels under English colours until the war of 1775. After that period, even in times of peace, we find that

occasional depredations were committed, and, unless speedy detection followed, which was not always the case, the vessels were not restored : when the capture, however, was clearly ascertained, they were released, and the apology offered for their detention was that they had been mistaken for ships of some other nation.*

Mannajee Angria of Kolabah continued in obedience to the Peishwa's authority until his death, which happened in 1759. His son Rughojee professed equal submission, but only obeyed when it suited his convenience. His piracies on the trading ships of the English were conducted in the same manner as the aggressions of the Peishwa. In November 1793 Rughojee died, when, without reference to the Poona court, the sovereignty was assumed in the name of his infant son Mannajee, under the guardianship of Jey Sing Angria. By this usurpation, as it was termed in those who had not power to support their pretensions, Mannajee and Jey Sing incurred the enmity of the Poona minister, of which Sindia's successor, Doult Rao, at a subsequent period took advantage, and raised a member of the family of Angria, who was nearly allied to himself, to the chiefship of that principality—a change which gave no umbrage to the English, because the reigning party, so far from courting their friendship, had most unjustifiably made prize of some of their ships.†

The Seedees of Jinjeera plundered all nations except the English, nor did they always escape. Several revolutions had taken place in this small principality. In 1762, Seedee Yakoot, by the will of the regent, Seedee Ibrahim, succeeded to the government, in prejudice to Seedee Abdool Rahim, who was considered the nearest heir. Abdool Rahim endeavoured to obtain possession by force, and was secretly reinforced by the Mahrattas. The English took part with the reigning chief, and, having failed in an attempt to arbitrate the difference, they assisted to repel Abdool Rahim, who, being defeated, fled to Poona. Seedee Yakoot, apprehending that the Peishwa might openly espouse Abdool Rahim's cause, offered a compromise, promising him Dhunda Rajepoor, and the succession to Jinjeera at his death—a proposal which was accepted, and Abdool Rahim succeeded accordingly. But Seedee Yakoot had made a will bequeathing the principality to the second son of Abdool Rahim at his father's death, under the guardianship, in case of a minority, of his own friend Seedee Johur, who was commandant of Jinjeera. Abdool Rahim died shortly after, in 1784 ; but, without paying any regard to the will of Seedee Yakoot, he had bequeathed the principality to his eldest son, Abdool Khureem Khan, commonly called Balloo Meah.‡ Seedee Johur, however, defended his pretensions, founded on the will of Seedee Yakoot, and endeavoured to arrest Balloo Meah ; but he, being apprized of the scheme, fled to Poona, carrying with him his younger brother, whom Seedee Johur wished to set up. Nana Furnuwees, in hopes that it was reserved for him to annex the unconquerable island to the Mahratta possessions, prepared to support the cause of Abdool Khureem Khan ; Seedee Johur, however, called on the English for protection, expressing his readiness to comply with any reasonable arbitration satisfactory to the inhabitants, but declaring his determination to resist the Mahrattas and the obnoxious Balloo Meah, "whilst the rock of Jinjeera remained and a man to stand by him." Nana Furnuwees, at the request of the Bombay government,

* Bombay Records and Mahratta letters.

† Mahratta MSS. and letters, Bombay Records.

‡ Mahratta MSS. and letters.

agreed to suspend operations until a reference could be made to Lord Cornwallis on the subject. It being at that time a great object of the governor-general's policy to gain the friendship of the Poona court, and it being generally believed that Seedee Johur was only striving to get the younger brother into his power, as a cloak to meditated usurpation, Lord Cornwallis directed the Bombay government not to support him. He also intimated to the Peishwa that, if he would make an adequate provision for the sons of the late Abdool Khureem Khan in some other part of the country, he might then take possession of the Seedee's territory. The Mahrattas, however, without making the provision stipulated, attempted, clandestinely, to possess themselves of Jinjeera, which no sooner came to the knowledge of the governor-general than he suspended the permission he had given. At length, when the treaty of alliance against Tippoo was concluded, the Peishwa having granted to Balloo Meah and his brother a tract of land near Surat, guaranteed by the English, and yielding annually 75,000 rupees, and having also given them 40,000 rupees in ready money, the heirs to the Jinjeera principality relinquished their right and title in favour of the Peishwa. The agreement was signed on the 6th June 1791; but the castle may fall whilst the cottage stands; the little island was never reduced, and the principality of Jinjeera has survived the empire of the Peishwas.

The most active, however, of all the corsairs on the coast, and the most destructive to the English trade, were the pirates of Malwan and Sawuntwaree. We have already cursorily alluded to the expedition sent against them in 1765. It was under the joint command of Major Gordon,* and Captain John Watson of the Bombay marine.† They speedily reduced the fort of Malwan, a much-valued possession of the raja of Kolapoor, and took Yeswuntgurb, or Rairee, from the dessaye of Waree. To the former the Bombay government gave the name of Fort Augustus, intending to have kept it; but the acquisition being unprofitable, they proposed to destroy the works; that alternative, however, was also abandoned on account of the expense, and they at last determined to restore it to the raja, on condition of his promising not to molest their ships or trade, to give security for his future good conduct, and to indemnify them for losses and expenses to the amount of rupees 3,82,896, the whole of which, except rupees 50,000, was received before Malwan was evacuated, in May 1766. This expedition took place during the minority of Sivajee, raja of Kolapoor. Kem Sawunt, dessaye of Waree, was then also a minor; and a confusion, greater even than usual, prevailed amongst his turbulent relations. To this confusion may be ascribed the difficulty which was experienced in effecting a settlement with the dessaye of Waree. The Bombay government do not appear to have been aware that there was a distinction between the pirates of Waree and Malwan, until 1765, when, on the 7th April of that year, they concluded a treaty of 19 articles with the dessaye, whom they distinguished by his ancient family name of Bhionslay, or, as written in their records, the Bouncello. Of this treaty not one article was observed by the Mahrattas. Mr. Mostyn was therefore deputed in 1766 to conclude some settlement, and obtained an obligation for two lakhs of rupees, with a promise on the part of the dessaye to refrain from further aggressions, on condition that the Bombay government should

* I am not sure if this name be correct; it is written Gowan and Gorcham, as well as Gordon, in the records of the period.

† The same who, as Commodore Watson, was killed at the siege of Tannah.

restore Rairee. The money could only be raised by a mortgage on the revenues of the district of Vingorla for 13 years ; and to induce the mortgagee, Wittoojee Koomptee, to advance the stipulated sum, Mr. Mostyn, in addition to two hostages procured from Waree, was obliged to promise that a small factory should be established, and the English flag hoisted, under the protection of a few sepoy, to be left in the fort of Vingorla. This arrangement being concluded, Rairee was restored in the end of 1766. A very short time, however, had elapsed, when the hostages made their escape, and the agents of Wittoojee Koomptee were driven from the stations where they were collecting the revenue. Much remonstrance and negotiation followed, but nothing specific was effected. At last, when the 13 years expired, the Sawunts, although they had prevented the mortgagee from recovering the revenue, demanded restitution of the district, which being refused, they attacked and took Vingorla on the 4th June 1780, with a considerable quantity of private and some public property belonging to the English. The piracies of the Sawunts of Waree were henceforth renewed, and the marriage of Kem Sawunt to Luximee Bye,* the niece of Mahadajee Sindia, although a connection more splendid than honorable, increased their arrogance, especially whilst the English were too much occupied to send a force against them. The raja of Kolapoor, seeing the depredations of the Sawunts escape with impunity, returned to his former habits ; and thus piracy became as prevalent as ever. Complaints on the subject were made by the English to Mahadajee Sindia, who promised to oblige his relations to restore their captures ; and the raja of Kolapoor was also induced to promise a liquidation of all balances, and to abstain from further aggressions on the English. The conditions were not enforced, and of course such temporizing measures only encouraged a repetition of robbery and insult. In the end of the year 1789 the English had resolved to adopt more active measures, and had determined to crush those depredators ; but in their extreme anxiety, at that time, to avoid giving offence to the Poona court, a doubt suddenly arose as to the propriety of attacking the raja of Kolapoor ; for so ignorant were they, at this late period, of the existing relations in the Mahratta state, that they supposed him a dependant of the Peishwa. When the question was referred to Nana Furnuwees, he foresaw, as he conceived, an opportunity of drawing in the Kolapoor state to seek the Peishwa's protection, and ultimately to yield obedience to the Poona government. Accordingly, by Nana's address, the raja was at first induced to accept the Peishwa's mediation ; but afterwards suspecting the design, and hearing of the hostilities in which the English were about to be engaged with Tippoo, he suddenly revoked his consent, and piracy was never more frequent on the coast of Malabar than during the war with Mysore. It was an attempt to mediate between the Bombay government and the Sawunts of Waree that led the former to accuse Sindia of the improper interference to which we have alluded. However, some compromise, through Sindia, was agreed on with respect to the Sawunts, and an armament was prepared against the Kolapoor raja in 1792. But the expedition never took place, as, in consequence of his offering indemnification to individuals, promising to pay the balance due to the company on or before January 1795, granting permission to establish factories at Malwan and Kolapoor, and tendering the humblest apologies for his misconduct, the numerous aggressions he had committed were once more overlooked,

* Luximee Bye was the daughter of Tookajee Sindia.

and a treaty was concluded with him on the terms he thus proposed. But no benefit resulted from it; on the contrary, in the ensuing year there were complaints not only against the raja of Kolapoor, but against the Sawunts Angria and Dhoolup, for the capture or plunder of British ships; and it is no slight stigma on the British Indian administration that this system of piracy was not finally suppressed until the year 1812.

CHAP. XXXVII.

A. D. 1794 AND A. D. 1795.

Reflections on the preceding details, and on the condition of the Mahrattas as a military nation at this period.—Their claims on Nizam Ally occasion a temporary union of the chiefs.—Course of policy adopted by the English in the negotiation which preceded the war between the Mahrattas and Nizam Ally.—Discussions between the courts of Poona and Hyderabad—war declared—assembly of the armies respectively—march to oppose each other—skirmish in which the Moghuls obtain some advantage—battle of Kurdla—extraordinary discomfiture of the Moghul army.—Submission of Nizam Ally, who surrenders the person of his minister, cedes large tracts of territory, and promises to pay three crores of rupees.—Anecdote of the young Peishwa.—Nizam Ally offended at the neutrality of the English, whose influence at Hyderabad is likely to be wholly superseded by a French party.—Unexpected rebellion of the prince Ali Jah occasions the recal of the English battalions.—The rebellion suppressed by the exertions of M. Raymond.—Movements of the Mahrattas during the insurrection.—No proof of their having been in any manner accessory to the rebellion.—Nana Furnuwees at the summit of power, when his anxiety to preserve it brings on an unforeseen catastrophe.

THE details in the last chapter, together with much of the preceding narrative, may tax the patience of the reader, but A. D. 1794. are, for the most part, absolutely necessary to elucidate our subject, and to afford a just view of the numerous authorities and interests which existed at this period among the Mahrattas. The empire founded by Sivajee now covered a vast space ; and had it been possible to combine its powers, to direct advantageously the peculiar genius of its people, and to render its various parts subservient to its general strength, the Mahrattas might still have extended their conquests, and a persevering predatory warfare would probably have arrested the rapid rise of the British nation in India. But the causes which drove the Mahrattas to predatory habits, and the circumstances which allured them to conquest, no longer existed, nor had they any chief whose authority was sufficient to unite them. They now lived under governments of their own, which were generally mild ; the executive authorities, even if administered by persons tyrannically disposed, were not so powerful as to become arbitrarily oppressive, but they were at the same time too feeble to call forth all the resources which smaller states, better organized, could have commanded. The Mahrattas were still a military people ; some member of every peasant's family, and sometimes the fourth or fifth of a whole village, had carried arms. Persons once employed were generally ready to return to the service when required, but pitched battles and regular warfare were unsuited to their genius ; the Mahratta cavalry, when accustomed to depend on regular infantry and cannon, lost their former surprising activity and confidence on distant enterprises ; even their courage, which

as a national virtue was never very conspicuous, had fallen below its ordinary level; and whilst some among them admired the wisdom of Mahadajee Sindia, and extolled the advantages to be attained by disciplined armies and artillery, others, as we have already mentioned, more justly predicted, from the same cause, the certain overthrow of the Hindoo power.

The great object, however, of preserving the supremacy of the Peishwa, and of giving to the Mahratta nation that common excitement to action, founded on the immediate gratification of self-interest, became, for a short period, a point of much less difficulty than might have been anticipated. This tendency to union proceeded from the existing claims on Nizam Ally, in the settlement of which all the Mahratta chiefs were taught to expect a part; the death of Sindia left the entire management to Nana Farnuwees, and the English adopted a neutral policy on the occasion.

We have before noticed the nature of the claims on Nizam Ally. They were outstanding balances for a series of years on account of chouth and surdeshmookhee. Discussions on the subject had been occasionally agitated by the Mahrattas for upwards of 10 years; but the alliance in which they had been associated against Tippoo had enabled Nizam Ally to procrastinate, and prevented the Mahrattas from insisting on a settlement of their affairs. In 1791 Govind Rao Kallay and Govind Rao

A. D. 1791. Pingley, the Peishwa's envoys at the court of Hyderabad, formally requested that Nizam Ally would appoint commissioners for investigating and adjusting the claims of their master. After considerable discussion, Nizam Ally delivered to these envoys a set of demands, under 34 separate heads, chiefly regarding contributions unjustly exacted, and the revenues of different places improperly taken, or withheld by the Mahrattas. He also demanded reparation on account of damage sustained by the inroads of Pindharees residing within the Peishwa's boundary. To all which, full and satisfactory replies, drawn up with remarkable clearness and ability by Nana Farnuwees, were promptly returned; followed by a set of articles, 28 in number, demanding the adjustment of the Mahratta claims, some of which Nana proved to have existed since 1774. Nizam Ally was compelled to acknowledge some of these demands; others he evaded: but he promised in general terms to appoint some persons to settle the whole, as soon as the war with Tippoo had terminated, hoping by that time to obtain the interposition of the English.*

At the conclusion of the war, Lord Cornwallis did endeavour to effect a treaty of guarantee, founded on that article of the alliance which regarded the assistance to be offered by the contracting parties, in case of an attack upon any one of them by Tippoo, believing that by such a treaty he should render a general benefit to all parties, and secure the peace of India. But it was hardly to be supposed that any Indian statesman could appreciate such a design; and accordingly each of the native courts interpreted the proposal as it appeared to affect their own interests. The Nizam saw in it a disposition to assist him, and hoped to realize his meditated scheme of raising a barrier between himself and the Mahrattas, so that he might not only resist their future encroachments, but evade their present demands; at all events he had no doubt of obtaining a settlement, such as Hyder had affected with the Mahrattas, by

* Mahratta MSS. and original papers.

paying a fixed tribute, and from which Tippoo, by the late treaty, was entirely absolved. The Mahrattas, on the other hand, viewed the proposal as an arrogant assumption of authority on the part of the British government, and it excited their jealousy, both as affecting their political consequence, and interrupting the settlement of their established dues. On the propriety of resisting this interposition both Mahadajee Sindia and Nana Furnuwees concurred; but they differed in their opinions with regard to the supposed designs of the English. Sindia conjectured that they projected an alliance with Nizam Ally for the purpose of obtaining the command of the Nizam's resources, and turning them against the Mahrattas; in consequence of which, for a short time previous to his death, he carried on a friendly correspondence with Tippoo Sultan. Nana Furnuwees, although he did not perceive the benevolent purpose by which Lord Cornwallis was actuated, took a more correct view of the subject, in supposing that the English, though desirous of becoming umpires, would not risk a war unless to save the Hyderabad state from being subverted; such a conquest, however, even in subsequent success, Nana Furnuwees never ventured to contemplate. When the treaty of guarantee was submitted to the court of Poona, Mahadajee Sindia would have rejected it at once, but Nana, being anxious to keep well with the English as a check on Sindia, without giving a direct refusal, prolonged the discussion, although with no intention of assenting to what was proposed.

Sir John Shore succeeded to the charge of the government of British India on the departure of the Marquis Cornwallis in A. D. 1793. August 1793. Nizam Ally had supposed the latter so intent on effecting the treaty of general guarantee, that he concealed the deep interest he felt in the success of the negotiation of Poona, until he saw the prospect of its failure. He then used every argument, and held forth every inducement in his power, to obtain a separate treaty of guarantee for himself. Sir John Shore, however, did not think it advisable to compel the Mahrattas to accept the mediation of the British nation, and adhered to a system of neutrality, for a variety of reasons which it is unnecessary to enter upon. We need only remark that, whatever might have been the apparent advantage of the governor-general's interference, if it had enabled Nizam Ally to effect his evasive purposes, it must have been recorded as an injustice to the Mahrattas.

From the period when the demands of the Mahrattas were formally renewed, whilst negotiations for the treaty of guarantee were in progress, Nizam Ally, probably without imagining that actual hostilities would take place, had been increasing his military force. A body of regular infantry which, during the war with Tippoo, had consisted of two battalions under a respectable French officer named Raymond, were increased to 23 battalions. His army was much augmented after Mahadajee Sindia's death, and he hoped, in consequence of that event, the Mahrattas might be easily satisfied, or successfully resisted, even if he should not be able to obtain the interposition of the English.* When the envoy, Govind Rao Kallay,† renewed his master's demands, he produced a detailed statement showing a balance in his favour of nearly two crores and sixty lakhs, or 26 millions of rupees. Warm discussions took place between the envoy and Musheer-ool-Moolk, when at last the former was told, in public durbar, that Nana Furnuwees must himself attend at the court of Hyderabad, in

* Mahratta MSS. and English Records.

† He was still alive when I left India in January 1823.

order to afford an explanation of the different items of their intricate claims. The envoy replied—"Nana Furnuwees is much engaged; how can he come?" "How can he come?" re-echoed Musheer-ool-Moolk—"I will soon show how he shall be brought to the presence." This menace was considered a sufficient declaration, and although negotiations continued till the last, both parties prepared to decide their differences by the sword.

The war, whilst still at a distance, was extremely popular amongst the Moghuls; the grand army under Nizam Ally's personal command was assembled at Beder, and the camp exhibited much bustle and animation. The most vaunting threats were constantly heard from the ill-appointed disorderly soldiery. Poona was to be pillaged and burned; the dancing-girls already sung the triumphs of their army; and even the prime minister declared, in a public assembly, that "the Moghuls should now be freed from Mahratta encroachments; that they should recover Beejapoor and Candeish, or they would never grant peace, until they had despatched the Peishwa to Benares, with a cloth about his loins, and a pot of water in his hand, to mutter incantations on the banks of the Ganges."^o

The minister at Poona was soon enabled to collect a very great army. No events had taken place since Sindia's death, except such as appeared favourable to Nana's power, and the prospect of sharing in the expected advantages brought to his standard all the chiefs whose attendance was important. Doulut Rao Sindia and Tookajee Holkar were already at Poona, and the raja of Berar had set out to join. Govind Rao Gaekwar sent a detachment of his troops; the great southern jagheerdars, composing the Bramin families of Putwurdhun and Rastia, the Bramin jagheerdars of Mallygaom and Vinchoor, the Pritee Needhee, the Punt Suchew, the Mahratta mankurees—Nimbalkur, Ghatgay, Chowan, Dufay, Powar, Thorat, and Pahtunkur, with many others less conspicuous, attended the summons. But this was the last time the chiefs of the Mahratta nation assembled under the authority of their Peishwa.

Nizam Ally was first in the field, and slowly advanced from Beder, along the banks of the Manjera, towards the Mahratta frontier. The Peishwa quitted Poona in January, and his

December.

A. D. 1795. army marched at the same time, but by different routes, for the convenience of forage. There were upwards of 130,000 horse and foot in the Mahratta army, exclusive of 10,000 Pindharees. Of this force upwards of one-half were either paid from the Peishwa's treasury, or were troops of jagheerdars under his direct control. Doulut Rao Sindia's force was more numerous and more efficient than that of any other chieftain, although the greater part of his army remained in Hindostan and Malwa. Jooba Bukhshee commanded immediately under Doulut Rao, and had lately joined him with a reinforcement; the whole consisted of 25,000 men, of whom 10,000 were regular infantry under De Boigne's second-in-command, Monsieur Perron. Rughojee Bhonslay mustered 15,000 horse and foot; Tookajee Holkar had only 10,000, but of these 2,000 were regulars under Dudrenec, and most of the Pindharees were followers of Holkar. Pureshrum Bhow had 7,000 men.

Nana Furnuwees consulted the chief officers separately.† He appointed

* Persian and Mahratta MSS.

† The memoranda in his own hand-writing of the different opinions were found in the Poona Records. He seems to have adopted the plans of Jooba Bukhshee and Tookajee Holkar.

Pureshrum Bhow to act as commander-in-chief. The Pindharees and some other horse were ordered on to plunder in the neighbourhood of the Moghul camp, and destroy their forage; the heavy baggage, properly protected, remained one march in the rear, and the best of the horse with the regular infantry, supported by upwards of 150 pieces of cannon, were sent forward to attack Nizam Ally, who, with an army amounting in all to 110,000 men, advanced towards Kurdla, and descended the Mohree Ghaut; a body of the Peishwa's household troops under Baba Rao, son of the deceased Hurry Punt Phurkay, attacked the Moghuls when descending the Ghaut, and, being driven off with some loss, Nizam Ally, on the same evening, sat in durbar, and received nuzurs of congratulation on his victory. On the ensuing day, when the

March 11. Moghuls were on their march from Kurdla to Purinda, the Mahrattas appeared on their right, and were soon perceived to be in great force. Nizam Ally halted his own elephant, sent off his baggage to the left, and directed Assud Ale Khan with the cavalry, supported by 17,000 regular infantry under Raymond, to attack the Mahratta army. Pureshrum Bhow prepared to receive them; he took his own station in the centre with the Peishwa's and Holkar's troops; Rughoojee Bhonslay commanded the right wing, and Doulut Rao's army formed the left. Pureshrum Bhow rode forward to reconnoitre, supported by Baba Rao Phurkay and Khassee Rao, the son of Tookajee Holkar. He had only advanced a short distance when he was suddenly charged by a body of Patans, under Lal Khan, a native of Baloochistan, who displayed great personal energy, cut down several men, and, with his own hand, unhorsed and wounded Pureshrum Bhow. But Hurry Punt Putwurdhun, the Bhow's eldest son, seeing his father fall, instantly attacked the aggressor, and killed him on the spot. The Patans, however, did not desist on the loss of their leader: being well supported by Alif Khan, the son of the nabob of Kurnoul, and Sula-bat Khan, the son of Ismael Khan, nabob of Elichpoor, they persevered until the advanced party of the Mahrattas gave way, and were driven back in such confusion, that they communicated a panic to a great portion of their army, and thousands fled precipitately from the field. Baba Rao Phurkay, though in charge of the Juree Putka, seemed about to follow the fugitives, but was prevented by Jooba Bukhshee, who rode up, reproached him as a coward, and told him if he sought a place of safety he would find it behind Sindia's troops.

By this time the regular battalions on both sides had approached within musket-shot of each other, and the Moghul cavalry were advancing to the support of their infantry with apparent steadiness, when Rughoojee Bhonslay assailed them with a shower of rockets, at the same moment that they received the fire of 35 pieces of cannon, judiciously placed on an eminence by Perron. In the course of a very few minutes the whole of the cavalry were put to the rout; but Raymond's infantry stood their ground, and had even obtained some advantage over Perron's battalions, when Raymond, by repeated and peremptory orders, was compelled to follow Nizam Ally, who had already retreated towards Kurdla. By the time the detached portions of the Moghul army had been made acquainted with their leader's intention, the sun had set, and darkness soon augmented the general confusion of the troops. Shots still continued to be exchanged in different directions after the night fell, and few men, except those of the half-disciplined battalions of Raymond, could find their own particular division. At last, the multitude, worn out by fatigue and vociferation, gradually sunk to rest, or lay down to await the return of

day. But in the stillness of night, a small patrol of Mahrattas, in search of water for their horses, came by chance to a rivulet where lay a party of Moghuls, who, discovering what they were, instantly fired upon them. Raymond's sentries, being in the neighbourhood, also fired, when their whole line, who, lay on their arms, with their muskets loaded as they had retreated, started from their sleep, and instantly fired a sort of irregular volley. The alarm which such a discharge of musketry occasioned, in the state of the Moghul army at that moment, may be conceived. The uproar suddenly became greater than ever, and many of Raymond's sepoy, seized with the general panic, quitted their ranks and mingled in the confusion. At last the moon rose, and Nizam Ally, in perfect consternation, sought refuge within the walls of Kurdla, a very small fort surrounded by hills. Most of his troops fled, plundering the baggage of their own army as they went off: but they were not allowed to carry away this ill-gotten spoil unmolested; the Mahratta Pindharees overtook them next day, and, without experiencing the slightest opposition, stripped the panic-struck fugitives of everything.

The Mahrattas, advancing in the morning, found guns, stores, and baggage, and all the usual wreck of an army, strewing the ground; but their surprise was still greater on perceiving Nizam Ally shut up in Kurdla, and about one-tenth of the original number of his troops lying round the fort. No people are more active and vigilant than Mahrattas on such occasions; their most distant parties soon heard of this joyful intelligence, and came swarming "*to plunder the Moghuls*," whom in a short time they had completely enclosed, and on the ensuing day opened batteries, which commanded the fort as well as the position of the troops. Nizam Ally endured this hopeless exposure for two days, but on the morning of the 15th March, he solicited and obtained a cessation of arms. The preliminary demand made by the Mahrattas was the surrender of the minister Musheer-ool-Moolk, that amends might thus be made for the insult offered to the Peishwa, in threatening to seize Nana Furnuwees. They next exacted territorial cessions, extending along the frontier from the district of Purinda on the south, to the Taptee river on the north, comprehending the fort of Doultabad, and such part of those districts, formerly conquered by Sewdasheo Rao Bhow in 1760, as had been restored to Nizam Ally. Three crores of rupees were promised on account of arrears of revenue and expenses of the war: besides which, by a separate agreement, Nizam Ally ceded territory yielding 3,18,000 rupees, in lieu of Rughojee Bhonslay's claims for ghas-dana in Gungthuree, estimated at three and a half lakhs annually. Nizam Ally likewise promised to pay up the arrears due to Rughojee Bhonslay, amounting to 29 lakhs, and to collect their respective shares of revenue in Berar, according to ancient usage, for all which the Peishwa afterwards became Rughojee's guarantee.

It was with extreme reluctance that Nizam Ally agreed to surrender the person of his minister. Musheer-ool-Moolk urged him to the measure, especially as, under the circumstances in which they found themselves, they did not consider the other conditions so immoderate as might have been expected. The minister was delivered over to a party of 200 Mahrattas, by whom he was escorted to their camp. The Peishwa met him at the outskirts, and received him with distinction, but his person was carefully guarded. The Mahrattas were rejoiced to excess by this triumph, and a remark of the young Peishwa, when rallied by Nana Furnuwees on the melancholy which his countenance betrayed at the time of Musheer-ool-Moolk's arrival, was as just, as from him it was interesting. "I

grieve," said he, "to observe such degeneracy as there must be, on both sides, when such a disgraceful submission has been made by the Moghuls, and our soldiers are vaunting of a victory obtained without an effort." There were scarcely 200 men lost by both those two great armies in the battle, though a considerable number of the Moghuls were killed in the subsequent confusion, and during the time they were surrounded; but to this day it is one of the great boasts of the old sillardars in the Mahratta villages that they were present in the glorious field of Kurdla.

During the action, the British envoys at the respective courts of Nizam Ally and the Peishwa were in the neighbourhood. Nizam Ally was much incensed against the English for their neutrality, which he considered an abandonment of promised friendship. On his return to Hyderabad he dismissed their two battalions, and ordered a great increase to the corps of Monsieur Raymond, assigning districts for their maintenance, in the same manner as Sindia had done. The influence of the English was further diminished by the captivity of Musheer-ool-Moolk, a great friend to their nation, and it was likely to be wholly superseded by the growing power of the French party, when an event occurred which induced Nizam Ally to recall their battalions, and the intercourse formerly subsisting was gradually renewed. The event alluded to was nothing less than the rebellion of Nizam Ally's eldest son, Ali Jah, who, from the time of the convention at Kurdla, had been actively engaged in a conspiracy, the ringleaders of which were all of the party most inimical to Musheer-ool-Moolk and the English interests.

On the night of the 28th June Ali Jah quitted Hyderabad, pretending to be forcibly carried off by a Mahratta, named Sewdasheo Riddey, for the purpose of obtaining the authority of his name in raising an insurrection. He was soon joined by many of his partizans, and took the route of Beder, of which fortress, and several other places of less consequence, he obtained possession. The season of the year was unfavourable to his success; but the vast body of unemployed horsemen in the country (50,000 of the Kurdla fugitives having been discharged by Nizam Ally in one day) rendered the insurrection extremely alarming, especially as several officers of rank joined the prince, and Tippoo, as was given out, had promised to support him.

M. Raymond undertook to suppress this rebellion. He followed the prince to Beder, pursued him to Aurungabad, took him prisoner, and was bringing him to Hyderabad; but Ali Jah, unable to face his father, put an end to his existence by poison, before they reached the capital.

On the return of the Peishwa to Poona, Nana Furnuwees was employed in distributing the late acquisitions,* and in settling various affairs with the different chiefs. Pureshrum Bhow and Rughoojee Bhonslay remained in the neighbourhood of the capital, but Holkar and Sindia encamped at some distance—the former at Jejoory, and the latter at Jamgaom—until news arrived of Ali Jah's rebellion, when they repaired to Poona, with what view is not ascertained, nor is there any proof that the Mahrattas were instrumental to the rebellion, although it was suspected by Nizam Ally, and has been affirmed by Moghul historians.

By the middle of September Doulut Rao had obtained his audience of

* The whole of the particulars of this distribution were found amongst the Poona records: but much confusion having subsequently arisen, the intended arrangements were never entirely completed.

leave, and proceeded to Jamgaom, on his route to Hindostan; Pureshrām Bhow had returned to the family jagheer at Tasgaom; Holkar continued at Poona, where Rughoojee Bhonslay also remained until the middle of October, when he was dismissed with great honor, receiving new sunnuds for a portion of territory lying on the south side of the Nerbuddah, which had been originally assigned to his grandfather by Ballajee Bajee Rao in 1750, but 12 of the districts* had not yet been conquered from the chiefs, who, in the confusion that followed the decline of the Moghul empire, had become independent.†

Nana Furnuwees was now at the summit of prosperity; without the intervention of a foreign power he had obtained every object of his ambition. Doulut Rao Sindia was favourably disposed towards him, and his ministers and officers were more intent on forwarding their own particular views in the government of their young master, than in schemes for controlling the Poona court. Tookajee Holkar had become imbecile, both in mind and body, and his officers were subservient to Nana. Rughoojee Bhonslay was completely secured in his interests, and the Bramin jagheerdars were of his party. The Peishwa's government had thus every prospect of regaining the tone and vigour it had possessed under the great Mahdoo Rao; but Nana's fondness of power, and his anxiety to preserve it, brought on a catastrophe which speedily undermined his authority, overturned the labours of his life, and terminated his days in trouble and in misery.

* These were—1st, Bachaee; 2nd, Beechea; 3rd, Burgee; 4th, Bhowangurh; 5th, Sypoor Choureeagurh; 6th, Khooreybharee; 7th, Kuthoottee; 8th, Pullahoo; 9th, Dujwurdha; 10th, Mookundpoor; 11th, Surnalpoor; and 12th, Ramgurh.

† This chapter is on the authority of original Mahratta papers, Persian and Mahratta MSS., and English Records.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

A. D. 1795 AND A. D. 1796.

Nana Furnuwees—his conduct towards *Mahdoo Rao*—the *raja* of *Satara*, and the family of the deceased *Rugonath Rao*.—The sons of *Rugonath Rao* confined in the fort of *Sewnerree*.—*Bajee Rao* the particular object of *Nana's* jealousy.—*Bajee Rao's* character at this period—his accomplishments.—The young *Peishwa* desirous of cultivating his friendship.—*Nana* advises him to beware.—*Bajee Rao* corrupts one of *Nana's* agents and opens a communication with the *Peishwa*—his insidious messages—discovery—its consequences.—*Mahdoo Rao* throws himself from the terrace of his palace, and dies.—*Nana* endeavours to exclude *Bajee Rao* from the succession.—*Bajee Rao* gains over *Balloba Tattya* and *Sindia* to his interests.—*Nana Furnuwees* determines on anticipating *Sindia*, and brings *Bajee Rao* to *Poona*.—*Sindia*, influenced by his minister, marches on the capital.—*Nana* withdraws from *Poona*.—*Balloba Tattya* resolves to set aside *Bajee Rao*, and raise *Chimnajee Appa* to the musnud, with *Pureshrum Bhow* as his minister.—*Nana Furnuwees*, being consulted by *Pureshrum Bhow*, assents with seeming cordiality to the proposal.—*Nana's* proceedings.—Suspensions of *Balloba Tattya*.—Conspiracy matured, and *Bajee Rao* confined.—*Chimnajee Appa* declared *Peishwa*.—*Sindia's* pecuniary distress—plan for alleviating it—enlargement of *Musheer-ool-Moolk*.—The new administration pretend a wish that *Nana Furnuwees* should take a principal share in the government.—*Nana* discovers their treachery.—Desperate situation of *Nana*—evinces great ability in extricating himself, and circumventing his enemies.—His interests in unison with those of *Bajee Rao*.—Rise of *Ballajee Koonjur*.—*Nana* discloses a part of his plans to *Bajee Rao*.—Rise of *Shirree Rao Ghatgay*.—*Nana Furnuwees* gains *Sindia* to his views.—The imprudent proceedings of *Bajee Rao's* party bring on a premature discovery of a part of the conspiracy.—*Bajee Rao* sent off towards *Hindustan*—enters into a compact with *Shirree Rao Ghatgay*.—Proceedings at *Poona*.—Schemes of *Nana Furnuwees* matured—excites the *raja* of *Kolapoor* to fall upon the districts of *Pureshrum Bhow*.—Treaty of *Mhar*.—Treaty with *Rughoojee Bhonslay*.—*Sindia* arrests *Balloba Tattya*.—*Pureshrum Bhow* accidentally forewarned of his danger—flees from *Poona*—is overtaken and made prisoner.—*Nana Furnuwees* obtains the guarantee of *Nizam Ally* and of *Sindia* before trusting himself at *Poona*.—*Bajee Rao* proclaimed *Peishwa*.—The adoption of *Chimnajee Appa* declared illegal.—*Chimnajee Appa* appointed to the government of *Guzerat*, with *Aba Sheelookur* as his deputy.

ALTHOUGH the young *Peishwa* was now in his twenty-first year, A. D. 1795. *Nana Furnuwees* relaxed nothing of the rigid tutelage in which he had reared him; and the old minister became more than ever watchful of all the state prisoners whose liberty might endanger his own power. He was apprehensive that Maha-

dajee Sindia had intended to use the raja of Satara as an instrument in overthrowing the Bramin government, and he now treated the object of his dread with more than ordinary severity, by diminishing his allowances, and prohibiting his relations from visiting him in the fort.

The family of Rugonath Rao were kept at Kopergaom until the year 1793, when they were removed to Anundwele, near Nassuck, as a place more agreeable to the widow Anundee Bye, whose health was on the decline. In the month of April of the succeeding year she died. The sons, Bajee Rao and Chimnaje Appa, with the adopted son of Rugoba, Amrut Rao, remained at Anundwelee; until upon the prospect of hostilities with Nizam Ally, they were conveyed to the hill-fort of Sewnerree, where, once secured, Nana Furnuwees, at the termination of the war, retained them in close custody, under two officers in whom he confided, Rughoo Punt Ghorebulay and Bulwunt Rao Nagonath.

The condition of these young men excited strong feelings of commiseration, even in the minds of those who judged it necessary; and others, swayed chiefly by their feelings, generally the larger portion of any community, execrated the conduct of the minister as cruel, vindictive, and unjustifiable. Distinct from either of these classes was the old faction of Rugoba, and other persons, wholly discontented, who endeavoured by every means to exalt the character of the prisoners, and lower the reputation of Nana Furnuwees. But these indications of the public mind only increased the wary circumspection of the minister, to whom the elder of the legitimate sons of Rugonath Rao early became an object of jealousy. Graceful in his person, with a handsome and youthful countenance which ensured favourable impressions, Bajee Rao had the mildest manner, and an address so insinuating, that he gained the good-will of all who approached him. His bodily and mental accomplishments were equally extolled; at the age of nineteen, he was an excellent horseman, and skilled in the use of the sword and bow, and allowed to be the most expert spearsman in Gungthuree. He was deeply read in the Shasters, particularly in such parts as regards the observance of caste; and, of his age, no pundit so learned had been known in Maharashtra.

The young Peishwa, so far from being jealous of the superior accomplishments of his cousin, was pleased at hearing him commended, and frequently expressed a strong desire to procure his enlargement, and cultivate his friendship. In vain did the cautious Nana Furnuwees advise him to beware of the sapling, however comely, which sprung from the weakness of Rugonath Rao and the wickedness of Anundee Bye; the greater the restraint, the stronger the inclination; but Mahdoo Rao was watched, and Bajee Rao was a close prisoner. The latter, however, having discovered the favourable disposition of the Peishwa towards him, and having at last gained Bulwunt Rao Nagonath, he conveyed a message with assurances of respect and attachment, adding that "he was in confinement at Sewnerree, and the Peishwa under the control of his minister; that their condition as prisoners was nearly similar, but that their minds and affections were free, and should be devoted to each other; that their ancestors had distinguished themselves, and that the time would arrive when his cousin and himself might hope to emulate their deeds, and raise for themselves a lasting and honorable name." This message was the commencement of a correspondence, which began shortly after the return of the army to Poona, and continued for some time, till at length it came to the knowledge of Nana, who betrayed a rage, altogether unusual, at the discovery. He immediately threw Bulwunt Rao Nagonath into a hill-

fort loaded with irons, severely reproached Mahdöo Rao, and rendered the strictness of Bajee Rao's confinement far more rigid than before. Mahdöo Rao, already galled by restraint, and irritated by the insidious messages of his cousin, was overwhelmed with anger, disappointment, and grief; he refused absolutely to quit his apartment, and his absence from his usual place at the durbar was imputed to fever. At the Dussera, which happened on the 22nd October, and was conducted with great splendour, he appeared amongst his troops, and in the evening received his chiefs and the ambassadors at his court in his accustomed manner; but his spirit was wounded

to desperation, a fixed melancholy seized on his mind, and on the morning of the 25th October he deliberately threw himself from a terrace in his palace, fractured two of his limbs, and was much wounded by the tube of a fountain on which he fell. He survived for two days, and having particularly desired that Bajee Rao should be placed on the musnud, he expired in the arms of Baba Rao Phurkay, for whom he had entertained a strong affection.

The death of Mahdöo Rao was an event of such awful importance to the political existence of Nana Furnuwees, that the consideration of its consequences withdrew his mind from the deep affliction which the untimely end of that amiable young prince would have disposed him to indulge. He carefully suppressed the request of Mahdöo Rao in his cousin's favour, dreading that by such an arrangement he should not only be deprived of power, but perhaps of liberty and of life. His first care, on ascertaining the nature of the accident, was to send off notice to Pureshrām Bhow,

requiring his immediate attendance at Poona with every man he could collect; and the day after the Peishwa's death, Rughoojee Bhonslay and Doulut Rao Sindia were recalled for the purpose of deliberating on the succession to the musnud. Tookajee Holkar, being in Poona, immediately visited the minister, who not only made use of all the popular prejudice existing against the name of Rugonath Rao, but described the enmity, which from the first dawning of reason had been instilled into Bajee Rao by his mother, against the whole of those officers who had now any experience in the affairs of the state; he showed the danger to be apprehended from the connection between his family and the English, dwelt upon the happy state of prosperity and union which then prevailed in the Mahratta empire, and enlarged on the increasing benefits to be expected if the existing course of policy were carefully preserved.

In these sentiments Holkar concurred, and the disposition of the other chiefs being sounded, Nana ventured to disclose his plan by suggesting that Yessooda Bye, the widow of the deceased prince, who had not yet attained the age of womanhood, should adopt a son, in whose name he proposed to conduct the government as heretofore. Some objections were raised by Balloba Tattya, one of the principal ministers of Sindia, but they were overruled by his colleague in office, Jooba Bukhshee, who observed that their master was too young to be able to judge for himself, but he thought his safest course was to be guided by the experience of the elder chiefs, and to follow the example of Tookajee Holkar. At length, after

some discussion, the consent of the principal chiefs was obtained in writing, and in the month of January they again retired from Poona.

In the preceding November, Mr. Malet, the resident on the part of the British government, had made a formal application to the minister for the purpose of ascertaining on what footing the Mahratta government was to be conducted. Nana Furnuwees replied that the widow of the late

Peishwa was to be considered head of the empire, until the great officers of the nation had deliberated upon the succession, when the result should be communicated. He now therefore intimated their resolution that the widow should adopt a son, to which no objection on the part of Mr. Malet could be offered, and nothing was now apparently wanting except the selection of a child, and the performance of the ceremony. But Bajee Rao, who had obtained information of the whole proceeding, by which he was thus unjustly to be deprived of his right, gave a further specimen of his talent for intrigue, by immediately taking advantage of the favourable disposition evinced towards him by Balloba Tattya, opening a correspondence with him, and in a few months gaining him to his cause. This union was the more important to Bajee Rao, as the death of Jooba Bukhshee had taken place a short time before, and on his death-bed he sent for Doulut Rao, and expressed his regret for having advised him to accede to the plan of adoption whilst a lineal descendant of Ballajee Wishwanath remained. Having secured the prime minister, Bajee Rao next addressed himself to Sindia, offering him four lakhs of rupees of territory, and whatever might be the expenses of his troops during the time he should require their aid in asserting his lawful succession to the musnud.

This offer was accepted, a formal agreement was drawn up, but it was scarcely concluded when the whole was divulged to Nana Furnuwees. In the greatest alarm that minister instantly summoned Pureshrum Bhow, who marched from Tasgaom to Poona with a body of horse in 48 hours, a distance of upwards of 120 English miles. After some deliberation, it was resolved to anticipate Sindia's design to release Bajee Rao, and to declare him Peishwa. Pureshrum Bhow accordingly proceeded to the fort of Sewneree, and made his proposals. Amrut Rao advised his brother not to accept them, observing that these offers were but certain indications of Sindia's sincerity. Bajee Rao did not rely on the good-will of either party beyond the dictates of their interests, and, if assured of attaining his object, he would not have hesitated; he, however, urged many objections, though only for the purpose of obtaining satisfactory assurances. With this view, amongst other solemn asseverations, he obliged Pureshrum Bhow to hold the tail of a cow, and swear by the holy Godavery that no deception was intended; after which he descended from the fort, and, accompanied by his brother Chimnajee Appa, set out for his future capital. Amrut Rao, by Pureshrum Bhow's orders, was detained in custody at Sewneree.

Immediately on Bajee Rao's arrival at Poona he had an interview with Nana Furnuwees, when they mutually promised to bury all traces of former enmity in oblivion; and Bajee Rao, on being assured of the succession, promised to retain Nana at the head of his administration. To this agreement both parties exchanged formal declarations* in writing.

* The following is a translation of that which was given by Bajee Rao to Nana Furnuwees:—

"In the presence of my God, and from the inmost recesses of my heart, have I rooted out every vestige of any former act; let all your future conduct be guided by the principles of good faith. I will never injure you or yours, by word or deed, by any inward thought or outward act, neither will I allow any other person to do so; on this point I will be inflexible, and will pay no attention to the suggestions of others. I will not allow your reputation to be sullied, and should any one attempt to instil anything of the kind into my breast, I will point him out to you. I will never release any one from confinement without your advice; all state affairs shall be managed by our conjunct counsel. From this day all your acts are mine: suspicion is wholly eradicated from my heart."

Balloba Tattya, on hearing of the step which Bajee Rao had taken, was incensed at his conduct, but determined to counteract the schemes of Nana Furnuwees. He therefore persuaded Sindia, then on the banks of the Godavery, to march on Poona with his whole force. Nana Furnuwees was dismayed; Pureshrum Bhow advised him to stand firm, to collect the troops, and to give battle; but Nana, deficient in personal courage, was also sensible of the superiority of Sindia's army; he could not trust Bajee Rao, and he was terrified lest he should fall a prisoner into the hands of Balloba Tattya, by whom he believed he should be put to death. Having therefore left Pureshrum Bhow with Bajee Rao at Poona, he told the latter that as Sindia was advancing with intentions hostile only towards himself, he thought the best means of averting ruinous civil dissensions was for him to retire from business, and withdraw from the capital. He accordingly repaired first to Poorundhur, and afterwards to Satara. Sindia arrived in the neighbourhood of Poona, and had a friendly interview with Bajee Rao; but Balloba Tattya, although he affected to meet him with cordiality, could not forget his behaviour, especially after he had seen Amrut Rao, whom he removed from Sewneree to Jamgaom, but did not restore him to liberty.* After considering various plans, Balloba Tattya at last resolved to set aside Bajee Rao, and to raise both a minister and a Peishwa of his own; for which purpose he proposed to Pureshrum Bhow, through Byhroo Punt Mendlee, that Mahdoo Rao's widow should adopt Chinnaajee Appa as her son, that Bajee Rao should be placed in confinement, and that Pureshrum Bhow should conduct the administration. Pureshrum Bhow had begun to despise Nana Furnuwees for his pusillanimous conduct, but he still so far respected his wisdom as to ask his opinion. Nana advised him to accept what was proposed, but to take care that Bajee Rao came into his own custody. To this last essential part of the advice no attention was paid by Pureshrum Bhow. Balloba Tattya pretended to be partly influenced in the measure he now pursued, by the hope of rendering it, in some degree, acceptable to Nana Furnuwees, lest the latter, in the present state of Doulut Rao's inexperience, should form some confederacy, by means of the other chiefs, against the house of Sindia. Balloba accordingly, as soon as Nana's assent had been obtained, made overtures for a reconciliation, to which the latter made no objections.

Nana's own proceedings in the meantime deserve notice. When he quitted Poorundhur and repaired to Satara, he entertained some design of emancipating the raja, and restoring the old form of the government of Sivajee, as a plan calculated to avert the dissensions that had arisen, and which were likely to increase in the state; but a very few days convinced him of the futility of this scheme. The raja, in consequence of the treatment he had experienced, had no confidence in him. The raja's name was sufficiently popular to have brought many of the most warlike Mahratta families to his standard, and to have awakened a powerful interest amongst the descendants of the first followers of Sivajee, residing in the wilds of the Mawuls and Khoras. The raja, though incapable of conducting state affairs himself, was a man of courage, and several of his relations were fit leaders for any desperate enterprize. But Nana's object was to devise some means of establishing a controlling authority over the chiefs of the empire, not to stir up a power subversive of all order. After a few conferences he desisted, and retired to Wasee, a town in the neighbourhood; but his having entertained such a scheme was so far fortunate for

* There is no reason assigned for his not having done so.

the raja, that he was indulged in a little more liberty, and was treated with greater kindness and consideration.

When Nana Furnuwees consented to the proposal of Balloba Tattya for adopting Chimnajee Appa, it became necessary to obtain the raja's khillut of investiture for the new Peishwa ; on which occasion Nana came from Wace to Satara, and, on receiving the khillut, promised that, if he ever had an opportunity, he would endeavour to fulfil the agreement made with Ram Raja in the time of Ballajee Bajee Rao, by putting the present Raja Shao in possession of the territory promised by the treaty of Sangola.

Nana would have proceeded to Poona, but, on finding that Pureshrām Bhow had allowed Sindia's minister to retain the person of Bajee Rao, he suspected, and with good reason, that the whole was a scheme to entice him into the power of Balloba Tattya ; and, therefore, although he forwarded the khillut, he himself remained at Wace.

Bajee Rao was still ignorant of the plot which had been formed against him, and the manner of disclosing it is too characteristic, not only of the period, but of the future ways of the Poona court, to be omitted. Some demands for money on account of Sindia's expenses were made on Bajee Rao, and, upon his expressing inability to comply with them, they were urged in a tone which produced altercation, and Sindia, pretending to take offence at the manner of Bajee Rao's refusal, begged permission to return to Hindostan. Bajee Rao, as had been foreseen, immediately repaired to Sindia's camp for the purpose of privately expostulating ; he was there detained in argument untill late in the evening, when the conference was suddenly interrupted by intelligence of Pureshrām Bhow's having carried off Chimnajee Appa ; no one, it was pretended, knew whither, but it was supposed to Satara. Bajee Rao, alarmed and astonished, begged of Sindia to pursue him ; but the uncertainty of their route, the strength of their party, and the darkness of the night were urged against this proposal. A request, however, to be allowed to continue under Sindia's protection during the night was readily granted, and next day he discovered the snare, upon being advised to remain, as any place beyond the precincts of Sindia's camp was unsafe for his highness.

In the meantime Pureshrām Bhow and Baba Rao Phurkay had merely conveyed Chimnajee Appa into the city of Poona ; but Chimnajee positively refused to become a party in the unjust usurpation of his brother's rights, and compulsion only induced him to bear his share in it. He was adopted by the name of Chimnajee Mahdoo Rao, and formally invested as Peishwa on the 26th May.

The pecuniary difficulties of Sindia, and the distress of his army, were not fictitious. Pureshrām Bhow, on being appointed minister, had promised to raise money, and for this purpose offered to restore the minister of Nizam Ally, Musheer-ool-Moolk, to liberty, on condition of receiving a portion of the balance of three krores of rupees, due by the treaty of Kurdla. Musheer-ool-Moolk said he could only use his endeavours ; but upon this promise he was released from confinement, permitted to encamp in the environs of the city, and, in a short time, was surrounded by a considerable retinue.

The day after the installation of the new Peishwa, Pureshrām Bhow proposed that Nana Furnuwees should come to Poona, meet and be reconciled to Balloba Tattya, and afterwards assume the civil administration in the new Peishwa's government, whilst the command of the troops and all military arrangements should remain with himself. In reply to this proposal, Nana Furnuwees requested that Pureshrām Bhow's

eldest son, Hurry Punt, might be sent to Wase for the purpose of clearly settling some preliminaries; but, instead of coming as an envoy, Hurry Punt crossed the Neera at the head of 4,000 or 5,000 chosen horse—a circumstance that in itself naturally excited suspicions, which were strengthened by a secret letter from Baba Rao Phurkay, advising him to seek his own safety without a moment's delay.

The fortunes of Nana Furnuwees were now, in the general opinion, and perhaps in his own, desperate; but on being forced to abandon half-measures, into which he was misled by a timid disposition, the vigour of his judgment, the fertility of his expedients, the extent of his influence, and the combination of instruments which he called into action surprised all India, and, from his European contemporaries, procured for him the name of "the Mahratta Machiavel."

When he saw the danger imminent, he immediately fled from Wase towards the Concan, blocked up the passes in his rear, threw a strong garrison into Pertabgurr, and, on arriving at the village of Mhar, his first care was to put the fort of Raigurr in the best state of defence. Balloba Tattya proposed that he should be followed up without delay, and offered some of Sindia's regular infantry for the purpose; but Pureshran Bhow, influenced by secret well-wishers of Nana's, objected to the employment of coercive measures, although his hostility to Nana Furnuwees was soon after avowed by his giving up Nana's jagheer lands to Sindia, and sequestering his houses and property in Poona for his own use. The ostensible property, however, of Nana Furnuwees bore but an insignificant proportion to the extent of his concealed wealth. It is a common report that he carried with him, when he quitted Poona, hoards of gold, the accumulated treasures of the Peishwas; but, as already stated on the authority of their accounts, the Peishwas, up to the time of the first Mahdoo Rao, were in debt, and were always embarrassed, so that the riches of Nana Furnuwees, which were without doubt considerable, must have been saved during his own administration. His funds were secretly deposited in different places, or lodged in the hands of agents in various parts of India, so that he could command them with promptitude in case of emergency; but the secret of their deposit, and of his management, remains a mystery, a subject of some curiosity, and the theme of many wonders and impositions amongst the Mahratta vulgar.

The revolution which had taken place naturally tended to unite Bajee Rao and Nana Furnuwees; and a secret intercourse was carried on between them, through the medium of an individual who afterwards became conspicuous. In the service of Nana Poorundhuree there was a Mahratta sillidar, the natural son of the patell of the village of Wangapoor near Poorundhur, who had contrived to attract the notice of Bajee Rao when he was taken from confinement at Sewnerree, and who was afterwards permitted by Nana Poorundhuree to enter Bajee Rao's service. Ballajee Koonjur—for such was the name of this sillidar—perceiving the situation of affairs, although he had little opportunity of consulting his master, visited Nana Furnuwees at Mhar, and conveyed the most friendly declarations and assurances on the part of Bajee Rao, begging of Nana to exert himself in their mutual behalf. No excitement to exertion was necessary: Nana Furnuwees had every engine at work. Baba Rao Phurkay, in command of the Peishwa's household troops, had engaged to bring them over to him. Tookajee Holkar's whole power and influence were ready at his signal, and he had opened

a negotiation with Sindia through Ryajee Patell, whom he knew to be inimical to Balloba Tattya, offering to Sindia the jagheer of Pureshrum Bhow Putwurdhun, the fort of Ahmednugur, with territory yielding 10 lakhs of rupees, on condition that he would place Balloba Tattya in confinement, establish Bajee Rao on the musnud, and return with his army to Hindostan. Thus far of his plans Nana Furnuwees communicated to Ballajee Koonjur for Bajee Rao's information.

This period of the revolution brought many persons into notice, although none so obscure as the individual just mentioned. Of these, one of the most conspicuous was the person employed by Nana Furnuwees to negotiate with Ryajee Patell in order to bring over Sindia: the name of this man was Sukaram Ghatgay, of the Kagul family, whose ancient title, as already mentioned, was Shirzee Rao. Sukaram, having had a quarrel with his relation Yeswunt Rao Ghatgay, the brother-in-law of the raja of Kolapoor, concerning the hereditary rights in their native village, they took up arms to assert them. Sukaram being defeated was obliged to fly from the Kolapoor territory, and seek shelter with Pureshrum Bhow, into whose service he entered, and afterwards exchanged it for that of Nana Furnuwees, who gave him the command of 100 horse. When Nana quitted Poona, Sukaram Ghatgay entered Sindia's service, where he obtained a similar command. He was of an active, bold, intriguing disposition; and by his address had gained the good-will of Ryajee Patell. He was also at this time much courted by Sindia, by reason of the reputed beauty of his daughter, whom Sindia wished to espouse; and Sukaram, who regarded his own aggrandizement more than the dignity of his house, which would be tarnished by his giving a genuine daughter of the Kagulkur Ghatgay to the spurious offspring of the patells of Kunneirkheir, was pleased with the prospect of the alliance, though, to enhance the favour of ultimate compliance, he raised numerous objections to the match.

By the aid of such an agent Nana Furnuwees was successful in gaining over Sindia to his cause; and this secret having been communicated to Baba Rao Phurkay and others of the party, they became less circumspect in their preparations. Bajee Rao in the midst of Sindia's camp, assisted by his father's friend, the veteran Mannajee Phakray,^o used supplies of money furnished by Nana Furnuwees, in levying troops in that situation. These imprudent proceedings were discovered by Balloba Tattya. Baba Rao Phurkay was seized, and imprisoned in the fort of Chakun, but his carcoon, Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo a very active officer, escaped by con-

* Mr. Tone, who was at Poona during the progress of these intrigues, published three letters from the 18th June to the 19th December, giving an account of the extraordinary affairs by which he was surrounded. I depend on better material, but I have examined attentively all which that intelligent gentleman wrote respecting the Mahrattas. What he saw may be relied upon; as to what he heard, I am less surprised that he should have fallen into error, than that he should have obtained information so nearly correct. He describes Mannajee Phakray as "an officer of high military reputation, and so disfigured with wounds as to have scarcely the appearance of a human creature." "Mannajee," say the old sildars of the present day, "was the last of the Mahrattas, and was worthy to wear a bangle on his horse's leg, for he never showed his back to a foe."

Mr. Tone's description of Bajee Rao at this period, except that Bajee Rao was not so old as he supposes, coincides with that of his own countrymen. "Bajee Rao," says Mr. Tone, "is about 25 years of age, light-complexioned, and rather above the middle size; his person is graceful, and his manner strongly impressive; his countenance is manly, sensible, and majestic."

cealing himself in the camp of Musheer-ool-Moolk. Neelkunt Rao Purbhoo and Mallojee Ghorepuray, two chiefs of their party, had a few minutes to prepare for defence; they repulsed the troops sent to apprehend them, and, at the head of a few followers, made good their retreat from Poona to the strong range of hills south of the Neera.

Bajee Rao's place of encampment within Sindia's lines was surrounded and water was cut off. The troops he had assembled were permitted to disperse, but Mannajee Phakray enjoined them to meet him in the neighbourhood of Waee, where they assembled accordingly, and were promptly joined by Neelkunt Rao and Mallojee Ghorepuray. Nana Furnuwees supplied them with money, directed them to take up a position at the Salpee Ghaut, where, being assisted by Nana's friend Bujaba Seroolkur in raising troops, they soon collected 10,000 men, upon which they declared for Bajee Rao.

Balloba Tattya, unconscious of the inextricable and extensive toils which Nana was weaving around him, attributed the whole plot to Bajee Rao, and therefore determined to send him off a prisoner to Hindostan. He was despatched, accordingly, under the care of Sukaram Ghatgay, to whom the command of his escort was entrusted. But Bajee Rao, aware of the most likely means of gaining Sindia, employed all his eloquence to induce Ghatgay to give his daughter to Sindia in marriage, on condition of Bajee Rao's being elevated to the musnud; and of preventing his being carried out of the Deccan, lest Nana Furnuwees, even if successful, should take advantage of his absence to exclude him from the succession. Ghatgay at first declared it to be impossible, but at last, pretending to be won over, he agreed to give his daughter on the following conditions:—that Bajee Rao should authorize him to promise Sindia two krores of rupees in ready money on his becoming Peishwa; that, when Peishwa, he should get him (Ghatgay) appointed Sindia's prime minister; and that he should also endeavour to obtain for him the village of Kagul in enam. Having assented to these conditions, Bajee Rao feigned sickness, and Ghatgay remained with him on the banks of the Paira.

At Poona great preparations were going forward. Musheer-ool-Moolk was permitted by Pureshram Bhow to raise troops, for the purpose, as the former pretended, of assisting to reduce Nana Furnuwees and the force which had declared for Bajee Rao. Holkar's and Sindia's troops were held in readiness apparently for the same purpose, and after the Dussara, which happened on the 11th October, the regular battalions in the Peishwa's service under Mr. Boyd marched to the Neera bridge, and a brigade of Sindia's regulars proceeded towards Raigurh. These movements were made by Pureshram Bhow himself, or artfully suggested by some conspirators, in order to veil the deception about to be practised on him and Balloba Tattya.

The schemes of Nana Furnuwees were now matured. In addition to what has been explained, he had incited the raja of Kolapoor to attack the districts of Pureshram Bhow; he had obtained Nizam Ally's approbation of the draft of a treaty afterwards settled on the 8th October with Musheer-ool-Moolk, the basis of which, was to be the establishment of Bajee Rao on the musnud, and his own re-establishment as minister; for which the territory ceded to the Peishwa by the convention of Kurda was to be restored, and the balance of the stipulated money-payment remitted. The entire remission of the chouth of Beder was also demanded by Nizam Ally, but Nana Furnuwees replied that he could not yield that

point without the previous sanction of Bajee Rao, to whose approval, indeed, the whole was declaredly subject.*

A negotiation with Rughoosjee Bhonslay had been equally successful. To him Nana promised 15 lakhs of rupees for his immediate expenses, the district of Mundelah, and the fort of Chooreegurh, with its dependencies. Three thousand horse, which, by treaty, he was bound to furnish when required, were now only to be called for on emergencies. Some other advantages were also held out, and Rughoosjee had solemnly promised his support.†

The principal powers having been thus secured, the English having

October 27. also expressed their approbation of Bajee Rao's being elevated to the musnud, Sindia, on the 27th October, arrested Balloba Tattya, and sent a body of his troops, accompanied by some of those of Musheer-ool-Moolk, both parties under the direction of Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, for the purpose of seizing Pureshram Bhow. Naroo Punt, however, being desirous of apprising one of his associates, named Pureshram Punt Wydh, wrote him a note, which was carried by mistake to Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun; the latter on reading it instantly got ready a body of horse, and having taken with him Chimnaje Appa, fled with precipitation to Sewnerree; but he was quickly pursued, and compelled to surrender. Anund Rao Rastia having become security for his safe custody, he was delivered over to his charge.

Bajee Rao was now brought back, and encamped at Korygaom, on the Beema, 18 miles from Poona. Amrut Rao and Baba Rao Phurkay were released, and Nana Furnuwees having joined his army at the Salpee Ghaut, the infantry under Mr. Boyd having likewise placed themselves under his orders, he commenced his march for the capital. But on the route, having received a note from Bajee Rao which hinted at the tardiness of his proceedings, he immediately took the alarm, and before he would advance, insisted upon receiving a written declaration from Bajee Rao that he intended no treachery towards him; and that, in case of desiring to resign his situation as minister, he might be permitted to retire where his person and property would be secure. A treaty of

* As this is the treaty of Mhar mentioned in the treaty of Bassein, the stipulations of which were perhaps not fully understood by the Marquis Wellesley, when, in subsequent negotiations with Bajee Rao, he insisted so particularly on their being recognised, I shall here detail them more particularly.

The preliminary of the treaty sets forth, that confusion have arisen in the affairs of the Peishwa, Nana Furnuwees has removed to Mhar, and, for the purpose of restoring order, he, as the chief director of the affairs of the Peishwa, calls for the interposition of Nizam Ally, through his prime minister Azim-ool-Oomrah (Musheer-ool-Moolk) with whom he concludes the following agreement:—Nizam Ally is to send an army of 15,000 men, with a train of artillery, to unite with those of Nana and Rughoosjee Bhonslay, in restoring Bajee Rao. In this alliance Nana engages for the neutrality, and even for the probable co-operation, of the English. The territory and the bills for the money-payment exacted from Nizam Ally at Kurda to be restored. Nizam Ally's right to certain districts near Delhi was confirmed. All contested points to be mutually relinquished, and the Mahratta claims settled annually. The chouth of the soobah of Beder being considered as the *wutum* or private hereditary property of the Peishwa, Nana Furnuwees can only recommend its being ceded to Nizam Ally by Bajee Rao. Two lakhs of rupees to be advanced to Nizam Ally for expenses. The English, to be engaged by Nana Furnuwees, to interpose, in case Tippoo should attack the possessions of Nizam Ally, whilst the army of the latter is employed in the Mahratta territories. Fugitives from the dominions of Nizam Ally to be given up, and Bajee Rao's signature to these articles to be obtained.

† Copy of the original treaty.

guarantee was at the same time entered into by Nizam Ally and Sindia, agreeing to establish Bajee Rao on the musnud, and to reinstate Nana Furnuwees as prime minister; but they also, with a view of securing themselves, agreed to oblige the latter to fulfil the articles of the *respective* treaties which he had made with them—an extraordinary oversight on the part of Sindia, who does not appear to have known the particulars of the agreement with Nizam Ally, or at all events to have considered how much he should become a loser by the relinquishment of the territory and arrears of tribute obtained by the treaty of Kurdla.

November 25. These preliminaries being adjusted, Nana Furnuwees returned to Poona, and resumed the duties of prime minister on the 25th November. The insignia of investiture having been procured from Satara, Bajee Rao was at last seated on the musnud 4th December 1796. It was declared by a council of Shastrees that the relationship between the late Peishwa, Mahdoo Rao Narain, and the sons of Rugonath Rao, prevented the widow of the former from adopting the second cousin of his father; the adoption was therefore declared illegal, and annulled. The Shastrees who had performed the ceremony were expelled. Chimnaje Appa, though he had acted on compulsion, was obliged to undergo some penance to atone for the deed, but he was shortly after appointed by his brother to the government of Guzerat, which was however merely nominal, and the active duties of it were performed by his deputy Aba Shelookur.*

* When not particularly specified, the whole of the foregoing chapter is on the authority of original Mahratta letters and papers, Bombay Records, Mahratta MSS, and from many conversations with actors in the scenes.

CHAP. XXXIX.

A. D. 1797 AND A. D. 1798.

New administration.—Army in a disorderly state.—Ahmednugur made over to Sindia, and the conditions of the treaty with Rughoojee Bhonslay fulfilled.—Bajee Rao refuses to ratify the treaty with Nizam Ally—Musheer-ool-Moolk suddenly quits Poona in consequence.—Nana Furnuwees endeavours to soothe him.—Bajee Rao's policy.—Death of Tookajee Holkar—dispute amongst his sons—Sindia espouses the cause of Khassee Rao—Mulhar Rao killed, and the house of Holkar rendered for a time subservient to that of Sindia.—Sindia's arbitrary conduct.—Bajee Rao still popular—his real character little known—proposes ridding himself of both Nana Furnuwees and Sindia—employs the latter to seize the former, and Nana, with most of the principal ministers, is thrown into confinement—the property of Nana and his adherents given up to plunder.—Outrages and alarms at Poona.—Amrut Rao becomes prime minister.—Sindia espouses the daughter of Ghatgay.—Ghatgay becomes Sindia's prime minister—is empowered to raise the money secretly promised by Bajee Rao by plundering the inhabitants of Poona—dreadful cruelties.—Amrut Rao proposes to seize and confine Sindia—Bajee Rao approves.—Differences with Hyderabad revived.—Bajee Rao summons Sindia to his presence.—Bajee Rao's weakness and treachery.—Affairs of Satara—a force required in that quarter—Bajee Rao's troops mutiny.—Pureshram Bhow enlarged—raises troops—disperses those of the raja, but afterwards refuses to disband his army.—Bajee Rao grants him a pardon.

NANA FURNUWEES was assisted in the ministry by Trimbuck Rao

A. D. 1797.

Pursooree. Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo had chief command of the army, which from the late dissensions was in a very disorderly state; and one desperate affray took place in the streets of Poona between a body of Arabs and a party of Mr. Boyd's sepoys, in which upwards of 100 persons were killed, and a great part of the shops and warehouses in the bazar plundered during the tumult.

The fort of Ahmednugur, and the dependant districts, were made over to Sindia as promised, and he was left at liberty to reduce the jagheer of Pureshram Bhow as he might find opportunity. The articles of agreement

July 13.

with Rughoojee Bhonslay were also fulfilled, and he departed for Nagpoor; but Bajee Rao refused to ratify the treaty of Mhar concluded with Nizam Ally, unless greatly modified; in consequence of which Musheer-ool-Moolk quitted Poona, without taking leave of the Peishwa, and returned, highly incensed, to Hyderabad. There was at that time no envoy at the Nizam's court, Govind Rao Pingley being at Poona; but his agent, named Sewdasheo Mankesir,* a person whom we shall hereafter have frequent occasion to notice, and whom Pingley kept at the court of Nizam Ally in the humble capacity of a news-writer, was

* Generally so written by the English; properly, however, it is Mankeshwar.

recommended by Pingley to Nana Furnuwees as a fit agent to soothe Musheer-ool-Moolk, and prevent the interruption of the amicable intercourse which it was so important for Nana to preserve.

The difference, however, which thus arose, Bajee Rao was at no pains to adjust ; it weakened the confederacy which Nana Furnuwees had formed,

and the great power he so lately combined was still more shaken by the death of Tookajee Holkar. Holkar left two legitimate sons, Khassee Rao and Mulhar Rao ; and two by a concubine, Jeswunt Rao and Wittoojee. Khassee Rao was imbecile both in mind and body, but Mulhar Rao was in every respect qualified to support the fortunes of the house. Disputes soon arose between the brothers, in which the illegitimate sons took the part of Mulhar Rao, who, in a few days, removed from his late father's camp with a small body of troops, and took up his abode at Bambooree, a village in the suburbs of Poona, where he was secretly favoured by Nana Furnuwees. Sindia, who only watched for such an opportunity, on being solicited by Khassee Rao, readily afforded the aid of a body of troops for the purpose of apprehending Mulhar Rao, who, refusing to surrender, was attacked, and maintained a desperate defence until he was killed. His half-brothers made their escape—Jeswunt Rao to Nagpoor, and Wittoojee to Kolapoor ; but most of his handful of associates fell with him, and, amongst others, Sindia, Ruwee Rao of Lonee, a gallant soldier, whose fate was rendered more memorable from the fatal effects which the communication of the news had on his widow, who, on being told, dropped dead on the instant.

The assistance thus afforded by Doulut Rao to a person of such a character as Khassee Rao rendered the house of Holkar for a time subservient to that of Sindia, and was a death-blow to the power of Nana Furnuwees. Sindia further secured his advantage by having Khundee Rao, the infant son of the deceased Mulhar Rao, kept in safe custody.

The interference of Sindia in the state affairs of Poona, which Bajee Rao, with a great want of foresight, secretly encouraged, soon extended to acts of sovereignty, some of which were of a nature more arbitrary than had ever been practised by the Peishwa's government. The circumstances particularly alluded to were the capture of the fort of Kolabah, the imprisonment of Mannajee Angria, and the transfer of that principality to Baboo Rao Angria, Sindia's near relation.

The obloquy of such a violent and partial proceeding did not attach to Bajee Rao ; his appearance and misfortunes continued to attract sympathy, and the control by which the supposed goodness of his natural disposition was repressed, became a theme of general regret. Mr. Uhtoff, however, the acting resident at Poona, seems, at this early period, to have discovered much of his real character ; and it soon appeared that the opinion entertained of Bajee Rao's goodness and wisdom was in fact but a proof of his dissimulation and cunning. To trust none, and to deceive all, was the game he invariably played, and, like all who have ever done so, he never failed to lose. His attention was naturally directed to become independent of Sindia and of Nana Furnuwees ; he imagined he should soon be able to induce or compel the former to return to Hindostan, but he concluded that the thralldom of the minister would be perpetual. His first object, therefore, was to endeavour to effect the ruin of Nana Furnuwees. Amrut Rao, Govind Rao Kallay, and some others were privy to the design ; but Bajee Rao's chief instrument was Ghatgay, now distinguished by his family title of Shirzee Rao, whose daughter, though promised, was not yet given in marriage, to Doulut Rao Sindia. No person

had more influence with that chieftain, and Bajee Rao persuaded Shirzee Rao that his views of becoming minister to his future son-in-law would al-

December 31. ways be obstructed whilst Nana Furnuwees had a vestige of power. It was therefore determined to place him in confinement. On the 31st December, Nana Furnuwees, after some precaution, was induced to return a formal visit of ceremony which Sindia had paid him a few days before, when he was seized by Michel Filoze, the Neapolitan who accompanied Mahadajee Sindia to the Deccan in 1792, and who now commanded eight battalions in the service of Doulut Rao. Filoze had, on his word of honor, guaranteed the safe return of the old minister to his home, and his perfidious conduct excited just indignation, particularly amongst the European officers in the service of the native states—a set of men who, though mere soldiers of fortune, had become as distinguished for good faith as daring enterprize, and their general character had induced Nana to accept Filoze's word in preference to any other pledge he might have obtained.* Aba Shelookur, Bujaba Seroolkur, Naroo Punt Wydh, and several other persons of distinction who accompanied Nana Furnuwees, were seized at the same time; the rest of his retinue, amounting to about 1,000 persons, were stripped, maimed, some of them killed, and the whole dispersed. Parties of soldiers were immediately sent by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay† to plunder, not only the house of Nana, but the houses of all his adherents, many of whom barricaded their doors, and defended themselves from the tops and windows. The city of Poona was like a town taken by storm; the firing continued the whole of the night and the ensuing day. The roads in every direction were stopped; all was uproar, plunder, and bloodshed; the alarm was universal, and, in the words of a spectator, "friends marched together in groups, with their shields on their arms, and their swords in their hands."‡

At the time Nana was seized in Sindia's camp, Bajee Rao, on pretence of business, sent for the other ministers of that party, and confined them. The principal persons among them were Baba Rao Phurkay, Appa Bulwunt, Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, Naroo Neelkunt Muzzimdar, and Govind Rao Pingley. Nana Furnuwees was sent into close confinement in the fort of Ahmednugur; and Bajee Rao appointed his brother Amrut Rao prime minister, with Govind Rao Kallay and Sewrain Narain Thuthay as his colleagues, whilst Ballajee Punt Putwurdhun, a man of no experience, was raised to the command of the army.

* The Mahrattas excuse Filoze's treachery by saying that he was entirely ignorant of Sindia's intention to seize Nana; that there was no premeditated deception on his part, and that he was compelled to the act by a sudden order, accompanied by threats and promises from Shirzee Rao, through a person named Meer Assud Alew Wahid. The mere circumstance of their wishing to defend Filoze is honorable to the European character; had it regarded any of their own countrymen, the story would have been received without investigation, as a matter of course.

Mahrattas wishing to be polite, always disparage themselves, and, in addressing a European, nothing is more common than to speak of themselves as a treacherous, deceitful race of marauders, on whom no dependance should be placed. One unacquainted with their manners, or who has superficially observed them, would not readily suppose that they merely intend an indirect compliment, knowing how highly truth and plain dealing are estimated among us.

† Ghatgay, Shirzee Rao, is the proper way of writing the name and title, but he is best known to Europeans as Shirzee Rao Ghatgay.

‡ Mahratta MSS., Mr. Uhtoff's despatches, oral information.

Having thus effected, as he supposed, the overthrow of Nana Furnuwees, A. D. 1798. Bajee Rao began to devise schemes for ridding himself of Sindia; but in the first instance he found himself compelled to perform his engagements with Sindia and Ghatgay, though he hoped that, in the progress of their fulfilment, he might find the means of completing his schemes.

Sindia espoused the daughter of Ghatgay in March; the marriage expenses were great; and the monthly pay of Sindia's army at Poona was upwards of 20 lakhs of rupees. His pecuniary distress soon became urgent: he pressed Bajee Rao for the payment of the two crores of rupees which he had secretly promised, and was answered that he had not the means of raising it himself, but if Sindia would create Ghatgay his dewan, the latter might, assisted by information from Ballajee Koonjur, levy it upon the rich inhabitants of Poona. To this Sindia agreed; and such was the secret means by which Shirzee Rao Ghatgay became minister to his son-in-law, and by which Bajee Rao Rugonath let loose upon his subjects the violence and extortion of a monster, whose name will be remembered whilst Poona exists, with horror and execration. To obtain the object of his mission, Ghatgay first proceeded to the palace of Bajee Rao, where the ex-ministers, late of the party of Nana Furnuwees, were confined. Those respectable persons were dragged forth, and scourged, until they gave up their property. Merchants, bankers, and all persons in the city supposed to possess wealth, were next seized and tortured. Several of them died of the consequences, and Gungadhur Punt Bhanoo, one of the relations of Nana Furnuwees, expired whilst tied on a heated gun—one of the many modes of torture invented by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay.

It was not supposed at the time, nor is it generally known, that Bajee Rao was the original cause of those excesses; he certainly never contemplated the commission of such barbarous enormities. He was shocked at the cruelties of Ghatgay, and remonstrated with Sindia on the subject; but the latter lent a deaf ear to complaints, which he considered mere hypocrisy, or excuses to the world. Amrut Rao, who knew nothing of the existing compact, or that his brother had devised this mode of raising money, being irritated at the conduct of Ghatgay, and encouraged by the universal cry of abhorrence against Sindia, proposed to his brother the bold scheme of seizing Sindia when on a visit; in which Bajee Rao immediately acquiesced, and was soon eager to carry it into effect. Previous to this suggestion, Bajee Rao had concerted with Amrut Rao a plan for raising a body of regular infantry, which in that respect might place him more on an equality with Sindia and Nizam Ally: in cavalry he could soon become superior to both. Amrut Rao, from his early intercourse with the British troops, during the campaigns of his father Rugoba, had a decided predilection for that nation over all other Europeans. He selected Mr. W. H. Tone to command the first brigade, of which the whole of the officers were to have been British subjects. To obtain a pretext with Sindia for this meditated augmentation, he referred to the state of their relations with the court of Hyderabad, and proposed that they should undertake a conjunct expedition against Nizam Ally, for the recovery of the balance of the arrears of tribute fixed, and of the districts ceded by the treaty of Kurdla, which had been restored by Nana Furnuwees without the Peishwa's authority or Sindia's knowledge. Sindia having readily acquiesced, the intention of the Poona court was formally announced to the British government on the 9th February; but the brigade of infantry was never raised, and the rest of the Peishwa's army,

owing to his secret jealousy of Amrut Rao, his own ignorance of military affairs, and his unfit selection of a commander, became daily less efficient. Bajee Rao's total want of preparation did not, however, deter him from carrying on the scheme against Sindia; strong factions began to prevail in the camp of the latter, which encouraged Bajee Rao to hope that, by fomenting the rising disorders, the ministers and army of Sindia might be brought over to his views, or soon be reconciled to the disposal of their master.

In this state of affairs Sindia's unpopularity having become extreme, Amrut Rao, with Bajee Rao's cognizance, prepared Abba Kally, the commander of one of the Peishwa's regular battalions, to be ready to rush in, upon an appointed signal, and seize Sindia. Doulut Rao was invited, on business, to the Peishwa's palace; but the invitation being declined, a positive order was sent by Bajee Rao, desiring his attendance. He obeyed the summons; and soon after he sat down, Bajee Rao told him he had sent for him to desire an explanation of his conduct; and suddenly assuming a tone of authority and decision, for which the other was quite unprepared, he required of him to declare whether he was master or servant. Sindia having answered, with respect and humility, that he was the Peishwa's servant, and ready to show his dependence by his obedience, Bajee Rao reminded him of the insolence, violence, and cruelty which he and his servants had used, in numberless instances, towards the servants and subjects of his government, in the city and even in his own palace; he declared that "the contempt and disrespect thus shown towards his person and authority, he could bear no longer, and therefore ordered Sindia to remove to Jangaoim." Doulut Rao's reply was couched in the mildest terms; but whilst he expressed his willingness to obey, he declared his inability to move from want of funds to pay his troops; "that he had large debts incurred by placing his highness on the musnud, which it was incumbent on his highness to discharge: when that was effected, he would immediately quit Poona." At this moment Amrut Rao asked his brother if he should give the signal; but Bajee Rao's heart failed him; he had not courage to proceed in the design, and thus gave his friends the first decided proof of that imbecility which swayed most of the actions of his life. Sindia withdrew from the presence in a manner the most respectful, but with a mind filled with suspicion and distrust; and Bajee Rao had afterwards the baseness, as well as the weakness, to tell him what Amrut Rao had intended, and to advise him to be upon his guard.*

The Peishwa's troops were as much in arrears as the army of Sindia. The state of affairs at Satara, which we shall presently explain, demanded the presence of a military force; but on their services being required, the men demanded their pay, and a tumult arose, which the commander, Ballajee Punt Putwurdhun, could not appease. Ballajee Koonjur, with the presumption of a favourite, made an attempt to restore order; but the soldiery ridiculed his interference, and, on his persevering, they grossly insulted him by knocking off his turban, and kicking it in the streets. Govind Rao Pingley, who was still in confinement, sent a confidential message to the Peishwa, advising him to release Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo as the only person capable of preventing most serious disturbance—a suggestion to which, in the moment of alarm, Bajee Rao readily acceded. He also restored Pingley to liberty the more readily as that person, though one of the late ministry, was no real friend to Nana Furnuwees.

* The despatches of Colonel Palmer detail what publicly took place at the interview; the rest is from living authority.

Naroo Punt Chuckurdeo, with that facility which any officer who has gained the confidence of the natives of India is sure to experience, calmed the tumult in a day; but Bajee Rao could neither spare troops from Poona, nor trust the new commander at a distance—circumstances which led to the enlargement of another state prisoner of consequence—Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun.

When Bajee Rao laid his plans for the overthrow of Nana Furnuwees, he engaged the raja of Satara in the plot, and advised him to confine Baboo Rao Kishen, Nana's agent, and to seize the fort, assuring him that it was his determination to re-establish the old form of government, and to serve the head of the state as faithfully as the first Bajee Rao had done. The raja promptly complied with this request, confined Baboo Rao, and seized the fort. But after Nana Furnuwees was imprisoned, when Sewram Narain Thuthay arrived on the part of the Peishwa to receive charge, the raja told him he would take care of the fort himself, and expressed a hope that his servant, the Peishwa, would soon fulfil his intentions. Bajee Rao, alarmed at the consequence of his own intrigues, ordered Mahdoo Rao Rastia to proceed to Satara, and endeavour to prevail on the raja to admit his troops into the fort. A respectable force accompanied Rastia; but the raja, having his relations about him, would neither yield to promises nor threats. These proceedings at last attracted the notice of Sindia, who, suspecting that Bajee Rao's intrigue with the raja was some scheme for enlarging his own power, secretly advised the raja to maintain the fort, and to raise troops, promising that he would assist him to throw off the Bramin yoke, for which purpose he solemnly engaged to send him five battalions with their guns.*

The raja soon began to collect troops; and Mahdoo Rao Rastia, having interfered to prevent it, was attacked and obliged to retire from Satara to Malgaom. This event became the more alarming to the Peishwa, from the disposition and state of his army at Poona, already described.

It so happened that Pureshram Bhow Putwurdhun, hitherto confined by Anund Rao, the brother of Mahdoo Rao Rastia, at Mandooagaom, was at the moment removed to Waee, and, confident in his own influence, he offered his services in suppressing the disturbances and recovering the fort, on condition that he should be permitted to raise troops for the purpose. Accordingly, having obtained the Peishwa's sanction, and being assisted by Rastia, Pureshram Bhow soon assembled a considerable force in the neighbourhood of Waee.

The town of Satara lies immediately under the fort, in a deep hollow nearly surrounded on three sides by hills; cut off from the west by the Syhadree mountains, and from every other quarter by the Yena, Kistna, and Oormooree rivers. The raja's troops lay encamped in the town, and it being then the height of the rains, when the Yena was supposed unfordable, they considered themselves so perfectly secure, that they had not even the precaution to send out patrols. Pureshram Bhow discovered a ford,† and crossed with nearly 10,000 men before intelligence was received of his approach. The force collected by the raja scarcely amounted to

* Bappoo Khanoo's history of his own times. This promise was actually made through Bappoo Khanoo, the secret agent of the raja of Satara. Shirzee Rao Ghatgay and Seedoojee Rao Nimbalkur, the present jagheerdar of Nepanee, were present at the time.

† The ford was known to very few persons, and the Bramins, desirous of improving any circumstance in their own favour, gave out, what is still generally believed, that on this occasion the waters divided to allow Pureshram Bhow to pass.

2,500 men, and were quite unprepared. The raja had barely time to escape into the fort, and his troops were flying, until rallied by his relations Yellojee and Senajee Mohitey, Kooshaba raja, and Doorgajee Raja Mahareek : these persons were gallantly seconded by the raja's brother, Chittoor Sing, who was the mainspring of the party. As soon as they had collected a small band, they advanced to the environs of the town to oppose the approaching army ; resistance was hopeless, but they pressed forward for a few minutes with impetuosity, until Yellojee Mohitey was killed, and both the Mahareeks wounded, when the party, by Chittoor Sing's advice, retreated. Senajee Mohitey, however, refused to turn his back, and though alone, having tried to single out Mahdoo Rao Rastia, he charged at him, in the midst of his followers, by whom he was soon cut in pieces.

The plunder of the town of Satara occupied the troops of the victors ; and though a party pursued him, Chittoor Sing was enabled, with a small band of faithful followers, to join the raja of Kolapoor, who, ever since he had been excited by Nana Furnuwees to attack Pureshrain Bhow, had spread fire and sword over the whole of the southern Mahratta country.

The fort of Satara being destitute of provisions, the raja surrendered, and the service being thus accomplished, Pureshrain Bhow was desired to disband his troops ; but he excused himself, declaring his inability to pay their arrears, and protesting his fidelity to the Peishwa's government. Bajee Rao was therefore recommended to grant him a pardon, on his agreeing to pay a fine of 10 lakhs of rupees.*

* My authority for the foregoing chapter is the same as the last,

CHAP. XL.

FROM A. D. 1798 TO A. D. 1800.

Disorders increase at Poona.—The Byes.—Commencement of their insurrection against Sindia—they seek protection in the camp of Amrut Rao—negotiation.—Amrut Rao's troops treacherously attacked.—Rupture between the Peishwa and Sindia.—The Peishwa negotiates with other powers.—Sindia releases Nana Furnuwees.—Reconciliation between Sindia and the Peishwa.—Shirzee Rao Ghatgay is seized and confined by Sindia's orders.—The union of Bajee Rao and Sindia strengthened by the course of policy adopted by the English.—The British government endeavours to negotiate a new treaty with Nizam Ally and the Maharrattas.—Nana Furnuwees is solicited to resume charge of the administration.—Nana, deceived by Bajee Rao, assumes charge without the guarantee he had at first demanded.—Treachery of Bajee Rao—Nana's behaviour.—The Peishwa's agents seized and confined.—New treaty between Nizam Ally and the English—regarded by the Maharrattas with much jealousy.—Nana's advice—Bajee Rao's dissimulation.—Plan of a confederacy against the English disconcerted by the subversion of Tippoo's government.—Orders sent by the Peishwa for the advance of his troops after the war had terminated.—Dispersion of the followers of Dhoondia Waug.—Dhoondia joins the raja of Kolapoor.—Remarks on the conquest of Tippoo's territory—partition—discussions with the Poona court.—New treaty between the English and Nizam Ally.—Affairs of Sindia—the insurrection of the Byes becomes extremely formidable—by the re-appointment of Balloba Tattya it is nearly suppressed.—State of the war with Kolapoor—exploits of Chittoor Sing—proposed plan of operations—Pureshrum Bhow defeated and killed—Kolapoor besieged—siege raised.

IN the meantime disorders increased at Poona, and Sindia's situation was rendered extremely critical. The danger proceeded from a quarter whence he least expected it.

Mahadajee Sindia at his death left three widows, one of whom, named

A. D. 1798. Bhagirthee Bye, was young and beautiful. Doult Rao, at the time of his being acknowledged the adopted son and heir of his uncle, promised to make an ample provision for these ladies. They accordingly continued to reside in his camp; but no steps were taken to ensure them a permanent establishment, and in a short time some of their ordinary comforts were circumscribed. No complaint appears to have escaped them; but of a sudden it was discovered, or at all events alleged, by the elder widows, that Sindia carried on a criminal intercourse with the youngest, at which they openly expressed their abhorrence, and declared they could no longer consider as a son the incestuous defiler of his father's bed. Shirzee Rao Ghatgay interposed; the ladies denied him admittance to their presence; but this miscreant, having forced the enclosure of their tents, seized, flogged, and barbarous-

ly degraded them. The Shenwee Bramins, who had held the principal offices under the government of Mahadajee Sindia, and many of whom were connected by relationship as well as by caste, being already much disgusted by the elevation of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay and the confinement of Balloba Tattya, whom they regarded as their chief, espoused the cause of the two Byes. Much dissension and discussion ensued; but it was at last settled that the ladies should proceed to Burhanpoor, where they were to take up their abode, provided with a suitable establishment and funds for its support.

They accordingly departed from Poona, but instead of carrying them to Burhanpoor, their escort was directed to place them in confinement at Ahmednugur. This treachery being immediately discovered by their adherents in camp, they had scarcely reached Korygaom, on the Beema, when Muzuffir Khan, a Patan officer in the interest of the Shenwee Bramins, who commanded a choice body of Hindostan horse in Sindia's service, suddenly assailed the escort, rescued the ladies, and brought them back to the neighbourhood of Sindia's camp. This daring act would have been punished immediately, but Sindia had reason to believe that many chief persons in his army were concerned, and he also hesitated in attacking a party of desperate men, lest either of the females, standing in such relationship to himself, should be killed in the tumult—an accident which would have entailed upon him the greatest disgrace and odium throughout the Mahratta country. Ghatgay, however, strenuously urged him to crush the conspiracy in the outset, and was at last permitted to act against them; but Muzuffir Khan, who had correct intelligence of their proceedings, withdrew the ladies to the camp of the Peishwa's brother, Amrut Rao, who happened to be near the Beema, on his route to Joonere, and who instantly afforded them protection. Ghatgay had in person pursued Muzuffir Khan, and the latter no sooner deposited his charge, than he sallied forth, attacked his pursuers, routed them, and returned in triumph to the camp of Amrut Rao.

It is alleged that Bajee Rao was the instigator of this revolt, and it is certain that he encouraged the partizans of the Byes to persevere. He said, with apparent sincerity, that he considered the protection which his brother had afforded as humane and proper; but apprehensive lest it should provoke Sindia and Ghatgay to deeds of violence, he solicited the friendly interposition of Colonel Palmer, the British resident at his court, who tendered his mediation to Sindia, by whom it was declined.

On the night of the 7th June, five battalions of regular infantry were sent by Sindia, under a Frenchman named Du Prat, to endeavour to surprise the camp of Amrut Rao, and seize the Byes; but he failed in the attempt, and, being briskly attacked, was compelled to retreat with some loss. Negotiations ensued; a suitable provision, and a place of residence of their own selection, were again promised to the Byes, and Amrut Rao, not doubting Sindia's sincerity, approached his camp in the neighbourhood of Poona, and took up his ground at the Khirkee bridge. When Amrut Rao had been thrown entirely off his guard, Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, taking advantage of the Mahomedan festival, which commemorates the death of the sons of Ali and Fatima,* came to the riverside on the 11th of Mohurram, when the bier is thrown into the water; he was attended by M. Drugeon, a French-

* This festival, termed the Hoosein Hosyn, should only commemorate the death of Hosyn, whose fall is nowhere so well related as by Gibbon, volume 9th.

man, at the head of two brigades of infantry, on pretence of preserving order, and protecting this concluding ceremony ; but they suddenly opened a fire from 25 guns upon the unsuspecting troops of Amrut Rao, advanced, charged, and dispersed them with this powerful body of infantry, and afterwards totally pillaged their camp. The Byes were at the time residing in the hamlet of Wittulwaree, so that this outrage was a direct attack on the Peishwa's brother, and open war between the Peishwa and Sindia was supposed to be declared. Khassee Rao Holkar joined Amrut Rao, the Mankurees repaired to his standard, and the Peishwa negotiated an offensive and defensive alliance with Nizam Ally, through his resident envoys, then at Poona. The articles agreed to between Nizam Ally and Nana Furnuwees by the treaty of Mhar were to be confirmed by the Peishwa, the chouth of Beder was to be remitted, and an additional tract of territory, yielding eight lakhs of rupees, was to be ceded to Nizam Ally in perpetuity, as the price of his assistance against Sindia. Nizam Ally also agreed to support the Peishwa against any future encroachment of the ex-minister, Nana Furnuwees ; but in case of his being liberated by Sindia, it was stipulated that Bajee Rao should allow him an annual pension of one lakh of rupees. Rughoosjee Bhonslay, if he chose to accede to it, was to be considered a party to this treaty, and was to receive the whole of Gurrah Mundelah from Bajee Rao.

Sindia, now alarmed, became very desirous of obtaining that mediation which he had before refused from the British government. Colonel Palmer recommended the dismissal of his present ministers, the settlement of a jagheer upon the Byes, and reparation to the Peishwa by submitting to his authority. Sindia appeared much disposed to follow this advice ; but the Byes became so extravagant in their demands, that it was impossible to accede to them ; and although he was now really desirous of returning to Hindostan, he had no means of discharging any part of the great arrears due to his army.

In order to intimidate Bajee Rao, and to establish an alliance as a counterpoise to that which was just formed between the Nizam and the Peishwa, Sindia sent envoys to Tippoo ; but Bajee Rao, by the advice of Govind Rao Kallay, did the same. A more efficacious mode of alarming Bajee Rao was the release of Nana Furnuwees, by which Sindia also hoped to obtain a sufficient sum to free him from the most urgent of his embarrassments.

Nana Furnuwees was accordingly brought from Ahmednugur, and two crores of rupees demanded as the price of his liberty. After some delay, during which Nana attempted to throw himself on the protection of the British government, he at last agreed to pay Sindia ten lakhs of rupees, provided he were previously set at liberty ; as otherwise, whilst under restraint, his agents would comply with no order, even if furnished with a private token from himself. He accordingly obtained his liberty, and the money was promptly paid.

The enlargement of Nana, though a source of great concern to Bajee Rao, was not unlooked for ; but when it was almost immediately followed by the revocation of the treaty with Nizam Ally, from causes not sufficiently explained, but chiefly owing to the unsteady and fluctuating policy of the minister Musheer-ool-Moolk, the Peishwa lost no time in commencing negotiations with Nana Furnuwees and with Sindia. The latter, not yet apprized of the revocation of the treaty, apprehensive of an attack from confederated Mahrattas and Moghuls, and alarmed by reports of disaffection among his troops in Hindostan, received these overtures with compla-

ceity, but insisted on the reinstatement of Nana Furnuwees as preliminary to an accommodation. Ghatgay, in the meantime, assisted by an agent worthy of himself, a Mahratta named Fukeerjee Garway, continued to commit every species of extortion and excess : he even disregarded the remonstrances of Sindia, and his cruelty, increased by indulgence, was almost unparalleled. He seized four officers in Sindia's army, on mere suspicion of their being concerned in the Byes' insurrection ; he blew three of them from guns, and the fourth, Yeswunt Rao Sivajee, had a tent-peg driven into his brain by a mallet.

Sindia, aroused at length by the contempt shown to his authority, and the universal cry of execration excited by such conduct, listened to the representations of Ramjee Patell and Aba Chitnees, and directed two young men, the sons of Filoze and Hessing* by native mothers, to arrest Ghatgay and Garway, which they effected with great dexterity.

The confinement of these persons was a further step to a reconciliation between Sindia and Bajee Rao, and the new course of policy adopted about this period by the English tended to a species of union between them.

The system of neutrality, followed by the British government in India, during the administration of Sir John Shore, was entirely reversed soon after the arrival of Lord Mornington, afterwards Marquis Wellesley, in India, on the 26th April 1798. The reversal of the political relations of the English with the courts of Hyderabad and Poona was the first object to which the residents were instructed to direct their attention for the purpose of securing the alliance of those states, so as, at all events, to prevent their resources from being employed against the British government, in the same manner as appeared to be meditated by the Sultan of Mysore in his recent connections with the French.

The principal danger to the English in a war with Tippoo, supported by their European rival, was the fear of his being joined by the other native powers, whose governments were not only becoming gradually weaker, and therefore more likely to be guided by petty intrigue than by sound policy, but a great change had taken place in their military strength, especially that of Sindia and Nizam Ally, which now, in a great measure, lay in their numerous corps of regular infantry, and these chiefly commanded by French officers.

It was, therefore, of importance to the British government to secure the alliance of Nizam Ally and the Mahrattas, and it became a primary object to induce Sindia to return to Hindostan, both from the central situation his brigades occupied in the Deccan, and from his known desire to obstruct the influence of the British with the Peishwa, over whom it was his policy to perpetuate his own ascendancy.

The reported designs of Zuman Shah, king of Cabul, and grandson of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, a name terrible to Mahrattas, were strongly set forth by the British agents, in order to induce Sindia to return for the protection of his dominions in Hindostan ; whilst to the Peishwa was offered a body of the company's troops for the protection of his person and authority, and the revival of the energies of his government. Bajee Rao had shortly before made an application to the British of a nature similar to this arrangement, but at that period, both their policy and the operation of the Act of Parliament prevented their complying with his request. The sudden desire now evinced by the English to grant him a subsidiary force,

* Hessing, the father, was an Englishman, and held the rank of colonel in Sindia's service. He bore an excellent character.

their frequent recommendations to reinstate Nana Furnuwees in the ministry, and to remove Sindia from Poona, led Bajee Rao, whose views and information were bounded by very narrow limits, to suppose that the whole was a scheme of the detested Nana, the object most dreaded, and therefore uppermost in his mind.

Accordingly, although Sindia had declared his intention of endeavouring to return to Hindostan, a public visit of ceremony announced the reconciliation which had taken place between Sindia and Nana Furnuwees on the one part, and Bajee Rao on the other, the Peishwa shortly afterwards, in a secret conference with Sindia, urged his stay at Poona for the purpose of preventing the introduction of the English by Nana Furnuwees; but he was at the same moment doing all in his power to conciliate Nana, and was pressing him to quit Sindia's camp for the purpose of resuming the duties of administration. Nana accordingly returned once more to the city of Poona, but declined interfering with the Peishwa's affairs, until the safety of his person and property should be guaranteed by the British government and Nizam Ally, and until he could effect a reconciliation in Sindia's family to enable him to return to Hindostan. To forward the latter object, he laboured to bring about an accommodation, and in hopes of expediting Sindia's march, advanced him 15 lakhs of rupees from his private treasury, in addition to the 10 lakhs before paid at the time of his liberation.

Perceiving that Sindia was really serious in his proposal of returning to Hindostan, Bajee Rao intimated his intention of paying Nana Furnuwees a secret visit, and in disguise, so that it might not come to Sindia's knowledge. In the middle of the night, attended by a single domestic, he repaired to Nana's house, and for the time succeeded in deceiving the old minister into a belief of his being wholly unconcerned in his seizure and disgrace, and that he confined the other ministers in the vain hope of affording them protection from the violence and rapacity of Sindia's agents. Colonel Palmer, the British resident, was of opinion that Nana Furnuwees was never deceived by him, but the fact is proved by the result; and, indeed, the eloquence and manner of Bajee Rao are so powerful and insinuating, that he had deceived most men even when on their guard against him. On this occasion, perceiving the effect his language produced, he laid his head at the feet of Nana Furnuwees, swore by those feet* to consider him as his father, to abide by his counsel in all his future measures, and finally, in a burst of tears, conjured and entreated that he would not abandon the Bramin sovereignty, assailed, as it then was, by the factions of the Mahrattas and the ambition of the English.

In consequence of this appeal Nana Furnuwees resumed the duties of

October 15. minister, without those securities for which he had at first so prudently stipulated; but scarcely had he begun the transaction of public business, when he was informed by Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray† that Bajee Rao was again endeavouring to persuade Sindia to confine him—intelligence which was confirmed by Sindia himself. Nana instantly repaired to the palace;

* To swear by the feet of a Bramin is one of the most sacred and solemn of Hindoo oaths.

† This person, who came into Sindia's confidence, whose name has already appeared, and whom we shall have occasion to notice repeatedly, was of the family of the great Suntajee Ghorepuray, so conspicuous in the days of Aurungzebe, and a descendant of Moorar Rao Ghorepuray of Gooty, so often mentioned by Orme.

taxed the Peishwa with his unparalleled duplicity; begged that he would no longer plot against the life and freedom of an old man, borne down by years, infirmity, and misfortune, but permit him to retire to some spot far from courts and camps, where his being suffered to exist could never interfere with any plans his highness might form. He abjured the desire of now possessing power on his own account, and declared that he had only accepted it in hopes of being still useful. Bajee Rao positively denied having been accessory to a proceeding so treacherous, and begged that those who had used his name might be apprehended. Sindia immediately seized the Peishwa's minister Govind Rao Kallay, and Sewram Narain Thuthay, the agents employed; but as it is a point of honor amongst Mahrattas never to divulge the name of their principal on such occasions, they bore the loss of their liberty and property without impeaching the veracity of their master, and Sewram Narain Thuthay soon after died.

Satisfaction being thus afforded, Nana Furnuwees resumed the office of prime minister; but his suspicions were not removed, and he avoided all interference in business not absolutely necessary.

The period, however, was extremely important; Nizam Ally had concluded a new treaty with the English on the 1st September 1798, by which he agreed to receive no Frenchman into his service, to dismiss his French officers, and disband the whole of the infantry lately commanded by Raymond,* receiving in their stead six battalions of English sepoys, each battalion 1,000 strong, with a proportion of European artillery, for which he agreed to pay an annual subsidy of 24,17,100 rupees. The English government also became bound, by an article cautiously expressed, to mediate between Nizam Ally and the Peishwa, and, in case of differences arising between them, to use every endeavour to induce the Peishwa to accede to a friendly arbitration.

The Mahrattas naturally viewed this treaty with much jealousy, and the Peishwa, on being urged by the British agent to conclude a similar one, evaded the subject by an assurance that he would faithfully execute the conditions of subsisting engagements, and, on the prospect of a war with Tippoo, promised to afford his aid. In these replies Bajee Rao had followed the opinion and advice of Nana Furnuwees, but had neither sincerity nor steadiness to fulfil the engagements alluded to, though assured by Nana that any departure from good faith must equally affect the honor and security of his government. Nana Furnuwees recommended that Appa Sahib, the son of Pureshrum Bhow, should be appointed to command the contingent intended to co-operate with the English; and in the present exigency proposed to assemble it, by collecting the force under Dhondoo Punt Gokla, sur-soobehdar of the Carnatic, the troops of Rastia and Vinchorkur, and all the horse which the Bramin jagheerders could raise. The necessities of the state, and the presence of Sindia, precluded the Peishwa from recruiting his own army or detaching any part of it from Poona.

Appa Sahib refused the command, but the offer having led to a reconciliation between Pureshrum Bhow and Nana, the Bhow agreed to head the contingent himself, on condition of having his fine remitted, and receiving Dharwar, with several places in the Carnatic, in jagheer. An English detachment, similar to that formerly employed, and under the command of the same officer, was held in readiness to join Pureshrum Bhow; but these endeavours on the part of Nana Furnuwees were frustrated by Bajee

* Raymond died March 25th, 1798.

Rao, who acted under the influence of Doulut Rao Sindia. After the English had commenced hostilities against Tippoo, his envoys were publicly received at Poona, although repeated remonstrances were made on the subject by the British resident. Even after their formal dismissal was intimated to Colonel Palmer, on the 19th March, they only retired to Kirwee, a village 25 miles south of Poona. Colonel Palmer at first supposed that the detention of the wukeels was a mere repetition of the former plan of obtaining a sum of money, on a false pretence of neutrality or aid. The British resident knew that Bajee Rao had received 13 lakhs of rupees from Tippoo, to which Sindia was privy, but it was not known at that time to Nana Furnuwees; and when the governor-general noticed the conduct of the court of Poona, by simply countermanding the detachment which had been prepared to accompany Pureshran Bhow, Nana Furnuwees could not comprehend the reason.

Bajee Rao imagined that, by the concessions made to Pureshran Bhow on the one hand, and the encouragement given to Tippoo on the other, he should deceive both parties, and postpone his ultimate decision, until circumstances enabled him to judge on which side it would be most advantageous to range himself. As far, however, as he was capable of following any plan, his resolution was taken in favour of Tippoo. In concert with Sindia, a scheme was laid to attack Nizam Ally, in which they hoped to engage Rughojee Bhonslay, and as the English would, as a matter of course, defend the Moghul territory, in consequence of their late treaty, the Peishwa was then to declare the Mahrattas the allies of Tippoo Sultan. The Marquis Wellesley, apprized of those views, was, on the other hand, endeavouring to engage Rughojee Bhonslay as a party to the treaty concluded with Nizam Ally.

But before the Peishwa or Sindia had the slightest conception that Tippoo's downfall was so near, they were astonished by intelligence of the capture of Seringapatam, the death of Tippoo, and the subversion of his government.

Bajee Rao affected the utmost joy, and soon after endeavoured to persuade Colonel Palmer that the failure of his engagement was entirely attributable to Nana Furnuwees. Immediate orders were sent to Dhondoo Punt Gokla, sur-soobehdar of the Carnatic, to advance into Tippoo's country with what force he could collect. The consequence was that many villages were plundered after the country had submitted to the British government; and the only merit which Dhondoo Punt's party could claim was that of intercepting Dhoondia Waug, a marauding fugitive from Seringapatam, whom Dhondoo Punt attacked by surprise, and dispersed his followers; after which Dhoondia entered the service of the raja of Kolapoor, who was actively engaged in hostilities against the Peishwa, and who readily received him into his army.

Sindia, on the news of Tippoo's overthrow, despatched emissaries to Seringapatam for the purpose of encouraging resistance among the partisans of the late Sultan who might yet remain; but he also sent abundant congratulations to the English resident at Poona, expressive of his happiness at the glorious termination of the war.

The judgment and energy by which the power of Tippoo was so speedily reduced, may be considered one of the first examples of that energetic policy by which Great Britain, in her subsequent mighty struggles in Europe, has been distinguished.

The resources of Nizam Ally's government had been placed at the disposal of the Marquis Wellesley, and the services of his contingent had

been directed with far greater efficiency than in the former war—an improvement justly ascribed to the ability and exertion of the governor-general's political agent, Captain Malcolm.*

The mode of dividing the conquered provinces was dictated by a wise and liberal spirit. Nizam Ally, with judicious confidence, had left the arrangements to the Marquis Wellesley, who effected them in the following manner.

As it was deemed incompatible with the future tranquillity of the country, and the security of the company's possessions, to establish a son of Tippoo in sovereignty, the descendant of those rajas of Mysore, from whom Hyder Ally usurped the government, was released from captivity,

June 22. and raised to the musnud of his ancestors. A partition treaty was then concluded by the British government, Nizam Ally, and the restored raja.

The whole of Tippoo's revenue being estimated at 30,40,000 pagodas,

To the raja was assigned, pagodas	13,60,000
To Nizam Ally	5,30,000
To the company	5,87,000
For the maintenance of the families of Hyder and Tippoo, in charge of the British government	2,40,000
For the maintenance of Kummur-ud-deen Khan and his family, in charge of Nizam Ally	70,000
Pagodas...	<u>27,37,000</u>

Notwithstanding the Peishwa's total failure in his engagements, the governor-general deemed it politic to allow him some share in the conquered territory, provided he could be brought to accede to an alliance corresponding to that formed with Nizam Ally. With this view, the balance in the territory adjoining the Peishwa's southern boundary, yielding an annual revenue of pagodas 2,63,000, was reserved, and was offered on the above conditions to the Peishwa.

Much discussion took place in consequence: the court of Poona was unwilling, by a distinct refusal, to afford the allies a pretext for at once appropriating the territory reserved, in which case two-thirds of it were to be given to Nizam Ally, and the rest retained by the company.

In a great part of the negotiation which took place, it is easy to perceive the ability of Nana Furnuwees. In extenuation of the circumstances which had caused the disappointment and dissatisfaction of the allies, the Peishwa represented the unfortunate distractions of the empire which had prevented him from assembling an army, and the usage of native states in permitting wukeels to reside in their courts in time of war. To the preliminary conditions requiring the Mahrattas to abstain from all aggressions on the territory of the raja of Mysore, the Peishwa replied that, upon obtaining the proposed cession, it should be considered an equivalent for the chouth, to which the Mahrattas were entitled from the whole of the territories of the late Sultan. In case the French invaded India, the Peishwa engaged to unite with the English in repelling them; but he would not agree to exclude individuals of that nation from his service. He offered to subsidize two battalions, provided they might be employed to assist in reducing refractory tributaries, and the Seedee of Jinjeera; but he absolutely refused the company's mediation in the existing differences between the Mahrattas and Nizam Ally respecting the

* Now Sir John Malcolm.

chouth. To an application for exchanging the chouth of Surat for an equivalent revenue—a measure in itself calculated to obviate vexatious disputes and loss—a like peremptory refusal was given; and a proposal for including Rughoosjee Bhonslay as a principal in the intended alliance, the Peishwa treated as absurd. Finally, after protracted discussion, the reserved territory was shared by Nizam Ally and the British government, as stipulated in the treaty, and, on the 12th of October 1800, a new treaty was concluded between them, by which the British government engaged to protect the territories of Nizam Ally from unprovoked aggression; two battalions of native infantry were added to the former six battalions, together with a regiment of native cavalry; and for the payment of the whole force, the territories acquired by Nizam Ally, on the partition of the provinces of Mysore, both in 1792 and 1799, were ceded in perpetuity to the British government.

The affairs of Sindia during this period continued in a very distracted state. After the treacherous attack made by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay on Amrut Rao's camp, the Byes fled to the raja of Kolapoor, who was still at war with the Peishwa. The Byes were soon joined by Narain Rao Bukhshée, and the principal Shenwee Bramins from Sindia's camp. Large bodies of horse flocked to their standard, and, when sufficiently strong, they returned to the northward, plundering every village from the Kistna to the Godavery which acknowledged the authority of Doulut Rao Sindia,*

February. and not only insulted Sindia in his lines, but stopped the roads in the vicinity of Poona. Sindia's horse at first attempted to oppose them, but their numbers were so inferior that, after a few skirmishes, in which they suffered severely, they would not advance unsupported by the regular battalions, before which the troops of the Byes retired, but as soon as the battalions returned towards their own camp, the insurgents also faced about and followed them. There is, perhaps, no parallel example of such an extraordinary state of affairs as that which the Peishwa's territory presented at this period, where a rebellion against one prince was maintained within the territory of another, whom both parties acknowledged as their sovereign. The anarchy which it engendered may be conceived; the whole country suddenly swarmed with horsemen, and, although plunder was not indiscriminate, great devastations were committed. The flame spread in Hindostan; Lukwa Dada, a Shenwee Bramin already mentioned, second in importance to the confined minister Balloba Tattya, by whom Lukwa Dada had been first raised, having been suspected of disaffection in consequence of his attachment to Balloba, was deprived of power, and dismissed from his employments. Being thus driven into the ranks of the insurgents, he soon raised a powerful army, repeatedly defeated the troops sent against him, and reduced the country from Oojein to Seronje.

To add to these troubles, Jeswunt Rao Holkar, who, after his brother fell at Poona, had fled to Nagpoor, and was there confined through the influence of Sindia, having effected his escape, repaired to Malwa, collected followers, and plundered the country. M. Perron had succeeded to the command of Sindia's regular infantry on the departure of M. de Boigne, who was compelled from ill-health to return to Europe in 1796; but Perron, at the period we have arrived, was so fully occupied in the siege

* Numerous villages belonging to one chief are frequently found intermixed with those of another in the Mahratta country, the reason of which has been already explained and accounted for.

of Agra, held by the adherents of Lukwa Dada, and in which he was assisted by Ambajee Inglia, that he found it impossible to stop the disorders in Malwa without additional troops, for which he sent repeated and earnest applications to his master in the Deccan.

Under these circumstances, Sindia had again recourse to negotiation; but the demands of the Byes extended to nothing less than complete sovereignty, which they required Sindia to hold under their authority; and before even these conditions could be admitted, they insisted on the release of Balloba Tattya.

Sindia's new ministers, Abba Chitnees and Ryajee Patell, with a judgment and a disinterestedness which do them honor, recommended their master to reinstate Balloba as prime minister, to which Sindia agreed, and no sooner was the arrangement accomplished, than it produced an immediate effect in detaching the principal leaders from the insurrection. The Byes agreed to an adjustment through Balloba's mediation; and the fort of Asseergurh with the city of Burhanpoor, and a jagheer of 11 lakhs of rupees, were to be assigned to them. Lukwa Dada, in consequence of the restoration of Balloba, had an interview with the brother of Ambajee Inglia, who had been opposed to him in Malwa, and agreed to a cessation of arms. Every difference was on the point of being settled, the Byes had received their clothes, jewels, and other private property from Sindia's camp, and had come as far as Rajawaree, near Jejoory, on their way to Poona, when one of their partizans having been attacked and cut off, they immediately returned towards Punderpoor, and recommenced their system of depredation.

The whole of the southern Mahratta country was in great disorder. The raja of Kolapoor still waged war with the Peishwa, and the reinforcement brought by Chitoor Sing, after the defeat of the raja of Satara, gave a new spirit to his efforts. Chitoor Sing had been closely pursued into the territory of the raja of Kolapoor by a body of Rastia's troops, joined by some others on the part of the Pritee Needhee, the whole of whom encamped near the Warnah river. Five hundred horse of the troops who had been dispersed at Satara having got together, apprized Chitoor Sing of their situation, and by his direction concealed themselves for some days in the hills, until he had got a reinforcement from Kolapoor, when, by a well-concerted attack upon the troops who had pursued him, he cut them off almost to a man. A body of Pureshrum Bhow's troops were shortly afterwards in a like manner surprised and routed; and Chitoor Sing, having learnt that, after Pureshrum Bhow's departure from Satara, 2,000 or 3,000 of Rastia's troops with some guns were encamped in the neighbourhood of the fort, he vowed to avenge the disgrace sustained by the first defeat. Accordingly he led 600 infantry through the hills and valleys until opposite to the village of Pal, where he remained concealed until night, when, repairing to a celebrated temple in the village, he performed the usual worship, and the whole party, having solemnly invoked the deity, stained their clothes with yellow dye, rubbed their hands and faces with turmeric, and issued forth, thus fortified with the implied vow of conquest or death, to attack their enemy. They did not find Rastia's troops unprepared; but the latter had only time to fire a few rounds, when they were furiously charged sword in hand, their guns taken and destroyed, and the whole body dispersed in a few minutes. A rapid march to the banks of the Warnah, before his retreat could be intercepted, marked a prudence, as well as enterprize, which gained Chitoor Sing considerable credit with the Mahratta soldiery, and his numbers were in a few months considerably

increased. At the head of a very inferior force, and with no funds to support it, he kept 7,000 of Rastia's troops in perpetual motion between the Neera and Warnah. He was, however, frequently defeated; and on one occasion, when accompanied by only 500 men,* he was surrounded by 5,000 of Rastia's troops, but cut his way through them, although with the loss of more than half his party. His enterprize, his remarkable escapes, his conciliatory manners, the popularity of his cause amongst Mahrattas, and his confidence in the peasantry, rendered him everywhere a favourite, notwithstanding his having repeatedly laid the whole of the villages under contribution.

Chitoor Sing's insurrection was considered at Poona as a part of the Kolapoor war, and both the Peishwa and Nana Furnuwees had their share of blame in exciting it.

During the insurrection of Satara, and afterwards, whilst Chitoor Sing kept Rastia in check to the north of the Warnah, the raja of Kolapoor was actively employed against the Putwurdhuns and Dhondoo Punt Gokla. Tasgaom, the capital of Pureshram Bhow's jagheer, was pillaged, and his palace, which had been erected at great expense, was burnt to the ground. The Carnatic was laid under contribution, and Dhondoo Punt Gokla, though a brave and active officer, was repeatedly defeated. Such was the state of the Kolapoor warfare up to the period at which we have arrived.

In the month of August, after Balloba Tattya's release, a reconciliation having taken place between him and Nana Furnuwees, they deliberated, with the knowledge and approbation of their superiors, on the course of policy necessary to be pursued with regard to Nizam Ally and the English; but both concurred in the necessity of suppressing the formidable disturbance to the southward, as a preliminary to any other arrangement.

It was accordingly resolved that the force, previously intended by Nana Furnuwees to have co-operated with the allies against Tippee, should be sent, under Pureshram Bhow, considerably reinforced for the present service. The whole, to be furnished in proportions by the Peishwa and by Sindia and other jagheerdars, was to consist of 30,000 horse and 6,000 infantry; but, as it was impracticable to prepare this force until the Dussera, Pureshram Bhow was directed to watch the raja of Kolapoor, and restrain him as much as possible. Pureshram Bhow, whose military spirit was on this occasion excited by personal injury and personal pique, although his health was in a declining state, kept the field all the rains, and recovered the garrisons between the rivers Gutpurba and Malpurba. In the month of September he advanced from Gokauk towards Kolapoor, not without hopes of finishing the war himself; but near the village of Putunkoondie he encountered the raja of Kolapoor and Chitoor Sing, when he experienced a total defeat, and was himself mortally wounded and made prisoner.†

* It is not mentioned whether horse or foot.

† Wiswas Rao, the brother of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, took up the dying man, and, laying him across his horse, threw him down before the raja of Kolapoor, who ordered him, it is said, when in this state, to be cut in pieces. Dajeeba Limmay, who was in the action, states this circumstance; and Bajee Rao, in a particular conversation with Mr. Elphinstone at Punderpoor in 1812, mentioned it as a well-known fact, but it is not generally believed at Kolapoor, nor at Satara, where the raja of Kolapoor had many enemies.

Dajeeba Limmay, whose name I have mentioned above, was a confidential agent of Pureshram Bhow; he was employed in several high situations during the administration of Nana Furnuwees, and was a sharer in many of the revolutions and events which I am now recording. At my request, he had the goodness to write the history of his own times, and I take this opportunity of expressing my acknowledgments.

Nana Furnuwees and Balloba sent the troops of the Vinchorkur, the Pritee Needhee, and five of Sindia's regular battalions under Major Brownrigg, to support Appa Sahib, Pureshram Bhow's son, and reduce the raja to submission.

This accession of force was too great for the raja of Kolapoor to withstand, and he therefore retired under protection of the fort of Panalla. But, in that situation, his troops were surprised by Appa Sahib, who drove some of them into the fort, whilst the greater part sought refuge in Kolapoor, which the Peishwa's troops invested, and after a

siege of considerable duration had nearly reduced it, when events and revolutions at Poona interfered to save the Kolapoor state, which would otherwise, in all probability, have been subverted, or at least held in future as a dependancy on the Peishwa's government.

CHAP. XLI.

FROM A. D. 1800 TO A. D. 1802.

Death and character of Nana Furnuwees—fresh dispute between Sindia and the Peishwa.—Balloba Tattya's confinement and death—dreadful executions of Dhondeba and Narain Rao Bukhshee.—The Peishwa's plans for ruining the adherents of Nana Furnuwees and the family of Pureshram Bhow.—Sindia, on being promised the jagheer of the Putwourduns, sends a force into their districts.—Great disorders—insurrection of Dhoondia Waug—suppressed by a detachment of British troops.—State of affairs at Poona.—Bajee Rao's situation and views—critical state of Sindia's affairs in Malwa.—Rise and progress of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.—Umeer Khan joins him.—Jeswunt Rao recognized in Malwa as the representative of his nephew Khundee Rao.—Imbecility of Sindia's proceedings.—Sindia induces Holkar to attack the Byes.—Marches towards Hindostan.—Holkar cuts off two of Sindia's detachments—is repulsed by Major Brownrigg.—Events at Poona—execution of Wittoojee Holkar.—Shirzee Rao Ghatgay defeats a plot against him in a singular manner—he is ordered to join Sindia—defeats Jeswunt Rao Holkar at Indore, which he plunders.—Sindia injudiciously gives Holkar time to recover himself.—Jeswunt Rao carries the war into the Deccan—his successes there.—Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur sent to oppose him.—The Peishwa's conduct.—Battle of Poona—Holkar is victorious.—The Peishwa flees to Singurh—and sends to the British resident a preliminary engagement, binding himself to receive a subsidiary force.—The resident's interview with Holkar.—The Peishwa proceeds to Bassein.—Affairs in Guzerat.

THE first of the events alluded to in point of time and importance was the death of Nana Furnuwees. His health
 A. D. 1800. had long been in a declining state; but he continued to transact business, almost to the last, with his accustomed order and punctuality. He died on the 13th March, "and with him," says Colonel Palmer, "has departed all the wisdom and moderation of the Mahratta government." Nana Furnuwees was certainly a great statesman. His principal defects originated in the want of personal courage, and in an ambition not always restrained by principle. In the latter unhappy years of his life, on the testimony of English as well as Mahratta authority, he is entitled to the high praise of having acted with the feelings and sincerity of a patriot. He honorably advised Bajee Rao to such measures as he believed advantageous, unmindful of any consequences. He was decidedly averse to the admission of a body of foreign troops in the manner proposed by the Marquis Wellesley, if the energies of the government could possibly be restored without their aid. He respected the English, admired their sincerity and the vigour of their government; but, as political enemies, no one regarded them with more jealousy and alarm. The life of Nana may be said to have been entirely public; and its events have been so fully recorded, as well as the motives for his conduct, that it

is unnecessary to enlarge on his character. In private life he was a man of strict veracity, humane, frugal, and charitable. His whole time was regulated with the strictest order, and the business personally transacted by him almost exceeds credibility.

In regard to civil government, whilst he continued in power he endeavoured to preserve the system of Mahdoo Rao Bullal; but overwhelming business, and the frequent distractions that prevailed, produced great laxity in the superintendence.

No instance of greater neglect on the part of an administration, or of more extraordinary criminality in a subordinate officer, is recorded in the annals of any state than the case of Gasseo Ram, kotwal, or police superintendent, of the city of Poona. This man, a Bramin native of Hindostan, employed the power with which he was vested in perpetrating the most dreadful murders. People disappeared, and no trace of them could be found. Gasseo Ram was suspected, but Nana Furnuwees refused to listen to complaints, apparently absurd from their unexampled atrocity.

At last, it being suspected that Gasseo Ram was starving a respectable Bramin to death, Mannajee Phakray headed a party of the people, broke open the prison, and rescued the unfortunate Bramin, which led to the detection of the monster's crimes; and he fell a victim to the vengeance of the exasperated populace, by whom he was stoned to death.

In his person Nana was tall and thin, his complexion was rather dark and his demeanour grave; but his look intelligent, quick, and penetrating; he left a young widow, and died without issue.

The death of Nana Furnuwees was the origin of a new dispute between the Peishwa and Sindia, each being desirous to obtain the treasures of which he was supposed to have died possessed. Sindia immediately seized Nana's jagheer on pretext of his having owed him a crore of rupees; he also supported his widow in her desire to adopt a son, both because it was in opposition to Bajee Rao's wish, and because it afforded the easiest means of getting the family and treasures into his own power. But these disputes did not prevent their plotting against others; and Sindia, whose re-establishment of Balloba Tattya to power had disarmed the insurrection of Lukwa Dada, now determined on Balloba's destruction. To this measure he was advised by his father-in-law, who had been set at liberty in the month of January at the recommendation of Balloba, and had regained entire influence over Sindia's mind, of which the first use he made was to stir up a faction against the minister, and then to excite Sindia to his destruction, and that of his immediate adherents. He was accordingly seized and imprisoned at Ahmednugur, where a natural death interposed to save him from a cruel execution. But his brother Dhondeba and Narain Rao Bukhshee, confined at the same time, were both condemned to suffer; the former, in a manner comparatively humane, was blown from a cannon; but the latter was barbarously destroyed by being tied round with rockets, which, being fired, carried him along, mangling his body dreadfully—the invention and sport of the execrable Ghatgay.

One of the ruling passions of the Peishwa was implacable revenge; and he having connived at the destruction of the Shenwee Bramins, Sindia, in return, agreed to assist him in the ruin of the friends and adherents of Nana, and the family of the late Pureshrum Bhow Putwurdhun. To accomplish the former object, the Peishwa, pretending to renounce the objection to the adoption of a son by the widow of Nana, indirectly encouraged the proceeding; and at last, in order to ensnare Nana's friends, invited them to a meeting at his palace, for the express pur-

pose of deliberating on the subject. When assembled, he suddenly accused them of treasonable practices, of plotting against him, and of intending to place the adopted son of Nana's widow on the musnud. He concluded by seizing and sending them off prisoners to hill-forts. In regard to the latter object, of crushing the Putwurdhun family, Sindia the more readily acquiesced in it, as he had long wished to possess himself of their extensive and fertile jagheer. It was this plot which prevented the capture of Kolapoor; as Appa Sahib, having received timely intelligence of their plan, quitted the siege, and with his own followers, accompanied by Dhondoo Punt Gokla, retired into the Carnatic. The raja of Kolapoor, through the influence of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, to whom he was reconciled, became the immediate ally of Sindia, whose battalions, under the orders of Seedojee Rao Nimbalkur, the dessaye of Nepanee, proceeded to attack the jagheer of the late Pureshram Bhow; Major Brownrigg, with the battalions, were soon recalled: but Seedojee Rao, at the head of a body of horse, plundered and devastated the country from Merich to Beejapoor.

Disorders were everywhere prevalent. Dhoondia Waug, whom we have already mentioned as having entered the service of the raja of Kolapoor, separated from him, returned into the Carnatic, and plundered in the company's lately acquired districts; taking advantage also of the absence of Gokla's troops, he laid the Peishwa's districts in the Carnatic under contribution, and committed great ravages. The British government made application to the Peishwa, and obtained permission to pursue and destroy the marauder; but in the meantime, on the return of Dhondoo Punt Gokla to the Carnatic, Dhoondia Waug, who burned with revenge, vowed, with singular ferocity, to sacrifice his life, or dye his mustachios in the heart's blood of Dhondoo Punt. On hearing, therefore, of his approach, he laid an ambush in a wood, and watching an opportunity, when Dhondoo Punt was separated from the main body of his followers, attacked and killed him, when he literally fulfilled his vow. Several persons fell with Dhondoo Punt, among whom was his elder nephew; his younger nephew, Bappoo Gokla, whom we shall hereafter have frequent occasion to mention, lost an eye; Chintamun Rao Putwurdhun was also wounded, and the whole of their party were driven to seek refuge at Hullyhal, where they were kindly welcomed and protected by a British detachment then in that garrison.*

The British troops sent in pursuit of Dhoondia Waug were under the command of Major-General the Honorable Arthur Wellesley, who, on entering the Carnatic, was joined by Gunput Rao Phansay, Bappoo Gokla, and the Putwurdhuns. These Mahratta auxiliaries were of little service; but the British detachment, after a persevering pursuit, had at last the

September 10. satisfaction of coming up with Dhoondia at the village of Kondagul. His party, consisting of about 5,000 horse, was immediately attacked, routed, and dispersed. Dhoondia exerted himself with spirit at the head of such men as stood by him, until he was cut down in a charge by the 19th Dragoons.

Sindia was much dissatisfied at the permission granted to the British government of sending troops into the Mahratta territory. His control over the Peishwa was now complete, and fearing that Bajee Rao intended to fly, he for some time kept a guard over his palace. The Peishwa found that his condition was by no means improved by the death of Nana

* Mahratta MSS.

Furnauwees, and, from the situation in which he was so long placed, we cannot be surprised that his natural disposition to intrigue should have become incurably habitual. He had much confidence, even at this period, in his own wisdom for extricating himself from the thralldom of Sindia. To that chieftain, even when experiencing indignity from him, Bajee Rao was profuse in his acknowledgments, and pretended to entertain for him the most unbounded gratitude and affection. When it appeared probable that Sindia would be compelled to retire to Hindostan for the protection of his dominions, the Peishwa entreated his stay, and even threw obstacles in the way of his departure; but he saw, with secret joy, the increasing predatory power of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, as affording a prospect by which he hoped to be enabled to establish his own authority, without the interposition of a foreign power. He was, however, conscious of his own unpopularity as a son of Rugoba; he was anxious to keep well with the British government, and really had a partiality for the English, though he rather chose to depend on Sindia, than to adopt, by calling in their aid, a course which he could not retrace. The establishment of an English subsidiary force was, it is true, in many respects consonant to his disposition: protection and support against his own subjects, could such have been obtained unfettered by control, being the end at which he aimed; and if the proposal had been met in the first instance, or afterwards allowed to come from himself, he would have had recourse to that plan at an earlier period. But the haste with which the Marquis Wellesley expected his agents to push on his system, evinced an anxiety which retarded his object at Poona, where the resident prognosticated that it would never be accomplished until Bajee Rao had found that all his own schemes were fallacious.

Sindia's affairs in Malwa at length became in the highest degree critical. Jeswunt Rao Holkar's energy and success threatened the entire subjugation of that province, a great part of which he had already pillaged and laid waste. The rise of this predatory chieftain was singularly rapid. After his escape from Nagpoor, he fled to Dhar, where he was kindly received by Annund Rao Powar; but as soon as Sindia heard of his retreat, Annund Rao being unable to shelter him from the power of that chief, he furnished him with a few horses and a little money, with which slender commencement, by enterprize and pillage, he soon collected a band of marauders, and united to his fortunes Umeer Khan, a Patan adventurer, at the head of a well-mounted body of his countrymen, and who, by his abilities and predatory habits, was a fit auxiliary for the schemes which Holkar meditated.

Khassee Rao Holkar, according to the first declaration of the party who opposed him, was set aside from incapacity. Jeswunt Rao, being illegitimate, gave himself out as the subordinate agent of his nephew Khundee Rao, in custody at Poona, and invited all adherents of the house of Holkar to unite with him in upholding the name, and rescuing the territories and family from the power of Doulut Rao Sindia. Proceeding to the banks of the Nurbuddah, he levied contributions, and plundered Sindia's villages. A detachment of Khassee Rao's regular infantry, sent against him by the Chevalier Dudrenec, was defeated, which greatly raised Jeswunt Rao's reputation, and brought on a negotiation, which ended in Dudrenec's joining him with his battalions and guns, and in Jeswunt Rao's being recognized and obeyed as the representative of his nephew, which, shortly after, enabled him to commence regular payments to his troops. But the predatory system being the mode of warfare he followed,

the work of pillage and destruction went forward, and Sindia's territory in Malwa was half ruined before he had taken any steps to stop the formidable progress of Jeswunt Rao.*

The cause of this military imbecility on the part of Sindia was the state of parties at his durbar. To impede Holkar's career, threats and conciliation were successively resorted to by Doulut Rao's ministers, and Jeswunt Rao, on promise of being supported by Sindia against Khassee Rao, agreed to seize the Byes, to whom he had before proffered friendship. He accordingly attacked their troops, forced the ladies into Burhanpoor, where he besieged them, but they were so fortunate as to escape towards Meywar, through the aid of Juggoo Bappoo, the colleague of Lukwa Dada. Sindia supposed that, in permitting them to get off, Holkar had acted with double treachery, so that, whether the supposition was well or ill-founded, this action was deservedly of no advantage to Jeswunt Rao. Sindia now became convinced that his presence was absolutely necessary to the northward, and in the end of November quitted the Peishwa's territory, where he left five battalions of regular infantry and 10,000 horse under Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, having, before he set out, exacted from the Peishwa bills to the amount of 47 lakhs of rupees.†

Sindia's progress was tardy, and Jeswunt Rao continued to plunder and

A. D. 1801. levy contributions throughout Malwa. Hearing of Sindia's great army, Holkar called in his detachments, and concentrated his force in the neighbourhood of Oojein, with an intention of plundering it. During this period there was a pause in their hostilities, and Sindia, in hopes of ensuring the protection of his capital, detached for that purpose four battalions from his own camp at Burhanpoor under Colonel John Hessing. Two battalions and six companies under Captain M'Intyre were ordered on to support Hessing; but Holkar, who saw that it was impossible to avoid extremities, and of the highest importance to strike a successful blow at the outset, first made a show of opposing Hessing, and drew him under the walls of Oojein, where, leaving some troops to amuse him, he pushed on to cut off the detachment under M'Intyre, in which he succeeded, having compelled them to lay down their arms at Newree. With his troops thus encouraged, he returned to the more

June. arduous attack of Hessing, and a most obstinate contest was maintained by that officer until his men were completely overpowered. Of 11 European officers in Hessing's four battalions, most of whom were British, seven were killed, and three were made prisoners. Hessing alone escaped, and four-fifths of his corps are said to have been killed and wounded.‡

Having exacted a very heavy contribution from Oojein, Holkar next proceeded to attack Sindia's grand park of artillery which had passed the Nerbuddah, and, under the protection of the four battalions of Major

July. Brownrigg, and a body of horse, was awaiting the junction of the army from Burhanpoor. Brownrigg, on hearing of Holkar's approach, chose a very strong position, which he defended with such judgment and intrepidity that Holkar's utmost efforts were unavailing.§

* Sir John Malcolm.

† Twenty-five by bills on Poona bankers, ten by a bill on the Gaekwar, and twelve by an assignment on Bundelcund. Mahratta MSS., Colonel Palmer's despatches.

‡ Ferdinand Lewis Smith.

§ In this action Dewajee Gokla, an officer of rank, Lieutenant Rowbotham, and 800 men were killed on the part of Sindia; Holkar's loss was three times that number.

This defence, as it checked Holkar's career, was of the greatest importance to Sindia, who had all this time remained inactive at Burhanpoor; but he now used every exertion to get his army sent across the Nerbuddah, in which he was much assisted by Rughoojee Bhonslay.*

Events were in the meantime occurring at Poona which require notice, as some of them were a good deal influenced by news from the northward. Bajee Rao, on Sindia's departure, instead of endeavouring to conciliate parties, evinced a malignant spirit of revenge towards all the great families whom he suspected of ever having been the political opponents of himself or his father. To distress and pillage all such of them as fell into his power, was, from first to last, a favourite object of his policy. The respectable family of Rastia was among the earliest who experienced his malevolence. Mahdoo Rao Rastia was invited on a friendly visit to the Peishwa's palace, seized, and hurried off as a prisoner to Raigurh. The unpopularity of this deed was proportionate to its treachery and injustice: many instances, though of a less conspicuous nature, occurred; the minds of his subjects were alienated, and distrust and disaffection towards Bajee Rao's power and government became almost universal. Anarchy was spreading in the country. Bodies of insurgent horse were plundering in various directions. One party under Bal Kishen Gungadthur was defeated by Gunput Rao Phansay; and Wittoojee Holkar, the brother of Jeswunt Rao, who was concerned with

him, and taken prisoner, was barbarously and ignominiously executed at Poona. That the Peishwa had a right to inflict the punishment of death on subjects so taken in arms cannot be doubted, but insurrection and plundering are not rigidly viewed among Mahrattas, and in public opinion a more lenient sentence than loss of life ought to have been passed upon the son of Tookajee Holkar; that circumstance, however, operated differently on the mind of the Peishwa, who could not forget that he was the son of the friend of Nana Furnuwees. Having seated himself with his favourite Ballajee Koonjur at a window which overlooked the exterior court of his palace, Wittoojee Holkar was brought before the Peishwa, and there tied to the foot of an elephant; in vain did he offer up the humblest supplications for life and mercy; the execution went forward; Bajee Rao sat a composed spectator, and heard the yells of the unhappy malefactor as the animal dragged him forth from the palace yard, to a lingering death, as in his case it happened to be, in the public street.†

Bajee Rao, by this cruel proceeding, at once glutted his revenge and performed an acceptable piece of courtesy to Sindia; but Jeswunt Rao, who loved his brother, vowed vengeance on those whom he considered his murderers; and his threats, being soon followed by news of his success against Hessing, communicated an alarm to the conscious and cowardly mind of the Peishwa, which towards Holkar he could never afterwards conquer. He now, however, opened a negotiation with him, offering to recognize him as the heir of Tookajee Holkar, on condition of his giving up the territories of the family in the Deccan estimated at 25 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue. He was also encouraged, by the prospect of Sindia's being long occupied in the north, to devise means of ridding his country of the presence of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, who only increased the trouble and disorders, to prevent which was the pretext

* Ferdinand Lewis Smith, Bombay Records, and Sir John Malcolm.

† Mahratta MSS., oral information, and Palmer's despatches.

for his being left in the Deccan. After plundering to the southward he repaired to Poona with a small party, where he became importunate in his demands for money, sat in dhurna on the favourite Ballajee Koonjur, and insulted the whole of the Peishwa's court. At last Koonjur, on pretence of giving him some orders on bankers, invited him to his house, received him graciously, and shortly after got up as if to bring the bills agreed upon. His quitting the room was to be, in reality, the signal for seizing or murdering Ghatgay, but the latter, guessing his intention, instantly grasped his throat with one hand, drew his sword with the other, and in this manner dragged him to the street, where, springing on his horse, he galloped off to join his party, pursued his route to his army, brought the whole to Poona, and encamped within a mile of the city, which he threatened to plunder and burn. Messages full of conciliatory explanation were sent by Bajee Rao, but the mediation of the British resident became necessary to prevent extremities. The accounts, however, of Sindia's reverses in Malwa, and his express desire that Shirzee Rao should join him immediately to assume command of the army against Holkar, effectually rid the Peishwa of this turbulent and audacious man.

Having joined the army after it had crossed the Nerbuddah, Shirzee Rao was sent forward with 10,000 horse, and 14 battalions under Colonel Sutherland, to avenge the plunder of Oojein by retaliating on Indore, the capital of Holkar. Jeswunt Rao advanced to its protection with some regular battalions, but without European officers, 5,000 irregular infantry, and about 25,000 horse. Skirmishes of some days' duration terminated

October 14. in a well-concerted but ill-executed attack on the part of Holkar, and a signal defeat was the consequence. He lost 98 pieces of cannon, and his capital was completely plundered. The remorseless Ghatgay had here a full opportunity of indulging his disposition to violence, which he fully gratified in dreadful acts of wanton and barbarous cruelty.

Had Sindia followed up the blow, the power of Jeswunt Rao was by this victory annihilated; but supposing him to be completely humbled, and being advised to recognize him as guardian to the head of the Holkar family, Sindia made proposals to that effect, and even sent Khasee Rao from his camp, who was thus compelled to seek an asylum in that of his half-brother. But Jeswunt Rao, whether suspicious of Sindia, encouraged by the Peishwa, or led on by an enterprising confidence in his own fortune, was immoderate in his demands; and although become, since his defeat, dependant entirely on plunder, his adventurous spirit was attractive to the soldiery, amongst whom he had a very high reputation, and many of Sindia's troops deserted to him, even at this stage of his career. But Dudre-

A. D. 1802. nec, conceiving it prudent to withdraw from a falling cause, listened to overtures from Sindia, which his battalions, more faithful than their commander, having discovered, went off in a body, and joined Jeswunt Rao at Jowud. Holkar now adopted a new plan, and determined on carrying the war into the Deccan. With this view Futih Sing Manay was detached with a body of horse to ravage the Peishwa's districts; the regular infantry took up a position at Mohesir, whilst Jeswunt Rao in person, in order to veil his intentions, went off to the northward with the remainder of his followers, to plunder in Malwa and Rajpootana, in hopes of drawing Sindia's forces after him, and thus facilitating his future design. He acquired very considerable booty, but Sindia did not pursue him as he expected, a detachment only having been sent after him. Holkar might therefore have been induced to reap a larger harvest in

pillage, but the Peishwa, having seized his districts in Candeish, he was hurried into the Deccan for their recovery. Previous, however, to his arrival, an advanced body of his troops attacked the Peishwa's general, Dhondoo Punt Ghorebulay, defeated him, and re-took the districts.

As soon as Jeswunt Rao was joined by his infantry from Moheesir, he assailed Sindia's possessions in Candeish, which he plundered and devastated without mercy, declaring at the same time that he was about to proceed to Poona to claim the interference of the Peishwa in protecting him, as the agent of the head of the Holkar family, against the tyrannical usurpation of Doulut Rao.

Notwithstanding this appeal to the Peishwa, Futih Sing Manay showed no respect to his territory, but swept the villages on the banks of the Godavery by contribution and plunder; whilst Shah Ahmed Khan, another officer detached by Jeswunt Rao, carried his ravages still nearer the Peishwa's capital, and being opposed by Nursing Khundee Rao, the jagheerdar of Vinchoor, at the head of 1,500 horse, the latter were cut off almost to a man.

The consternation at Poona was great in consequence, and Bajee Rao renewed his negotiations with the British government, desiring the aid of a force, but objecting to its being stationed within his own territory; neither would he consent to the articles of the treaty of Mhar, nor the arbitration of the British government in the Mahratta claims on Nizam Ally.

Sindia, supported by Rughoosjee Bhonslay, exerted his utmost influence to obstruct the conclusion of any arrangement with the British government, with which he was himself negotiating, not with any intention of becoming a party to the defensive alliance, against which both the raja of Berar and Sindia always maintained a strenuous opposition, but merely to gain a certain degree of consequence, which the presence of the British envoy in his camp was at that time likely to create, in the mind of the Peishwa.

It is difficult to account for the inactivity of Sindia in the prosecution of the war against Holkar. Doulut Rao became about this period suspicious of Perron, but the death of Lukwa Dada, and a final arrangement concluded with the Byes by Ambajee Inglia, one of Sindia's principal officers, left him nothing to apprehend in Hindostan which should have prevented his following up Holkar. After much delay, he at last ordered Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur to march against Jeswunt Rao with a large body of cavalry, and 10 battalions of infantry under Captain Dawes. This force forded the Nerbuddah without impediment; but, on their arrival at Burhanpoor, the troops refused to advance without payment of all their arrears, and before these could be settled, the Taptee was so swollen that they could not cross. Jeswunt Rao at first moved as if to give them battle on the southern bank; but if such was his intention, he soon abandoned it, and again moved towards Poona. The Peishwa tried by every means to prevent his advance, desired him to state his demands, and promised to arbitrate all differences if he would remain to the northward of the Godavery. "My brother Wittoojee," replied Jeswunt Rao, "is dead; he cannot be restored to me; but let Khundee Rao, my nephew, be released, and let the family possessions be given up." To these conditions Bajee Rao appeared to assent, and assured Holkar he had sent an order for the release of Khundee Rao; but instead of which he begged of Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur to take advantage of the negotiation, and advance with all speed, while Khundee Rao was thrown into prison in the fort of Asseergurh.

Shortly afterwards a body of the Peishwa's troops under Pandoojee Koonjur attempted to oppose Futih Sing Manay at Gardoon, but were defeated with loss; Manay followed up his victory by attacking the Peishwa's camp at Baramuttee, where he routed Nana Poorundhuree and Gunput Rao Phansay, taking the whole of the artillery. The southern jagheerdars, particularly the Putwurdhuns, who had evinced considerable discontent towards the Peishwa since the treacherous seizure of Rastia, might have prevented or avenged this loss, but, except Chintamun Rao, none of the Putwurdhuns joined the Peishwa's standard at this period, and that chief took the first opportunity of quitting it.

Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur at the head of Sindia's forces, having passed Holkar's army, advanced by Janlana and Bheer towards Poona, and having formed a junction with the Peishwa's troops, the united armies prepared to oppose Holkar at the Ally Beylah pass, on which he was marching; but Holkar, aware of the strength of their position, made a circuit to the eastward, passed Ahmednugur, proceeded towards Jejoory,

October 23. formed a junction with Futih Sing Manay, descended the Rajwaree pass, and on the 23rd October encamped in the neighbourhood of Poona, between Lonee and Harupseer. The opposing army had returned from Ally Beylah about eight days before, and occupied a position nearer the city, and in the vicinity of the present cantonment of the British troops. Two days were spent in negotiation. The Peishwa demanded Holkar's reason for thus advancing in a hostile manner to his capital, and ordered him to retire. The latter professed his readiness to obey every order from the Peishwa when he was not under the control of Sindia, but that Sindia had disobeyed the Peishwa's orders, had rendered the confinement of Khundee Rao doubly severe, and had sent his army to prevent that mediation which the Peishwa had promised; that Sindia therefore was the real rebel, and he would soon oblige him to submit to the sovereign authority of the Peishwa.

The armies drew out for battle on the morning of the 25th October.

October 25. Holkar had 14 battalions—six under Colonel Vickers, four under Major Harding, and four under Major Armstrong: 5,000 irregular infantry, and 25,000 horse. Although Sindia's infantry was in every respect much inferior to that of Holkar, Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur did not decline the contest, to which he was strongly urged by Captain Dawes. His cavalry and irregular infantry, including those belonging to the Peishwa, were, in point of numbers, at least equal to those of Holkar. The action began at half-past nine o'clock by a brisk cannonade, which continued with little interruption for two hours and a half. A body of Holkar's Patan cavalry made a successful charge on the horse of the jagheerdar of Vinchoor, but Futih Sing Manay, in a like attempt on the Peishwa's Hoojrat Pagah (or horse on the personal establishment), was repulsed with very considerable loss. Sindia's cavalry followed up the advantage, and those of Holkar were on the point of discomfiture, when Holkar himself, who had taken his station in the rear, sprang on his horse, and calling to those near him, "now or never to follow Jeswunt Rao," rallied the fugitives, and collected a compact body of his best horse, with which he met and repulsed those of Sindia.

In the meantime six of Sindia's battalions, which were without European officers, and opposed to those of Holkar under Vickers, had given way. The remaining four, however, being of the old battalions of De Boigne,

though with only four European officers to head them, behaved with great intrepidity. They stood their ground with remarkable firmness and discipline; but Holkar, having driven off the cavalry, charged the infantry, cut down the artillerymen at their guns, killed three of the European officers of the battalions, and took the fourth prisoner: still these battalions fought on, till they were completely overpowered by the persevering and desperate efforts of Holkar, who headed his cavalry in charge after charge, and at length bore all before him. A complete victory was the reward of the uncommon energy displayed by Jeswunt Ráo on this memorable occasion. The whole of Sindia's guns, baggage, and stores fell into his hands, and the army of his rival was driven off the field. Holkar's troops were ordered to fall back, and not to enter the town, but many of them showing no inclination to obey, he compelled them to desist by turning his own guns upon them.

The Peishwa, not doubting of success, had quitted his palace with an idea of joining in the action: but the noise of the firing frightened him, and he turned off to the southward of the town to await the result. On ascertaining the fate of the battle, he fled with about 7,000 followers to the fort of Singurh, and despatched to Colonel Close, the British resident, a preliminary engagement, binding himself to subsidize six battalions of sepoys, and to cede 25 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue for their support. In the course of the previous negotiation he had conceded that point which regarded their being stationed within his own dominions.

Towards the close of the action the cavalry of the contending armies were very near the British residency. Colonel Close had taken the precaution of hoisting the British flag in the most conspicuous parts about the Sungum, which had the effect of ensuring the respect of both parties.

Holkar sent an invitation to the resident to come and see him on the following day, which Colonel Close did not think it prudent to decline. He found the conqueror in a small tent, ankle deep in mud, wounded by a spear, and with a sabre cut in the head, which last he received from an artilleryman in one of the charges. In his conversation he was polite and frank, spoke lightly of his wounds, and expressed himself in the most friendly manner towards the resident and the British government. He seemed extremely desirous of obtaining the mediation of the resident in settling with Sindia and the Peishwa, and solicited Colonel Close, whom he detained about a month at Poona, to arbitrate in the existing differences.

For a short time after his victory, Holkar assumed an appearance of great moderation; he placed guards for the protection of the city, treated all the dependants of the Peishwa with kindness, and used many vain endeavours to induce him to return to his palace. Bajee Rao remained for three days at Singurh, and then hastily retired to Raigurh, where he released Mahdoo Rao Rastia, till then confined in that fortress, restored his jagheer, and gave him a commission to raise men for his service.

Quitting Raigurh, the Peishwa proceeded to Mhar, whence he despatched letters to the Bombay government, requesting that ships might be sent to convey him and his followers to that island. Before a reply was sent to that communication, Khundee Rao Rastia, the sur-soobehdar of Bassein, had joined Bajee Rao at Mhar; but on hearing of the approach of Holkar's troops, who were sent in pursuit of him, the Peishwa repaired to Severndroog, where he resided for some time, under protection of that fort, until again alarmed by accounts of Umeer Khan's being in the neighbourhood, he crossed over to Rewadunda, and thence embark-

ing in an English ship provided for his reception, he proceeded, accompanied by Khundee Rao Bastia, to Bassein, where he landed 6th December.

Previous to entering on the events at Poona, and the articles of provision of the treaty of Bassein, or its important consequences, it is necessary to explain the state of affairs in Guzerat, and the immediate causes which led to the connection, still subsisting, between the Gaekwar and the English ; leaving their definitive treaty of 1805, and all subsequent settlements, to be explained in their natural order.

CHAP. XLII.

FROM A. D. 1793 TO A. D. 1803.

Affairs of Baroda.—War between Govind Rao Gaekwar and Aba Shelookur.—The English depose the nabob of Surat—they are promised the Gaekwar's share of the chouth and the district of Chourassy.—Gaekwar reduces Shelookur, and obtains the Peishwa's share of Guzerat in farm.—Death of Govind Rao Gaekwar—his eldest son, Anund Rao, succeeds him—two parties in the government, the one under Rowjee Appajee, the other under Kanhojee Rao Gaekwar—both apply to the British government for aid—the governor of Bombay supports the party of Rowjee Appajee by sending a small detachment into Guzerat under Major Walker.—Mulhar Rao Gaekwar attacks the British troops—reinforcements sent into Guzerat—Mulhar Rao is reduced.—A British subsidiary force established at Baroda—embarrassed state of the finances.—Sunkhera reduced.—The Arab mercenaries oppose the projected reforms.—Siege and surrender of Baroda.—Kanhojee Rao Gaekwar maintains an insurrection against the government.—Affair of Saurree—gallant conduct of Major Holmes.

THE reader may recollect that Govind Rao Gaekwar assumed charge of the Baroda government in December 1793, and also that A. D. 1793. Aba Shelookur, the deputy governor of the Peishwa's share of Guzerat, was one of the principal persons who accompanied Nana Furnuwees to Sindia's camp, the day on which that minister was treacherously seized by Michel Filoze. Aba Shelookur gave Doulut Rao

A. D. 1798. Sindia a bond for 10 lakhs of rupees as the price of his liberty, and for permission to return to Guzerat, where, on his arrival, he immediately assumed charge of the government at Ahmedabad. Being one of the partizans of Nana, Govind Rao Gaekwar was secretly incited against him by Bajee Rao, and Shelookur, being pressed for the payment of his ransom, levied more than his own proportion of revenue, and exacted money from some of Gaekwar's villages. Hostilities soon followed, and for a time Aba Shelookur was successful in the war of plunder and extortion which he pursued against the subjects of Govind Rao.

In 1799 the nabob of Surat died, and the year following, during the prevalence of the disturbances to which A. D. 1799. we have now alluded, Mr. Jonathan Duncan, governor of Bombay, proceeded to Surat, commissioned by the governor-general to assume charge of the government of that city, granting to the nabob's brother, who was the heir apparent to the naib-ship, an annual pension, on condition of his resigning all pretensions to the exercise of authority. Mr. Duncan was at the same time directed to endeavour to obtain the Gaekwar's share of the chouth of Surat, without reference to the negotiations with the Peishwa for his portion of it. Two wukeels having been sent by Govind Rao to congratulate Mr. Duncan on his arrival, the latter conceived the opportunity favourable for making the

application in question, to which he added a request that Chourassy, the district immediately surrounding Surat, might be added to the grant. Govind Rao readily promised to bestow both the one and the other on the East India Company, without requiring any condition on their part, merely observing that it was incumbent on the company to obtain the Peishwa's sanction to the measure, which, had the Peishwa been able to maintain his authority independent of the English, would have been tantamount to a refusal—both because the Poona court was particularly anxious to perpetuate the Mahratta claims on Surat, owing to an extravagant idea of its consequence which they derived from the Moghuls, and because, in regard to the cession of Chourassy, the same objections urged by the British government, and admitted by Nana Farnuwees, at the time of Govind Rao's accession, were precisely applicable on this occasion.* The reason of Govind Rao's extreme complaisance was soon apparent by his making an application for aid against Shelookur, which was evaded; but shortly afterwards Ahmedabad was taken, Shelookur was made prisoner, and the Peishwa granted his share of the revenue of Guzerat in farm to the Baroda government, for a period of five years, at five lakhs of rupees annually. This agreement was concluded in October 1800; but the death of Govind Rao, which happened during the preceding month, occasioned fresh disturbances in the province.

Govind Rao Gaekwar left a large family; four legitimate and seven illegitimate sons, besides daughters. His eldest son Anund Rao was acknowledged by the principal officers as successor; but, being a prince of weak intellect, different parties attempted to take the lead in the administration. Kanhojee Rao, the eldest illegitimate son of Govind Rao, a bold ambitious young man, was, in consequence of his turbulent behaviour, placed in confinement previous to his father's death, but having afterwards contrived to effect his release, by professions of attachment to his brother and his influence with some of the soldiery, he soon usurped, not only the office of minister, but the entire powers of the state, and continued to rule for some months. At the end of that time he was deposed

A. D. 1801. by a party headed by Rowjee Appajee, a Purvoo, who had been the principal minister of the late Govind Rao; and both these persons—Rowjee the minister in power, and Kanhojee the deposed authority—made offers to the Bombay government, in order to engage its support. Rowjee promised to confirm the cessions of the late Govind Rao, and Kanhojee offered to add the district of Chickly to the grant.

Rowjee was supported by his brother Babajee, who commanded the cavalry of the state, and by the greater part of a large body of Arab mercenaries who composed the garrison of the town. The Arabs, whose numbers amounted to about 7,000, though in some re-

* On this transaction of the governor of Bombay, the Court of Directors make the following observation:—"How desirable soever it might have been to obtain a territory contiguous to Surat, in consequence of the late arrangement with the nabob of that city, it ought not to have been accepted at the risk of incurring the imputation of a breach of faith, and the consequent resentment of the Peishwa, with whom we were reciprocally bound to preserve the integrity of the Brodera principality, and with whom our interference has, at a former period, been successful in preventing the execution of a similar design on his part. We have, however, the satisfaction to observe, by the 14th article of the treaty of Bassein, that the Peishwa has formally recognized the treaty with the Raja Anund Rao Gaekwar, otherwise we should have thought it incumbent on us to desire that the before-mentioned cessions be restored to the Gaekwar government."

spects bound by unity of interests, were, with their chiefs, divided among themselves into parties, under the influence of two soucars or bankers,* the one named Mungul Parikh, the other Samul Becher—both men of great wealth acquired by exorbitant interest on loans, and who were the means by which the needy government of the Gaekwar was at once supplied and impoverished. Both these persons had acceded to the deposition of Kanhojee, so that Rowjee's party was the strongest at Baroda; but the cause of Kanhojee was espoused by Mulhar Rao Gaekwar, the first cousin of the late Govind Rao, and son and successor to Khundee Rao, the jagheerदार of Kurree, a man of considerable talent and enterprize. On promise of a remission of arrears and exemption from future tribute on the part of Kanhojee, Mulhar Rao, although he had at first acquiesced in the propriety of deposing and confining him, took the field, at the head of a considerable army, in aid of his cause, and began to reduce the garrisons held for Anund Rao under the administration of Rowjee. The minister immediately proposed to the Bombay government to subsidize five battalions, on condition of being supported against Mulhar Rao—an offer too tempting to be resisted; but the governor-general having sent no reply to Mr. Duncan's numerous applications for instructions, it was determined, with that injudicious caution which characterizes half-measures, to send a small auxiliary force of about 1,600 men to Rowjee's support. Major Alexander Walker, the officer in command of the detachment, was instructed to settle the disturbance by amicable mediation, if possible; otherwise he was to act with Babajee, the brother of Rowjee, in suppressing the rebellion of Mulhar Rao. Major Walker's detachment joined the Gaekwar's army in the end of February 1802, and advanced with it towards Kurree. Mulhar Rao, affecting regret for what he had done, offered to restore the places he had taken, and seemed sincerely desirous of making his peace: it was, however, soon discovered that he was insincere in his professions: the army advanced, Mulhar Rao continued to negotiate, but suddenly, and in a most treacherous manner, attacked the troops, and

March 17. was repulsed by the British detachment, though they lost on the occasion about 50 men. It being, however, afterwards discovered that Mulhar Rao had seduced many of the Gaekwar's troops, Major Walker's situation became critical, and all the disposable troops at Bombay and Goa were immediately embarked under command of Colonel Sir William Clarke, who landed at Cambay on the 12th of April, marched on the 14th, and joined Major Walker at Kurree, who had acted chiefly on the defensive since the action of the 17th of March. Colonel Clarke found Mulhar Rao's army strongly entrenched under the walls of the town, and it was determined to storm their position without delay.

April 30. The attack was made at break of day on the morning of the 30th April, and the entrenchments carried in the most gallant style, with the loss on the part of the British of 163 men in killed and wounded.† Mulhar Rao shortly afterwards surrendered at discretion;

* The soldiery in the service of native states in India, owing to the irregular manner in which they are paid, have generally a shroff, or money-changer, the agent of some soucar, attached to each division, who advances them money at a high interest, and recovers it as he best can.

† An extraordinary anecdote is related of Lieutenant M'Cole of the 75th regiment in this attack, which deserves to be recorded. Just as Lieutenant M., at the head of the grenadiers, had got into the entrenchment, he observed a Patan in the act of levelling his matchlock at him, when, snatching up a cannon-shot which happened to be at his

Kurree was evacuated, and made over to the Gaekwar's government, but two companies of sepoy remained under a British officer to garrison the citadel. A small part of the army returned with Sir William Clarke to Bombay; the rest remained under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington, subject to the requisitions of Major Walker, who was appointed political resident at the Gaekwar court.

A place of residence was assigned to Mulhar Rao in the town of Neriad, and 1,25,000 rupees of the revenue of that district were set aside for his support, with a promise, in the event of his conducting himself peaceably, to enlarge his income as the necessities of the state were diminished.

The finances of the Baroda government were in such a deplorable state of confusion and embarrassment, that without foreign aid it would have been quite impossible to extricate it from total ruin. The prudence and ability of the British resident were a powerful means of introducing reform; for although Rowjee Appajee was anxious for power, and jealous of authority, he gladly solicited support when insurrections were to be suppressed, the government to be strengthened, its expenses to be reduced, money to be raised, and debt to be redeemed.

The object requiring immediate attention was Gunput Rao, a relation of the Gaekwar family, and mamlitdar of Sunkhera near Baroda, who had declared for Mulhar Rao, and held the fort of Sunkhera in his name: he had also been joined by Moorar Rao, one of the illegitimate sons of the late Gaekwar. A detachment of the subsidiary force was sent to reduce Sunkhera, and soon succeeded in obtaining its surrender; but Gunput Rao and Moorar Rao made their escape, and found a refuge with the Powars of Dhar.

The next difficulty originated in the first essential reform—the reduction

A. D. 1802. of the military force. The Arab mercenaries, who had for some time ruled at Baroda, became alarmed at the prospect of a diminution in their body, and after some discussion, in the course of which they advanced extravagant demands for arrears, taking advantage of their situation in the town, they confined the Gaekwar, and refused to release him until their claims were satisfied. They also permitted Kanhojee to escape. Mulhar Rao disappeared about the same time from Neriad, and from the number of men already discharged, the late dispersion of Mulhar Rao's army, and the unemployed soldiery at all times numerous in Guzerat, great apprehensions of serious disorders were naturally entertained. Major Walker anxiously endeavoured to bring them to terms, and to restore order without the necessity of resorting to force; but finding every reasonable inducement ineffectual, he called in the aid of a European regiment from Bombay, which, having joined the subsidiary

force, Colonel Woodington invested the town of Baroda, December 18. and after a siege of ten days, during which the Arabs from the cover of the walls and houses killed a number of the assailants, and picked off a large proportion of officers, the breach being practicable, the garrison surrendered. The terms of capitulation were the payment of such arrears as might be found justly their due, and a promise on their part to quit the country. The arrears amounted to 17½ lakhs, and were duly discharged. Most of the Arab chiefs honorably adhered to the

foot, he threw it with such instantaneous effect, as to prevent his purpose by killing him on the spot. Lieutenant M.'s strength and agility, as may be conceived from this fact, were very remarkable; but shortly afterwards, having caught the Guzerat fever, he died at Baroda after a few hours' illness.

conditions, but some of them, especially Abood Jemadar, forfeited the pledge he had given, went off at the head of a large party in a contrary direction to that which had been prescribed, and with a view to join Kanhojee. Colonel Woodington, having been sent in pursuit of them, surprised their camp, and dispersed them, but the fugitives prosecuted their route, and ultimately most of them joined Kanhojee. That person, after his escape from Baroda, fled to Rajpeeplee, a hilly tract on the northern boundary of Maharashtra, where, having collected a body of men, he returned to Guzerat during the siege of Baroda, attacked and routed a body of Baba-jee's troops, and prosecuted his march to the vicinity of the town.

Five days after its surrender, a detachment, consisting of his majesty's 75th regiment and a battalion of sepoy, was sent under Jan. 1, 1803. Major Holmes in pursuit of Kanhojee, who continued moving about, collecting troops, levying contributions, and endeavouring to stir up a party in his favour at Baroda. After a vain pursuit of one month, it was thought advisable to reinforce Major Holmes with 250 Europeans and 300 sepoy, and at length Kanhojee took post in a strong ravine within

February 6. four or five miles of the village of Sauree, where his troops, concealing themselves, allowed the advanced guard to enter before they gave their fire. It fell with such effect that the troops were thrown into some disorder. The Arabs immediately charged sword in hand, overpowered the advanced guard, and pressed forward in a most animated and daring manner. Major Holmes instantly dismounted, and placing himself at the head of the grenadiers of the 75th, followed by those of the second battalion 1st regiment, he rushed forward, supported by his whole line, and soon drove the enemy from the field. The loss of the British in this affair was considerable, upwards of 100 men having been killed and wounded, of whom five were officers. Major Holmes displayed great energy on the occasion, particularly in a personal rencontre with an Arab of great size, whom he laid dead at his feet, having by one cut nearly severed the body of his antagonist.*

Kanhojee continued in Guzerat for about a month after this defeat, till having near Kupperwunj made a last attempt to stand, his camp was stormed by Major Holmes, and his force dispersed. He himself fled to Oojein.†

* I give this anecdote on the authority of my friend and brother officer, the late Major Edward Tandy, who saw the combat between them. The late Major-General Sir George Holmes, K.C.B., Major at the time the above affair took place, was a man of great stature and strength. He is said to have been frequently engaged hand to hand, and to have been always equally successful. He carried a stout stick in action, which, when he condescended to draw his sword, he used as a shield.

† Major Tandy's private journal, Bombay Records, oral information.

CHAP. XLIII.

A. D. 1802 AND A. D. 1803.

Events at Poona.—Winaek Rao, the son of Amrut Rao, is placed on the musnud by Holkar.—Treaty of Bassein.—Sindia and Rughojee Bhonslay unite to obstruct the objects of the treaty.—Advance of the British troops—return of the Peishwa to Poona—Negotiation with the confederates—preparations for war—war declared—capture of Ahmednugur—battle of Assaye—Burhanpoor—Asseergurh—Baroach and Pavungurh taken.—Of the war in Hindostan.—Revert to General de Boigne—his opinions and those of his successor—advance of the Bengal army—affair of Coel—storm of Aligurh—successful attack on Shekoabad by M. Fleury—battle of Delhi—battle of Agra—battle of Laswaree—conquest of Kuttack, and of Bundelcund.—Supplemental articles to the treaty of Bassein.—Prosecution of the war in the Deccan—Captain Baynes' defence—negotiations—battle of Argaon—siege and storm of Gawelgurh—negotiations—treaty of Deogaon—treaty of Surjee Anjengaom, and of Burhanpoor—partition treaties—treaties with the Rajpoots, Jaths, and Ambajee Inglia.

THE natural order of events now carries us back to affairs at Poona before entering on the history of the important transactions which succeeded the Peishwa's arrival at Bassein.

A. D. 1802. The moderation at first shown by Holkar after his victory was a mere cloak to allure Bajee Rao to return to his capital. Being in distress for funds to pay his troops, Holkar, in order to satisfy the most urgent of their demands, was obliged to levy a contribution from the city of Poona, but for that purpose he employed two of Bajee Rao's ministers, Chintoo Punt Deshmookh and Wyjunath Punt Mama, who, without being apprized of their master's intention, had been sent by him to negotiate with Holkar a few hours previous to his retreat from Singurh to the Concan. Such was their influence with the inhabitants, that a very considerable cess was promptly raised, in the vain hope of buying exemption from future pillage by their readiness to comply with a measure, which, sanctioned by these men, had something of the character of regular authority.

When Holkar found that the Peishwa had no intention of returning, he sent a body of his troops to Amrut Rao at Joonere, inviting him to take charge of the government at Poona; but Amrut Rao, on various pretences, declined the invitation for several days. At last he arrived on

the 12th November, and was prevailed upon to assume the government, in which he was assisted by Moraba Furnuwees, Baba Rao Phurkay, and several others of the adherents of Nana Furnuwees. He held his court in tents pitched at the village of Bambooree on the outskirts of the city. He refused to ascend the musnud himself, and for some time opposed a plan of elevating his son, Winaek Rao, to that dignity, as desired by Holkar; but when Bajee Rao quitted Mhar, and threw himself entirely on the protection of the English, Amrut

Rao pretended to consider it an abdication of the Peishwa-ship, and assented to the proposal of Holkar. The raja of Satara at first obstinately refused to grant the usual form of investiture, till prevailed upon by his brother Chittoor Sing, who had been for some time of Holkar's party, serving with the division of Futih Sing Manay.

Holkar now laid aside the mask of moderation, and began to extort and to plunder with all the violence of his habits and character. Chintoo Punt and Wyjunath Punt, who, by their exertions in levying the contribution, might have been at least entitled to his forbearance, were delivered over as prisoners to Huree Punt Bhawey and Hureenath, two Bramins, equally cruel, and more systematically wicked, than Shirzee Rao Ghatgay. They tortured both the persons thus made over to them in order to extort money; and every respectable householder of Poona, possessed of property, was seized and forced, by any means, to give up his wealth. Several men died under the tortures they underwent. Amrut Rao was not less blameable than Holkar in the enormities thus inflicted on the unhappy inhabitants of Poona, whose sufferings at this time were particularly severe, owing to Bajee Rao's having stationed guards to prevent their flight previous to the battle of the 25th October; and Holkar, though with a different motive, took care to observe a similar precaution as soon as the issue of the contest had established his control.

These excesses were begun even before Colonel Close quitted Poona. Both Amrut Rao and Holkar were very desirous of prolonging his stay, in hopes of his being prevailed upon to mediate in their differences with Sindia and the Peishwa, and of gaining by his presence the apparent sanction of the British government to their usurpation; but finding that no persuasion could alter his purpose, he was at last permitted to depart on the 20th November, and he arrived at Bombay on the 3rd of the following month. Colonel Close met Bajee Rao on the evening of the day on which the latter landed at Bassein; and the preliminary of the proposed treaty, already tendered by an agent on the day of his flight from his capital, was immediately alluded to, and acknowledged by the Peishwa himself. The 18th December was the day appointed for the discussion of the various articles of this treaty, and on the 31st it was finally completed. It was declaredly for the purpose of general defensive alliance, and the reciprocal protection of the territories of the Peishwa and the English East India Company, and their allies respectively. For this purpose a subsidiary force, of not less than 6,000 regular infantry, with the usual proportion of field-artillery and European artillerymen, were to be permanently stationed in the Peishwa's dominions. In the event of war, two battalions of the infantry, not less than 1,000 each, were to remain near the Peishwa's person: the rest, joined by 6,000 infantry and 10,000 horse of the Peishwa's own troops, were to act as circumstances might require. No European of a nation hostile to the English was to be entertained by the Peishwa. Districts yielding 26 lakhs of rupees were assigned for the payment of the subsidiary force; and all articles intended for the consumption of these troops were to be allowed to pass duty free. The Peishwa relinquished his claims on Surat, and submitted to the British arbitration in the adjustment of his differences and claims on the Nizam and the Gaekwar: with respect to the former, he bound himself to conform to the treaty of Mhar; and in regard to the latter, he recognized the engagement lately concluded between Anund Rao Gaekwar and the British. The Peishwa likewise bound himself to engage in no hostilities with other states, neither to commence nor pursue, in future, any

negotiations with any power whatever, without previous consultation with the British government.

Such was the substance of the important treaty of Bassein, by which the Peishwa sacrificed his independence as the price of protection; but it was the only course he could pursue to save himself from becoming, more than ever, a pageant in the hands of one or other of the contending chiefs. He had scarcely ratified the treaty when he began to waver in his plans, and to regret the decided line of policy, so contrary to his disposition, into which he had been hurried by the exigency of his circumstances. Motives of policy probably dictated the expression of his regret that Sindia had not been consulted, but there was no insincerity in his strenuous objections to those articles which tended to control his political freedom and influence, nor to the arbitration of his claims on the Gaekwar and the Nizam—a sacrifice on his part greater than the English authorities seem ever to have fully understood, or at all events appreciated. He despatched

A. D. 1803. Ballajee Koonjur to Sindia, and Narain Rao Wydh to

Rughoojee Bhonslay, ostensibly with the view of explaining the nature of the alliance into which he had entered, but in fact, as he knew they were both averse to it, rather to excuse his conduct in having been obliged, owing to their absence, to flee from Holkar and seek safety with Europeans. He sent no copy of the treaty, and in his letter invites Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay to march to Poona with all speed—not expressly to act against the English, of whom he takes no notice, but to punish the rebel Holkar.* He seems to have expected that Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay would unite to oppose the objects of the treaty; to have been doubtful of the issue of the contest that might ensue between them and the English; and to have been anxious, as usual, to deceive all parties, whilst he at the same time endeavoured to keep on terms with them.

The governor-general hoped that Sindia might be deterred from any hostile attempts to obstruct the operation of the treaty. After the battle of Poona, an effort was made to induce him to enter upon the defensive alliance, and, upon the conclusion of the treaty of Bassein, he was again invited, in the manner hereafter detailed, to enter on similar engagements; but Sindia, though he would have been pleased in the first moment of alarm, after the defeat of his army by Holkar, to have seen a British force co-operating with his own for the temporary purpose of re-establishing the Peishwa in his capital, and suppressing the power of his rival, was mortified and incensed on finding that his own and his uncle's plans for controlling the Peishwa's government were at once frustrated and overturned. Nor were these the only evils resulting from the Peishwa's engagements. He saw his own independence might be soon affected by the support which the Peishwa derived from a foreign nation, whose power, by a novel system of encroachment, threatened the subversion of the Mahrattas, as effectually as their establishment of chouth and surdeshmookhee had overwhelmed the empire of the Moghuls.

The aversion with which Rughoojee Bhonslay had always regarded the Peishwa's connecting himself with the English was well known, and his sentiments on the present occasion were in entire unison with those of Sindia. Yadow Rao Bhaskur, Sindia's prime minister, was deputed by his master to consult with Rughoojee on the best means of cementing a general confederacy of the Mahrattas against the common enemy; and

* Copies of his secret letters found in his palace at Poona.

Sindia, who had been preparing troops to oppose Holkar, crossed the Nerbuddah on the 4th February with a large army, with which he encamped at Burhanpoor on the 23rd of that month. It was a few days after this period when Colonel Collins, an envoy on the part of the governor-general, arrived for the purpose of again inviting him to enter upon the alliance, and engaging his co-operation in the arrangements required by the treaty with the Peishwa. To gain time Sindia at first evaded discussion; but, when pressed by Colonel Collins, he declined becoming a party to the defensive alliance, declaring that he had no intention of obstructing the treaty; he added that, as guarantee to the treaty of Salbye, he expected to have been consulted before these new engagements were made, but that his intentions were, in every respect, friendly to the British government. These professions were from the first deceitful; both Rughojee Bhonslay and himself were actively preparing for war, and Bajee Rao continued in constant correspondence with them, secretly encouraging their views.*

The governor-general, in the meantime, had taken his measures for the re-establishment of Bajee Rao on his musnud at Poona. For this purpose the subsidiary force at Hyderabad, consisting of six battalions of infantry, each upwards of 1,000 strong, with two regiments of native cavalry under Colonel Stevenson, took up a position at Purinda near the Peishwa's eastern frontier, accompanied by 15,000 of the Nizam's troops. The Hon'ble Major-General Wellesley was detached from the main army of Madras, assembled on the northern frontier of Mysore, with 8,000 infantry and 1,700 cavalry, being directed to march towards Poona for the purpose of co-operating with Colonel Stevenson in the Peishwa's restoration. General Wellesley was joined on the banks of the Kistna by the southern Mahratta jagheerdars—Appa Sahib and Chintamun Rao Putwurdhun, Bappoo Gunnessh Gokla, Appa Dessaye Nepankur, and the family of the Patunkurs. The jagheerdar of Vinchoor, grandson of Wittul Sewdeo, likewise attended the British army. The southern jagheerdars had orders from the Peishwa to co-operate with the English; and all of them on this occasion, especially the family of Putwurdhun, evinced a very friendly disposition to the British government.

Straggling bodies of Holkar's horse, belonging to the division of Umeer Khan and Futih Sing Manay, were plundering the country between the Beema and Kistna; but on being called upon to desist, they retired. They had scarcely crossed the Beema when Umeer Khan, suspecting that Manay intended to join the Peishwa, contrived to seize him, and disperse his troops.

General Wellesley, on approaching Poona, made a march of 60 miles in 32 hours, and reached that city with his cavalry on the 20th April. Colonel Stevenson in the meantime arrived from Purinda at Gardoon on the Beema. General Wellesley's object in advancing so rapidly was to save the city of Poona, which it was supposed Amrut Rao intended to burn; but he had retired many hours before the arrival of the British troops. Holkar was already on his retreat towards Malwa; but intelligence having reached Colonel Stevenson that he had levied a contribution on Aurungabad, and plundered some of the Nizam's villages, that officer advanced towards the Godavery for the protection of the country.

Amrut Rao, accompanied by Huree Punt Bhawee, after leaving Poona, marched to Sungunnere, plundering the towns and villages on his route;

* Copies of secret letters found in the palace at Poona.

then turning on Nassuck, he attacked and defeated a body of troops in the interests of Bajee Rao, commanded by Raja Buhadur, and pillaged the town in the same barbarous manner as had been already done at Poona. Amrut Rao remained in the neighbourhood of Nassuck for some time; and, as we shall have little occasion to introduce his name in the subsequent pages of this history, we may here briefly mention that all overtures of reconciliation between him and Bajee Rao having been obstinately rejected by the latter, he entered into an engagement with General Wellesley, and, during the progress of the war which followed, joined the British troops with a body of horse. His services were on no occasion conspicuous, but a most liberal pension of eight lakhs of rupees was assigned to him by the British government, on which he retired to Benares, where he still resides.

The Peishwa, escorted by a body of 2,300 infantry, of whom 1,200 were Europeans, arrived from Bassein, and resumed his seat on the musnud the 13th May. Sindia still occupied his position at Burhanpoor, and Rughoojee Bhonslay was preparing to join him. Every endeavour was used to induce Holkar to take a part in the confederacy. Rughoojee Bhonslay was employed as mediator between him and Sindia; and Holkar, who was at the same time carrying on a negotiation with the Peishwa through Colonel Close, listened and appeared to favour the overtures of the confederates, from whom he obtained the release of his nephew, Khundee Rao, the restoration of his family territory in Malwa, and a promise that all his rights in Hindostan should be recognized.

It was the interest of the British government to conciliate Holkar; and, in order to prevent his joining the confederacy, they wished to overlook any cause of complaint they had against him; but the Peishwa could not be prevailed upon to listen to any mediation in his favour. The confederates wished Holkar to unite his army with theirs in the Deccan, but he excused himself by asking who was to take care of Hindostan; and immediately retired to Malwa with the real design of being guided by the issue of events.

Although the plans of the confederates were conducted with considerable secrecy, rumours of their hostile designs were universally prevalent. The governor-general deemed it expedient to call upon Sindia for an explicit declaration of his intentions, and to make efficient preparations in every part of British India to repel the hostilities apparently meditated. In reply to the demands for explanation sent by the resident, Sindia declared that it was impossible to afford any satisfaction until he had met the raja of Berar, after which the resident should be informed whether it would be peace or war.

Their armies advanced to the frontier of the Nizam's boundary, and encamped in the neighbourhood of each other. The force under Colonel Stevenson crossed to the northward of the Godavery, and General Wellesley occupied a position in the neighbourhood of Ahmednugur. A long train of evasion and delay followed the meeting between the chieftains. They declared they had no designs hostile to the British government, nor any intention of obstructing the articles of the treaty of Bassein; but they alluded to their having received no official copy of it from the Peishwa, and mentioned that there were many points of it to be discussed, which the Peishwa was bound to have consulted them upon before he signed its stipulations. Their professions of friendly intentions were only made with the view of gaining time, in the hope of Holkar's being induced to embrace their cause. Their whole conduct in other respects

indicated their hostile determination ; and the menacing position which they occupied, justified the warlike preparations of the British government. General Wellesley, having been vested with full powers as political agent of the governor-general, as well as military commander of the British troops in the Deccan, proposed, as the test of the friendly declarations of the chiefs, that they should withdraw their armies—Sindia to Hindostan and Rughoojee Bhonslay to Berar, whilst he should also direct the British troops to retire within their own territories. This plain and distinct proposal, so characteristic of its author, perplexed the Mahratta chiefs, as there was no evading compliance, except by a subterfuge too palpable to be overlooked or justified ; after much discussion, it was finally rejected ; the resident withdrew from their camp on the 3rd August, which was considered a declaration of war.

The governor-general, when he saw that war was inevitable, had resolved to strike a decisive blow, and, by a grand effort, to attack the territories of the confederates in every quarter at once. For this purpose the preparations of the British government were necessarily very extensive. Its resources were called forth on a scale of magnitude and efficiency before unknown, and the governor-general, by his liberality, his judicious selection of agents and commanders, and his confidence in the whole service, roused that ardour and spirit of enterprise which have been handed down in the Indian army, from the first struggles of the British nation in the east.

The British forces assembled in different quarters of India amounted to nearly 50,000 men.

The army in the Deccan and Guzerat amounted to 35,596 men, of whom 3,595 were left for the protection of Hyderabad and Poona, and 7,826 formed the covering army under General Stuart, between the Kistna and Toongbuddra.* The advanced force with General Wellesley consisted of 8,930 men under his personal command, and 7,920 under Colonel Stevenson. There were 7,352 men in Guzerat, of whom, after providing for the garrisons, 4,281 were available for field service, and placed under the orders of Colonel Murray, subject to the control of General Wellesley.

In Hindostan 10,500 men were collecting under General Lake, 3,500 men were assembled at Allahabad to act on the side of Bundelcund, and 5,216 men were destined for the invasion of Rughoojee Bhonslay's districts in Kuttack.

The armies of Doulnt Rao Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay were estimated at about 100,000 men, of whom about 50,000 were horse, and upwards of 30,000 were regular infantry and artillery, commanded by Europeans ; of the rest, some were half-disciplined corps under the command of natives belonging to Rughoojee Bhonslay, some were matchlockmen and rocketmen ; they had many hundred pieces of cannon, and Sindia's train of field artillery was excellent. Of the regular infantry, 10,000 or 12,000 were with Sindia in the Deccan, and 4,000 or 5,000 were on their march from the Deccan, conducted by the Chevalier Dudrenec, for the purpose of reinforcing the army in Hindostan. Sindia's army in the latter quarter was commanded by Monsieur Perron, the successor of De Boigne. His whole force, including those not yet joined, under Dudrenec, amounted to 16,000 or 17,000 regular infantry, and from 15,000 to 20,000 horse, of which 4,000 or 5,000 were regular cavalry. This estimate does not include the forces

* In this part of the force there was subsequently some alteration made of no importance to the Mahratta history.

of Shumsher Buhadur in Bundelcund, who was a party in the confederacy. Shumsher Buhadur was the son of Ali Buhadur, who, as the reader may remember, attempted, in conjunction with the Gosaeen Himmut Buhadur, to conquer Bundelcund. They so far succeeded as to possess themselves of several districts, all of which they held in the Peishwa's name—partly as belonging to him from a remote period, and the rest as their own jagheer. But being constantly engaged in warfare with the petty chiefs of the country, it furnished an excuse for remitting no part of the revenue to the Peishwa, although they acknowledged his authority. Ali Buhadur died in 1802, and his jagheer was formally resumed by the Peishwa; but, as the latter had no means of enforcing the resumption, Shumsher, the son of the deceased, retained charge of the territory, took part against the English on the present occasion, and mustered, of all descriptions, about 10,000 or 12,000 men.

General Wellesley received accounts of the unsuccessful termination of the resident's negotiation with the confederates on the 6th August, the

August 6. same day on which Nizam Ally died at Hyderabad—an event long expected, and which was attended by no commotion or change, except the accession of his son, Mirza Secundur Jah, to the soobehship of the Deccan.

General Wellesley, who was encamped at the village of Walkee, eight miles south of Ahmednugur, was prevented by heavy rain from marching

August 8. against that fortress until the 8th, when he commenced hostilities by detaching three divisions from his line of march to attack the pettah by escalade. The pettah is surrounded by a mud wall, and was obstinately defended by a body of Arabs and one of Sindia's regular battalions, supported by a party of horse stationed between the pettah and the fort; but the perseverance and spirit of the assailants surmounted every obstacle; and this prompt manner of proceeding gave a character to the commander and troops, in the opinion of the enemy, which made amends for the loss sustained in the attack. Of the British detachments, 28 were killed and 22 wounded, of which number six were European officers. A battery was opened upon the fortress on the 10th,

August 12. and on the 12th this important garrison, once the capital of the Nizam Shahee kingdom, which, ever since the days of Chaund Beebee, had the reputation in the Deccan of being almost impregnable, was surrendered by its killidar, who marched out with private property and arms at the head of his garrison, 1,500 strong—a conduct for which he was much censured by the confederates.

The acquisition of Ahmednugur as a point of support to all future operations to the northward, was of great consequence to the British army. A respectable garrison was left in the fort, and the revenues of the district were temporarily collected by an agent of the British government, and appropriated to assist in the expenses of the war. General Wellesley moved forward, crossed the Godavery, and arrived at Aurungabad on the 29th August. The Mahrattas had ascended the Ajunta Ghaut on the 24th with a large body of horse, and, avoiding Colonel Stevenson, who was some miles to the eastward, they encamped at Jaulna. On hearing of General Wellesley's arrival at Aurungabad, they moved off in a south-easterly direction, intending, it was said, to proceed to Hyderabad. General Wellesley immediately moved down to the left bank of the Godavery to check their probable design of plundering the country, and to protect his own convoys of grain, which were forwarded by General Stuart from the covering army south of the Kistna.

Neither Rughoojee Bhonslay nor Sindia were possessed of military enterprize or experience, and they were quite undecided as to their plan of operations; sometimes Sindia proposed to depend on his battalions and artillery, at other times Rughoojee persuaded him to act on the predatory plan; their operations were of course feeble in the extreme. When General Wellesley moved down the Godavery, they countermarched in a northerly direction; and whilst the general awaited the junction of his convoys, Colonel Stevenson made several unavailing attempts to bring them to action, but only succeeded in partially surprising their camp on the night of the 9th September. He had also

September 9.

made himself master of the fort of Jaulna. On the

September 21.

21st September the whole of the Mahratta army, joined by their infantry, of which there were 16 battalions of regulars, was encamped about the village of Bokerdun, and between that place and Jaffeirabad. On the same day General Wellesley and Colonel Stevenson met at Budnapoor, when it was agreed that the two divisions, then in the neighbourhood of each other, should move separately, and attack the enemy on the morning of the 24th. They accordingly marched on the 22nd—Colonel Stevenson by the western, and General Wellesley by the eastern, route. On the 23rd, on reaching the village of Naulnye, where he was about to encamp, General Wellesley learnt from his spies that the confederate armies were encamped on the Kailna river, within six miles of him. With great prudence and decision, founded on a remarkable discernment of the character of his enemy,* he instantly resolved on attacking them without waiting for Colonel Stevenson. Had General Wellesley hesitated, the enemy's infantry would have moved off, their horse would probably have been encouraged to attack his baggage and annoy his camp, the service must have been prolonged, and by one day's delay or hesitation a new character might have been given to the war.

Having directed his deputy adjutant-general Captain Barclay to place the baggage in the village of Naulney, under the protection of a battalion and some details from the native corps, and to bring on the rest of the line with all convenient despatch, General Wellesley moved out in person at the head of the pickets to reconnoitre, and in a short time, on ascending a rising ground, the host of the confederates was seen extending in a vast line along the opposite bank of the Kailna river, near its junction with the Juah. Their army amounted to upwards of 50,000 men, of whom more than 30,000 were horse, and 10,500 were regular infantry, supported by upwards of 100 guns. The handful of British troops which now moved straight down upon this formidable array did not exceed 4,500 men,† but the general sentiment was that of their commander—"they cannot escape us." As General Wellesley drew nearer

* I have had occasion to observe how well the Duke of Wellington must have known the Mahrattas from having read his private letters to Sir Barry Close during the war of 1803. Without being acquainted with their language, and, one would have supposed, with little opportunity of knowing the people or their history, his correct views of the Mahratta character and policy are very remarkable. As the letters in question were shown to me confidentially in 1817, in the course of my official duties, I may be only authorized to mention that, in some instances, his opinion of individuals, particularly of Bajee Rao, was correctly prophetic.

† The corps which had the honor to serve on this occasion were the 19th light dragoons, the 4th, 5th, and 7th Madras native cavalry, a detachment of Madras, and a small detail of Bombay, artillery, the 74th and 78th highlanders, 1 battalion 2nd, 1 battalion 4th, 1 battalion 8th, 1 battalion 10th, and 2 battalions 12th regiment of Madras sepoys.

the enemy's line, he found their right composed entirely of cavalry, and that their cannon and infantry, which it was his object to take and destroy, were on their left near the village of Assaye. He therefore moved round and passed the Kailna river at a ford beyond the enemy's left flank, forming his infantry into two lines, and his cavalry as a reserve in a third, with his right towards the Juah, and his left on the Kailna. The horse belonging to the Peishwa and the raja of Mysore accompanying General Wellesley formed at a distance across the Kailna, but had little or no share in the conflict.* The position thus occupied by the British, between the two rivers and near their junction, not only brought them upon their object, but was of importance in diminishing the front of the enemy, who changed their position as the British turned the flank of their old ground, and were now drawn up in two lines, one of them fronting the British troops, the other running at a right angle to their first line, with the left of both resting on the fortified village of Assaye. In this situation, as the British lines were forming, the Mahrattas opened a heavy cannonade, the execution of which is described as terrible. The pickets of the infantry and the 74th regiment, which were on the right, suffered particularly: the pickets were for a time halted, and the officer in command of them, when urged to advance, sent word that the guns were disabled, and the bullocks killed. General Wellesley received the message with the utmost composure, and coolly replied—"Well, tell him to get on without them." The whole line without artillery was exposed to a dreadful fire of round and grape; the ranks of the 74th were completely thinned, and a large body of the Mahratta horse charged them: the order was given for the advance of the British cavalry: the 19th light dragoons, who only drew 360 swords, received the intimation with one loud huzza! Accompanied by the 4th native cavalry, who emulated their conduct throughout this arduous day,† the 19th passed through the broken but invincible 74th, whose very wounded joined in cheering them as they went on, cut in and routed the horse, and dashed on at the infantry and guns. Never did cavalry perform better service, or contribute more to the success of a battle. The British infantry likewise pressed forward, the enemy's first line gave way, fell back on their second, and the whole were forced into the Juah at the point of the

* Just before the battle of Assaye commenced, intelligence was brought to General Wellesley that the Peishwa's troops intended to join Sindia in attacking him. That they would have done so in the event of a reverse is not improbable, but I have not met with any confirmation of the circumstance.

† Nothing could exceed the zeal of some of the cavalry, particularly the 19th dragoons; every officer and man fought as if on his arm depended the victory. As instances may be mentioned, Lieutenant Nathan Wilson, who, with his arm shattered by a grape shot, and dangling by his side, charged on at the head of his troop. Lieutenant Alex. Grant, of the Madras native infantry, major of brigade to Colonel Maxwell, observing a gun pointed ready to discharge on the flank of the 19th dragoons, the match suspended on the touch-hole, with a noble impulse, in hopes of preventing it, darted forward almost on its muzzle, and with such force that his horse stuck between the cannon and its wheel; in this situation the gun went off, as he was in the act of endeavouring to prevent it by cutting down the artilleryman. Captain George Sale was attacking a man who defended himself with a pike or short spear, a weapon with which all Sindia's artillerymen were armed; the man's comrade, standing on a gun, made a thrust from above at Captain Sale, but it was turned by the breast-bone, and glanced off diagonally across his chest; his covering serjeant, named Strange, laid the man dead who wounded his officer, but in the act was himself speared through the lungs by another man from below the gun. Captain Sale went on, but begged the serjeant to fall in the rear; this, however, he gallantly refused, and rode out the day. Captain Sale and others afterwards saw him, when in hospital, blow out a candle from his lungs. The reader will be pleased to learn that the gallant serjeant recovered.

bayonet; the fugitives, on gaining the opposite bank, were followed, charged, and broken by the cavalry; but some of their corps formed again and went off in good order. One large body of this description was pursued and routed by the British cavalry, on which occasion Colonel Maxwell, who commanded them, was killed. As the British line advanced, they passed many individuals of the enemy who either appeared to have submitted or lay apparently dead. These persons, rising up, turned their guns on the rear of the British line, and after the more important points of the victory were secured, it was some time before the firing thus occasioned could be silenced. The enemy's horse hovered round for some time, but when the last body of infantry was broken, the battle was completely decided, and 98 pieces of cannon remained in the hands of the victors. The loss was severe; upwards of one-third of the British troops lay dead or wounded, but they had, considering the circumstances, achieved a triumph more splendid than any recorded in Deccan history.

Of the enemy 1,200 were killed, and the whole neighbourhood was covered with their wounded. Yadow Rao Bhaskur, Sindia's minister, was amongst the slain. Rughoojee Bhonslay fled from the field in the commencement of the action, and Sindia soon followed his example. The whole of the horse behaved in the most dastardly manner; Sindia's infantry, although defeated by such a disparity of troops, did not altogether sully their high reputation. The artillerymen stood to the last, and eight of the old battalions of De Boigne fought with ardour and firmness. Most of Sindia's battalions laboured under disadvantages by the secession of the British part of their European officers, who, in consequence of a proclamation by the British government, quitted the Mahrattas at the breaking out of the war. This proclamation was addressed to all British subjects, native as well as European, offering them the same pay which they enjoyed with Sindia. It was judiciously extended to all Europeans, and in regard to the British officers was equally humane and politic.

Colonel Stevenson, owing to various impediments, did not join General Wellesley until the evening of the 24th, when he was immediately detached in pursuit of the enemy, whose regular infantry retired before him and crossed the Nerbuddah, towards which Colonel Stevenson followed them. But the main army of the confederates moved to the westward, with an intention, as was supposed, of marching by the Kassarbharee Ghaut towards Poona. Under this supposition General Wellesley remained on the south side of the Ajunta Ghaut, and directed Colonel Stevenson to take possession of the city of Burhanpoor, and to reduce the strong fort of

October 21. Asseergurh, both of which objects he had accomplished by the 21st of October with inconsiderable loss. The dependent districts in Candeish, which fell in consequence to the British disposal, were placed under the temporary management of revenue officers of the Hyderabad state.

In regard to the operations of the Guzerat troops under the orders of General Wellesley, a detachment of the field force was sent by Colonel Murray, under Lieutenant-Colonel Woodington, for the purpose of reducing Sindia's possessions in that quarter. The fortified

August 29. town of Baroach was stormed and taken on the 29th August. Colonel Woodington next marched against the strong hill fort of Pawungurh, took by assault the town of Champaneer,

September 17. which is attached to it, and the fort surrendered on the 17th September.*

* Public records, Mahratta MSS., Ferdinand Lewis Smith, and oral information.

Whilst those successes attended the British arms on the west, affairs of not less consequence were passing in the north and east of India. The important possessions which had been acquired by Mahadajee Sindia in Hindostan were a primary object of attention with the British government. These provinces, independent of their value and their situation, were the nursery of the regular infantry of Sindia, which, although in itself less formidable to the British power than other descriptions of the Mahratta force, was in one respect dangerous, from its introduction of French officers, whose patriotism might induce them to encourage and support their countrymen in a favourite scheme of conquest in the east.

General De Boigne, having been compelled, as already mentioned, to return to Europe in 1796 from bad health, was succeeded by M. Perron, who had particularly recommended himself to Sindia by his conduct at the battle of Kurdla, and who had been sent from the Deccan to Hindostan to assume the command of the army, the charge of the emperor's person, and the management of the jagheer from whence his brigades were paid. De Boigne, with much of military enterprize and enthusiasm, was at the same time a man of sense and prudence; a decided enemy to French revolutionary principles, and, though friendly and kind to Frenchmen who sought his service, the ideas of conquest in India entertained by many of his nation he regarded, even at that period, as chimerical. He knew the power and the watchful jealousy of the English, and he foresaw that any object which might be attempted by the states of India, through a connection with France, would certainly be anticipated by their subjugation. His last counsel to Sindia, "never to excite the jealousy of the British government by increasing his battalions, and rather to discharge them than risk a war," was a sound advice; but his supposed partiality for the English, and the sentiments of his successor, Perron,* which were precisely the reverse, was one cause which drove Sindia, more confident and ignorant than Perron himself, to attempt projects which brought on ruin and disaster, before he and his coadjutors had fixed the mode of warfare they intended to pursue. Perron is said to have laid down a scheme of operations,† but jealousy and distrust on the part of Sindia, the neutrality of Holkar, and the intrigues of Sindia's officers for the purpose of superseding Perron in the government in Hindostan, seem to have combined in preventing its adoption.

The main body of the British force in Hindostan, already mentioned in the general preparations of the governor-general, was assembled at Cawnpore; and General Lake, the commander-in-chief, was vested with the same powers, civil and military, which had been delegated by the supreme government to General Wellesley in the Deccan. As soon as General Lake understood that the confederates had refused to withdraw their armies on the terms proposed by General Wellesley, he considered them in a state of war with the British government, and immediately put his troops in motion.

On the 29th August General Lake's army first came in sight of Perron's cavalry, 15,000 of whom were encamped at Coel, near the fort of Aligurh. After a trifling skirmish they retired as the British troops advanced; the

* He appears to have imbibed some of his opinions after the departure of De Boigne, who represented him to me as a man of plain sense, of no talent, but a brave soldier.

† Ferdinand Lewis Smith.

town of Coel was taken possession of, and Aligurh was summoned; but every endeavour on the part of General Lake failed in inducing M. Pedron, its governor, to surrender. Much dependence was placed on this fortress. It is very strong, situated on a plain, surrounded by swamps, having a good glacis, with a ditch 32 feet deep and 200 feet wide. It was well garrisoned, fully provided with cannon, ammunition, and provisions; and the Mahrattas expected, as they had a right to expect, that it would sustain a long siege. The only passage into the fort was by a narrow causeway across the ditch, for which the French commandant, by gross neglect, had omitted to substitute a drawbridge. General Lake, apprized of this circumstance, determined to hazard an attack by the gateway; and Mr. Lucan, a British subject, one of the officers who had come over from Sindia's service, offered to conduct the storming party. Break of day on the morning of the 4th September was the time appointed for the enterprize. On the firing of the morning gun, the party, who had been lying for some time within 400 yards of the gate, waiting for this signal, immediately advanced; and Colonel Monson pushed forward at the head of the flank companies of the 76th, in hopes of being able to enter the fort with a party of the enemy, supposed to have been stationed outside a breast-work. The work in question, however, was found abandoned, and the gate closed. Scaling ladders were applied, but such a formidable row of pikemen presented themselves above, that it was impossible to mount. A six-pounder was brought up to blow open the gate, but it had no effect. Much time and many lives were lost before a twelve-pounder could be substituted; and when it did come, four or five discharges were necessary to force an entrance. Advancing round a bastion, the party came upon the second gate, which was easily forced, and the third was taken by entering it with the fugitives: but the fourth and last gate, which led to the body of the place, could not be blown open, even by the application of the twelve pounder, though great delay was experienced before the gun could be brought in. Thus disappointed, in a most trying situation, Major M'Leod, of the 76th regiment, attempted the wicket, and most fortunately gained an entrance. He was followed by the grenadiers; the rampart was mounted, opposition soon ceased, and the British troops, by extraordinary bravery and good fortune, found themselves masters of the fortress of Aligurh with the loss of 278 men in killed and wounded, of whom 17 were European officers. M. Pedron, the commandant, was taken prisoner, and 2,000 of his garrison are said to have perished, including those who were drowned in the ditch.

In the meantime 5,000 of the Mahratta cavalry, which retired from Coel, prosecuted a successful enterprize under the direction of a Frenchman named Fleury, by attacking the cantonment of Shekoabad, where there was a detachment of five companies of sepoy and one gun. The assailants were repulsed on the first attempt, but having renewed the attack after the intervention of a day, the detachment, when nearly destitute of ammunition, capitulated, and were permitted to retire with their arms, on a promise of not serving against Sindia during the war. This attack obliged General Lake to send off a strong detachment, which arrived too late to save the cantonment, but was of importance to the security of an expected convoy.

Perron, who had for some time been conscious of a decline in Sindia's favour, and had even made some overtures to General Lake before the commencement of the war, proceeded, after the affair at Coel, to Muttra, where he received certain accounts of his being superseded in the govern-

ment of Sindia's districts, and that his successor and personal enemy, Ambajee Inglia, was intriguing with the French officers under him, to deprive him of his jagheer, and of course of his command. Under these circumstances, to secure his private fortune, and avoid a crisis in which he had nothing to gain, he addressed a letter to General Lake on the 5th September, requesting permission to pass with his effects, his family, and the officers of his suite, through the company's territories, to Lucknow; with which General Lake, under instructions from the governor-general, yielded a ready compliance.

On the 7th September General Lake's army marched from Aligurh towards Delhi, and on the 11th encamped within six miles of that city; but scarcely were the tents pitched, when the enemy unexpectedly appeared in front. The pickets immediately turned out, and General Lake with the cavalry proceeded to reconnoitre.

M. Louis Bourquin, the officer next in rank to Perron, hearing of the advance of the British force towards Delhi, and that a part of the army was detached in pursuit of Fleury, crossed the Jumna with 12 battalions of regular infantry, amounting to 8,000 or 9,000 men, besides 5,000 cavalry and 70 pieces of cannon, for the purpose of attacking General Lake, whose force, after providing for the safety of his baggage, amounted to about 4,500 men. Bourquin took up a strong position with his guns concealed by high grass, and General Lake, in advancing to reconnoitre, became exposed to a very heavy and destructive fire. The line of British infantry were ordered on, but it was a considerable time before they came up, and General Lake in the interim practised a successful feint, by retiring with the cavalry, which the enemy, mistaking for a retreat, followed them, shouting as if secure of victory. The cavalry, however, opening from the centre, permitted the British infantry, advancing in perfect order, to pass to the front. The fire of grape, round, and cannister from the Mahratta guns was for some minutes tremendous, but the British troops moved on steadily, without returning a shot, until they were within 100 yards. They were then ordered to fire a volley and charge bayonets. Sindia's infantry could not withstand the fury of their onset, but, abandoning their guns, fled with precipitation. The line of infantry then broke into open columns of companies; and the cavalry, which formed the second line, charging through the intervals, committed great slaughter among the fugitives, many of whom escaped from the sabre but to perish in the Jumna. The total loss of the Mahrattas was estimated at 3,000; that of the British army was 585, of whom 15 were European officers. Louis Bourquin, the commander of the Mahratta infantry, and five other French officers surrendered themselves prisoners three days afterwards. The other results of the victory were the possession of the capital of the Moghul empire, and of the family and person of the descendant of Timour. Though the change was but change of masters, it was a happy event for the aged and unfortunate Shah Alum to find himself once more under the protection of the British nation, of whose honor and liberality he had experienced many proofs.

General Lake next marched against Agra, which he summoned, but no answer was returned. This garrison had been under the command of English officers, who, on the breaking out of the war, were confined by their own troops; this circumstance, combined with other causes, occasioned the greatest anarchy and confusion in the fort. Seven battalions of Sindia's regular infantry were encamped on the glacis; but the garrison were afraid to admit them, lest they should plunder a rich treasury which

they wished to reserve for themselves. General Lake resolved to beat up the quarters of the seven battalions outside, in the first instance, in which

October 10. he completely succeeded, taking 26 of their guns. Three days afterwards, 2,500 of those who remained came over in a body, and were admitted into the British service. A few days after this event, the progress of the siege being considerable, the garrison applied to their European officers, whom they had kept prisoners, to make

October 18. terms for them; on the 18th October they evacuated the fort with their private property; but the treasury and arsenal, with 162 pieces of cannon, fell into the hands of the victors.

General Lake's next object was the infantry which had been sent under Dudrenec, by Sindia, to reinforce his army in Hindostan. It consisted of seven battalions, and arrived from the Deccan about the beginning of October. This body had been joined by three of Bourquin's battalions, not engaged at the battle of Delhi, and by some of the fugitives from Delhi and Agra, who were formed into two battalions, the whole consisting of 12 strong battalions, and amounting to about 9,000 men. They had a very superior equipment of artillery, were accompanied by 1,200 or 1,500 good horse, and during the siege of Agra had occupied a position about 30 miles distant from the British army. The commander was a Mahratta officer,* Dudrenec having surrendered to the English on the 30th October. It was understood that they intended to march on Delhi for the recovery of the capital. General Lake with a strong force proceeded in quest of them on the 27th of October; but as he advanced they retired

Oct. 27—31. towards the hills of Mewat. On the 31st of October General Lake, on arriving at the ground which they had occupied the preceding day, determined, in order to prevent their escape, to pursue them with his cavalry, now consisting of eight regiments, three of which were European dragoons. He accordingly moved off at eleven o'clock that night, directing the infantry to follow at three o'clock next morning. After a march of 25 miles he came up with them at sunrise of

November 1. the 1st November. On descriing the Mahratta infantry they appeared in motion, and, supposing them to be on full retreat, Lake ordered on the cavalry to impede them by an immediate attack. The Mahrattas, however, had time to form, and, instead of being found on the retreat, they had taken up a strong position, their right on the village of Laswaree, partially protected by a deep ravine, and their left resting on the village of Mohaulpore. To their rear was a deep rivulet, and their front was lined with 75 pieces of cannon, chained together the more effectually to resist the charge of horse. The whole were concealed by very high grass. The different brigades of cavalry, particularly that under Colonel Macan, executed the orders they had received in the most spirited manner; but the opposition with which they had to contend was formidable in the extreme, and their loss was very great; in so much that General Lake was compelled to desist from this hazardous attack, and await the arrival of the infantry.

The Mahratta troops, in the meantime, changed their position, and drew up in two lines—the one in front, the other in rear, of the village of Mohaulpore. Their commander, on seeing the approach of the British infantry, offered to surrender his guns on certain conditions

* I have not ascertained who this officer was; he is called Abajee by Major Thorn, but I regret not having obtained more satisfactory information respecting him. It was perhaps one of Ambajee Inglia's carcassons.

which were accepted, and one hour was allowed to fulfil the terms ; but at the end of that time General Lake prepared to renew the attack. The British infantry consisted of the 76th regiment and six battalions of Bengal sepoy. Of three brigades of cavalry one was directed to support the infantry ; another was detached to the right to watch the enemy, and take advantage of any confusion that might appear among them ; and a third brigade formed the reserve. The whole of the artillery was thrown into four batteries to support the attack of the infantry. General Lake's was to turn the right of the enemy's position, for which purpose he moved off with the infantry in open column of companies, along the bank of the rivulet, which was nearly at right angles to the enemy's new position. For a time the march of the British troops was concealed by the high grass, but the Mahrattas no sooner discerned them, than they perceived the general's intention, which they immediately frustrated by throwing back their left wing, covering the movement with a heavy cannonade, which did severe execution on the front of the British column.

The British artillery returned the fire with good effect ; but the enemy's cannon were far superior in number and weight of metal, and equally well served. The ground was much broken, the advance greatly impeded by that circumstance, and the ranks of the 76th were so much thinned, that General Lake, who now, as on every occasion, was foremost in the battle, deemed it advisable to hasten on the attack with that regiment, and one battalion and five companies of sepoy who had closed to the front. When they arrived within reach of the cannister shot, the fire and the execution became so extremely severe, that it prevented a regular advance, and the Mahratta horse were encouraged to charge. They came on, but were repulsed most heroically ; again they rallied, and assumed so menacing a position, that General Lake ordered the British cavalry to charge in turn. This service was gallantly performed by the 29th dragoons,* who dashed through both lines of the enemy's infantry, wheeled round upon their cavalry, killed many of the latter, drove them from the field, and, turning round, fell upon the rear of their second line. That line was by this time hotly engaged with the British infantry, which, having taken advantage of the gallant charge of their cavalry, had rushed forward on the guns, taken possession of them, and driven the first line back on the second. The whole of the British troops had now come up and joined in the attack ; but the hardy veterans of De Boigne determined to die where they could not conquer, fought on with brave though unavailing obstinacy, and, excepting about 2,000 who were broken, surrounded, and made prisoners, they fell with their arms in their hands ! Few, if any, of those men were natives of Maharashtra ; they were chiefly from Oude, Rohilcund, and the Doab, for, except Sivajee's Mawulees, and men trained in the ranks of the Bombay sepoy,† the native Mahrattas have never made good infantry.

The victory of Laswaree cost the English army 824 men in killed and wounded, but it completed the overthrow of the brigades of De Boigne

* When forming for the charge on the flank of the infantry, the 76th, with the same spirit which distinguished the 74th at the battle of Assaye, gave them three cheers.

† The men of this description are remarkably quiet and sober, patient under privation, and good soldiers ; they used to be more apt to desert than any other men, but that was probably owing to circumstances no longer in existence.

and Perron, and placed Agra and Delhi, with all Sindia's districts north of the Chumbul, in the power of the British government.

While success thus attended the British arms in Maharashtra and in Hindostan, a force commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt invaded Kuttack. Manikpatam was taken possession of without resistance on the 14th September. The Bramins of the temple of Jaggernaut placed it under the protection of the British government, and the town of Kuttack was surrendered on the 10th October. A detachment under Captain Morgan occupied Ballasore on the 21st September, and took Soorung on the 3rd October. The storm of the fort of Barabuttee on the 14th October, by the troops under Colonel Harcourt, completed the conquest of the province of Kuttack.

The conquest of Bundelcund was effected with equal celerity. In regard to this province, a new arrangement had been made with the Peishwa in the month of August, by which the greater part of his rights in it was ceded to the English company, in lieu of Savanoor and Benkapoor in the southern Mahratta country, and Oolpar in the neighbourhood of Surat—all of which were included in the cessions made by the treaty of Bassein, and yielded an annual revenue of 19,16,000 rupees. The nominal revenue of Bundelcund was 36,16,000 rupees, but the state of the country rendered the first-mentioned cessions of much greater value to the Peishwa; whilst to the British, Bundelcund, from its situation in the neighbourhood of their position on the Jumna, and their means of rendering its revenues available, was extremely important. The British government, in consideration of the advantages thus derived, agreed to maintain a body of 5,000 Mahratta horse during the continuance of the war, and to keep a regiment of cavalry, in addition to the 6,000 infantry, on the permanent establishment of the Poona subsidiary force; whilst from the Peishwa, instead of 6,000 infantry and 10,000 horse, only half of that number was to be required. This arrangement was afterwards regularly recognized, and the treaty drawn up in consequence of it, under date 16th December 1803, was termed supplemental articles to the treaty of Bassein.

The Gosaeen Himnut Buhadur had tendered his services to the British government to assist them in the conquest of Bundelcund; and his offer being now accepted, he joined the British detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Powell, on the 16th September, with a large body of troops. Colonel Powell had crossed the Jumna ten days before. The united forces, after reducing various forts, crossed the river Cane on the 10th October. On the 13th they found the army of Shumsher Buhadur drawn up to oppose them; but after a feeble resistance they gave way, fled across the river Betwah, and evacuated the province.

We now return to the contending armies in the Deccan.

As soon as the confederates found that General Wellesley had not passed the Ghaut, but was moving south towards Aurungabad, and that Colonel Stephenson had marched against Burhanpoor, they made preparations for following and interrupting him in that object. General Wellesley, learning their design, immediately returned north, and descended the

October 19. Ajunta Ghaut. Sindia, on finding that General Wellesley had returned, halted, but Rughojee Bhonslay, who had separated from his confederate, marched to the southward by the Unkye Tunkye pass. General Wellesley, therefore, in order to protect the territory of the Nizam, re-ascended the Ajunta, and continued his route beyond Aurungabad, until he arrived in the neighbourhood of the camp of Rughojee, who was so apprehensive of a night attack that he moved his

camp five times in less than 48 hours. On the 31st Rughoojee detached

October 31. 5,000 horse to cut off a convoy of 14,000 bullock-loads of grain, escorted by three companies of sepoys and a party of Mysore horse, under Captain Baynes, who made a judicious and spirited defence at the village of Amber, and brought in the whole of his convoy safe, with the exception of about 200 bullocks. After this event General Wellesley, finding that Rughoojee was moving towards his own territories, once more returned to the northward, and descended the Ghauts at Rajoor, for the purpose of supporting and covering Colonel Stevenson, whom he had ordered to form the siege of Gawelgurh.

Previously to this period, several propositions for peace had been made to General Wellesley in Sindia's name. Ballajee Koonjur, the Peishwa's most confidential agent, who, notwithstanding the war, continued in Sindia's camp, sent a letter 15 days after the battle of Assaye, requesting that one of the British and one of the Nizam's officers should be sent to Sindia's camp to settle terms of pacification; but as he was not an accredited agent, and as the appearance of a British officer in Sindia's camp would have enabled the Mahrattas to represent the British nation as supplicants for peace, General Wellesley refused compliance, but expressed his readiness to receive any envoy the confederates might depute. Another communication was opened through Appa Dessaye Nepankur, who was serving with the Peishwa's contingent, and the result was that Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray, accompanied by a Bramin named Naroo Punt, arrived in General Wellesley's camp on the part of Sindia for the purpose of negotiating; but as they also were unprovided with credentials, General Wellesley refused to treat until they should obtain them from Sindia. That chief, in the meantime, sent a letter, disavowing Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray's mission; but, notwithstanding this disavowal, General Wellesley was convinced, from a letter addressed by Sindia to Appa Dessaye, that Ghorepuray had been deputed, and therefore permitted him to remain in his camp until a reply to his first reference should be received. A few hours after the interview in question, powers arrived for constituting Ghorepuray and his companion the envoys of Sindia, but they were essentially defective, as they did not enable the envoys to cede any portion of territory as compensation to the British government and its allies, which was required as the basis of the pacification. Until this authority could be obtained, Ghorepuray solicited a cessation of arms for both the confederates. It was granted to Sindia on the 23rd November, on condition that he should occupy a position 20 *kos* east of Elichpoor, and forage still further to the eastward; but it was refused to Rughoojee Bhonslay, because he had sent no envoy, nor expressed any desire for peace.

The conditions, however, on which General Wellesley agreed to a suspension of hostilities were not observed by Sindia; Rughoojee Bhonslay's army was encamped at Argaom, near Gawelgurh, under his brother Venkajee Munya Bappoo, and Sindia's cavalry were at Sersowly, within about five miles of him. Venkajee, besides cavalry, had the whole of his brother's infantry, and a considerable number of guns. The wukeels of Sindia urgently dissuaded the British commander from attacking Venkajee. General Wellesley told them repeatedly that there was no armistice with Rughoojee Bhonslay, and none with Sindia, until he complied with the terms of the agreement. Colonel Stevenson was by this time within a short distance of the confederates, and on the 28th November halted to enable General Wellesley to co-operate in the expected battle. The confederates decamped from the position they had occupied, when the united

British divisions moved towards them on the ensuing day. As General Wellesley approached his intended ground of encampment, a few of the

November 29. enemy's skirmishers appeared in front, and were opposed by the Mysore horse. General Wellesley, not intending to pursue them, was, after a long march, about to pitch his tents, when the Mahratta cavalry appeared in greater force, and it became necessary to support the Mysore horse with the pickets. General Wellesley, moving out at the head of the latter, described the army of the confederates drawn up in line, on an extensive plain, in front of the village of Argaoim. Though late in the day, he immediately advanced to the attack, and marched on in column until near the enemy, when he formed his army into two lines—the infantry in the first, and the cavalry in the second. Some confusion ensued in forming the lines, when the Mahratta guns first opened upon them, but, when formed, the whole moved on with steadiness and order. A body of about 500 infantry, supposed to have been Persians, in the service of the confederates, rushed upon the 74th and 78th with desperation, and were destroyed to a man. Sindia's cavalry under Gopaul Rao Bhow charged the 1st battalion 6th regiment of Madras sepoys; but they were repulsed, and their commander was wounded; on which the whole army retired in confusion, pursued by the British cavalry and by the Mysore and Moghul horse. In this action the loss of the British was 346 men in killed, wounded, and missing; that of the Mahrattas is nowhere stated, but was very considerable.

The British army next invested Gawelgurh. The principal operations were carried on by Colonel Stevenson's division on the north face, where the troops went through uncommon labour and fatigue in carrying the guns and stores to the point of attack.

December 15. The outer fort having been breached by the 14th, was stormed on the ensuing morning; the inner fort was escaladed by the light company of the 94th, headed by Captain Campbell, who immediately opened the gate and admitted the rest of the troops.

In the meanwhile negotiations had been going forward at intervals for upwards of a fortnight. Yeswunt Rao Ramchandur, the wukeel of Rughoojee Bhonslay, endeavoured to prove that his master was not the aggressor in the war; that the Peishwa had concluded a treaty contrary to the usage of the Mahratta state, without consulting the chiefs of the empire; that his master had not quitted his own territory, nor moved towards Sindia's, with any hostile design against the British government, but had gone with his army to mediate between Sindia and Holkar; that Holkar was strong and Sindia was weak, and that the latter would have been overpowered without his master's assistance. General Wellesley represented the fact of his having assembled an army on the frontier of an ally of Britain, and having, in conjunction with Sindia, refused to withdraw; he denied the right of the Mahratta chiefs to be consulted by the Peishwa before he could make a treaty; and, in regard to interfering between Sindia and Holkar on account of the weakness of the former, admitting the fact to have been so, it was, General Wellesley observed, an extraordinary mode of strengthening Sindia and weakening Holkar to transfer to the latter all the territories of the Holkar family. In short, after a long argument as to the merits of the war, and a still longer discussion respecting

December 17. the terms of the pacification, it was finally agreed on the 17th December that Rughoojee Bhonslay, Sena Sahib Soobeh, should cede to the British government and its allies the province

of Kuttack, including Ballasore, and the whole of his territory and shares of revenue to the westward of the river Wurdah, and south of the hills on which stand Nurnalla and Gawelgurb. The forts of Nurnalla and Gawelgurb remained in Rughoojee Bhonslay's possession, together with districts lying south of those forts, valued at four lakhs of rupees. All claims on the Nizam, including of course chouth, ghas-dana, &c., were renounced; all differences between the Nizam, the Peishwa, and the Sena Sahib Soobeh were to be arbitrated by the British government; and no European or American of a nation at war with the English, or any British subject, was to be entertained without the consent of the British government. Such was the substance of the principal articles of the treaty of Deogaom. Accredited ministers from each of the contracting parties were to reside at the court of the other; and the Hon'ble M. Elphinstone, at that time Persian interpreter on the staff of General Wellesley's army, was appointed to act as resident at Nagpoor.

The negotiations with Sindia were not so promptly terminated. Doulut Rao endeavoured by every means to avoid making the cessions which the British government demanded as the basis of a pacification: and it was not until assured that his compliance was the only means of averting the entire conquest of his territories, that he at length assented. The treaty

December 30. was concluded at Surjee Anjengaom on the 30th December, and Sindia ceded to the British government and its allies his territory between the Jumna and Ganges, and all situated to the northward of the Rajpoot principalities of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, and Gohud; but the territory lying between Jeypoor and Joudpoor, and to the southward of the former place, was reserved. The forts of Ahmednugur and Baroach, with their districts, his possessions between the Ajunta Ghaut and the Godavery, and all claims on the emperor of the Moghuls, the British government or its allies, the Peishwa, the Nizam, and the Gaekwar, were renounced by Sindia: he also gave up all claims upon such rajas or jagheerdars as might have become allies of the British government during the war, and declared them independent of his authority. Sindia entered into the same agreement in regard to Europeans and Americans, and to residents of the courts, as had been admitted by Rughoojee Bhonslay: Major Malcolm was appointed to act as resident in his camp. The city of Burhanpoor, the forts of Asseerghur, Pawungurb, and Dohud, with their dependant districts, conquered by the British government during the war, were restored to Sindia. The enams granted to Mahadajee Sindia by the emperor, namely, the district of Dholpoor-Baree and Raj-kerrah, situated to the northward of the prescribed limits, and certain jagheers belonging to the family, or to immediate dependents of Sindia, were restored; and the British government likewise promised jagheers, or pensions in lieu of them, amounting to 15 lakhs of rupees annually, to some other persons in Sindia's service. All enam villages, lands, or *wutun* obtained by Sindia and his predecessors, within the territories ceded, were to be restored to him and to the respective owners; but no troops were permitted to be kept in such places, either to the north or south of Sindia's own territory. Finally, the British government left it in the option of Sindia to become a party to the defensive alliance, offering him a subsidiary force, payable from the revenues of the territories already ceded, whether furnished or not. In conformity with this article in the treaty of Surjee Anjengaom, a new treaty was afterwards concluded with Sindia at Burhanpoor, on the 27th February 1804, by Major Malcolm, empowered for that purpose by General Wellesley. Sindia then

agreed to become a party to the defensive alliance, and a subsidiary force of 6,000 infantry, with their artillery, was to be stationed near his boundary, but within the British territory.

Of the conquests thus gained from the confederates, by subsequent partition treaties between the British government and its allies, the Nizam and the Peishwa, the province of Kuttack including Ballasore, the pergunna and fort of Baroach, the districts conquered from Sindia north of the Rajpoot states, the territory along the bank of the Jumna, and between that river and the Ganges, were assigned to the British government. The whole tract west of the Wurdah, eastward of the Peishwa's frontier, and southward of the range of hills on which stand Nurnalla and Gawelgurh, down as far as the Godavery, was made over to the Nizam. The Peishwa having failed to afford the aid which was in his power, and having in other respects profited largely by the war, the fort and district of Ahmednugur was the only portion reserved as his share of the conquests.

The princes and chiefs who, by treaties with General Lake, had become the allies of the British government, were the rajas of Jeypoor, Joudpoor, Boondée, and Macherry, the Jath raja of Bhurtpoor, the rana of Gohud, and the Mahratta officer Ambajee Inglia. The agreements with the Rajpoots and the raja of Bhurtpoor specify the guarantee of their territory against external enemies, an exemption from tribute, and the aid of their forces in the event of any invasion of the country lately conquered by the British; Europeans not to be received into their service without the consent of the British government. With respect to the rana of Gohud and Ambajee Inglia, with whom treaties were also made, it will be recollected that Mahadajee Sindia conquered the Gohud territory in 1784, and since that period it had been held by that chieftain and his successor. Ambajee Inglia, whom we have seen appointed successor to Perron, was mamuldar of the province of Gohud, and after seeing the rapid conquest of Hindostan, revolted, or pretended to revolt, against his master, and joined the English, from whom he obtained by treaty a share of the province of Gohud, which was divided between him and the rana, with the exception of the fort of Gwalior, ceded by the rana to the English. The treaties with the rana of Gohud and Ambajee Inglia were similar to those concluded with the Rajpoots, excepting that the rana of Gohud agreed to subsidize three battalions of sepoys, paying for them at the rate of 75,000 rupees a month. But these two treaties last mentioned afterwards became null and void, for reasons which the progress of our narrative will explain.*

* The above chapter is on the authority of English Records, the Marquis Wellesley's narrative, oral information, Mahrattas letters and MSS., and Major Thorn's memoir.

CHAP. XLIV.

A. D. 1804.

Reflections on the late war.—Views of Jeswunt Rao Holkar.—Negotiations.—Lord Lake advances against Holkar, preceded by a detachment under Colonel Monson.—Holkar retires across the Chumbul.—Tonk-Rampoorah taken.—Umeer Khan cuts off part of a detachment in Bundelcund.—Lord Lake re-inforces Monson, and cantons the main army for the rains.—Monson advances—escalades Hinglajgurh—Holkar crosses the Chumbul—Monson hesitates—Holkar attacks him—Monson retreats—bravery—privations—distresses—disasters—and discomfiture of his detachment.—Holkar invades Hindostan—Muttra evacuated—is repulsed at Delhi.—Defence of Colonel Burn at Shamlee—Holkar carries his depredations into the Doab—is pursued by Lord Lake—battle of Deeg—surprise at Furruckabad—storm of Deeg.—Holkar's possessions in the Deccan reduced—Indore evacuated.—Lord Lake determines on besieging Bhurtpoor—The raja's resolve.

THE rapidity of the conquests, and the speedy termination of the war, surprised all India, and it was naturally supposed that the astonishing success of the British arms would have deterred any power, however inimically disposed, from evincing a spirit of hostility at such a moment ; but the conduct of Asiatics is frequently so capricious that it cannot be foreseen by any reasonable estimate of their interests.

Family rivalry, next to disputes concerning hereditary rights, is always uppermost in the mind of a Mahratta. Jeswunt Rao Holkar, notwithstanding the great sacrifices made by Sindia to induce him to join the confederacy, could not believe that his rival would forget the defeat and disgrace he had so lately suffered ; and he concluded that, in the event of success against the British power, Sindia's first object, after re-establishing his influence at Poona, would be a war of extermination against himself. On the other hand, if the tide should turn against the confederates, he imagined, after the power of Sindia had been reduced to the level of his own, he might not only interpose with safety, but attain a consequence, so much the greater, as it would be manifest, in the event of ultimate success, that it had mainly depended on his exertions. Like all the Holkar family, he was a great advocate for the predatory system of warfare, and conceived that it would have been better for the confederates if they had carefully reserved their infantry and guns under the protection of forts, avoided an action, devastated the company's provinces, and acted with vigour upon General Wellesley's supplies.

Holkar, during the progress of hostilities, remained in Malwa, levying enormous contributions* from friend and foe, and could scarcely credit the

* Sir John Malcolm mentions his having exacted a crore of rupees from the city of Mundissore alone.

accounts he received of the rapid victories of the English. When too late, he began to carry his designs into execution, and moved up towards the Jeypoor territory, for the purpose of negotiating for aid from the Rajpoots, the raja of Bhurtpoor, the Rohillahs, and the Seiks. He likewise despatched an envoy to Sindia, recommending him to break the treaty, and renew the war; but that chieftain was, or pretended to be at the moment, so exasperated against him, that he immediately communicated the fact to the British authority. Some of his ministers, especially his father-in-law, Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, had more confidence in Holkar, and advised Sindia, notwithstanding the communication to the British resident, to despatch a wukeel to the camp of Jeswunt Rao, for the purpose, as they gave out, of ascertaining his designs, but in reality to leave open the door of reconciliation, in case the project of Holkar, in whose wisdom and fortune all the Mahrattas began to have great confidence, should prove worthy of regard.

The principal part of the British armies in the Deccan, after the termination of hostilities, retired to the southward, and two considerable divisions were stationed, the one at Jaffeirabad, to ensure the tranquillity of the country and its occupation by the Nizam, and the other at Poona, with the Peishwa, whose territory was a good deal molested by plundering insurgents and freebooters, which is usually the case in India after the close of a war.

The army in Hindostan under General Lake was still in the field to watch the motions of Holkar, whose menacing position, as well as the tone of his language, the general report of his hostile intentions, and his having put to death three officers, British subjects, who wished, in consequence of these reports, to take advantage of the governor-general's proclamation and retire from his service, afforded strong indications of an approaching rupture. Superadded to these were the machinations already mentioned, which were ascertained from his intercepted correspondence; but it was scarcely credible that he could intend risking a war, and General Lake believed to the last that affairs with Holkar would be amicably adjusted. In Holkar's letters to General Lake, as is frequently the case when insolence is designed on the part of a Mahratta, it is difficult to discover whether friendly profession, arrogance, or humility predominate. In his first letter, professing that he had no intention of saying anything improper, he requested General Lake to retire towards Agra, "as his near approach to his victorious army appeared likely to produce unpleasant circumstances." In his next he declares that from him the general shall never have any other language than that of friendship; "but if anything contrary to friendship shall appear from you, then I am helpless." At length it became absolutely necessary to ascertain the designs of Holkar, and the governor-general directed General Lake to intimate to him the necessity of withdrawing his troops from the frontier of the allies of the British government. Whatever claims might be urged by the Holkar family against the Rajpoots and others, such claims, he was told, could not be considered to rest in him; but the British government was willing, with the consent of the Peishwa, to arbitrate the existing difference between him and his brother Khassee Rao, on principles of equity and justice: Jeswunt Rao was also invited to send wukeels to the British camp. To these proposals Holkar replied by promising to withdraw his troops; and in the middle of March sent wukeels to General Lake's camp at Rangurh. These persons produced a letter from Holkar, in which, after many friendly professions, he recommends the general to con-

sent to the propositions they would offer, otherwise "his country and his property were on the saddle of his horse; to whatever side the reins of

March 18. his brave warriors should be turned, the whole of the

country in that direction should come into his possession." The wukeels submitted the following propositions:—"1st, that Holkar should be permitted to collect chouth agreeably to the custom of his ancestors; 2nd, that the ancient possessions formerly held by the family, such as Etaweh, &c., 12 districts between the Ganges and Jumna, and a district in Bundelcund, should be ceded to him; 3rd, that the country of Hurriana, which was formerly in the possession of the family, should be given to him; 4th, that the country then in his possession should be guaranteed, and a treaty should be concluded with him on the same terms as that with Sindia." These demands were altogether extravagant, and were treated as such by General Lake. Most of these countries, mentioned in the second and third propositions, had been conquered from Sindia; Etaweh had not been in the possession of the Mahrattas since their garrisons were driven out by Shujah-ud-Doulah, after the recal of the Peishwa's general, Visajee Kishen, in 1773, and had been ceded in 1801 by the nabob of Oude to the East India Company. The wukeels proceeded, in a high strain of menace, to exaggerate the power of Holkar, and the value of the connections, hostile to the British government, which he had formed. General Lake replied "that it was not customary with the English to boast of their power, but that Holkar would find, in the event of a rupture, that he had much overvalued his own." General Lake also took occasion to mention to the wukeels that their propositions and their language were so much at variance with the tenor of Holkar's letters, that no judgment could be formed of his real wishes and intentions. On the ensuing day the wukeels attended to receive a reply to the letter they had brought from Holkar, when they solicited a grant of some country, or an annual sum in lieu of an increase of country, and asked whether or not Holkar was to be allowed to collect the customary tribute from the states of Oudepoor and Kotah. To all which General Lake merely replied that Holkar must first evince his friendly intentions by returning into his own country before the British government could be enabled to enter upon a discussion of any claims.

Five or six weeks before the despatch of these wukeels to General Lake, Jeewunt Rao Holkar had addressed a letter to General Wellesley, in which he demanded from him certain districts claimed by his family in the Deccan as the condition of peace, and concluded in a strain of the most vaunting menace, in case by non-compliance it should be rendered necessary to resort to war.

In the beginning of April Holkar repaired on pretence of devotion to Ajinere, belonging to Sindia, where he levied contributions, and made an unsuccessful attempt to possess himself of the fort; but he justified these acts to Sindia's wukeel as necessary to enable him to prosecute a war, involving the independence of the Mahrattas. A great portion of his army remained on the frontier of the Jeypoor territory, where they commenced plundering.

In the meanwhile the governor-general having been made acquainted with Holkar's demands, and apprehending many evils from continuing to temporize, issued orders to General Lake and General Wellesley to attack Holkar's troops and possessions in every direction, declaring at the same time that it was not his intention to retain Holkar's territories for the British government, but to divide them amongst its allies.

April 16.

General Wellesley was at this period at Bombay, and, in consequence of a famine in the Deccan from a deficiency of rain, superadded to the devastations occasioned by the moving armies and plundering bands by which that country had been for years infested, it was apprehended that it would be impracticable to act against Holkar's possessions in that quarter until the fall of the rains; but General Wellesley directed Colonel Murray to assail them from Guzerat, and to advance upon his capital in Malwa. Sindia, who was informed of these particulars, professed his readiness to act in cordial co-operation for the reduction of Jeswunt Rao.

On the 18th April General Lake sent forward a detachment of three

April 18—23. native battalions under Colonel Monson to Jeypoor, on which Holkar began to retire rapidly to the southward. Parties of irregular horse under European officers followed his march, to watch his motions and harass his troops. Holkar having halted for two days, General Lake advanced upon him, preceded by Lieutenant-Colonel Monson's detachment, but Holkar renewed his flight, and continued his route until he had gained his own frontier, and crossed the Chumbul. During his retreat he made an attempt to renew the negotiation, which was declared inadmissible. He was followed by the irregular horse and Lieutenant-Colonel Monson, covered by General Lake's army, from which a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Don gallantly stormed and took the fort of Tonk-Ramipoorah by blowing open the gate.

The news of this first success in the war against Holkar was shortly afterwards followed by intelligence of a different description from the province of Bundelcund, where the refractory chiefs in that strong country occupied the troops for a considerable period after its transfer to the British government. Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett, the officer in command, had detached seven companies of sepoy, with some artillery, for the purpose of reducing a small fort. Whilst operations against it were in progress, the killidar sent out an offer to surrender on the ensuing morning, on condition that the firing should cease. The proposal being accepted, the killidar apprized Holkar's general, Umeer Khan, of the circumstances, and invited him to send a detachment, and fall by surprise on the British troops. In this scheme they were partially successful; the horse approached the battery before they were discovered, and two companies of sepoy with 50 artillerymen, their officers and guns, were completely cut off. The remaining five companies under Captain Smith, supported by their only remaining gun, effected their retreat to the head-quarters of Lieutenant-Colonel Fawcett. Umeer Khan, encouraged by this success, made an attack on Kalpee, and attempted to pass the Jumna, for the purpose of plundering the Doab, but he was checked by two companies of sepoy stationed on the bank, and was shortly afterwards attacked and routed by a party of horse and a battalion of infantry, which had been received into the British pay from the service of Ambajee Inglia. Umeer Khan, however, continued to act for some time on the side of Bundelcund, where the numerous refractory zumeendars facilitated the means of predatory warfare.

In the meantime, as the rains approached, and the troops in Guzerat, in concert with those of Sindia, were supposed best capable of acting with advantage against Holkar's possessions during that season, General Lake, after the capture of Tonk-Ramipoorah, returned with the main army into cantonment, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Monson to keep Holkar in check, with five battalions of sepoy and about 3,000 irregular horse—the latter

divided into two bodies, the one under Bappoojee Sindia, in the service of Doulut Rao, and the other under Lieutenant Lucan. After the return of General Lake, Monson, intending to co-operate with Colonel Murray from Guzerat, entered Holkar's territory by the Mokundra pass, and a detachment from his division took the hill-fort of Hinglajgarh by escalade. Without efficient means of supply, he continued his route towards the Chumbul until the 7th July, when he received information that Holkar was crossing that river to attack him with the whole of his army, including his infantry and guns. Monson, who, shortly after his appointment to his present command, was nominated to the temporary rank of brigadier-general by the British commander-in-chief, at first advanced with the intention of meeting the enemy, and of taking advantage of their probable confusion in crossing the river. But staggered by a report that Colonel Murray intended to fall back on Guzerat, he began to reflect that he had only two days' grain for the supply of his camp, and that several detachments might be expected to join him; he therefore determined to retire to the Mokundra pass. A prompt and spirited attack on Mahrattas has always succeeded: indecision on the part of their enemy encourages them to fight when they would otherwise only think of escape, and a prolonged retreat before them, except in the single instance of the British detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob Camac, has invariably ended in disaster.

Having adopted the unfortunate alternative we have mentioned, Brigadier-General Monson, on the 8th July, began his retreat

July 8. by sending off his baggage and stores at four o'clock in the morning. No enemy having appeared, the line of infantry followed at nine, and the irregular horse were left on the ground, with orders to follow in half an hour, and to send the earliest intelligence of Holkar's motions. The division had retired about six *kos*, when intelligence was brought that the irregular horse had been attacked and defeated, and that Lieutenant Lucan* was taken prisoner. This information, it may be here observed, was brought by Doulut Rao's officer, Bappoojee Sindia, who in a few days afterwards deserted to Holkar. On the ensuing morning,

July 9—11. however, Monson took post in front of the Mokundra pass. On the 10th the Mahratta cavalry appeared, and next morning, their numbers having greatly increased, Holkar sent a letter requiring the surrender of the arms of the British detachment. The demand was of course rejected; when Holkar, dividing his cavalry into three bodies, attacked the division in front and flanks, but after various unsuccessful attempts, he withdrew his troops in the evening, and encamped at the distance of two *kos*, where, being joined by his infantry and guns, he intended, as was supposed, to renew the attack on the following morning. Monson not deeming his post tenable, and being apprehensive of having his retreat cut off, quitted his position, and in two marches, though

July 12. harassed by the enemy and exposed to very heavy rain, reached Kotah. The raj-rana of Kotah, when the British troops appeared as fugitives, would neither admit them into the town nor supply them with food; † Brigadier-General Monson was therefore ob-

* Lieutenant Lucan's fate was never positively known. He was supposed to have been poisoned, but this I have heard contradicted on tolerably good native authority, which stated that he died of a bowel complaint. The authority alluded to was Mohommud Khan Bungush, one of Holkar's officers, taken in rebellion by Colonel Wallace in 1808.

† Monson's narrative as published by government. The raj-rana, Zalim Sing,

figed to continue his route towards the Ganmuck ford on the Chumbul. Although its distance from Kotah was only seven miles, the obstructions occasioned by the incessant rain, and the deep nature of the soil, prevented

July 13, 14. his reaching the expected ford until next morning, when it was found impassable until the ensuing day. On the 14th Monson was obliged to halt to enable the troops to procure some grain; heavy rain continued throughout the night. On the 15th he resumed his march, but the guns sank so deep in the mud that they could not be extricated. The grain in the adjoining villages was exhausted,—retreat was now necessary to procure subsistence; the ammunition was therefore destroyed, and the guns were spiked and abandoned; but they were recommended to the care of the raja of Boondee, who, although he could not save the guns, had the courage to maintain his engagements with the

July 17. English in the face of the host of Holkar. On the 17th the troops reached the Chumbelee rivulet, which was not fordable, but Monson, on the ensuing day, sent his artillerymen across on elephants, with orders to proceed to the fort of Rampoorah. Nearly ten days elapsed before the whole of the troops—some on elephants, some on rafts, and some by being sent to a ford farther down—could cross this rivulet, so greatly was it swollen. During that time they sustained much privation; in different situations they repulsed several persevering attacks which were made upon them by Holkar's cavalry; and a detachment of flank companies, under Captain O'Donell, beat up the camp of a large body of the enemy on

the evening of the 21st July, with great spirit and success. July 21. Many of the men were drowned in crossing the Chumbelee; but the most trying to the poor sepoys of all that they endured, was the loss of many of their wives and children, who, being in some instances necessarily left on the opposite bank till the last, were, in this helpless and unprotected state, in view and within hearing of their husbands, barbarously massacred by Bheels from the neighbouring hills, who were in the interests of Holkar.

By the 29th July the whole of the corps of the division reached Rampoorah, and here Brigadier-General Monson was joined by two battalions of sepoys with four field-pieces, two howitzers, and a body of irregular horse, bringing with them a supply of grain. This reinforcement had been ordered forward by General Lake as soon as he was apprized of the situation of the detachment at the Mokundra pass; but Brigadier-General Monson, not judging his supplies sufficient, after a long and apparently unnecessary halt, determined to continue his retreat to Kooshaigurh, where he expected to find supplies, and to be joined by six of Sindia's battalions with 21 guns, under Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskur, the officer defeated by Holkar at Poona in October 1802. After throwing a strong garrison with his field-pieces into Rampoorah, the division, consisting of five battalions and six companies of Bengal sepoys,* with two howitzers, on the morning of the 22nd August, reached the Bunass, which was so much swollen as to be scarcely fordable for the largest elephants. Three boats were found, with which the treasure of the detachment, protected by

afterwards denied his having refused them food, and said he had offered them an asylum outside the walls; but allowing this last to have been true, Colonel Monson, by accepting such an equivocal support, might have exposed his detachment to certain destruction between two fires. It is however certain that Zulim Sing was fined ten lakhs of rupees by Holkar, whilst the latter lay in the neighbourhood of Kotah.

* 2 2d, 1 9th, 1 14th, both battalions of the 12th, and six companies of the 31st Bengal native infantry.

the six companies of the 21st regiment under Captain Nicholl, were sent across and forwarded to Kooshalgurh. On the 23rd August Holkar's cavalry again made their appearance in force, and on the 24th, the river being fordable, Brigadier-General Monson began to send over his baggage and one battalion. Holkar at the same time took possession of a village on Monson's right, but was promptly dislodged from it. The river having decreased considerably, the Mahrattas were enabled to pass it to the right and left, and most of Monson's baggage having got across, his main body, consisting of three battalions with one of the howitzers, followed. Major James Sinclair was left with one battalion, the 2nd battalion 2nd regiment, and the pickets of the four corps which had crossed, to protect the passage of the remaining baggage and camp-followers. At 4 p. m., however, Holkar's infantry and guns camp up, and opened a heavy cannonade. Major Sinclair desperately charged the guns with the small party that remained, took several of them, and for a moment was victorious; but the enemy, rallied by Jeswant Rao Holkar in person, charged in turn with overpowering numbers, and the gallant handful of sepoys was nearly annihilated. Of the brave European officers who led them on, 12 fell with their commander, and the wreck of the party escaped under cover of the fire of their comrades, who lined the opposite bank. The Mahrattas, as usual in success, were now active and energetic; they prosecuted the advantage which they had obtained, and compelled Monson to abandon his baggage, which, with their usual avidity, they seized as trophies of a decisive victory. But the British detachment could yet show they were far from being subdued; every attack was repulsed, and Colonel Monson reached Kooshalgurh on the night of the 25th August. Here a most unexpected

state of affairs presented itself; instead of finding an ally in Sewdasheo Bhow, that officer had attacked Captain Nicholl, who had, with much judgment and spirit, maintained his post, and protected Kooshalgurh, a town belonging to the raja of Jeypoor. On the 26th August the Mahratta cavalry encamped in separate bodies, surrounding the British detachment; and two companies of sepoys, belonging to the 1st battalion 14th regiment, with a large proportion of the irregular horse, seduced by Holkar, deserted. Of the cause of this partial disaffection there is no account afforded, but for the treachery of the few, the general fidelity and steadiness of the detachment, most amply made amends.* Unfortunately, Brigadier-General Monson did not know the sepoys; they had no confidence in him, nor he in them. At seven o'clock on the evening of the 26th August, having previously spiked his remaining howitzer, the other having been taken by the enemy on the bank of the Bunass, Brigadier-General Monson moved out of Kooshalgurh, and prosecuted his retreat towards Agra in an oblong square. During that night and the ensuing day the Mahratta horse, supported by guns, repeatedly attempted to penetrate, but could make no impression. On the night of the 27th,

under the protection of the ruined fort of Hindoun, Monson halted a few hours to refresh his weary men, but one hour after midnight his retreat was resumed. As soon as he had cleared the ravines near Hindoun, the horse in three different bodies made a desperate

* During the most harassing days many of the old sepoys and native officers were often heard encouraging the younger European officers, when sinking under their fatigues, telling them "to cheer up, for that they would carry them safely to Agra."

charge; but the sepoy, reserving their fire until they were almost within reach of their bayonets, then gave it with such signal effect that the enemy retired in every direction. The troops, almost exhausted with fatigue and hunger, reached the Biana pass about sunset; here Brigadier-General Monson intended to halt during the night, but the ardent and persevering enemy once more brought up their guns, and opened so heavy and severe a fire on the exhausted troops as to oblige them to go on as they best could. But weary, and harassed beyond endurance, the baggage having become entangled with the line of march, and the night being excessively dark, no order could be restored, and the whole were thrown into inextricable confusion. In this state the troops fairly broke, and fled towards Agra. The enemy, though they attacked in straggling parties, fortunately were not in sufficient force to reap the full advantage they

might have done, and by the 31st August, the greater part of the fugitives, who escaped the enemy, found an asylum at Agra.

Holkar, at the head of 60,000 horse,* 15,000 infantry and artillery, with 192 guns, advanced triumphantly to Muttra, which at his approach was abandoned by the British troops; and parties of the Mahratta horse pushed across the Jumna. But General Lake, with his accustomed energy, had already taken measures for repairing the disasters. The Mahrattas who crossed the Jumna were driven back, troops were ordered on to Agra with all expedition, and the British army, in the course of a month, again advanced on the Mahrattas. In a few days the Mahratta horse began, in their usual manner, to show themselves in small parties, gradually increasing in numbers, flying before the British cavalry when sent to pursue them, evading every attempt to bring them to action, turning as their pursuers turned, firing their matchlocks, and brandishing their spears: whilst others stole in upon the flanks and rear, where they at first cut off stragglers and baggage with considerable success. The cruelties committed by Holkar on all who fell into his hands were barbarous in the extreme. It is probable that General Lake, instead of making fruitless attempts from a standing camp to bring Holkar's cavalry to action,

October 4—12. would have pushed at his infantry and guns, but he seems to have remained at Muttra for the purpose of collecting supplies, which afforded Holkar an opportunity of attempting an important enterprize, being no less than that of endeavouring to possess himself of the emperor's person. The plan was well conceived, but it was completely frustrated by the precaution and gallantry of Lieutenant-Colonel Ochterlony, the resident at Delhi, assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel Burn, the commandant. The whole of the enemy's infantry and artillery attacked Delhi on the 8th, and continued the siege until the 14th, during

October 8—14. which, though deserted by a party of irregulars attached to the garrison, a small body of British sepoy, ably commanded,† made a successful sortie, repelled an assault, and under incessant fatigue defended a city ten miles in circumference.

* So stated by Sir John Malcolm, who, in regard to Jeswunt Rao Holkar, is our best authority. To account for this vast body, it must be recollected that he was recruited by the wreck of the armies of Sindia and Rughojee Bhonslay, and a part, no doubt, were Pindharees.

† In regard to sepoy, it cannot be too well understood that much depends on their European officers; no officers in the British service can be placed in situations where more address, suavity, and firmness are necessary; consequently none are more deserving of consideration from their country; but officers must also remember that

General Lake, on hearing of this attack, marched to the relief of the capital, and arrived there on the 18th October; but it was

October 18. Holkar's plan to keep his infantry out of reach, and they were already five days on their march towards the territory of his ally the raja of Bhurtpoor, who, in favor of his old friends the Mahrattas, particularly the family of Holkar, had seceded from his engagements with the English, notwithstanding the great advantage which he derived from their alliance. Holkar's cavalry, except a few thousands who accompanied the march of his infantry, continued to hover round Delhi for some days; but on the 29th of October suddenly crossed the Jumna below Panniput, for the purpose of cutting off a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Burn, who, after being called in for the defence of Delhi, was on his return to his station at Sehraunpoor, with one battalion of sepoy and some matchlockmen, when he was overtaken by Holkar at Shamlee. He formed his camp into a square, which, towards evening, the enemy surrounded, but drew off in the night to the high road leading to Sehraunpoor, which enabled Colonel Burn to throw his party into a small gurhee near the town, where he resolved to defend himself if he could procure supplies, and, if not, to fight his way back to Delhi. In consequence of the hostility evinced towards him by the inhabitants of Shamlee, who joined Holkar in attacking him, he had determined to adopt the latter alternative, when he heard that General Lake, with three regiments of dragoons, three regiments of native cavalry, the horse artillery, and a brigade of infantry under Colonel Don, was marching to his relief. General Lake arrived at Shamlee on the 3rd November; Holkar retired on his approach, and now prepared to execute his long-meditated threat of wasting the company's provinces with fire and sword. To leave him no time for the purpose was now the object of the British general; and on the 5th November the pursuit of Holkar commenced; his route lay in a southerly direction, straight down the Doab, in which he pillaged and burned the defenceless villages as he passed along.

The British infantry, excepting the brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Don, was sent with two regiments of cavalry by General Lake, when he crossed the Jumna, to follow Holkar's infantry and guns, which had taken post near Deeg, a fort belonging to the raja of Bhurtpoor. Major-General Frazer, who commanded, arrived in the neighbourhood of Deeg on the 12th November. Holkar's infantry was encamped behind

November 12. an extensive morass and a deep tank, with their left on a fortified village, and their right on the fort of Deeg, supported by ranges of batteries, which they deemed impregnable. On the morning of the 13th the British troops, in two lines, moved

November 13. on to the attack; the gallant 76th first carried the fortified village with their bayonets, and finding a range of guns immediately under it, charged on through a tremendous fire of round, grape, and chain shot: the 1st Bengal European regiment rushed on to support the 76th, followed by the sepoy. Holkar's infantry abandoned the first range of guns, and retired to the next; but this was as instantly charged by General Frazer, who fell mortally wounded in the operation, deeply regretted by his troops. The command devolved on Colonel Monson, under whom the victory was completed; the enemy being compelled to abandon battery after battery, until they were forced into

it is generally their own fault when confidence is not mutual. To encourage the sepoy on this occasion, Colonel Ochterlony served out sweetmeats, and promised them half a month's pay as soon as the enemy was repulsed. He knew them.

the fort of Deeg, the garrison of which immediately fired upon the British troops. During the battle the Mahratta horse retook the first range, and for a short time turned the guns on the rear of the British line, but they were again re-taken by 28 men of the 76th regiment, headed by Captain Norford, who lost his life in the performance of this remarkable exploit. The loss of the British was severe; no less than 643 were killed and wounded, and of these 22 were European officers. The loss of the enemy was estimated at about 2,000; 87 pieces of ordnance were taken, and among them Colonel Monson had the satisfaction of finding 14 of those lost during his retreat.

Four days after the victory at Deeg, on the morning of the November 17. 17th November, General Lake, after a most persevering pursuit, came up with Holkar's cavalry at Furruckabad, and falling upon them by surprise, put 3,000 of them to the sword. General Lake from the 31st October estimated that he had marched at the rate of 23 miles daily, and that during the night and day preceding the attack, including the space gone over in the pursuit, his cavalry went upwards of 70 miles in less than 24 hours.

The explosion of a tumbrel, as the British troops approached the Mahratta camp, gave the alarm to Holkar, and on the first discharge from the gallopers, Jeswunt Rao fled with such of his followers as were ready on the instant, taking the direction of Deeg, to join the remains of his army, of whose defeat he received intelligence the night before he was surprised. General Lake, continuing the pursuit, arrived at Deeg on the 1st December, when the siege of that fortress having been determined upon, the battering train was brought from Agra, and the trenches opened on the 13th. In ten days a breach was made in an outwork, strongly fortified at one of the angles of the city, which was stormed and taken at

December 23. midnight, with the loss of 227 men killed and wounded. On the ensuing day and night the town and citadel of Deeg were evacuated, the garrison, including the remains of Holkar's infantry, betaking themselves to Bhurtpoor.

The capture of Deeg, involving the loss of the greater part of the territory of the raja of Bhurtpoor, was a severe blow to Holkar. His territory in the Deccan was already reduced by the capture of all his forts, including Chandore and Galna, which, after a slight resistance, surrendered to a division under Colonel Wallace by the end of October. His principal forts in Malwa were also occupied by British troops, and in the month of August, Indore, his capital, had been taken possession of without resistance by the detachment of the Bombay army from Guzerat. That division had been ordered to advance into Hindostan for the purpose of endeavouring to intercept Holkar in his expected flight to Malwa, and it had reached Kotah by the end of December. The reduction of Bhurtpoor, however, was deemed necessary in order to cut off Holkar's only asylum, after which he might, it was supposed, be followed up as a fugitive, and either taken prisoner or rendered insignificant.

But the fortunes of Jeswunt Rao, though in a few weeks they had undergone a signal reverse, were not yet destined to close. The situation of his ally the raja of Bhurtpoor was still more desperate than his own, for as a Mahratta freebooter "he had still his country and his property on the saddle of his horse," but the Jath raja, as he himself declared from the first, "must stand or fall with his fort."^{*}

* The above chapter, where the authority is not expressly mentioned, is from English Records, Major Thorne's memoir, and oral information.

CHAP. XLV.

A. D. 1805 AND A. D. 1806.

The siege of Bhurtpoor commences.—Holkar and Umeer Khan attempt to obstruct the operations.—Umeer Khan proceeds to Rohilcund—is pursued by General Smith—defeated and compelled to return to Bhurtpoor.—The Jaths repulse the British army in four assaults.—The raja sues for peace—terms granted—principal reason for admitting him to terms.—Disputes with Sindia.—The Marquis Cornwallis returns to India as governor-general—his views—death—is succeeded by Sir George Barlow.—Holkar takes the route of the Punjab—is pursued by Lord Lake.—Peace with Sindia—and with Holkar.—System of policy pursued by Sir George Barlow—remonstrances of Lord Lake—declaratory articles annexed to the treaties—policy of the British government towards the Rajpoots—particularly ungenerous towards the raja of Boondee.—Treaty with the Guekwar.

THE Bengal army arrived before Bhurtpoor on the second day of the new year. General Lake being accustomed only to success, without properly reconnoitring the place, and with a very inefficient battering train, commenced the siege by taking possession of a grove which afforded a partial cover to his operations. Bhurtpoor is a fortified town, six or eight miles in circumference, everywhere surrounded by a very high strong mud wall, and bastions planted with a numerous artillery, having a wide and deep ditch, capable of being rendered unfordable. It was strongly garrisoned by the whole of the raja's troops and the remainder of Holkar's infantry. The raja pressed a great proportion of the neighbouring villagers, many of whom were of his own caste, to assist in repairing the works; and having a very large treasury, nothing to obstruct his supplies on three sides of the town, and Holkar's cavalry to act upon those of the besiegers, his means of defence were proportionate to his resolution to use them. In addition to Holkar's cavalry, Umeer Khan was summoned from Bundelcund, and during the progress of the siege, after making on one occasion a considerable but unsuccessful effort on an important convoy, where a number of his men were killed, he went off to effect a diversion, crossed the Jumna and the Ganges, and invaded the company's districts in Rohilcund. He was, however, so closely pursued by the British cavalry detached by General Lake under General Smith, that he had not time to effect extensive mischief. He was at last overtaken on the 1st March, and after a sharp skirmish routed with considerable loss. This defeat encouraged the people of the country to resist him, and his followers began to desert. Tired at length by a campaign less profitable and more hazardous than he expected, Umeer Khan, about the 20th March, returned to Bhurtpoor, which still defied every effort of the British general, who had by that time come to the resolution of suspending operations until the arrival

of stores, and the junction of a more powerful artillery. The army had been repulsed in four assaults ; the first, led by Colonel Maitland, who lost his life on the occasion, was made on the night of the 9th of January. Several causes were assigned for its failure ; owing to the irregularity of the ground, and the extreme darkness, a confusion took place at the outset, from which many of the men lost their way ; the ditch was very deep, and the breach was not only imperfect, but defended with determined courage. A better breach induced General Lake to try the second assault on the 21st of the same month : it failed from the depth of water in the ditch. Means had been taken to ascertain the extent of this impediment by a stratagem of three of the Bengal native cavalry, who, pretending to go over to the enemy, and being fired upon with blank cartridges from the trenches, had thus an opportunity of making their observations, and returned with a favourable report. The enemy, however, dammed up the ditch in front of the breach, which, on the part of the besiegers, rendered valour unavailing,

and perseverance destruction. On the 10th February
February 10. the Bombay division, under Major-General Jones, joined the Bengal army to assist in the siege, which was now going on by regular approaches. On the 20th of that month another assault was made

with no better success than the former. Two European
February 20. regiments, one of them the hitherto brave 76th, refused to follow their officers, and thus gave the 12th regiment of Bengal sepoys an opportunity of immortalizing themselves. Following the gallant remains of the flank companies of the 22nd regiment of foot, the sepoys advanced with the greatest alacrity, planted their colours on the top of a bastion, and it was supposed that an equal degree of ardour on the part of the 75th and 76th regiments would have made them masters of the place. Next day the men of these regiments, when addressed by General Lake, were overpowered by shame and remorse ; they volunteered to a man ; and a fourth and last attempt was made on the 21st February. The

February 21. men, marching over the dead bodies of their companions, which crowded the ditch and glacis, rushed on with a desperate resolution, which would have overcome any practicable obstacles. On this, as on every former occasion, none of the troops relaxed in their efforts ; and for two hours, until ordered to desist, they persevered at the breach, or in climbing up a high bastion which adjoined it. But as fast as the leaders got up, they were knocked down with logs of wood, or speared by rows of pikemen who crowded the tops of the parapets. The besieged took every precaution, and used every effort of prudence and resolution ; the damage done to the mud wall by the shot was generally repaired during the night, their guns were drawn within the embrasures to prevent their being dismounted, and during the assaults, particularly in the last, pots filled with combustibles, burning cotton bales steeped in oil, with incessant discharges of grape from the cannon, and a destructive fire of small arms were poured upon the British troops, whose casualties were very great, and in the four assaults 3,203 men were killed and wounded, of whom 103 were European officers. The most afflicting circumstance attending these failures was the necessity of leaving many of the wounded behind, who were almost invariably put to death by a sally of the garrison.

The Mahratta horse made their appearance daily, endeavouring to obstruct the operations of the siege, and during the assaults afforded considerable assistance, particularly when the British cavalry was in pursuit of Umeer Khan. They occasionally cut off cattle, foragers, and

stragglers, and the foraging parties of the besiegers were necessarily so strong, and obliged to march to such a distance, that very considerable impediment was the consequence. Besides the attempt made by Umeer Khan, already adverted to, there was another serious but unavailing attack upon a convoy, which was made by both Holkar and Umeer Khan, assisted by some of the Jath horse. On both occasions the convoys were saved by seasonable reinforcements from the British camp. Upon the return of the cavalry from the pursuit of Umeer Khan in Rohilkund, General Lake made two attempts to surprise Holkar, in the second of which he was particularly successful;* 1,000 of the Mahrattas were killed, and great numbers of the horsemen their spirit being now completely broken, quitted their leader after this chastisement. To such a pitch of alarm had they now arrived, and so completely disheartened were these active tormentors of Monson's detachment, that they had not courage to fight for their lives; not one of the British cavalry was killed on the occasion. A few days after this event, 3,000 of the remains of Holkar's regular infantry were intercepted by a detachment of British troops under Captain Royal, and defeated with severe loss.

To complete Holkar's misfortunes, his ally, the raja of Bhurtpoor, hoping to save himself, took advantage of the intermission of the siege to testify his desire of reconciliation; offering terms which, even after everything was prepared to renew the attack, many concurring reasons

induced the British authorities to accept, although at the April 10. prodigious sacrifice of leaving a lasting impression of their failure. The raja of Bhurtpoor paid 20 lakhs of rupees, renounced his alliance with the enemies of the British government, and his claims to advantages secured by the former treaty with General (now Lord) Lake. The fortress of Deeg was to be restored when the British government had reason to be assured of his fidelity.

The principal cause which actuated the British authorities in accommodating matters with the raja of Bhurtpoor was an apprehended rupture with Sindia. Doulut Rao, several days even before he signed the treaty of defensive alliance, had made strong objections to the restorations granted by the British government to the rana of Gohud, whom, as being long dispossessed of all territory, he affected to consider as a private individual possessing neither rights nor independence, and therefore incapable of engaging in any treaty; consequently it was unjust, he argued, to set up his antiquated claims as one of the independent rajas or jagheerdars, and absurd to pretend that this elected rana could cede Gwalior to the company. These arguments, though easily combated, were sufficiently ingenious for the immediate purpose of Sindia's ministers, whose chief aim was to seek cause of present dispute, trusting to events for widening or repairing the breach as they saw occasion.

Ambajee Inglia, who was insincere from the first in his treaty with the English, and who claimed and obtained merit with his master for what he had done, by retaining possession of some of the districts in jagheer, is said to have been the deviser of this scheme in regard to Gohud,† and to have been the active abettor of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay in endeavouring to excite Doulut Rao to a union with Holkar. No Mahratta doubts, and the

* In the first attempt the clattering of the steel scabbards worn by the cavalry gave the Mahrattas intimation of his approach; in the second, by leaving them behind, he got nearer to their camp before being discovered.

† Oral information from Ambajee's son-in-law and others.

governor-general must have known, that Bappoojee Sindia and Sewdasheo Bhow Bhaskar joined Holkar with Doulut Rao's consent. Whilst disavowed, it was not expedient to charge him with such an act of treacherous hostility, and therefore, in the event of their being apprehended by General Lake, he had instructions to try them by a court-martial for their treason and desertion, and to carry into execution whatever sentence might be passed. Sindia, in a long letter of frivolous and unjust complaint, which he addressed to the governor-general on the 18th October 1804, had the assurance to adduce the desertion of those officers as one of his grievances, originating in his not having received pecuniary aid from the English, to enable him to co-operate against Holkar; and that they had only feigned to join the enemy for the purpose of obtaining subsistence for their troops.

At the period of the date of this letter, Sindia was on his march from Burhanpoor towards Malwa, professing an intention of proceeding to his own capital, Oojein, agreeably to frequent recommendations from the British government. But under the influence of Shirzee Rao, who from the first earnestly promoted the union with Holkar, Sindia was fully bent on joining that chief, and, in addition to various acts of a hostile nature against the allies of the British government, committed a gross outrage by attacking, plundering, and detaining Mr. Jenkins, the acting resident in his camp.

A division of the British army under Colonel Martindell in Bundelcund had been directed to reinforce the army at Bhurtpoor, and had advanced for that purpose as far as Gwalior; but on receiving intelligence of this outrage, Colonel Martindell fell back on Jhansee to frustrate any scheme which Sindia might have formed of invading the company's provinces, which from Kalpee to Calcutta were completely exposed; but Sindia moved on gradually to the northward, until his approach to the Chumbul produced a strong remonstrance from the British resident, to whom Sindia declared that he was unable to proceed to settle his own country from the state of his finances, and that he was only marching towards Bhurtpoor to mediate a peace. He agreed, however, if assisted by the British government in the removal of his pecuniary embarrassments, to return to the southward, and act as they might desire; he also promised to make reparation for the plunder of the British resident. At the interview where these assurances were given, the demeanour of Sindia and his ministers was much more conciliatory than it had been for some time before, and it being of great importance to prevent Sindia from joining the confederacy at Bhurtpoor, the governor-general accepted this promise as an atonement for the outrage on his representative, and agreed to advance some pecuniary aid, provided Sindia would return and employ himself in taking possession of Holkar's unoccupied districts in Malwa. Sindia pretended to acquiesce, and retired eight miles towards Subbulgurh; but still, on pretence of mediating, sent on a part of his cavalry and all his Pindharees towards Bhurtpoor. The treaty, however, was concluded previous to their arrival; the raja declined an interview with Sindia's wukeel, and the troops, joined by Holkar with the remains of his cavalry, returned to Sindia's camp, where Holkar met with a cordial reception, as did Bappoojee Sindia and Umeer Khan. Sindia in regard to Holkar endeavoured to justify himself to the British government, by telling the resident that Holkar, who had intended to plunder the British territories, had at his request abandoned that design, and consented to his mediation for the attainment of peace.*

* Mill's History of British India.

Lord Lake, in consequence of this junction, moved from Bhurtpoor with his whole army towards the camp of Sindia and Holkar, desiring the resident to quit Sindia's camp. The resident, however, was still detained on various pretexts, whilst the two chieftains, on Lord Lake's approach, retreated in a south-westerly direction towards Kotah, with great precipitation. Their whole force consisted of 5,000 infantry with 140 guns, 12,000 sildar horse, and 12,000 Pindharees. From the advanced state of the season, Lord Lake did not deem it advisable to pursue them, and therefore directed the army to take up positions during the monsoon. The Bombay troops, under General Jones, occupied a central situation at Tonk-Rampoorah, Colonel Martindell's division returned to Bundelcund, a detachment was placed at Gohud, and the main body of the Bengal army was stationed at Agra and Muttra.

Sindia and Holkar repaired to Kotah, and afterwards moved towards Ajimere. Holkar was a decided advocate for continuing the war; Shirzee Rao was strenuous in support of this proposal, and whilst he continued to sway the councils of his son-in-law, Holkar had entire influence in Sindia's administration. But the violence of Shirzee Rao defeated his own purposes, and Holkar was instrumental in removing him from power, and placing Ambajee Inglia at the head of Sindia's administration. Holkar, with Sindia's connivance, had at first confined Ambajee, and after exacting from him a large sum of money, on which the troops subsisted for some time, he was released, and appointed as has been just mentioned. Holkar expected to find in him a willing coadjutor, and, from the reputation of his wisdom, much more was hoped than from the rash violence of Shirzee Rao; but the temporizing policy of Ambajee, the re-kindling rivalry of the two chieftains, the separation of their camps, and, above all, Sindia's conviction of their impotency to contend with the British government, paved the way to a pacification which had by that time, owing to a change in the government, become the primary object of the British cabinet.

Peace was no doubt of the greatest importance to British India at this period, but the power of the Mahratta chiefs was completely broken: the Peishwa, however inimically disposed, had as yet acquired no authority, and the Marquis Wellesley, without renouncing any advantages, would have soon been enabled to effect every arrangement for securing a long, if not a permanent, tranquillity; but the protracted warfare, and the popular clamour in England against his administration, arising chiefly from temporary embarrassments and a sudden accumulation of debt, began to influence the opinions, not only of the proprietors and directors of the East India Company, but of the British ministry. The return of the venerable Marquis Cornwallis to India was solicited by the highest authorities, as if the salvation of that country depended on his presence. He arrived in Calcutta on the 30th July, and on the same day assumed charge of the government. He showed, almost from the first act of his administration, that he disapproved of the system of defensive alliance conjoined with a subsidiary force, and evinced so great an eagerness to put an end to the war with Holkar, and to accommodate the differences with Sindia, that, had the power of these chiefs and of Rughoojee not been completely broken, it would probably have ensured a prolongation of hostilities, conducted with all the energy and activity of Mahrattas in success. Lord Cornwallis was willing to overlook the outrage committed by Sindia on the British resident, to give up Gwalior and its dependencies, and to make some provision for the rana of Gohud from the disposable territories on the Jumna. To Holkar he proposed to restore the whole of the territories

conquered from him during the war. He greatly disapproved of the treaties of defence and guarantee entered into with the petty rajas of Joudpoor, Jeypoor, Bhurtpoor, Macherry, and Boondee. As to the first, the raja of Joudpoor having refused to ratify the treaty which his wukeel had made with General Lake, of course no agreement with that state existed. With regard to the second, the raja of Jeypoor had not fulfilled the conditions of his agreement, and the Marquis Cornwallis, at an early period, had directed him to be informed that it was considered as dissolved; but the raja's subsequent conduct had in a great degree retrieved his previous neglect. With respect to the other three, the governor-general proposed, as an inducement to their renouncing the alliance, to make over portions of the territory conquered from Sindia south of Delhi, and on the west of the Jumna, which river he intended should form the south-western boundary of the company's possessions in that quarter, and by these means exempt the British government from all obligation to guarantee or defend the territory so assigned from the attack of Sindia or any other potentate. In conformity with these sentiments, instructions were forwarded to Lord Lake on the 19th September; but before their official transmission, Lord Lake, apprized of the pacific course of policy which the new governor-general had determined to pursue, seized an opportunity, consequent to Ambajee's appointment to the administration, and to the dismissal of Shirzee Rao, to draw proposals from Sindia—an important advantage in most negotiations, but particularly so in the present case. To the overtures made Lord Lake replied that he could listen to no proposition until the resident was released, a preliminary to which Sindia now readily consented; and Lord Lake, in anticipation of the wishes of the governor-general, had submitted, previously to the receipt of his instructions, a plan for the adjustment of differences with Sindia. In consequence of this favourable state of affairs, and the evils he conceived likely to result from abandoning the connection with the petty states, and permitting the Mahrattas to regain a footing in the northern provinces, he delayed acting upon the instructions, and represented the reasons by which he was guided.

Before this representation was received, the mortal illness of the Marquis Cornwallis had rendered him incapable of attending to public business;

October 5. and at his death, which happened on the 5th October, the charge of the British government in India devolved on the senior member of the Bengal council, Sir George Barlow.

In the meantime Holkar, perceiving the change of politics on the part of Sindia, and that he had nothing to hope from him whilst his own fortunes were so low, quitted Ajimere early in the month of September, and with about 12,000 horse, 2,000 or 3,000 infantry, and 30 guns, took the route of the Punjab, giving out that he expected to be joined by the Seiks and the Afghans. Two divisions of the British army—the one under General Jones from Rampoorah, and the other under Colonel Ball, in the Rewaree hills—made ineffectual attempts to intercept him; on which Lord Lake, having posted divisions to prevent his getting back, set out in pursuit of him with five regiments of cavalry and four battalions of infantry.

These operations did not obstruct the arrangements with Sindia, which, under the immediate direction of Lord Lake, were concluded by a new treaty on the 22nd November; Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm being the agent on the part of the company, and Moonshee Kavil Nyne on that of Sindia. The treaty of Surjee Angengaoon was to remain in full force, excepting in such parts as might be altered by the present arrangement.

The subsisting engagement between the British government and the rana of Gohud being inconvenient, or, as was declared, the rana being found totally unfit for the exercise of sovereign authority, the agreement was dissolved, and the fortress of Gwalior with the Gohud territory were restored to Sindia. It was, however, stipulated that an establishment should be provided for the rana by the British government; and, in order to remunerate them for the expense of supporting it, Sindia, on his part, agreed to relinquish the pensions of 15 lakhs of rupees, granted to certain officers in his service, and to resign his enam districts of Dholpoor-Baree and Raj-Kerrah, which were reserved to him by the treaty of Surjee Anjengao. The river Chumbul, from Kotah on the west, to the extremity of the Gohud territory on the east, was declared the boundary of the two states; and, in consideration of the benefits derived by the company from this line of demarcation, it was agreed to allow Sindia, personally, an annual pension of four lakhs of rupees, and to assign jagheers to his wife and daughter—the former to have two lakhs, and the latter one lakh of rupees annually, within the territory of the company. The two small districts of Bhadek and Sooseporarah, on the right bank of the Jumna, and south of the Chumbul, being necessary to the greater security of the company's frontier, were made over to them. Sindia renounced all claim to tribute from the raja of Boondee, or from any other state north of the Chumbul, and to the eastward of Kotah. The British government engaged to enter into no treaties with the rana of Oudepoor, the rajas of Joudpoor, Kotah, and other chiefs, the tributaries of Sindia in Malwa, Marwar, and Mewar; nor to interfere with the arrangements Sindia might make with them. In the event of peace with Holkar, the British government engaged that they should not desire the restoration of such of the districts of Holkar between the Taptee and Chumbul as Sindia had taken, or interfere in any manner with their arrangements, wars, or disputes. The losses, public and private, sustained by the British residency, were to be made good; and as it was notorious that Shirzee Rao Ghatgay was the instigator of this outrage, and that he had always acted with the most virulent hostility to the British government, Sindia agreed never to admit him into his councils. The negotiation of this treaty did not obstruct the active pursuit of Holkar; Lord Lake, joined by reinforcements as he advanced, followed him into the Punjab with unremitting perseverance. Jeswunt Rao, if he entered the territory of the Seiks in any expectation of assistance from them, was totally disappointed; but, whilst they preserved a strict neutrality, they were also anxious to become mediators for Holkar, whose hopes of resisting the British power were now completely crushed. Driven at length to extreme distress, he sent agents to Lord Lake's camp, on the bank of the Beah, to sue for peace; and as the instructions of the late governor-general remained in force, under the authority of Sir George Barlow, it may be imagined that the negotiation of a treaty which restored conquered territories, to which Holkar had forfeited his right, even had he been the legitimate representative of his family, was very soon concluded. Holkar renounced all right to Tonk-Rampoorah, Boondee, and all other places north of the Boondee hills, all claims on the province of Bundelcund, and on the British government and its allies; he engaged never to entertain Europeans in his service, and never to admit Shirzee Rao Ghatgay into his councils or employment; he also became bound to return to Malwa by a prescribed route. The British government engaged to have no interference with the possessions of Holkar south of the Chumbul; to restore the forts and districts of the family in the Dec-

can, excepting Chandore and its dependencies, and the districts of Amber and Sewgaom; but, in case of Holkar's evincing amicable and peaceful intentions towards the British government, Chandore, Amber, and Sewgaom were to be restored, and the district of Koonch; in Bundelcund, was to be given in jagheer to his daughter—the former in 18 months,

and the latter in two years, from the 24th December 1805, the day on which the treaty was dated.

Sir George Barlow, in whom the power of confirming treaties on the part of the British government now rested, made an alteration in this treaty, as well as in that concluded with

A. D. 1806. Sindia. Sir George Barlow conceived that the reasons adduced by Lord Lake for continuing the connections with the petty states north of the Chumbul, were outweighed by the political advantage of their dissolution. Lord Lake maintained that the alliance of these petty states interposed a strong barrier against the future encroachments of the Mahrattas; and that, at all events, the honor of the British government was pledged to respect its engagements, until the treaties were infringed or renounced by the states in question. Sir George Barlow contended that the security of the British government depended either on its controlling all the states of India, or on leaving them to the wars and disputes which were sure to arise if left to themselves; and if the British government renounced its claim to the territory in which any such petty state was situated, all obligation to protect it was dissolved. It is not clear, in the circumstances then existing, in what manner Sir George Barlow meant to apply this latter argument, excepting to the raja of Boondee; but with respect to the former observation, as far as regarded the contentions of those states, Lord Lake had before expressed his opinion that, if left to themselves, they would quarrel with each other, call in the aid of the native powers in their vicinity, and large armies of irregulars would be contending upon the frontier of the most fertile provinces of the British government, against whose eventual excesses there would be no well-grounded security, but a military force in a constant state of preparation. Had His Lordship's life been extended to the term which might have been reasonably hoped, he would not only have seen his prediction verified, but that a military force, acting on the defensive, afforded no certain security against the incursions of swarms of brigands which were thus nourished.

Agreeably to the system of policy he had determined upon, Sir George Barlow annexed declaratory articles to the treaties concluded with Sindia and Holkar, explaining away any obligation which, by the treaty with the former, might be inferred, of protecting the petty states north of the Chumbul, from Kotah to the Jumna, and restoring to the latter Tonk-Rampoorah and all the territory north of the Boondee hills; thus abandoning to his fate the raja of Boondee, who, on his part, had maintained the alliance with honor and generosity.

Lord Cornwallis, disapproving of the system of alliances, had, as already mentioned, taken advantage of a failure in his engagement on the part of the raja of Jeypoor, to direct that alliance to be considered as dissolved; but Lord Lake had prevailed upon Lord Cornwallis to suspend this dissolution, because, at the period, the raja had it greatly in his power to assist or incommode the British army; and from that time he had performed such essential service as to render himself obnoxious both to Sindia and Holkar, to whose vengeance he became exposed, should the British government withdraw its protection. Notwithstanding these claims, and the earnest recommendation of Lord Lake, Sir George Barlow

obstinately adhered to his determination, and declared the alliance at an end. This declaration, it may be observed, did not take place until subsequent to the treaties with Holkar and Sindia; so that, without infringing its engagements with them, the British government was still at liberty to extend its protection to Jeypoor if it should see fit. The engagements with the rajas of Bhurtpoor and Macherry, though their dissolution was much desired by the governor-general, remained in force.

The treaty of Deogaon concluded with Rughojee Bhonslay, 17th December 1803, also continued in force; but by an engagement, dated 24th August 1806, Patwa and Sumbulpore were restored to him. By the definitive treaty with Sindia it became necessary to provide for the rana of Gohud, and the districts of Dholpoor-Baree and Raj-Kerrah were assigned for that purpose.

A definitive treaty of general defensive alliance had been concluded with the Gaekwar, 21st April 1805, for the purpose of consolidating the stipulations contained in three preceding agreements, drawn up in March, June, and July 1802, and making some additions and alterations which were deemed expedient. The Gaekwar had previously received a subsidiary force of 2,000 men, and he now engaged to maintain 3,000 infantry and a company of artillery, which were to be stationed within his territory, but only employed on occasions of some importance. Districts yielding rupees 11,70,000* were assigned for their support. The districts of Chowrassy, Chickly, and Kaira, together with the Gaekwar's share of the chouth of Surat, were ceded to the company. The British government having advanced, or become security on account of the Gaekwar's government to the amount of nearly 41½ lakhs of rupees, the revenue of districts yielding nearly 14 lakhs annually was appropriated for liquidating this debt. The Gaekwar agreed to submit the examination and adjustment of the outstanding accounts and debts between him and the Peishwa to the British government, to receive no European into his service, and to commit no act of aggression against any other power without the acquiescence of the British government.

Such was the substance of the principal articles of the treaty of Baroda, concluded by Major Walker on the part of the company, and intended to render the engagements with the Gaekwar state consonant to those of the treaty of Bassein.†

* Viz.—Dholka.....	Rs. 4,50,000
Neriad	1,75,000
Beejapoor	1,30,000
Mahtur	1,30,000
Moondah	1,10,000
Tuppa of Kurree	25,000
Kheemkatodra	50,000
Wurat on Kattywar	1,00,000
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	Rs. 11,70,000
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† Authorities as in the preceding.

CHAP. XLVI.

FROM A. D. 1806 TO A. D. 1814.

Review of the condition of the Mahratta states—and of the British policy in regard to them.—Holkar's proceedings—insanity—confinement—death and character.—Regency under the control of Umeer Khan—factions—embarrassments and anarchy.—State of Sindia's territory.—Death of Shirree Rao Ghatgay.—Affairs of Rughojee Bhonslay.—Rise of the Pindharees—their mode of assembling and conducting an expedition—their progress—general anarchy in central India—alarming increase of predatory power.

In the preceding chapter we have brought to a close the detail of those important events in Mahratta history which immediately followed the treaty of Bassein. It now becomes requisite to survey the condition of the Mahratta states before and at the conclusion of those arrangements with the British government, to review briefly the policy which actuated that government, and to explain the effects resulting from it on the various Mahratta states. It will then only remain to detail the principal causes which led to the last great revolution, and entirely subverted the dominion of the Peishwa.

The treaty of Salbye, by which Mahadajee Sindia was acknowledged by the British government as head of an independent state, and the policy of Warren Hastings, which permitted him to extend his power on the side of Hindostan, had a great effect in weakening the power of the Peishwa, and in hastening the decline of the Mahrattas, by dissolving that community of interests which was the mainspring of their union. Previously, however, to the treaty of Bassein, if we except the engagements entered into by the Gaekwar with the English, the visible changes in the Mahratta government were wrought by domestic feuds, originating in the intrigues of some of its principal members—first, of Nana Furnuwees and Sindia to supplant each other; next, of Bajee Rao to overturn the power of both; and finally, of the Mahratta chiefs, Sindia and Holkar, to obtain by force a control over the Bramin court, similar to that which the Peishwa had established by policy over the head of the empire.

By the treaty of Bassein, and the subsequent treaties on the part of Rughojee Bhonslay, Sindia, and Holkar with the British government, a still greater and far more obvious change had taken place in the condition of the Mahrattas than that which resulted from the treaty of Salbye. The Peishwa had ceded a large tract of country; he was controlled in his foreign relations, and upheld in his musnud by a British force. The territories of the other Mahratta chiefs had been dismembered; the Moghul emperor had fallen into the hands of their great rival; and they sat down exhausted and dismayed, sensible of some of their errors when too late, but with no plan, or even sentiment of union, except hatred to that nation by which they had been subdued.

The inconsistencies observable in the British policy were produced by

the different views entertained by successive governors-general, each influenced in a greater or less degree by opinions in England. Lord Cornwallis, before the close of his first administration, perceived the necessity of some measures of precaution to secure the territories of the company, and to preserve the peace of India. He hoped that the native powers would become sensible of the integrity and advantage of the plan he suggested for ensuring a common alliance, and that they would embrace it with the same candour with which it was proposed; but he failed in completing the treaties of general guarantee, which he had contemplated as a remedy for the evils with which the country was threatened.

The Marquis Wellesley, looking equally to the security of British India from foreign invasion, and from wars with the native powers, believed that such security was only attainable by establishing an ascendancy in the councils of the native states, so as to be able to direct their resources to their own advantage, and to that of the British nation; hence his policy tended to the control of all the native powers from Cape Comorin to the gulf of Kutch, and from Kutch to the Sewalick mountains. How far, and with what success, he carried his measures into effect, has been detailed. His extensive plans, the effect which their prosecution had upon the commercial interests of the East India Company, and the obstacles he encountered, alarmed the authorities at home, some of whom, doubting the justice of the measures pursued, and dreading a rapid extension of dominion, were desirous of at least impeding the conquest of all India; and others, whose views extended little further than the obvious increase of debt, and the irregularity of furnishing the company's investments, sought a change of policy as essential to prevent or repair these apparent evils. The Marquis Cornwallis was accordingly, as we have seen, again sent out, and an instant stop was put to the system of defensive alliances. His successor, Sir George Barlow, inflexibly pursued the same line of policy without regard to various circumstances, which he considered unimportant in attaining a general end; but his measures were as short-sighted and contracted as they were selfish and indiscriminating.

The Nizam, the Peishwa, and the Gaekwar were already bound by the defensive and subsidiary alliances of the Marquis Wellesley; but British protection was withdrawn from the petty states in Hindostan, excepting the rajas of Bhurtpoor and Macherry. Rughojee Bhonslay, Sindia, and Holkar were each left in possession of considerable tracts of territory; but under their management the net revenues of each state, after deducting enams and jagheers, did not exceed 60 lakhs of rupees; that of Rughojee Bhonslay was considerably less, but his military followers were fewer, and of an inferior description. The treaties with these three states were mere instruments of general amity; their intercourse was completely unrestrained, and no control, except in relation to the allies of the British government, was to be exercised over them. Plausible reasons were not wanting for supposing that the whole pacification was wise and politic. The progress of conquest was at least impeded; a considerable territory, pretty equally balanced, remained to each of the chiefs; and it was expected that their domestic wars, the plunder of their neighbours, and the fear of losing what they possessed, would deter them from hostile proceedings against the British government. In the armies which they maintained a portion of the unemployed soldiery, numbers of whom were entertained in the British service during the war, and discharged from it immediately afterwards, would still obtain a livelihood; and it was even hoped that these chiefs would

find it to their interest to establish order in their revenue collections, gradually to reduce their military establishments, and turn their attention to cultivate the arts of peace. Until these desirable reforms could be effected, the vigilance of the British government and the power of its allies would, it was supposed, be quite sufficient to quell disorders or inroads occasioned by the plundering hordes, which, after every war in India, disturb the general tranquillity.

It is not the object of this work to enlarge on this subject; it is sufficient to state the policy embraced, and the ends expected by the British government; but the consequences, as they tended to hasten the decline of the Mahrattas, and the leading events antecedent to their fall, it is our province to explain.

When Jeswunt Rao Holkar returned from Hindostan, he intimated to his army his intention of discharging about 20,000 of his horse, chiefly Deccanees;* but large arrears being due to them, which Holkar could not immediately pay, they placed him in *dhurma*, when he gave them his nephew Khundee Rao as a pledge that their demands should be satisfied. The advantage of having the admitted head of the Holkar family in their custody was not overlooked by a turbulent soldiery, already disaffected and mutinous; they immediately hoisted the standard of Khundee Rao, declared him the only legal representative, and refused obedience to Jeswunt Rao. But the overawing power of the infantry, and the payment of their arrears, to defray which Holkar exacted a large sum from the raja of Jeypore,† had an immediate effect in quashing the sedition. But the innocent instrument of the mutineers fell a sacrifice to his enraged uncle, who secretly put him to death; and the ferocious jealousy of Jeswunt Rao, once roused, could not be allayed until he had also decreed the death of his brother, Khassee Rao, who was in like manner privately murdered.

Those atrocious deeds were the forerunner of a state of insanity, which A. D. 1807. was further evinced by extraordinary military preparations, carried on with an ardour and violence proportionate to the derangement of his intellects; until at last in 1808, his extravagant conduct led to his being put under restraint, in which state he continued in his camp for the space of three years, until the 20th October 1811, when his miserable existence terminated.

The chief feature of Jeswunt Rao Holkar's character was that hardy spirit of energy and enterprize which, though like that of his countrymen, boundless in success, was also not to be discouraged by trying reverses. He was likewise better educated than Mahrattas in general, and could write both the Persian language and his own: his manner was frank, and could be courteous, and he was distinguished by a species of coarse wit very attractive to the Indian soldiery. He had few other commendable

* Sir John Malcolm. Bappoo Kanhoo, one of my authorities, who was with Holkar at the time, says, "there were no words with the Mahrattas," and that the subsequent mutiny was occasioned entirely by the Patans. Bappoo Kanhoo, to whose authority I have here referred for the second time, is a respectable old Bramin soldier, who was the staunch adherent and devoted friend of Chittoor Sing. He was employed in all his negotiations, and shared in most of the vicissitudes of his remarkable life. Bappoo Kanhoo was found imprisoned in one of the hill-forts taken by the British troops in 1818, and, on being rescued, joined the raja of Satara, at whose court he now resides. The history of his own times, written at my request, is lodged with the Literary Society of Bombay.

† Bappoo Kanhoo.

qualities ; for although sometimes capriciously lavish, he was rapacious, unfeeling, and cruel, and his disposition was overbearing, jealous, and violent. In person his stature was low, but he was of a very active strong make ; though his complexion was dark, and he had lost an eye by the accidental bursting of a matchlock, the expression of his countenance was not disagreeable, and bespoke something of droll humour, as well as of manly boldness.

When Holkar returned from the Punjab, after signing the treaty with Lord Lake, the rajas of Jeypoor and Joudpoor were at war on account of a princess of Oudepoor, for whose hand both were pretenders. Each party solicited aid from Sindia and Holkar ; Sindia sent them

A. D. 1808. Shirzee Rao Ghatgay and Bappoo Sindia with 15,000 horse ; and Holkar allowed Umeer Khan to join the raja of Jeypoor with his Patans. This raja was for a time successful, until Umeer Khan left him, commenced plundering the Jeypoor and Joudpoor districts indiscriminately, then, changing sides, reversed the probable issue of the contest by joining the raja of Joudpoor. At last, interposing between them, he put an end to the contest by horrible deeds of treacherous assassination.*

When Holkar's state of mind rendered it necessary to place him under restraint, Umeer Khan was just disengaged from his Rajpoot warfare, and proceeded with all speed to Rampoorah. It was there settled that the government should be administered by a regency controlled by Umeer Khan, but under the nominal authority of Toolsee Bye, the favourite mistress of Jeswunt Rao, a woman of profligate habits, and of most vindictive disposition, totally unfit for high station, or the exercise of the power with which she was vested. On the death of Jeswunt Rao, she adopted Mulhar Rao Holkar, a boy of four years old, the son of Jeswunt Rao by another concubine, and in his name continued to govern. Umeer Khan was soon recalled to Rajpootana in the prosecution of his own views, which were solely bent upon the extension of predatory power for the interest of himself and his ferocious band of Patans, over whom he maintained an authority by superior art, but in whose hands he was sometimes a mere instrument. When it suited his views of plunder, Umeer Khan sometimes advanced claims in Holkar's name, but those claims were not pressed where the consequences might involve the state of Holkar with the British government. At his departure from Rampoorah, he caused a jagheer to be conferred on his relation Ghuffoor Khan, whom he left as his agent and director with Toolsee Bye.

The conduct of the administration was worthy of such a regency ; there was no regular collection of revenue, the government had not the power of reducing its army, and the finances of the state, even under the most skilful management, were inadequate to the support of the establishments. Bodies of troops, under various commanders, were therefore sent to collect or extort subsistence from the provinces, without much regard to the rights of neighbouring states ; many of them became disobedient ; one body of Holkar's troops, under Mohummud Ally Khan Bungush, went into rebellion at a very early period, plundered the districts in Candeish, and would have forced their way through the Nizam's territory into Holkar's district of Amber, but the subsidiary forces of Poona and Hyderabad were called out to oppose them, when the rebels were dispersed, and Bungush was sent as a state prisoner to the fort of Bombay.

* See Malcolm's Central India.

The government, if such it may be designated, of Holkar was alternately swayed by two factions, the Mahrattas and the Patans, who were constantly intriguing against each other, and nothing could exceed the state of anarchy which prevailed throughout the country—at the court, bribery, execution, and murders; in the provinces, violence, rapine, and bloodshed.

Sindia's territory was nearly as much disturbed as that of Holkar. His military establishment far exceeded his financial means, and, to rid himself of the clamours of his troops, he was obliged to send them out to subsist upon the districts in the manner which was adopted by Holkar; but some found employment in reducing several refractory zumeendars and rajas, who were Sindia's tributaries. Armies accustomed to rapine and violence in extensive regions were now confined to tracts comparatively small; the burden of their exactions became, in many places, intolerable, and districts, before cultivated and populous, were fast running to waste and wretchedness. For the supply of personal exigencies Sindia was obliged to have recourse to a banker, who at large rates of interest furnished him with occasional advances of money; and of all his pecuniary resources, the pensions which he and his family derived from the British government were the security most acceptable. On the death of Ambajee Inglia, Sindia proceeded to reduce the territory in Gohud held by Ambajee's family, and, having established his camp at

A. D. 1810. Gwalior in 1810, though he frequently went on pilgrimages and expeditions, he had never moved his head-quarters from that spot; hence Sindia's camp, as it is called, has become a great city. His authority was considerably strengthened by the reduction of Inglia's jagheer; and the death of his father-in-law, Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, having happened during the preceding season, was important both in tranquillizing the domestic feuds and public dissensions, which that turbulent man was perpetually exciting. The articles of the treaties with Sindia and Holkar respecting Shirzee Rao were subsequently annulled by the British government. He afterwards exercised considerable power, and frequently dictated to his son-in-law in the most audacious manner: the circumstances which led to his death originated in a violent altercation respecting a jagheer, which Shirzee Rao, in opposition to Sindia, wished to confer on some rich sillidars,* the Nimbalkurs of Watar. Sindia, unable longer to endure his violent and contumacious behaviour, ordered him to be arrested, when Shirzee Rao having refused to obey the mandate, Anund Rao Sindia, the son of Mannajee Phakray, transfixed him with his spear, and thus rid the world of a being than whom few worse have ever disgraced humanity. Doulut Rao, if he did not order, approved of the deed; and it is said that he has all his life been a prey to remorse for the atrocious actions to which he was induced to lend his sanction when under the influence of the monster Ghatgay.†

The state of affairs at Nagpoor under the government of Rughoojee Bhonslay partook of the weakness and confusion prevalent in the territory

* Poor soldiers are at least as common in Maharashtra as in other parts of the world. The Nimbalkurs of Watar are the only rich sillidars with whom I am acquainted. Watar is a village between Phultun and the Mahadeo hills, where the different members of this inferior branch of the Nimbalkur family have expended vast sums of money in the erection of palaces, which are more remarkable for their solidity than their elegance. They have at least the merit of being the most substantial dwellings in the west of India.

† Malcolm, Prinsep, Mahratta MSS., and oral information.

of Sindia and Holkar, with this difference, that the troops of Rughoojee were inferior, and the country became in consequence more exposed to the attack of freebooters from without. Invited by these circumstances, Umeer Khan, in 1809, after establishing himself in Rajpootana, made a pretext of some alleged claim of the Holkar family to carry his ravages into Berar, and to let loose the Pindharees, as well as his own followers, to plunder the territory of Rughoojee; but the British government, glad at the moment of an opportunity to employ its troops, gratuitously interposed, and forced these predatory bands, which no state acknowledged, to recross the Nerbuddah.

The Pindharees, a class of the lowest freebooters, whom we have already had frequent occasion to mention, were early known in the Deccan. Great numbers of them followed the army of the first Bajee Rao; and it probably was an object of that great man's policy to draw them out of the Mahratta country. It is certain that he left his Pindharees in Malwa with his officers Sindia and Holkar, that they always attended their armies when they invaded the Moghul provinces, and that the Pindharees of each of these leaders distinguished themselves as Sindia Shahee and Holkar Shahee, or the respective followers of Sindia and Holkar.

In 1794 Sindia assigned some lands to the Pindharees near the banks of the Nerbuddah, which they soon extended by conquests from the Grassias, or original independent landholders in their neighbourhood. Their principal leaders at that time were two brothers, named Heeroo and Burrun, who are said to have been put to death for their aggressions on the territory of Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonslay. The sons of Heeroo and Burrun became Pindharee chiefs; but Khureem Khan, a Pindhara, who had acquired great booty in the plunder of the Nizam's troops after the battle of Kurdla, and was distinguished by superior cunning and enterprize, became the principal leader of this refuse of the Mahratta armies.

Khureem got the district of Shujahpore from Umeer Khan, which, with some additions, was afterwards confirmed to him by Sindia, through the interest of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay. During the war of 1803, and the subsequent disturbed state of the country, Khureem contrived to obtain possession of several districts in Malwa, belonging to Sindia's jagheerdars; and his land revenue at one time is said to have amounted to 15 lakhs of rupees a year. He also wrested some territory from the nabob of Bhopaul on which he built a fort, as a place of security for his family, and of deposit for his plunder. Khureem was originally a Sindia Shahee,* but, like most of the Pindharees, except about 5,000 of the Holkar Shahees, who remained faithful, he changed sides, or plundered his master whenever it suited his convenience, which was as often as he found an opportunity. Sindia, jealous of his encroachments, on pretence of lending him some guns, inveigled him to an interview, made him prisoner, plundered his camp, recovered the usurped districts, and lodged Khureem in the fort of Gwalior.†

A number of leaders started up after the confinement of Khureem, of whom Cheetoo, Dost Mohummud, Namdar Khan, and Shaikh Dulloo became the most conspicuous. They associated themselves with Umeer Khan in 1809, during his expedition to Berar; and in 1810, when Khureem Khan purchased his release from Gwalior, they assembled under that leader, a body of 25,000 horse and some battalions of newly raised infantry,

* Sir John Malcolm.

† Prinsep.

with which they again proposed to invade Berar; but Cheetoo, always jealous of Khureem's ascendancy, was detached by Rughoojee Bhonslay from the alliance, and afterwards co-operated with Sindia in attacking him; Khureem was in consequence driven to seek an asylum with his old patron Umeer Khan, but, by the influence of Sindia, Umeer Khan kept him in a state of confinement until the year 1816.*

When the Mahrattas ceased to spread themselves, the Pindharees, who had attended their armies, were obliged to plunder the territories of their former protectors for subsistence, and on being suffered to exist at all, their numbers were very soon augmented. To the unemployed soldiery of India, particularly to the Mahomedans, the life of a Pindhara had many allurements; but the Mahratta horsemen who possessed hereditary rights, or had any pretensions to respectability, did not readily join them.

In every 1,000 Pindharees, about 400 were tolerably well mounted and armed; of that number, about every fifteenth man carried a matchlock, but their favourite weapon was the ordinary Mahratta spear, which is from 12 to 18 feet long. The remaining 600 were common plunderers and followers, armed, like the bazar retainers of every army in India, with all sorts of weapons.

Before the Pindharees set out on an expedition, a leader sent notice to the inferior chiefs, and hoisted his standard on a particular day after the cessation of the rains, generally about the Dussera. As soon as the rivers were fordable, and a sufficient number had assembled, they moved off by the most unfrequented routes towards their destination. Commencing with short marches of about 10 miles, they gradually extended them to 30 or 40 miles a day, until they reached some peaceful region against which their expedition was intended. Terror and dismay burst at once on the helpless population; villages were seen in flames, wounded and houseless peasants flying in all directions, fortified places shutting their gates, and keeping up a perpetual firing from their walls. The plunderers dispersed in small parties, and spread themselves over the whole face of the country; all acting on a concerted plan, they swept round in a half circle, committing every sort of violence and excess,—torturing to extort money, ravishing, murdering, and burning in the defenceless villages; but seldom venturing on danger, unless the prospect of booty was very certain. When they approached a point on the frontier, very distant from where they had entered, they united and went off in a body to their homes. Whilst they continued their excesses, marauders of all descriptions sallied out to join them, or to profit by their presence, and whole districts became a scene of rapine and conflagration.

The ordinary modes of torture inflicted by these miscreants were heavy stones placed on the head or chest; red hot irons applied to the soles of the feet; tying the head of a person into a tobra, or bag for feeding horses, filled with hot ashes; throwing oil on the clothes and setting fire to them; besides many others equally horrible. The awful consequences of a visitation from the Pindharees can scarcely be imagined by those who have not witnessed them. For some time, until the districts in Malwa, Marwar, Mewar, and the whole of Rajpootana were exhausted, and the Pindharees were encouraged and excited to venture on more fertile fields, their ravages were chiefly confined to those countries and Berar; a few of them, however, ventured almost every year into the dominions of the Nizam and the Peishwa, though little notice was taken

* Public Records, Prinsep, Sir John Malcolm.

of them by the British government whilst they refrained from molesting its own subjects* and territory. But even had no other causes arisen to excite the Pindharees to extend their depredations, it was impossible, in

A. D. 1812. the state in which India was left, by the half-measures and selfish policy adopted by the British government, that any part of it could long remain exempt from predatory inroad. The Rajpoot states were overrun by Umeer Khan, Sindia, Holkar, and the Pindharees; and the territories of Sindia and Holkar, intermixed as they were in Malwa, and in the hands of a powerful and lawless soldiery, soon became, like Rajpootana, common prey. The aggressions of Sindia and Holkar on each other gave rise to disputes, and even to battles; but to no political warfare. Had Sindia been able to pay up the arrears due to his troops, and to command the services of those who owed him allegiance, he might, at Jeswunt Rao's death, have made himself complete master of Holkar's dominions; but intrigues were substituted for military force, and these were counteracted. Although the chiefs were not at war, the troops of the Rajpoots and of Umeer Khan, and those of Sindia, Holkar, the Powars of Dhar, and the Pindharees, fought frequent battles amongst each other, when plunder was in dispute, all which had no other effect than that of rendering yet more miserable the already unhappy country, and stirring up materials for predatory power, on which Umeer Khan and Sindia began to found higher hopes when they foresaw a prospect of support from the head of the empire.

To him, therefore, we now return, in order to detail the events preceding that revolution in Maharashtra with which this history closes.

* For a long time they respected the persons of the British subjects, to which the author can himself bear testimony, having accidentally passed through a body of Pindharees in the middle of a night when they had committed great excesses; and to him, though unarmed and unattended, they offered neither molestation nor insult.

CHAP. XLVII.

FROM A. D. 1803 TO A. D. 1817.

The Peishwa's proceedings after being re-established on his musnud.—Appoints Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir to conduct affairs with the British residency.—Ingratitude to Khundee Rao Rastia—and total disregard of the claims of the former servants of the state.—Appoints Ballajee Luximon sur-soobehdar of Candeish and Buglana.—Treacherous seizure and murder of the Bheels at Kopergaom.—Rebellion of the Pritee Needhee—suppressed by Bappoo Gokla, who is enriched in consequence.—Appa Dessaye Nepankur—called to interfere in the wars of Kolapoor and Sawuntwaree.—Affairs of these petty states.—Revert to affairs at Poona.—Collusion of Sewdasheo Mankesir and Khoosroojee Moodhee.—Mr. Elphinstone is appointed resident.—Settlement with the southern jagheerdars, who are compelled to submit to the Peishwa.—Suppression of piracy in the Concan.—Treaties with Kolapoor and Sawuntwaree.—Exultation of the Peishwa—he raises a brigade of regular troops.—Accusations against Khoosroojee Moodhee by Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir.—Rise of Trimbukjee Dainglia.—Bajee Rao extends his views of policy—recruits his army.—Conduct of Bappoojee Sindia in regard to the surrender of Dharwar.—Trimbukjee Dainglia becomes prime minister.—Mode of letting the districts in farm.—Bajee Rao's neglect of civil government—amasses considerable wealth—perseveres in sequestering jagheers.—Case of Madhoo Rao Rastia.—Plan of an extensive confederacy.—Endeavours to establish an ascendancy in Guzerat.—Affairs of the Baroda government.—Able management of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker.—Claims of the Peishwa.—Counter-claims of the Gaekwar.—Attempt at adjustment—fails.—Gungadhur Shastree is deputed to Poona—progress of his mission—he is murdered by Trimbukjee.—Trimbukjee delivered up to the British government—effects his escape from confinement.—The Peishwa raises troops through Trimbukjee for the purpose of maintaining war secretly against the British government.—Conduct of the resident for defeating this design.—The troops assembled are declared insurgents—pursued, and attacked.—Intercourse suspended.—Proposed preliminary to an adjustment.—Bajee Rao denies all knowledge of Trimbukjee or his adherents—Refuses to comply with the proposed terms.—Poona surrounded.—The Peishwa submits.—New treaty.

BAJEE RAO was scarcely re-established on his musnud when he evinced

A. D. 1803. the distrust and duplicity of his character towards his new allies, and openly avowed, in regard to many persons subject to his authority, that, in entering on the alliance with the English, a principal inducement was a motive of revenge.

He kept up a correspondence with the chiefs confederated against the

British power,* and ascribed his connexion with that government, which to them he reprobated and deplored, to necessity, occasioned by their absence, and to the treachery of the southern jagheerdars. He withheld the services of his troops as much as possible, and prevented the Putwurdhuns from accompanying General Wellesley, by secretly inciting the raja of Kolapoor to invade their jagheer, thereby hoping to make a merit with Sindia, and afford to himself an opportunity of wreaking his vengeance on the family of Pureshrum Bhow, by making it appear that they were enemies to the alliance with the British government, and had forfeited their jagheer by disobedience to him.

These indications spoke very unfavourably to his new allies of what might be expected from the Peishwa in case any reverse should attend the British arms. Bajee Rao, as the reader has had ample occasion to observe, was not deficient in a species of ability, but he had little talent for government; intrigue was with him a passion; profound in the arts of deceit, he believed all his plans infallible, and at this period no person shared his entire confidence. He aimed at conducting the administration himself; but as his chief business for some time lay with the British resident, with whom it was his plan to avoid all personal discussion where difference of opinion might arise, he found it expedient to intrust the management of that important branch to Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir, whom we have already mentioned as the agent of Govind Rao Pingley, the Peishwa's envoy at Hyderabad. Sewdasheo Bhow was subsequently employed, on the part of Sindia and Bajee Rao, to endeavour to engage the Nizam in the proposed confederacy against the British government during the last war with Tippoo, at the moment when the speedy reduction of Seringapatam and the fall of the Sultan crushed their machinations.

Sewdasheo Mankesir was a Deshist Bramin, one of the family of the deshbandya of the village of Taimboornee, and at one time gained a livelihood by reciting Kuthas† in Poona, before he entered the service of Pingley; but notwithstanding his humble origin, he was dignified in his manner, polite and affable in conversation, and, as a statesman, possessed of considerable ability. His avowed enmity to the alliance with the English was Bajee Rao's chief motive for selecting him as minister for their affairs; and during several months the Peishwa was at pains to show that circumstances alone had forced him to sign the articles of the treaty; but the success of the war, the protection which the presence of the British troops afforded, and the power, the security, and the comforts to which he had hitherto been a stranger, and which he soon experienced in the connection, not only reconciled him to it, but induced him to declare, and probably for a time with sincerity, that he considered the alliance as the most fortunate of events. The forts hitherto in possession of Amrut Rao or Nana Furnuwees were reduced and given up to the Peishwa; his country, which, for a time after his re-establishment, was overrun by freebooters, and exhausted from the effects of war and famine, even under

* After Bajee Rao's disposal, it was found that Sindia's villages, within the Peishwa's boundary, ceded by the treaty of Surjee Angengaoon, were all secretly continued to Sindia by Bajee Rao.

† Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir was a great musician and composer; all the airs of which he is the author are distinguished by a peculiar plaintiveness, and several of them are well worthy of being preserved. Some of our countrymen at Poona, who have leisure, may be induced to do so, before they are forgotten or corrupted by the general bad taste of the Deccan, which, according to a saying of the natives of Hindostan, is the grave of music.

the disadvantage of a pernicious revenue system, gradually recovered itself in most places; and his authority, at first scarcely acknowledged beyond the environs of Poona, soon became respected throughout his dominions.

The British force, although seldom required to be put in motion, was the chief cause of strengthening his authority by its presence, and gave a power and stability to his government which he had never known since his first accession to the musnud. Adherents were not long wanting, and a few had been faithful even in his adversity. Khundee Rao Rastia, sur-soobehdar of the Concan from the time of Bajee Rao's flight to his restoration, had shown great fidelity to his cause, and his respectable support was at first of much consequence to the Peishwa; but his influence was undermined by Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir, who unjustly represented his being in league with the British resident in every measure proposed; and in a few years, on an accusation, never attempted to be proved, of corrupt practices in his government in the Concan, he was removed from office, and his jagheer was sequestrated. The year after the re-establishment of the

A. D. 1804. Peishwa, Khundee Rao Rastia had an opportunity of performing a service of some importance. When Amrut Rao and Moroba Furnuwees joined General Wellesley, Baba Rao Phurkay went off with the Hoojrat Pagah,* and acted during the war with Rughoojee Bhonslay against the British government. After the peace, Baba Rao returned from Nagpoor, gave his followers the slip, and retired to Merich, where he was protected by Appa Sahib Putwurdhun, the son of Pureshram Bhow. His troops, thus left to themselves, plundered the country and erected the standard of insurrection; Bajee Rao had no disposable force, and the British troops could not at that time be spared to hunt down horse. Khundee Rao Rastia, having formerly served with the men exciting these disturbances, had the address to effect an arrangement with the whole body, and brought them under the Peishwa's authority, at a critical time, when they might have committed infinite mischief. But Bajee Rao made no permanent provision for the commanders of the army, the soldiery of the country, nor the civil servants of the government. They had served the state under Nana Furnuwees, which was of itself a strong reason with him for excluding them from employment. His total disregard of their claims and their necessities must inevitably have increased the disorders prevalent on his restoration, and under ordinary circumstances, had he persevered in such a line of conduct, it probably would have required the whole power of the British government to keep him on his musnud; but the severe famine of 1804 destroyed vast numbers of men and horses; a provision was thus opened to many of the remaining sildars by the quantity of land and *watun*, to which they succeeded by deaths amongst their relations and fellow-villagers; and as Sindia was then exchanging his Rajpoots and Mahomedans for Mahrattas, a great part of those persons who would have joined an insurrection became interested in the tranquillity of the country, or were withdrawn to another scene.

Ballajee Luximon, the dewan of Wittul Nursing Vinchorkur, who, during his master's minority, managed the affairs of the jagheer, was a staunch adherent of the family of Rugoba, and one of the very few res-

* The Hoojrats, or household troops, were originally the raja's, and afterwards the Peishwa's, personal cavalry. Many of them were, to the last, composed of the immediate dependants of the raja of Satara.

pectable men who to the last preserved a large share of Bajee Rao's confidence. He was appointed with the fullest powers sur-soobehdar of Candeish and Buglana ; and a body of the Peishwa's infantry under Munohurgeer Gosaeen was sent to support him. But such was the state of those provinces that they were never restored to order under the Peishwa's government. Holkar's ravages had been followed by various plunderers ; and the Bheels, who until 1802 had lived intermixed with the rest of the population, betook themselves to the mountains, and carried on precisely the same system of plunder as is now practised by the brigands of Italy and Spain.

One of the first acts of Ballajee, instigated by the Gosaeen, has left a stain on his memory which cannot be effaced. Finding it impracticable to reduce the Bheels by force, he inveigled the whole tribe of them, with their wives and families, to an interview at Kopergaom, on pretence of affording them a settlement, when they were treacherously seized, and most barbarously precipitated into wells, where the whole perished. This inhuman action had the effect, in some degree, of checking the Bheels about Chandore and the southern part of Buglana ; but to the northward, and along the Sautpoora mountains, it drove them to desperation, and they continued to molest the country.

During the war between Holkar and the British government, Futih Sing Manay returned to the Peishwa's territory, and recommenced his ravages to the south of the Neera with an army of nearly 10,000 men. But Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees, the mootaliq of the Pritee Needhee, assisted by the troops of Chintamun Rao Putwurdhun, planned a judicious attack on his camp, routed his troops, killed Futih Sing Manay, together with a great number of his followers, and completely dispersed them ; after which he formally addressed a despatch, stating the particulars, to the Peishwa, who approved of the service performed, and was much gratified by this act of courtesy from the mootaliq of the Pritee Needhee. Bulwunt Rao was at this time chief director of his master's affairs. Pureshrum Sree Newas, the son of the deceased Bowan Rao, Pritee Needhee, was a young man of some spirit, but of weak intellect and of dissolute morals. He was born on the day of his father's death, and during his minority had been kept in a state of tutelage by Nana Furnuwees, and reared with hereditary enmity to the house of Rugonath Rao. Bajee Rao, before his connection with the British government, had, with Sindia's assistance, laid a plan for seizing the Pritee Needhee in his own house at Poona ; but it was frustrated by his bravery, and the exertions of one of his adherents, named Doulut Rao Ghatgay, by whose assistance he cut down the persons who laid hold of him, and immediately fled from Poona to his own jagheer at Kurar.

The management of his jagheer was in the hands of his mother, who was assisted by Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees, the mootaliq already mentioned. The Pritee Needhee wished to assume the control himself, and he was assured by his mother that he should be placed in authority ; but being deceived by false hopes for a period of years, he at last determined on asserting his rights by force. Bajee Rao saw their differences with satisfaction, as he wished for a favourable opportunity of stripping the Pritee Needhee of

his possessions ; but this extreme measure he at first would not venture upon, as he apprehended that the Pritee Needhee might be supported by the Putwurdhuns. Pretending, therefore, to be anxious to mediate between the parties, he decided in favour of Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees, in which he was supposed to have been influenced

by the good conduct of the mootaliq in suppressing the depredations of Kutib Sing Manay. In order to support Bulwunt Rao, he sent a body of his troops under Bappoo Gokla to enforce submission, and the Pritee Needhee was placed in confinement by his mother in the gurdhee of Mussoor. Gokla returned to Poona, the country was tranquillized, the adherents of Pureshrum sought safety in concealment, and it was generally supposed that the Pritee Needhee would remain a prisoner for life. But Pureshrum Sree Newas had a friend from whom no one expected his succour. His wife, one of the most respectable ladies in the country, perceiving the weakness and violence of her husband's character, had several years before endeavoured to bring him into his mother's views, which so exasperated the Pritee Needhee that he never afterwards would live with her. He chose as his mistress a Telin, or wife of an oil-seller, with whom he cohabited, and, to the great scandal of his caste, as a Bramin, made no secret of the connection. The Telin, after the Pritee Needhee was confined, had the address to obtain possession of the fort of Wassota, situated in a most inaccessible part of the Syhadree mountains, where, having collected some

A. D. 1807. followers, she headed a party, attacked Mussoor, and rescued the prisoner. As soon as the Pritee Needhee found himself at liberty, he hoisted his standard, declared himself the servant of the raja of Satara, and bound by no tie to obey the Punt Purdhan. The inhabitants of the tract between the Neera and Warnah, in which the Pritee Needhee's districts were situated, being prone to insurrection, the standard of rebellion soon found supporters, and some of the old retainers of the Pritee Needhee's family joined him. The temporary power thus obtained by the assemblage of a body of troops was, however, exceedingly abused. He committed great cruelties on such of the adherents of his mother and of Bulwunt Rao as fell into his hands; and he rendered himself odious to the peasantry by a system of plunder and extortion worthy of the lowest Pindhara. Had the Pritee Needhee possessed moderation and ability equal to his spirit, there were materials for a rebellion in that quarter, which Bajee Rao, unassisted by British troops, could never have suppressed; but, before he had made adequate preparations for resistance, Gokla once more came against him; the few faithful sildars who accompanied him, recommended his retiring to the hills, and raising the Ramoosees, until, like Chitoor Sing, he could attack with effect. Regardless, however, of this advice, he waited for Gokla, near Wussuntgurb; a few of his men stood by him, but most of them fled at the first charge.

The Pritee Needhee was supposed to have been killed; he was taken up by his enemies for dead; but although he had lost his hand, and was severely wounded in the head, he recovered, and was ever after, during the reign of Bajee Rao, confined in the city of Poona, where a small portion of his late extensive jagheer was assigned for his support; the remainder, without any separate provision for the opposite party, was sequestered. Bulwunt Rao Furnuwees regretted the opportunity thus afforded to Bajee Rao by their differences when too late; the country was soon reduced, all the garrisons having surrendered excepting the fort of Wassota, which held out for eight months, when the Telin, after a spirited defence, surrendered, in consequence of a fire which destroyed her granary. The jewels and private property of the Pritee Needhee's family were seized by Bappoo Gokla, and never accounted for to the Peishwa. In order to prevent the odium likely to arise from having thus reduced the Pritee Needhee, Bajee Rao allowed Bappoo Gokla to retain possession of

the conquered districts, as if they were kept more as a punishment to the Pritee Needhee than as an advantage to himself. During the period Gokla retained possession of the conquered territory, his exactions were most severe, and, being supported by a large force, they were irresistible. By these means Bappoo Gokla became the wealthiest of the Peishwa's

sirdars. He succeeded to the command of his uncle's troops, when the latter was killed by Dhoondia Waug as already mentioned; but he owed his elevation chiefly to General Wellesley, whom he accompanied in the war of 1803, and, excepting Appa Dessaye Nepankur, was the only good officer in the immediate service of Bajee Rao.

Appa Dessaye's name is Seedojee Rao Nimbalkur; we have already had occasion to mention this person on more than one occasion, but about this period he became more conspicuous from the following circumstances.

About the year 1785, the petty states of Kolapoor and Sawuntwaree, always jealous of each other, went to war, because Luximee Bye, the wife of Kem Sawunt, dessaye of Waree, and niece of Mahadajee Sindia, had obtained some privileges of royalty for her husband from the Moghul emperor, through her uncle's all-powerful influence at the court of Delhi. With a few intermissions, and with various success, this warfare had continued for 23 years, when at last the troops of Kolapoor gained a victory over those of Sawuntwaree in a pitched battle fought at the village of Chowkul, and the fort of Waree was immediately besieged. Kem Sawunt had been dead some years; he had left four widows, the eldest of whom, Luximee Bye, become regent on account of the minority of Kem Sawunt's only son by Dawee Bye, his third wife. Luximee Bye, when her capital was besieged, called in the aid of Wiswas Rao Ghatgay and Appa Dessaye. Wiswas Rao Ghatgay had been put in possession of two districts, called Chickooree and Menowlee, belonging to Kolapoor, by Shirzee Rao Ghatgay. His pretended right to dispose of them originated in their having been conquered by the first Mahdoo Rao, and bestowed on the family of Putwurdhun; and Sindia having authority for possessing himself of the sequestered jagheer of the Putwurdhuns, Shirzee Rao, who had seized those two districts, made them over to his brother, Wiswas, when he was ordered by his son-in-law to join him in Malwa. Wiswas Rao would have been driven out of them by the raja of Kolapoor, but he was supported by Appa Dessaye, who afterwards took them for himself. The Peishwa, on the plea of wishing to avoid disputes with Sindia, pretended to take no concern in those districts,^a but it was on the authority of his secret orders that Appa Dessaye seized them, and Bajee Rao at a subsequent period, in 1812, asserted his own claim to them on grounds which were admitted by the British government.

On the present occasion, when Luximee Bye applied for aid, Appa Dessaye, with the Peishwa's secret concurrence, readily afforded it; the siege of Waree was raised, and the territory of the Kolapoor raja above the Ghauts was invaded; so that the Kolapoor troops were recalled from the Concan to defend their own capital. Application was made to the British government for its mediation, but Lord Minto, then governor-general, declined all interference; and the Peishwa, who was the principal cause of the disturbance, began to hint at his rights of supremacy over all

* Colonel Close's despatches, 5th May 1808.

parties—a disposition to encroachment which, if checked by the British authorities on its very first indication, would have been of essential importance to the stability of Bajee Rao's government.

Appa Dessaye, however, made himself complete master of Chikcooree and Menowlee, and endeavoured to establish his authority over Sawuntwaree. The son of Kem Sawunt was strangled at the instigation of Appa Dessaye's carcoon, with the concurrence of Luxmee Bye, and of Poond Sawunt, the next heir to the principality. But Appa Dessaye did not profit by this atrocious deed. Poond Sawunt, taking advantage of the weak state of Appa Dessaye's troops, the greater part being withdrawn to maintain the war above the Ghauts, drove them

A. D. 1809. from the country, and possessed himself of the government.

Luxmee Bye died soon after, when Poond Sawunt found a rival, rather than a coadjutor, in the person of Doorga Bye, the second widow of Kem Sawunt, and the daughter of a Mahratta officer named Khanwelkur.

In the meantime the utmost apparent cordiality subsisted between the British resident and the Peishwa's court. Bajee Rao, as often as he could find a pretext, was prosecuting, with inflexible perseverance, his favourite plan of sequestrating the jagheers of all whom he considered the political opponents of his family, and appropriating their revenues to his own use. Whilst thus engaged, Bajee Rao was happy. On every occasion he enlarged on the blessings he enjoyed through his alliance with the British government; he professed the warmest affection and friendship for the resident, Colonel Close; and it is not probable that Bajee Rao, in all he thus expressed, was in a great measure sincere.

Colonel Close was in the habit of receiving all native visitors through an agent, a Parsee, named Khoosroojee, familiarly styled the Moodhee—a person of comprehensive judgment, and of great address, who soon attained considerable influence with his master. Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir and the Moodhee soon formed a compact, and having united with them Byajee Naik, a Hoojah, or personal servant of the Peishwa, by whom Byajee was much trusted as a spy, they contrived to persuade Bajee Rao that, by gaining Khoosroojee to his interests, he might command the services of the British residency—a proposal well suited to the mind of Bajee Rao, by whom no means were spared to attain an end so desirable.

The triumvirate, in all probability, participated in the spoils, and all intercourse, public as well as private, went on so agreeably by the agency of those persons that there was no cause of dissatisfaction. Any subject likely to occasion unpleasant discussion was either postponed, or so arranged that, before being brought forward on either side, it was smoothed of its asperities, so that little difficulty remained in the adjustment.

The services of Colonel Close during this year were called for, on a very important occasion to Hyderabad, and he never returned to his situation at Poona. Mr. Henry Russell succeeded to the temporary charge of that residency until the return of Mr. Elphinstone from a mission to Cabul, and

A. D. 1810. the same harmony continued to prevail. Khoosroojee, though a servant of the British residency, had been permitted to accept the high office of sur-soobehdar of the Carnatic under the Peishwa's government, and he appointed as his deputy a Bramin named Bappoo Sawney.

Mr. Elphinstone had been an assistant to Colonel Close at Poona before he was attached to General Wellesley's staff in the war of 1803, so that he

took charge of his appointment as resident with considerable local information.

A. D. 1811. Being in the habit of communicating with the natives direct, he saw all persons who had business, and discontinued the form of introduction through any one agent. This alteration, superadded to a quarrel which had taken place between Khoosroojee and Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir, was a source of secret vexation and discontent to the former, as it so greatly tended to lessen his importance and his gains ; but Khoosroojee had much personal influence with the Peishwa, which he unfortunately exercised in prejudicing his mind against the resident, by representing him as one who entertained the same sentiments as General Wellesley, whom Bajee Rao hated because he had opposed his schemes of vengeance against Amrut Rao and the family of Pureshrum Bhow Putwurdhun. Several instances might be adduced of the effect which the Moodhee's insinuations produced on the mind of the Peishwa ; but although many subjects hitherto kept back were now brought into discussion, in hopes of creating necessity of again interposing the agency of the Moodhee, Bajee Rao had soon reason to acknowledge the impartiality of the resident on the subjects from which his chief prejudice against him had arisen.

As soon as he had resumed the lands of the inferior jagheerdars who had ever been disobedient to himself, or who had taken an active part against his father, the Peishwa desired Bappoo Gokla to make over the Pritee Needhee's district to the state, and again brought forward his complaints and claims against other great jagheerdars, particularly the Putwurdhuns, Rastia, and the dessaye of Kittoor.

These persons, presuming on the protection already afforded to them by the British government, neglected to obey the orders of the Peishwa, and omitted to send their troops, which were now much wanted to defend the country from the Pindharees, whose inroads were every year becoming more powerful and destructive. When Bajee Rao embraced the British alliance, he wrote to the jagheerdars in question to assist the British troops. Most of them, being personally acquainted with General Wellesley, readily obeyed Bajee Rao's orders, co-operated in his re-establishment, and were disposed to forget past injuries, until the rancorous revenge and studied aggressions of Bajee Rao completely alienated their minds. They were only deterred from supporting the Pritee Needhee's rebellion by the fear of the subsidiary force, and, had the interposition of the British government been withheld, they would, when joined to the Pritee Needhee, have probably effected another revolution, as it was estimated they could at that time bring into the field nearly 20,000 horse. In considering a plan of settlement between these jagheerdars and the Peishwa, several modes were discussed at a very early period by the British authorities. To have avowedly withheld support from both parties would have involved the country in war and confusion ; to have assisted in the destruction of families, in whose favour so much might be urged, would have been unjust ; and it would have been still more so to raise them into independent principalities under the guarantee of the British government. It therefore appeared advisable to steer a middle course ; and it was determined to enforce the service of their troops as due to the Peishwa, and to cause them to restore all usurped lands ; but to guarantee their territory as long as they chose to abide by the tenor of their original engagement to the Poona state.

With this arrangement of the southern Mahratta country, it was resolved to combine the effectual suppression of piracy in the states of Kolapoor

and Sawuntwaree, which, it was foreseen, could never be rooted out until some harbours and fortresses on the coast of Malwan were placed in the hands of the British government.

The Putwurdhuns were very averse to acknowledge fealty to Bajee Rao, but they at last submitted, and complied with the conditions imposed by the British government. The raja of Kolapoor nearly lost his capital by the intrigues of the Peishwa, who secretly encouraged him to resist the demands of the English, hoping that his general, Appa Dessaye, then besieging Kolapoor as if in his own quarrel, might be able to reduce it before the terms were accepted; whilst, on the other hand, in order to cause delay, he declared to the resident that the British government had no right to enter into a treaty with the raja of Kolapoor, who was his subject—an assertion as bold as it was false. Before any of the objects could be effected, Mr. Elphinstone found it necessary to assemble an army at Punderpoor, and move it down to the neighbourhood of the Kistna. In regard to the jagheerdars, besides what has been already stated in the general plan of settlement, Appa Sahib Putwurdhun was obliged to surrender the person of Baba Rao Phurkay—a concession to the Peishwa, on the part of the British government, which was very unpopular in the Mahratta country, and, although it may have been strictly just, the policy of the measure is questionable. Baba Rao was confined by the Peishwa in the fort of Bassein, where he shortly after died. By the terms tendered and accepted by the raja of Kolapoor, he renounced all right to Chickoorce and Menowlee, which were ceded to the Peishwa; but all other places taken from the raja, in consequence of the disputed right to these districts, were restored. To the British government the raja ceded the harbour of Malwan, which included the forts and island of Malwan or Sindeedroog and its dependencies; he also agreed to renounce piracy, to permit no armed vessels to be fitted out, or to enter his ports, on pain of becoming lawful prize to the British government, and to restore wrecks, as well as to assist vessels in distress. He also became bound for himself and his successors to pursue no manner of hostility against any other state without the consent of the British government. The British government renounced its long-existing claims against the raja, and became bound to guarantee his possessions against the aggressions of all foreign powers and states.

Poond Sawunt, dessaye of Sawuntwaree, was at the same time bound

October 3. down to suppress piracy, to make over the fort of Vingorla and the battery of Gunaramo Tembe, with his port and limits; and, in case of being guilty of further piratical acts, the forts of Newtee and Rairee were likewise to be required of him. British merchants were to be allowed free ingress and egress to and from the dessaye's territory, on paying the customary duties; but all articles of consumption required for the British troops, stationed within the territory, were to pass duty free.

Soon after the conclusion of the agreement, Poond Sawunt died, and Doorga Bye became regent. This old lady, regardless of the guarantee of the British government, attacked the possessions of the raja of Kolapoor, took the fort of Burratgurrh, which had formerly belonged to Sawuntwaree, and refused to evacuate it. A British detachment from the Madras establishment was brought down to protect the Kolapoor territory, when she withdrew the garrison of Burratgurrh, but continued to brave the threats and despise the arguments which were offered to deter or induce her to refrain from aggression. No retaliation was permitted against Doorga

Bye till every reasonable proposal had failed, when the British troops were ordered to occupy some of the districts, with a view of forcing her into terms. No opposition was actually made, but the British troops were kept perpetually on the alert by threatened attacks, and thus was engendered a state of affairs, neither of peace nor of war, but which occasioned all the expense and inconvenience of the latter. Doulut Rao Sindia, though unconnected with the Waree state after the death of Luximee Bye, interested himself in behalf of Doorga Bye, and much discussion and correspondence resulted from her contumelious behaviour; nor did she desist from her vexatious opposition, until, in consequence of many hostile acts against the British government, her territory was reduced in the beginning of 1819 by a British force; but, after exacting the necessary securities, the principality of Sawuntwaree was left in its original independence.

In the meantime, although Bajee Rao was disappointed in the hope of being able to ruin the southern jagheerdars, they were compelled to bow before him. He could scarcely refrain from insulting the Putwurdhuns when they came to pay their respects, and his exultation at getting Baba Rao Phurkay into his power knew no bounds. He was profuse in his acknowledgments and expressions of gratitude to the governor-general and the resident; but he at the same time declared that he should wish not to have a single Surinjamee horseman* in his service, and proposed raising a brigade of infantry, to be disciplined entirely by European officers, and paid, like the British sepoy, direct from the treasury. To

A. D. 1813.

this proposal the governor-general readily acceded, and Captain John Ford, of the Madras establishment, who had been long attached to the escort of Colonel Close, was, at the recommendation of Khoosroojee, selected by the Peishwa as commandant of the brigade, and able officers from the line, chosen by Captain Ford, were lent from the Bombay establishment to assist in its formation and discipline. The men, excepting a small proportion of Mahrattas, were chiefly raised in the company's provinces in Hindostan, and, on entering their battalions, swore fidelity to the Peishwa whilst he continued in alliance with the British government.†

The cantonment allotted for this brigade was about four miles to the north-west of Poona. One brigade of British troops was stationed on a spot originally selected for the protection of the city in its immediate vicinity; and the rest of the British subsidiary force occupied a position about half-way between Poona and Ahmednugur, near the village of Seroor, on the river Ghore.

The Peishwa had soon a fresh instance of the utility of the British force, by finding it necessary to call in a part of it against Appa Dessaye, who, although he came to Poona on being ordered, refused to comply with certain claims devolving on the Peishwa by the late settlement, or to give up some territory belonging to the raja of Kolapoor. The British authorities interposed, but Bajee Rao artfully contrived by his intrigues to induce Appa Dessaye to trust to his lenity, and to resist the demands; by which insidious conduct the dessaye was led on to forfeit one-fourth of his jagheer to the Peishwa.

* That is, horse furnished by jagheerdars.

† Oral information. If I am not mistaken, this condition was proposed and insisted upon by the Hindostan sepoy themselves, without its being suggested by their officers.

We have already alluded to the quarrel between Khoosroojee Moodhee and Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir. Their differences likewise originated in the intrigues of the Peishwa, who, having been informed of their collusion, concluded, with some justice, that such a cable might as often act against him as for him, and he therefore determined on creating a division between them. It was with this view that he conferred the appointment of sur-soobehdar of the Carnatic on the Moodhee in preference to Sewdasheo Bhow, who would have been much gratified by it. The Moodhee was thus secured in Bajee Rao's interests, but the envy of Mankesir was excited, and he in a short time informed the Peishwa of the corrupt practices of the Moodhee in the affairs of his government. These charges Bajee Rao secretly advised his minister to prefer to the resident, which was accordingly done; and as the Moodhee was a servant of the British government, they would have been immediately investigated, but the Peishwa's object being answered by the accusation from Mankesir,* he interfered to prevent the inquiry, and, as it related to an affair connected with his government, the proceedings were quashed at his request.† This intrigue answered its purpose by incensing Khoosroojee against the minister; and as *friendship*, according to the interpretation of the court of Bajee Rao, was to aid and to conceal the acquisition of corrupt emolument, the Peishwa secured the good-will of Khoosroojee; but the nature of the Moodhee's confidential situation at the residency being incompatible with his appointment as governor of a Mahratta province, he was afterwards required by Mr. Elphinstone to resign the one or the other, and he accordingly relinquished the latter.‡ Trimbukjee Dainglia was immediately appointed to the vacant office. Trimbukjee was originally a jasoos, or spy, and brought himself to the Peishwa's notice, when he fled to Mhar from the power of Holkar, by carrying a letter to Poona, and bringing back a reply in a very short space of time. Being afterwards entertained on the personal establishment of the Peishwa, his activity, intelligence, and vigour soon became conspicuous; and by unceasing diligence, and, above all, by being pander to his vices, never hesitating to fulfil his wishes whatever they might be,§ he gradually gained the confidence of his master, and was the only man who ever obtained it. When Gunput Rao Phansay, the respectable commandant of the Peishwa's artillery, was deprived of his jagheer, Trimbukjee was appointed commandant in his stead. He at first courted Mankesir and Khoosroojee; but having discovered their collusion, he disclosed it to the Peishwa, and though it did not, for some time, become apparent, he entirely supplanted Mankesir in his master's councils, and retained Khoosroojee in the manner already described.

Bajee Rao's success in bringing his jagheerdars under his authority encouraged him in more extensive plans for aggrandizing his power. He occasionally mentioned his claims on the Nizam, but as often as the resident prepared for entering on the investigation, Bajee Rao found some excuse for delay. He likewise spoke, at first distantly, of his claims on

* The accusation was not made by Mankesir himself, but by three persons employed by him and the Peishwa.

† The above is from native information of respectability; but I am not certain of the date, or whether Mr. Russell or Mr. Elphinstone was resident at the time. I think the former.

‡ Native information.

§ Trimbukjee once told Mr. Elphinstone in conversation—"If my master order me, I will kill a cow"—a declaration of servile devotedness, equally strong and impious.

Sindia and Holkar, although sensible that they were dissolved by treaties to which he was himself a party; and he pressed, with seeming earnestness, early settlement of the debts due to him by the Gaekwar—a subject which had already for several years occupied attention, and to which we shall presently advert.

Unfortunately for Bajee Rao, the low favourite whom he had chosen, and who had much of the character of Shirzee Rao Ghatgay, entertained a strong prejudice against Europeans, and his arrogant presumption and unprincipled mind were equal to any attempt. Bajee Rao, at first, in wishing to extend his power, entertained no hostile designs against the British government; but, elated by his increasing consequence, without reflecting from whence it was derived, and flattered by the suggestions of Trimbukjee, who tried to persuade him that he would recover by the force of his wisdom all that his ancestors had gained by their swords, he became irritated by opposition to his wishes, and was hurried forward, until he was overwhelmed in the intrigues and crimes which Dainglia led

him on to perpetrate. In frequent consultations with the Moodhee and Trimbukjee, they advised him, before entering on the more important discussions with the British government, to increase his military establishment, which, without any design or appearance of hostility, would, they represented, tend to render him more respectable in the eyes of all India, and give weight to arguments with his allies. Of the benefit derived by the British government from the treaty of Bassein, the Moodhee, perhaps from conviction, impressed Bajee Rao with the most exaggerated opinion; and he may have thought, from the evident desire of conciliation which existed in the councils of the British government, that much would be conceded to avert a war. The annual inroads of the Pindharees, and a pilgrimage undertaken by Bajee Rao, for the second time, to a celebrated temple in the Carnatic, furnished ample excuse for raising troops, had a pretext been wanting, but the fact was, the resident had been constantly pressing on the attention of the minister the inadequate force maintained by the Peishwa for the protection of his country. Up to 1812, exclusive of the troops maintained by the jagheerdars and the Sebundees, or irregular infantry, employed in collecting the revenue, his army amounted to no more than 2,500 horse and 3,000 infantry. Four thousand horse were that year added to the establishment, and several hundreds each year subsequently; but instead of continuing to increase the levies of horse so useful to check the Pindharees, a large body of Gosaeen infantry was now entertained at Trimbukjee's suggestion; and Arabs, whose enlistment Bajee Rao had at one time not only prohibited, but had begged of the Bombay government to arrest on their route from the coast to his dominions, now met with every encouragement. An opportunity of exercising the new levies soon occurred by the refusal of Bappoo Sindia, killidar of Dharwar, to surrender that fortress. Having come to pay his respects to the Peishwa on his route to the Carnatic, Bajee Rao desired him to give up the fort to Trimbukjee. "If your highness," replied the killidar, "will send a gentleman to relieve me in the command, or if you will send a carcoon in your own name to whom I can commit my charge, your servant will present the keys to him, but I will never give over the fort of Dharwar to such a person as Trimbukjee Dainglia." In consequence of this speech, as soon as he had reached the door of the Peishwa's tent, he was arrested, bound, and tortured by Trimbukjee, until a promise of surrender was extorted. His carcoon, a Bramin on whom the killidar could rely, was despatched

with Trimbukjee, who, accompanied by a body of troops, proceeded to take possession ; but, on approaching the gate, the carcoon begged permission to go on a few minutes in advance of the party, that he might speak to the garrison, and make some arrangements, when, no sooner had he got inside, than he shut the gate, and, on pretence of being detained by the garrison, opened a fire on Trimbukjee and his followers, who were obliged to retire with precipitation. This insult could not be resented at the time, nor until the Peishwa's return to Poona, when Dharwar was invested ; but the faithful carcoon did not surrender until an order was obtained from his imprisoned master, through the interposition of Bappoo Gokla.

About this period the conduct of Khoosroojee Moodhee, which from the first had not escaped the resident's observation, became such as to render it necessary to remove him from Poona, in order to prevent, as far as possible, the bad effects of the dangerous opinions which he inculcated. His past services entitled him to all due consideration from the British government ; and it would have been both difficult and ill-judged to have proved the circumstances by which he had forfeited his claim to its reward. A liberal provision was therefore made for him in his native province, Guzerat ; but, about the eve of his intended departure, he died by poison. Whether it was administered by others, or taken wilfully or accidentally by himself, could never be discovered, although the case underwent a long and strict investigation. If he knew more secrets with respect to foreign intrigues than Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee Dainglia thought fit to trust to any third person beyond their own power, his death may be imputed to their machinations ; but it was the general opinion of the people at Poona that he had poisoned himself through a fear of the loss of reputation, when, by removal from power and office, his corrupt practices might become public. It is, however, remarkable that, in succession to this general report, the Peishwa, who had before quashed the proceedings against him, now became his accuser ; and Bappoo Sawney, the deputy of the deceased, was called upon by Bajee Rao to account for the defalcation, bribery, and corruption of his master. During the proceedings Bappoo Sawney died suddenly—of fright, it was said, at what he might expect if proved delinquency threw him into the power of Trimbukjee Dainglia. This person, who had

A. D. 1815. been for some time the chief director of the Peishwa's councils, was at last appointed his minister in the transaction of affairs with the British government. He studied his master's humours, and attained entire ascendancy over his mind ; his measures were vigorous, though marked by ignorance, violence, and treachery. His punishments were at once lenient and severe ; robbery and murder might be compensated by a small fine, but a failure in a revenue contract was an unpardonable offence.

The Peishwa farmed his districts to the highest bidder ; and those who failed in their contracts were compelled to surrender their whole property with that of their securities ; and should all be insufficient, they were thrown into hill-forts, and treated with the greatest rigour. On one occasion, Trimbukjee, before his power was completely established, being enraged at some delay on the part of a banker who had become security for a revenue contractor, used him in the harshest manner, and at last ordered the banker to be dragged before him, when he struck him a violent blow on the head, which, owing to a heavy ring on his finger, proved instantly fatal ; but, although the person thus deprived of life

was a Bramin of respectability,* no notice was taken of the circumstance.

These severities to the contractors did not deter others from adventuring on the same course; for Bajee Rao, who let the districts himself, was an adept in the art of flattery, and his manner plausible to a degree which few could resist. His court, which was gay and licentious beyond that of any other Peishwa, soon became agreeable to the generality of Bramins in Poona, and a high offer for a district was a sure way to the temporary notice of the prince. All his expenditure was regulated by contract. The net revenue of the state was about 120 lakhs of rupees, of which Bajee Rao saved annually about 50 lakhs, and had, at this period, collected treasure exceeding 50 millions of rupees. Whilst thus intent on amassing wealth, his time was divided in the encouragement of the grossest debauchery, and the practice of the most absurd superstitions. He aspired to a character for sanctity; was rigid in the observance of every form required by the rules of caste; and the murder of Narain Rao, attributed to his parents, was a subject of inquietude and remorse. To atone for their crime, he planted several hundred thousand mango trees about Poona, gave largesses to Bramins and religious establishments, and was particularly generous to the temple at Punderpoor. As an instance of his superstition may be mentioned a dream of one of his religious attendants, who declared he saw the ghost of Narain Rao, and that it had ordered a dinner for one hundred thousand Bramins—an entertainment which was immediately provided.

To the complaints of his subjects he never listened; and if the villagers endeavoured to approach his presence, they were driven away by the attendants. The farmers of the districts had generally the superintendence of civil and criminal justice, and their powers in this respect enabled them to increase their collections by fines and exactions. There was a nominal court of justice at Poona under a Shastree, who had a very large establishment. It was supported entirely by the corrupt emoluments which power enabled its members to draw from the public, and was so notoriously corrupt that the poorer suitor, unless he had interest, or could bribe some great man of whom the Shastree stood in awe, was certain to lose his cause.

Defective as the system was under Mahdoo Rao Bullal, the Shastree who then superintended and directed the Punchayets was a person of strict integrity, and that Peishwa's reign was always referred to as the times when a poor man had justice: even the administration of Nana Furnuwees was spoken of with applause; but Bajee Rao, the only Peishwa who had full leisure to amend the civil government, had neither ability nor inclination for the task.

He persevered in his plan of sequestering jagheers, and Mahdoo Rao Rastia having failed to produce his quota of horse for muster, the Peishwa represented to the British resident this departure from what was stipulated as wilful disobedience to his authority. The agreement in question being one of those concluded through the interposition of the British government, Rastia was called upon by the resident to fulfil his engagement with the Peishwa, otherwise he must abide by the consequences. Rastia hesitated, declared his inability to furnish so many horse, owing to the disobedience of the Duflays, who were jagheerdars under him, and, by the Peishwa's usual artifice, was secretly encouraged to believe that, by trusting to his lenity, more favourable terms might be obtained. It was in vain that the resident represented his situation in its true colours, and

* The banker's name was Sukharam Naik Loondee.

warned him of his ruin; he steadfastly refused compliance, and was stripped by the Peishwa of all his possessions.

Every day made it more evident that the Peishwa's government was now aiming at the revival of the old Mahratta policy, and was running a course equally incompatible with the Peishwa's alliance and his political existence, unless it were expected that he could overturn the British government. By Trimbukjee's advice he had sent agents in the preceding year* to the courts of Sindia and Rughojee Bhonslay; he also despatched an envoy † to Holkar, with whose court Bajee Rao had never before held any friendly communication; but, what was still more extraordinary, he sent an agent‡ to reside with the Pindharces, and had a secret interview at Kopergaom with some of their chiefs. The object of his missions to the Mahratta courts above named was to negotiate a secret treaty of general confederacy and support, which was actually concluded. The declared intention seems to have been for the purpose of strengthening themselves, and uniting together in case the British government should meditate further encroachment on any of the states concerned, or to act offensively against the British should an opportunity arise, either in consequence of their expected failure in the Nepaul war, then going forward, or on any future occasion; but those of his countrymen who know Bajee Rao best are of opinion that, notwithstanding these extensive and apparently well-ordered intrigues, he had neither a fixed plan, nor any serious intention of making war upon the English at this period; certain it is, however, that his measures were such as would have subjected him to the loss of his musnud, had the facts been formally substantiated and strict justice enforced.

His next scheme was to establish his ascendancy in Guzerat. Like his claims on the Nizam, he frequently expressed a wish to have his affairs with the Gaekwar settled; but as often as the wish was met by the British government, he contrived to delay the adjustment. There had been no settlement between the Gaekwar and the Peishwa since the accession of Govind Rao. On the suppression of the rebellion of Aba Shelookur, the Baroda government agreed, as already mentioned, to hold Ahmedabad in farm from the Peishwa, including the tribute of Kattywar, with Pitlaud, Nappar, Couira-Ranpoor, Dhundooka, Gogo, and some rights in Cambay, for the annual sum of five lakhs of rupees. When the Bombay government sent the detachment into Guzerat to support the party of Rowjee Appajee at Baroda, the government was fast approaching to that state of anarchy and confusion in which the dominions of Sindia and Holkar were afterwards involved. This fine province was in a great degree preserved from similar misery by the active interference of the British government under the able arrangements of Lieutenant-Colonel Walker, the resident. The revenues of the state amounted to 55 lakhs of rupees, and its expenditure to 82. The power of the government was, as we have seen, in the hands of a body of Arab mercenaries, and the divisions in the family of Gaekwar afforded a wide field of hope and of profit to military adventurers of all descriptions, who abound in that quarter. The Arabs were driven out: the debts, exclusive of the heavy balance due to the Peishwa, were compromised for a sum less than 42 lakhs; and money was raised

* Trimbukjee is supposed to have held communication with Sindia and Rughojies Bhonslay as far back as 1811, no doubt with his master's approbation.

† The envoy was a Bramin, named Gunness Punt.

‡ This agent was a Mahratta, his name Kistnaje Gaekwar.

on the security, or advanced from the treasury, of the British government for its liquidation. Mulhar Rao Gaekwar, whose rebellion brought the English permanently to Baroda, went off from Neriad, as the reader may recollect, about the time when the Arabs were besieged in Baroda. He was afterwards, when nearly famished, taken prisoner by Babajee, commander of the Gaekwar's troops, delivered over to the charge of the British government, and long kept a prisoner at large in the fort of Bombay, or its environs, where he ended his days. Kanhojee surrendered himself in 1808, and at first was allowed his liberty and an ample pension; but his natural turbulence and love of intrigue could ill-brook the undisturbed calm of such a life. In a short time he forfeited the advantages he enjoyed, engaged in plots against the existing government, and was finally conveyed to Madras as a state prisoner.

The collection of the tributes in Kattywar required a considerable force every year from Baroda. The Mahrattas give the name of Kattywar to the whole western peninsula of Guzerat, although strictly applicable to one district only of that extensive tract which derives its name from the Kattees, a very peculiar race, who worship the sun. The whole region is inhabited by a warlike people, chiefly Jarejah Rajpoots, who are under separate chiefs, and whose internal divisions had early made them an easy prey to the plundering bands of Kantajee Kudum Banday and Dummajee Gaekwar. The resident, attended by a British force, repeatedly accompanied the Gaekwar's army, and contributed much to tranquilize the province, and to improve its revenues. He also humanely exerted himself, though in the end with little success, to suppress the barbarous practice of female infanticide, to which the Jarejah Rajpoots are prone. From all these circumstances the Baroda government fell much under the control of the British resident; but as Lieutenant-Colonel Walker was enabled to direct its principal acts without paralyzing its internal authority, much benefit resulted to the country from his superintendency.

The ministry was chiefly composed of a set of Purvoes, a caste frequently remarkable for great fidelity and bravery, and, when poor, they are often frugal to parsimony; but it may be observed of the Purvoes, that wherever they attain power, and can command wealth, they are lavish and improvident. The head of this ministry was Rowjee Appajee, who died in July 1803; but having previously adopted his nephew, Seetaram Rowjee, as his son, he was, with the consent of the resident, appointed his successor. After a patient trial of his ability and resources, Seetaram was found incompetent to the duty, and his uncle Babajee, hitherto at the head of the army, was invited to assist him. Futih Sing, the brother of the Gaekwar, and the heir apparent, whose liberty had been purchased from one of Holkar's commanders who carried him off from Poona in 1803, was also at the same time brought into the administration. Futih Sing chose as his secretary Gungadhur Shastree, originally in the service of the Phurkay family at Poona, and a man of considerable activity and address, who had been very useful to the resident in the important measures he had effected. Lieutenant-Colonel Walker placed the highest confidence in the integrity and fidelity of the Shastree, and upon the death of Babajee, and great misconduct on the part of Seetaram, Gungadhur Shastree, supported, as he was, both by Futih Sing and the resident, soon became prime minister in all but the name.

The first arrangement of any importance which took place between the

government of Poona and that of Baroda, after the treaty of Bassein, was the settlement of the farm of Ahmedabad and its dependencies.

The former agreement was made in October 1800, and the term of its duration was to have been five years; but as Ranpoor, Gogo, Dhundooka, and the Peishwa's rights in Cambay were ceded to the British government by the treaty of Bassein, the Gaekwar was anxious to obtain a perpetual lease of the remainder, as the evils of divided authority would be avoided, and his own districts become more valuable in consequence. The British government was equally desirous of having the farm continued, both for the reasons mentioned, and because much confusion and oppression were likely to be averted by the arrangement. The Peishwa, on these representations, and upon condition of receiving five and a half lakhs of rupees for the remaining districts, consented, without difficulty, to allow the Gaekwar to retain them for ten years, from June 1804, and a new agreement was concluded accordingly. But at the expiration of the period, the Peishwa's views were entirely altered, and five times the amount of the sum realized from the districts could not compensate, in his estimation, for the advantages of an increased political influence on the side of Guzerat; nothing could induce him to renew the lease. Long, however, before the period of renewal, the question of his claims upon the Gaekwar had become a subject of attention with the British authorities. The governor-general deemed it advisable to allow the two states to settle their affairs by direct negotiation, and to desire that the arbitration of the British government should not be resorted to, except in the event of a failure on their part to effect an accommodation. At an early stage of the discussions, an agent of the Gaekwar government, named Bappoo Myraul, was sent to Poona. The debts of the Gaekwar to the Peishwa, according to the statements of the latter, which appear to have been correct, amounted to nearly a crore of rupees; but, as the chief cause of the embarrassments of the Baroda government originated in the attachment of the family to the cause of his father, Bajee Rao generously acceded to the relinquishment of 60 lakhs of rupees of this demand. The Baroda government, without claiming exemption as matter of favour, advanced counter-claims on the following grounds.

When Dummajee gave up half of Guzerat to Ballajee Bajee Rao, in 1751, he retained his rights in Baroach undivided, and the Peishwa got Jumbooseer and some other districts as an equivalent for his share. By the treaty of Baroda, in 1775, Rugonath Rao obtained from Futih Sing Gaekwar the cession of his rights in Baroach for the East India Company; and by the treaty of Poorundhur, although the Poona ministry had no power to alienate Baroach from the Gaekwar, it was wholly ceded to the British government. It was in vain that Futih Sing demanded his rights in Baroach from the English who kept them, or from the Peishwa who had given them away; and although, when the war was renewed, General Goddard put Futih Sing in possession of several of the Peishwa's districts, he was compelled to relinquish them by the treaty of Salbye. Mahadajee Sindia, on the conclusion of that pacification, obtained Baroach from the British government: with Sindia's successor it remained, until it fell, by right of conquest, to the English in 1803; and the Gaekwar now advanced a demand on the Peishwa for the amount of his share of its revenue since the treaty of Poorundhur.

His other counter-claims were on account of expenses incurred in reducing the rebellion of Aba Shelookur, and in maintaining an extra-

ordinary number of troops for the defence of the Peishwa's, as well as of his own, possessions in Guzerat. These intricate claims occasioned infinite discussion; and when Bajee Rao adopted the plans of Trimbukjee, he threw every obstacle in the way of a settlement, because the outstanding demands on Baroda and Hyderabad were reserved as a means of communicating with these courts; from which, owing to the nature of their engagements with the British government, his intrigues might otherwise have been excluded. Bappoo Myraul, the Gaekwar's agent at Poona, a sensible, upright man, and of a cautious, observant disposition, was soon found unfit for the Peishwa's purpose. Some other agent must be sent with whom the settlement could be conducted. The Gaekwar's government, therefore, resolved on sending Gungadhur Shastree, both for the adjustment of the accounts, and for obtaining a renewal of the lease of the Peishwa's share of Guzerat.

Accordingly the Shastree proceeded to Poona; but such was the general

A. D. 1814. powerful Trimbukjee towards all who opposed his wishes, that the Gaekwar asked and obtained the formal guarantee of his minister's safety from the British government. As early as September 1811, it had been proposed to send Gungadhur Shastree to Poona, the proposal was at that time readily and distinctly acceded to by the Peishwa; but on the Shastree's arrival, in 1814, Bajee Rao objected to him, and even refused to see him, on the plea of his having been insolent to him when a carcoon in the service of Phurkay. The fact was, the Baroda minister, Seetaram Rowjee, jealous of the Shastree, and already seduced by the Peishwa, represented the Shastree as a person wholly in the interests of the English.

It must be explained that Bajee Rao, on the decline of Seetaram Rowjee's influence at Baroda, attempted, with success, to gain him to his views; and on the resident's discovering the intrigue, and protesting against it, the Peishwa first denied, and afterwards justified, the correspondence, by endeavouring to prove his right to appoint the dewan at Baroda, according to the ancient practice in the plenitude of the Peishwa's power. Such a right, in regard to the Senaputtee or his mootaliq, Gaekwar, never did exist on the part of the Peishwa; but, without reference to the alleged right, or the object of the intrigue, the reasons urged did not appear sufficient, in Mr. Elphinstone's opinion, for the Peishwa's refusing to transact business with the accredited agent of a government in alliance with the nation which he represented, especially after having once assented to his mission: the Peishwa's objections were therefore overruled.

The proposed renewal of the lease of Ahmedabad, for reasons already explained, was positively rejected by the Peishwa; and Trimbukjee, having obtained the appointment of sur-soobehdar, prepared his troops and agents, who, in the Peishwa's name, took possession of the districts in Guzerat, and very soon commenced a systematic plan of insurrection and intrigue, which threatened to throw the whole country into confusion and disorder.* No better success attended the other objects of the mission to Poona; and the Shastree, at last, with the concurrence of the resident, determined to return to Baroda, and leave the questions to the arbitration of the British government.

* In the rains of 1815, the British troops in the cantonment at Kaira, their usual strength being much reduced at the time, were for several nights in expectation of being attacked in their lines by the Koolees, who are very numerous in that quarter, and were excited against the British government by Trimbukjee's agents.

This determination produced a marked change towards the Shastree in the conduct and demeanour of the Peishwa and Trimbukjee, who, foreseeing that they should thus be shut out from Baroda, resolved to spare no pains in gaining the Shastree to their interests. It was just at this period that Trimbukjee was appointed to carry on the communications between his master and the British government.

The Shastree was induced to postpone his departure, and every means was employed to conciliate his regard and confidence. Trimbukjee assailed him on the side of his vanity, which was the weak point of the Shastree's character, and persuaded him that the Peishwa, in admiration of his talents, both throughout the negotiation in which he was then opposed to his government, and in regard to what he had effected at Baroda, had resolved to appoint him his own minister. As a proof of the sincerity of this proposal, the Peishwa offered his sister-in-law in marriage to the Shastree's son, and acceded to an adjustment of the Gaekwar's affairs for a territorial cession, on a plan suggested by the Shastree, though without consulting his own court or obtaining the sanction of the British authority. Every arrangement was made for the intended nuptials, when the Shastree, having received no reply from the Gaekwar respecting the territorial cession, became apprehensive that it might be supposed he was neglecting his master's interests in forwarding his own, hesitated and suspended the solemnization of the marriage, after great expense had been incurred by preparations. This conduct was deeply resented; and the refusal of the Shastree to permit his wife to visit the Peishwa's palace, or to witness the scenes of gross debauchery to which every lady who entered it was subjected, was an offence which Bajee Rao never forgave in him or in any other person. Trimbukjee, however, affected to treat the Shastree with more cordiality and friendship than ever.

The Peishwa proceeded on a pilgrimage to Punderpoor, and the Shastree accompanied him, although his colleague, Bappoo Myraul, warned him of his danger, and begged that he might at least be permitted to attend him; but the infatuated man would neither listen to his advice, nor allow him to be of the party. At Punderpoor, on the night of the 14th July, Gun-gadgur Shastree, who had that day dined with the Peishwa, was invited by Trimbukjee to repair to the temple, for the purpose of paying his devotions on an occasion of particular solemnity. The Shastree, being a little indisposed, excused himself, but upon earnest and reiterated entreaties he at last complied. With a few unarmed attendants, he proceeded to the temple, where he performed his devotions, conversed with Trimbukjee, and paid his respects to the Peishwa, who was seated in the upper veranda of the temple, and on that occasion treated him with particular condescension.

The unfortunate Shastree, who, like many others, could never resist the agreeable manners of Bajee Rao, quitted his presence in the highest spirits, and set out on his return; but he had scarcely proceeded 300 yards when he was attacked in the street, and almost literally cut in pieces. Trimbukjee Dainglia hired the assassins; two agents of Seetaram Rowjee from Baroda assisted in pointing out the Shastree; and the Peishwa, if he did not instigate, approved of the murder, which was rendered peculiarly atrocious in a Hindoo, by being not only perpetrated on a Bramin, but upon the consecrated ground of Punderpoor, a place of extraordinary sanctity. As Bajee Rao and Trimbukjee denied all knowledge or participation in the deed, the resident, who at the Peishwa's request had not accompanied him to Punderpoor, called for an immediate inquiry into the circumstances for

the satisfaction of the British government : but no investigation took place. The general voice of the country pronounced Trimbukjee the perpetrator of the murder ; Bappoo Myraul openly accused him of it, and the resident instituted a very minute and strict inquiry, which clearly established his guilt. The Peishwa was called upon to place him under restraint, and afterwards to deliver him up to the British government ; but he refused compliance, evaded the demand, and for a time seemed resolved to stand or fall with his favourite. Being, however, unprepared for extremities, and the British troops being assembled at Poona, his natural timidity prevailed over every other sentiment, and on the 25th September he delivered up Trimbukjee, whom he had previously sent into confinement in the fort of Wussuntgurrh. The two agents of Seetaram, being deeply implicated, were seized at the same time, and delivered to the Gaekwar, by whom they were confined in hill-forts. Seetaram, who, in conjunction with the agents of Trimbukjee, had been levying troops whilst the Peishwa hesitated to deliver up his favourite, was removed from the administration at Baroda, and taken into custody by the British government. This measure was much against the inclination of the regent Futih Sing, who on this occasion betrayed symptoms of being himself swayed by the intrigues of the court of Poona.

Trimbukjee was confined by the British government in the fort of Tannah, on Salsette, whence he effected his escape over the wall between seven and eight o'clock of the evening of the 12th September.* The guard over Trimbukjee, owing probably to excessive precaution, had no mixture of sepoy upon it, but was composed entirely of Europeans. From this circumstance, the Peishwa was able to communicate with Trimbukjee, and, for some days previous to his making the attempt, several of his friends and servants were waiting in the neighbourhood with full expectation of his joining them. The principal agent of communication was a Mahratta horsekeeper, in the service of one of the officers in the garrison, who passing and re-passing the window of Trimbukjee's place of confinement, when in the act of airing his master's horse, sung the information he wished to convey, in an apparently careless manner, which the Europeans, from want of sufficient knowledge of the language, could not detect. The difficulties of this escape were exaggerated into an exploit worthy of Sivajee, and greatly contributed to raise the fame of Trimbukjee amongst his countrymen, with whom it gained him a degree of popularity which he had never enjoyed while in power. He confided his safety to the Bheels, Ramoosees, and Mangs, and resided chiefly in the hills about Nassuck and Sungumnere, sometimes in Candeish and Buglana, and frequently amongst the Mahdeo hills towards Satara, but never in the original haunts of Sivajee, where he would not have been safe. This circumstance is to be accounted for in his having treacherously seized Chitoor Sing, who was extremely popular in that part of the Mahratta country.

Chitoor Sing, since we had last occasion to mention him, after the battle of Poona in 1802 had served in most parts of India. He was conspicuous in the charge made upon the 74th regiment at the battle of Assaye,† and

* Trimbukjee, in conversation with different officers on his guard at Tannah, before he had any hopes of escape, admitted the murder, but said he had merely obeyed his master's orders.

† I know this circumstance from Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray, who was himself in that charge, and with Chitoor Sing.

was afterwards in the armies of Holkar, Umeer Khan, and the Rajpoots. In 1812 he was returning home through Candeish, when Trimbukjee seduced him to a conference, took him prisoner, loaded him with irons, and threw him into the fort of Kangooree in the Concan. Many vain attempts were made by his partizans to effect his rescue, till at last a Gosaeen of the same name, aided by some of the Ramoosee chiefs, taking advantage of the interest felt for him in the country, gave out that Chitoor Sing had escaped, and obtained possession of the fort of Prucheetgurh, by a daring and well-planned enterprize, suggested, it is said, by a traditionary account of one of Sivajee's exploits.* They afterwards took many other forts, and raised a formidable insurrection, which, though generally kept in check by the troops of Bappoo Gokla, was never reduced by the Peishwa's government. Their real object was plunder, but their avowed purpose was the re-establishment of the Mahratta sovereignty, and the release of the raja of Satara; and had Trimbukjee Dainglia fallen into their hands, they would have put him to death; Chitoor Sing lingered in prison at Kangooree, where he died in the end of April 1818. His brother Shao died at Satara, 3rd May 1808, and was succeeded by his son, Pertab Siew, or Sing, the present raja, then in his sixteenth year.

However strong the suspicion of the Peishwa's connivance at the escape and concealment of Trimbukjee, there was no proof of the fact; and as it was thought he would rest satisfied in having effected his freedom, little notice was taken of the circumstance. Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir was again called into the Peishwa's councils; Moro Dixit, a student of Bassein, and Chimnajee Narain, both Concanist Bramins, who, like most of Bajee Rao's courtiers, had gained the favour of their prince by the dishonour of their families, were likewise employed in the administration; and Captain Ford, the commandant of the regular brigade, in whom the Peishwa placed considerable confidence, because his prosperity depended on the stability of his government, was frequently the channel of communication between the British residency and the Peishwa's ministers. The utmost cordiality seemed to prevail between the court and the residency at Poona; but nothing could be more deceitful on the part of Bajee Rao. He was now engaged in the most active negotiations with Sindia, Holkar, the raja of Nagpoor, Umeer Khan, and the Pindharees against the British government; he made great additions to his army, and supplied Trimbukjee with large sums of money, directing him to raise troops at different places, in his own territory, which, even if discovered by the British government, might appear to be plundering Pindharees or insurgents. The resident, who had early and exact information of Trimbukjee's secret proceedings, applied to the

A. D. 1817. minister to ascertain whether the assembly of such troops was authorised or not by the Peishwa; and he was assured, not only that it was not authorised, but that no such assembly existed. Mr. Elphinstone was therefore bound to consider it an insurrection; he told the minister that such levies were going forward; that the principal body was assembling near Nattapoota, a village south of the Neera, within 50 miles of Poona, and he begged that immediate steps might be taken for its dispersion. Although the minister continued to deny the existence of any assembly of troops, a part of Bappoo Gokla's horse was sent down, as was pretended, for the resident's satisfaction. They quietly occupied a position

* The manner of it has already been explained in a note on Sivajee's life, chapter 4, page 68.

in the very district where the insurgents were collecting, but declared they could hear nothing of them. The Peishwa also persisted in denying all knowledge of Trimbukjee, or of an insurrection, and called on the resident, if he really did believe such an absurd report, to take his own measures for suppressing it. It was by this time known to the resident that the Peishwa, during a visit to the country, had invited, and positively given Trimbukjee an audience at Phoolshuhur, within 17 miles of Poona; but what made this meeting the more remarkable is the fact, afterwards ascertained, that Trimbukjee came there attended by a large body of horse, who surrounded the village during the interview. The subsidiary force was then in an advanced position, near Jaffeirabad, for the purpose of protecting the country from the ravages of the Pindharees, and of assisting in giving effect to political measures to the northward; but it was now, with the consent of the governor-general, ordered to act against the insurgents. Whilst two detachments of the Madras army advanced to the frontiers of the Nizam's territory—the one to Tooljapoor, the other to Beder—Colonel Lionel Smith, who commanded the Poona subsidiary, marched to the Neera with a light division, leaving his reserve to follow at leisure. The insurgents had moved from Nattapoota to Jhutt; but, on Colonel Smith's approach, they countermarched, and passed by a rugged and unfrequented route through the Mahdeo hills; Colonel Smith followed them, but they had gained many hours' march before the division got into their tract; the pursuit, however, was taken up by a party of infantry from the reserve, under Major Smith of the Madras native infantry, who, after a persevering march, surprised and killed several of them; but they had previously marked their course by several acts of atrocity, particularly by the murder of Lieutenant Warre of the Madras artillery. The object of this body in moving to the northward was to join another party, assembled in Candeish under Trimbukjee's relation, Godajee Dainglia; but, before their arrival, Lieutenant Evan Davies, of the Bombay establishment, at the head of a body of the Nizam's horse, had attacked and dispersed the troops of Godajee.

The existence of the insurrection could be no longer denied by the Peishwa; orders were therefore issued to the jagheerdar of Vinchoor to act against them; and some time after, a letter from the Vinchorkur, with a fictitious account of their attack and dispersion, was sent for the perusal of the resident, and the officer commanding the subsidiary force.

In the meantime the Peishwa continued to levy troops, both cavalry and infantry; every endeavour was used to induce him to desist; he was warned of the consequences of such proceedings, and of the dangerous course he had followed in abetting the insurgents, and thus evincing intentions decidedly hostile to the British government. But he still persevered; the language of his ministers assumed a peremptory tone, and they demanded from the resident whether he intended war or peace. Mr. Elphinstone, in order that nothing might be wanting to bring the Peishwa to a sense of his situation, had suspended the intercourse between the residency and the Poona court about the time when Colonel Smith proceeded against the insurgents; he now, in expectation of receiving instructions from the governor-general, directed Colonel Smith to move towards Poona with the light division, acquainting the Peishwa with his having done so; the plan he pursued was to proceed gradually, giving the Peishwa time to correct his errors, if so disposed, at the same time relaxing nothing of the steadiness and dignity which became the representative of the British nation. Many reasons, however, combined to

render it advisable to bring matters to an issue. The insurgents gained ground in Candesh : a fort fell into their hands ; the Peishwa's levies, and the repairs of his forts, which had been going on for some time, proceeded with great activity, and as the rainy season approached, it was apprehended the Peishwa might betake himself to a hill-fort, inaccessible at that season, and commence a war which must be protracted, and would probably encourage all the Mahratta powers to unite in his cause. At this important crisis the communication between Calcutta and Poona was interrupted by disturbances in Kuttack ; but, in the absence of the expected instructions, Mr. Elphinstone had fortunately received a private letter from the secretary to the governor-general, which mentioned the surrender of Trimbukjee Dainglia as an indispensable preliminary to any new settlement whatever. On this information he determined to act without delay. Having intimated a desire to communicate with the minister, the Peishwa requested to see him, and throughout a long conference displayed an unusual degree of coolness and self-possession. He entered into a warm and most eloquent defence of himself ; reverted ; as usual, to his obligations to the British government, and spoke with so much apparent reason and candour of his own situation, and of the consequences of the conduct and views imputed to him, that any person who had not considered the weight of the evidence, and fully understood the character of Bajee Rao, must have felt disposed to give credit to the soundness of his arguments, even if he had been inclined to doubt the sincerity of his protestations. But whilst his actions contradicted his words, Mr. Elphinstone was not to be deceived ; he tried, however, by every means, both during the conference and subsequently, to induce the Peishwa to prove the sincerity of his professions, and avert the danger by which he was threatened ; he distinctly told him that Trimbukjee Dainglia must be delivered up, or not suffered to remain in his territory, and that the consequences of a refusal must involve the states in immediate hostilities. At last, after several days had passed in this manner, the resident formally demanded the seizure of Trimbukjee in the space of one month, and the immediate delivery of three principal forts—Singurh, Poorundhur, and Raigurh—as a pledge for the fulfilment of the demand. Bajee Rao, still under an impression of the high importance of his alliance to the British government, believed that the resident would not proceed to extremities ; and he hoped that, without making such a humiliating concession, or surrendering pledges so important, he should be able to temporize until the season was advanced, and should find time to call into operation, with full effect, the extensive confederacy planned by himself and his favourite. Even when Mr. Elphinstone, on the 7th of May, intimated his determination to surround the city of Poona, Bajee Rao still refused compliance with the terms required. At last, at one o'clock in the morning, the Peishwa sent a messenger in hopes that the resident might be

induced to postpone or to relinquish his intention : and it was only on finding him steady to his purpose that the messenger told him he was instructed to comply with his demands. During the discussion the day had dawned ; the troops were moving round the city, and had completely surrounded it before the resident could reach the head of the line. They were withdrawn as soon as the order for the surrender of the forts was sent out : and the Peishwa, as if at length sensible to his situation, and resolved to give up his favourite, issued a proclamation, offering rewards for the seizure of some of Trimbukjee's adherents, and a sum of two lakhs of rupees, and an enam village of 1,000 rupees a year,

to any person who should bring in Trimbukjee Dainglia, dead or alive. He likewise seized some of Trimbukjee's adherents, sequestered the property of others concerned in the insurrection, and manifested an apparently strong desire to comply with the recommendation of his allies. Although these proceedings did not deceive his own subjects, and the proclamation, without the Peishwa's cordial concurrence, was of little importance to the apprehension of Trimbukjee, still it seemed reasonable to admit these acts as a concession of that preliminary, without which no proposals for present satisfaction or future security would have been received by the British authorities.

The instructions of the governor-general, which reached Poona on the 10th of May, were framed for the purpose of circumscribing the Peishwa's power, of imposing such restrictions as should prevent the evils apprehended from the course of policy pursued by the court of Poona for several years, and of obviating inconveniencies found to exist in the performance of the articles of the treaty of Bassein.

A new treaty was therefore drawn up, by which, in order to mark the foundation of the whole proceedings, the Peishwa was compelled to admit the guilt of Trimbukjee Dainglia as the murderer of Gungadhar Shastree, the accredited agent of the Gaekwar state, residing under the guarantee of the British government within the Peishwa's territory, and his consequent obligation to seize and deliver him up to the British government; until the accomplishment of which, the family of Trimbukjee Dainglia were to be given over as hostages.

The Peishwa engaged to have no communication with any foreign power whatever, neither to send nor to receive wukeels, and, as head of the Mahratta empire, renounced all rights beyond the boundary of his own dominions between the Toongbuddra and Nerbuddah; he relinquished all future demands on the Gaekwar, and agreed to compromise all past claims on him for the annual sum of four lakhs of rupees. He also agreed to let the farm of Ahmedabad to the Gaekwar for four and a half lakhs of rupees a year, exclusive of the tribute of Kattywar and his other rights in Guzerat, which were dismembered by another article. Instead of furnishing the contingent of 5,000 horse and 3,000 infantry required by the treaty of Bassein, he agreed to cede territory yielding 34 lakhs of rupees for that purpose. This cession included Dharwar and Koosghul with some undefined districts in the Carnatic, the Concan north of Bombay, and the Peishwa's revenue in Guzerat, except Ahmedabad and Oolpar; but Ahmedabad was subsequently included. The Peishwa also ceded the fort of Ahmednugur, together with all his rights north of the Nerbuddah; he recognised the settlement with the jagheerdars concluded in 1812; and, at the recommendation of the British government, restored the jagheer of the unfortunate Mahdoo Rao Rastia; finally, he renounced Mailghut, a possession on the Nizam's frontier, which the Peishwa's troops had occupied in 1811.

In consequence of this treaty, by which important advantages were secured to the Gaekwar's government, a new arrangement was concluded with him, which had for its object the consolidation of the territories of the respective governments, and also to impose on the Gaekwar a more adequate proportion of the military charges of the province of Guzerat than he had been hitherto called upon to bear; for, although his irregular troops were maintained at a great expense, they were found wanting in efficiency, and the duty, as well as extra charges of field service, fell upon the British government. It was therefore proposed that a part of the irregulars should be discharged, that the subsidiary force maintained by

the Gaekwar should receive an addition of 1,000 regular infantry and two regiments of cavalry ; and that districts, lying conveniently for the meditated consolidation, should be assigned to the British government for defraying the additional expense. To this plan the Baroda government acceded, and a treaty to that effect was concluded on the 6th November.*

* The above chapter is on the authority of English records and oral information, Mahratta MSS. and personal observation.

CHAP. XLVIII.

FROM A. D. 1814 TO A. D. 1817.

The Marquis of Hastings assumes charge of the government of British India. —State of India from the increase of predatory power.—Patans and Pindharees.—Plan for improving the defensive military positions.—Failure of the negotiations with Bhopaul and Jeypoor—defensive alliance embraced by Appa Sahib, the regent at Nagpoor—Appa Sahib falls into the views of the Poona court—murders Pursajee.—Progress of the Pindharees.—Plans of the Marquis of Hastings for the suppression of the predatory system—political and military arrangements.—Sindia is forced into the governor-general's views—progress of the negotiations with the Rajpoots, Umeer Khan, the chiefs in Bundelcund, and the nabob of Bhopaul.

In October 1813 the Marquis of Hastings, then Earl of Moira, assumed charge of the government of British India as successor to Lord Minto. In addition to affairs immediately pressed upon his notice, the new

A. D. 1814. governor-general instituted inquiries into every department of the state; extending his interrogatories to the public character and services of individuals, by which he not only collected a mass of information, but awakened a lively attention in the minds of the officers throughout the vast army of British India, and inspired them, by this obvious desire to ascertain real merit, with the hope of honor and reward both for past and future exertions.

The defective nature of the political arrangements concluded by the British authorities in 1805-6 had become very evident from the state of anarchy existing in Malwa and Rajpootana; and the necessity of suppressing the spreading hordes of Patans and Pindharees was universally acknowledged. The numbers of these marauders had augmented to about 50,000 men, of whom about one-half were Pindharee horse. Both the one and the other were systematic plunderers; but the Patans were associated under Umeer Khan for the purpose of invading and plundering such states as they could overpower or intimidate, whilst the object of the Pindharees was universal rapine.

The Patans, therefore, required infantry and guns, and in this respect no native army in India was more efficient: their artillery was excellent; and they had some of the oldest of Holkar's battalions as the foundation of their infantry, which was estimated at about 10,000 and their cavalry at 15,000 men. They were also distinguished from Pindharees by having a fixed rate of monthly pay, though it was seldom punctually received.

These plunderers, especially the Pindharees, were always gaining an accession of strength as the countries around them became exhausted; for not only did every lawless man, who could command a horse and a spear, join them, but the more peaceable part of the community were driven for subsistence into the same course of life; so that additional wants and accumulating strength tended of themselves to enlarge the sphere of Pindharee operations, without other less apparent sources of augmentation,

derived from the secret support and encouragement of various principal chiefs of the Mahratta empire.

Representations of the growth and formidable nature of this predatory power were early made to the Court of Directors; but as the question seemed to involve a revision of their political relations with several of the native states, years had elapsed before any latitude was granted for departing from the defensive system of policy pursued since the settlement of 1805-6.

The authorities at home, however, regretting the manner in which some of the Rajpoot states had been thrown off, were desirous of repairing what was still in their power, by taking the raja of Jeypoor under British protection, and orders to that effect were received at Bengal in 1814; but as the measure was part of a plan which the Marquis of Hastings had in view for effecting a complete arrangement, he postponed attempting it until a more favourable season.

As a prelude to the great object contemplated, it being supposed that Rughoojee Bhonsalay, from his dread of the Pindharees, and from a sense of the gratuitous aid which had been more than once afforded when Nagpoor was threatened, might now be induced to enter on a defensive alliance with the British government, proposals to that effect were made to him; but a long negotiation through the resident, Mr. Jenkins, ended in a positive rejection of the terms.

The chief end of these overtures, in the present instance, was with a view of connecting the chain of military posts between the frontier of the British possessions in Bundelcund and the territory of their ally, the Nizam. The same object was attainable by taking Govind Rao Nana, the chief of Sagur, and Wuzeer Mohummud, nabob of Bhopaul, under British protection; but being by this time involved in hostility with the Goorkhas of Nepal, Lord Hastings intended to postpone the offer of protection to the principalities in question, when he obtained information that a negotiation for a treaty, offensive and defensive, was in progress betwixt Sindia and Rughoojee Bhonsalay, and also between Sindia and the ministers of Toolsee Bye Holkar: * he further learnt that Sindia, who had made great efforts against Bhopaul the preceding year, was determined to renew the siege; that in its exhausted state even the heroism of Wuzeer Mohummud† must prove unavailing; and finally, that this chief earnestly solicited to be taken under British protection.

From these circumstances, Lord Hastings determined on adopting the proposed measure, and directed certain terms to be offered, which comprehended the free ingress, egress, and residence of British troops within the nabob's territory, and the surrender from Bhopaul of a fort as a present depot. To support the negotiations, the troops in Bundelcund were reinforced, the Hyderabad subsidiary moved from Jaulna to Elichpoor, the Poona subsidiary from Seroor to Jaffeirabad, a large reserve was formed in the Deccan, and the army of Guzerat occupied a position at Soneepoor, on the right bank of the Myhie.

Wuzeer Mohummud appeared most ready to embrace the terms, and it was in consequence intimated to Sindia, by the resident in his camp, that

* These negotiations, of which the governor-general had obtained intelligence, were the prelude to the treaty of confederacy, of which the first article expressed the determination of these princes to serve and obey the Peishwa.

† See Sir John Malcolm's Central India for an interesting and animated account of the defence of Bhopaul.

the principality of Bhopaul was under British protection. Sindia protested most vehemently against the measure, declared the nabob A. D. 1815. to be his dependant, and, in defiance of the assembled armies, threatened an immediate attack upon him. His battalions advanced, and although under a certain assurance that an attack on Bhopaul would occasion an immediate rupture with the English, Sindia, for a time, seemed quite determined to risk the event; but his action fell short of his words, and ultimately his army was withdrawn. His conduct was to be accounted for in the unfavourable commencement and brilliant termination of the Nepal war; but the first impressions throughout India respecting that warfare inspired hopes in all who wished the overthrow of the British power. Of that number, the Peishwa, from the time he was guided by the councils of Trimbukjee Dainglia, and especially after having instigated and participated in his crimes, may be considered the chief; it was, however, at one time supposed that the plan of the general confederacy already mentioned did not originate with the Mahrattas, but was suggested through Sindia by the Nepaulese.

The Peishwa and Rughoojee Bhonslay assented, with seeming cordiality, to the proposed connection of the British government with Bhopaul; but no agreement ever took place with Wuzeer Mohummud. As long as he was threatened by Sindia, he not only appeared to accede to the terms, but gave out that he was under the protection of the British; but when the danger subsided, he objected to the surrender of a fort, and the negotiation terminated. The descendant, however, of the nabob of Bhopaul, who in 1779 dared, in defiance of Mahratta hostility, to befriend the English detachment under General Goddard, could be forgiven for an evasion, by which, if he refused protection, he also preserved independence. The failure of this arrangement prevented the prosecution of any plan of settlement with Govind Rao Nana at this period.

In the ensuing year, after the termination of the war in Nepal, the raja of Jeypoor, being much pressed by Umeer Khan, applied A. D. 1816. for protection from the British government, which Lord Hastings, with a view to the general plan of settlement, was willing to afford; but the raja broke off the negotiation as soon as he had induced Umeer Khan to withdraw, and, like Wuzeer Mohummud, showed that necessity alone prompted his application.

The nabob of Bhopaul, however, died on the 17th March 1816, and March 17—22. Rughoojee Bhonslay on the 22nd of the same month. Wuzeer Mohummud was succeeded as nabob of Bhopaul by his son Wuzeer Mohummud, and Rughoojee Bhonslay was succeeded by his only son Pursajee. But Pursajee, whose intellects were always weak, fell into a state of idiotism immediately afterwards; and his cousin Moodajee, usually styled Appa Sahib, the son of Venkajee Munnya Bappoo, who commanded at the battle of Argaom, was chosen regent, although not without considerable opposition. To secure an ascendancy, by no means fully established, Appa Sahib applied to the British resident to be admitted to the defensive alliance, before proposed to Rughoojee, which was promptly acceded to, and a treaty was signed 27th May 1816. A stipulated money payment,* calculated to defray the additional expense of field charges for one regiment of cavalry and 6,000 infantry, was to be paid by the Nagpoor government, and a contingent of 3,000 horse and 2,000 foot was to be maintained by the terms of the alliance. A sub-

* Of seven and a half lakhs of rupees annually.

diary force was immediately formed, and until Appa Sahib was secured in the government, the whole continued in the neighbourhood of the capital, it being agreed that, when the troops were required in advance, or even on ordinary occasions, two battalions only should remain at Nagpoor. By the end of October 1816, Appa Sahib had completely established his authority, but being immediately assailed by the intrigues of the

A. D. 1817. Peishwa, he very soon came into the views of the Poona court; being, however, apprehensive that if he threw off the support of the British government during the life-time of Purnajee, a

February 1. party might endanger his power, he one night caused Purnajee to be secretly strangled, and on the following morning it was announced and believed that he had been found dead in his bed.

In the meantime the aggressions of the Pindharees increased, nor could the British government defend its territory from their ravages, although large armies, at a vast expense, were annually called into the field. During the season of 1815-16, or from October till May inclusive of those years, the Pindharees pushed their depredations to a great extent, and were very successful in eluding the parties sent in pursuit of them. In the ensuing seasons they were less fortunate in their escapes: the British detachments, performing extraordinary marches, frequently came up with them, sometimes fell upon them accidentally, and cut off many of their parties. The Pindharees never fought, and seldom defended themselves against British troops; but these successes, though in many instances highly creditable to the zeal and perseverance of the army, were but a mere palliative to this growing and deep-seated evil. It was observable that for several years the territory of the Mahrattas was in general respected, and their ravages directed principally against that of the Nizam and the British government.

To prevent suspicion from this circumstance, the Peishwa sent a party of horse to plunder in his own country, who gave themselves out as Pindharees; and Sindia professed the greatest desire to suppress them; but his commanders openly countenanced them, and it was manifest that both Sindia and Holkar were not only unwilling but unable to restrain their dependants.

The subsidiary treaty with Nagpoor, and the acquisition of the Peishwa's rights by the treaty of 1817 over his remaining tributaries in Bundelcund, greatly improved the defensive means hitherto adopted by the British government; but the governor-general, before receiving authority from England, had come to the resolution, as early as December 1816, of effectually suppressing the Pindharees; various reasons, however, induced him to defer carrying his plan into effect until the close of the ensuing rains; and in the meantime the Court of Directors had sanctioned offensive operations to the extent of driving the Pindharees from their haunts on the banks of the Nerbuddah and from Malwa.

The views of the Marquis of Hastings were more enlarged; he aimed at their complete suppression by eradicating the predatory system from

* The fact here recorded is stated on good authority, but it was not suspected or known till after the war; the party was sent by Trimbukjee, in the end of 1816, or very early in 1817, into the southern Concan, where they plundered and committed very great excesses. Having dispersed, they afterwards re-assembled in the neighbourhood of Nattapoota. They halted one night in Satara on their way down, of which place some of them, I believe, were natives, at all events they were afterwards well known there.

central India, so as to carry peace to those desolated provinces, and security to the rest of the country. Berar was supposed to be settled by the late subsidiary alliance; and the Peishwa, crippled by the treaty of Poona, might, it was hoped, see the necessity of refraining from hostilities, secret or avowed, if he wished to retain the territory still left to him. The plan, therefore, of the governor-general embraced principally the possessions of Sindia, Holkar, the Rajpoots, the nabob of Bhopaul, and the principalities of Bundelcund. The former treaties with Sindia and Holkar became virtually annulled from the period when their dependants began to ravage the territory of the British government. Many proofs of secret hostilities, particularly on the part of Sindia, had come to the knowledge of the governor-general, besides the treaty of confederacy by which all the Mahrattas engaged to serve and obey the Peishwa; he therefore determined on submitting a plan of a treaty of concert and alliance to those two states,—to declare the treaties of 1805 annulled, so that he might be at liberty to admit the claims of every state, tributary or otherwise, that had any pretensions to independence; and to guarantee rights and possessions in all instances where the state or principality agreed to make common cause against the predatory system; but he resolved to admit of no neutrality. He adopted as a principle not to disturb occupancy, but to treat with the existing government or chiefs who might be in possession of the country at the time. Thus Umeer Khan, though an undeserving instance of the operation of this general benefit, if he agreed to the proposals, and dismissed his Patans, was to be guaranteed in the jagheer which he held from Holkar. On these principles, and to the above effect, as soon as the military preparations were in sufficient progress, orders were despatched to the various political agents.

The military plan was equally simple and comprehensive. Armies were to be assembled around the territories described, to close in by simultaneous movements to a common centre, so as to hem-in the Pindharees and their abettors at all points; taking care to provide efficient means for resisting or following up any bodies of the enemy who might pass through the advancing divisions. For this purpose five divisions were prepared in the Deccan, and placed under the orders of Sir Thomas Hislop, commander-in-chief of the Madras army. One division was held ready in Guzerat, and four divisions, with two in reserve, were to co-operate from Bengal under the personal command of the Marquis of Hastings, who took the field that he might be on the scene of operations, and superintend the execution of his arrangements. Sir John Malcolm was appointed political agent of the governor-general with the army of the Deccan, and had also command of one of the divisions destined for active operations in the field. The preparations in the south, as the troops had so far to march, were necessarily public, but those to the northward of Bundelcund were managed with secrecy, so as not to give the alarm to Sindia, until he should find himself compelled to submit to the intended propositions, or obliged to commence war under great disadvantage.

The forces of the Deccan, including a sixth or reserve division formed at Adonee under Brigadier-General Pritzer, the Guzerat division under Brigadier-General Grant Keir, and the troops left for the protection of Poona, Hyderabad, and Nagpoor, amounted to upwards of 57,000 regulars, of which number 5,255 were cavalry. The army which took the field in Bengal consisted of about 34,000 regulars, of which the cavalry amounted to nearly 5,000. Besides these, there were 13,000 irregular horse on the

strength of the Deccan army, and nearly 10,000 with the army of Bengal, many of them good troops.

The 1st division of the army of the Deccan under the command of Sir Thomas Hislop, preceded by the 3rd division under Sir John Malcolm, was destined to advance into Malwa, and cross the Nerbuddah at Hindia. The 5th division, consisting of the Nagpoor subsidiary force under Colonel Adams, was to advance by Hooshingabad. The 2nd division under Brigadier-General Doveton, and the 4th division under Brigadier-General Smith, were to occupy positions, the former in Berar, and the latter in Candeish, and to act according to circumstances. The army of Guzerat was to advance by Dohud into Malwa.

The four principal Bengal divisions were to be assembled at Rewaree, Agra, Sikundra near Kalpee, and at Kalinjer in Bundelcund. The two divisions in reserve were intended as detachments of observation; the one was stationed under Brigadier-General Toone on the upper Saone, the other under Brigadier-General Hardyman in Rewah, on the upper Nerbuddah. The division from Bundelcund, under the command of General Marshall, was to advance with the Deccan army against the Pindharees. The division from Rewaree, the most northern point, was under the command of Major-General Ochterlony, and was intended to expedite the arrangements with the Rajpoots, and to co-operate in overawing the Patans or attacking the Pindharees. The main body, to be assembled at Sikundra, was under the personal command of the Marquis of Hastings, and was prepared with considerable celerity and secrecy by the middle of October. It was destined to cross the Jumna by a bridge of boats a little above Kalpee, to march due west, and to occupy, in the first instance, a position south of Gwalior, whilst the division from Agra, under Major-General Donkin, took up its station at Dholpoor, immediately to the northward. This judicious manœuvre, which gave the command of Sindia's camp with the best part of his artillery, was executed with great success; it disarmed one important member of a hostile confederacy formed against the British government, and compelled Sindia to sign a treaty, which, however unpalatable at the moment, was really ensuring his safety.

In September it was intimated to Sindia through Captain Close, the resident in his camp, that the army of the Deccan was about to advance for the extirpation of the Pindharees, and, as matter of form, passports were requested for the free ingress and egress of the British troops through his territory. At this period Sindia's army at Gwalior was more than usually turbulent—a circumstance principally attributable to a strong excitement caused by reports of the Peishwa's determination to break with the English, and a general hope that their master was about to join him. Sindia, in reply to the application for passports, stated that he had not given up his intention of punishing the Pindharees, and requested that the troops might be stopped; but this being declared impossible after what had happened in the last two years, the passports were granted. Before the middle of October the views of the governor-general were completely unfolded to Sindia by a paper prepared and sent from the camp at Sikundra. It contained remonstrances on his evasive conduct for having harboured freebooters, who had plundered the British territory at the very time when he was pledging himself to punish their depredations, and it combated the plea he had advanced of inability to suppress them; if, however, that plea were admitted as personal exoneration, it constituted a virtual dissolution of the treaty, and more especially annulled those stipulations in regard to his dependants in Rajpootana; because, if unable

to restrain such dependants, when they committed aggressions on the British government, the treaties which bound that government to regard them as the subjects of Sindia could no longer be considered in force. The paper in question further declared that the British government had no other view than the effectual extinction of all predatory associations; and Captain Close was authorised to communicate the mode in which Sindia's aid was solicited for that purpose. He was required to place his troops at the disposal of the British government, to be stationary or employed at its option, with a British officer superintending each of the principal divisions; and any of Sindia's officers supporting or harbouring freebooters were to be dealt with as rebels. A contingent of 5,000 horse, to be employed under the direction of British officers against the Pindharees, and funds allotted for its expenses for three years, from the pension payable by the British government and the tribute demandable from Boondee and Joudpour. The lands recovered from the Pindharees belonging to Sindia to be restored to him, and to the rightful owners, in all cases where they co-operated for their suppression; where they did not, the whole to be given up to Sindia. As a security for the fulfilment of the proposed terms, the forts of Hindia and Asseergurh were demanded, but Sindia's flag was to be allowed to fly, and a few of his troops permitted to remain in each of them. The tribute due to Sindia by the Rajpoot principalities was not to be affected by any agreements which the British government might make with them; on the contrary, its due receipt was to be guaranteed to him. A treaty to this effect was signed by Sindia on the 5th November, and ratified by the governor-general on the following day. Hindia was given up according to the terms of the treaty; but Jeswunt Rao Lar, the killidar of Asseergurh, refused to obey the order of surrender. The three principal divisions of Sindia's army were thus stationed—the first at Ajimere under Bappoojee Sindia, the same person who treacherously deserted on Monson's retreat; the second at Jawud under Jeswunt Rao Bhow; and the third at Bhadurgurh under Colonel Jean Baptiste. The British officers chosen to superintend those divisions were, in their respective order, Major Ludlow, Captain Caulfield, and Major Bunce.

Soon after Sindia had signed the treaty, General Donkin's division proceeded to the westward for the purpose of co-operating in the general plan, but the Marquis of Hastings continued to move about to the southward of Gwalior, to observe the motions of Sindia, who, though compelled to accept the terms imposed, was watching the progress of events in the Deccan, intriguing with the Peishwa, and endeavouring to stir up the Goorkhas of Nepal to make common cause with the Mahrattas.

In the meantime the political agents of the British government were actively engaged in negotiations with the petty states. The raja of Kerowlee, a dependant of the Peishwa, to whom the raja had paid a small tribute of 25,000 rupees a year, was the first to accept the proffered protection. He acknowledged the supremacy of the British government, was guaranteed in his possessions, and in his particular case the tribute was remitted. He agreed to furnish troops to the extent of his means. This agreement was signed on the 9th November, and on the same day Umeer Khan's agent at Delhi accepted the terms offered for his master. His jagheer was guaranteed and taken under British protection, on condition of disbanding his followers, except a small number for the internal management of his jagheer, which were to attend on the requisition of the British government; he was also to relinquish all connection with

freebooters, and to give up his artillery for an equitable pecuniary compensation. After the conclusion of the treaty with Sindia, Captain Tod, assistant to the resident in Sindia's camp, was sent on a political mission to the Rajpoot states. The raj-rana, Zalim Sing of Kotah, who governed the principality in the name of his imprisoned sovereign, with all the prudence and vigour of the ablest of the Mahratta Peishwas, immediately acceded to the terms proposed, blocked up the passes in his country, and furnished a contingent to act with the British troops. A treaty was afterwards concluded with him on the 26th December.

In Bundelcund, Govind Rao Nana had signed a treaty on the 1st November, by which his tribute and military service, transferred from the Peishwa to the British government by the treaty of Poona, was commuted for the cession of a part of the district of Mahabuk, which lay within the British frontier in Bundelcund. Winaek Rao, the chief who had possession of Sagur, refused the proffered terms. The raja of Simpthur and the soobehdar of Jhansee readily accepted the terms of protection and guarantee; and the nabob of Bhopaul not only accepted them, but entered most heartily into the cause. The political arrangements in Bundelcund were conducted by Mr. Wauchope; those already mentioned as concluded with the rajas of Kerowlec and Kotah, and Umeer Khan were framed by Mr. Metcalfe, the resident at Delhi; but that of Umeer Khan, though signed by his agent on the 9th November, was not ratified by himself for some time, as the crafty Patan was then engaged in other negotiations with the Peishwa's agent in his camp, and, like Sindia, was watching the important events which were passing at Poona and Nagpoor.*

* In addition to the authorities quoted for the preceding chapter, I have to acknowledge my obligations to Mr. Prinsep's narrative.

CHAP. XLIX.

A. D. 1817 AND A. D. 1818.

The Peishwa proceeds to Punderpoor—pretended reduction of his military establishment.—Poona auxiliary force.—Sir John Malcolm, political agent of the governor-general, arrives at Poona—interview with the Peishwa at Maholy—is deceived by Bajee Rao—system recommended in consequence.—Advance of the divisions of the Deccan army.—Peishwa's proceedings at Maholy—invests Bappoo Gokla with full powers—plan for corrupting the troops—fidelity of the sepoys—murder of the resident prevented by Gokla.—Festival of the Dussera—alarming appearances at Poona—Peishwa hesitates—arrival of the European regiment.—British troops take up a new position—are suddenly attacked by the Peishwa's army—battle of Khirkee—residency plundered and burnt—violent proceedings of the Peishwa—remonstrances.—Interview between the resident's moonshee and Gokla.—General Smith returns to Poona—flight of the Peishwa.—Poona is occupied—pursuit of the Peishwa—defence of Korygaom.—The Peishwa continues his flight—pursuit taken up by General Pritzer—resumed by General Smith.—Mr. Elphinstone is appointed commissioner, and two divisions of the army of the Deccan placed at his disposal.—Capture of Satara.—The Satara proclamation—new distribution of the force.—General Smith surprises the Peishwa's army at Ashtah—death of Gokla—rescue of the raja of Sataru.—Affairs of Nagpoor—treacherous attack on the British troops—Battle of Seetabuldee—arrival of General Doveton.—Appa Sahib surrenders himself—his guns are stormed and taken—attack on Nagpoor repulsed—Arabs capitulate—operations of General Hardyman, and reduction of the northern districts.—Appa Sahib is reinstated.—Revert to affairs in Malwa and Hindostan.

IN the month of July, as soon as the arrangements resulting from the treaty of Poona were put in a train of adjustment, the
 A. D. 1817. Peishwa left his capital, and proceeded on his annual pilgrimage to the temples of Punderpoor, unaccompanied by the resident, which promised to have a good effect in marking the restoration of confidence on the part of the British government. He immediately reduced his military establishment, chiefly his cavalry ; but it was subsequently discovered that he had given every sillidar seven months' pay, with orders to remain at his village, and to hold himself in readiness to return when called upon, with as many of his friends as he could collect.

The regular battalions raised by the Peishwa were transferred as part of the contingent, which was placed under the direction of the British government, and now termed the Poona auxiliary force ; but at Bajee Rao's particular request, that he might be able to confer the command on Captain Ford, one of the battalions was to be retained in his own pay, and in lieu of it a new corps was to be recruited. Every exertion was made to raise the stipulated number of horse ; but the Peishwa's emissaries opposed the recruiting by every means they could devise. From

Punderpoor, the Peishwa, instead of returning to Poona, proceeded to Maholy, a village near Satara, and a sacred place at the junction of the Yena and Kistna. During his stay there, Sir John Malcolm arrived at Poona, having, on his appointment as political agent to the governor-general, with his usual great activity, visited all the native courts in the Deccan, for the purpose of consulting with the residents previously to entering on the scene of operations in Malwa ; and the Peishwa, on hearing of his arrival, invited him to a conference at Maholy.

In the course of conversation, the Peishwa complained much of the degraded state in which he was left by the late treaty, lamented the loss of that friendship which had hitherto been only productive of benefit, but enlarged on the gratitude which he felt, and must ever feel, for the protection and support he had experienced from the British government. Sir John Malcolm endeavoured to soothe him, explained in a general manner the plans of the Marquis of Hastings for the suppression of the Pindharees, and strongly recommended him to adopt a line of policy calculated to assure the British government of his sincere desire to promote the alliance, and secure its friendship : that the restoration of what was already forfeited he must not expect, but, by pursuing the course now recommended, and aiding the operations with his utmost means, he might rely on the justice and liberality of the governor-general for obtaining considerable acquisitions as a recompense for the fidelity of which he boasted, and which he might now display. The Peishwa's professions were most cordial, and communicated, as usual, with so great an appearance of candour and good sense, that Sir John Malcolm was completely deceived, and returned to Poona in the full conviction that Bajee Rao would now heartily engage in the British cause, and that, by encouraging him to raise troops, and treating him with perfect confidence, he would prove a faithful ally. Mr. Elphinstone, though he expressed his opinions, would not oppose the liberal system recommended by Sir John Malcolm ; but he contemplated and foretold a different result, especially on considering the tempting opportunity which would be afforded by the advance of General Smith's division to the frontier, and the exposed state of the handful of troops at Poona.

The forts of Singurh, Raigurh, and Poorundhur were restored to the Peishwa during the month of August. The excessive heavy rains of this season, prolonged to an unusually late date, delayed the advance of the whole Deccan army. Brigadier-General Smith had transported his division across the Ghore by the 9th October, and by the 20th occupied convenient positions close to the Chandore range of hills, with a view of advancing into Candeish, as soon as it should appear requisite. A battalion of light infantry, with some auxiliary horse, were left between Seroor and Ahmednugur ; one auxiliary battalion was stationed for the protection of the Seroor cantonment, and the Peishwa's own corps, consisting of from 400 to 500 men, remained at Dhapooree, in its first cantonment, a few miles to the north-west of Poona. The company's European regiment from Bombay was to be held in readiness to join the brigade at Poona about the end of October.

The Peishwa did not return to his capital until the end of September. During his stay at Maholy he was most actively engaged in those schemes he had long meditated against the British government ; but, by the advice of Bappoo Gokla, he had determined on changing his plans of covert hostility to an open attack, as soon as he should be prepared. The recommendation of Sir John Malcolm to recruit his army, for the purpose of

aiding in the Pindharee war, afforded an excellent cloak to his designs. Gokla was now the leader of all his measures, and Bajee Rao was induced to give him a formal writing under his own seal, which he confirmed on oath, binding himself to be implicitly directed by his counsel, and investing him with the full powers of his government. This measure seems to have been adopted not merely as a security to Gokla, but as a means of allaying the mistrust which the sildars entertained towards Bajee Rao, and was the condition on which several of the jagheerdars pledged themselves to stand by him. This circumstance, though reported in the country, was not fully ascertained until after the commencement of hostilities. Bappoo Gokla received ten millions of rupees—nearly a million sterling—to assist in the expense of preparation. From the time of his first determination to break with the English, Bajee Rao restored the lands of many of his jagheerdars, and for several years had been endeavouring to render himself more popular with all classes of his subjects. He unfolded his intention of going to war with the English to the raja of Satara; and, whilst he exacted from him and his mother an oath of secrecy and support, he sent them and all their family into strict confinement in Wassota. His recruiting went forward with remarkable activity; his forts also were garrisoned, stored, and repaired; and orders were issued to prepare his fleet. Many Bheels and Ramoosees were engaged in his interest by Trimbukjee Dainglia; and especial missions were despatched to Nagpoor and the camps of Sindia, Holkar, and Umeer Khan; but the schemes which he personally directed were the seduction of the native troops and the assassination of the resident. His plan of corrupting the troops extended even to the European officers; and the agent employed for the latter purpose was Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray, who for many years had resided at Poona, was intimately acquainted with many of the officers, and, since the treaty of Surjee Angengaoim, had received a pension of 1,000 rupees a month from the British government.* Jeswunt Rao had experienced much kindness from Mr. Elphinstone; but at this period, in consequence of some petty intrigues in which he had made an improper use of his name, the resident was obliged to treat him with unusual reserve. Bajee Rao, judging the opportunity favourable, sent for Jeswunt Rao, and, after many promises, exacted an oath of secrecy, and communicated the plan for corrupting the European officers—a commission which Jeswunt Rao, although he well knew its futility, like a true Mahratta readily undertook, upon receiving an advance of 50,000 rupees. So far he kept his oath as to say nothing of these circumstances;† but Jeswunt Rao had a great personal regard for Mr. Elphinstone, and, throughout the rise and progress of the Peishwa's preparations, gave early and constant warning of what might be expected. Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray was the only man of family who at the rupture

* It may be here mentioned that Jeswunt Rao Ghorepuray had a just claim to the fort and valley of Sondoor, held by his brother Khundee Rao Ghorepuray, but which Jeswunt Rao had made over to the Peishwa in exchange for other villages. The British government approved of the transaction, and promised, at the time the transfer was made, to put the Peishwa in possession of Sondoor, but various causes prevented the fulfilment of this promise until the end of October of this year, when Sondoor surrendered to a part of the reserve under Colonel Thomas Munro, detached from the force of Brigadier-General Pritzler for the express purpose.

† Independently of its having been found in the Peishwa's accounts, I became acquainted with the circumstances from an individual then high in Bajee Rao's confidence, whose name it would be improper to publish.

openly espoused the British cause ; but, of all its adherents, none was of so much importance, or rendered himself so eminently useful, as a Bramin named Ballajee Punt Nathoo,* whose vigilance, judgment, fidelity, and firmness at that trying period entitle him to be mentioned in this place.

The reports of corrupting the troops were brought from all quarters ; some of the sepoy indignantly refused what to them were splendid offers ; and others, pretending to acquiesce, communicated the circumstances to their officers ; but the extent of the intrigues could not be ascertained, and they at last became alarming, even to those who knew the fidelity of the Bombay sepoys, from the circumstance of the Peishwa's having many of their families and relations in his power, against whom he commenced a system of persecution, which he threatened to perpetuate if the sepoys refused to desert the British service.

It was the Peishwa's wish, previous to the commencement of hostilities, to invite Mr. Elphinstone to a conference, and murder him ; but this plan was opposed by Gokla, who, though he concurred in that of corrupting the sepoys, and was most sanguine in his belief of its complete success, disdained to perpetrate so base a crime, especially as Mr. Elphinstone had more than once proved himself his friend. But Bajee Rao was unwilling to relinquish a favorite scheme of personal revenge, and proposed to assassinate the resident as he rode out ; or, should that fail, to get Trimbukjee, with a body of Bheels, to endeavour to surprise the residency by night, whilst a simultaneous attack should be made on the cantonment.

The last interview which took place between Mr. Elphinstone and the Peishwa was on the 14th of October, when, although the latter adverted to the loss of territory and reputation he had suffered by the late treaty, he continued to express grateful acknowledgments for the former friendship of the British government. On Mr. Elphinstone's mentioning how anxiously the advance of the troops was desired, Bajee Rao repeated the assurances which he had of late frequently made through his ministers, that his troops should be sent to the frontier to co-operate against the Pindharees immediately after the Dussera.

The festival of the Dussera took place on the 19th October, and was the most splendid military spectacle ever witnessed since the accession of Bajee Rao. Two circumstances were particularly observable on this occasion ; a marked degree of slight towards the resident, and at the moment of the Peishwa's quitting the ground, a large compact mass of horse, under an officer named Naroo Punt Aptey, galloped down, as if they had intended to charge the flank of the British troops, but wheeled off as they came close up. The intention of this manœuvre was to show the sepoys their insignificance when compared to this host of Mahratta spears, and might be supposed to have its effect in

* At my particular request, he wrote a very correct and voluminous history of his own times, in which he quotes his authorities. It was translated for me by my friend Mr. William Richard Morris, of the Bombay civil service, whose valuable assistance I have already acknowledged ; but the original MS. is in possession of its author, who, for various prudential reasons, was desirous of retaining it. Ballajee Punt Nathoo was the carcon of the ill-requited Khundee Rao Rastia, who at his death appointed him guardian to his children. He endeavoured to interest Colonel Close in their behalf, was in the habit of coming much to the residency, and at last attached himself to Mr. Elphinstone, openly embraced the British cause, and proved himself well entitled to the munificent reward which was conferred upon him before Mr. Elphinstone assumed the government of Bombay.

aiding the Peishwa's intrigues. It would have been difficult to convince the Mahrattas, in that vaunting moment, that of the three weak battalions then peaceably and unsuspectingly standing before them, one should, in less than three months, repulse their whole army.

After the Dussera every day became more interesting, and by the 25th parties of troops were coming into Poona from all quarters, by day and by night. General Smith's force was now at a distance, and the European regiment from Bombay could hardly be expected in less than ten days. The position occupied by the brigade almost joined the northern environs of Poona; it had been originally taken up by Sir Arthur Wellesley for the protection of the city, but circumstances were now reversed. Gardens and inclosures, with high prickly-pear hedges, ran in many places within half musket-shot of the lines, affording not only every advantage for the attack of the Arabs and irregulars, but, in case of disaffection amongst the sepoys, every facility to desert. Small parties of horse came out, and encamped round the British cantonment, and in a few days were augmented to large bodies, whilst a strong corps of Gosaeen infantry occupied a position on one of the flanks. The Sungum being at some distance from the cantonment, the Vinchorkur's horse, with some infantry and guns, encamped between the residency and the village of Bambooree: but, besides these preparations, all reports concurred in representing that an immediate attack was meditated.

For several nights the Peishwa and his advisers had deliberated on the advantage of surprising the troops before the arrival of the European regiment; and for this purpose, on the 28th October, their guns were yoked, their horses saddled, and their infantry in readiness. This intelligence was brought to Mr. Elphinstone a little before midnight of the 28th, and for a moment it became a question whether self-defence, under all circumstances, did not require that the attack should be anticipated. It was an hour of anxiety: the British cantonment and the residency were perfectly still, and the inhabitants slept in the complete repose inspired by confidence in that profound peace to which they had been long accustomed; but in the Peishwa's camp, south of the town, all was noise and uproar. Mr. Elphinstone had as yet betrayed no suspicion of the Peishwa's treachery, and, as he now stood listening on the terrace,^a he probably thought that, in thus exposing the troops to be cut off without even the satisfaction of dying with their arms in their hands, he had followed the system of confidence, so strongly recommended, to a culpable extremity: but other motives influenced his conduct at this important moment. He was aware how little faith the other Mahratta princes placed in Bajee Rao, and that Sindia, who knew him well, would hesitate to engage in hostilities until the Peishwa had fairly committed himself. Apprized of the governor-general's secret plans, and his intended movements on Gwalior, which many circumstances might have concurred to postpone, Mr. Elphinstone had studiously avoided every appearance which might affect the negotiations in Hindostan, or, by any preparation and apparent alarm on his part, give Sindia's secret emissaries at Poona reason to believe that

* As I was the only person with Mr. Elphinstone during that night, though I here narrate simply what I saw and heard, some apology to him may be necessary for publishing without his sanction what relates to him personally, but I trust that the occasion is sufficiently interesting to the public, and honorable to him, to authorize my having done so.

war was inevitable. To have sent to the cantonment at that hour would have occasioned considerable stir ; and in the meantime, by the reports of the spies, the Peishwa was evidently deliberating ; the din in the city was dying away ; the night was passing ; and the motives which had hitherto prevented preparation, determined Mr. Elphinstone to defer it some hours longer. Major J. A. Wilson, the officer in command of the European regiment on its march from Bombay, had already been made acquainted with the critical state of affairs, and was hastening forward.

Next morning, however, the officer in command of the brigade at Poona was requested to keep the men ready in their lines, but

October 29. with as little appearance of bustle as possible. At three o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Elphinstone sent a message to the Peishwa, mentioning that his highness's horsemen were crowding in upon the position of the brigade ; that such a mode of encamping had never been practised or permitted by British troops, and therefore the commanding officer confined his men to their cantonment until those of his highness should be withdrawn, lest, by their contiguity, disputes might arise between them. This message was delivered by Captain Ford, and created a great sensation. Gokla recommended that the attack should not be delayed, the Peishwa hesitated, stating that he wished a little more time to make sure of corrupting the sepoys ; the European regiment was still, as he believed, at a great distance, and every hour was adding to his army ; another night was thus wasted in consultation, and at four o'clock of the

October 30. following afternoon, the European regiment by great exertions marched into the cantonment. Mr. Elphinstone now determined on removing the troops from their present very bad position to another in many respects more eligible, at the village of Khirkee, four miles distant, which had been early pointed out by General Smith as the proper one to be occupied in case of an apprehended rupture. The

November 1. troops accordingly took up their ground at Khirkee on the 1st November, and the residency being close to the town, 250 men were sent for its protection. The Peishwa was apprized of the intended movement ; but his army supposed that the British troops had withdrawn from fear, and was much encouraged in consequence. The cantonment was plundered ; an officer,* on his route to Bombay, was attacked, wounded, and robbed in open day ; the language of the Peishwa's ministers was that of perfect slight ; his troops everywhere began to insult individuals as they passed ; and they continued to push forward their parties as if in defiance. They proposed forming a camp betwixt the old cantonment and the new position, and a party of horse moved down for the purpose. A second message was therefore sent to the Peishwa, begging that the motives of the movement might not be misconstrued ; for, if the British troops were pressed upon as in the old position, those of his highness must be treated as enemies. The Peishwa now believed, from the reports of his emissaries, that the sepoys were completely seduced.†

November 4. On the 4th November, Moro Dixit, the minister who had formed an attachment to Major Ford,

* Lieutenant Shaw. Veeram Sing, a horseman of Bajee Rao's personal retinue, was the individual who spared him.

† Many of the sepoys behaved with admirable fidelity ; one native officer, Jemadar Shaik Hoosein, of the 2nd battalion 6th regiment, on being tampered with, encouraged the overtures, by the advice of his adjutant, Lieutenant Robert Billamore, who was instructed on the subject. The Peishwa sent for the jemadar, made him great promises, and desired a carcoon to give him 10,000 rupees, but the latter gave the

and was anxious to save him, communicated this circumstance, and that his master was determined to cut off the British detachment without sparing a man.* He advised him to stand neuter, when his property should be spared and his family protected; but on Captain Ford's telling him he would immediately join his countrymen, he took an affectionate leave of him, promising, at all events, that he would do his best to befriend his family; but as there was, he observed, no saying what turn the war might ultimately take, he exacted a like promise from Captain Ford, which was readily granted. Until this communication was made, Captain Ford, though in daily intercourse with the city, and made acquainted with the circumstances by Mr. Elphinstone, was perfectly confident that the Peishwa had no intention of going to war, and his astonishment and alarm were proportionally great. The Peishwa's reason for still wishing to procrastinate was the expected arrival of the Putwurdhuns and Appa Dessaye Nepankur; matters, however, were brought to a crisis before they could join his army. General Smith, who continued in the position already described, on hearing what had taken place, was prepared to expect a rupture; and therefore, without waiting for orders from Sir Thomas Hislop, concentrated his force at Phooltamba, on the Godavery, and ordered the light battalion to fall back to Seroor; it was also settled between him and the resident that, in case the communication were interrupted, the general might conclude that the troops at Poona were attacked.

November 3. On the 3rd November Mr. Elphinstone directed the light battalion and a party of auxiliary horse, stationed at Seroor, to move to Poona. As soon as the news of these arrangements reached the Peishwa, he determined to delay the attack no longer. His preparations began about seven o'clock on the morning of the

5th; but in the early part of the day he sent out several messages calculated to lull the resident's suspicions; such as, that his troops were alarmed by hearing that those at Khirkee were under arms; that he was about to perform a religious ceremony at the temple of Parbuttee, and that the troops were drawn out, in honor of the occasion, to form a street as he passed. In the afternoon, when all was in readiness, the whole of his principal officers having assembled at his palace, Wittoojee Gaskwar, a personal servant of the Peishwa, was despatched to Mr. Elphinstone, by Gokla's advice, to inform him that the assembly of troops at Poona was very offensive to the Peishwa; to desire him to send away the European regiment, to reduce the native brigade to its usual strength, when it must occupy a position which the Peishwa would point out, and that if these demands were not complied with, he could withdraw from Poona and never return. Mr. Elphinstone denied the Peishwa's right to require the removal of the European regiment, explained the reason of his having called in the light battalion, and recommended that the Peishwa should send his troops to the frontier as he had promised, in which case all cause of complaint would be removed: there was a good deal more passed, as the conversation on the part of the messenger was intended to engage as

jemadar one-half, and kept the other himself. The jemadar brought the money to his officer in a bag of rice, just before hostilities commenced.

* Dr. Coats and Captain Ford, the latter only if he stood neutral, were to be the sole exceptions. Dr. Coats had attended the Peishwa in an illness, had gratuitously performed many cures amongst the people of the country, and had spread vaccination for many miles around; the anecdote proves that Bajee Rao was not wholly devoid of gratitude.

much attention as possible ; but he at last withdrew, warning the resident of the bad consequences of his refusal. In the meantime the Peishwa's officers at the palace were despatched to their troops ; Bajee Rao in person proceeded to the Parbuttee,* and Wittoojee Gaekwar had scarcely quitted the residency when intelligence was brought that the army was moving out on the west side of the city. There was a momentary consultation about defending the residency, but it was instantly abandoned as impracticable, and it was determined to retire to Khirkee, for which purpose the nature of the ground afforded great facility. The river Moola betwixt the Sungum and the village of Khirkee forms two curves like the letter S inverted. The residency and the village were both on the same side of the river, but at the former there was a ford, and near the latter a bridge ; so that the party, by crossing at the ford, had the river between them and the Peishwa's troops the greater part of the way. From the residency no part of the Mahratta army was visible excepting bodies of infantry, which were assembling along the tops of the adjoining heights, with the intention of cutting off the residency from the camp, and, having this object in view, they did not molest individuals. On ascending one of the eminences on which they were forming, the plain beneath presented at that moment a most imposing spectacle. This plain, then covered with grain, terminates on the west by a range of small hills, while on the east it is bounded by the city of Poona, and the small hills already partially occupied by the infantry. A mass of cavalry covered nearly the whole extent of it, and towards the city endless streams of horsemen were pouring from every avenue.†

Mr. Elphinstone had personally reconnoitred the ground in front of the village of Khirkee, and ascertained that there was a ford between that village and Dhapooree, which, although difficult, was practicable for six-pounders, three of which, manned by native artillerymen, belonged to the auxiliary force, and was attached to Captain Ford's corps. It had been arranged, in case of an attack, that Captain Ford was to join the brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Burr ; and Mr. Elphinstone had been at pains to explain to all concerned the advantage of always acting on the offensive against Mahrattas. When the party was fording at the residency, a messenger was despatched to warn the troops of the approach of the enemy. Lieutenant-Colonel Burr, the officer in command, wished to have acted on the defensive ; but as the message required him to move down and attack the Peishwa's army, he immediately sent the battalion companies of the 2nd battalion 6th regiment to protect the stores, ammunition, and followers in the village of Khirkee, left his camp standing, and instantly marched down by the high road for about a mile ; then, wheeling to the right, he moved in the direction of Dhapooree, to facilitate the junction of Captain Ford's corps, and bring his front parallel to that of the enemy. In a few minutes the expected corps was seen approaching ; the resident's party had joined, and Colonel Burr advanced to the attack. The Mahrattas, who

* Situated on a hill on the south side of Poona, and already mentioned.

† Those only who have witnessed the Bore in the Gulf of Cambay, and have seen in perfection the approach of that roaring tide, can form the exact idea presented to the author at sight of the Peishwa's army. It was towards the afternoon of a very sultry day ; there was a dead calm, and no sound was heard except the rushing, the trampling and neighing of the horses, and the rumbling of the gun-wheels. The effect was heightened by seeing the peaceful peasantry flying from their work in the fields, the bullocks breaking from their yokes, the wild antelopes startled from sleep, bounding off, and then turning for a moment to gaze on this tremendous inundation, which swept all before it, levelled the hedges and standing corn, and completely overwhelmed every ordinary barrier as it moved.

had sent on their skirmishers, some of whom had already suffered from the fire of the light infantry, were surprised by this forward movement in troops whom they had been encouraged to believe were already spiritless ; and a damp, which had been spreading over the whole army by the accidental breaking of the staff of the Juree Putka before they left the city, was now much increased. Gokla, with the true spirit of a soldier, was riding from rank to rank, animating, encouraging, and taunting as he thought most effectual ; but the Peishwa's heart failed him, and, after the troops had advanced, he sent a message to Gokla, desiring him " to be sure not to fire the first gun." At this moment the British troops were halted, their guns were unlimbering,—it was the pause of preparation and of anxiety on both sides ; but Gokla, observing the messenger from the Peishwa, and suspecting the nature of his errand, instantly commenced the attack by opening a battery of nine guns, detaching a strong corps of rocket-camels to the right, and pushing forward his cavalry to the right and left. The British troops were soon nearly surrounded by horse ; but the Mahratta infantry, owing to this rapid advance, were left considerably in the rear, except a regular battalion under a Portuguese, named De Pento, which had marched by a shorter route, concealed for a time under cover of the enclosures, and were now forming, with apparent steadiness, immediately in front of the 1st battalion 7th regiment, and the grenadiers of the 2nd battalion 6th : no sooner, however, were their red coats and colours exposed to view of the English sepoys, than the latter, with one accord, pushed forward to close, and in their eagerness got detached from the rest of the line. Gokla, hoping that they might either be disposed to come over, or that he might be able to take advantage of their impetuosity, prepared a select body of 6,000 horse, which, accompanied by the Juree Putka, and headed by several persons of distinction, had been held in reserve near his left, and were now ordered to charge.* The Mahratta guns ceased firing to let them pass ; and they came down at speed, in a diagonal direction across the British front. Giving their fire, and receiving that of the line, they rode right at the 7th. Colonel Burr took his post with the colours of that corps ; it had long been his own battalion, he had " formed and led" it for many years ; he was then suffering under a severe and incurable malady,† but he showed his wonted coolness and firmness in this moment of peril. He was the first to perceive the moving mass : he had just time to stop the pursuit of De Pento's battalion, already routed, and to call to the men, who could not be dressed in line, to reserve their fire, and prove themselves worthy of all his care. Fortunately there was a deep slough, of which neither party were aware, immediately in front of the British left. The foremost of the horses rolled over, and many, before they could be pulled up, tumbled over those in front ; the fire, hitherto reserved, was now given with great effect, numbers fell, the confusion became extreme, and the force of the charge was completely checked : a very small proportion came in contact with the bayonets, a few continued the attack in the rear, but

* Naroo Punt Apty, Mahdoo Rao Rastia, and Aba Poorundhuree were all in this charge. Gokla advanced a considerable distance with them, until his horse was wounded : he told Naroo Punt that most of the sepoys were friendly, and would fire over his head.

† Colonel Burr had lost the use of his side from a paralytic stroke, and both mind and body were impaired, but he was foremost in the post of honor. On this occasion, two of his attendants were shot by his side, his horse's head was grazed by a ball, and another went through his hat.

many turned back ; some galloped round the left as if to plunder the camp, but they were driven off by a few shots from two iron guns at Khirkee, and the sepoys had nearly repulsed the attack before a company of Europeans could arrive to their support. This failure completely disconcerted the Mahrattas ; they began to drive off their guns ; their infantry retired from the distant position they occupied, and upon the advance of the British line the whole field was cleared. The brigade returned to its position at Khirkee after night-fall, and the light battalion and auxiliary horse joined it next morning. The report of their arrival, and the effect of the forward movement, deterred Gokla from renewing the attack. The Mahrattas in Captain Ford's battalion deserted, and a part of the newly-raised auxiliary horse were, at their own desire, permitted to quit the British camp ; but not one sepoy of the regular service left his colours. The number of the British troops engaged at the affair of Khirkee, including Captain Ford's battalion, was 2,800 rank and file, of whom about 800 were Europeans. Their loss was comparatively trifling, amounting only to 86 men in killed and wounded, 50 of whom were of the sepoys on the left. The Mahratta army consisted of 18,000 horse and 8,000 foot with 14 guns.* They suffered considerably, having lost 500 men in killed and wounded ; and though the proportion of horses killed on the spot was inconsiderable, a very great number were disabled. Amongst the sufferers was the minister Moro Dixit, who, by rather a strange fatality, was mortally wounded by a grape shot from one of the guns attached to the battalion of his friend Captain Ford.

Hostilities were no sooner commenced than the ferocious and vindictive character of Bajee Rao's previous orders became apparent from the proceedings in every direction, probably before he had time to stop them. The residency was plundered and burnt, and of the resident's library and private apartment not one stone was left upon another ; the families and followers of the troops who fell into the hands of the Mahrattas were robbed, beaten, and frequently mutilated ; the gardens were destroyed, the trees were torn from the roots, and the graves were dug up. An engineer officer on survey was attacked and killed ; two brothers, of the name of Vaughan, one of them a captain in the Madras army, were taken while travelling between Bombay and Poona, near the village of Tullygaom, and though they made no resistance, were most barbarously hanged under the superintendence of a Bramin, named Babjee Punt Gokla.† These atrocities, excepting the plunder of the adherents and servants of the British government, were not perpetrated under Bappoo Gokla's sanction ; but as he had been intrusted with the entire powers of the state, Mr. Elphinstone took the first opportunity of intimating to him that any individual, however exalted his rank, who might order the death of a British prisoner, should answer for it in his own person.

Two officers, Cornets Hunter and Morrison, of the Madras establishment, on the route from Hyderabad to Poona with a small escort, were attacked when they approached the latter place, and after a manful resistance, being compelled to surrender, they were confined in a hill-fort ; some small parties who stood on the defensive in various situations, and surrendered

* This number is given from the actual returns, and does not include 5,000 horse and 2,000 foot stationed with the Peishwa at Parbuttee, so that Bajee Rao had already collected 83,000 men at Poona.

† This person is now a prisoner, in a wooden cage, in the fort of Singurh. Bajee Rao disavowed the murder of the Vaughans, but acknowledged that the residency was destroyed by his orders.

on terms, were permitted to join the British camp. Amongst this number was the resident's moonshee, who, having a party of Arabs in his pay, defended his house in the city for several days, until Gokla interposed, and sent for him. During their interview, at which several persons were present, Gokla showed him the Peishwa's paper investing him with the full powers of his government, and, after some conversation, observed — "I have given you protection because your master was an old friend of mine; we are now enemies; the trial we have already had" (alluding to the action of the 5th) "has not turned out as I expected, but tell him we shall persevere; we may have taken our shrouds about our heads, but we are determined to die with our swords in our hands."

As soon as General Smith found the communication cut off, he advanced on Poona. From the time his division quitted Seroor, he was followed by flying parties of Mahrattas, who, owing to his want of cavalry, harassed

Nov. 13—15. his march. He arrived on the evening of the 13th, and preparations were made to attack the Peishwa before daylight of the 15th. His army, having obtained a considerable addition by the junction of most of the southern jagheerdars, had come out a few days

November 10. before, and encamped with its left on the late cantonment of the British troops, and its right stretching along the Hyderabad road for several miles. The intended attack, however, on the morning of the 15th, was postponed by General Smith in consequence of unforeseen difficulties at the ford. About sunset on the evening of the 16th an advanced brigade was ordered to cross the ford, and take up a position to the east of the Peishwa's army, at the village of Ghorepuray, for the purpose of co-operating in an intended attack on the ensuing morning: it was opposed by a body of the Peishwa's infantry, supported by parties of horse and two guns; but having succeeded in getting to its station, though with the loss of 84 men in killed and wounded, it was no longer molested during the night. In the morning, when General Smith moved towards the camp, he found it abandoned, and that the Peishwa had fled towards Satara. During the day the city was surrendered, and the greatest care being taken on this, as on every occasion, by General Smith for the protection of the peaceable part of the community, order and tranquillity were soon re-established. General Smith remained at Poona for five days, during which time the communication with Bombay was opened, and a party being detached for the purpose, succeeded in capturing several guns in the neighbourhood of the fort of Singurh. Some of the inhabitants of Poona, who fled, as usual, with their property towards the hill-forts, were sufferers on this occasion, as a great quantity of baggage was taken at the same time with the guns, and became the booty of the army.

On the 22nd November, General Smith, having been joined by a regiment of native cavalry, commenced pursuing the Peishwa, who remained at Maholy; and, during his stay there, sent a party to Wassota, for the purpose of bringing the raja of Satara, his mother, and brothers to his camp, but he had quitted Maholy prior to the raja's arrival, owing to the approach of General Smith, before whom he fled to Punderpoor, and thence, turning up the bank of the Beema, he continued his flight until he ascended the Lag Ghaut, north of Joonere, where he occupied a position at Banunwaree. This part of the country is exceedingly strong, with mountains on all sides, and the passes were stockaded by Trimbukjee Dainglia, who here joined the Peishwa with a reinforcement. The raja and his family were brought into his camp whilst on the route from Punderpoor. General

Smith followed the Peishwa until he was past Poona, when he proceeded to Seroor : he there deposited his battering train and heavy baggage, and left a battalion of native infantry and a body of auxiliary horse to reinforce the station ; he then proceeded by Ahmednugur down the Nimbadevra Ghaut, and up the bank of Paira to Sungumnere. Finding he had got to the northward of the Peishwa, he ascended the Wursura Ghaut, and here he divided his force, sending back a part by Ahmednugur, and, with a light division, continuing the pursuit of the Peishwa, who fled to the southward, as soon as he heard of General Smith's arrival at Sungumnere, giving out that he intended to attack Poona. Great exertions were, therefore, made to come up with him ; but, in the meantime, the most remarkable event of the war took place from the following circumstances. General Pritzler, it must be premised, was at this time advancing with the reserve division of the Deccan army from Adonee towards Punderpoor, for the purpose of co-operating in the pursuit of the Peishwa, and Smith, deeming it probable that he should get to the northward of the Peishwa, as in fact he did, and that the Mahratta army, afraid of being driven back upon Pritzler, might descend into the Concan, where there was a small force fitted out by the Bombay government, under Lieutenant-Colonel Prother, employed in reducing the country, and which might thus be exposed to be cut off, it became necessary to provide against such an event. Accordingly Lieutenant-Colonel Burr, who was stationed at Poona, was directed, in case he should have positive information that the Peishwa had descended into the Concan, to detach the 2nd battalion 6th regiment from his own immediate command, to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Prother ; and in that case he was authorized to call in to Poona the 2nd battalion 1st regiment, lately left by General Smith to reinforce the cantonment at Seroor. But when the Peishwa commenced his flight to the southward, Colonel Burr, hearing that he meditated an attack on Poona, sent off an express for the 2nd battalion 1st regiment to reinforce himself.

The battalion, on receipt of this application, commenced its march from Seroor on the last day of the year, at eight o'clock in the evening. It consisted of little more than 500 rank and file, and was supported by two six-pounders, well manned by 24 Europeans of the Madras artillery, under a sergeant and a lieutenant. It was also accompanied by 300 of the newly-raised irregular horse, and the whole

were under the command of Captain Francis Staunton. Jan. 1, 1818. Having marched all night, by ten o'clock on the morning of New Year's Day, Captain Staunton reached the high ground above the village of Korygaom, on the Beema, where he beheld the whole of the Mahratta horse, consisting of about 25,000, on the opposite side of the river. He continued his march towards the bank, and the Peishwa's troops believed that he intended to ford, but as soon as he had gained the neighbourhood of the village, he immediately took post in it. Korygaom is a moderate sized village, immediately overhanging the steep bank of the Beema ; but owing to the immense beds of the Indian rivers, which are never filled except during the rains, the channel occupied but a small part of the space between the banks, so that the village was 50 or 60 yards from the water. There is a mud wall which, at one time, probably surrounded the village, but it is now full of large breaches on the side next the river, and on the east it is completely open.* Most of the

* I write this description of the village from recollection ; I have not seen it for seven or eight years : not indeed since the morning after Captain Staunton

Peishwa's infantry, in number about 5,000, had gone on in advance towards the Bhore Ghaut, east of Poona; but on first descriing the battalion, immediate orders were sent to recal them. As soon as they arrived, three bodies of 600 choice men in each, consisting of Arabs, Gosaeens, and regular infantry, mixed together, advanced on three different points, under cover of the bank of the river, and supported by two guns, to storm the village. A continued shower of rockets was at the same time poured into it, and many of the houses were set on fire. Captain Staunton had selected a commanding position for the guns; but unfortunately the interior of the village was not sufficiently reconnoitred, as there was a strong square enclosure commanding most of the streets, of which the enemy obtained possession, and whence they could not be dislodged. The village was immediately surrounded by horse and foot, and the storming party was supported by fresh troops. All access to the river was speedily cut off; Captain Staunton was destitute of provisions, and this detachment, already fatigued from want of rest and a long night march, now under a burning sun, without food or water, began a struggle as trying as ever was maintained by the British in India. Every foot of ground was disputed, several streets were taken and re-taken, but more than half the European officers being wounded, the Arabs made themselves masters of a small temple, towards the east side of the village, generally used as a choultry, where three of the officers were lying wounded. Assistant-Surgeon Wingate, one of their number, got up, and went out, but was immediately stabbed by the Arabs, and his body cruelly mangled. Lieutenant Swanston, who had two severe wounds, had the presence of mind to advise his remaining companion to suffer the Arabs to rifle them unresistingly, which they did, but committed no further violence; and, in the meantime, a party of the battalion, under Lieutenant Jones and Assistant-Surgeon Wyllie, arrived to their rescue, re-took the choultry, avenged the death of Mr. Wingate, and carried their companions to a place of greater safety. The sufferings of the wounded became extreme from thirst; and the men who continued to conflict were fainting, or nearly frantic, from the dreadful privation of water. Some of the artillerymen, all of whom bore a very conspicuous part in this glorious defence, proposed to Captain Staunton that they should surrender if terms could be obtained. His determined refusal did not satisfy them, but Lieutenant Chisholm, their officer, being killed, the enemy, encouraged by this circumstance, rushed upon one of the guns and took it. Lieutenant Thomas Pattinson, adjutant of the battalion, lying mortally wounded, being shot through the body, no sooner heard that the gun was taken, than, getting up, he called to the grenadiers "once more to follow him," and, seizing a musket by the muzzle, rushed into the middle of the Arabs, striking them down right and left,* until a second ball through his body completely disabled him. Lieutenant Pattinson had been nobly seconded; the sepoys, thus led, were irresistible, the gun was re-taken, and the dead Arabs, literally lying above each other, proved how desperately it had been defended. The body of Lieutenant Chisholm was found by his gun with

evacuated it, when though I carefully examined that scene of recent and desperate conflict, I at that time had no intention of publishing an account of it.

* Lieutenant Pattinson was a very powerful man, being 6 feet 7 inches in height; nothing could exceed his heroic conduct on the memorable occasion where he received his wounds; he did not expire until the regiment reached Seroor, but unfortunately, in his last moments, he laboured under an impression that his corps had been defeated, which caused him great distress.

the head out off ; Captain Staunton judiciously took advantage of the circumstance by pointing it out to the men, and telling them "such was the way all would be served, who fell dead or alive into the hands of the Mahrattas," on which they declared "they would die to a man," and the conflict was resumed by all with the most determined valour. Captain Staunton, Lieutenant Jones, and Assistant-Surgeon Wyllie were the only officers who remained fit for duty, and manfully persevered in continuing the defence. Their situation towards evening was very hopeless ; Captain Staunton had apprized Colonel Burr of the difficulties he laboured under, and an unavailing attempt from Poona had been made for his relief. As the night fell, however, the vigour of the attack relaxed, and the men were able to procure a supply of water. By nine o'clock at night the firing ceased, and the village was evacuated by the Peishwa's troops.* Next morning

January 2. the Mahratta army was still hovering round the village, and Captain Staunton opened his guns upon them as soon as he could see. They appeared to draw off in the direction of Poona ; but they had heard of General Smith's approach, who was hastening forward with a very small force, in hopes that the Peishwa might be encouraged to make a stand ; but Captain Staunton, not knowing of General Smith's advance, and having reason to believe the enemy was in wait for him on the route to Poona, gave out that it was his intention to proceed thither. As soon as it was dark, however, taking as many of the wounded with him as he could carry, he moved out of the village at first in the direction of Poona, then, changing his route, he retreated to Seroor, where he arrived next morning, with the loss of 175 men killed and wounded, of whom 20 were of the small detachment of artillery. Besides these, about one-third of the auxiliary horse were killed, wounded, and missing.† The Mahrattas lost 500 or 600 men, and have the generosity, on all occasions, to do justice to the heroic defenders of Korygaom. During the conflict the Peishwa sat on a rising ground on the opposite side of the river, about two miles distant. Gokla, Appa Dessaye, and Trimbukjee directed the attacks, and at one time Trimbukjee entered the village. Bajee Rao frequently expressed his impatience, and asked his commanders "where were now their boasts of defeating the English when they could not overcome one battalion ?" The raja of Satara was with the Peishwa, and having put up an affabgeer, or screen from the sun, the latter begged he would put it down, "otherwise the English would send a cannon-ball through it."

After leaving Korygaom, the Peishwa fled towards the Carnatic, fol-

* To commemorate this glorious defence, a monument was erected by government, recording the names of those who fell ; the corps was made grenadiers, as their 1st battalion had been for the defence of Mangalore, and "*Mangalore and Korygaom*" became the animating motto of the regiment.

† There were eight European officers on this memorable defence.

2ND BATTALION 1ST REGIMENT.

Captain Staunton.

Lieutenant and Adjutant Pattinson, died of his wounds.

Lieutenant Conellan, wounded.

Lieutenant Jones.

Assistant-Surgeon Wingate, killed.

ARTILLERY.

Lieutenant Chisholm, killed.

Assistant-Surgeon Wyllie.

AUXILIARY HORSE.

Lieutenant Swanston, wounded.

lowed by General Pritzler, who took up the pursuit near the Salpee Ghaut. On Bajee Rao's arrival on the Gutpurba, he was surprised to find a part of the country already in possession of the British government. It appeared that Brigadier-General Munro, who had been originally sent up by the Madras government as commissioner to receive charge of the districts in the Carnatic, ceded by the treaty of Poona in June 1817, had collected a few regulars in addition to his own escort, and, by his personal influence and experience, had raised the native population, who were averse to the Mahrattas, as they had been to Tippoo, and eagerly desired a change of government.

The Peishwa, in pursuing the southern route, was supposed to have some hope of being joined by the raja of Mysore; but, disappointed in this respect, and alarmed at the progress of General Munro, he turned suddenly round, passed General Pritzler, and re-crossed the Kistna, where General Smith, having arrived with the light division, pressed him very hard, until he got down the Salpee Ghaut, and went off in the direction of Sholapoor. General Smith's division was then

halted for the purpose of allowing General Pritzler to join, in order to form a new distribution of the force, according to a plan proposed by Mr. Elphinstone, who now took upon him the direction of affairs, by authority received from the governor-general.

When the Marquis of Hastings heard of the Peishwa's treachery, super-added to the numerous proofs of his insidious and persevering intrigues against the British government, he determined to put an end to the dynasty of his family, and to annex his dominions to the company's territory, merely reserving a small tract, sufficient for the comfort and dignity of the imprisoned raja of Satara, which might serve as a counterpoise to the remaining influence of the Bramins, conciliate the Mahratta nation, and leave an opening for the employment of many persons, in their own way, whom it would have been expensive to subsist, and who could not obtain a livelihood under the English administration. Instructions to this effect were transmitted to Mr. Elphinstone, vesting him with full powers as sole commissioner for the settlement of the territory to be conquered. The 4th and 6th divisions of the Deccan army, under Generals Smith and Pritzler, were withdrawn from Sir Thomas Hislop's control, and placed at the disposal of the commissioner. These instructions were received by Mr. Elphinstone early in January, but various reasons induced him to reserve their promulgation for a short period, until it could be done under impressions more favourable to the British cause than existed at the moment; and he then followed up, in a manner which should convince the Mahratta nation of the advantages of submission, and the hopelessness of resistance. Hitherto the pursuit of the Peishwa had been productive of nothing important, excepting the political effect of holding him up as a fugitive. Whenever Bajee Rao was pressed, Gokla, with all the light troops, hovered round the pursuing divisions, firing long shots with their matchlocks, throwing rockets in favourable situations, and cutting off cattle and baggage. Some skirmishes took place in consequence, and the Mahrattas frequently suffered from the shrapnell shells of the horse artillery; but these affairs were attended with no advantageous result to either party.

The two divisions having united at Rehmutpoor, the whole force, under the command of General Smith, proceeded to Satara, which February 7. it was thought advisable to reduce, on account of the importance attached to the possession of that fortress in the minds of the

Mahratta people. It scarcely made any resistance, and was surrendered on the evening of the 10th February, when, the British colours were

February 10. hoisted; but next day they were hauled down, and the Bhugwa Jenda, or standard of Sivajee and his descendants, was, with due forms, hoisted in its place. A manifesto was at the same time published by the commissioner, in the name of the British government, succinctly representing the whole conduct of Bajee Rao, and stating the reasons of its being deemed incumbent on the British to deprive him of public authority; to exclude him and his family from all concern in Deccan affairs; to take possession of his territory, and to govern the whole under the authority of the company, excepting a small tract to be reserved for the raja of Satara. It was declared that there should be no interference with the tenets of any religious sect; that all *wutuns*, enam lands, established pensions, and annual allowances should be respected and continued, provided the owners withdrew from the service of Bajee Rao, and retired to their habitations in two months from that date. Farming of revenue was to be abolished, and the hereditary district and village officers were called upon to reserve the revenue, otherwise they would be compelled to make good the payments; and should they or any other wutundars afford aid or pay money to the deposed Peishwa, their *wutuns* were declared liable to confiscation. No notice was taken of jagheers, as it was soon understood they would be kept or restored according to the readiness with which the holders under the Peishwa should tender their allegiance to the new government, and, whilst retained, they became a powerful security for the fidelity of the claimants. The reader who has perused the foregoing pages with attention will be able to judge of the merits of this proclamation, and how well it was calculated to the end in view, especially when seconded by strenuous and persevering exertions on the part of the military.

A new distribution of the two divisions of the army was immediately formed—one for the purpose of pursuing Bajee Rao, the other for besieging his forts. General Smith chose the former, as promising the most active service, and marched with two regiments of cavalry, a squadron of the 22nd dragoons, 1,200 auxiliary horse, and 2,500 infantry, in quest of the Peishwa. General Pritzler, in the meantime, attacked the strong hill-forts immediately south of Poona, whilst a small force, originally sent back by Sir Thomas Hislop, under Lieutenant-Colonel Deacon, to occupy the intended position of the 44th division in Candesh, had moved down at Mr. Elphinstone's request, and laid siege to Chakun. Other divisions were likewise occupying the country; General Munro in the Carnatic was eminently successful; the small force of Lieutenant-Colonel Prother, already mentioned, had taken many forts in the Concan; and another small detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Kennedy, likewise fitted out by the exertions of Sir Evan Nepean, governor of Bombay, had commenced operations in the Concan, south of Banqote.

Whilst the new arrangement of the divisions and the reduction of Satara were in progress, Bajee Rao remained in the neighbourhood of Sholapoor, where he exacted large sums of money from the carcoon of the late Sewdasheo Bhow Mankesir. That minister died at Poona a short time before the breaking out of the war, and with the general respect of all parties. During the short time he was employed after the surrender of Trimbukjee, he honorably endeavoured to convince Bajee Rao of the futility and wickedness of the course he meditated; and that there now

was neither honor nor safety to the Mahratta nation, excepting by a faithful adherence to that alliance, which, when contracted, might, in his opinion, have been avoided. The Peishwa deceived him respecting the secret insurrection; and though so well acquainted with Bajee Rao's character, when the facts were forced upon his conviction, he gave vent to expressions of indignation and disgust at the unparalleled deceit and treachery of his master.

At Sholapoor Bajee Rao was joined by a body of horse from Nagpoor under Gunput Rao, to whom we shall hereafter revert. In the meantime General Smith was marching towards the Mahratta army; the Peishwa decamped and moved to the westward, as Gokla conceived he should have no difficulty in passing the British detachment, and avoiding them or not

February 19. as he thought proper. On the 19th General Smith arrived at Yellapoor; he heard that the Peishwa was on the route from Sholapoor towards Punderpoor. He therefore marched all that night in hopes of coming upon him; but before morning he learnt that he had gone to the northward, and was encamped at Ashtah. Taking, therefore, the cavalry and horse artillery, desiring the remainder to follow as expeditiously as they could, General Smith pushed forward, and came in sight of the Mahrattas about half-past eight, just as they were moving off the ground. The Peishwa sent Gokla a taunting message for having thus allowed the army to be surprised, to which the latter replied that he might rest assured his rear should be guarded. Gokla, having desired Appa Dessaye Nepankur, who was at the head of about 4,000 men, to support him, waited with 500 horse for the approach of the cavalry, who were then advancing in three columns, the dragoons being in the centre, the 7th on the right, and the 2nd regiment on the left. Gokla's friends advised him to retire for support, and return better prepared to meet them; but to this he objected, and merely replied, "whatever is to be done, must be done here." As the British troops came near, the Mahrattas fired a volley with little effect; and 300 of them, with Gokla at their head, came galloping down diagonally across the front, wheeled suddenly round on the flank of the 7th regiment of cavalry, as they were forming after crossing a ravine, and, driving upon them with their spears, occasioned considerable confusion; but Captain Dawes, of the 22nd dragoons, instantly throwing back a troop of his men, charged along the rear of the 7th, and, dashing into the middle of the Mahrattas, in a few minutes dispersed them in flight. Gokla fell on this occasion by the hand of a dragoon; and, though supposed to have been wounded before he came in contact with his antagonist, fought bravely to the last, literally dying, as he had pledged himself, with his sword in his hand. Govind Rao Ghorepuray and Anund Rao Babur, both persons of distinction, were killed with him. The Mahrattas were pursued for some miles; several elephants, a quantity of baggage, and a few horses were taken; but the most important result was the capture of the raja of Satara, with his mother and brothers, who on this occasion, to their great joy, were rescued from the power of Bajee Rao, and the thralldom of the Concanee Bramins. Prior to this event, the Mahrattas had resolved to stand a general action, as soon as Ramdeen, a partizan of Holkar's, should arrive. For this purpose the Peishwa's infantry and guns, before left at Nepanee, had arrived at Kurar; but the unexpected attack of General Smith and the death of Gokla completely disconcerted their arrangements. The affair of Ashtah, trifling as it was, had a very material effect in hastening the termination of the war, and

these advantages were purchased with the loss of only one man killed, and 18 or 20 wounded; amongst the latter was General Smith. The Mahrattas, in the charge and during the pursuit, lost about 100 men. The raja of Satara, having been made over to the

care of Mr. Elphinstone, General Smith proceeded to Seroor, and thence resumed the pursuit. Bajee Rao remained for a time at Kopergaom, where he was joined by the expected

March 12. Ramdeen, and deserted by his lukewarm friends the Putwurdhuns. He next continued his route towards Chandore, intending ultimately to proceed to Nagpoor, where events, as interesting as those already detailed, had taken place before this period.

We left Appa Sahib in February 1817 established in the regency. It was not discovered at the time that he had been accessory to the death of the Raja Pursajee; and he was therefore proclaimed his successor by the name of Moodajee Bhonslay. The emissaries of the Peishwa were so successful at Nagpoor that, until the feigned insurrection, set up by Bajee Rao under Trimbukjee, was checked, Appa Sahib had pledged himself to take part in the warfare begun in that insidious manner; but, on hearing of the Peishwa's submission, he completely changed his conduct, and, although he continued in constant correspondence with Poona, the resident did not anticipate any more serious departure from the terms of his alliance, until it was known that the Peishwa had attacked the British troops. Upon this intelligence Appa Sahib secretly determined to make common cause with him, and immediately exerted himself, by every means in his power, to augment his military establishment. Mr. Jenkins, on perceiving these preparations, sent to Colonel Adams, requesting that a brigade of his division might be left to the southward of the Nerbuddah, and that a part of it should be held ready to march on Nagpoor. This application, however, was merely precautionary; Appa Sahib betrayed no other indication of hostile designs; on the contrary, he was profuse in his professions of friendship, and inveighed bitterly against the conduct of Bajee Rao in treacherously attacking the English: but on the night of

November 24. the 24th November he sent to inform Mr. Jenkins that a khillut had arrived for him from the Peishwa, who had also sent him a Juree Putka, and conferred on him the title of Senaputtee; that he intended to go in state to his camp to receive these honors next day, and invited the resident to be present at the ceremony. Mr. Jenkins' remonstrances against such a proceeding were, of course, of no avail; the insignia were received, and Appa Sahib's troops immediately took up positions in the vicinity of the residency, so threatening that Mr. Jenkins was induced to call in the brigade from its cantonment, about three miles westward of the city. Next day appearances were so

November 26. hostile that preparations for defending the residency became necessary, and an express was despatched to call in the 2nd division of the Deccan army, under General Doveton. The whole force at Nagpoor consisted of a brigade of two battalions of Madras native infantry, the 1st battalion 20th regiment, and 1st battalion 24th regiment, both considerably reduced by sickness; the resident's escort of two companies of native infantry, three troops of the 6th regiment of Bengal native cavalry, and four six-pounders manned by Europeans of the Madras artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel Hopeton Scott was the senior officer.

The residency lies to the west of the city of Nagpoor, and is separated from it by a rocky hill, running north and south, called Seetabuldee.

At each extremity of this hill, and distant about 30 yards from each other, are two eminences; that to the north, which is close to the residency, is considerably larger and a little higher than that to the south; but the base of the latter, being close to the huts of a village, communicating with the suburbs, and affording facility to the approach of irregulars, was a most important point, and was occupied by 300 men of the 24th regiment, under Captain Sadler, supported by a six-pounder. The three troops of cavalry under Captain Fitzgerald occupied the enclosures surrounding the residency, being behind and partly to the right of the larger hill, upon which the remainder of the force was posted. In the evening, as the British pickets were about to be placed, a party was fired upon from the village, at the bottom of the lower hill; but, under the possibility of a mistake, they forbore returning it, until, upon a continuance of the aggression, they gave their fire, and retired upon the smaller hill, under a heavy discharge of matchlocks, which became the general signal for an attack on the British position. A smart fire was maintained on both sides till two o'clock in the morning, when it slackened on the part of the Mahrattas, but was renewed with great fury with cannon and musketry at daylight. The heaviest loss which the British had hitherto sustained was at the smaller hill. Frequent attempts had been made by the Arabs to carry it, and that post had been, in consequence of the slaughter, repeatedly reinforced. At last, by the accidental explosion of a tumbril, some confusion was created, of which the Arabs took immediate advantage, charged up the hill sword in hand, carried it, and immediately turned the gun against the larger hill, where the casualties became distressingly severe. Emboldened by their success, the enemy's horse and foot closed in from every direction, and prepared for a general assault. To add to this appalling crisis, the Arabs got into the huts of the British troops, and the shrieks of the women and children reached the ears of the sepoys. The residency grounds, where Captain Fitzgerald was posted, were also attacked; guns were brought up, and bodies of horse threatened to break in. Captain Fitzgerald had repeatedly applied for permission to charge, and was as often prevented by orders from the commanding officer; but, seeing the impending destruction, he made a last attempt to obtain leave. Colonel Scott's reply was—"Tell him to charge at his peril." "At my peril be it," said the gallant Fitzgerald on receiving this answer, and immediately gave the word to advance. As soon as he could form clear of the enclosures, he charged the principal body of horse, drove them from two guns by which they were supported, pursued them to some distance, cut a body of infantry accompanying them to pieces, and brought back with him the captured guns. The infantry posted on the hill witnessed this exploit with loud huzzas; the greatest animation was kindled amongst them: it was proposed to storm the smaller hill as soon as the cavalry returned, but another explosion of ammunition having taken place amongst the Arabs on the south hill, the same accident by which it had been lost, men and officers, mingling together, rushed forward: irresistible, under such an impulse, they carried everything before them, pursued the Arabs down the hill, took two of their guns, spiked them, and returned to their posts. The Arabs again assembled, and evinced a determination to recover their ground; but as they were preparing to advance, a troop of cavalry, under Cornet Smith, charged round the base of the hill, took them in flank, and dispersed them. The British troops now advanced from the hills, drove the infantry from the adjoining huts, and by noon

this trying conflict, only equalled during the war by the defence of Korygaom, had wholly ceased. Instances of heroism equal to that of Pattinson are adducible, particularly that of Lieutenant John Grant, adjutant of the 24th regiment, who, though impeded by two severe wounds, was foremost in the storm of the smaller hill, and received a third and mortal wound as the post was carried.

The British had not 1,400 men fit for duty in the defence of Seetabuldee, whereas the army of Appa Sahib amounted to 18,000 men, half of whom were infantry, and of these 3,000 or 4,000 were Arabs, who fought with much resolution. The British lost 333 in killed and wounded, amongst whom 12 were European officers.* The Mahrattas lost about an equal number. The disproportion at Nagpoor was not much greater than at Poona; but the presence of an European regiment, and the advantage of acting offensively, gave a very different character to the contest.

Appa Sahib being foiled in his treacherous attempt, sent wukeels to express his sorrow, and to disavow his having authorized the attack; but Mr. Jenkins refused to treat with him under present circumstances, until he disbanded his troops, though he agreed to a suspension of hostilities. Reinforcements poured into Nagpoor from all quarters. Lieutenant-

November 29.

December 5.

Colonel Gahan with a brigade from Colonel Adams' division appeared on the 29th, Major Pitman arrived with a detachment on the 5th December, and General Doveton, with the whole 2nd division, had reached Nagpoor before the middle of that month. On the morning of the 15th Mr. Jenkins demanded the

December 15. absolute submission of Appa Sahib, requiring of him to disband his troops, to place his territory at the disposal of the British government, and to surrender himself as a hostage for the performance of these conditions; but he was at the same time given to understand that, upon compliance, no harder terms should be enforced than a cession of territory equal to meet the expenses of the subsidiary force, and as much control in his internal government as should prevent similar treachery in future. Till four o'clock on the following morning was the time allowed for his acceptance of the terms. At six o'clock it was intimated that the troops would not permit Appa Sahib to come to the residency as he wished; a respite of three days was requested, but three hours only were granted. When the time expired, the troops advanced; Appa Sahib then came in, and the army was halted in hopes that his force would be disbanded, and his guns given up. Such of the latter as were in the arsenal were surrendered, but on advancing to take possession of the others, a cannonade was opened upon the British troops. The line was in consequence immediately formed, and the guns were stormed and taken, but with the loss of 141 men in killed and wounded. Two of Appa Sahib's officers, Gunput Rao and Mun Bhut, were the persons who maintained this resistance, and, it was supposed, without their master's orders. Gunput Rao afterwards went off towards the Peishwa's territory, and joined Bajee Rao, as already mentioned, near Sholapoor; but Mun Bhut, with the Arabs, retired to the fort of Nagpoor, where an attempt was made to storm one of

December 24. the gates on the 24th December, and repulsed with the loss of 269 men in killed and wounded. The Arabs afterwards offered to surrender, on being permitted to march out with their property,

* Including Mr. Sotheby of the civil service, 1st assistant to the resident, who was killed.

families, and arms—terms which were admitted, because time was of importance, and there was no efficient battering train on the spot.

The reserve division of the Bengal army stationed at Rewah under Brigadier-General Hardyman was ordered down to Nagpoor when the Marquis of Hastings was first apprized of the defection of Appa Sahib; but the order was not received until the 6th December, so that General Hardyman did not reach the neighbourhood until the whole was settled by General Doveton; but on the 19th December he routed a body of the enemy assembled at Jubbulpoor, reduced that place, and co-operated with Lieutenant-Colonel M'Morine in occupying the whole of Appa Sahib's northern territory, excepting Choureesagurh and Mundelah.

Hostilities at the capital were brought to a conclusion by the capitulation of the Arabs and the surrender of Mun Bhut; Mr. Jenkins, owing to the interruption of the communication, had received no instructions relative to Appa Sahib in case of submission; and therefore, in consequence of what had been already proposed, although the terms had not been complied with, Mr. Jenkins, on a consideration of all circumstances, conceived it incumbent on the British government to reinstate Appa Sahib, but deemed it necessary that his government should be most effectually controlled. For this purpose, to secure the subordination of the capital, the Seetabuldee hill was to be fortified; the British troops to have complete military occupation of the whole country; and a territorial cession, amounting to about 24 lakhs of rupees, equal to the full charge of the subsidiary force, was demanded. A treaty to this effect was drawn out, and about to be submitted for the raja's acceptance, when, on the 2nd January, Mr. Jenkins received instructions from the Marquis of Hastings, issued on first hearing of the raja's defection, before being informed of what had passed subsequent to the arrival of General Doveton. These instructions forbade any reconciliation with Appa Sahib himself, and directed that the son of the daughter of the late Pursajee, a minor, should be placed on the musnud, and affairs confided to a regency, selected by the British government. Afterwards, however, upon considering the motives which swayed the resident, respect for the moral obligation implied by the terms of his personal surrender induced the governor-general to confirm the treaty* on the terms proposed by Mr. Jenkins.

At this point, therefore, we shall for the present leave the detail of Deccan affairs, and return to the operations which were about to be commenced by the British armies in central India, when their Mahratta allies at Poona and Nagpoor, taking advantage of the removal of the British troops, treacherously attempted, as we have seen, to annihilate the detachments at their capitals.†

* The treaty was dated 6th January.

† Authorities as for the preceding chapter.

CHAP. L.

A. D. 1817 AND A. D. 1818.

Pindharees.—Divisions close in upon the durras of Khureem Khan and Wasil Mohummud—pursuit of Cheetoo by Sir J. Malcolm.—Cheetoo is protected in Holkar's camp—hostile appearances.—General Malcolm forms a junction with Sir Thomas Hislop—battle of Mehidpoor—treaty with Holkar.—Cheetoo is protected by Jeswunt Rao Bhow, one of Sindia's generals.—Jeswunt Rao is in consequence treated as an enemy—Camp attacked, and Jawud stormed by General Browne—destruction of the durras of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem Khan—and of Cheetoo—dispersion of the Pindharees—and dismemberment of the Patan association.—Treaties with the Rajpoots.—Recompence to the raja of Boondce and nabob of Bhopaul.—Sir John Malcolm appointed to the government of Central India.—Operations in Bundelcund.—Storm of Talneir.—Operations against the Peishwa—Affair of Sewnee.—Bajee Rao reduced to great distress—writes to Sir J. Malcolm, who negotiates with him—interview—surrender—terms—remarks.—Seizure of Trimbuljee.—Escape of Appa Sahib.—Siege and capture of Ascergurh.

DURING the rains of 1817, the Pindharees in three separate bodies, or
 A. D. 1817. durras, under their leaders Cheetoo, Khureem Khan, and Wasil Mohummud, occupied positions between Indore and Sagur. Khureem Khan was particularly active in recruiting his durra, and was anxious to concert some general plan for eluding the coming storm; but the enmity between him and Cheetoo was too rancorous to admit of cordial co-operation, even in self-defence. They were promised assistance by all the native princes, according to their hopes or fears, but none stood forth openly in their favour. The left division of the Bengal army assembled on the 10th October at Kalinjer in Bundelcund under Major-General Marshall, and reached Sagur by the 28th. Whilst on its march, a party of Pindharees from the durra of Wasil Mohummud got in its rear, and began to ravage the territory in Bundelcund: but their progress was arrested by a detachment from the governor-general's division, which obliged them to return to Malwa; and this was the only enterprize attempted by the Pindharees. General Marshall, without noticing this attempted diversion, marched on according to his instructions, and arrived at Rylee on the 10th

November 10. November, where he opened a communication with Colonel Adams, whose division was already in its prescribed position at Hooshingabad. Sir Thomas Hislop by the same time had reached Hurda, and assumed command of the first division of the Deccan army; Sir John Malcolm, with the third division, composed of the Nizam's battalions and the Mysore irregular horse, had arrived in that neighbourhood some time before; and the Guzerat division, having advanced from Baroda, was in its position at Dohud. Everything was now ready for the combined movement, when news of the breaking out of hostilities at Poona reached Sir Thomas Hislop. Conceiving from this intelligence, and from

recent accounts of apprehended treachery in the court of Nagpoor, that it would be necessary to support Brigadier-Generals Smith and Doveton, General Hislop, departing from his instructions, immediately reinforced General Malcolm's division with a brigade of the regular troops, and sent him forward to co-operate against the Pindharees, whilst he himself, with

the first division, began to retrace his steps towards Burhanpoor. Sir John Malcolm crossed the Nerbuddah on the 16th November, and Colonel Adams on the 14th. By a concerted movement with General Marshall, the three divisions respectively

reached Ashtah, Rassein, and Ratgurbh on the 22nd, and thence, in the same manner, reached Tullain, Bairsea, and Gunj Basouda by the 26th. They thus drove the Pindharees from their

accustomed haunts, and their lands were either taken possession of, or restored to the agents of Sindia and the nabob of Bhopaul. The durras of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem Khan united about Seronje, and thence, invited by Sindia, took the route of Gwalior; but Cheetoo went off to the north-west, in hopes of support from Holkar, and from Jeswunt Rao Bhow, one of Sindia's officers stationed, as already noticed, at Jawud. Lord Hastings' camp at this period was at Erich, and he had placed detachments connecting his own with General Marshall's division. Upon ascertaining that Khureem and Wasil Mohummud had come to the northward, one of the detachments moved from Burwa Sagur through Dutteea, across the Sindh, so as to cut them off from Gwalior; and Lord Hastings brought his division within 30 miles of Sindia's camp, which had the effect of completely overaweing that chieftain. The Pindharees, unable to advance to Gwalior, or to return to the southward, whence General Marshall and Colonel Adams were closing in upon them, remained at Shahabad until General Marshall, though he advanced tardily, was close upon them. They then forced the Lodwana Ghaut, leading into Huraotee, which they were enabled to effect, owing to the misconduct of a party of Zalim Sing's troops posted there; but General Marshall succeeded in destroying a few of them. They then intended to cross the Chumbul by the Loharee ford; but they were intercepted by General Donkin; and Khureem, with Wasil Mohummud, after having burnt their baggage, went off to the southward, at the head of 4,000 of the best-mounted of their followers, with whom they succeeded in passing Colonel Adams' division, and directed their flight westward into Meywar. Of those who were left behind, some were cut off by the troops, and some by the exasperated villagers; one considerable body, however, got clear off to the southward, and, after traversing the whole Deccan, entered the company's provinces in the Carnatic, where they were annihilated, or completely dispersed, before the end of the ensuing January.

The scene of operations was now changed; General Marshall was posted at Seronje, Colonel Adams moved down upon Gungraur, and General Browne, detached with a part of the Marquis of Hastings' division, also proceeded westward, in a parallel direction to the northward of Colonel Adams; General Donkin, re-crossing the Chumbul, took post at Shapeora, west of the Bunass. But whilst such was the progress of the Pindharee warfare in the east of Malwa, more important events were passing to the westward.

When Cheetoo went off towards Holkar's camp, he was pursued by General Malcolm with the third division; but there being reason to apprehend that hostility was meditated by Holkar's army, Colonel Adams for a time inclined his march to the west, in order to be able to support Sir

John Malcolm ; on its being understood, however, that the governor-general disapproved of Sir Thomas Hislop's retrograde movement, and had ordered him on as first directed, Colonel Adams co-operated, as before, against Khureem and Wasil Mohummud. Sir John Malcolm continued

December 4. to pursue Cheetoo, until the latter found refuge in Holkar's camp, in the vicinity of Mehidpoor, when the third division halted at Agur on the 4th December.

It has hitherto been quite unnecessary to refer to the everlasting turmoil of Holkar's durbar. The Mahratta faction, which Toolsee Bye, the regent, joined, had, in a moment of superiority over their Patan rivals, put the minister Ballaram Seit to death, which threw the principal power into the hands of Tattya Jogh, and Holkar's hereditary dewan, Gunput Rao, a man of weak intellect, under the guidance of Tattya Jogh ; he was also the paramour of Toolsee Bye, over whom her passion gave him entire ascendancy. When the Peishwa's emissaries were negotiating the confederacy against the British government, one of their objects was to reconcile the Patan and Mahratta factions ; but at the crisis when the British army crossed the Nerbuddah, there was a division amongst all parties and factions in Holkar's camp. Gunput Rao had been for a time gained over to the Peishwa's cause, and Toolsee Bye had no will but his ; Tattya Jogh, suspected of being favourable to a negotiation opened by Mr. Metcalfe on the part of the British government, was placed under restraint, and the war faction, or, in other words, Bajee Rao's influence, predominated. The negotiation alluded to as opened by Mr. Metcalfe was part of the governor-general's plan, who, as will be recollected, intended to form a treaty with Holkar, nearly similar to that which was concluded with Sindia. The proposals were made to Holkar at the same time that the terms were offered to Umeer Khan ; but no reply was received until the middle of November, when a secret communication from Toolsee Bye, offering to place the young Mulhar Rao and herself under the protection of the British government, was, by the advice of Tattya Jogh, transmitted to Mr. Metcalfe. The regency, however, being under the control of their own soldiery, were obliged to yield to the popular cry in the camp, and to move towards the Deccan, trusting to some favourable opportunity of effecting their purpose, though now obliged to join in the general demonstrations of loyalty in favour of the sovereign Peishwa. But Gunput Rao having, as already mentioned, been gained over, Toolsee Bye likewise seceded from the plan of seeking protection from the British ; and Tattya Jogh, the original proposer of that measure, was placed in confinement. The soldiery were averse to the admission of terms from the British government, because the chiefs knew they must lose the power and consequence which the existing state of anarchy conferred, and the troops apprehended the loss of their bread. Before Holkar's army quitted Rampoorah, some advances were made by the Peishwa's agent, and larger sums were promised as soon as they should cross the Nerbuddah. They were joined by Roshun Beg, one of Holkar's commanders, with 14 battalions before they reached Mehidpoor, and all were apparently enthusiastic in the Peishwa's cause. The arrival of General Malcolm's division in their neighbourhood caused some alteration in the minds of the regency ; but the general indications of hostility were so strong that Sir John Malcolm retired, upon the first division advancing, to Oojein. The division from Guzerat ought to have been by that time about the same point, but Sir William Grant Keir had fallen back a considerable distance, at the requisition of the Bombay government, as, in consequence of the Peishwa's defection, disturbances

were apprehended in Guzerat; but of this movement the governor-general disapproved, and the division was ordered to return for the purpose of co-operating as at first directed.

In the meantime, the first and third divisions, having^e united, advanced towards Holkar's camp. Terms agreeably to Lord Hastings' instructions were offered, and a show of negotiation was kept up by Ghuffoor Khan and the Patan commanders, in the name of Mulhar Rao Holkar; but their horse committed hostilities, molested the foragers, carried off cattle, and at last made a direct attack on a body of the Mysore horse.

December 20. So determined were the Patans to cut off all chance of pacification, that, suspecting the regency of an intention to accept the terms, they confined Gunput Rao, and put Toolsee Bys to death. When Sir Thomas Hislop found his parties at-

December 21. tacked, he immediately determined on bringing affairs to a crisis. Holkar's troops, estimated at nearly 20,000 men, of whom about one-half were infantry, were posted on the left bank of the Seeprah, and on the opposite side from that on which the British army was advancing. Sir Thomas Hislop had four regiments of native cavalry, two squadrons of dragoons, a battalion of Europeans, and, including the Nizam's corps, seven battalions of native infantry, besides a considerable body of irregular horse. The position of Holkar's troops at the point attacked was exceedingly strong. The ford by which it was determined to cross was about 800 yards from the enemy's line of infantry, which was drawn up at an angle of the Seeprah, with its left flank protected by the steep bank of that river, and its right covered by a deep ravine; its front was lined with a formidable artillery, consisting of about 70 pieces, many of them heavy guns, which, being well served, overpowered the light English field-pieces, and occasioned a heavy loss before the British troops, after crossing the ford, had time to form an advance, which they did with all their characteristic bravery. The first and second brigades, gallantly led on by Sir John Malcolm, had the principal duty to perform; the Madras rifle corps bore a very conspicuous part in the battle, but earned the honor at a high price, having suffered most severely. Holkar's artillerymen stood bravely to their guns, even after their battalions had retired; but all the cannon were taken, excepting five or six of the lighter pieces, which were carried off by the flying troops. Holkar's horse showed considerable spirit in skirmishing before the British army crossed the river, but fled as soon as the action became general. This victory cost the British troops a loss of 778 men in killed and wounded, of whom 38 were European officers. Holkar's army lost 3,000 men, principally in the pursuit; but it is creditable to his battalions that two bodies of the infantry effected their retreat when the British general was so strong in cavalry. One of these bodies, under Roshun Beg, reached Rampoorah, where it was attacked and dispersed on the 10th January by the division.

Jan. 10, 1818. under General Browne, detached, as already mentioned, from the force under the personal command of Lord Hastings. The other body was under Ramdeen, a person notorious in the intrigues and anarchy of the period, who made good his way to the Deccan, and joined Bajee Rao, as already mentioned, at Kopergaon. After the battle, Sir John Malcolm, with a light force, followed up the main body of the fugitives on the route towards Mundisore; whilst Sir Thomas Hislop, joined by the Guzerat division, followed in the same direction a few days afterwards. At Mundisore the submission of the

young Holkar was tendered, and a treaty was concluded on the 6th of January 6. By this treaty Holkar confirmed the agreement with Umeer Khan; ceded several districts in perpetuity to the rana of Kotah, which Zalim Sing had before only rented; transferred his tribute on the Rajpoots to the British government; and also ceded to it his territory north of the Boondee hills, and south of the Sautpoora mountains. He agreed to commit no hostilities, to have no communication with other states, and to entertain in his service no native of Europe or America, without the sanction of the British government; to discharge his superfluous troops, but to maintain a contingent of 3,000 horse, which were to co-operate with the English troops when required. The jagheer of Ghuffoor Khan was to be continued under the guarantee of the British government. A wukeel from Holkar was to reside at Calcutta, and a resident envoy was to be appointed to Holkar's court. The British government became bound to protect the territories of Holkar, and to maintain a field force for that purpose.

Sindia's durbar, after the conclusion of the treaty with Holkar, became perfectly tractable; but some of his officers still showed a determination to support the Pindharees. After the battle of Mehidpoor, Cheetoo proceeded to Jawud, and was admitted into the camp of Jeswunt Rao Bhow, who at first refused to receive Captain Caulfield, the superintending officer appointed to his division. But afterwards, pretending to comply with whatever was required, he desired Cheetoo to withdraw, and allowed Captain Caulfield to join him. It was found, however, that he harboured and protected the Pindharees, whom he would neither arrest nor expel from his camp; and the Marquis of Hastings at last gave orders that he should be treated as a public enemy. The division under General Browne was sent against him; and here, as at Rampoorah, this division was distinguished by the prompt and efficient manner it performed the required service; the camp of Jeswunt Rao was beat in, his guns were captured, one of the

gates of Jawud was blown open, and the town taken on the 28th January. The districts occupied by Jeswunt Rao Bhow had been usurped from the rana of Oudepoor, with whom an agreement, similar in principle to those with the other Rajpoot states, had been concluded by the British government on the 13th January. Kumulnere, Rypoor, and Ramnugur—three forts of some consequence, particularly Kumulnere—being situated in the usurped districts, General Donkin was ordered to reduce them, which was effected with little trouble by the middle of February. When General Donkin's division was broken up, the service in this quarter being by that time completed, a part of it joined Sir David Ochterlony, then engaged in negotiating with the Patans, and aiding in the settlement with the Rajpoots.

In the meantime Cheetoo, with his durra of Pindharees, had gone off in a north-westerly direction, when the pursuit was taken up by the Guzerat division with considerable effect. A part of the durra was destroyed, and several of their parties were overtaken in villages. Cheetoo, finding himself harassed, turned suddenly to the southward, and, by passing through a very difficult country, where Sir William Grant Keir found it impossible to follow him, he effected his escape; he re-appeared near Dhar, whither he was followed by the Guzerat division by another route. The broken remains of the durras of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem, at the time when they thought themselves secure from pursuit, were completely surprised in the middle of January by a detachment from Colonel Adams' division,

which destroyed a great number of them. Khureem was not with his followers at the time, having been left in a jungle as they were flying through Hurattee; but he was in Jawud when the town was stormed by General Browne, and escaped on foot with great difficulty. After a variety of adventures, Khureem surrendered himself to Sir John Malcolm on the 15th February; Namdar Khan came in on the 3rd February, with such of his followers as remained, and many of the principal chiefs followed his example. The only terms required by Namdar Khan were an assurance that he should not be sent to Europe or Calcutta. Many persons belonging to the durras of Wasil Mohummud and Khureem gave themselves up to Zalim Sing of Kotah, and the small parties dispersed. Wasil Mohummud in person took refuge in Sindia's camp at Gwalior, where the British authorities would not seize him, but caused Sindia to do so, that it might be manifest to all India that an enemy of the British government could nowhere find an asylum. He was not imprisoned, but kept at Ghazeepoor under a strict watch; and at last, being intercepted in an attempt to escape, he destroyed himself by poison.

Of the Pindharees, Cheetoo's durra alone remains to be accounted for. January 25. The main body had hitherto escaped; but on the 25th January it was completely surprised and dispersed by a detachment from the garrison of Hindia; and the Bheels and Grassias in the neighbourhood, from whom, it may be recollected, the Pindharees took several districts, being encouraged to attack the fugitives, spared none who fell into their hands. Cheetoo with 200 followers escaped: he endeavoured to make terms for himself through the nabob of Bhopaul, but his demands were extravagant, and, being again pursued, his followers dropped off daily. He afterwards went through a variety of adventures, and we shall again have occasion to mention him; but at length, hunted from his last asylum, and still bearing up with a spirit and perseverance worthy of the leader of a better band, Cheetoo, when singly pursuing his flight, was devoured by a tiger in the jungles adjoining the fortress of Aseergurh. The Pindharees thus dispersed, without leaders, and without a home or a rendezvous, were afterwards little heard of, though flying parties were seen in the Deccan until the termination of the war with the Peishwa: they mingled with the rest of the population, but the real Pindharees still retain their name, though some of them have become active improving farmers.*

With regard to the Patans, Umeer Khan, after he had made the agreement with Mr. Metcalfe for himself, did not ratify it until he heard of the defence at Seetabuldee, when, considering the Mahratta game as completely lost, he immediately dismissed the Peishwa's agents, ratified the engagement with the British government, and endeavoured by every means in his power to fulfil its stipulations.

The advance of Sir David Ochterlony, who judiciously interposed his division between the two principal Patan camps, would soon have compelled Umeer Khan to submission, had coercion become necessary; but his presence in that situation was afterwards very important in enabling Umeer Khan to obtain the promised guns, and to satisfy the turbulent soldiery. The Patans were prevented from trying their strength by the fate of Holkar's troops at Mehidpoor, by the influence and cunning of Umeer Khan, and by the address and firmness of Sir David Ochterlony.

* I know personally some of this description settled in the Deccan, and; I dare say, many may be found cultivating the fields in Malwa.

Some of them were dismissed with part of their arrears, some of them were taken into the service, and the whole were overawed or conciliated without bloodshed.

The presence of Sir David Ochterlony likewise facilitated the negotiations with the Rajpoots, and enabled the Marquis of Hastings to complete his plans, or put the whole into a train of adjustment by the middle of February. A treaty with Joudpoor was signed on the 6th January, but the negotiation with Jeypoor did not terminate until the 2nd April, when a treaty was concluded. All the other states and principalities, excepting Sagur, of which the British government took possession, accepted the terms offered by the governor-general; and Sindia having given up the district of Ajimere, and relinquished his tribute on the raja of Boondee, in exchange for part of the lands of the jagheerdar of Vinchoor, situated in Malwa, and forfeited by his adherence to the cause of Bajee Rao, the British government was thus enabled to recompense the hitherto ill-requited raja of Boondee, who behaved so well to the English when retreating under Colonel Monson. Not only was the tribute thus obtained from Sindia relinquished by the British government, but all the possessions usurped from the raja by Holkar were restored, and Sindia's encroachments, within his frontier, were also recovered for him by negotiation. The record of this instance of national gratitude will be read by every Briton with satisfaction, and the Marquis of Hastings also had it in his power to confer on the nabob of Bhopaul a reward equally suitable, not only for the friendship of his ancestor towards General Goddard's army, but for the zeal he had himself displayed in the British cause* during the present war, since he acceded to the proffered terms in the month of November. A treaty was concluded with him on the 26th February, by which a small contingent of 600 horse and 400 infantry was all that was required to be furnished for the service of the British government, and five districts† were ceded to him in perpetuity for their support. Some forfeited lands of the Vinchorkur, and a part of the district of Shujawulpoor, were afterwards added; the fort of Islamnugur, a much-valued possession, was likewise obtained for him from Sindia by negotiation. These cessions placed the principality of Bhopaul on a very respectable footing; and amongst the natives of India, where the recollections of benefits and injuries are treasured up for generations, nothing in the whole administration of the Marquis of Hastings conveyed so deep an impression of the value of British friendship, as the conduct of its government to Boondee and Bhopaul.

The military operations in central India being completed, Sir John Malcolm remained there as agent for the governor-general; and by the active exertions and conciliatory methods, which during a long career have characterized his services, and which, on the whole, have been surpassed by those of no living servant of the East India Company, that officer introduced order and peace in an extensive tract, where those blessings had been long unknown.

The division under General Marshall was ordered from Seronje into Bundelcund; and, after reducing Sagur, took Dhamounsee and Mundelah, belonging to the territory of Nagpoor, the killidars of which had refused to surrender, in consequence of secret orders from Appa Sahib. At the same time that General Marshall was sent into Bundelcund, the greater

* He sold his jewels to support troops.

† Ashtab, Ichawur, Sehar, Dowaha, and Dewapana.

part of the first, third, and fifth divisions were placed at the disposal of Mr. Elphinstone, to assist in the more important revolution going forward in the Deccan.

Sir Thomas Hislop, as commander-in-chief at Madras, proceeded to Fort St. George; but, on his way to the southward, he took possession of those places in his immediate route which were ceded to the British government by Holkar. The killidar of Talnair, from a pertinacity common to governors of forts in India, resisted the order of surrender; and, although warned from the first that he should be treated as a rebel if he refused to obey the orders of his government, he continued to fire upon the British troops. A storming party was therefore sent to force the entrance of the fort, which is by five successive gates; of these, the first and second were passed without difficulty, and at the third the killidar came out and surrendered himself. He also returned with the party through the third and fourth gates, which were opened, but at the fifth gate there was some demur made by the Arabs when told they must surrender at discretion; the wicket, however, was at last opened, and a few officers and men had entered, when the Arabs, from some misapprehension, rushed upon them, cut most of them down, and, amongst the number, killed Major Gordon and Captain Macgregor. Their companions behind, hearing of what had been perpetrated, with the exasperated feelings of British troops where they suspect treachery, rushed in as fast as they could gain admittance, and of a garrison of about 300 men, one only, by leaping the wall, escaped with life. Sir Thomas Hislop, under the same impulse by which the troops were actuated, ordered the killidar to be hanged as the cause of all the bloodshed, without reflecting on the probability of his not being, even in the first instance, wholly to blame for this lamentable catastrophe, and that his subsequent conduct entitled him to clemency.

In taking possession of the forts in the territory ceded by Holkar, Sir Thomas Hislop was aided by the second division under General Doveton, who, shortly after the surrender of Nagpoor, had proceeded to the westward, believing that everything in the quarter he had just quitted was finally arranged; but no sooner was Appa Sahib reinstated on his musnud, than he renewed his intrigues, encouraged the savage Goonds to revolt, sent secret orders to his killidars to resist the orders of surrender which he had granted in favour of the British government, and applied to Bajee Rao for assistance. An application to this effect had arrived at the time Gunput Rao joined the Peishwa near Sholapoor, and frequent messengers followed, subsequent to the affair of Ashtah, imploring succour.

We left Bajee Rao on the route to Chandore. Before he reached that place, hearing of the approach of the divisions under Sir Thomas Hislop and General Doveton, he returned to Kopergaom; but there, having learnt that General Smith was advancing, he pursued his route to Bheer, and thence, turning off to the eastward, hastened towards Chandah in the territory of Nagpoor, sending Gunput Rao forward to the assistance of his master by a different route.

Sir Thomas Hislop endeavoured to intercept or overtake the Peishwa's army, but, finding they were beyond the reach of pursuit, he continued his march to Poona, and left the conduct of operations to Generals Doveton and Smith. The former took the route by Basum and Kurinja, the latter moved eastward along the line of the Godavery.

In the meantime, Mr. Jenkins, having discovered Appa Sahib's extraordinary treachery, arrested him; and preparations being made to oppose the advancing succour, Gunput Rao's party

April 8. was met on the banks of the Wurdah, and driven back by a detachment under Colonel Scott. Colonel Adams with his division also arrived on the banks of the Wurdah in a few days; and Bajee Rao, uncertain how to proceed, halted at Pander Koura to the west of the Wurdah. There he was hemmed in by the divisions of Doveton and Adams, and, in endeavouring to avoid the former, was driven upon the latter near Sewnee, where a considerable

April 6. number of his followers were killed. Many of his jagheers had quitted his standard before this event, and most of them took advantage of the opportunity to disperse to their homes. The Peishwa's brother, Chimnajee Appa, fled to the southward with Appa Dessaye Nepankur and Naroo Punt Apti, and surrendered himself to a party detached to intercept him by General Smith. Colonel Adams, as soon as the pursuit ceased, proceeded against Chandah, which was held by the partizans of Appa Sahib, and after a short siege carried the place by assault. Bajee Rao, followed by General Doveton, fled in great consternation to the northward, and for six days his army suffered severely from fatigue and privation. He had faint hopes of aid from Sindia; but all he now desired was a good opportunity of throwing himself in the way of the British general. He had made many overtures to Mr. Elphinstone, but as they always implied an ability to treat, he was distinctly told his submission only could be accepted. He again despatched agents to Mr. Elphinstone and to the resident at Nagpoor, but continued his route, forded the Taptee on the 5th May, and advanced towards Sindwa, where he intended to cross the Nerbuddah; but finding that point guarded, and that Sir John Malcolm had made every preparation to intercept him, he sent forward an agent, Anund Rao Chundawurkur, with a letter to that officer, and retired to wait the result at Dholkote, in the neighbourhood of Aseergurh. That fortress, though stipulated to be given up by Sindia in the treaty of the 5th November, was still held by his killidar, Jeswunt Rao Lar, who had always refused to surrender. Here Bajee Rao, with about 8,000 men, remained in a state of the utmost disquietude and alarm; he was unacquainted with the country, and, excepting the Vinchorkur and Aba Poorundhuree, abandoned by almost every person of consequence in the Mahratta country; the fords and passes to the northward were guarded, and troops were closing in upon him on every side. His agent reached General Malcolm's camp at Mhow, near Indore, on the 16th May. On receiving the Peishwa's overtures, Sir John Malcolm, who had been furnished with a copy of the governor-general's instructions to the commissioner in the Deccan, resolved to make the Peishwa's letter the basis of a negotiation for his surrender. Accordingly, two of his political assistants, Lieutenants Low and M'Donald, were despatched towards the camp of Bajee Rao, instructed to open a negotiation, requiring him to renounce all sovereignty for himself and family for ever in the Deccan, to which he was never to return; and to surrender Trimbukjee and the murderers of the Vaughans. After these preliminaries, Lieutenant Low was to insist upon his immediately separating himself from Ramdeen, and all proscribed rebels and Pindharees, and advance to meet Sir John Malcolm, who in such case promised to become the medium of an adjustment with the British government, and obtain for him a liberal maintenance at such holy city as he might select for his future residence. The governor-general did not approve of any deputation to Bajee Rao, both because it had a tendency to cramp the military operations against him, and conveyed an impression of the Peishwa's being in a condition to treat, when he was, in fact,

eager to submit. Some circumstances proved the justness of these opinions ; and, in several respects, there was an inconsiderate zeal evinced in the proceedings on this occasion which has not escaped censure. The Marquis of Hastings, although he had given the outline of the conduct to be observed towards the Peishwa, reserved to himself the particular terms to be granted to him, after obtaining his submission to a justly offended nation ; but before his sentiments in regard to the first steps taken by Sir John Malcolm could be received, Bajee Rao, on the 3rd June, after a protracted negotiation, surrendered himself,* on condition that the stipulated maintenance should not be less than eight lakhs of rupees a year, which was promised to him by Sir John Malcolm, from an idea that it should not be less than the pension of his brother Amrut Rao. The Marquis of Hastings deemed the amount too great ; and seeing that his deposal was declared, and his country almost entirely reduced, knowing also the intriguing disposition of Bajee Rao, and the amassed treasure which he and his adherents might secrete for purposes hostile to the British government, it was generally considered the extreme of liberality. But there was a conditional promise to Bajee Rao in favour of jagheerdars who had adhered to his cause, and of Bramins and religious establishments supported by his family, which was quite unnecessary, and certainly should have been avoided ; because it implied that Bajee Rao was in a condition to treat, not only for himself, but for others ; it detracted in some degree from the liberality of the British government in the settlement of the conquered territories, and it obtained for Bajee Rao, amongst such of the Mahrattas as were disposed to advocate his cause, praise which he did not merit, and honor which it never could have been the intention of Sir J. Malcolm to confer. Whilst commenting, however, in this instance, on the supposed failings of the politician, justice is due to the generous feelings of the man : Sir J. Malcolm saw the prince whom he had visited nine months before in the midst of a gay court, and in a newly-erected palace on the banks of the Kistna, now a harassed and houseless fugitive ; he forgot the manner in which he had been so grossly deceived ; he thought only of the contrast in the Peishwa's situation, and of the benefits which the British government had derived from its connection with that misguided and unfortunate individual ; and he pitied those faithful adherents who still followed their sovereign in hopeless adversity, and forfeited their all, when, by personal submission, they might have secured their possessions. The Marquis of Hastings ratified the terms ; and Beithoor, a place of sanctity near Cawnpore, was appointed for Bajee Rao's future residence, to which he was immediately conducted.

Ramdeen surrendered on being promised pardon, but Bajee Rao evaded compliance with that part of the stipulated terms which required the surrender of Trimbukjee ; he escaped to the southward, and for a time attempted to collect adherents, and conceal himself as before ; but Captain Briggs, Mr. Elphinstone's agent in Candeish, discovered the place of his retreat, and by a well-concerted plan sent a party of irregular horse under Lieutenant Swanston,† who seized him in the village of Aheergaom. He

* Before surrendering himself, he had an interview with Sir J. Malcolm, and in a private conference displayed his usual address and eloquence, appealing to Sir John as the last of his three earliest and best friends—Colonel Close being dead, and General Wellesley (the Duke of Wellington) in a distant land.

† The same officer who assisted in the defence, and was severely wounded, at Korygaom.

was afterwards conveyed to the fort of Chunargurh in Bengal, where he remains a prisoner. The surrender of Bajee Rao was an important event, and was rendered more so by the escape of Appa Sahib—a circumstance which partly actuated Sir John Malcolm during the negotiation.

After the arrest of Appa Sahib by Mr. Jenkins, the governor-general directed that he should be sent to Allahabad, and there confined. He was accordingly sent off from Nagpoor for that purpose; but having corrupted some of the sepoys of a Bengal corps on his guard, and being furnished with a suit of their regimentals, he got off in that disguise on the morning of the 13th May, and fled to the Mahdeo hills between Nagpoor and the Nerbuddah, whence it was impossible to dislodge him during the monsoon. Here he was joined by Cheetoo Pindharee; and the person of Appa Sahib became a rallying-point for all the disbanded and broken troops of the country. The unfortunate negligence which occasioned his escape was productive of much harassing service, owing to insurrections in various quarters.

The grandson of the late Rughoojee Bhonslay, a minor named Goozur, was in the meantime adopted by the widow of the late Rughoojee, and, assuming the name of his grandfather, was seated on the musnud. The widow was considered regent; but for the present, and during the minority, the whole administration was committed to the charge of the resident, who, in the raja's name, directed every department under the immediate superintendence of officers appointed by himself.

The season was considerably advanced before troops could be spared to co-operate in a combined attack upon the position of Appa Sahib; it was hoped he might be taken; but being assisted by the skill and intelligence of Cheetoo, he passed one of the parties which was hemming him in, and though subsequently exposed to imminent danger from a guard of British troops, he succeeded in gaining the fort or neighbourhood of Aseergurh.

That celebrated fortress was besieged by General Doveton, Sir John Malcolm co-operating with a force from Malwa. After a respectable defence during about 20 days, it surrendered on the 9th of April 1819. Appa Sahib, if he ever had been in the fort, made his escape. He afterwards sought refuge amongst the Seiks, where he still is; and no desire being evinced by the British government to receive his submission, he has sunk into the insignificance to be expected from a person of his weak and treacherous character. The dreadful fate of Cheetoo, as he attempted to fly from Aseergurh, has been already told.*

* Authorities as in the preceding.

CHAP. LI.

. A. D. 1818 AND A. D. 1819.

The final reduction and settlement of the Peishwa's territory—Capture of the principal forts by General Pritzler.—The raja of Satara placed on his throne.—Successes of General Munro—attack and dispersion of the remaining infantry at Sholapoor.—Reduction of the Concan accomplished by the Bombay government—Appointment of officers to the civil government of the country—instructions—procedure.—The capture of Mallygaom and Pruchetgurh completes the reduction of the Peishwa's territory—mode of preventing insurrection—of settling the Bheels—detection of a conspiracy.—Claims—the Nizam—jagheerdars.—Judicial and revenue administration—Punchayets—rewards—charitable donations.—Hindoo college.—Remarks on the settlement.

In the preceding chapter we were drawn forward to mention the last event of the war, whilst the reduction and settlement of the Peishwa's territory remains to be briefly explained. By the 10th of April the strong forts of Singurh, Poorundhur, and Wassota, with many others, had been taken by the besieging force under General Pritzler. Though places of that remarkable strength which has been already described, none of them made a good defence, none stood the assault, and as their previous history was scarcely known, their capture excited less interest, even among the besiegers, than it otherwise was calculated to produce. An exception must be made in regard to Wassota; the wild country through which the troops advanced for about 20 miles, far exceeded in sublimity and grandeur any pre-conceived ideas the British officers might have formed of those vast mountains, dells, and forests, which they were told existed in the Ghaut-Mahta. The necessary artillery was transported with extraordinary labour, through thick jungles and deep valleys, where natural barriers presented themselves in every succeeding hill, at which a handful of men might have arrested a host; and when at last brought to the point of bombardment, intense interest was excited for the two officers, Cornets Hunter and Morrison, who, the reader may recollect, were taken prisoners at the commencement of the war, and were now in confinement in this fortress. The wives and families of the raja of Satara and his brothers were also in Wassota, and these princes were present in the British camp. The obstinacy of the killidar, who at first would listen to no terms of surrender, was in this instance a cause of general regret. At length the

April 5. mortars opened; and though the peal of every salvo as it reverberated from the surrounding rocks carried with it an anxiety for the fate of the prisoners, the bombardment was kept up for about 20 hours, with such effect that the killidar capitulated, and fortunately none of the captives suffered. The two British officers were found in a dress of coarse unbleached cotton, made into a form neither European nor Indian, but partaking of the nature of both; their beards had grown, and their ap-

pearance was, as may be imagined, extraordinary ; but their health was perfectly good. They had been kept in ignorance of the advance of their countrymen, or the state of the war ; the firing, in driving in the outposts, was represented by their guard as the attack of some insurgents in the neighbourhood ; the bursting of the shells over their heads was the first intimation of approaching deliverance, and the most joyful sound that had reached their ears for five dreary months. They had been at first used very harshly in the fort of Kangooree ; but they were removed to Wassota by Gokla's orders, and a letter, in his own hand-writing to the killidar, desiring him to treat the two poor Europeans well, was one of several instances of a like generous character, tending to prove that Gokla had no participation in the cruelties of his master, and at that moment excited some feeling of pity for his fate. On most occasions the captive officers had been humanely treated by the native soldiery, and they met with some remarkable acts of disinterested kindness and sympathy.

Shortly after the reduction of Wassota, the raja of Satara was with
 April 11. great pomp seated on his throne by the commissioner, when he published two proclamations—the one announcing his connexion with the British government, the other making over entire powers for the arrangement and government of his country to the author of this work, who was the agent selected by Mr. Elphinstone for that purpose. In the first proclamation the raja dwelt on the injuries received from Bajee Rao ; amongst these was an order, the existence of which was confirmed by the killidar of Wassota, to put the whole family to death, rather than suffer them to fall into the hands of the British government. The raja Pertab Siew (or Sing) was in his 27th year, naturally intelligent and well-disposed, but bred amongst intrigues, surrounded by men of profligate character, and ignorant of everything except the etiquette and parade of a court. His whole family entertained the most extravagant ideas of their own consequence, and their expectations were proportionate ; so that for a time the bounty which they experienced was not duly appreciated.

As it was inconvenient to reduce the whole of that strong country at this period, a battalion of sepoys and 500 auxiliary horse were left for the protection of the raja and the defence of the fort. After these arrangements, a part of the besieging division was detached to

April 13. assist in the capture of the forts to the northward of Poona, and General Pritzler proceeded to the Carnatic to place himself under the orders of General Munro. That gallant officer with a mere handful of men had taken a number of very strong forts, amongst others Badamee, which he carried by assault. Having added to his limited means, by raising a great body of irregulars, he had already possessed himself of the country in that quarter. On being reinforced, he immediately marched to the northward against the remainder of Bajee Rao's infantry, which, in number about 4,500, with 13 guns, were levying contributions, under Gunput Rao Phansay, in the Nizam's districts near Beejapoor. On hearing of General Munro's approach, they retreated under the walls of the strong fort of Sholapoor, where they were followed up, attacked, routed, and pursued with great slaughter. The pettah of Sholapoor had been previously carried by escalade ; and the fort, after a short siege, surrendered. As General Munro advanced from the Carnatic, he sent his irregulars to the right and left of his column of march, who occupied the villages, fought with spirit on several occasions, stormed fortified places, and took possession in name of " Thomas Munro Buhadur."

The Bombay government having conquered the Concan by its own exertions, Mr. Elphinstone did not interfere in its settlement, especially as few of the difficulties to be apprehended above the Ghauts existed in the low country. Mr. Pelly and Mr. Marriott were appointed to the charge of the civil duties—the former in the southern, the latter in the northern, Concan, or to the territory south and north of the river Penn. Raigurh, famous as the capital of Sivajee, and a place as impregnable as Gibraltar, surrendered to Colonel Prother on the 7th May : it contained the Peishwa's elder wife, Waranussee Bye : a fortunate shell having set fire to her habitation and destroyed it, she prevailed on the Arab killidar to capitulate. Waranussee Bye was allowed to retire to Wace near Satara, where she resided for nine or ten months, until it was discovered that her being there facilitated Bajee Rao's persevering intrigues, when, with a suitable escort, she was despatched to join her husband at Beithoor.

In regard to the settlement above the Ghauts, General Munro, as we have seen, took possession of the Carnatic, which he subsequently made over to Mr. Chaplin, an experienced civil servant of the Madras establishment, who was appointed, under Mr. Elphinstone, principal collector of the Mahratta country south of the Kistna, and political agent with the raja of Kolapoor and the southern jagheerdars.

To the management of the provinces extending from the Kistna to the Nerbuddah, Mr. Elphinstone, at different periods during the progress of the conquest, appointed four subordinate agents. The territory reserved for the raja of Satara* was the tract between the Warnah and the Neera, extending from the base of the Syhadree mountains on the west to Punderpoor on the east, or nearly to the Nizam's boundary. Until reduced, and some progress made in its settlement, the Satara country was managed entirely as a British province. Captain Henry Dundas Robertson had charge of the city and district of Poona, of which he was collector of the revenue, judge, and magistrate. His district lay between the Neera and Beema. From the Beema to the Chandore hills was intrusted to Captain Henry Pottinger, with the same authority as was delegated to Captain Robertson ; and Captain John Briggs, in the province of Candeish, in addition to the duties of those officers, was agent for effecting a settlement with the Bheels.

With each of those officers, whose authority nearly resembled that of the great sur-soobehdars under the Peishwa's government, experienced natives were appointed to conduct the numerous subordinate situations, with permanent salaries, on a scale of liberality which rendered their offices, both in regard to power and emolument, exceedingly respectable.

To get possession of the country ; to prevent the revenue of the current year, or the treasures of the Peishwa, from being made applicable to purposes of hostility ; to protect and conciliate the inhabitants ; to attempt no innovations ; and to endeavour to show the people that they were to expect no change, but the better administration of their own laws, were the primary objects to which the commissioner directed the attention of his agents. As the country was drained of British troops, the greater part of which had proceeded in pursuit of the flying Peishwa, the means of those agents were at first limited ; but by raising irregulars, taking such places as they could reduce, destroying or executing straggling plunderers, especially when they were found torturing or murdering the villagers, opening negotiations with the killidars of the stronger forts, and representing the hopelessness of resistance, the country, with the assistance of such regulars as could be spared, fell almost as fast as men

could be collected to keep possession. It not unfrequently happened that irregulars, who had left Bajee Rao's service a few days or hours before, entered that of the British government; and instances are adducible where, having quitted the Peishwa, they were enlisted, subsisted, supplied with ammunition, and fighting for the new government within little more than 24 hours; so readily do the irregular troops of India transfer their allegiance to the prevailing power. To these men the new conquests were frequently of necessity intrusted, and they proved in no instance treacherous or disobedient.

By the month of May a small detachment of regulars from Poona under Major Eldridge had obtained possession of the numerous hill-forts between that city and the Ahmednugur hills, some of which are as strong as any in the world. The defences are entirely composed of solid rock, in which caves are hewn that rendered the garrison safe from the effect of shells, and a very few resolute men could maintain an assault against any numbers.

Another small detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel M'Dowell was equally successful in reducing the forts in the Chandore range; and by the end of May the Arabs in Candeish, and the insurgents under the pretended Chitoor Sing in the Satara territory, were the only opponents of the British government within the dominions of the late Peishwa.

On the 13th June the Arab garrison of the strong fort of Mallygaom surrendered to Colonel M'Dowell, after a very obstinate defence, during which they repulsed an assault, and occasioned a loss to the besiegers of upwards of 200 men in killed and wounded. In the opposite quarter of the country, and on the ensuing day, the fort of Prucheetgurrh and the pretended Chitoor Sing were taken by a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Cunningham.* These events, except a few detached expeditions in the ensuing season, and the siege of Aseergurrh already mentioned, put an end to military operations in the Mahratta territory.

The progress of the settlement went forward as rapidly as the conquest.

A. D. 1819. After the first instructions were in train, the next object was to obtain full information respecting individuals, that their claims to consideration might be fully understood. Inquiries were also circulated by the commissioner to his agents, and by them to their subordinate agents, on the usages and laws of the country, in which all the intelligent part of the community were called upon for their opinions. A mass of valuable information was thus speedily collected, and from the judicious nature of the queries, so far from alarming the inhabitants—an inconvenience to which such interrogatories are particularly liable in India—these, on the contrary, being committed to men who

* Prucheetgurrh, in a most inaccessible situation, was taken by an enterprize successful from its apparent impracticability. The fort was commanded by an adjoining hill, from which a brisk fire soon drove the besieged from the gate, to seek shelter behind some stone houses in the fort; upon which Captain Spiller suggested the possibility of blowing a hole in the gate with musketry. This strange breach was effected under a heavy fire from his companions, which prevented the besieged from suspecting what was going forward at the gate. Captain Spiller went in first, but a grenadier sepoy, who attempted to follow, could not get through owing to his cart-ridge-box; Captain Spiller was therefore obliged to return until he had made the entrance sufficiently large, by which time he was joined by Colonel Cunningham and Assistant-Surgeon Radford, when they got in, one by one, concealing themselves in the gateway until their party had entered. They then rushed upon the garrison, completely surprised them, and carried the place without the loss of a man.

knew the natives, tended to gain their confidence, and were in this respect useful to the new government. To keep down insurrection, to settle claims and rewards consequent upon such a revolution, to make some provision for all who suffered, and to better the condition of those whom the voice of the community pointed out as fit objects of bounty, were a part of the duties which devolved upon the commissioner.

In regard to insurrection, vigilance was enjoined and strictly maintained by a system of private intelligence, which the Mahrattas consider necessary to good government, and which the state of the country, as well as the usage of the people, rendered necessary; armed men travelling without passports were required to deposit their weapons, and the hoarded resources of the late government were seized wherever found; but as it was not intended to disarm the Mahrattas, still less to create a vexatious search, which might in the slightest degree interfere with private property, or even to exact from inoffensive individuals all that they were known to possess belonging to Bajee Rao, great relaxation in these respects soon took place. After the first year, no passport was required from any body of armed men not exceeding 25, and no search for treasure was authorized without previously obtaining satisfactory testimony in regard to the information concerning it. A strong military force occupied positions at Belgaom, Kuladgee, Kurar, Satara, Sholapoor, Poona, Seroor, Joonere, Ahmednugur, and Mallygaom, and numbers of the enemy's irregular infantry were employed in the British service. The ranks of the auxiliary horse were already filled by men enlisted beyond the borders of the Mahratta country; but more than half the horses which returned from Bajee Rao's army died in the course of six months from the fatigue they had undergone.

The Bheels in the mountains adjoining Candeish continued to disturb the country for some time after the new government was established. The plan adopted for settling them was to appropriate waste lands for such as chose to cultivate them, and to grant to every chief an allowance for a certain number of men, for which they became bound to restrain the excesses of the rest. To force them to accept of these terms, their supplies, which were drawn from the plains, were stopped, parties issuing out to plunder were cut off, and vigorous attacks were made on the points in the hills occupied by the refractory chiefs. These measures at length reduced them to submission, but it must be the work of many years to reform their habits.

There were few attempts at insurrection; one conspiracy was detected, which had for its object the release of the pretended Chitoor Sing, the murder of all the Europeans at Poona and Satara, the surprise of some of the principal forts, and the possession of the person of the raja of Satara. The persons concerned were men of desperate fortunes among the unemployed soldiery: many of them were apprehended and tried; and the ringleaders, some of whom were Bramins, were blown from guns—an example which, though severe, had a great effect in restraining that intriguing race, and preventing similar attempts in the country.

As to claims, the most important upon the British government were those which regarded the settlement with its ally, the Nizam; but no arrangement of their mutual affairs could be made, until it had been fully ascertained what surplus revenue the British government should derive from the conquest. The advantages immediately gained by the Nizam were exemption from debts amounting to about 60 millions of rupees; and which, on the most moderate estimate, he could not have settled with

the Peishwa without making a cession of territory equal to 10 lakhs of rupees a year. The shares of revenue within the boundary of the soobehdar of the Deccan, which the Peishwa or his subjects had enjoyed up to the breaking out of the war, and of which the Nizam now retained the collections, were more than equal to 12 lakhs of rupees a year, and the cessions which fell to him from the governments of Holkar and the raja of Nagpoor amounted to nearly six more; so that the Nizam obtained an addition of at least 28 lakhs of rupees of annual revenue.

Though the British government gained much by additional strength and security, it was doubtful how far its income was benefited by the conquest. The provision for the raja of Satara was completed by a treaty dated 25th September 1819, by which he agreed to hold his territory in subordinate co-operation to the British government; neither to increase nor diminish his military force without its sanction; and, as a fundamental condition, he was positively prohibited from holding any intercourse with persons not his own subjects, except through the resident at his court. The company charged itself with the defence of his territory, which for a time was to be governed under an agent of that government, until the raja and his people were made acquainted with business.*

Next to the provision for the raja of Satara was a reward to the raja of Kolapoor, who, on the first declaration of hostilities, espoused the British cause. The much-desired districts of Chickooree and Menowlee, with the history of which the reader is already acquainted, were therefore restored to him—a recompense equal to his highest expectation.

The next claims were those of the jagheerdars; but it may be first proper to mention that every species of hereditary right not jagheer, all other rent-free lands, all established pensions, charitable and religious assignments and endowments, were restored; and that every promise held out by the proclamation of Satara was fulfilled without reserve or modification, excepting with respect to the Dukshina, which will be subsequently explained. In regard to jagheers, there were various points for consideration. In the first instance, unless specially exempted, every jagheer was taken possession of, like the territory in the immediate occupation of the Peishwa's agents,—and all jagheers falling within the Nizam's boundary were declared to be irrecoverably lost to their late owners. Jagheers also, which had been sequestrated by the former government, were not restored. Certain jagheerdars, whom we shall designate of the first class, were the old mankurees, or native chiefs of the country, whom the reader has it in his power to trace from the earliest history of Maharashtra, such as the Nimbalkurs of Phultun, the Duflays of Jhutt, the Ghorepurays of Moodhole, &c., &c. Others, in the second class, were the old aristocracy of Sivajee and his descendants, such as the Purdhans, the Pritee Needhee, Angria, and the raja of Akulkote. A third class was that which was

* The plan followed in the raja's country was simply to amend the native system, and to place the routine of business in that train, which it was possible might be preserved after the interference of the British government was withdrawn. The raja himself was taught to expect power according to his ability to exercise it, and in a short time laboured as assiduously as any carcoon under his government. The entire powers of the state were formally delivered over to him on the 5th April 1822, at which period the boon thus conferred by the British nation on the descendant of Sivajee was certainly appreciated by the country generally, as well as by his relations and himself; but time must prove whether this liberal experiment on the part of the authorities of the East India Company will be attended with any lasting good effect to the governors or the governed.

raised by the Peishwas, some of whom had established claims by their early submission, or former services to the British government ; but even of those dependants of the Peishwa, who had adhered to him to the last, it was, as remarked, "politic and humane to allow them a liberal maintenance, but it was neither required by humanity nor policy to give such persons the command of troops, paid from the revenue which had fallen into the hands of their conquerors."^e

The various claims of each of these classes being considered, the first, or old hereditary jagheerdars, had the whole of their lands restored. Of the second class, the Punt Suchew was the only one of the Purdhans to whom the Peishwa had left a vestige of power : he was one of the first who joined the British cause after the proclamation of Satara, and his territory, valued at three lakhs of rupees of annual revenue, and which includes the spot where Sivajee first established himself, was immediately placed in his own hands. The Pritee Needhee took the first opportunity of escaping from the Peishwa's camp, and the lands held in his name, which were assigned for his maintenance, but never committed to his own management, were given up. The raja of Akulkote was one of those jagheerdars who, from the first, would have resisted Bajee Rao's authority, had he not been overawed by the subsidiary force ; he joined in the war with reluctance, quitted the Peishwa early, and his jagheer was immediately relinquished. Of the third class of the jagheerdars, the Putwurdhuns were the most conspicuous ; Gunput Rao Putwurdhun of Tasgaom, one of the surviving sons of Pureshrum Bhow, never joined the Peishwa, and took an early opportunity, before the Satara proclamation, of assuring Mr. Elphinstone of his determination not to do so ; his lands were confirmed to him. The other members of this powerful family left Bajee Rao about the end of February : a like favourable consideration was shown to them. Appa Dessaye Nepankur did not join the Peishwa till late ; he never acted with vigour against the British troops, and on one occasion behaved remarkably well to some prisoners. He, as well as the Putwurdhuns and Rastia, maintained a communication with Mr. Elphinstone throughout the war ; but as he did not quit the Peishwa's standard until a late period, he lost a part of his jagheer by the restoration of Chickoorree and Menowlee to Kolapoor, and he likewise lost considerably by revenues within the territory of the Nizam ; but for these last he was at a subsequent period partly compensated, and the rest of his jagheer was restored. Mahdoo Rao Rastia had less reason than any other jagheerdar for those ideas of honor which induced many of them to adhere to the falling fortunes of him whom they considered the chief of the Hindoos. He quitted Bajee Rao after the affair of Sewnee, and thus lost the claim of fidelity to the Peishwa, or of gratitude to the British government. All jagheers granted under the Mahratta governments are for personal support, or the maintenance of troops ; and each chief has a certain portion of his jagheer allotted for the former purpose. To such persons as had forfeited all claim, like Rastia, and even to those who rather feared persecution than expected favour, their personal estates were in every instance restored. The Pritee Needhee, the Punt Suchew, the raja of Akulkote, the Dufays, and the Nimbalkurs were, at their own request, placed under the raja's government, and their lands guaranteed to them. To all the great jagheerdars the same powers were permitted within their own territory as had always existed ; and even towards those chiefs who had lost their lands,

* Elphinstone's despatches.

great delicacy, and as little interference as possible, were enjoined. The equitable and enlightened law which levels all distinctions would have been intolerable to men's minds in the existing state of the Mahratta country, and would have been as little relished by the lower as by the higher classes of society.

The punchayet was the ordinary tribunal for the decision of civil suits, and it is that which gives, and, if judiciously administered, probably always will give, more satisfaction, and be, in their own opinion, of greater benefit, to the natives of Maharashtra than any other mode of trial. The English officers of government, who had been accustomed to the courts of Udalt, could not reconcile themselves to the corruption, delay, and apparent injustice of some of their decisions ; but, in commenting on the evils of the Mahratta system, it is to be feared they forgot the many defects of their own. Although punchayets are continued under the provisional government which is still maintained in the conquered territory, it is to be apprehended they can neither exist, nor have a fair trial, where, whilst some are prejudiced, others, overwhelmed by business of various kinds, are discouraged by the difficulties they find in the system ; and a few (though I do believe such selfishness in the present state of feeling to be rare), considering it at variance with the interests of the civil service, only strive to discover objections, which in some shape may be found to every form of administration, but which time and vigilance would, in this instance, in a great measure remove. On the temper, zeal, and perseverance of the government officers, much must depend : punchayets, where neglected or merely tolerated, cannot prosper ; they require a pure and steady superintendence, with all the weight of authority to correct and amend the faults of the people which are confounded with the defects of the system. A very active able agency would at first be necessary after a plan of reform had been digested ; but once instituted, carefully watched and encouraged at the outset, and carried on for a time, much less interference would become requisite on the part of government ; and not only would the natives be called upon to administer justice in the form most popular among them, but, leaving advantages to policy out of the question, the punchayet might be made a powerful instrument for improving the minds and amending the morals of the natives of India. At present, even in the Mahratta country, those who have a suit will frequently solicit the decision of an English judge ; but the same persons, if intelligent men, when exempt from the impulse which influences their opinions under such circumstances, will invariably declare that the punchayet, in civil cases, is far better suited to the country at large than any mode of decision by individuals.

The criminal law in the conquered territory was administered, as it usually had been, by the decision of individual judges, assisted by Hindoo authority in regulating the measure of punishment ; but the evidence and sentences, in all important cases, were subject to the approval of the commissioner before being carried into execution. Punchayets in criminal cases had been known in the Satara country constituted of the servants of government. The same mode was revived in that territory, but punchayets in criminal cases might be chosen from the body of the people, although the advantages of a trial by jury would not be at first appreciated, and would require to be introduced by persons thoroughly acquainted with the natives.

The revenue system, of settling with the people through the agents of government, instead of renting the districts, was the means of abolishing

many grievances ; but in the Peishwa's country, especially in the villages, where a portion of the inhabitants were composed of the soldiery, there was not so much oppression as might have been expected.

The mode of settlement for the jagheerdars has led to a brief notice of the revenue and judicial system, and, in regard to the latter, has called forth reflections which have been seldom intruded on the reader in the plain narrative now about to be concluded.

Mr. Elphinstone took charge of the government of Bombay on the 1st November 1819, and Mr. Chaplin succeeded him as commissioner for the conquered territory ; but liberal pensions in land or money were previously granted to those adherents of the British government whose services during the revolution had merited such rewards. The ministers of the late government wholly unprovided for, and those of the times of Nana Furnuwees, who were pining in want, had also pecuniary assignments for their maintenance during life. Chiefs, not jagheerdars, who were reduced to absolute indigence, had also a provision according to circumstances.

The Dukshina, as the reader may remember, was a charitable institution, originally established by Dhabaray Senaputtee, and perpetuated by the first Bajee Rao and his successors. The great Madhoo Rao confined the donations principally to poor Bramins, whose proficiency in science and mythology entitled them to distinction ; and the rewards were conferred in proportion to their acquirements, moral conduct, and sanctity. During the reign of the second Bajee Rao, though a portion was always reserved as the reward of learning, it degenerated into an indiscriminate distribution, dictated by the superstitious idea of feeding and bestowing on Bramins as an atonement for sin. Many poor Bramins, however, had become greatly dependent on this charity, and therefore to have stopped it at once would have been inconsistent with the humane munificence which pervaded every act of the British government in the conquered territory ; but to have continued that promiscuous alms to all Bramins, who chose to collect at Poona for the purpose, would have been a wasteful, and in many respects a useless and pernicious, expenditure. It was at first therefore bestowed under certain limitations ; the portion assigned to men of learning was duly distributed ; and that the benefit to the country might be rendered more essentially important, as the donations at the Dukshina were circumscribed, a Hindoo college was instituted at Poona, where the minds of the youth might acquire such instruction in their own way as they are disposed to receive in mathematics, astronomy, medicine, &c. ; and pains were taken to erase from their elementary books of ethics such principles of morality as have a dangerous or a doubtful tendency. Though the institution of the college, which was committed to Mr. Chaplin, was at first regarded with some signs of distrust, before the end of 1822 there were 143 Bramins, students or candidates for admission, even before fit teachers for all the branches had been found.

The saving to the British government from the revenues of the Peishwa's territory, after all these arrangements were completed, became very inconsiderable ; but by lapses of lives of the pensioners, effectual protection to the country, fortunate seasons, and progressive improvement of agriculture, the revenue in three years increased upwards of 17 lakhs of rupees.

Thus was completed, under the direction of the Hon'ble Mountstuart Elphinstone, this important change in the government of the Mahratta country ; the liberality of the settlement authorised by the Marquis of Hastings far exceeded the expectations of the people, and more was in consequence done for the tranquillity of the Deccan in 18 months than had

ever followed a revolution in that disturbed country after a period of many years. The name of Elphinstone was deservedly associated with the acts of the British government ; and the memory of benefits conferred by him on the inhabitants of Maharashtra will probably survive future revolutions, and will do much in the meantime to preserve the existence of British India.*

* Authorities as in the preceding.

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The following Index is also frequently a Glossary. In regard to such words as may not be translated, the reader will always find their explanation in the text or note of the page in which the word is first mentioned.

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